Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 17, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 25, 2000
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 30, 1972
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP80-01601R000400200001-8.pdf9.59 MB
STATINTL -12 Approved For Release 2000/08/16: CIA-RDP80-01601 R00_ DES MOINES, IOWA REGISTER 0 .L 3 O 1370 M -- 250,261 s - 515,710 New Man for CIA Only a few insiders have much basis for judging the I,.ork of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and they rarely talk. But there are a few hints along the way about the meaning of President Nixon's decision to name James R. Schlesinger Ct di- rector and make the present director, Richard Helms. ambassador to Iran. President Nixon has not been satisfied with the performance of the U.S. "in- telligence Community." In late 1969 lie cut CIA personnel abroad by to to 1S per cent. Ile ordered a study of the CIA and intelligence generally by James Schlesinger, then a military and inter- national specialist in the While House Office of Management and Budget. and by K. W. Smith, a National Security Council aide. Their report came out in May, 1971. It. recommended pulling intelligence to- gether either by giving CIA Director Helms more authority over the five oth- er U.S. agencies beside the CIA that gather intelligence, or by setting up a new cabinet-level Department of In- Atomic Energy Conunission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Now the President pulls Helms out and puts in one of the authors of the report - Schlesinger. One complaint that the President is said to have against the CIA under helms is that the CIA often has been realistic about Vietnam. For example, the CIA didn't think bombing North Vietnam `would be effective, or that it was effective after it started. Ousting Helms for being right is wrong. On the other hand. Senator J. William Fulbright's Foreign Relations Com- mittee has been hassling the CIA for its private wars in Laos and Cambodia, which either violate U.S. law or come close to it. Ousting Helms for making war against the will of Congress Would be proper - but it is clear Helms w As only carrying, out Nixon's policy there. James Schlesinger is an economist who spent 12 yeau?s in the RAND Corpo- ration, an Air Force think tank, then three years as a Nixon appointee in the ,Bureau of the Budget and the White telligencc. In November, 1971. the White House et, then a year as Nixon's choice as ordered a reorganisation of intelligence chairman of the Atomic Energy Com- activities to give llelms more leadership mission, His record in government is over the rival intelligence agencies in good, but lie is a weapons man and a the State and Defense Departments, the hardliner. Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/16. I .I?80A .601, 00R 0~ 01- 1n7') C DEC By Richard E. Ward. Last of a series How will a potential Vietnam ceasefire affect Cambodia? Contrary to statements by the U.S.-sponsored Phnom Penh administration about peace talks with the "Khmer Rouge," the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia, headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, has denied that there have been any discussions between the resistance .forces,and the puppet regime. Although the government of National Union has given its full support to the nine-point peace agreement for Vietnam, after it was announced by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Cambodian resistance is determined to fight until the ' U.S.-sponsored Lon Nol regime is over- thrown. Recent Western press reports imply that this may well be within, the capacity of the resistance forces within the foreseeable future. The position of the National Union govern- ment in no way conflicts with the position of its Indochinese allies, which would be able to furnish greater assistance to the Cambodian resistance if there were a cease-fire in Vietnam and the U.S. persisted in prolonging the war in Cambodia. In the short run, the U.S. could bolster the Phnom Penh regime for a time, but the days of its Cambodian clients appear to be numbered, despite the approximately $350 million in military aid annually being sent to Phnom Penh, the clandestine presence of U.S. military advisors and continued heavy U.S. air attacks against the patriotic forces. Rapid growth Two-and-one-half years after the U.S.- promoted coup ousting Sihanouk in Phnom Penh, the resistance forces in Cambodia are growing more rapidly than ever, controlling 85 percent of the national territory, according to an Oct. 23 report by A.P. correspondent Holger Jensen who also wrote: "Khmer Rouge (the name used by the Western press for the Cambodian resistance forces) strength has jumped from little more than 5000 in March to about 40,000 combat-honed troops... . "U.S. officials . . . concede they 'drastically underestimated' the Khmer Rouge, which means Cambodian Reds. " 'They grew more, rapidly than anyone realized or reported; it's as simple as that,' said one high-ranking American here. 'They're not dependent on the North Vietnamese any more. The Khmer Rouge are actively engaged in combat against Cambodian government forces and they're making a maximum effort." This assessment was corroborated by the Far Eastern Economic Review's Phnom Penh correspondent Nayan Chandra, who wrote in the to open Highway 6 and lift the siege of Kompong Thom, the Cambodian army has not recovered its morale. 'Chenla 11, has been as decisive for Cambodia,' estimates one diplomat, 'as Stalingrad was to the Germans.' Not only was there heavy loss of men and material, but the credibility of Lon Nol as a strategist and leader suffered a grievous setback. Since then the army has launched a few half- hearted operations, with claims of initial victories followed by disastrous defeats. "Taking full advantage of the political demoralization and popular malaise (toward the Lon ' Nol regime), pro-Sihanouk forces have considerably strengthened their position. One knowledgeable observer says looting by South Vietnam (Saigon) and Cambodian troops, plus American bombing, has given the Khmer Rouge an audience that did not exist a year ago." While the American bombing continues to devastate the liberated zone, Saigon troops are no longer in a position to be sent in significant numbers to Cambodia, as the Nguyen Van Thieu regime needs every soldier available to him to meet the continuing offensive by the Liberation Armed Forces of the PRG. In reply to questions posed by a correspon- dent, Sihanouk explained on Oct. 29 that- the Cambodian resistance forces "sometimes have combined operations with our North Vietnamese;. and NLF friends along the Cambodian- Vietnamese common border, but our armed forces, alone, have responsibility for all military operations in the interior of Cambodia. We give the troops of our north Vietnamese and NLF friends the right to cross our national territory but these friendly Vietnamese troops do not possess any permanent base in the interior of the country. The question of their evacuation from Cambodia is not an issue and will never be an issue." In answer to another question during the same interview Sihanouk noted that "the only route between Peking and the liberated zone of Cambodia is- the Ho Chi Minh trail" on which travel would be much easier if there were cease- fires in Vietnam and Laos. Although the Cam- bodian leader was referring to the possibility of returning to his homeland, the military im- plications are quite clear and must be discon- certing to the Nixon administration which once called U.S.-supported operations in Cambodia the best example of the "Nixon doctrine" in- action. , The realities of the Nixon doctrine in Cam- bodia are quite different than Washington. originally envisaged when the CIA promoted the coup by Lon Nol and Sirak Matak, now bitter rivals, like most other "leaders" of Phnom Penh's pro-American camp. The regime now barely extends its authority outside of Phnom Penh and t ven subjected to military attacks within its Nov. lei ~6ye '06lerea CIA-RM, M~, ~}Q40020001-8 never b n gloomier. tree t o rout o ambitious 'Chenla II' operation earlier this year t/ continued Approved For Release 2000/08/16?:.CIA-RDP80-01601R000400200001-8 Virtually all traffic arteries from Phnom Penh have been cut on a more or less permanent basis. Route 5 going to the rice-rich Battambang -province have been held by liberation forces since August, which cut off the capital city from its main source of rice. Since September there have been periodic "riots" over rice shortages in which troops of the Lon Not army have par- ticipated. Apparently a large segment of U.S. aid goes into the pockets of corrupt officials and military officers. Interviewing some soldiers early in November, Times correspondent Schanberg noted that they were lucky to be receiving their pay, for "corruption has permeated the Cam- bodian army ever since the U.S. began pumping . military aid into the country. "Many commanders keel) dead men on their unit payrolls and put the dead men's pay into their own pockets. Other commanders even keep the pay of their own troops, which leaves the troops penri,iless and demoralized and results in their looting and pillaging the nearest village for food and other wants." Selling rope for their own noose On the point of the regime's total corruption, all Western observers in Phnom Penh agree. Lon Not's personal doctor who was appointed minister of commerce earlier this year had to quit after a scandal" involving sales of rice to the patriots. _ Although most of Lon Nol's military forces are demoralized and unreliable and there is not the. slightest prospect of broadening the base of the puppet regime, the U.S. has accelerated its arms shipments to Phnom Penh in recent weeks, which raises several questions, including the probable violation of congressional limitations on U.S. aid to Cambodia and the presence of U.S. advisors, also prohibited by congressional enactments. It is also conceivable that at least some of the military equipment, especially aircraft, is destined not for Lon. Nol's forces but for America and other clandestine U.S. operations which are burgeoning throughout Indochina. It is understandable that Sihanouk does not desire to negotiate with the traitors who serve the U.S. imperialists, as they represent nothing in tite country, so.the probability is continued conflict in Cambodia as long as the U.S. seeks to maintain its Phnom Penh retainers. The Vietnamese liberation forces have expressed full support for the refusal of the Royal Cambodian Government of National Union to negotiate with the puppet regime. Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 _ NA~z4ty (~( 1972, Approved For Release 2000/08/1-62 CI DP80-01g1jj & PYRRHIC PLOY Tf CIO V-3 TN rT rn T"% "'W", 'I" E. W. P ElF 'Ef Mr. Pfei/3er is professor of zoology at the University of Montana and a co-author of Harvest of Death: Chemical Warfare in Indochina (Free Press/Macmillan). Ile visited Cambodia in 1969.and 1971 and was in Hanoi in 1970, While on a visit to Hanoi in June 1970 my two compan- ions and I met with Premier Pham Van Dong. During the conversation, I asked the Premier to evaluate Nixon's in- vasion of Cambodia which had occurred one month ear- lier. His ,answer was straightforward: "It makes things very favorable for the success of our revolution." By "our revolution" I suppgsed him to mean the revolution of the Indochinese people against foreign invaders. How well does Premier Pham Van bong's 1970 evalu- ation accord with the situation of Cambodia in late 1972? Recent dispatches from Indochina suggest that he knew what lie was talking about. According to the A.P. (Sep- tember 1), only one-third of Cambodia is still under "Khmer Republic" control. It has been revealed that the tanks used in the fall offensive against the An Loc area, (only a short distance from Saigon) came from the Chup Rubber Plantation and nearby areas in Cambodia. These are the very areas that President Nixon characterized in April 1970 as "Communist sanctuaries" that must be cleaned out. Two factors have been principally responsible for the failure of Ni}.on's Cambodian policies. First, the Presi- dent was badly misinformed about past U.S.-Cambodian d b t the situation on the Vict- I received some months later from Sen.Frank' Church, the raid was carried out by Air America, a CIA airline, for what purposes we still do not know. After the raid, the Sihanouk regime asked that American officials visit the region, with a view to making reparations for the 'damage. Although the U.S. Government to this day offi- cially denies having carried out this operation, it did send a team of experts, including Charles Minarik of the Chem- ical Warfare Laboratories, U.S. Army, into the Mimot region shortly after the raids. This team's report describes how they were flown over the region, driven through it, and how they walked in it-just as Westing and I did some months later. It is inconceivable to me that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong, who according to Nixon controlled the area, would have permitted an official U.S. Government team to wander through what Nixon called "the headquarters for the entire Communist military op- erations in South Vietnam." After the invasion began it was widely reported that no key control center could be found. Some arms caches were reportedly uncovered and, of course, a great deal of rice. The rice did not greatly surprise me, since at the time we were there, the main occupation; in addition to tapping rubber, was liar- vesting rice. When speaking about the Cambodian "Communist sanctuaries," Mr. Nixon failed to mention that, on orders of Prince Sihanouk, troops of the Royal. Cambodian Anny had in fact swept these areas about three months before his invasion. The troops were led by Prince, Sirik Matak, a loyal American protege and one of those later involved in Sihanouk's overthrow. Sihanouk ordered Vietnamese relations an . a ou nainese-Cambodian border prior to the March 1970 Matak to search out and destroy all Cominunist-Viet- change in the Cambodian Government. For instance, in namese positions in Cambodia. Paul Bennctt of the Cam- his speech of April 30, 1970, announcing the U.S. -in- bodian desk of the State Department informed me in an i di A b " xon vasion of the Fishhook region of Cambodia, Ivir. N stated: "Tonight American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam. This key control center has been occupied by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong for five years in blatant violation of Can_bodia's neutrality." Mr. Nixon, standing in front of a map of Cambodia, put his finger on the little town of Mimot as he made this accusation. That puzzled me a great deal, for I had spent two days in and around Mimot about four months before the U.S.' attack, and knew it to be controlled by French and Cambodian rubber interests. Mahy Europeans were working there, and some of them (e.g., a Belgian plant pathologist) were in complete sympathy with the American effort in South Vietnam. These Europeans were living with their wives and chil- dren in an environment of complete tranquillity. We asked many of them whether they had seen any sign of North Vietnamese or Vietcong activity and they all answered no. My colleague A. H. Westing and I had visited the re- rmy opera- o an A Cam interview, March 22, 1971: tion began in January of 1970 in a northeastern province at approximately the time when Sihanouk left for France and when Prince Sirik Matak was Acting Prime Minister. They sent up a number of additional battalions, among the better troops in the Cambodian Army, and carried out a series of small sweeps generally in this area. They did have, as I recall, a number of contacts with small V.C. and North Vietnamese units. They found and de- stroyed a number of small supply dumps, a relatively small campsite, but there was no major contact with the main North Vietnamese forces." Where were the thou- sands of North Vietnamese troops that Nixon said had occupied the area for five years? Besides being mistaken about the nature of the so-called Communist sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia, Mr. Nixon grossly misrepresented the facts when he stated that "American policy since 1954 has been to scrupulously respect the neutrality of Cambodia. . . . North Vietnam, however, has not respected that neutral- gion to in lie ~aa d ne by clandestine defolia it ." The defoliation of vast sections of the rubber plan- tion raid c rr e vo t ~ g _y ' 1~e1C~} PA&~1560A9RN4Q0 01~y4's one blatant violation of 200,000 acres of eastern Cambodia. According to a letter STATINTL Approved For Release, 2000/08/16`: k-26 P9b4+d6ih00 Parallel to the case of the. two announced opposition cAndidatds in the Saigon's presidential "elections" last October Sirik Matak pulled out of the contest Aug. 3, :l: t'tl;at iiilI Is, by Wilfred Burcltett Guardian staff correspondent top. The electoral farce is a classic example of alien traitors fall' out." A fourth and most dangerous rival remains in the shadows for the three others to exhaust themselves while he prepares to eventually knife the winner. and. take over. This ambitious Son .N goclhanh. former puppet p.' set it by the Japanese during their World War.ll r I v _11 stating as his reason "the unconstitutional and anti- democratic nature of the decrees governing the elections adopted on July 15." Ile accused "the present gove.rnntcnt of using the administrative apparatus to put pressure Oil its employes to ensure that one-single party, sponsored by it, gains the, victory'." To complete the parallel with Thicu's one-man election,' In Tam announced three days later his party would also boycott the "elections" held under a system in which Lou Nol's party would need to obtain only one eighth of the - rotes needed by the opposition parties, to win, In completely farcical presidential "elections" last June, In Tani soundly'defeated Lon Nol in Phnom Penh, the only place where any control' of voting and the counting of votes could be effected. The July electoral decrees were to Paris 'Brace'vourself for another "free election" in an Asiaie country with special ties to the U.S.--Cambodia., When general now Pr-eniier, Lon Not overthrew Cant- bodot s neutralist goveI'll utent of prince Norodom' 'Sihanouk _ in a military coup d'etat March ? 18, 1970, Sihanouk quickly branded the usurper as a "puppet's. puppet.., Events quickly proved the term was exact. The Lon Nol- Sirik Matak regime was demonstrably a sub puppet of the Saigon puppet regime, propped up by Saigon mercenary troops and U.S. air power. A slavish imitator in all things,-Prentier'Lon Not is now resorting to a one-matt electoral farce-with Saigon- Washington blessing---similar. to that perpetrated by dictator Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon last October.. The ,object is to,keep himself in?power. On Sept. 3, there will be "elections" in that fast shrinking one fifth of the counts-y the lion Not regime still controls to a new "National Assembly." Since the U.S. prefers the facade of "democracy," three main parties are "competing." Even under a microscope it wotdd be impossible to distinguish any difference in their programs. Each is headed by. one of the main plotters of the' anti-Sihanouk coup.. . The "Social-Republican party of Lon Not is led by proxy by the dictator's younger brother, the fascist Col. Lon Non, who master-minded the attacks on the embassies of the'Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam which preceded the coup and the massacre of Cambodians and Vietnamese that followed. The "Republican" party 'is headed by chief co-plotter and former Premier, Sirik Matak. The "Democratic" party is headed by In Tam, who as vice president. of the National Assctt.bly-which was surrounded by Lon Nol's tanks at the time-moved the motion deposing Sihanouk is head of state. The only thing that distinguishes the parties is the deadly rivalry between the three leaders for power. at the 'guard against any such future "accidents. Thus assured of a sweeping victory, Lon Not and "free world democracy" will probably score another triumph this month: Sirik Matak and In Tam are just as ferocious enemies of democracy as Lon Nol. If they had his power they would 'do exactly'the same thing. They had both played a leading role in suppressing any shred of democracy following the coup. This did not prevent In Tam however, from usmhing- the name of the Democratic party which once had real influence among progressive intellectuals in Cambodia. No Democratic party In a statement July 16, prince Phourissara-one of the most distinguished Foreign Ministers in the pre-coup years who recently escaped to the Liberated Zone-vigorously denounced in Tarn's pretense of heading the Democratic -party. After exposing the traitorous and double-puppet role of Siril: Matak?and In Tam, Phourissara and two other well-known personalities, in the name of the Democratic tarty of which they had been leading members?'stated: "(1) The Democratic party has ceased to exist for several years following the unanimous decision of its members. At the present time there is no Democratic party. ? "(2) The overwhelming majority of its members of good reputation and faithful to the democratic ideals of the. party categorically repudiated the traitors Lon Not, Slrik Ma.tak and Son Ngoc Thant following the March 18 coup. At the present time a great number of members of the ,former Democratic party play their part in working within the ranks of the Cambodian National United Front (NUFK) which is a broad organization of national unity with a political program in conformity with the idea of the whole nation and the whole of the Cambodian people. "(3) The so-called ;Democratic party' of the In Tam, Doue Rasy clique and a few other intellectuals who haye .. p . tt.nuc oc?