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November 25, 1972
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Approved For Release 2oM64)b 9'9 t -RDP80-01601E 000400160001-3 2 J iO J 7372 Stud coy : ah. '.~ INVISIBLE EMPIRES, Multina- tional Companies and the Mod- ern World, by Louis Turner. Harcourt Brace Janovich, New York, 1971.228 pp. By VICTOR PERLO This book. written by a young Englishman. can be used as ref- erence for sonic facts and partial histories about multinational corporations. There is even one more or less valid. broad general- ization: --We shall argue in this book that the typical transaction in international commerce is no longer simply exporting or im- porting. Instead. it is increasing ly the creation of manufacturing facilities owned by multinational companies." Turner visited 'the offices of International Business Machines and was given some interesting facts which he retails to his read- ers: IB\l operates in 104 countries. through charging super monopoly prices after buying materials at prices below their value. There is no examination. for example. of IBM's pricing policy. which in essence is to sell its products at about five times the factory cost of production: There is no mention of how -paternal- istic." anti-union IBM engages in super exploitation of labor. Within the United States it signs con- tracts with service supply com- panics for laborers. cleaning per- sonnel. etc., who are largely Black or members of other mi- nority groups and get none of the benefits of IBM's "regular" em- ployees.Outside theUnitedStates, it manufactures components in the U.S. puppet state of Taiwan. using workers paid one twentieth the U.S. scale. Turner minimizes the impor- tance and scale of international operations before World War II. and, in particular, omits the long- standing operations of 'the inter- national oil trusts and cartels. Incredibly. Turner doesn't even mention the multinationa) banks. which play a role in the interna- tional operations . of monopoly capital quite comparable to their role within individual imperialist countries. Nor is there any. sys- tematic discussion - under any name - of the elaborate inter- twining of imperialist government and private monopoly. of the man- ifold means of assistance derived from the home government by the mulitnationals in their drive to expand. Turner notes the rapid growth of U.S.-owned multinational cor- porations in Europe since. WVorld War H. How did they get there? He attributes this to U.S. advan- tages in research. development and management. But he com- pletely evades the main point: The U.S. emerged ? unscathed and enriched from World War II, with an overwhelming advantage over its imperialist rivals in financial and material resources. Achieving military occupation and relatively permanent military bases in Western Europe, it im- posed anti-Communist govern- ments there'. In effect, it made with over 500 sales offices and pro- duction facilities. All this is cen- trally' coordinated through 307 communication centers. via some 10.000 teletype messages daily letters are obsolete. Some 2.500 executives have desk-top micro- film readers to get instantaneous- ly any piece of information they need. It employs 24.000 research and development personnel in 26 laboratories, seven of them in ,Europe.One might add-it wasn't -true vet when Turner wrote - that IBM now makes more profits from its foreign operations than from its U.S. operations. and more. from its foreign operations than any other U.S. corporation. Turner points out that IBM, de- spite its "multinational" charac- ter, is solidly U.S. in ownership, control, and management. Only 1.6 percent of the executives are non-U.S. citizens, which means that in all the far-flung establish- ments of IBM, the local workers have U.S. bosses. But there is nothing in this book about the driving force behind IBM and the other multinationals. There is no realization that this. is the modern expression of the need of monopoly capital to ex- pand anywhere and everywhere. and especial ert su r e profits Cram o eli~ eo r eleas 9 IPA r"- ~t4trt1601 R000400160001-3 through payment of lower wages the socialist revolutions that were than in the home country and inevitable at that time in .a num- ber of these countries if the in- ternal forces were permitted to settle the issue without outside interference. This resulted in an J open door for U.S. capital and for U.S. military power to ensure the retention of privileges of U.S.