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November 17, 2016
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July 25, 2000
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March 2, 1972
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TAB LONDON NEW SCIENTIST .c\r\ c,? Approved For Release 200&dt/n11:3C9R-RDP80-01601R9090q0901:0-0 No break in the code war 0 3 The business of Intercepting and interpreting the radio transmissions of potential enemies grows steadily more sophisticated, more expensive John Marriott Last week, senior officers of all NATO nations up before transmission is decyphered at the Is the pen name or a met for a three day conference at the SHAPE headquarters. Using modern on-line cypher retired RN officer who headquarters near Brussels to discuss a machines, this work Is nowhere near as writes on defence subject which is commanding increasing laborious as it sounds. matters for British, attention?electronic warfare. In the words The traffic arriving at the headquarters is European and US of General Sir Walter Walker, who has just subjected to two processes: traffic analysis periodicals relinquished the command of NATO's and cryptanalysis. The former is a method Northern Area,. "In a limited aggression of gleaning intelligence from the scrutiny of situation, the skilled use of electronic war- traffic paSsed, without necessarily knowing fare by Soviet forces could be an overwhelm- its contents, and the latter is actual cypher ing factor in deciding the outcome of the breaking. The very volume of traffic alone -battle." Interception of enemy transmissions may indicate that something is happening, or is one of the key elements in electronic war- about to happen; but apart from this, move fare. ments of units can often be deduced simply' When the Second World War began, by the manner in which a signal is routed. Britain's own intercept organisation, which Suppose that a warship, whose call sign is had done excellent work during the First ABC, is heard regularly working a Black Sea World War, had dwindled . to practically shore station. Suddenly she is not heard for nothing. However, the principles were well two weeks; then she is ?nee again picked up, known and it was not long before Britain had by another listening post, calling a Vladivos- established listening posts all over the world. tok shore station and thereafter she is heard' Perhaps because the techniques had not been working this station regularly. Obviously she kept alive, Britain's cyphers were singularly has moved from the Mediterranean area to insecure and German intelligence Was able eastern Russia. The ship could of course to break them with little difficulty. At the change her call sign, but even then it is same time, British cryptographers were able sometimes possible to recognise a ship's to read many of the German secret messages actual transmitter. Transmitters, like type- -so honours were about even, writers, often have small characteristics un- By 1943, Britain had. built up an efficient noticeable to the human senses but instantly intercept organisation, known as the 'Y' detectable by electronic analysis. service. It consisted of a large number of Another useful method of recognising a intercept stations, a direction finding net ? 'particular unit, so long as the morse code is (directed primarily against the U boats) and still with us, is by "fingerprinting" its. opera- a headquarters situated in a stately home at tors?most of whom have certain peculiari- ? Bletchley Park, Buckinghamshire. The 'Y' ties, one perhaps making his dashes slightly service grew apace, and by the end of the too short, another hurrying over certain war no less than 25 000 persons were letters and so on. By recording messages and employed on this work. analysing them by means of an oscilloscope it ? The generic term for the business today is is possible to note these idiosyncracies. This Signal Intelligence (Sigint). This is divided useful give-away is, however, gradually being .. into two halves?Communication Intelligence lost as morse code is replaced by teletype (Comint) and Electronic Intelligence (Elint). and data transmissions generally. The basis of successful cryptanalysis is to have the maximum possible amount of traffic The unbreakable codes to work on. Comint organisations, therefore, A modern cypher, working on the one time endeavour to intercept as much enemy 'signal principle, is virtually unbreakable. The traffic as possible. This may mean establishing simplest form of "one timing" is to code-up listening stations close to an enemy border the message from a code book into num- (or in the air) to intercept frequencies which bered groups. These groups are then sub- travel over line of sight paths such as VHF, tracted from (or added to) a recyphering UHF and microwave, or in good receiving table of similar groups, but the groups so sites at strategic points around the world to used are never used more than once. This intercept high frequency communications, system has now been replaced by machines The listening stations themselves can vary which do the entire process automatically. In between huge receiving complexes, with fact, it is possible to type out the message perhaps 1'00 or more