~pgi?t~7Srr~~l`~t~0~~d/JII` 0 01601R000400200001-8 puppet Premier. Ile is Washington,s 1` rs Penh." conGinuec. 6SEP1972 2 2 JUL 1972 Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-Q#,QQ040 not Says it Prfers McGove~ jack Anderson of Mr. Nixon seemed almost possible, at the same time a last year eroded these natures paranoid, their trust in Mc POW settlement is reached. barriers. Thus, U.S. bombs ex- Govern wary. The 60 to 100 Americans ploding near the dikes jar the In their first comment on weakened bulwarks and cause the U.S. presidential cam- paign, the North Vietnamese have Informed us they expect President Nixon to win reelec- tion, but they would prefer to deal with George McGovern. From their Paris embassy, North Vietnamese spokesmen have sent us an exclusive mes- sage that they feel sure Mc- Govern would pull U.S. troops out of Vietnam as he has promised. They also believe he would keep his word not to give more military backing to the Saigon: regime. Nixon Paranoia They recited Mr. Nixon's record back to his 1953-61 term as Vice President when lie made saber-rattling speeches about Indochina. Nevertheless, they were ready to negotiate with Mr. Nixon in 1971, they said, for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces and the immediate return of U.S. urisoners. President Thieu on Oct. -1 and the escalated bombing of North Vietnam a few days later, they said exacerbated their old suspicions of Mr. Nixon. Now they feared Mr. Nixon would listen to Thicu's ap- peals for renewed U.S. inter- vention In the Vietnam war, As evidence, they cited the buildup of U.S. forces in neighborhing Thailand and the increase in air-naval units around Vietnam. The Communist diplomats said they trusted McGovern, if he should be elected, not to re-intervene in the war. But one diplomat suggested that they would make rapid ar- rangements with McGovern to return American prisoners so he would have no excuse to re-intervene. They, therefore, not only would negotiate the POW issue with McGovern, but they would move. fast, suggested one North Vietnamese diplo- mat, to return American pris- oners. But the North Vietnamese conceded, in the end, they probably will have to negoti- ate with a re-elected Richard Nixon. They couldn't afford, therefore, to place all their bets on McGovern, they said. Hanoi's views on the elec- tion were delivered to us by an emissary who met with the North Vietnamese three times for a total of four and. one-half hours. For diplomatic reasons, we agreed to withhold the names of the participants. All the discussions were held in French, so we can only paraphrase what the North Vi- etnamese said. Their suspicion Bombing of Dikes The North Vietnamese said they would make an account. in Laos, the North Vietnamese said, could be returned as part of a general U.S. agreement to withdraw from Indochina. They said the Americans held in Cambodia could also be re- turned as part of a general In- dochina settlement. A Cambodian Communist, who was present during the discussions, said the American prisoners in Cambodia are sus- pected CIA agents and specia forces, not combat troops cap- tured during the U.S. incur- sion of May, 1970. The North Vietnamese were particularly emotional over the alleged American bombing of the dikes, which they pleaded could lead to two mil- lion deaths from drowning and starvation. We have seen secret Penta- gon documents, which substan- tiate the U.S. claim that the Red River dikes and dams are Some roads directly on top of dikes,, and U.S. at- tacks on the military traffic have blown holes in the dikes, they said. A combination of air raids, defoliation and arti- ficial rain-making, they feared, could turn their flood-control system!nto a huge mudslide. Footnote: Intelligence re- ports suggest that 1110scow and Peking, unlike Hanoi, would ,prefer to deal with Richard Nixon than George McGovern. The reason, apparently, is that they feel more comfortable with the known Nixon than the unknown McGovern. Appeal to Pope Three priests imprisoned in Brazil's dread Sao Paulo pene- tentiary have smugg]ed out a letter to Pope Paul begging hive to intervene against the torturing of political prisoners by Brazilian authorities. The priests' - letter, dated June 29, said they had fasted 21 days in protest against "atrocious tortures" that have killed more than 200.Brazili- ans. Although the priests claim they and hundreds of others are political prisoners, they have been thrown into common cells with rapists, murderers-and other hardened criminals. ? 1972, United Feature Syndicate oft limits to our bombers. The documents indicate, however, that some flood-control instal. lations have been hit acci- dentally, because of the close proximity of military targets. .The North Vietnamese ex- plained to our emissary that 1 - they had bolstered the hi1 sides above the darns and dikes with trees, grass and un- derbrush. The torrential rains ing of U.S. missing, insofar as Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 Approved For Release 20001 AN ,9 ` #-01601RO004002000 L C Fs 01, L L SIR: I refer to the letter of W. E. Colby, executive director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who re- butted the charges made by some American newspa- permen that the CIA was involved in opium traf- ficking. I do not question Colby's good faith, neither do I say that the CIA, as an entity, traffics in opium; but, I am sorry to say that there is more to these charges than more "gossip, conjecture and,, old history." I also know what I am talking about because'I was involved in security matters for the South Vietnamese government under President Ngo Dinh Diem. In effect, one day, the President told me to investigate into the activities of our chief of secret police, chief of our own "CIA" and chief of military security, and to report, di- rectly to him, because as he put it: "I cannot ask my own chiefs of police, `CIA,' and military security to investigate into themselves." I found out the corruption of two. chiefs, ? and the President took very drastic measures against them. I have kept the contact with my security agents ever since. They firmly confirm that a few CIA agents in Indochina are involved in opium trafficking. But above all, a line must be drawn between Indochina and the rest of the world, because, due to the fact of the coun- ter-instu'gency warfare, the operations of the American CIA in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are extremely ira- portant, when they are compared to operations of the same agency in other countries. In Indochina, the CIA is a real army with his own aerial fleet. A number of CIA operatives deal directly with Vietnamese, Lao, or Moo warlords or officials at the highest level with whom they share the proceeds of the opium traffic. For good American citizens in the United States, it is very difficult to imagine the influence and power of those operatives in Indochina, Their power, in fact., is un- limited-they are the true rulers of Indochina; their desires are orders-no Vietnamese, Laotian or Cambo- i dian official would dare resist their orders. Corruption growing from a do facto power-affects some of these CIA operatives. The traffic of opium involves a rely t.ively large num- her of persons. Outside a few Americans, there are Vietnamese Laotians and Aleo who are involved. Since these personis have their clans, families and friends who live from this traffic, the total number of persons con- cerned become so great that it is impossible to keep secret the operations. I also do not question the good faith of CIA Director Richard Helms when he said that "os an agency, in fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a solution; we know we are not contributing to the prob- lem ... -" However, as I said previously, a line must be drawn and a distinction must he made; for circum- stances are not the same-there is not the vaguest re- semblance between CIA operatives in Indochina and their colleagues operating in other countries. In conclusion, CIA Director Helms and Colby, Miss Randal, and McCoy said the truth and did not contra-. diet one another; they perhaps did not talk about the same country. Tran Van Xlniein, Attorney, Former Deputy, Vietnamese National Assembly. Chevy Chase, Md. Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 Ctll.C GO TR1_r1i `NN 18 JUL 1972 Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400 es Def a eat of Red's . BY DONALD KIRK Far Eastern Correspondent Chicago Tribune pass Service PHNOM PENH, Cambodia- In the demoralized atmosphere of this war-weary capital, one of the country's highest lead- ers still maintains a sem- blance of unabashed confi- dence in the face of the worst enemy threats. He is Son Ngoc Thanh, a revolutionary figure from Cambodia's French colonial ast and now prime minister der the ailing President Lon Nol. . . "We are determined to push out the enemy," said Thanh, a peppery, slightly built man, "We are now establishing a true Khmer or Cambodian re- public," said Thanh, who last served as prime minister at the end of the Japanese occu- pation in 1945, "Now there are no more quarrels. The people can decide whom they want to lead them." Vote Fraud Charged Thanh's faith in Cambodia's fledgling efforts toward de- 0 0 mocracy remains unshaken by a presidential election last month in which Lon Nol easily steamrollcd over two oppo- actually have instigated his ouster. Thanh preferred not to dis- cuss the CIA's role in the sud- I/ den turn of events in Phnom Penh. Instead, he noted the build-up of the Ca m b o d i a n army over the last two years. "At the beginning we had only 30,000 men in Cambodia and another 20,000 of my men," he said. "Now we have at least 170,000. We have a broad army now." He admitted that the quality of his own forces, the best in pressure and fraud. I tie '?,,pave declined since they were p bases near the fronr. The Instead the prime minister l American Central Intelli ene ampletely integrated . with g cited the elections for a Na- I FL tional Assembly planned fo,,t, A;ency provided the funds, wCambodian units. v,'hile the U. S. Army's Special 1? "We have so many men," he gesturing excitedly as he talked in Cambodian thru an interpreter. "At the same time we will strengthen the regime we have built up." Returned from Disgrace If Thanh seems overly opti- m i s t i c about Cambodia's chances of success, it is partly because he himself has re- turned from disgrace and exile since the overthrow of the Leftist chief of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, more, than two years ago. Appointed prime minister early this year, Thanh doubles as foreign minister and spends most of his clays in his office in the Foreign Ministry over- looking a park beside the Me- kong River. August or September as evu- # Forces trained the men. said, "but we lack mo- d t ' e s ry dence of the coun cratic methods under its new constitution. Critics charge that Lon Nol will manipulate the assembly election just as he is accused of doing in the ballot- ing for president-and that, in any c a s e , the constitution grants little real power to the assembly. For Thanh, however, almost any alternative seems prefera- ble to the rule of Sihanouk, his most bitter foe since World War II. The rivalry between Thanh and Sihanouk dates to the Japanese decision to ele- vate,Thanh to national leader- ship during the war while Si- hanouk remained only a fig- urehead'with little power. French Dump Thanh The French colonialists, re- turning after the war, prompt- ly dumped Thanh, who then alternately fought and recon- ciled with Sihanouk. Finally, in the 1950s, Thanh organized a guerrilla force that fought against Sihanouk until fleeing to Thailand and South Viet Nam. It was from Viet Nam, thru- out the decade before Siha- nouk's downfall, that Thanh "We had our troops along the , border before Sihanouk was overthrown," said '? nanh. ,,He knew he would fall. I had had contact in advance withi Lon Nol and Lon Nol's young- er brother, Col. Lon Non." Almost immediately after Si- hanouk's ouster, Thanh's forces crossed the frontier into Cambodia and began fighting the Vietnamese Ccrninunists: The speed-with which Thanh's troops entered the war in Camdodia has nonvinccd some observers that the CIA may have known in advance that Sihanouk. would fall-and may the leaders. We have had some good offi- cers, but they were not used to war and lacked the train- ing.)) As an out the Sosthene example he pointed case . of Maj. Gen. Fernandez, a one- time crony of Sihanouk's and now the commander of a large region south of Phnom Perh. "Fern, dez, of course, was t r a i n e d, in France," said Thanh. "H1 6 has never fought in the jungle or the mountains. He had bad training." Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400200001-8 1,G Appr+o4Se1?For Release 2000/08/16: CIA-RDP80-01 co, 7 ` 'i STATINTL ~, - 239,919 6-11 q rph `t TIiE SPOIF people who gave the (1 'ld the Gatlitlg bun, the A-bomb and plastic bombs oI' ask a few id City to i - f Ra l , p nl e o tempt the peop shrapnel we now have, once again, a new, proved way of making war. more' questions about that cloud-seeding ex The U.S. Air Force and the CIA can now periment that was conducted in the Black make it rain on your parade, whether that hills on the day their city was flooded and parade is a military convoy on the Ito Chi scores of their friends and relatives were Minh. Trail or a political demonstration in killed. Saigon (or Louisville?). The anonymous official's question also We understand the Nixon administratiion's prompts a second question: Is the destruction unwillingness to brag about the cloud-s?.ecung wrought by our bombing in Indochina as in operations that the Unit.eck tates -ilas''been discriminate as that wrought by the forces conducting,in;Indachitla. Any. bragging?low-=- of`'nature? If it is, then we've been lied to or, even any -,admission that such operations again about the pinpoint accuracy of our at- have, indeed, taken place-would make it ap tacks on war supporting industries 'and sup- per that Defense Secretary Laird lied to the plies in North Vietnam, in which our "smart". Senate Foreign Reiations Committee last bombs always seem to demolish' our targets month when'.he was asked about Air Force but leave the civiliEins unharmed. If it isn't, rainmaking activities. The Secretary said, then the rain could be far worse than the "We have not engaged in any over North Viet: bombing especially during the two monsoon gam." seasons when, as an official explained, the Now at least a dozen present and former ' cloud-seeding amounts to "just trying to add military and civilian officials tell The New on to something that you already got." One York.. Times that our pl~ines have seeded thing the'Indoehinese peoples have got during clouds over North Vietnam at least as late as those seasons is the strong danger that they'll Cambodia and South be wiped out. by floods. And it's a safe bet that 1971-and over Laos , Vietnam as well. the soldiers in that American Special Forces In addition to damaging Secretary Laird's camp that received seven inches of rain in impeccable credibility, premature admissions two hours, courtesy of a CIA blunder, didn't to rainnmal'irig might also lose Mr. Nixon the - laugh. votes of those environmentalists, if any, who in addition to sizable quantities, the Ameri- still take him seriously when he puts on his calls, never content to let nature go unirn- mokey the-Bear hat and proclaims himself proved-upon, can now deliver two kinds of hard to beat at admiring and protecting rain---either the plain, old-fashioned variety Mother Nature. or a now, improved rain with an extra secret For it appears that Mr. Nixon, who rarely ingredient. This new rain, according to' one hesitates to rush in where angels and Demo- source, has "a'1 acidic quality to it and it crats fear to tread, has outraincd-as well as would foul up mechanical equipment-like outbonibed--the previous administration. radars, trucks and tanks." State Department protests that our tinkering We're left to wonder whether it damages with Indochina's rainfall was taking environ- other mechanisms, such as humans and trees. mental risks of unknown proportions appar- But even if it doeen't, we hope the White ently. persuaded former Defense Secretary . House reserves the fancy rain for, export only. dcNa?rlarw to call off' cloud'Iseediny'. opera- If our government begins using rain to break tions in 1967 up political demonstrations, as the CIA did lint; it, the words of oni? pro-rainmaking in Selig; n when the Diem regime was totter- official, "What's worse, dropping bombs or ing, we hope the protestors will be spared the rain?',' additional indignity of having to hitch-hike Added irlgre(1--ient possible home. Richard Jordan Gatling, the inventor of that rimitive' machine gun that we see used with p if v; e overlook the fact that Mr. Nixon and such effectiveness against the l:idians in as seems to be corn- Western movies from time to time, hoped that 1enerals (or erha s p p , 1 n the generals without Mr. Nixon's con- by developing such a terrible weapon he a fascinating it in d op y,.,_-, g both, '-' `- s p f on. arms. If meteorological warfare fulfills its P0- The residents of our drought-stricken tential, Mr. Gatling's dream might yet Co111e 4+,uth vest probably would. reply that bombs true. Our future disputes may be settled by ,arc worse than raid. However, the citizens a few wizards-Beads of state, maybe-at con- of Rapid City, S.D., or our eastern seaboard trot panels, instructing Mother Nature where 1111ght n t a ttee. end tI e ti 1 y os t e ild- f1 s ' inds, earthquakes and mouthsp~11L~1 ~R~xo O'M,t6 tl ~'0-0~ I R60040020001-8 There'll be .. need of arms then, and "World War" will have. a new mealning. hat's :worse, V T7 :iTX VO LD Approved For Release 2000/08$1OW(CI*RDP80-01601R000400200001 ga In VIVO . V'.`, 0, , By LENORE WEISS NEW YORK, July 4 - Returning from a three-clay meeting last week in Paris with veterans of the Southeast Asia liberation forces, 15 delegates of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW), announced plans here to report their-finding.,;- to their local areas. This includes, said William del Rosario, a national coordina- tor of the ' VVAW, "'speaking tours, articles, testimony to-Con- gressmen and appearances on ra- dio andTV." The interview took 'place at VVAW headquarters on West 2G street. They had to do their own pub- is last week, they had []let with licity, 'the veterans said, because veterans of the South Vietn;cmese their trip had been. ignored by National I.iber;ctinn front, the the commercial press. Army of the` Uc nlnrratic iteputi- The veterans brought back pho- lie of V ietn;uu. the I athet Lao tos documenting the effects of and the (';inlhodian United Front U.S. bombing raids on North to fine! ??;l voinnlon basis for Vietnam. ending the war " In their three-day talks in Par- The talks had been organized by Frenc?ti pe;ice (;roues and rep- resentatives of the 15.;ir Crimes Coil) [III ssum, a citizens, group es- tablished several years ago by Bertrand Itussell. the late Brit- ish philosopher. ..We achieved more in tlii ee days than our f ovcrnment has achieved in three years, said John Boyc?huck, all active-duty GI Who was due to return to hit. Ilome Air Force Base in Idaho. "We didn't have to de- cide if we wanted round ash- trays, square ashtrays or who was going to sit where." Precious minutes Toby Hollander, of East St. Louis, Ill., an Annapolis grad- uate, said the PRG spokesman in Paris, Ly Van Sau, expressed the purpose of the meeting when he said, "If our efforts cause the war tb end one minute ear- lier, this equals four tons of bombs:,, Veterans learned in Paris of specifications by the U.S. mili- tary for 40,000 new "tiger cages," which are cells 8 by 10 feet on Con Son Island, for the prisoners of the Saigon regime. Laotian and Cambodian repre- sentatives in Paris told the vet- erans, said Paul Richard, .Seattle, that the war, contrary to U.S: State Department reports, is not limited to Vietnam. They cited the presence of U.S. ad- visers and helicopters along Routes 4 and 5, as well as a training camp in Cambodia con- ducted by the CIA. The Paris meeting, said Rich- ards, demonstrated. the solidarity of liberation forces in Southeast Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01618000400200001-8 R U'ARTS Approved For Release 2000/08/T6"161A-RDP80-01601 R0004002000 +~~..,rr..fx..~._~ 1a., a.~:aL::t;t..a:i....i.'s~ iia::+..~....:sus:~ar..~?~?-.i.;..