- owned corporations, among other purposes. Without this. all of the alleged "managerial superiority." of the U.S. corporate brass would have counted for nought. Turner does tell of the espion- age operations of firms such as Imperial Chemical. Monsanto. du Pont: the relations of some U.S. monopolies to the Central Intel- ligence Agency, and connections with military intelligence and armed interventions. As an ex- ample. he cites the role of the United Fruit Co.. the Dulles brothers and the CIA in the 1954 overthrow of the progressive Ar- benz regime-in Guatemala. But all this is in the past. says Turner. Twenty }ears ago. at the time of U.S. interventions in Iran and Guatemala. the apologetic professors were referring to the supposedly extinct imperialism of Teddy Roosevelt and Calvin Cool- idge. Now Turner simply updates the same, transparent technique softened with sham naivete: "This area is grossly under- studied. The classic firms with in- telligence links, like United Fruit. are relics of the "bad old days of open 'dollar imperialsm.' We need to know more about how the man- ufacturing newcomers to the world scene.are conducting then- selves." Come now, Mr. Turner. What about ITT and Chile? What about the warfare of the Seven Sisters of international oil against Iraq? What about Union Carbide and Rhodesia? What 'about the U.S. sugar trust and the Marines in Santo Domingo?And above all, what about that most fierce and on-going genocidal warfare of U.S. imperialism, on behalf of Standard Oil, Chase Manhattan and the Bank of America, Ford Motors and McDonnell Douglas - coT1' Approved For Release 2001 8t'P80-01601 R0004 PAIL 1972 What Can Be Done At Foggy Bottom (2) OP RATION TOPSY by John W. Tuthill Everybody seems to talk-or write-about the bureaucracy, but, like the weather, nobody does anything about it. A faceless and pervasive force, it overwhelms people, and few ever confront it. One man who did was John W. Tuthill, a career Foreign Service Officer who came to the simple conclusion that in Brazil, where he was appointed Ambassador in 1966, there were too many official Americans. His remarkable attack on the "system," or systems, had far-reaching con- sequences for it helped set in motion successive rounds of personnel cuts throughout the world- by both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations- which have actually resulted in an over-all reduc- tion in U.S. officials overseas. Here, for the first time, Ambassador Tuthill tells his own story. He called his project "Operation Topsy," because, as he puts it, "it sought to deal with an organization that had not been constructed on the basis of a comprehensive decision of the U.S. government, but had `jest growed.' "-The Editors. Operation Topsy resulted in considerable budgetary and balance-of-payments advantage for the U.S. government. These benefits, however, were not the basic reason for its being. Operation Topsy came about because of a political judgment. U.S. government personnel in Brazil had increased 'steadily since the spring of 1964, when the corrupt and ineffective Goulart regime was overthrown and General Castelo Branco was proclaimed President of Brazil. By mid-1966, there were 920 U.S. citizens, plus about a thousand Brazilian employees in the American' mission. This number did not Corps volunteers. While Operation Topsy was to involve all major U.S. government agency operations in Brazil including the pro- fessional staff of the Peace Corps, it did not include the volunteers. This was the only im- portant exception to the cut in personnel, and it was based upon my conviction that a huge country like Brazil could easily absorb several hundred Peace Corps volunteers, who were engaged in useful work, often in remote parts of Brazil. Castelo Branco, who was Put in office by the military, nevertheless was an extraordi- nary head of government. Intelligent, trained to public service and of unquestioned integrity, his interest was to bring his country out of the disorder, the lack of growth, and the corrup- tion that had existed during the immediately preceding years of the Quadros and Goulart regimes. After years of corruption, drift and infla- tion (at rates up to and above 100 percent a year) the American government welcomed with enthusiasm-some thought. with exces- sive enthusiasm-the Castelo Branco govern- ment. The result was a staggering expansion of the role and personnel of the American