receivers together with en c/air and the machine will produce the their associated forest of aerials; a UHF encyphered version as fast as one can type, receiver in a jeep or on top of a haystack, the one time recyphering tables being fed and receivers in aircraft or satellites, into the machine on tape, which is then des- ? The intercepted traffic must, of course, be troyed to ensure that it is never used again. got back quickly to a central headquarters for A refinement is to put the process on-line, id'ate analysis __. Hence Comint organisa;olevRoothemmencyphered version produced on SethWIMINEIblifirthemiAkIRDIRRO ApProyed 4.4 Oeisedourlype transmitter as equipped with their own cyphers. The ?raw it is producen. Intercepted traffic which has been cyphered-- What is the situation today? Nobody out- YORK nrY,'S 1 7 AB 1971 Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 Rooplcymowt-,.k , - WASHINGTON, Aug. 10 ? Many United .States military planners, looking to the pos- sible results of change in Wash- ington's policy on China, be- lieve that a withdrawal of American forces and instal-la.; tions from Taiwan would not 'substantially weaken this coun- try's strategic position, in the Far East. Senior military men inter- viewed here said that while :they would rather not see a sudden reduction in forces on the Nationalist-held island, they foresaw no dire conse- quences if political . decisions called for withdrawal as urged. by Peking, Premier Chou En-lad of China, in meetings with visiting jour- nalists .and .scholars in recent weeks, has insisted that the American military presence Tnust be removed from Taiwan if Washington wards more nor- mal -relations with Peking. Nigh American officials have avoided public comment on the demand, But late last month, Secretary of Defense Melvin it. Laird, when asked about the military value of American forces on Taiwan, answered: "If we are going to perform adequately and carry forward oil...the Nixon doctrine of part- nership, strength and showing a willingness to negotiate, now LI [lot the time to take unilat- eral actions in withdrawing or in lessening the credibility of our deterrent." ' Advantages Outlined : G?tillo Fat,ei,-;.g?0 ,Loss.,3een, Ira a, 21: Taiworg 1.1j/ WILLIA14 EEC ' 5pcc13.1 t TM Nf,?: Yee,: :Conn' (Stores of tactical nuclear weapons for use against China in the event of a major war. Vietnam radionts Cited On the first factor, military planners say that as the United States continues to reduce its troops mid activity in South Vietnam, the need for repair and resupply facilities dimin- ishes. Of the fewer than 9,000 United States military person- nel stationed on Taiwan, about two-thirds are involved in the repair and supply effort. Tliirty- three C-130 transports, based at Ching Chuan Hang Air Base, fly regular resupply missions to South Vietnam and Thailand. The Taiwan Defense com- mand, which is manned by about 200 Americans from all services, works out contingency plans with Taipei under the 195/ iinztual security treaty. .Military sources ray that if it becomes necessary to reduce this command to a handful of men, they could be based in the United States Embassy, with the others transferred. to Pacific command headquarters in Hon- olulu. These men could shuttle baek and worth to Taipei as direct consultations were re- quired. The planners say that con- tingency plans do not include the use of American ground troops in any defense of Tai- wain, United States military in- volvement, should it become necessary, would be primarily those of ships and planes of the Seventh )dleet, . together with Air Force planes from the Philippines and Guam.. : The Military assistance and Advisory Group, which helps train Nationalist soldiers in us- ing American equipment, num- bers 300 to 400 men, This group, too, could be sharply reduced if necessary, officials say. The United States maintains a substantial eavesdropping and cryptographic effort cen- tered at Shulinko 13ase While sources are reluctant to discuss this intelligence activ- ity, some have suggested that the information it develops? on such matters as the move- ment of troops and air units within China--has not been all ,that valuable.' - Release 2000/08/16: n Nonetheless, military plan- ners are assessing the impli- cations of a force reduction on Taiwan if it should be or- dered. In their view, Taiwan currently- offers these principal advantages: clExcellent repair facilities for tanks and trucks used in Vietnam and a relative-1y close supply base for the Indochina war. ciA relatively small headquar- ters to develop joint contin- gency plans for the defense of Taiwan under the mutual defense treaty between the Nationalist Government and the United States. ? lExtensive communications- intelligence facilities to eaves- drop on military communica- tions on ina.miand China. . Approved FOr More useful, they say, las been information on the radar frequencies air defense facili- ties for use in the event of war. Pentagon sources said this .sort of. inforMat ion could be oh- tained just es easily from elec- tronic intelligence planes and ships Operating from interna- tional waters and air space. . Overflight Yialte.c1 Reconnaissance flights over mainland China were termi- nated in