~ [MOSCOW - PEKING) OU MUST NOT GO, SAMD1CH SIIIANOUK. It's Friday, the thirteenth." These words were spoken to me, half in jest, by one of my aides on the way to Orly Airport for the plane which was to take me from Paris to Moscow. It was the morning of March 13, 1970. Unlike many of my countrymen, I am not superstitious, so I laughed, and flew off to meet the Russian leaders. Five days later, while still in Moscow, I was deposed as Cambodia's Head of State so it was an un- lucky day after all. ]'resident Podgorny net my flight, but there were no elaborate welcoming ceremonies, because mine was a po- litical and not a state visit. After greeting nie he said there was a plane waiting to take me straight home to Phnom Pcn h. "Take an overnight rest in Moscow, if you like," he said, "but fly on to Phnom Penh in the morning. We have confidence in you, Sihanouk. You are really the indispens- able leader of your people. But you must go back and take charge of Cambodia's affairs. See that they don't fall into the hands of Lon Nol and Sirik Matak. You must ensure that Cambodia doesn't drift into an American takeover, prevent Lon No] and Sirik Matak from creating difficul- ties for the South Vietnamese people who are waging a heroic struggle for the liberation of their country." I re- plied that I'd have to think things over very carefullyi had been anti-Vietnamese demonstrations in Svay Rieng Province-the reports reaching me showed that Lon Nol was behind them. On March 11, a mob-ostensibly of students and school children--attacked the cmbassy of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (the NLF) and, a few hours later, that of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Hanoi). My re- ports showed it to be the work of the Army-specifically Lon Nol. The nucleus of the attackers was, in both cases, some fifty military men in civilian clothes, com- nmanded by Lon Nol's younger brother, Colonel Lon Non. This was a far cry from (lie "spontaneous demonstrations" naively reported in the European press and on American television. Signs had been prepared in English, a language rarely used in public display in my country. Photographers and TV crews had been alerted. Everything pointed to a scenario drawn up well in advance. As soon as I heard of the attacks on the embassies, I sent a cablegram to my mother, the Queen, condemning the violence as "acts of personalities attaching greater im- portance to their personal and clan interests than to the country's future and to the fate of the people." I warned of the possibility of a rightist coup and said that I would return for a confrontation with those responsible, but, added that, if the people chose to follow them "along a path that will turn Cambodia into a second Laos, they will compel me to resign." The answer to my message to the Queen came in the There wA~ft le~PF4S't"' 049 We 2006)05)16: d1AQRDF*151104(66114000ft"W0 79U$ and outrageous attacks i3IILY ViOR D Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R600400200001 8JUN197Z it,? Lon Noll QC M ~fl e ByTONI FOLEY Puppet President Lon Not of- Cambodia easily won his regime's first presidential election Sunday, with a comfortable but discreet 60 percent' of the vote. The actual number of voters was nowhere stated, only percentages were giv- en,and this is not surprising. Marshal Lon Nol's army cannot go anywhere outside capital city of Phnom Penh without being at- tacked by the patriotic forces of the Cambodian National United Front. NUF units are able to operate within a few miles of the center of Phnom Penh without any hin- drance. A? conservative estimate would place NUF control of the country at around 80 percent. In fact, while the votes were being counted Monday, the NUF shelled the Defense Ministry building in downtown Phnom Penh, some.of the shells landing only 50 yards from Lon Nol's residence. hard to see how Lon Not could claim to have held elections at all. Last Oct. 20, when he abolished his own puppet National. Assembly and announced he would rule by decree, stating lie would no longer "play the game of democ- racy," he was being much more time to form. But this inust have disturbed his U.S. advisers, who have an eye out for U.S. public opinion, so in March, Lon Nol simply declared himself the President of Cambodia and an- nounced there would be a presi- dential election soon. Interestingly enough, Lon Nol is supposed to have gotten 60.76 per- cent of the vote, a figure that was "predicted" down to the last deci- mal point by his regime's official newspaper, Le Republicain. Son Ngoc Thanh - who was ap- pointed Premier by Lon Nol this March- has a lurid past: lie was born in South Vietnam, a member of the Khmer Krom or ethnic Under. 'these conditions it's , Cambodian minority of some two o million in the' Mekong Delta. The Japanese appointed him their puppet Premier of Cambodia in World War II; after 1945, he was in exile in Thailand until be was picked up by the U.S. Central In- telligence Agency and sent back to South Vietnam. The CIA had established what it called the Khmer Serei ("Free Cambodian") movement, made up entirely of Khmer Kroln who were carrying out armed raids into Cambodia from South Viet- nam. Son Ngoc Thanh was in- stalled as the head of this "move- ment." In the past, LonNol was always able to call in heavy U.S. air sup- port plus invasions of his own country by thousands of Saigon puppet troops when things' got really rough for him. Today, things are different. The patriotic offensive in South Vietnam made the Saigon regime pull all its troops out of Cambodia. Lon Nol is thus left on his own. Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : C P01R000VPR9W11--8 By William Worthy character, sections of the- W rn " Nut long after being restored to power in periodically invented."rifts e,ste press political independence to num erous " between the two colonies during the 1950s and 1960s. One of 195& as the North African crisis in Algeria close friends. deepened, French President Charles de Numerous assassination attempts, usual] the best-publicized examples, of course, was y in Gaulle offered ?a so-called "choice" to traceable to outside intervention, dotted Both the former ect and in Congo (now is Zaire). France's West African colonies: a place Nkrumah's years in power. In one instance, that r retrospect and angh est it is clear up had onot n the slightest intention within the French Union (a euphemism for by unintentionally arriving a few 'minutes of giving Brussels on French neo-colonialism) or a total, abrupt late for a dedication ceremony, he avoided le up its control over that colony's severance of all formal ties with the g by priceless resources. The quick, greased rybetnkilled b a time-bomb planted in a downfall of Congo Premier Patrice "mother" country. bouquet of flowers that had been'given to a Lumumba had been plotted long before the After long and varying periods of plunder small child to present to hon. Knowing how" formal lowering of tie Belgian flag in June by French imperialism, all but one colony eagerly the West sought his ouster because 1960 at so-called independence ceremonies. decided they couldn't make a clean break of his strong anti-colonialism, Nkrumah was with their dependent status. It was obvious naive to absent himself front home and Former UN diplomat Conor Cruse O'Brien that de Gaulle had manipulated and counted thereby to make a coup that much easier and others have thoroughly documented the on just that reaction. Some 14 years later, tostage. From reports at the time, British Secretary Gene BGene-Bral ritDag g Ha duplicity. ld Dmmd most of the countries that followed his script intelligence seemed to have played the l owed th have et t i ld e usen i y o ga wor n true national libeti major outside role ih /Z organizatio t bd i ,raon.n te coup, with the CIAnoe usen the other.option was Guinea. To the surprise Those two closely meshed a autumn of 1960, when events were closing in encie m g s ay . and fury of Paris, President Sekou Toure led well have instigated the naive and futile on the . trusting Lumumba--events that his financially bankrupt people out of the Vietnam "peace mission" . that .Nkrumah culminated in his foul and brutal murder in French embrace. For the colonial allowed the British prime minister and other president February of Ghana, wamwrotee to Nkrumah, as metropolis. his decisipn was as intolerable Commonwealth leaders to talk him into hint with the (as 'a precedent for others) as was 'Fidel undertaking. As long ago as 1966, both classic warning: "The only colonialist or Castio's opting out of the U.S. empire in Hanoi and the National Liberation Front'of imperialist that "I The is a dead one." Latin' America. South Vietnam had already made clear the Believing that the UN would play a neutral. Every conceivable measure was devised to basic terms on which the war could be role, Lnmumha fro f~t'sru?t sh's dismnvl had make an example of the uppity upstart from settled and there was no role for the London called in UN forces after a Belgian-instigatea Guinea. All programs .of economic aid in dominated British Commonwealth to play in rebellion in his own army. .every field were abruptly terminated, reaching such a settlement. Had Nkrumah not died of cancer while Teachers, doctors, technidians and other under medical ,treatment in Bucharest, experts were summoned home to France, Knowledge of, neo-colonialism might he ultimately have regained power? leaving behind a trail of economic sabotage By no means should it be implied that No one an say for sure. But an official and a colonized people with almost none of Kwame Nkrumah had no understanding of invitation to return home to Ghana after the the educated cadres needed to keep a the devious workings of imperialism. That recent overthrow of the repressive pro- society afloat. Toure acceded to "power," he knew much about his enemies is clear Western regime amounted to a vindication only to find that his treasury had been from his 1965 book "Nhis monies s: ea of his efforts, if not of his complete ad- o-C - rifled by the. departing French Last Stage of Imperialism," which 'he preside live record, as father and first ci%ilizers" and that the free and in- dedicated to "the freedom fighters of Africa, president of his country. After six years, the dependent 'country was on the verge of ? living and dead." right wing generals of Ghana and the no collapse and imminent starvation. While Nkrumah was in power, his country socio-political-economic program to r,?reet ? , was a home away from home for countless the many problems of a new nation. The Solidnrity In practice African exiles and liberation fighters. In the policy Ghana to Into this dire gap stepped President early 1960s, our -own W.E.B. DuBois and his western oveopeeing and exploitation unlimhad Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, with $20 million wife gave up their U.S. citizenship to move worsened on investment and Ita of d to tide Guinea over the immediate crisis. For. to Accra and to become highly P honored ihe the ecoscon and the condition e. a country itself only a year or so out of the citizens of Ghana. Nkrumah personally people. Discontent was massive. sponsored DuBois' last p Y Corruption was everywhere. Universities grip of classic British colonialsm, $20 great scholarly were closed because the students were in million was a good sized loan that probably undertaking (at age 90): the projected 10- active rebellion. put a strain on Ghana's own treasury. near editorship of an encyclopedia of Africa. As with Indonesia after Sukarno's But it saved the day for Sekou Toure, who (Shortly after the 1966 coup, DuBois widow, in 1965 by his army and the CIA, ~/ remained remained eternally grateful. Not sir- , Shirley Graham, left Ghana.) as with Cambodia after the military-CIA it was he who invited Nkrumah to As Nkrumah surveyed the neo-colonial coup in 1970 that deposed Prince Sihanouk, come to live in exile in Guinea after the, pro- mess that much of Africa has become, he as with all the former colonies that enjoyed a Western Western 1966 army coup in Ghana deposed must have died with a broken heart. The brief respite of self-respect before being re- Toure bestowed on him the honorary West has skillfully re-established its de facto coloniz d Ghana lost a leader respected title of "co-pre erdRseiriz`~~~'j9?`~(Af~?1~8AYOrbRfl6(t1~0}eA Africa, whatever his short enya, a ter !raving granted nominal comings, as a true patriot. He failed to build continue Approved For Release 2000/08/10~NAT : W ?W W&000400 1 V" 77 WT ovadau U00 0(2006va CAMBODIA "g,m has Piven the lie to P 'statement in- 1970 that Sihanouk's ouster "surprised no nation more than the U.S." According to Intercontinental Press, the recently named prime minster Son Ngoc 1hanh revealed to Oxford University scholar v T.D. Allman in a series of interviews that CIA agents promised to do "everything possible" to aid anti-Sihanouk forces in a coup. Allman, who was in Asia last year on assignment for the Manchester Guardian, said Thanh told him the U.S. paid "millions of dollars" to train and equip his own private forces, the "Khmer Serei" ("Free" Cambodia) forces, which were recruited from Cambodian mercenaries living in South Vietnam. Shortly after the coup by Lon Nol, the Intercontinental Press report states, Thanh's group was air-lifted to Phnom Penh where it played a key role in holding the capital.... The Phnom Penh army is becoming more unpdpular among youth in Cambodia. According to a Feb. 2 AFP report: "The Cambodian military authorities are having a lot of trouble in recruitment, many youths having crossed over to Thailand to dodge service in the Phnom Penh army".... "News from Cambodia," a feature in the Vietnam Courier, published In Hanoi, reported in March that Thai mercenary troops have pillaged homes, shrines and temples in Cambodia-all on the pretext of pursuing, "Co'mmunist rebels". . "News from Cambodia" also reported that the deputy manager of the Sihanoukville branch of the National Bank /crossed over to the liberated zone of the country Feb. 13. A celebration was held in Paris April 22 to mark the second anniversary of the summit conference of the Indochinese peoples. The first meeting was held in the spring of 1970, shortly after Norodom Sihanouk was over- thrown from his position as head of Cambodia by a CIA sponsored coup. The Paris meeting last month, organized by the Paris Committee of the National United Front of Cambodia; the Union of Lao Students in France; and the Union of Vietnamese in France, was attended by over 4000 people. The meeting unanimously adopted a resolution that ac- claimed the victories of the Indochinese peoples and condemned the U.S. war escalation, especially the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. A banner across the meeting hall read: "Long live the fraternal 'militant solidarity of the Cambodian, Lao and Viet- namese peoples!'.' The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) is continuing its efforts to get the Saigon regime to release Mme. Ngo Ba Thanh from jail, where she has been held for the last six months due to her antiwar activities- When she collapsed on a stretcher in a courtroom March 22, due to an asthma attack, Thanh issued a statement saying: "We don't want the Americans to come here. I, want all the Americans to go home and hand back our sovereignty and we want to talk with the. other people from the other side, about our business, among the Vietnamese".. ..A letter from a Saigon puppet soldier, written as he was retreating from the demilitarized zone last month, was printed in the Washington Post April 6. The letter said in part: "We did not want to fight the Reds. What for? They have never harmed us... we should kill Instead the corrupted leaders in Saigon and their dirty Saigon-American friends (President Nixon's) withdrawal is in. terminable. hence we have no independence. His Vietnamization shall never work because he is fighting not only the Communists but also the whole Vietnamese population"... . The Gaiphong Press Agency of the revolutionary forces reported from Hue April 18 that puppet general Hoang Xuan Lam, former commander of the I corps area, built an "execution pole" in the center of the city of Hue in order "to intimidate the people." Lam also ordered his agents. the report said, to murder those who propagandized in favor of the. liberation forces. -o- Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/1-6-: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 NEW O1 LMNS, LA. STATES ITEM E - 134,707 'MAY 41972 ntiwar De ?. About 100 anti-war demon- strator~ marched from Beaur- egard Square to Lafayette Square today where they gathered under an oak tree and listened to speeches con- demning President Nixon's re- cent "re-escalation" of the air war in Vietnam. The procession bristled with signs that said things like . "Smash . Imperialism, Not Women and Children," or "WhoProfits From This War?" The marchers chanted slo- gans such as ."Stop the War Now," and."Prices up, W'Vages /Down, Why war?" / Willie Gunther, a Vietnam veteran, led the list of speak- ers recounting that when he onstrators worker as cryptographer in 'Vietnam he discovered son "truths" about the war "that the people of the United States are not being told about the war." He said the government "is telling a lie," when it says North Vietnam is invading South Vietnam. He said the North Vietnamese troops com- ing south are merely advisers and support troops to the Viet Cong. Gunther said the President's attempt to suppress the Pen- tagon Papers indicates that. Nixon does not want ?the American people to know the truth. "Because if the Ameri- can people knew the truth, Nixon would have the same problem with them' as with his own troops." He. said that since he. ar- rived in Vietnam hard drug use has escalated and that the Ce trral le lligep~eAZency, working with poppy growers in Cambodia who are friendly to the U.S., is running "junk" in Vietnam. He said studies by the Army have shown that troops on hard dope don't resist the army and that one general has recommended that hard drugs be allowed into dorr,?s- tic and foreign posts to keep Gi's from protesting the war. State Rep.-elect Johnny Jackson told the group the continuing Vietnam war is symptomatic of the U.S. con- arch tinuing to hold the wrong priorities, particularly in re-, gards to the black and poo_^ c mmunities. . ml Steve Cohen, who said he is with a group called "Air War," spoke of the anti-per- sonnel ,bombs he said are being used in Vietnam. . - He said the U.S. has used a progression of more and more. destructive anti-personnel bombs. He said that recently the Flechettes, which are tiny nails with fins on the back; which could be dispersed from a bomb, strike humans and cause gaping wounds, have been replaced by plastic pel- lets which Cohen said are "even more nefarious." Approved For Release 2000/08/16: CIA-RDP80-01601R00040020000'1-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 TARENTUM, PA. VALLEY NEWS-DISPATCH 39.APg2201972' ? ,#r opinions last to learn what the Central The CIA AMERICANS seem to be the Intelligence Agency is up to, and J now they are learning about the CIA's role in Cambodia from a, 'CMMMM 'trwho had a part in it. Prime Minister Thanh told a British inter.viewer, before attaining his present post, that the United States paid millions after 1965 to train his own rebel troops. He said CIA agents assigned to him assured him of help if existing government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk were overthrown and the rebels came under left-wing attack. The government was overthrown in 1970 and that led to a leftist counter-attack joined by Sihanouk and that in turn led to a massive American-South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. So the Southeast Asia war engulfed meddles Cambodia, as it had Laos, where the' CIA also was involved with its private army. The results of all this meddling have been to spread a war without gaining a vestige of victory. If the meddling alone were not bad enough, the disasters following it made it worse. So far the CIA seems to have done better in its strictly intelligence operations than in its. paramilitary and covert actions, but not even Congress knows fore sure. Congress might be expected to approve a standing proposal to require that the CIA report to it as well as to the Executive branch. Instead, Congress is voting what amounts to a blank check, and getting reports on Central Intelligence Agency activity through the prime minister of Cambodia. Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA=RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 25X1A Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 BGSTONApp d For Release 2000/08/1? CIA-RDP8O-01601R000400 HERALD TRAVELER M - 194,557 S - 260,961 APR 1 0.1.9r Calls Nixon Policy `Fraud Vieimn a ' By MARY TIERNEY U.S. Rep. Michael J. Har- rington, D-Beverly, yesterday attacked President Nixon's policy of Vietnamization as a "fraud." He made the re- marks following a visit to South Vietnam last week,. As a member of the House Armed Services Committee, the North Shore congressman has been working for the past month to force' the adminis- tration to increase the flow of public information about U.S. military activities in South- east Asia. Yesterday, at a Parker House press conference, Rep. Harrington said that "Viet- namization has been sold to the American people as a way of withdrawing our presence from the Indochinese war. "In fact," he continued, "that policy, as it is now be- ing pursued, requires a con- tinued, massive American military presence in Southeast Asia for many years to come. "It commits us to continue to spend billions of taxpayers' dollars for the support of the armies of Laos. Cambodia and South Vietnam. "IT COMMITS US to spend many billions to pay for an air war as extensive as any this country has ever engaged in - even at the, height of. World War II.. . "It commits us to continued direct involvement by the, Central Intelligence Agency in the groundTigliting in Laos and Cambodia and to continue to devastate four countries in a war which has long since lost any conceivable justifica- tion - militarily, politically or morally." I { ?2 S weapons will be deeply en-' gaged in that war," he said. Rep. Harrington. said that, American involvement is greater than the American people have been told and that ; it is time "to raise American consciousness to the magni- tude of our involvement." He said he was "particular- ly disturbed" about the secrecy that surrounds the military operation in Thailand where the U.S. is "spending $5 million a day to maintain 25,000 Air Force men at five large air bases in a country. club atmosphere." He said he would do every- thing in his power to see that all censorship of news from .Thailand would be lifted so that the American people would know where their money was going. "When the full facts are known there will be public annoyance, anger and frustra- tion in the inability to extri- cate," he said. . Rep. Harrington said that' since the U.S. has broken off peace talks, the South Vietna- mese Army has been unable to hold its ground without full- scale American military sup- port. "Current American policy requires us to maintain our involvement in the Indo- chinese War for the forseeable future. And, as long as we remain committed to the maintenance of a pro-American regime in Saigon and as long as the pro- American forces are unable to sustain themselves in power, American men, money and Approved For Release 2000/08/16: CIA-RDP80-0160112000400200001-8 More ttA. 1VIe ULU Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601.RO00400200001-8 STATINTL I ST. LOUIS, MO. POST-DISPATCH, E - 326,376 S - 541,868 - APR 7 1972 Americans seem to be the last to learn what bodia. So the Southeast'Asia war engulfed Cam- the Central Intelligence Agency is up to, and now they' are learning about the CIA's role in Cambodia from a CarnLodian who had a part in it. Prime Minister Son Ngoc Thanh told a British interviewer, before attaining his present post, that the United States paid millions of dollars after 1965 to train his own rebel troops. Ile said CIA agents assigned to him ("they have three names a month," he added) assured him of help if the existing government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk were overthrown and the rebels came under loft-Nving attack.. The government was overthrown, in-1970, and that led to a leftist counter-attack joined by Sihanouk, and that in turn led to a massive American-South Vietnamese invasion of Cam- bodia, as it had Laos, where the CIA also was involved with its private army. The results of all this m addling have been to spread a war without gaining a vestige of victory. El the med- dling alone were not bad enough, the disasters following it made it worse. So far the CIA seems to have done better in its strictly intelligence operations than in its paramilitary and covert actions, but not even Congress knows for sure. Congress night be ex- pected to approve a standing proposal to require that the CIA report to it as well as to the Executive branch. Instead, Congress is voting what amounts to a blank check, and getting reports on Central Intelligence Agency activity through the prime minister of Cambodia. Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP8O-01601 R000400200001-8 ST..LOUIS POST-DISPATCH Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : C17A A0 17(%1 R000400200001-8 More CIA Meddling Americans se^m to be the last to learn what the Central Intelligence Agency is up to, and now they are learning about the CIA's role in / Cambodia from a Cambodian who had a part in it. Prime Minister Son NgocThanh told a British Interviewer, before attaining his present post, that the United States paid millions of dollars after 1965 to train his own rebel troops. He said ,CIA agents assigned to him ("they have three names a month," he added) assured him of help if the existing government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk were overthrown and the rebels came under left-wing attack. The government was overthrown, in 1970, and that led to a leftist counter-attack joined by Sihanouk; and that in turn led to a massive American-South Vietnamese invasion of Cam- STATI NTL bodia. So the Southeast Asia war engulfed Cam- bodia, as it had Laos, where the CIA also was! involved with its private army. The results of all this meddling have been to spread a war .without gaining a vestige of victory. If the med dling alone-were not bad enough, the disasters following it made it worse. So far the CIA seems to have done better in its strictly intelligence operations than in its paramilitary and covert actions, but not even Congress knows for sure. Congress might be ex- pected to approve a standing proposal to require that the CIA report to it as well as -to the. Executive branch. Instead, Congress is voting what amounts to a blank check, and getting reports -on Central Intelligence Agency activity through the prime minister of Cambodia. Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 Approved For Release 2000/08V ole B a-red Dispatch News Service, .the source of the following article,. was the first news agency to disclose details of the killings at My Lai; South Vietnam. By RICHARD A. FINEBERG Copyright 1979 Dispatch News Service Interuatioval WASHINGTON.-The Cen- tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) played a crucial role in en- couraging the coup that top- pled Prince Norodom Sihan-. ouk and plunged Cambodia into the Indochina war, ac- cording to Cambodia's re- ently named prime. minister, Son Ngoc Thanh. vv Describing Sihanouk's over- throw in a series of interviews last year with Oxford Univer- . sit}?- scholar T. D. Allman, Thanh said that CIA agents promised they would do "ev= .erything possible" to help if the Cambodian plotters suc- ,cessfully mounted a coup and .then-found themselves under attack by pro-Sihanouk and Communist forces. Shortly after the March 1970 coup, Thanh's own forces, trained by U. S. Special Forces in Vietnam, were dis- patched by plane to Phnom Penh, where they played a vital role in defending the Cambodian capital for Gen. Lon Nol. THE WHITE HOUSE main- tains that ? the U. S. had no prior knowledge of the coup and that "no American mili- tary or civilian officers" were ever involved officially or un- officially with the plotters. Si-' hanouk's ouster "surprised no nation more than the United States," President Nixon said after the coup. Sen. Mike Gravel (D., Alaska) said on Tuesday that White House denials of U. S. involvement in the 1970 coup are "incredible" and he called for full disclosure of the U. S. T1 - (0040 Q ho"n3s1k, Ous-t';e/ on assignment for the (Man- Nol coup. The CIA, he saia, ssible would Chester) Guardian, that in promised that the poU " to do "everything p 1969 a U.S. agent assigned to help. Thanh's staff gave assurances The 63-year-old Thanh was that the U.S. would support a named prime minister by the two pronged invasion of Cam- ailing Lon Nol on March 21. A bodia by Thanh's partisans. devout Buddhist and an early Cambodian nationalist leader, TIIE PLEDGE, Thanh said, Thanh was prime minister for `came from a CIA operative f a brief period in 1.995 when he identified only as Fred. "They staged a coup prior to the have three names a month," Japanese surrender. Ile was kl arrested by British oc- c PRINCE SIHANOUK .. toppled by CIA role in Cambodia prior to said Thanh referring to his American collaborators. "We never knew their real the names." s id , wa coup. The plan, Thanh sa ,,it is incredible to take the ,to penetrate the country" position-as the White House from the South Vietnam and has done-that the U. S. con- Thai borders. "Our hope was ducted continuous clandestine that the Cambodian army incursions into Cambodia, would rally to us. We would hired and trained members of. negotiate with Sihanouk, to a sect avowedly dedicated to avoid bloodshed. He could ei- Sihanouk's overthrow, and ther leave the country or still did not know that a coup agree to become a constitu- was being planned, Gravel tional monarch." said. Lar ge-scale Khmer Serci ALTHOUGH TIIE Sihanouk -defections to the Cambodian regime was faltering, Gravel . government were reported in said, "It i; doubtful that the prince could have been bver- thrown without clandestine U. S. support for the coup." According to Son Ngoc Thanh, CIA agents assigned to Thanh's staff were kept aware of developments concerning the coup including secret meetings b' t:veen Thanh and aides of Gen. Lon Nol. At that time, Lon Nol was Sihanouk's prime minister, while Thanh, who had been sentenced to death by Sihan- ouk,. headed a rebel sect known as the Khmer Screi ("Free Cambodia") from a jungle post near the Viet- narn- Cambodia border. According to Thanh, begin- ning in 1965 the U. S. paid "millions of dollars" to train, arm and support his forces, most of whom were recruited from the Cambodian minority living in South Vietnam's Delta region. - Thanh told Allman, who was 1969 and may have been part of Thanh's invasion plan to overthrow Sihanouk. Accord- ing to reliable sources, the re- patriated Khmer Serei units were serving in the royal army under Lon Not and spearheaded political demon- o and the war that had strations in Phnom Penh just bodia , before the coup. raged on its borders for two Thanh's invasion plan was decades finally engulfed Cam- shelved - overtaken by SIf~t INTL events," as Thanh put it - early in 1970 when Lon Nol's. aides sought Thanh's support in the event of- a coup. THANII TOLD Allman that Lon Nol's officers asked him "If the Vietcong attack Phnom Penh the way they attacked Saigon in 1968, could Lon Nol expect the help of Son Ngoc Thanh's forces in defending the capital?" After checking with his "American friends," Thanh committed his U.S.-trained and financed forces to the Lon y < q>,i cupyi:no forces, however, and exiled` to France. Tha-)li ; returned to 'Cam- bodial,in 1951 and joined the milit'.,,t Issarek (Independ- ence; movement. At that time he allied with the Communist Vietminh to oppose Sihanouk. whose strategy of cooperation with the French to achieve in- -dependence was too "lode. - for the militant nationalist. From that time until the March 1970 coup, Thanh en- gaged in anti-Sihanouk guer- illa efforts from rural Cam- bodia, Thailand and Vietnam. In July 1970, Thanh re- turned to Phnom Penh to be- come an advesir to Lon Nol. By that time, Cambodian left- ists had become allied wittt Sihanouk and Vietnam Com- munist forces to fiiht -Lon Nol, the combined U. S.-Saigon rces had swept into Cam- f Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/16: _c1A-RtV401 1 R000400 Nixon's Peace Offer HE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE at stake political structures in which the indig- in the Indochina war has always enous resistance is rooted, what is been a relatively simple one; is called "nation-building" by some of the d i bl h tes spawne e ypocr the United States (or the French be- more contempti fore it) to have a predominant voice in the course of this endeavor, for ex- in determining the political and social ample, Robert Komer, chief President structure of Indochina, or will this tial advisor on "pacification" in the question be settled by the Indochinese . Johnson Administration. Five years peoples themselves, relatively free from ago, he held out the hope that "ero- outside intervention? It has been fairly sion of southern VC strength" may be clear from the outset that, if external feasible because, though none of the force were withdrawn, Vietnam would American programs are very efficient, ultimately be unified under commun- "we are grinding the enemy down by ist leadership, since the Viet Minh and sheer weight and mass" (Pentagon its successors had "captured" the na- Papers, Beacon, volume IV). After the tionalist movement, as U.S. govern- Tet offensive of 1968, it became clear the that the American public- would not ' Laos it I , . n ment analysts express Pathet Lao have been unmatched in their ability to construct a popular na- tionalist political movement, in this case, too, with revolutionary social con- tent. U.S. intervention from the late 1950s has drawn North Vietnam in- creasingly into Laotian affairs, much as in South Vietnam and more recently Cambodia, where the March 1970 coup, very likely with a CIA hand, and the US-ARVN invasion that followed, shattered a fragile though conceivably stable neutralism and increased the probability that Cambodia too will be brought ultimately into a communist- led federation of. some sort if outside force is withdrawn. For reasons that need not detain us here, the United States has never been willing to tolerate the "loss" of Indo- china, and remains unwilling today. The conditions of U.S. intervention have changed over the years, but not the essential goals. Furthermore, the basic problem facing the Western in- vaders has also changed little during the past quarter century. Several years ago, an American military spokesman formulated the problem clearly: the U.S. has enormous military force but littl.: political power and must defeat an adversary with enormous political power but only modest military force. To this problem the U.S. must find the "proper response"-in Vietnam and elsewhere in the third world as well. (Jean Lacouture, Vietnam: Between Two Truces, 1966). This problem dictates American strategy. The basic strategy has been, necessarily,?to demolish the social and Approved For Release long tolerate the costs of a continuing military occupation in South Vietnam, coupled with a costly air war against the North. Consequently, the direct U.S. troop commitment was leveled off and then gradually lowered through "Vietnamization"-a policy suggested by Pentagon systems analysts in 1967 -while a sharply expanded techno- logical war reached its peak in the early months of the Nixon Administration. Nixon and Kissinger are gambling that the massive destruction and forced population concentration in the South, with its devastating impact on the rural society, may create conditions under which the U.S.-imposed regime can survive. To use Robert Komer's terms, "thanks to massive U.S. military in- tervention at horrendous cost," a "fa- vorable military environment" has been created "in which the largely political competition for control and support of the key rural population could begin again" in this "revolutionary, largely political conflict" (!. of International A(jairs, 1971, no. 1). He fails to add that control of the "key rural popu- lation" may be facilitated by the fact that at least half the population, 85 percent rural in 1960, now lives in urban ghettoes (J-C Pomonti, Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1972), part of the "hor- rendous cost" of "massive U.S. mil- itary intervention." Much the same is military and police apparatus, an'd gradually absorbed within the U.S.- Japan Pacific system. The vast areas ceded to ' the resistance will be sub- jected to intensive bombardment which will continue to make an organized so- cial life virtually impossible. Parts of Laos may be effectively incorporated within Thailand, as George Ball sug- gested years ago. It may be that the willingness of the Administration to concede the presence of Thai mer- STATINTL cenaries in Laos (in conflict with ex- plicit legislation designed to prevent this) reflects the need to prepare the public for this outcome. As the very knowledgeable Austra- lian analyst Peter King observes; such "successes" as have been achieved in this program are "no mystery": "It re- quires more than ordinary courage for civilians to maintain their political al- legiances openly in the face of a semi- genocidal counter-insurgent strategy" (Pacific Affairs, Fall 1971), the pre- requisite for Komer-style "nation- building." It is this counter-insurgent strategy and its results that lead Gen- eral Westmoreland to believe: "I think particularly significant is that the en- emy does not have the strong infra- structure and the guerrilla forces in large numbers, well equipped and high- ly motivated, that he had in 1963" (Peter Osnos, Washington Post-Bos- ton Globe, Feb. 1, 1972). However, as King and many others recognize, "the durability of that success may be doubted." Given the insistence of the U.S. pub- lic on scaling down the direct Amer- ican involvement, it has been obvious for several years that it would become necessary for the U.S. to engage in some sort of political manipulations within the areas'of South Vietnam that remain tinder U.S. control, or to "get ready for political competition in South Vietnam," as Harvard Professor Sam- uel Huntington put it in a paper be- fore the May 1969 meeting of the Council on Vietnamese Studies of SEA- This collection of scholars, who DAG . true in Laos and Cambodia. Nixon and claim to be concerned with support Kissinger appear to be moving towards -for research on Vietnam, struggled an effective partition of Indochina: the manfully with the problem of how tc heavily settled areas of Laos, South ensure control at the national level for Vietnam and Cambodia will, it is "our side," given that the NLF re- hoped, be separated from the resist- mains "the most powerful purely po- 2on/J146 b7ClI44q1Dpt&9."1d10W 1209Qtt organization," "the struction, controlled by an elaborate ocnx t`5nucd Approved For Release 2000/08%'16;AA F d&- l601R00040020 SHT0,V'0'rt for on' T611 washington Post Foreign Service the capital, have of in PHNOM PE'VH 1% IF themselves made "++.,, hanouk was toppled. Ile has one current theory is that , arch become a focus of their dis- he plans slowly to gather 30-Th.e broad popular sup- dramatically worse, enchantment. port for the Lon Not govern- But the disorder and fear en power to himself and chal- Contributions to the un- lenge Lon Not. deepened the disillusio ment that made it s ibl po s e n- to marshal the will of pas- ment that first became evi- easiness is the fact that the sive Cambodians to resist a dent after a series of battle- government, as it now fierce and disciplined 'en. stands, has legal basis. Lon field reverses in November Not is a self-declared presi- emy is now, perhaps irrc- and December. Then it was dent: a dictator, in effect. tr ievably, a thing of the the army that was discred- Not that the nicities matter nnct It is not only that Phnom Penh's university and high school.' students have been on strike for three weeks or that a political split has de- veloped a m o n g senior Buddhist monks. It is that, the malaise seems to have ited; this time it is the poli- a great deal here, but too ticians. much symbolic importance Making the rounds of dip- has been given to the trap- lomats and various Cambo- pings of the Republic for dians one hears as never be. them not to be missed. fore that the government is Apparently sensing that, unpopular. Lon Not has appointed a "It is staggering and ood ' caprobhi- committee headed by the abl no damn a y g , spread everywhere. minister told an rector of Phnom Penh Uni- Ameri- What Is vocal discontent net t t h when expressed by student leaders is. merely apathy (coming from simple farmers and soldiers, but it amounts to degrees of the same thing: an unhappy recogni. tion that this regime is in most respects no different from the one it replaced two years ago, only now there is war. Sophisticated Cambodians from all walks of life, who a year ago spoke hopefully about progress being made on the drafting of the new republican constitution and about the high-spirited brav- ery of the Khmer army, now see only corruption and mil- itary weakness. "The corruption is worse than under Sihanouk," said an English-speaking Cambo- dian,. cheerful by nature, who fled the countryside in June 1970, three months after the prince was over- thrown. "Then the officials had motorbikes, now the army officers have cars and .villas" "The soldiers don't pay at- tention," he went on. "They ,sit in their barracks and ,play cards. The Communists must laugh." The latest round of politi. cal maneuvering by Lon Nol-which produced gov- ernment by decree and scut- tled, at least temporarily, 'the almost-completed consti- tution-plus. the worst rocket attack ever made against y o ave another go can friend the other day, Veisi but he agreed to rejoin the at the constitution he has re- cabinet because he though it jected: (His chief objection was his responsibility. was that it would give too Lon Nol, an unpredicta- much authority to the legis- ble, invalided mystic, retains lature and not enough to the a special status, a kind of executive.) benign father image diffi- cult for outsiders to under- stand. This puts him largely above public criticism, which falls heavily on those around him, although he is criticized privately. The biggest loser has been Sisowath Sirik itiatak, who for months was the day-to- day head of government, ad- miret`i far above all others by the U.S. embassy, but dis- liked by many Cambodians, especially the students. He has been forced out al- together, a major concession by Lon Not who counted on Alatak as his closest aide. The U.S. Embassy hopes that some way can be found to bring Matak back, per- haps as an unofficial ad- viser. For the moment that looks unlikely. Banners still hang on the walls of Phnom Penh University's law school proclaiming that "Sirik Matak is the source of all that is bad." - a CIA supported movement only drops of tears and blood that can be promised ainst Prince Sihanouk i st a h h . g arges aga n e c T to Matak, an aloof aristocrat, ' It is not at all clear why you." are vague. To'the students, Thanh, who has supporters lobs' however, he apparently rep- among the students and whose shhinining g patriotism resents the old order that monks and some In the once so impressed and they thought ended when Si- army, took the job, although touched foreign visitors, were not stirred enough to -dig, a single trench. The commitce is to report in two weeks or so. Then- in a matter of months, Lon Not has said-there will be a referendum and election, probably for a new National Assembly. Whether it will go as smoothly as that is considered doubtful. In a radio speech last night, Lon Not drew a fine. distinction between freedom. in a democracy and anarchy. "I ask you to understand the difference," lie said, in ex- plaining why he seized com- plete power. "Our constitution is soon to be finished," he said. "Afterward we will have a referendum as we all wish and we will have a good sys- The rest of the govern- ment consists of a half- dozen holdovers from the last cabinet, a new defense minister who is apparently well thought 'of, a few non- political functionaries and as minister of commerce-- said to be a particularly lu- crative post-Lon Nol's per- sonal physician. The selection of the new government has not ended the student strike, which is desultory in the late-;March heat but completely effec- tive. Nor has it stopped the dispute between two of Cambodia's