government between 1964 and 1966. The U.S. government assured Castelo Branco of a very considerable increase in economic aid along the lines of the Alliance for Progress. Previously, U.S. aid had pretty much been limited to local "islands" within Brazil, in an effort to be of help to the Bra- zilian people, but at the same time, to avoid giving support to a corrupt and inefficient gov- ernment. In addition-and this of course was more controversial-the U.S. government agreed to increase its military aid and im- plicitly to increase the number of military advisers in Brazil. Like most governments, the U.S. govern- ment is hard to move. However, once the governmental mass begins to move, it is ex- tremely difficult to change its direction. It is also almost impossible to prevent bureaucratic Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400160001-3 `continued Approved For Release 20 IeFlAgRDP80-01.601 P,dR#'80r1a i4, more authoritar R ,. tan, and less concerned about main- Richard Barnet LETT taining a constitutional facade) CvTAT .felo Branco assumed extensive dicta- {itorial powers. In 1968 a leftist. move- ment began to grow in the universi 'ties, and there was a blight of bank robberies and urban terrorism that culminated in the kidna aping of the "Fairly cruel but sensible policies American ambassador. The govern A few months ago, I would hear major .competing forces in Brazilian nlent of Costa e Silva, in poser since every week of sonic personal friend or life by listening . to what people say 1966; responded with the suspension of habeas corpus and the blatant use acquaintance who had just been tor- about torture. ~overinment attitude of torture. Lured. Many of my former students The -official g d with a prominent ban}:cr have been.subjected to electric shock, concedes that some "excesses" may I talked plantation wit owner was en beaten and had their. bones broken by have occurred but insists that torture liusia c about the tough wasuen- the police, and they killed m best is. not a policy. Indeed, Jarbas Pas- -the antic had et employed to curb friend in an interrogation session. But sarinho, the Minister of Education, ?~ 1 ye now you hear less about torture. well over a year ago publicly 'de- inflation, defeat terrorism. and pro- There are not many people left worth nouncecl torture, and at least one mole growth. I~ or him there was no torturing. -An intellectual critic brigadier general was transferred in doubt that anyone who had suffered, mild disgrace' because lie had author- any unpleasantness at the hands of the' s nce deserved it. None his friends tP Of course the economic miracle ized the use of electric shock treat police. deserercd the ne of his fin .will continue. T'his is a next. country meat on political prisoners: At the p ha a~reccl that the novetest fro had with' tremendous opportunities and same time the generals ]pith whonn I :, z we have f6itrid the way to develop. talked stook obvious pride in the keen able to keep inflation down only -A retired admiral "stability" that had been achieved by by breaking the power of the unions their "strong measures." "In 1961?," and controlling wages. (There has one admiral said, "-our couittry.was on been no legal strike in Brazil since ? illegal strikes were HE T3ItAZ1LIANV REFOT:UTION, Which the brink of collapse: terrorism 1961. , ruthless! 'T'he f reew w ill ga "Ekes wens recently celebrated its eighth bank robberies, Communists ?in the y 1 'birthday, 'is a unique political pile- zovernffic lt, and a 9.1 per cent rate of don't understand that we need a stronmnovernnncnt here. The people nonSe non1. Although Brazil is now run inflation. '1 he Revolution brought the ot readfor ow' };ind of denloc largely by the Army with the aid of discipline and order essential for. aIrree;dn At liii), fogyouion that perhaps the police, it is neither a COI1uCntional economic progress. the inent was now secure .police state nor a traditional Latin There arc signs that the rulers of thou goveovtrnreturn to a s ten] of direct American military govcrnnunt. Nor, Brazil are divided about the most g } for most of the people who live there, effective techniques of social control.