July to avoid any ,incident that could interfere .with President Nixon's planned ;visit to China. The most valu- able intelligence - information, however, comes front recon- naissance satellite missions, which are continuing. Experts say China has been very skillful in hiding military construction from reconnais- sance cameras. Railroad. spur lines to missile sites were clev- erly camouflaged, they say, that it was difficult to confirm China's first deployment of op- erational medium-range lois- tiles last summer. Tactical nuclear weapons, primarily nuclear bombs with about three times the force of those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are the most controversial aspect of the *American military presence on Taiwan. Three Y-4 fighter-bombers able to carry nuclear bombs are based at Taidan Air Base, on detached duty from the Philip- pines. Military planners say that in the unlikely event of a major war with . China, Washington would probably not want to use Minuteman or Titan missiles fired from the United States since they would have to pass -over-Soviet territory on the way Ito China. Weapons-to-Leave Oleinavin I. The bulk of nuclear weapons that might be employed, they say, are Polaris missiles on sub- marines in the Pacific, bombs stored aboard Seventh. Fleet- carriers and tactical nuclear weapons on Guam and in the Philippines, Taiwan anti South Korea. Additional weapons On Okinawa are to be. removed be- fore the island reverts to Japa- nese control. "Taiwan, in offect, is an un- sinkable aircraft carrier 100 CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400050001-5 miles from China," one general said. 'We'd like to keep some weapons there." But he and other military officials acknowledged that if the White House decided other- wise, greater reliance could be placed on 1:-52 bombers oper- ating .from Guam.. eN. NEW REPUBLIO Approved For Release 2000/0871611LCIAIRDP80-01601R0000001301:115f-- -0 c C sop , Code Cracking The specter has been raised of a massive breach in the nation's communications security as a consequence of the' publkation by newspapers of top-secret, offi- cial documents from the McNamara study of the Viet- ram war. Mr. Joseph Alsop, _for example, finds that ."the quantity of 'plain text' published in the Times is already so great that the government cryptographers now consider as compromised all the secret messages sent in the same period over the same types of coding machines," One can defer to Mr. Alsop's familiarity with confi- dential information, without accepting his' judgment on cryptography. Communications security in the US has progressed considerably since World War II. The old "code wheel" machines, popular at post World War II consulates and for low-level Navy ship messages, invited "cracking" in the traditional sense, because they used the same code base every day. Enough messages and skilled cryptographers could break the system. Today, all secret messages are sent by high-speed equipment, and the code is not break- able. The principle in use is that of the "one-time pad" ? used up and destroyed page by -page. Secret. texts are enciphered with a one-time, random selected code to produce the coded message. It is this that is transmitted. If you have the answer in hand, as Mr. Alsop poinfs out, you could find the original "one time" letters. But it is only good for that one message. Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400050001-5 Approved For Release 2000/08ti6r. ellkiRpP80-016011R0010400600101-5 c 3. 2. . ? 2 2 JUN 197 r? 3 c c cl.rf ? t t-c? p S ? Former Cryptograph er .Leaks ? ... ... ? ..? -BY ALFRED L. 3VIALANta; Ja. - ? 1. ? . ? A prime example of the long?winded:vari 1.- he govonment' s effortt o stop publication of the Vietnam war documents is based in ? large part ? on the fact that the material is classified information. Accordingly, the argu- ment runs, its publication is highly detrimen- T.tal to T.J.S. interests. Indeed, there has even been: criticism that the published material could enable an enemy to break U.S. codes, ? Maybe so. ? But pardon a former cryptographer if he experiences a twinge of skepticism about the government arguments. During the early and mid-1950s/this writer served its a so-called top secret control officer attached to the staff of the top U.S. naval command for the eastern Atlantic,? the Mediterranean and Europe. The job chiefly involved enciphering, deciphering and carefully disseminating classified mes- sages to and from the command. It was an exciting time?because the com- mand happened to be located in London, which in those clays was a wonderfully fasci- nating and absurdly inexpensive place for a young American naval officer, with his sought-after 'U.S. dollars, to live. The job it- self, however, top secret messages and all, was strictly dullsville. The reason simply was that with one or two rare exceptions, the clas- sified messages flying back and forth between Washington and London and London and other places were trivial, long-winded and generally boring. For the most part, they would have pro- duced a big yawn on the face of any enemy managing to sneak a peak. A few illustrations from those London clays would hardly jeopardize national security in 1071 and might just shed some light .on the current charges against The New York Times and The Washington Post. Perhaps the most remarkable message, :for its insignificance, that springs to mind ac- tually involved The New York Tines. The. precise phraseology cannot :be recalled, but the content will never be forgotten: A notice ..from Washington to the London command in- ?,forming it that Mr. Hanson Baldwin, military ,affairs ed.itor of the Times, was planning a trip to London and elsewhere in the area,, and ..please be nice to him. ? ? 