most important monks over the right to crit- icize the government. One of the monks, Khiew Chum, has a long record of opposing the monarchy. Like the students, he speaks out for some undefined prin- ciples of freedom that were supposedly embodied in the coup against Sihanouk: The monk has been warned by his superior to desist or be punished. There is no evidence that a significant number of the students of Khiew Chum and his followers are leftists or that their outspoken op- position could trigger large demonstrations. But their activities are symptomatic of the sapping of the public spirit. Last weekend, the govern- ment called on the people of Phnom Penh to prepare for- tem..'' future attacks by digging In the -meantime, after 'a trenches and arming them number of public figures turned down the post, Lon Not has retained as his prin- and spears." The message ended with a cipal deputy, Son ' Ngoe paraphrase of what Winston Thanh, a 64-year-old former J-Churchill told the British in Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200 HARTFORD, CONN. TIMl,1R 2 9 't9 E & S - 135,812 Is Son Ngoc Thanh our next albatross?, Most Americans pay little at- tention to changes of government in small and volatile nations like Cam- bodia. Political leaders come and go, and it is difficult to remember their names. The name of Son Ngoc Thanh is worth remembering. He would appear to be, at the moment, the real power in Cam- bodia. He has been for more than two generations a leader of the na- tionalist movement in Cambodia. But he has also been, for the last twenty years or more, in nearly con- stant opposition to the now-exiled Prince Sihanouk, and his opposition has in recent years been heavily financed by the American Central Intelligence A. In a very real sense, the CIA's man is now in power in Phnom Penh. His arch-enemy - and still the most popular, beloved, and nearly-deified Cambodian, Norodom Sihanouk - is in exile in Peking. That Js hardly a recipe for stability. a politician nearly as popular at times, as Sihanouk himself. Son was exiled; recalled briefly; exiled again. He has since the early 1950s organized several nationalist, anti-Sihanouk guerrilla organiza-, tions, backed variously by Saigon and Bangkok (both historic an- tagonists of Cambodia) and the CIA. Ile comes to power in Phnom Penh now by a curious route. Lon Nol, the general who drove Sihanouk into exile, this month abrogated all semblance of democratic process in Cambodia: He cancelled the nearly-completed draf- ting of a new constitution, declared himself president, ousted the titular "chief of state" and assumed that role as well; and surrounded himself by a "cabinet" of Army men loyal to him, with only one token member of the democratic opposition. From a man who has suffered a crippling stroke, who apparently can- not walk without support, and who has never in several previous stints as head of government been con- sidered anything but -a figurehead, it was a remarkable show of decisiveness - remarkable enough to make one wonder who was behind it. He then named Son Ngoc Thanh -as premier and prime minister. AMERICAN POLICY in Indochin ,, has, on previous occasions, single out nationalist leaders whom we coul trust, and helped to install them in power, Ngo Dinh Diem was only the first of many such men in Vietnam. It is, at best, a risky business. Today's American-sponsored national hero can be tomorrow's albatross. SUPPORT FOR Son Ngoc Thanh is not unreasonable. He began his career as a crusading anti-colonial editor (in Cambodia's first newspaper in the Cambodian. language) in 1937. He worked with the Japanese in the latter stages of World War II to drive the French out. His pressures pro- bably made Sihanouk, then a very. young (and French-sponsored) king, hasten Cambodia's independence. Sihanouk's hostility toward Son can be seen as personal jealousy of Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 MW YOE C AIML.r Approved For Release 2000/08/1 (IIJA-RR P80-01601 R000400200 Lon Nol Gets Full Control in Cambodia By FOX BUTTERFIELD (raised in a tradition of rev-(continued their protests. against lomats here agree, having re-!the West, said one former op-I American officials here, who position member of the nation-shad developed great respect for moved the last legal opposition al assembly today. "We mavtGeneral Sirik Matak, say that to him and, in,tle process, the not like what Lon Nol does?his loss to the Government will last COMM " f ' c d b PNOMPENH Cambodiaihas been little real protest over March' 22-President Lon NollPresident Lon Nol's assumption has emerged from Cambodia's l of power. latest political crisis with vir. "We do not look at things tuaIly unchallenged power, dip- lascategorically as you do in 11 e o emo?_racy, ut he is our leader and most There had been some., :.aubt of the people believe in him." in Pnompenh that he wc:::d be "Besides," he explained with able to form an effective govla deep sigh, "Cambodia is at ernment after he abruptly dis-,war and we cannot afford the . But his official announcement Cabinet appear to have been!izs presence in the Cabinet is last. night that he had formed part of . Cambodia's annual !regarded as token representa- la 17-man Cabinet, including;frame 'Of 'musical chairs in tion for the opposition bloc thati only one member known as an which members of the small had formed in the assembly be- opponent, dispelled the linger- Political elite shuffle the. im- fore it was dismissed.. Ing hopes of some who thought portant Government posts Mr. Thanh, who was first the President might be forced among themselves. made Premier by the Japanese to back down. The new premier, Son during their occupation of Cam- ? The army, which is believed Ngoc Thanh, a longtime guer-Ibodia during World War II has to be completely loyal to Pres- rilla leader in the fight to oustla reputation as an ardent na- ident Lon Nol and the basic !Prince Sihanouk, represents altionalist and an eccentric. The source, of his power, has two!sharp change from the fo.nner guerrilla forces he led, which: important representatives in Premier, Lieut. Gen. Sisowathiwere reportedly financed by the the new Government, the Min-(Sirik Matak. The latter, a mem- American.., Central Intelligence ister of Defense, Maj. Gen. Sak!ber of the royal family and a Agency' fc,aht Prince ihan? Suthsakhan, and the Minister close associate of President{ouk's army for manyvearSs dur- +of Interior, Alai. Gen. Thapana Lon Nol, was widely regardedling the ninteen fifties and nine- : Nginn. Two other members of!asaCambodia's most energetic!teen sixties, and many Cambo- missed the constituent assem-(luxury of too much politics." bly,- canceled the constitution_ Musical Chairs 1it was preparing and proclaimed himself president 12 days. ago) Most of the changes in the With the removal of the con- stituent assembly, which had been the national assembly un- til Lon Nni fhon .-ti,i tions that has made foreign diplomats here fond of saving Cambodia's politics sound like a story from Alice in Wonder- changed its role by decree last land, thousands of students at October, only PnomDenh's stu-1pnompenh University and the gents remain as a possible dis- sident voice. But In a country that has known only monarchy and French colonial rule, and in which the people have been demonstrating for two weeks for the ouster of General Sirik Alatak. The students have accused him of corruption and of being undemocratic for denying them freedom of speech. They have even after he announced his withdrawal from political life last week and after President Lon . Not failed to reappoint 1.:..- . be a serious one. One Opposition Minister The only member of the new Government who has been as. sociated with the opposition is the new Minister of Justice, Yem Sambaur, a former presi- las a result. ? Despite Mr. Thanh's reputed close relations with Americans over the years, he is not be- lieved to be as highly regardedi as General Sirik Matak by the! American Embassy. But the students have said--they favor Mr. Thanh's appointment. Many longtime observers of Cambodian politics say that there will probably be another political crisis within a few months and that the Cabinet is likely to change again. Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400200001-8? NGTO Approved For Release 2000/08/1 : felligenrP Agency. Lon Rol Aide Accepts Post PHNOM PENH (UPI) - Elder statesman Son Ngoc Thanh, senior adviser to presi- dent Lon Nol, said yesterday that he had agreed to accept the post of prime minister, ending Cambodia's govern- mental crisis. Son Ngoc Thanh served as prime minister during the Jap- anese occupation . in World War H. He is known to hve kept in close contact with U.S. officials in recent years, and was repeatedly accused by deposed chief of state Prince Norodom Sihanouk of being an agent for the U.S. Central In- came as the regime was cele- brating the second anniversa- ry of the overthrow of Sihan- ouk, who has set up a govern- ment-in-exile in Peking. Cambodia has been without .a government for four days, during which five other candi- dates for prime minister re- portedly have turned down of- fers of the post, Thanh told reporters he had "imposed no conditions, but s coun- only wanted to ser74 try." He said his job would be that of "coordinator" of the council of ministers, all of whom would be chosen and headed by Lon Nol. He also said there would be an executive council and a se- curity council in the new gov- ernment, but added that "as yet no decision has been made on filling the post of vice presi- dent." Thanh's acceptance was re- portedly welcomed by Phnom Penh's protesting students, whose main target was former Prime. Minister-Delegate Siso- wath Sirik Matak. He is ap- parently now completely out of top positions in the govern- ment after acting as Lon Nol's right-hand man in the first two years of the war. Approved For Release 2000108/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/1 iI V T P?80-01601 R000400200001 14 MAR 1972 Goc9mpe ~ oG c ~~ Daily World Foreign Department from combined news sources The World Council of Peace has called on more _ than ' 100' of its national peat committees to implement the program for a worldwide Week of Solidarity with the In< dochina Peoples. ? The Week of Solidarity. being held this week is to include dem- onstrations, meetings, rallies and campaigns protesting the contin- uation of the U.S. aggression against Vietnam, Laos and Cam- bodia and demanding the with- drawal of U.S. and allied forces. . Meanwhile a massive drive to annihilate the Khmer Rouge, or Cambodian patriotic forces, en- tered its fourth day, with more than 50,000 Saigon puppet troops supported by U.S. aerial and ar- tillery forces conducting a "search - and destroy" operation in Cambodia. Puppet regime near collapse The puppet Saigon trbops were ordered into Cambodia as a po- litical crisis threatened to topple the puppet government in that country headed by Prime Min- ister delegate Gen. Sisowath Sirik Matak, a. compradore cap-. italist and arch conspirator against the Cambodian people. The gavernmental crisis came to a head Friday when the inval- ided Lon Nol, crippled by a stroke, took over from Cheng Heng as chief of state and dis- solved the National Assembly. Lon Nol, who had seized pow- er with the aid of the U.S. Cen- t/ tral Intelligence Agency while former head-of-state Prince No- rodom Sihanouk was out of the country, today proclaimed him- self president; commander-in- chief of the armed forces, and prime minister: Last week the Cambodian Stu- dent Association precipitated the crisis when it voted "absolutely no confidence" in Sirik Matak. Lon Nol claimed that he had act- ed "according to the wishes- of Buddhist monks and all compat- riots." Khmer Rouge attacked The seriousness of the Cambod- ian situation was evident in the size of the puppet Saigon force sent to buttress the Cambodian puppets. U.S. jets and helicopters were reported to be backing the Saigon forces. U.S. B-52 bombers pounded areas.believed to. be oc- cupied by the Khmer Rouge. U.S. and Saigon military spokes- men apparently got their lines crossed in reported details of the operations. One dispatch from Saigon claimed the' invasion of Cambodia had been launched to head off an attack by "North Vietnamese" troops. This is the standard jargon used by the U.S. and puppet regimes, which pur- port to see "North Vietnamese" as the only fighters in the three Indochina countries. A second dispatch from Saigon admitted, however, that the inva- sion was ordered to prevent a "guerrilla attack on Saigon," which apparently referred to the Khmer Rouge forces. This dis- patch said a force of about 25 U.S. helicopters was flying a "search and destroy" mission at tree-top level in advance" of the Saigon puppet forces. Neither dispatch admitted, how- ever, the real motive for the new invasion of Cambodia-the need to protect the Cambodian puppets from the Cambodian people. Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 EARTH Approved For Release 2000' :?RDP80-01601R00040020 C I A DOPE CALYPSO. by Allen Ginsberg (for Peter. Dale Scott) IN NINETEEN HUNDRED FORTY SIX CHINA WAS WON BY MAO TSE-TUNG CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S ARMY RAN AWAY AND THEY'RE WAITING THERE IN THAILAND TODAY THE WHOLE OPERATION FELL INTO CHAOS TIL THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE CAME INTO LAOS I'LL TELL YOU NO LIE I'LL SPREAD NO RUMOR OUR BIG PUSHER THERE WAS SOUVANNA PHOUMA SUPPORTED BY THE C I A PUSHING JUNK DOWN _AqAY FIRST THEY STOLE FROM THE MEO TRIBES UP IN THE HILLS THEY STARTED TAKING BRIBES THEN THEY SENT THEIR. SOLDIERS UP TO SHAN COLLECTING OPIUM TO SELL TO THE MAN PUSHING JUNK. IN BANGKOK TODAY SUPPORTED BY THE C I A BROUGHT THEIR JAM ON MULE TRAINS DOWN TO CIIIENG MAI THAT'S A RAILROAD TOWN SOLD IT NEXT TO POLICE CHIEF BRAIN Ht TOOK IT TO TOWN IN THE CHOOCHOO TRAIN TRAFFICKING DOPE TO BANGKOK ALL DAY SUPPORTED BY THE C I A THE POLICEMAN'S NAME WAS MR. PHAO HE PEDDLED DOPE GRAND SCALE AND HOW CHIEF OF BORDER CUSTOMS PAID BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE'S U.S. AID THE WHOLE OPERATION NEWSPAPERS SAY SUPPORTED BY THE C I A HE GOT SO SLOPPY & PEDDLED SO LOOSE HE BUSTED HIMSELF & COOKED HIS GOOSE TOOK THE REWARD FOR AN OPIUM LOAD SEIZING.HIS OWN HAUL WHICH SAME HE RESOLD BIG TIME PUSHER ADECADE TURNED GREY WORKING FOR THE C I A THREE STRONG PRINCES IN A POWER PLAY BUT PHOUMA WAS THE MAN FOR THE C I A TOUBY LYFONG HAD WORKED FOR THE FRENCH BIG FAT MAN LIKED WINE AND WENCH -PRINCE OF THE MEOS GREW BLACK MUD OPIUM FLOWED THROUGH THE LAND LIKE A FLOOD COMMUNISTS CAME AND CHASED THE- FRENCH AWAY, SO TOUBY TOOK A JOB WITH THE C ' A AND HIS BEST-FRIEND GENERAL VANG PHAO RAN OUR MEO ARMY LIKE A SACRED COW HELICOPTER SMUGGLERS FILLED LONG TIENG'S BARS IN XIENG QUANG PROVINCE ON THE PLAIN OF JARS IT'STARTED IN SECRET THEY WERE FIGHTING YESTERDAY CLANDESTINE SECRET ARMY OF THE C I A ALL THROUGH THE 'SIXTIES-THE DOPE FLEW FREE THRU TAN SON NHUT SAIGON TO MARSHALL KY AIR AMERICA FOLLOWING' THROUGH TRANSPORTING CONFITURE FOR PRESIDENT THIEU ALL THESE DEALERS WERE DECADES AND TODAY THE INDOCHINESE MOB OF THE C I A -- January 5, 1972 Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R00040020 MONTGOMERY, ALA. ADVE~W 11972 t~ M - 61,769 S - 80,831 THE CENTRAL Intelligence It includes t h eIA in t A Light Checkrein On The CIA agency's budget to be kited by a A favorite method is for another Agency gets a large chunk of its funds through hidden channels. . oversight panel are angry. They contend CIA activities around the world have a decisive effect on the conduct of U.S. diplomatic policy. They have taken action to by- ?pass Stennis and to gain some measure of control over CIA funds, personnel and activities by writing new curbs into the foreign aid certain amount, then that amount is declor-ed surplus and transferred to the CIA. In this manner, only a handful of people know what has occurred, most. of them in the Executive branch. There is an oversight committee of the Senate made up of senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, plus four members of the Foreign Relations Committee. As chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Sen. John Stennis of Miss. presides over the group, which is supposed to monitor all CIA activities. Last year the oversight committee didn't meet a single time. The Foreign Relations Committee members on. the Laos. authorization bill. The bill, signed by President Nixon the other day, requires for the first time a reduction in military personnel working for the CIA in activities similar to the assistance and advisory groups now operating in Cambodia and $341,000,000 ceiling on aid o Cambodia and requires'CIA ar s transfers to be counted against the military aid appropriation. The CIA is reported to have warehouses filled with arms at various points in Southeast Asia for distribution-to anti-communist guerrillas. The CIA will be forbidden to pay foreign troops - such as the 4,800 "volunteers" in Laos - more than their' counterparts in the U.S. armed forces. The bill specifical- ly, places the CIA under existing restrictions on giving arms to forces in Asia. It will require quarterly reports to Congress on Cambodia and annual reports on foreign aid. CIA assistance will. be included in the totals, althoughit will probably not be pinpointed. These regulations will increase congressional supervision over, shadow wars, but the language is not so tight as to prevent some circumvention, if the CIA. is supported by the White House. The National Security Council, the President's consultative committee to which the CIA reports, has the final decision on the agency's activities. However, the new controls should require the CIA to think twice before committing the U.S. to clandestine wars, as it has done, years. Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R00046200bQ1=8 CHARLOTTE, N.C. 013SERVER M -.174,906 - 204,225. 'Congress And CIA Control. The Central Intelligence Agency, a sat of world power unto itself these many years, is going to have to join the Union at last. The Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee put its foot down recently and slopped some new controls on the CIA when it prepared the foreign aid authori- za.ion bill. President Nixon signed the bill last week. The controls mean the CIA will be limited in the number of military person- ?r nel it can use for its projects; in how .. much it can pay foreign troops; and in the amount of arms it can distribute i other countries. One objective of the Foreign Rela- tions Committee was to curb CIA activity to Cambodia, where the committee feared the agency might generate anoth- er war, as it helped to do in Laos. Thus, aid to Combodia is limited and the CIA must make quarterly reports on that country to Congress. The new limitations are not air-tight. More are probably needed. But the Con- gress has at last put a firm hand on the reins for the first time since the CIA was created in 1947. Approved For Release 2000/08/16 CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 - : Ea 1 ?_197Z STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/08/16 CIA-RDP80-01601 R0004 YORK, PA. RECORDFEB . 1 7 1972; M - 33,894 Through the efforts of a handful of U.S. senators, controls have at long last been placed on the operations, cost and i personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. These cui bs are contained in t1 Toreign aid authorization bill.signed last week by President Nixon. { Credited with providing the controls are Senators Clifford Case of New Jersey, Frank Church of Idaho and Stuart Symington of Missouri. All are {members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Together with ? -Sen. William Fulbrfght, committee chairman, they have protested in- .creasingly that Congress has too little knowledge of the CIA's activities, particularly in Southeast Asia. According to the New York Times, Senator Case urged last summer a tightening of restrictions over the Defense Department's use of its funds overseas and over its power to transfer "surplus" military material' to other ;,U.S. agencies. Senator Case, the Times said, insisted that the CIA be included it U.S. involvement in Cambodia .develop surreptitiously, as he said it had in Laos. Such restrictions, the senator said,. N e A007 - -Curbs,on th (L "would prevent the circumvention of- congressional intent in funding of activities such as the Thai troops in' Laos through the CIA rather than! through more open government agencies." . A number 'of senators, particularly. those serving on the Foreign Relations Committee, have complained. over the years regarding the lack of congressional knowledge and control over military action abroad. The disastrous "Bay of Pigs" invasion of Cuba soon after John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency in 1961 was one of the major operations planned secretly by the Central Intelligence Agency. Since 'then the agency has been blamed or received credit for masterminding various coups and revolts in various parts of the world. The CIA, by the nature of its in- telligence work, must indeed have privacy. But when it comes to involving the nation in military operations abroad, and otherwise affecting foreign policy, the CIA should be responsible to Congress as well as the President for its actions. The curbs that were placed on the agency last week are a start iu that direction. Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : LISA fl#t3k 6-0& R000400 12 FEB 1972 ommumsts ff"orce Hah Washington Post Foreign Service among the ruins were provid- 11- ing intelligence to the govern Feb PHNO1tiI PENH . , For the first time since the an- ment on enemy movements clent city of Angkor was occu. and supply routes. ,pled .. by Communist forces in . As many as 10,000 Cambodl-' June, 1970, conservationists ans flocked to the temples in have been forced to give up the past. 20 months because the ? never-ending struggle to there was so little likeihood of preserve the temple ruins, fighting there. Market places French archeologist Bernard Groslier, the only Westerner sprouted amid the old pillars m;++e,d to and peace prevailed. h d b n h a ee per w o cross , enemy lines and super- j vise the work of 1100 Cambo-i than laborers and technicians, 'bodian soldiers are reported to the ground that some of their have fanned out south, east, money was supplied by the and west of the temples from government of Marshal Lon the nearby town of Siem Riep. Nol. Military sources here stressed The workers left in such a that the troops are moving hurry that they left behind slowly and very cautiously. some $2 million worth of equip- The temples are occupied by ment at the sites and in ? a the 204th North Vietnamese I suspended, the Cambodian I 114$LltGllb, 111UUU Uil U1 1VV1611 Vietnamese a n d Vietcong e C di b .lon am o an %JV111munists.? the- conservation worx there quietly left for Paris in late ~ militar b aerations in the vicin- are also ' Januar ++ i present, but relations has been a new spate of re- y. I ity of the temples. The possi- between the Cambodians and He left after receiving a been ports that the temples are warning that the Communists!, bility that there might be an Vi Vieettnamese mere sources have not m Penh being looted by Communist , in had accused him of being a effort to retake the area with soy troops and artwork smuggled -CIA agent and were planning force is not ruled out. to Hong Kong and Bangkok. On Thursday, the Just how tangled the gala- ze i m that morning as y, govern tions are was illustrated by The government dispatched he rode to the Angkor Vat ment announced it had exam-1 one Cambodian official who experts, including the director ruins on his bicycle. Five of fined the 1954 Hague Conven-; said that of the national museum, to on the night of Jan. his team leaders actually were tion on protection of historic 20 the Vietcong organized a both places. They reported time and abducrted, and are. it is unknown deci d monuments that it wasinot barred demonstration lagers -aamong the vii h earls valuede frond $other 10,000rto lagers against the presence of .v Government sources here! from taking military action if Cambodian Communists and i $2 million missing. said Groslier told them he it decides such steps are abso- then, when it was over, ac- 1 Western experts, while not would seek the help of nego-j lutely necessary. cused the villagers of making i disputing that some smuggling tiators at the Paris peace talks;{ Arguing against such aitrouhle. is evidently going on, pointed Since the first incident, .,other Cambodian workers-es- timates vary from 20 to more than 100-have been seized. Many others have fled with The shift in the Cemmu- an artillery round damaging nists' attitude towards the res- Angkor Wat. toration project clearly in- "We do not even send in pa- creases the danger that the his. trols in this area" the spokes- toric ruins may be damaged man, Col. Am Ron,, said, "be- by natural causes. Experts in cause we are afraid the other Phnom Penh say that the mostiside would take the opportu- immediate threat is the rainy nity to destroy our temples." season, now three months off. In the meantime, an esti- Eventuall'y, according to the 'mated four brigades of - -- ? Cam- experts, weak scaffoldings could tumble from around the nearly 1,000-year-old walls and bat guano, among other things, could turn the stone to dust if allowed to grow thick with time. But the end of the restora- - tion work has important politi. cal and military implications as well, raising the liossibilityj that the North Vietnamese; and their Cambodian allies' may be planning to put the - ruins to some new use. Diplomats also suggested that the Communists may - have acted because they de- cided that some of the Cambo- in reopening the temples and move is the very strong emo It was early the next morn. out that the statues turned up tional attachment Cambodians ing that the Vietcong went outside Cambodia even before profess to feel for the ruins. through the temples with a the war. "We value those temples as loud speaker denouncing Gros- The Cambodians have ex- much as our lives," a govern-.liar and his "coolies" as Am- pressed their concern about ment spokesmen said last erican spies and saying that the end of the restoration spring in denying a report the villagers would support work and the looting in nu- Cambodian forces when they merous cables to the United invaded the grounds. Nations calling on the world The Communists also at- body to declare the temple tacked the conservationists on area a neutral zone. WOT, k- at An"?- or Coincidental to the end of Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 Approved For Release 2000/08' ~ 0P80- 1601 R00040020000 Unquote Regular listeners to the Agence Khmer d'Information, take note. This is the rebel radio station in Cambodia that emits a stream of propaganda calcu- lated to damp the ardour of General Lon Nol's soldiers. Lots of people quote The Economist, but you can trust the AKI to quote it in its own way. On December Loth, for instance, the AKI broadcast this passage ' supposedly culled from our pages : The Cambodian puppet army has lost a great battle. This is undeniable. Puppet General Lon Nol's situation is worsening. . . . Thus, the Lon Nol- Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh traitors cannot hide their defeat. . The only article ,in The Economist on that subject, and at about . that time, had been published nearly a fortnight earlier and had expressed a cautious optimism about the Cambo- dians' chances of holding their own. And The Economist, sorely afflicted by British reticence,, is not in the habit of dubbing politicians puppets and trait. ors. But then it pays to take anything you hear on the radio in that part of the world with a pinch of salt. The Central Intelligence Agency is said to be practising "disinformation " on the sound waves on a considerable scale, using an actor who can mimic Prince Sihanouk perfectly. And just to com- plete the confusion, the English initials used by our friends of the Agence Khmer are CIA. Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 CSNII CT0?I kOS~, Approved For Release 2000/dBiiJl JECl4RbP80-01601 R000400200001 34Dd m L I vo, By Peter Osnos Washington Post Foreign Service PHNOM PENI-I, Dec. 18--, While enemy forces make damaging advances in the countryside, an important contest for leadership is cur- rently taking place among Cambodia's senior political and military leaders, accord- ing to diplomatic sources here. .Deals are bean; struck and alle:;ianccs spitted that ebuld when completed pro- duce a dramatic overhaul, even the equivalent of a coup d'etat, or perhaps noth- ing more than a reshuffling of some of the old personali- ties. The departure of Marshal Lon Nol, the ailing ]lead of government whose primacy is being increasingly criti- ~ized by those beneath him, would certainly be the most significant change. It is be- lieved a strong possibility. The marshal tried to re- tire last spring, but was then persuaded to stay on. Now there are signs he doesn't want to go. This week' he promoted to gen- eral eight officers in an ap- parent effort to consolidate his position, Logical Successor break with the past, there Tacit Agreement are indications that each is 'For the first time since promising to deal at long the fighting began in Cam- last with the problems of cor? podia such a prospect is ruption and inefficiency being seriously discussed, at that are crippling the coun- least in certain small circles try. and always in whispers. If it Thanh, who led a CIA su 1 Jcame to pass, more likely 1 tl,- nnf the agreement ported movement against Prince Sihanouk for many years, has support among many younger military offi- cers and is courting major Buddhist monks. In Tani has proved himself an able ad- ministrator. and talks much about organizing the coun- tryside. Details of the leadership struggle are difficult to fol- low day to clay for even the most astute foreign observ- ers who only know that it is going on because Cambo- dian friends and contacts privately tell them so. Morale Low From these and other con- versatians they sense also that public and official mo- rale has fallen sharply in re- cent weeks-lower, it is said, than at any time since war spread to the country in March, 1-970. While the decline may merely be a passing phe- nomenon, brought on by a series of military defeats, it is stall serious in a country major asset in a war Tho logical successor to be virtually d Lon Nol would be Caen. Siso- doer control is has ar- wath Sirik 1llatak, his pow- co ndl has been an pr- erful number two (officially de ent and enthusiastic pa- erful t1'1Ot15n1. p r i m e minister-delegate) Many of the young intellcc- and the man favored by the tuals and professionals who U.S. embassy as the most flocked to the government pragmatic and W'estern?ori- after the toppling of Prince ented of Cambodia's top Sihanouk are now said to be echelon. quietly bowing cut as they Others prominently men- the regime to carry on. tioned are In Tani, a former As for the beleaguered deputy prime minister dis Cambodian army, some ana- missed by Lon Nol in Octo- ]!,,St., believe that if its f would be a tacit one, never made public, to' stop fight- ing. One diplomat who is espe- cially sensitive to the cur- rent manucvei'in-s believeti the Cambodians, under such an arrangement., would effectively cede control over that part of the country cast of the Mekong River where North Vietnamese are bat- tling; South Vietnamese. This would leave a neu- tralized Cambodia consist- ing essentially` of the major towns and 'the rice-rich Western provinces, with the Communists retaining con- trol over the sparsely popu- lated northeast where they have held sway since the early days of the war. Critical events in Cam- bodia never seem to have the urgency they might else- where, but in the jockeying now going on there is an ap- parent awareness that while the malaise in Phnom Penh deepens the Communists are making headway. Depressing Picture` Military successes are one aspect. of the energy ad- vance. But in the depressing picture painted this week by both Cambodians and for- eig_ ners there was also talk of limited Comninnist politi- cal progress in organizing the population and recruit- ing cadres. The principal handicap of the Sihanoukists now in Pe- king exile and their North Vietnamese mentors has been the Cambodians' abid- ing nationalism demon- n ' to sinx under strated in the raising of a -- /dues; and Son Ngoc Thane; lips __ t/ ti+n was a Son minister 30 the pressure of a deter- 1130,000 man volunteer force Mined Communist offensive, in a matter of months. years ago and then went a overnment might emerge The nationalism remains into exile. lie is now an ad- -, rt , that is prepared to negotiate but: as the fighting drags on viscr to the government. with the Communists to pie- and tens of thousands of (largely to-avoid U.S., South Vietnamese and Cambodian government strikes) the. Communists solicit support by pledging peace, agricul- tural aid, an end to corrup tion and lower prices. In their favor are tight or- ganization and rigid disci- pline which elminate the de- pradatioiis so often commit- ted by South Vietnamese soldiers and ,Cambodian gov- ernment troops. The North Vietnamese army and Viet- cong are ordered to pay for their food rather than steal it and keep out of the vil- lages as much as possible. While there were no more than a few thousand Cambo- dian Communists--Khmer Rouge--20 months ago; the prevailing estimates now. range from 15,000 to 20,000, fully one-third of the Com niunist forces. Loyal Recruits Most of these recruits are nominally at least, loyal to Sihanouk's' National United Front of Cambodia. For the most part they play a military role subordi- nate to the North Vietnam- ese and Viefeong but that too is said by intelligence gained from defectors to be slowly changing with some Cambodians now being given commands. The U.S. embassy is acutely aware of the present situation and is sending word back to Washington in what surely must be the gloomiest cables since the very early days of the Lon Nol government. While none of these on vent an outright defeat. people become refugees the' surfacc_ civo be ef For Release 2000/08/1-6 ': CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/16 CIA-RDP80-01601 R0004 OIL CITY., PA. DERRIC& a 197 - 14,890 - own ifld4J In the last five years we have heard various reasons for our violent presence in Vietnam. We had commitments; we wanted self-determination for the South Viets. And our GIs were told that they were fighting in Southeast Asia to keep war from the beaches of California. So we have not felt this war's outrageous im- mensities. Unless one of ours was a casualty. And we sit satisfied that our President is "winding down the war." Some say he is merely substituting brown bodies for white. But how much longer will we keep converting their "green earth" into brown dust? In one of those wind-down years, April 1969, one "clandestine raid" (so described by Paul It. Ehrlich and John P. Holdren in Saturday Review) by Air America, an airline of the U.S. Central In- telligence Agency defoliated 173,000 acres in eastern Cambodia. It damaged about one-third of Cambodia's rubber crop and damage to local fdod production was severe. Presumably the defoliation of 173,000 Cam- bodian acres prevents this same from happening to 104,000 Crawford, 24,300 Venango, 28,600 Warren, and 2,800 Forest county crop-producing acres. By late 1969, more than five million acres of Indo China had been treated with defoliants applied at an average of 13 times the dose recommended by the USDA for the domestic use. Those millions represent, more acres than all Pennsylvania farms used for crop production in 1967, according to the Pennsylvania Statistical Abstract of 1969. For Southeast Asians it's often fatal to be down- wind from the "wind down." J. Approved For Release 2000/08/16: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/16_ CIA-RDP_80-01601 R000 CHICAGO, ILL. SUNS-TIMES 1d _.536,103 S 709,123 ___-- ~ 61>,t> 4 if Many of its seem to believe President Nix- on's protestations that the Vietnam war is being wound down. We see casually figures of -five to eight a week and we tend to think it is all over. Alt of which shows how callous and arrogant we have become, as a people, recent New York Times story told of a military hospital in South Vietnam with 1,800 'beds that currently cares for 4,500 wounded `soldiers --- two to a bed, hundreds on the floor. The carnage obviously is far from over. Unfortunately, because the dead have yel- low.instead, of white or black skins, far too many Americans drink the htvar is over. Out of sight, it seems, out of mind. If the news- papers have buried the war on Page 3I the readers don't think it exists. Yet Mr. Nixon 'continues to rain =50,000 bombs on Indochina, a year--almost half the bombs dropped by .the U.S.Air Force in all of World War II. And by all the evidence, the American stir force intends tbstay on in Vietnam indefinitely. Thicu recently said there would be a residual force of 50,000 U.S. troops glus two combat divisions by the end of 1972. That's about 110,- 000 troops. Defense Sec. Melvin R. ),aircl and President Nixon have both made it?clear that despite all the talk of withdrawal a large resid- ual force will Continue to occupy Vietnaiii. I 'now that the President has said he will keep his word about ending the war. Do you remember what he said in April, 1970, when he invaded Cainbocbn? That all troops would be out within 30 clays and that there would be no air action in Cambodia in support of the Canibodian army? What of the pledge not to' conduct military campaignsin Laos or to pay :for mercenary foreign armies? We are cur- rently up to our ears in a CIA war in that little Country.' V'~a c"r We have a long way to go before America turns around and the American government begins to respond to the wishes of its people -:to stop' the war and shed our militarism. Many of its are tired from years of shouting, -demonstrating, writing letters, picketing. But isn't it clear that when we relax our pressures, the Nixon administration .and the Pentagon continue to flout the undisputed desire of the, people for peace? Chicago area chairman, - Women for Peace t Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400200001-8 11O1MlGII POLICY Approved For Release 2000/08/16: CI RP POI 01800040020000 f ~1 +~ T,f~.i~~ 7il}j0.ri1pm 1~\ t?iii~eEl~ U' iJi[ A by John 1'. Leacacos operates within the NSC systcnl and , als utilizes it as a forum to establish whatev policy position is preferred by his Stat Department; but he side-steps the r:sc o occasion to carry his demurrer, dissent alternate position to the President privatel Atop WYWashiilgton's complex foreign affairs -Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird bureaucracy sits the National Security Coun- cil, a 24-year-old body given new status in 1969, when President Nixon moved to make it a kind of command and control center for his foreign policy. The new Nixon Nsc sys- tem, run from the White House by Henry, A. Kissinger, has now existed for nearly three less personally involved in. the -,,-Sc proces having apparent indifference to wJiat believes is unnecessary nsc paperwork, whic he leaves to his deputy, David Packar Laird's main clay-to-day operational preocc pation is with the exit of U.S. forces fro Vietnam. His International Security Affai Bureau in the Pentagon performs poorly Washington bureaucratic standards. years, producing 138 numbered study memo- randa, reaching 127 formal decisions, and employing a permanent staff of -about 120 personnel (more than double the pre-Nixon figure). Though the substance of its opera- tions are necessarily secret, interviews with officials permit tentative evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the Kissinger rise. There is broad agreement on the follow- ing seven points- --The NSC has served President Nixon more or less as he desired, that is, in Iiie ordered style of formal ans~~?ers to detailed questionnaires. The volume of this paperwork has at times been staggering, but it has sharpened focus ot1 the search for policy Choices. --The answers and alternatives for action. "corning up through the irse" have produced few panaceas, but have contributed greater coherence of outlook in foreign affairs man- anement. NSC recommendations are more -The influence on foreign policy of tl' military, including the joint Chiefs of Staff, who are usually represented in the rrsc proc- ess, is at the lowest point in several years. This has been attributed to the anticlimactic winding-down atmosphere of the Vicfliam war, and to the fact that the Chiefs' once die- hard views and abstract argumentation on strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union have been successfully emulsified into the Nixon-Kissinger basic prinCipleS for SALT negotiations- with Russia. Kissinger has com- meilted: "In, my experience with the military, they are more likely to accept *d ecisions they do not like than 'any other group." From time to time, gears have clashed within the system. The State. Department has complained bitterly of the "Procrustean bed" fashioned by the .Kissinger staff. Meeting excessive White House demands, bureaucrats pragmatic than academic, reflecting Kis- allege, robs State and Defense of manpower singer's view: "We don't make foreigU I? n policy hours needed for day-to-day'operations. After by logical syllogism." his first year; Kissinger conceded: "Making Explicit insistence on the "limited" foreign policy is easy; what is difficult is its nature of U.S. power and the need for coordination and implementation." greater -restraint and cautious deliberation White Howe r SC staffers, on the other about its exercise have been reinforced at the hand, exuberant at their top-dog status, ex-. highest level by Nixon's habit of withdrawing :, cl,,aree of condescension for the work d of to make final decisions in solitude an of the traditional departments. In 1969 Kis-. frequently deciding on no-action rather than singer staffers rated State-chaired studies and accepting advice to initiate new action. recommendations only "50 to 70 percent -By being close to the President and keep- acceptable" and based on ' mediocre reporting ?ing his fingers on all aspects of the rise which failed to sift wheat from chaff in the process personally, Kissinger without question political cables constantly arriving from 117 is the prime mover in the NSC System. The U.S. embassies' overseas. The Kissinger staff question arises whether the NSC would fund- say that they. have to hammer out the real tion as effectively without Kissinger, and choices on the hard issues, since a cynical and whether it can bequeath a heritage of.accom- sometimes bored bureaucracy offers up too plishnlent to be absorbed by the permanent really "straw o )tions"State's planners, for .'machinery oP KPLy 1- or Release 2000/08/i1 ; ql#. -Secretary of State William P. Rogers Approved For Release 2000/0 Approved For Rel e ,se.-2000/08%16 , CIA-RDP8a 0i601R00040 CH USTIAl S CI EI4CE } O-NUTOR Approved For Release 2000/08AEV: - F9~80-01601 R00040020 Ty George V1. Ashw6ytli The Christian Science Monitor With Senate passage of drastically chopped foreign-aid legislation, the future prospects for the Nixon doctrine remain very much in 'doubt. Beyond that, it is clear now that there is a widening willingness on Capitol Hill to try to exercise steadily more control over U.S. handling of overseas involvement. In the past several days, the Senate has approved $2.65 billion in economic and -mili- tary aid. While still a substantial sum, the figure is about $267 million less than in the bill defeated by the Senate two weeks ago and about $000 million less than the admin- istration wanted. Close vote studied It remains to be worked out just how the .reduced funds are to be allocated, but it is clear now that the administration faces the very real prospect of seeing some of its most --1 cherished programs drastically curtailed unless agreement can be worked out in conference. 