- elections, he became agitated. "There be elections is it an "economi:c miracle." Between Some favor putting more emphasis on 11 won't lectidoons f fo'rfh~ aloCnog time and the torture rate and the growth rate the rack, others on the TV tube. One win." shouldn't l be. fficial only- an o there is a profound and subtle con indication of this tension is the his- woAlld overn wme ]ant and an official o neetion. The generals who !told Brazil tory of the Revolution itself. The first government erim min part)' and tho C - peneration of generals, who seized posit } in a more effective grip than exists in generation gist ptar[ illegal, his fears seemed any government elsewhere in Latin power in 1961?, were, within' the spec- } America worship economic develop- from of Brazilian military politics, irrational, but the emotion in his voice meat. They are prepared to achieve it -liberals. The first president, General .1cf taro doubt that they were real. through a judicious mixture of official Castelo 'Branco; though prepared to For intellectuals, would-be political terrorism, modern techniques of take stronaction against any polit- activists, and students, the police 'tor- Z3 and social control, and ical activity identified as "subver- ture has succeeded in imposing a code what former Minister of Economic sion," looked fjorward to-the relaxa- of behavior. After almost four years of systematic sadism, the litres are Planning Roberto Campos calls "but- lion of military rule. of elem.. systematic one in Brerli are cancer capitalism." The state elections of 1965 de- 'low ,a r No oneil do t is In every conversation I had in stroyed those hopes. The opposition social in is s a a 1. rsu sine inaz icial tc strums iof ntro Brazil, whether. with generals, high candidates die} too well; under pros- socsocceedon brilliantly for two reasons. government officials, corporation su1e from the right using generals First, the government has made it presidents, professors, or students, it Richard Barnet, codirector- of the destitute clear that it will resort to any met}nods, !was evident. that police torture was for Policy Studies in Washington, has written no matter how barbarous, to discour- { much on their minds. One can gatn ? sereral books on foreign and military policy, agc a?sociatiotts it considers daIlget'- an instant and, I suspect, reasonably the rnoSt recent of which is The Roots of War ous. It has used such spectacular accurate impression "of some pf the (Atheneum). methods as loosing a live alligator on a young woman who would not talk.- Approved The deterrent effect is obvious. People For Release 2006/01/03 :CIA-RDP80-01601R0QO4QQOc6Q00de8ftde in their closest friends for fear that they Will reveal ~~AASSxg T Approved For Release 2UUN~~ 3 I, C - P80-016018000 26 A U G 1972 By RAGNAR LANGE A Brazilian joke goes, "Cabral dis- covered Brazil in 1500 - Tad Szulc discovered the Northeast in 1960." In= deed; Szulc's front-page articles in the New York Times catapulted the area out of. 200 year. of obscurity into inter- national renown. Szulc wrote of the shocking deprivation 'and inequities of the Northeast and described the rise of Francisco Juliao`s Peasant Leagues. And he concluded with the warning that "the makings of a revolutionary situa- tion are increasingly. apparent." Szulc's article found many avid readers, among, them John F. Kennedy, who was just winding up his campaign for the presidency. After his inaugura- tion, Kennedy dispatched Arthur H. Schlesinger Jr. to make a first-hand investigation of the situation in the Northeast. Schlesinger returned con- vinced that something must be done to prevent the area from falling prey to a Communist revolution. According to the domino theory, if Northeast Brazil went Communist, Brazil would go; and if Brazil went, Latin America would, go; and if Latin America went ... obvious- ly, emergency action was indicated. THE "EXPLOSIVE" situation there made the Northeast an obligatory stop-off on everybody's trip through South America. Within' two years the list of visitors included George Mc- Govern, Sargent Shriver, Edward Ken- nedy, Henry Kissinger, Ralph Nader and Yuri Gagarin. Unfortunately, none of them was able to offer a solution to the Northeast's problems. Meanwhile, Francisco Juliao, Per- nambucan lawyer turned peasant orga- nizer, basked in the fame Szulc's arti- cles had brought him. Enthusiastic throngs of farm laborers gathered to cheer him wherever he spoke and to give him assurances of their readiness for action. However, as it turned out, action was not Juliao's strong point. For one thing, he lacked a program; for another, he was ideologically inconsist- ent, one day espousing violent methods and the next day eschewing them. The only point he madc.absolutely