7.sIt ? . . . ? Another memorable classified correspon- dence occurred shortly before a change of ' :. command at the London'headquarters. There, was an exchange of coded messages between. ?:: the Incoming and outgoing admirals (each had four stars) to discuss whether or not they should retain each other's stewards. (These, . .. were sailors, black or Filipino, who per-.. ? ? formed domestic-type :work for admirals and % other high-ranking officers; the. jobs included i? . cleaning shoes, waiting on table, making beds. - and so on.) ? . : ------,:-.:,. - ----A0provedT-OrRe I e ety of classified message was a weekly report to Washington, encoded and often classified "secret,? 'yet usually composed wholly of ex- cerpts from local newspapers. Often, ?a cryp- tographer would have the task of putting Into ?code an editorial that had appeared three or four daysNearlie.r in the ManeheSter Guardian or London Times. Sometimes the weekly re- ports to be encoded would run half a dozen single-spaced typewritten pages. The fondness for classifying, messages that Involved Such things as the abilities of. a par- ticular admiral's steward or the travels of Hanson Balwin, it appears on reflection, was not only stupid, making unnecessary work for,: cryptographers among other things, but also somewhat dangerous. The danger can be illustrated by recount- ing events in the message center during the 1050 Suez Canal crisis. Because so many mes- sages were transmitted in code during the heat of the crisis, and therefore required ? extra time to handle,"many reports were not _being routed to the propenpeople in anything like a reasonable period. During the peak of the crisis, when the message flow was ex- tremely heavy, many Messages designated for "priority" handling were being &pi- phered two days after receipt. Some "rou- tine" and "deferred". reports were not han- died for more than a week after receipt. Even some urgent messages were not .clecoded for many hours. (The highest desig- ? nation?"flash"?was supposed to be reserved for enemy contact reports and never to be in code on the ground that the urgency woula allow no time for cryptographic handling. During the Suez crisis, however, "flash" was frequently used?in code and not involving enemy contact?as a means of trying to ram a report through the traffic jam at the London message center.) . In a year and a half of top-secret message work, handling dozens of classified reports. daily, this writer can recall only one message that seemed truly vital. It was a report from sources in Turkey during the early stages of the Suez crisis, when British and French ? forces were staging at Cyprus. It stated that "unidentified" jet bombers had overflown Turkish airspace, heading toward Cyprus. (A subsequent message reported that the planes had turned around and headed back to the northeast, a maneuver that personnel in the message center at the time felt may have averted World War HI.) - ? The criticism in recent clays that the publi- cation of the Vietnam papers may somehow endanger U.S. codes may have validity, but just where that validity lies- is 'difficult to fathom. Even a decade and a half ago, codes bc- a grAl 01R000400050001-5.: arrie-zu, came ,11,14solikaitghp ip.,y4(415 gn4y%-? ._sender-and -receiver-At-is-Impossible to ima:g: Me how the publication of the Vietnam papers T MT:IS:U.41 SCIKIC.2 M01.1ITOII cVs Approved For Releasjai/20tqfp/p1[16 : CIA-RDP8O-R1_601 Ropo40005000i -5 t ? ?c) " ?6 By George 'George W. Ashworth - Staff correspone.entof The Christian, Science Monitor Washington ? Disclosure of portions of the Pentagon's war record has raised several security is- sues 'that go far beyond the war, Because the issue is Vietnam, the very controversy of that war and the way it was started. has tended to overshadow so far the possible security implications of the dis- closures in the New York Times, But officials here see these .potential dif- ficulties: O Some of the material used was original- ly encoded, at least several items being sent in very classified and closely held forms. ?Disclosures of these messages in 'their un- coded form could serve to help .other inter- ested nations decipher other messages of the period that might so far have eluded translation.' Beyond that, the information made avail- able could serve to give a great deal of in- formation about U.S. procedures in cryp- tography. o The .intelligence material disclosed, while not particularly sensitive now in ? terms of national security, could serve over-. ? seas analysts interested in studying how U.S. intelligence operates, and give better insight into methods, procedures, weak- nesses, and strengths. O Some officials believe that the disclo- sures tend to weaken expectations by other countries that confidences exchanged with officials of the U.S. will remain respected. 