'Seen here as highly significant was the narrow passage of an amendment raising military aid from $1.2 billion to $1.5 billion. That was still less by about a half billion dollars ? than the administration desired originally. And the closeness of the vote, even in the light of the reduction, did not appear here to portend well for the future of military aid at present levels. It is quite likely that in future years the administration may find itself very hard- pressed to do nearly as well in gaining ap- o An amendment proposed by Sen. Clif It is probably true that the future of mili- ford P. Case (R) of New Jersey to prohibit tary assistance and security-related cco- nomic assistance will hinge largely, sources Laos in Thailand ercenarie th , , s e Ilse of m -believe, tipon what happens between now and North Vietnam was . approved. This and the next budget-consideration. time in theoretically would bar, according to the the war in Vietnam. If between now and wording of the amendment, the 'present then the American pullout is completed or payment of Thai irregular forces for use.,,,nst comn}eted without a ereat disaster, try to have the amendment killed in con many on Capitol Hill who have been giving ference and may not abide by it even if the administration a hard time this year will be less belligerent as.the level of,friis- proved. apl tration falls. o Another amendment removes service- Essentially, it is crucial to the Nixon doe- funded military, assistance for Thailand trine that many of the present uncertainties from the defense budget and puts it under over the level of aid disappear and be re- foreign aid and., thus, 'surveillance by the placed by fairly widespread domestic and Senate Foreign' Affairs Committee, rather foreign understanding of precisely where than Armed . Services Committee. If the)tnerica can be expected 'to stand and what d d ' o. to service it can be expecte amendment survives conference, spending for Laos and South Vietnam may be shifted to the domain of the foreign ser-. vice committees. This could place the Nixon doctrine under very close scrutiny and criti- cism each year, more so than in the armed services committees, with their myriad other military concerns. o Another amendment, also by Senator Case, would strengthen the present Cooper. Church prohibition on advisers in Cambodia by including the CIA in the prohibition. Total pullout sought The Senate also approved an-a.mendment offered by Sen. Mike Mansfield (D) of Mon- tana calling for a total pullout, from Viet- nam within six months of final approval of the foreign-aid legislation. Sources in the administration and on Capitol Hill are gets-, eraIly agreed that this limitation will fail proval for heavy military assistance spend- to win-final approval: The most likely limi- ing as was done this year. Ration will be the one approved with the As finally passed by the Senate, the Mil. Military procurement authorization on call- itary-assistance program was reduced from ing for an expeditious departure v.-ith the the $705 million approved by the House to release of prisoners being the controlling $452 million; supporting assistance, from factor. the $S00 million approved by the House to There is little doubt that the administra- $566 million, plus $35 million for Israel; and tion will come out of the present arguments military credit sales from $510 approved somewhat more limited in a number of by the House to -$400 million. ._ areas. And, it is clear- that no matter what In one crucial test, the administration final decisions on money for economic and won once again approval to spend $341 for military aid carne out of conference, the military and economic assistance to Cam strictures will be much .tighter than 'the bodia. But Senate doves saw as highly Sig administration would wish. fact that the Senate had ap- - t' th ncan e proved a specific limitation of both Ameri - ' ,can personndA0prb*ddoFc$6O2 for a country. Limitation agreed to for Laos only covered money. / - The sources said that the. U. S. ritelIigence teams, which are as- signed to the American military command in Saigon, are engaged fir unannounced missions in Cam- bodia in cooperation with the Combodian army. Their activities include securing and evaluating intelligence information acquired by the Cambodians. -- Tire teams are reassigned to the missions from Phnom Penh, the Cambodian, capital. U. S. offi- cials have insisted that there are no American military personnel operating on the ground-in Cam- turnover of, another U. S. Air Force base,. at I'bu Cat; 270 miles northeast of Saigon, to the South' Vietnamese. But military sources' said that the U.S. Air Force per- sonnel would not be included in withdrawals of American troops from Vietnam. for at least the uext-several months. The closeout of the base. for U. ? S. Air Force Phantom jets also included deactivation of -the base's 12th Tactical Fighter Tiling headquarters, the conmrand said. bodia except for. the U.S. rnili-J! The 150 men of tide unit will tary equipment delivery teams. , be the last air force personnel j'TH'r'J. Y.OR ( 1>.yILY Ptu',','S Approved-For Release 2000/08/1P 7cH,e 2[ jq0-c 6Tl' Ob400 -Saigon, Nov. 16-The United States is sending Americali military intelligence :teams secretly into Cambodia despite a declaration by Washington that only American equipment: delivery teams are operating in Cambodia, sources disclosed tonight On the battlefronts of I n d o- china, a U.S. air force F-4 Phan- tom jet attacked an antiaircraft lartillerv site about 75 miles in- side Nor th Vietnam. The jet bombed the North Viet- :namese gull emplacement after _it was fired at during a mission -over Laos. It was the 76th air. strike against North Vietnam's 'defenses this year. Headquarters said the jet damaged one rf the :antiaircraft guns. Two GIs were killed when their patrol-walked into a mine field s t up earlier by another U.S. Army unit, a military spokesman said. - Transfer Another Base The. accident vas the fourth in a 48-hour period in which seven Americans were killed and nine were injured. The command spokesman said that there were no. other American casualties during that period. The,. command announced _the-, By JOSEPH FRIED Staff Correspondent of THE Nrws to be included it the current pi'p grans of withdrawal of American servicemen from-the war none. Approved For Release 2000/08/16: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 Approved For Release 2000/ 1 e8W-B160 "02000 ove~;2be? 971 that while attending school they should Vietnam it ,is {that the xceliti eosho ld bodia, un e n A r the aegis of the Contra me nd l ~~ vote their .dul schooling. these days the executive branch has conic cone a , 1' g STATI Mr. TALCOTT. I commend the chair- to assume that in matters of foreign china is laid waste in the process. Aud i ecially foreign policy which. with the failure of Congress to effectively li esp man and the ranking member and the po cy- full committee for trying to save some may lead to wars the Congress is under prevent the President from conducting a A 'money. I think that we can save consi- the duty to accept the judgment of the secrl war mercenathrough his. f andom and thr can derable amounts of money which are used executive - branch. in developing flying schools and in cre- To frequently the executive branch tinue our tragic involvement in South- ating flying facilities and in the main- has failed to follow the sage advice of east es A a rem ofns hisuncheck Viet do policy is teriance of aircraft and facilities if they the late Senator Vandenbur~ that the T fraud are not necessary to maintaining flying Congress should be informed and con- fiord thanhimatch d, policywever, by the proficiency. suited before the takeoff and not merely I simply wanted to be assured that at the end of the crash landing of an Ill- dented by disloca he billobef re us s owch w Theo rated .personnel who become students fated venture. meconomic any millions of Americans are suffering se of my amend- that is the purp And ent l l o vem , , are the direct result of our invo would be permitted, like other personne to fly, to keep up their proficiency, if they ment: To bring the Congress into the pie- ture before we are so overcommitted by in Southeast Asia and the continued desired. the President that it almost impossible dominance of defense spending is our -Mr. INTAHON, minutes to the gen e a afro I yield 5 to extricate ourselves. In this clay and first national priority. The defense ap- (Mr.Y to gentleman from Illinois age when wars can break out anywhere propriatiolis bill on which we will soon eaceful.fishermen and plr.nta- tion wor.';ers and 90 percent t,oman Catholic. Icier reports indicated that Lon Nol vios defiberohay trying to stir up anti-Vietnamese chauvinism in an attempt to stay in power. It was also revealed that Lon Not carried out his coup with the milifury help of "Khmer Krum,'! ethnic Cornbedions from South Vietnam, who had been trained and organized by the U.S. Central lr.telli gence r;c,'ency and who were infilircrted into Cambodia. The fol!owing report shows what ton Not and his CIA bathers did to implement their policy!lass than a month after they seized power. - Drily t'?orldForeign D;:pnrt:'iont' NEW YORK, June 1 (UPI) - craft and taken to Con Trung, Cambodian soldiers rounded tip about 30 miles south of the Caln- soine 3,000 Vietnamese and killed bodian capital. them by shooting diem in the back At about 9 a.rn., the hostages on an isolated sand dune near the were tied with their hands bo.hind Mekong liver in Cambodia on their backs and marched "along; April 12, 1970, according to a cor- the sand dunes where the soldiers respondent for Look Magazine, were waiting with rifles, Warner Denis Warner, who based in Asia reported. for Look, said he was informed "At the sound of a whistle,'' the of the slaughter by Lieu Van Tam survivor related to Warner, "the a 00-year-old Vietnamese fisher- soldiers shot them down." man, who was one of 23 surviv- Shot in the back ors. He said Van Tani told hiin According to Warner, Van Tam that all of the victims were men said the Vietnamese were shot in and boys from the Roman Catho- the back. He said the 3,000 execu- lie community in Phnorn Penh. tions took a very long tinge, since Van Tani said he escaped with the Cambodians had only 20 rifles. only a bullet crease in his skull. Van Tam told Warner he and by feigning death with two dead about 27 others survived. compatriots lying on top of him. "I 'fell with two dead men on A knock on the door me," Van Tarn told Warner. "I Van Tarn told ,'garner the itici- lay there, not moving. I did not dent began "when I heard a knock dare move." on the door, I went outisde. Im- Warner said Van Tam told him mediately, the soldiers grabbed he left when he heard the firing me and took me a?Nay. First they stop and the boats leave. Van Tani told nie to lie on the ground with said he' was captured with the tile other risen 'that they had' other survivors on -the outskirts of taken." Phnom Penh and placed in a con- "Then," Warner said Van Tani centration camp before being de- told hirn, "they.told its to standup. ported to Vietnam. with our hands over. our heads. At the time of the reported Anyone who didn't, the soldiers massacre, hundreds of Vietnamese said, would be shot." . ' . . ? t : nationals were found dead float- The Vietnamese 'were. herded irig. down the Mekong: River into aboard two Cambodian landing Vietnam from Cambodia, Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 Approved For Release 2000/08 6pi601 R00040020 few wceks?- encouraged by several promi- nent Americans-he revealed clear political intentions. Early in 1952 he began publish- ing K]luu.r Krauk (Cambodians Awaken), violating his repatriation agreement with the French. By March he fled the city to rejoin an underground resistance band in northwest Sicnu'cap province. Ile had, there, only a few hundred men and a radio transmitter. His broadcasts called upon the population to We up and overthrow colo- nial rule under the French. JD WS veith the CIA In November 1953, Siliarioul:'s efforts at influencing the French paid off and Cambodia was grantccl formal indepen- dence. Son tried to gain some control in the new regime. at I'ilnonl Penh. Unsuccess ful, he rein rued to the armed ha id in the By Charles Meyer 1 icific Nec.'c'Serricc Lou Nol's recent abdication of power in Phnom Penh Iva once again brought into the spotlight the man who in the CIA has long sought to impose upon Cambodia. Only three months after the coup of March 1970 which overthrew Prince Norodom 'Sihanouk, most pol]tic]ans in the Cambo- dian capital were predicting a short term for Premier Lon Not and naming as his 1/ probable successor Son bloc Thaull. Son was born 1)ec. 7, 1908 ik Ky La, South Victnam, of a Cambodian fattier and a Vietnamese mother. After attending a French high school, he moved to Phnom Penh in 1937; a functionary in the govern- ment there. The same year lie started a nationalist gfoup which publishc-J the'. first native language journal, Nagaravatta (Land of the Pagodas). In 1941, French Indochina', still techni- cally ruled by the Vichy government, granted the use of military facilities to the Japanese, in exchange or maintaining French sovereignty over Vietnam, Cambo- dia and Laos. Soil immediately became all active collaborator with the Japanese Black Dragon Society, which aimed at owertlu'ow- itlg the French. On the verge of arrest by French authorities in the summer of 194t Son. fled to Tokyo. With defeat imminent, the Japanese. aboheited the colonial administration in March 1945 and imprisoned all French citizens in Cambo;tia. A month later Son appeared in Phnom Pcnh as a Japanese captain. and became minister in charge of rela?ticort" with the Japanese command. On Aug. 10 a palace revolt inspired by Son and supported by the Lempelai (Japanese po- lice) forced Sihanouk, then king, to confer upon Son the office of prime minister: Following the collapse of Japanese pow- er,,Sihanouk on Oct. 8 secretly delegated a cabinet minister to go to Saigon for the avowed purpose of discussing "certain questions" with the French command. A week later French Gen. Leclerc arrived in Pllrlolll Penh and arrested Sou. Ile was put in the Saigon jail a nd then sentenced to forced labor for collaborating with the Japanese. Soon, he was scant to France and put under house arrest. After several royal interventions, Son was pardoned in October 1951. Ile re- turned to Phnom Penh on the agreement that he would abstain from all political activities. Ile refused the, ministerial port- folio Sihanouk offered to him, but within a northwest, where defections during his absence had weakened the ranks severely. his political constituency gone, in the wake of Fre.ix1; maneuverings, Son was forced to ally himself with the CIA. In January 1956 the final blow was struck, as government troops a ttackecl his camp near the Thai border Lillin 108 nlcn and destroying the radio station. Son and a few men escancct and entered the service of One But Cambodian public opinion rernaius very unfavorable to Son. The urban youth is violently hostile to him. Ile therefore continues to live in Saigon, where lie has the solid support of the South Vietnamese puppets and the entourage of U.S. Ambas- sador Bunker. More importantly, he enjoys the loyalty of the Cambodian armies trained by American Special Forces units, who consider him a "spiritual father." Son has also renewed his tics with the Japanese groups which carried him to power in 1945. Representatives from Tokyo consult him on their Indochinese political and economic questions. Son Ngoc Tlianh wants to redeem the. defeats that impeded his political life, and now anxiously awaits his hour. "Tire CIA, which has backed Son for fifteen years, will be happy to make good his losses. C'har/es Meer was edito -in-chkf of the tilaga- Ai nc Ftt:dcs Cc. ml oclgiennes (Cambodian Studies) and Nokor Khmer. From 1957 l/nolrgll 1970 he tray a counselor to the cebinct of Silr^nouk and cortinnued as such to Lou Nol until June' 1970, (.'IA in Don~,ko!c. Allhoug?n'his moot nicilt-now known as. the 1; hmer Serai (Frei Cambodia)--lire] been crushed, the CIA revived it steadily and built it into an army of 5000 ethnic Cambodians. Most of these men were recruited from Cambodians living in Thai- land and South Vietnam. The mercenary army was based on Thai territory, from which it launched' sabotage missions. Soil became a front for these operations and plots, mounted jointly by the CIA and U.S. Army Intelligence in Bangkok and Saigon, against Sihanouk and Cambodian neutral- ity. The Khmer Scrai, transformed into the "National Liberation Front of Cambodia" (sic), announced on May 15, 070, its support for the regime which grew out of the. coup'under Gen. Iron Nol. Son, how- ever, secretly entered the capital as his supporters began to prepare for a returrt to power. Lon Not who had the full hacking of the Pentagon, wasn't about to step down for the CIA's roan. Son had to settle for the post of principal advisor to the premier. Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 ITP;1 N.01 "K TIME'S Approved For Release 2000/08/16: CIA-RDP80-01601 R0004002 27 MAY 1971 CAMBODIAN FOR MS secret landing zones in Itatta- k BY SPIES REPORTED PNOMPENIH,, Cambodia, May 26 (AP)-Twelve-nian teams of Cambodian troops, trained by v Central Intelligence Agency per- sonnel at a base in Laos, suc- cessfully infiltrated deep into Communist-held territory in Cambodia two months ago, ac- ccrding to Western sources here. ;' The sources said about 20 such intelligence teams were flown last March from a base near Pakse in southern Laos tol na i, i, Stuug bong and Preah Vihear provinces in northern Cambodia. The entire reL ion has been controlled by North Viet- namese and Vietcond forces since early last month. The teams. were said to have re- turned' after a month. The sources said the Cambo- dians were flown aboard heli- copters from the United States air base at Udorn, Thailand. American pilots and crewmen in uniform were aboard some of the aircraft, the sources stated, Other helicopters were: manned by Thai crews, accord ing to the sources. Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 R ..v N Approved For Release 2000f /A-.YCWDP80-01601 R000400 (AP)-A Green Beret officer says he took part in a secret mission in lyb( aesignea to aid'in the overthrow of Cam- ouk, the Norfolk Virginian- Pilot reported in its Sunday Capt. John McCarthy, 28, who said today he will resign his. Army commission. in Au- gust, said the clandestine op- Irected from South Vietnam by / the Central Intelligence f Agency, the paper reported. The mission was, known as peration Cherry," the paper said, and involved McCarthy, ;w=orking under cover, and members of the Khmer Serai :'. MarcIi1970,,a out a month lie- fore American South Vietnam- . .. ese troops entered the country to bit Communist ' supply bases... consistently' :denied having anything ' to'_ do with.. Sihan- ouk's downfall. .. McCarthy said he is leaving the Army because the govern- ment had suppressed defense . "I have come to the conctu= sion that.loyalty, silence and :faith were to no avail," the :Virginian-Pilot quoted him as La society of Cambodians work CAPT. JOHN McCARTHY JR. ng to oust Sihanouk. -.. alleges.ClA operation t ??The Pentagon today denied Aan.y> , riefused to elaborate on the knowledgge of Operation Cherry:' n e:wspaper article. .. 4 McCarthy 'served t< to years Asked if it was far-fetched; to say Cambodians may have Iin 'a federal prison for the :murder of a Cambodian mer- ;cenary before his conviction been hired for . "Operation Cherry," McCarthy said, "No." was overturned by a military But he refused further com-, ~'ourt of appeals. Reached at! ment. He is now stationed at" ,home ir} Arizgna Saturday,M1heIFt_Huachuca, Ariz._ SIAIINIL r. f Approved For. Release. 2000/08/16-: CIA-RDP80-01601R000400200001-8 BALTIMORE, MD. NEWS AMER Loved ForRe lease .2000/9-8/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000 E - 219,140 S - 316,275 FLAY 1 9 197, ':.By WILLIAM THEIS Chlal News American Washin ton Bure u g WASHINGTON - One year after his "40 days with the enemy" 1 as a ti i ? cap ve n Cambodia, Washington correspondent Richard Dudman is able to say of the Communist guerrillas %Oho were his guards: . "Where their brand of morality and ethics affected us' most directly was that they always respected our rights. We were never coerced or even asked to {,write or say anything we, considered untrue, nor were we kLsked to sign anything formulated DUD31AN IN HIS new book, "40 ' tanks and planes of AmericanDays with th e Enemy " ' lmperalism. So you are not safe I (Liveright), published today, among the Cambodians." recalled that he and his friends The "task force" that was in were "unmilitary" in appearance charge of Dudman, Morrow and -carrying no arms and wearing Miss Pond included "two ex, what amounted to western sport periencetl Vietnamese soldiers, a clothes. Cambodian defector, a Viet. "Beyond that, we all had been, namese-Chinese Cambodian with personally opposed to the Vietnam] limited experience," and Anh Hai, a veteran, revolutionary and war for a long time," the balding, 52-year-pld Dudman wrote.