clear was that if there were any violence, he didn't want to be involved. Nevertheless, despite his ambiva- lence, there could be no doubt that Ju- liao was amassing. considerable. poten- tial political power - potential because under Brazilian law illiterates could not vote, and in Northeast Brazil almost all peasants are illiterate. However, at this time there was a movement underway to enfranchise them and the various leftist parties set about courting Juliao in the hope of guaranteeing themselves the peasant vote, if it materialized. Both the Brazilian Communist par- ty and President Joao Goulart's Brazili- an Labor party made overtures, but Juliao was carried away by dreams of a grandiose scheme for a nationwide peasant-worker alliance of which he himself would be "maximum leader." This plan put him on a collision course with Goulart, who had visions of filling the void left in Brazilian politics by the suicide of his mentor, Getulio Vargas, by assuming the Vargas role himself. Goulart made Juliao a concrete offer, the exact terms of which never have been disclosed, and, when Juliao reject- ..ed it, Goulart turned on him with all the fury of an avenging angel. the workers nor the peasants but wholly Juliao did not fare much better with with his own personal ambitions. the Communists. Ile became entangled None of the Northeastern peasant in,the web of the Sino-Soviet dispute, organizations offered the slightest re- and because he felt that the Brazilian sistance to the military takeover. Fol- situation more closely approximated the lowing the coup, Juliao was seized and Chinese c x p e r i e n c e of revolution spreading from the countryside' to the cities, he earned the undying enmity of the Moscow-controlled party leadership. His ideas were derided by the party's Central Committee as a manifestation of "leftist extremism - the infantile disease of communism." By now, Juliao was facing yet an- 10- years ago. Or 100 years ago, for that other challenge. Among the stream of matter. "The peasants," Page writes, visitors to the Northeast had -been a "were imbued with a sense of fatalism respectable number of CIA operatives. toward the travails of their earthly Having analyzed the situation as one in . life." Their feeling of hopelessness is which the deep-seated influence of the abviously well justified. Catholic Church could be used to turn the tide in favor of democracy, freedom and the status quo, the CIA proceeded to lend 'unlimited assistance - finan- cial, organizational and otherwise - to Church-sponsored unions. According to Joseph Page, the padres were so naive that they did not realize they were re- ceiving CIA support. Be that as it may, the CIA funding soon enabled the . Church-affiliated unions to make deep .inroads into Juliao's Leagues. Alarmed by the growing power of the Catholic unions, Goulart moved to close them down through federal "intervention." At the same time, a group, of young Trotskyists and a Maoist splinter group entered the competition to unionize Northeastern farmworkers. By the end of 1963, the situation in Pernambuco wad one of utter chaos. AGAINST THIS backdrop USAID and SUDENE, the Brazilian regional development. agency, were trying to bring about some kind of economic inir- acle that would significantly alleviate the .plight of the Northeastern peasants. Given the circumstances, it seems hard- ly surprising that their plans failed to produce any substantive results. Nor does it really seem surprising that the Brazilian Army finally tired of Goulart's ineptitude and decided to re- move him from office. Ile had long since degenerated into a political demo- gogue of the worst variety, and Page's thrown into a dungeon where he was kept in solitary confinement for two months. He was freed on a writ of habeas corpus in September, 1965, and now lives in Mexico. The lot of the Northeastern farm laborer today probably remains sub- Approved For Release 2006/01/03 CIA-RDP80-01601 R00040016.0001-3 THE, NATIOli Approved For Release 20041Q1/04L. 7z3RDP80-01601R000400160 1.L 7-, Z li J'LU 2 J V A 2, . I i;wAD OMD 19, T`3I15 Mr. Burns, professor of Latin American history at UCLA, has traveled extensively in Brazil during the last twelve years. Ile has written five books on that country, of winch the most recent are Nationalism in Brazil (Praeger) and A History of Brazil (Columbia University Press). Ond hundred fifty years ago, Brazil broke its political ties with Portugal. While serving