0 The disclosures may tend to weaken still further respect by the press for security classifications imposed by the U.S. Govern- rnent. The present trend, the. New York Times series, is for media orga- nizations or individuals to be their own arbiters oVer whether something classified by the U.S. government should remain privileged. ? Although top-secret and secret material is supposed to be closely held and limited .only to those with requisite clearances and whatis called "need to know," materials of a classified nature have often in the past .been shared by government officials with ?representatives of the news media. Normally Speaking, this practice has largely been carried out at the highest gov- ernment levels in order to help the press understand various situations more fully. It is usually understood that this material should.not be publicly disseminated because of its nature. - Approved For Release I\LiIJt, y-oc)-- ? Howevein the" mu's? of. the Vietnam war there has been a general loosening of long- standing security practices. More and more,. persons who- disagree either with the war or with other persons in government have felt more free to release mAterial damaging ,to those with whom they disagree. This tendency has been compounded by an increasing government willingness, as many officials see it, to classify excessively. Some of the most mundane material is routinely classified. And it is not uncommon for classi- fications to be given merely to lend impor- tance. This is particularly true of study papers. ? ? CanRdian involvement. As a result, a cloud of classification hangs over a great deal of material of.interest to the public and perhaps Of no great advant- age to any national enemy. It is often said jestingly here that a great deal of classified material is secret only from the American .people. Thus the willingness- to classify widely, and the accompanying growth of disrespect for classification, have caused problems for the last administration s well as the current one.. ? Of particular concern now are American relations with foreign countries in the wake of the New York Times disclosures. Already the Canadians are having an in- ternal argument over the fact that a Cana, dian diplomat serving on the International Control Commission carried notes. from Washington to Hanoi in 1964. As one source here put it, "The stories have just about finished the Canadians as intermediaries, as well as weakening their faith in us." The question of governmental privacy has been raised before by other nations dealing with the United States. Just as there are allied nations that, the U.S. will not trust with really important secrets, other nations now are 'making- it very clear that they do not believe the U.S. can be trusted with pri- vate matters. This viewpoint has been par- ticUlarly evident lately in relations with the government of Thailand. ? If governments cannot trust each other, relations become both more difficult and more potentially dangerous.. ^ 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400050001-5 px Approved For Relepte J2R(kft/A8f16 : CIA-RDP80-01601ROOEF4011056001-5 ? ?ciSovZo-l's cran _ Q._ tcl 0 6- t5,01. ik3Q-011\1 5 0 0 - ITIW) {UPI)?Government officials seem more. dis- turbed about diplomatic end espionage conse- quences from publication by The New York Times of the secret Vietnam war history than by the facts revealed. Of particular concern to many officials is the possibility that extensive publication of ? diplomatic and military cable texts might al- low the Soviet Union to crack the code of other - U.S. communications transmitted during the early ligiOs. - "You may rest assured that no one is read- ing this series any more closely than the So- viet Embassy," one official said. ? Others said the series had Produced few sur- prises. "If The Times had not printed all those texts," one official said, "very little might have been done. Stories about the study ? by 0 themselves ? would p?obably not have caused, much reaction." ? . ? The Times, however, 'accoMpanied the three installments with numerous texts of ?high-level memos and cables. Many were messages be- tween Washington and Saigon or other U.S. diplmatoic and military outposts in nidochir,.9... In each case the sender, receiver and date of the message were given just before the text. No one knows how many of these messages, transmitted in code, may have been intercept- ed by the Soviet Union; Security experts at the Pentagon and elsewhere operate on the as- sumption that any Of them might have, been intercepted. ? , They also assume that even the most sophis-. floated code may be broken by a cryptanalyst who obtains a "plaintext," or decoded version, of messages sent in that code. Once a code: pattern is deciphered, 'other coded messages sent during that period ? perhaps to entirely different areas and on entirely different sub- jects ? might be read. ? For these reasons, verbailm texts of diplo- matic and military messages are almost never ; released 'andthis is why The Times' printing of the texts generated concern. Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400050001-5