- "I am optimistic by nature and felt elated at the prospect of getting my first look at'the other side of a war I had been writing about for 10 years." r Questioned at great length until. the "enemy" was satisfied that dman and his two journalist mpanions were not oQ-I A `blindfolded, from jungle shack to that hit him after his return to village hut to escape Vietnamese, Washington. and American troops-yes. k_1 - 11 1 ~' HIS, FIRST SHOCK came, ...THREATENED, TOO, at the however when the captured trio , outset by villagers angry at' was being raced blindfolded away American invaders. _1 t from' a' village 'near where they But Dudman's story makes had been taken prisoner: Dudman, clear that his hardships were not, remembering the Communist t those of punishment. His captors massacre at Hue, was "certain suffered the -same poor food, that the same thing was going to illnesses and brushes with death happen to us." He recalled: as be. "The thought did not frighten Dudman is Washington bureau me so much as it puzzled and chief of the St. Louis Post- disappointed me. I thought to Dispatch. He had been writing myself: 'I'm right in the midst of Iftut the Indochina war for a my life. There are so many things decade when he and his compa I still want to do. Now it, looks as, so they would "not be stranded" Worts, Elizabeth (Beth) Pond of if the whole thing will be over in I the next minute or two'." on the way back to,Saigon. ,the Christian Science Monitor and Mike Morrow of Dispatch News AU he got then wasaknockon Then,: after a final banquet oft Service International were cap- the head, 'and many questions. Hisi dog, and. one false' start inter- tured ,on the highway between Vietnamese interrogator told him: Irupted by a storm, they dropped-, Saigon and Phnom Penh. 'IF YOU ARE truly interna-I the reporters in the moonlight at a It was just six days after Presi- tional journalists you will . bed village on Cambodia's Route 1. .dent Nixon had announced 'that released. If you are agents of they Back in Washington, ia Route 1. 's U.S. and South Vietnamese forces CIA, you will be treated according) had moved into Cambodia , to to the law of the count The concern was for other newsmen destro Communist sanctuaries still in the,, hands of the Com- Y Cambodian people do not know near the frontier. monists. He advised U.S. officials that there are good as well as bad not to- use military or diplomatic Americans. They know.only. the[ pressure for their release, rather I private groups of f o r e i g n r intermediaries. He concluded that the "good sense" of that advicel Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA He got the look, and with it he got out of their land rover scares from low-sweeping -U S. during a roadside stop. "We had political leader of the enemy group. DUDMIAN FIRST found trust in the enemy when at one point Anh Ba, the military leader, dropped his loaded pistol 'and ammunition =belt into the reporter's lap when fles pointed at out heads that first afternoon," Dudman wrote. r$afsra4-their release, the American trio had to write. a for- mal statement on their experience for the Communists and agreed to make a tape recording of their feelings. Hai admitted the latter was for later broadcast use but added, according to Dudman, "only after we know that you are safe." THE COMMUNISTS turned down small token farewell presents, except for a set of crude chessmen Dudman had carved during their captivity. They gave 'I;U'R00=0 210001-8 7: ST~INGTc D ILY NEWS Approved For Release 2000/08/66 MR @A80-01601 R00 - By KATE WEBB United Press Intl; narlonal The frankness of our cap- tors amazed and puzzled me. Toshiichi Suzuki of Ni- hon Denpa News and I both requested interviews and it was we who subsequently .,ran out of questions. The Vietnamese never tired of talking. It indicated, I per- sonally concluded, the con- fidence which they kept ex- pressing that public opinion was on their side thruout the world. Thru the inter- views and chats with guards, as well as what we saw, we obtained a glimpse of what has puzzled the world-how and why they fight. We, spent two weeks in a place we called Plum Ka- sat (Press V ill a g e.) It seemed to be some kind of transient camp, a collection of thatched roof "hootches" (huts) scattered under thickets of trees between two villages. We were con- fined to two small huts, one -built on the second day when it became obvious the six of us were too cramped in the first. They put Suzuki and me .in one hootch, the Cambodians in the other. There was a manger-type wooden water trough, small bamboo table, hammocks and mosquito nets. We were permitted to walk only to a "squat-hole" type toilet about 50 yards away through some trees at the rear. A lean-to bath house, with, a crock of water filled only three times before we were released, backed onto the ~,;nali hut Suzuki and I shared on those interminably long days and nights. We had no idea why we were there or for how Ion-. We sometimes lost track of the days and never saw our faces In a mirror. I made a crude sun dial out of a stick in the ground. We gauged when our twice daily. meals would come by when the cows from the east village walked past. HALF A SHELL OF WINE The monotony was broken only during our conversa- tions with the officers and casual chats with our guards. Otherwise, it was nightly Radio Hanoi broadcasts, rising before dawn for exercises and speculating on the move- ments of the villagers and 20 or so military personnel in the camp. . One night the guards gave Suzuki and me half a coco- nut shell filled with rank, fiery rice wine. It was the only night we slept well; One day we saw them pull a motorcy- cie out of a haystack. There. were. days. we huddled in a C 0 0 0. .. 10 ? ? Arl C'':JlJ LjAj bunker while U.S. "Cobra" helicopter gunships and "slicks" (Hueys) circled overhead. Sweating, we were aware that the black pajamas they had provided for me and the green uniforms given the men would identify us as part of the communist outfit if ever there was an attack. - There were daily visits from the camp doctor, a cheer- ful young kid with a shock of black hair who lanced my feet and cleaned Moonface's (Tea Kim Heang,. a free- lance photographer) open wounds. He handed out pills for fever and stomach upsets and warned us against becom- ing seriously ill because, he 'said, nothing could be done about it. We came to know and study, the camp dogs, cats and Kate Webb, 28, UPI bureau manager in Phnorn Penh, Cambodia, was captured by the communists while cover- ing military action in Cambodia last month. On Tuesday and Wednesday, she told about her capture and the long. walk to her place of captivity. In the following dispatch, the third of four, she describes how she was interrogated. and what her captors told about themselves and the Inda-? china war. chickens, the habits of ants, and made half-hearted at- tempts to learn one another's languages. But most of the time we sat, or lay, wrapped in our own thoughts and deliberately avoiding talk of home or families, Phnom Penh or freedom. INTERROGATED ALL DAY I made some diary entries on the back of a cigaret package: "Friday 19th. S. (Chhim Sarath, UPI driver interpret. er) in depths of all-time low. After yesterday's interroga- tion he sure he going to be zapped. He told me he told not .to talk to me. But said I was English and always very good. He huddles in corner silent all day. If had more paper would write essay on prisoners as domestic pets. New house means we must be in for long stay." "Saturday 17th. Ten days now and days do not vary. We told that interpreter fighting -at Pich Nil. My feet worse. Suz and I questioned by "Dad", thin man with bad eyes and girl in black pajamas, speaking bad French. We told to answer in writing 29 questions, and asked if any- thing want. Tailor measures us for clothes. What the hell iS this? Hot, hot. "Sunday 18th. Interrogated all day by young man with screwed-up index finger with wound. I call him the Fin- ger. Notice girl has wedding ring, tough face, soft voice. Dad there and two old men, one in civilian clothes and specs speaking very good French. The other squat in mil. unif. They all laugh when I ask of their difficulties with Sihanoukists. Splitting headache aster interrogation. All in French." We were given paper for the 29-question questionnaire and I asked them for more to keep a journal. Suzuki also was keeping notes, in Japanese. They made no attempt to take them or read them, and gave us each two sheets of a er for our personal use. The are b side me as I write ` Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA- RDPB?0-01601 R000400200001-8 LOS 1C LEA r, 110.1%1 10,A Approved For Release 2000/08/14 nth kr d0-01601 R000 i ~~ 4hks ~~ Lorchme Fren i ar rk - ? ri mDdo~d BY ARTHUR J. DO,11,11EN Times 5121r Writer ' C 1911, Los An;ales Times PHNOM: PENH - The French government was in touch with the top leaders of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front for at least four years before the start of the Paris peace talks, according to re- liable French sources. The contact points were in Cambodia. Through these contacts with the NLF leaders, the French govern- ment received accurate advance in- formation of such moves as the pre- parations for the 1968 Tel. offensive in South Vietnam and the decision to transform the NLF into a provi- sional government in June. 1060. The French government was thus In a unique position to make arse:ss- ments of such matters as the strengths and weaknesses of the Communist effort in Vietnam, the delicate and often ambiguous rela- ?tionship.between the NLF and Han- oi, the Communist ' leadership's readings of American willpower to continue the war, and Communist strategy.. These contacts took place on the grounds of the several French- owned rubber plantations in eastern Cambodia not far from the border of South Vietnam. They were fre- quent and continued almost up to the day Prince Norodon-r Sihanouk was ousted as Cambodian head of state. The IT ii i t e d States deliberately avoided trying, to make use of the F r e n. c h channel to the 1 LF for soundin;s? about a peace settlement,. the sources said, because President Lyndon B. Johnson want- ed to do nothing that would obligate the United States to French President Charles de Gaulle, whose hostility to American in- tervention in Indochina was Well known. American diplomats and other officials used highly valued French channels, however, on Vietnam mat- ters. And ' American' e-- perts on the Tet offensive say ample intelligence was available at U.S. head- quarters in Saigon that a major offensive was corn- ing One sourcAp13 m*ed seen many of the official documents says the top command misread the in tellience they had and t h ereby underestimated the magnitude of what the enemy planned.). The possibility that the French would pass on con- fidential information to the top NLF leadership through Cambodia ap- pears to have been a major reason why the American delegation to the talks w i t h North Vietnam, which opened in Paris in May, 19GS. consistently de- clined to take the French fully into confidence. In- stead, the Americans chose to deal with Russian diplomats, thereby giving the Soviet Union the cre- dit for serving an interme- diary role. The French contacts in Cambodia were estab- lished on such a firm working basis that when the French wanted to find out some important point of NLF policy, or to dis- cuss a minor detail such as safe passage for a French citizen driving from one place to another within South Vietnam on a par- ticular day, they had. only to pass a message to an NLF agent and a meeting with a high-ranking NLF official.. would be arranged -a day or two later. The French-N LF con- tacts.-were directed by French intelligence agents who lived with the ma- nagement staff of the plantations at Chup, Krck. llimot, Snuol and other plantation towns in Cam- bodia. The Quai d'Orsay, French Foreign Ministry, kept in touch through its embassy in Phnom Penh with the NLF's perma- nent representation in the Cambodian capital. But this channel normally did not afford the face-to-face For ReleaMe i "1dt,IIat1~Mt`c ~'1 irel.. also learned about the ex- the A in erican intelligence iste'nce of the French-NLF contacts;"'ac'cording to French sources. This re- porter has not been able to confirm this information f r o in official American sources but if the Ameri- cans knew about the con- 80-648Qt&WMA062OQOO 1ia8 the information derived from them. Known to Sihanouk The contacts, according to the. French sources here, were known to Prince Sihanouk. He did not object to them because he saw them as hastening the end of the war in Viet- nam through some kind of negotiated solution that would bring the NLF to power in Saigon but spare Cambodia from takeover by the Vietnamese Com- munists in the near fu- ture. Sihanouk was so dis- creet about the contacts that he never once alluded to them in public. The contacts also be- came known to South Vietnam and the United States, and they exerted an influence on their di- plomacy vis-a-vis France. The French-NLF meet- ings began on a systema- tic basis after the Indochi nese peoples' summit con- ference hosted by Sihan- ouk in Phnom Penh in March, 1965, at which the, NLF was represented. In- formation about there was passed to South Vietna- mese intelligence by South Vietnamese agents in Cambodia. The fear of. the Saigon govern;ne'nt that the French might be transmit- ting information of tacti- cal value to the NLF was reportedly an unspoken reason behind Saigon's decision to break diploma- tic relations with France in 1965. After the break, the French Embassy in Saigon was reduced in sta- tus to a consulate general and its staff cut sharply. . At the time of the - killer-!can-South Vietnamese in- cursion into Cambodia in May, 1970, American mili- tary intelligence in a i n- tained that the Central Of- fice for South Vietnam, the Communist headquar- ters for South Vietnam, was located in the Fish- hoo:c area of Cambodia not far from the town of Mim- ot. This headquarters was n e v e r uncovered, a n'd: American officials a r e now inclined to believe that COSVN was located' all along in the NLF Em- bassy in Phnom Penh. The French have never said anything publicly about COSVN, but their intelli- gence information is be- lieved to have been more accurate. Among the top leaders of the NLF who are reported to have had a, number of secret meetings in Cambo- dia with French intelli- gence agents is Tran Bu'u Kiem, a member of the NLF Central Committee who became the head of the NLF delegation to the enlarged Paris conference after the bombing halt in November, 1968. He is presently listed by the NLF as minister to the of- fice of the chairman of thy; Provisional Revolutionary' Government of the Repub- lic of South Vietnam. From the point of view of the NLF, the contacts in Cambodia furnished the' only available channel for a continuing exchange of information w i t h ' t h e Western world-at least until the start of the Paris negotiations' - in condi- tions as close to total se- curitv as any that could be obtained anywhere. The American Embassy in Phnom Penh had been forced by Sihanouk to Q4Z t ftiti~ cl - C ~' 1'i EW S Approved For Release 2000/08/16 PWFJj80-01601 R r>y KATE WEBB Our acquaintance with the communists began at rifle point and ended 23 clays later with hand- shakes and whispers at a pre-dawn release point. Thruout, I found in them an odd mixture of thoughtfulness. They called themselves the "Lib- eration Front of Cambodia," with the same con- scious humor that the Americans in South Viet- nam call themselves a "Military Assistance Com- -mand." They were Vietnamese, from the north and south of Vietnam, and like American GIs, they were homesick. They listened to radio Hanoi as GIs listen to the Armed Forces Vietnam Net- .work (AFVN). They complained that Cambodian tea was not as good as the tea from the planta- tions in the north.. They sang Vietnamese songs and as he walked thru villages at night, we sometimes heard Cambodian kids calling out "Viet Cong Vietnam," much the same as I have heard South Vietnamese youngsters," calling "O.K- GI." My notebook.entries for the clay of our capture were lost when the- book was confiscated, but Kate Webb, 23, UPI bureau manager in Phnom Penh, disappeared on April 7whiie covering military action in Cambodia yesterday, she told about her capture by the Viet Cong. In the following dispatch, the second of four, she tells about the long march to the place of captivity. those first moments wilt take -a long time to for- get. ? The two soldiers who had captured us tied our arms behind our backs with t a p e , vines and ropes. They ordered us, into a nearby bunker and a few moments lat- er approached with a green sack. "It's plastique (an ex- plosive widely used in Indochina)," I thought, and tried to scramble out, passing the word back to the others. We all thought.we would be blown to pieces. But the sack was for our cameras and per- sonal effe ts. One'of the soldiers sat methodical- ly taking inventory on -?~ in round North Vietnamese military canteen,, but it was not enough. We grabbed at the canteens, drained them and pleaded for more. They brought more from a nearby command post that we had passed without. seeing. - Running .silently on his thick rubber Ho Chi Minh sandals, one of the soldiers returned with the first officer we were to meet. He wore no rank insignia. Only a pistol on an American belt identified him as a superior. His uiform, drab brown shirt and green trousers, was the same as those of the common soldier. "You are invited to go to my place where there will be food and water," he said, checking the binds on our arms. "It is a short walk from here." It was the first of many walks which were nev- er short, always long. It was the worst. The trail was one we had crossed several times while trying to elude the communists. It led back to the Kirirom road, branching off from Das Kan chor, the Cambodian outpost that had been our hoped-for renclevous point with government troops. The guards stopped and hacked branches from the trees around us. With difficulty, we each held one with our bound hands. Like walking trees, we set off down the roadside, A Cambodian wearing a bright blue shirt and civilian trousers appeared from somewhere and soon the other five captives were brought back. That whispered that they had simply undergone questioning by the Viet- namese. The Cambodian, prompted by Vietnamese, an- nounced in Cambodian that we were prisoners of the Cambodian Liberation Forces. He said we were not to fear for our lives and would be taken a short way to another place. He said the Liberation Armed Forces were "humane." Our ropes were replaced with green plastic-covered wire, Mine, I noticed, were looser than the others. Tied in a chain and warned again not to run from the planes, we marched off into the night. I remember little of that walk, except that we had no shoes. We were passed by shadowy groups of troops and some girls with pony tail hair styles. Four litters moved past shadows, their bearers running at a shuffling trot. Two litters were closed, carrying dead. Groans. and screams came from another and a guard told us it was a malaria case. We were moving deep into the mountains and an artil- lery barrage started. We were herded into a three-man bunker. The guards stayed outside. The bunker was typi- cal, deep and thick with about three feet of overhead cover. The six of us crammed inside, hardly able to breathe for what seemed about 30 minutes. It also smelled-of U.S. Our party moved across creek beds, adways uphill. We were passed by 'two soliders carrying the tube of a 75 millimeter recoiless rifle on a tree branch and struggling and slithering under its weight, our geaxA p1 v> do l R%11",30spd0#{e1 %etcf14s-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 They counted.the money each of us had and not- on our I.D. cards. Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R0004 HARTFORD, CONN. TIMES APR 2 9 E & S - 135,812 S~akrvf Cmbodicrn. regime The cabinet crisis that has af- flicted Cambodia for the past _ two weeks offers a discouraging glimpse into the political health. of our coun- try's newest Southeast Asian ally. The premier, General Lon Nol, who was swept into power in the coup that preceded the American- South Vietnamese invasion a year ago, tried in vain to resign. He has suffered a serious stroke; has been hospitalized in Hawaii; has returned, under doctor's orders to spend no more than an hour a day doing any kind of desk work; and would obviously like to retire. But if he were to retire, a clique of colonels grouped around his younger brother would lose in- fluence, so they are urging him to remain, in title at least, premier. His deputy premier, General Sirik Matak, is unpopular with some fac- tions, so everyone prefers to have Lon Nol remain formally premier - even though the latest report on his health is that he is too ill to make important decisions, or to be told bad news. Meanwhile, some of the important, .decisions will apparently include the advice . and counsel of a long-time Cambodian exile, Son Ngoc Thanh. Thanh was briefly his nation's premier in 1945. His ambitions clash-. ed with those of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and Thanh fled into exile, where he encouraged the view that Sihanouk was a tool of Communism. Thanh has spent most of the last decade raising a clandestine guerrilla army to overthrow Sihanouk, with. support from the American CI;4 and possibly the Green Berets as well. With Sihanouk now overthrown, Thanh obviously feels it safe to re- appear, and the CIA is presumably glad to see him back. Whether his presence, Lon Nol's tottering premiership, Sirik Matak's enemies or the colonels and their friends will bring stability to Cam- bodia remains to be seen. Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8 C{-;-T)1r} `} 5 I A I IN I L Approved For Release 2000/0811'' :U~-'RD'80-01601R00 In a fi'med ni.2s2 2 or, ih CCth birch,-"y, Vdilfre~' Sur