as regent of Brazil, Prince Pedro, the young Braganza heir to the Portuguese throne, unilaterally declared Brazil's independence. With most of the Western Hemisphere independent of Europe by 1822, Pedro had little choice. Ile could declare Brazil's independ- ence and'become its emperor, or he could stand by while the restive Brazilian elite declared their own independence and established a new government without the guiding hand of the I3raganzas. The former course was obviously his' preference, and.the I3raganzas ruled until the republic was established in 1889. Although nominally independent, Brazil changed little throughout most of the 19th century. True, a small Brazilian elite exercised political power in place of the Portuguese, but institutions, customs and so- cial patterns remained much as they had been in the colonial past. Great Britain dominated the economic life of the new nation at least as much as Portugal had during' the colonial period. Fifty years ago, a group of writers, poets and artists, weary of Brazil's slavish imitation of European culture, gathered at the Municipal Theatre in Sao Paulo to pro- claim their country's intellectual independence. During the "Modern Art Week" of 1922, they pleaded with their com- patriots to forget the marble temples and Gothic churches of Europe and contemplate the lush vegetation and nat- ural wealth of Brazil. They turned the eyes of the nation inward,.an introspection which produced a series of fasci- nating studies of the Brazilian character and soul. A new type of writer-of whom Gilberto Freyre and Jorge Ama- do are best known in the United States-created a .style, language and-subject matter that were uniquely Brazilian. Having achieved their new intellectual; insight, the Bra- zilians became increasingly aware of their economic de- pendency. If Great, Britain had dominated the economy in the 19th century, the United States did so.after World War I. The great . financial debacle in Western Europe and the United States in. 1929 adversely affected brazil and prompted the new government of Getulio Vargas, the man who, alive or dead, shaped Brazil in the 1930-64 period, to take measures to reduce Brazil's economic dependency. Ile increased governmental planning and par- ticipation in the economy. A steel'company was founded in the 1940s; a national oil monopoly, Petrobras, was authorized in 1953; a company to encourage and control the production of electrical energy, Eletrobras, came into being in 1962, the same year in which the government promulgated a law to limit profit remissions abroad. Those measures, taken to increase Brazil's polit- ical, intellectual and economic independence, v,'ere dra- matically reversed after April 1, 1961. On that day the miliiary swept into. power, deposing the constitutionally selected President, Joao Goulart, and ending nineteen years of successful experimentation with democracy. Vocal and powerful elements of the upper and middle classes, fearing the Populist tendencies of the Goulart government, had called upon the military to put an end to further reform. The officers had intervened in politics before but customarily withdrew after a short tir,te, leav- ing the government in civilian hands. Not so in 1965. The officers resolved to exercise power themselves and they have done so with increasing harshness ever since. One of the most surprising results of these eight years of military rule has been the surrender of much of Brazil's independence of action and choice, so painfully won dur- ing the preceding decades. The originality characteristic of Brazilian political and intellectual life during the 1950s and early 1960s has disappeared, smothered by an official disapproval of trends prevalent in that period and de- nounced by an insecure middle class that is eager to imitate as superior whatever originates abroad. With Brazil now exercising, less independence of action than at any time in memory, it is ironic that in 1972 the nation lavishly commemorates 150 years of political in- dependence. The irony has not gone unnoticed. What happened to a slogan posted on a wall in downtown Rio de Janeiro indicates that at least some Brazilians are aware of the absurdity of the commemorations: a vertical line drawn in the appropriate place in "Viva Independ- encia" (Long live independence) transformed the mean- ing to "Viva In/dependencia" (Live in dependency). Nearly every aspect of Brazilian life feels the weight of the new