OUR INTELLIGENCE IN VIETNAM, AND WHY IT DOESN'T WORK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300360134-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 134
• Publication Date: March 12, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

STATINTL
pproved For WWAW20Q1/O 04 !CIA-RDP80-fl160
I 511 ['1i15N 1 t11I3ttOSit There Caine Tet. It t,as an
infellgfence disaster of BcJt
so miserably', Consis`ently by PCarl harbor ar?(l itftC- lin:d tlhe process hereby our and would rise up against hire
/bad? Between ?: them, it CiA Arthur's assurance that the troops were going to sui?rosuid at the first small sign of nut-
and the intelligence branciu's ` Chinese would 110L. alter tea, and Capture great rhumliers' of side srlpport, such as a Iii nl
of the three armed seijTiees Korean war even it Ame;?ic n the enemy, in an operation at the Lay of figs.
have a budget that probably troops marched to the Yalu. comparable only to the Ccr-
o cecds the GN1 of North I,et vras one of the bw major, anan blitz';criez in Poland, The more important foctoc is
Vietnam. 't'hey have agents widespread ground e f~nsives }`lance, and Russia. ill the broad st eal:,t political.
CVcry wlwr e, extensive, an and sa- Na OCle, 1101 CS fit W Anherl-
in htiru