dependency. In no 'realm is it more obvious or heavier than in foreign policy. Hardly had the military Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400160001-3 Cdr t5.niaoci? cc> MOSCOW., ZA RUBEZHOM Approved For ReleaS,! RQg6I73 : CIA-RDP80-01601 ROQ - no CO06lll.eH'NK) 4K0ppecnOH, eHTa? mm 93 Ba- wHHrTOHa, ienOCne nony4acosor.o Apy)KeCTBCHHOro onpOCa)) ceHarc a KOMHCCHR no AenaM aoopy)KeH- Hbrx c,n yreepANna Ha3HageHNe reHepan-MaAcipa BepHOHa YOn?Tepca Ha nOCT 3aMeCTNTen51 AHpeKTO- pa ueHTpanbHoro pa30CA61BaTenbHoro y.npaBneHHR CWA. Ci)aKTV.4eCKN OH 6yACT, OCyw,CCTBnRTb HCnO- CpCAC,TBCHHOe py,KOSOACTSO ynpasneHHeM, nOCKOnb- tcy AMPCKTo-py L>,PY P. XOnMCy, KaK o6b)tone"o, no- py4eHO IHa6woACHNe 3a BceMH onepaU1l?RMN aMe- p14K8HCK14X opraHOB pa30eAKH, BKntogaJ cneLtcny)K- 6b1 fleN7arOHa. YonTepcy 55 neT. 31 roA off inposen a BOCHHOA pa3seAKe,H3 HHx 24 roAa 3a rpaHHLw . B aMepN- K8HCKOA npecce Yonrepca npwHRTO HMCHOBaTb 4mmHrDKCT0M)) (NnK 1 I I11 40p1 600n1-3 gone, but if you cancentrate with all your strength on o t. me had Been suffering Trom ulcers.' r nr iy thing 'you'll talk about." .a tiirourh at the hands of the police one thins. the : Contfudd 0 GUARDIAN Approved For Release VP31-RDP80-01601 R000 Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP80-01601RO THE STOCKTON RECORD .4 may 1970 rUOP.PrOfeSSOrFrOm Brazil l+ lSays CIA '? Debases Peace Corps By MARJORIE FLAHERTY are involved in the shaping of Of the Record Staff "the right way of behaving". The U.S, Central Intelligence through programs in which? Agency has debased the once "every course out I I n e is /beautiful Peace Corps, Dr. Flor- checked for content." Peoplel V -' tt,rh Villa_Alvarez a Coven r,.{_ Fare b e i n g labeled subversive , lege p r o f e s s o r from Brazil, ~vua ; is one of "cultural terrorism aaaress at the university of the tures," Villa-Alvarez claimed. P ifi ac c. '85 FIRED' "CIA agents play the role of ?: , P o I n t I n,g out that "85 out anti-Americans in the P e a c e standing scholars were f I r e d ' Corps to find out what others last year in Sao Paulo alone," I FF think," Villa-Alvarez declared. Villa-Alvarez said, "before theyl The educator, who once removed me I left the' trained Peace Corpsmen, indig 'colony."' nantly reported that "some of_ Reflecting his frustration, the t my former students at New ? professor, who has taught in the E; ,York University are: being 'used ? U.S., Brazil and other countries, by CIA to try to penetrate Bra- said he officially "denounced" f 7ilian student ' grnnne A. - gracing worx.'- opportunity, and has even been 'WORST KIND' ; praised .for his efforts, but his Villa-Alvarez, who has worked. reports have been shunted aside on socio-economic projects in. without action. Latin America for the United' Warning that present tactics Nations as well. as for his own.? in South America "will ?raise~ country, sees U.S. influgnce' as.- radicalism against the United 1 "cultural colonialism-the worst, States,' Villa-Alvarez "support-h kind.' - ..ed every word" of Dr. Richard ` Thoroughly disenchanted' with,'' Shaull, Princeton professor whol American and Brazilian ap- declared at UOP Monday nightql h proac es. to progress, Villa that Latin America is ripe ford ?Alvaro7 asserted businneemen ...t..,: t._.... .L___ use are in both countries think only of viable political alternatives .for'4 their own Interests and have those who want reform, "manipulated technical assist-?. Shaull also said the future of t d .ante o is s e r v e both coun Latin America will be deter- " tries. ' mined by what basic changes { Since the rise of the military' occur in the United States. p a r a d I s e for foreign invest ' associate professor of commu=` ments," Villa-Alvarez declared.:' nity development,' sociology and', . The regime invited "an inva cultural anthropology at Covell Sion, a take-over of Brazilian'in-.. since September, noted that ml- dustries," he said, and the sub- norities in the U.S.- are "claim- Sequent "denationalization I s' ing through violence ;what' tragic and frightening." should have been given to them -- The government sought for- by right" but said he-does not-I eign money by offering special .yet have a "complete grasp" of;~ ' rivileges . to foreign ' bu i ee2_?' `. h t._.-t - ._ ___ ~.___ . p s n t e ene ble > men, he added. d i s c it s s the social, revolution. $a said U.6. experts in Brazil ? tare i,? Approved' For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400160001-3