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September 27, 1971
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Y.494)-.1?;GritO`ts1 ST.,C ' Approved For Release ,2001.f08/041: CIA-RDP80-0 16/7 t tra rjr; /67:), j!it."7(rt f\ C.40 i?,.f Ci r. \ , ? r A I tri \ r.. r C.;:% at- Oni a?,?? ? By JAMES DOYLE Star Staff 1';ritcr Early in 1E63 a group includ- ing former officials of the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency and the State Department setled down after dinner at the Ita.rold Pratt house, on New York's Avenue, to discuss some of the CIA's problems. A record of heir conversa- tion shows that the particular -concern of the group that night was how to provide a deeper cover for Americans gathering information by using non- governmental organitations as ? fronts. , The participants were mem- bers and guests of the presti- gious Council on r01-0,12,11 Rela- tions, men who seem to direct foreign policy from within and - ? s - - - -without the government on a permanent basis, and publishers of "Foreign Affairs," the quar- terly bible of American diploma- cy. ? ? A record of the discussion at the council's headquarters 011 that evening, Jan. 8, 1988, has been circulated to seine newspa- pers by a gioup of self-styled radical scholars based hl Cain- bridge. It portrays with some new de- tails-the structure and the style of the American intelligence community. The document is limelny in the wake of events last week in London, where 105 members of the Soviet commu- nity there, including employes from the Soviet embassy, trade delegation, tourist agency, Mos- cow Narodny Bank and Aeroflot Airline wire uncovered as espio- ' nage agents, and banned from ? the country without replace- ments. . It was a fear of just such an incident, apparently, that domi- nated the conversation at Pratt House that night. TM U.S. "emple,jos" whose cover constantly is endangered, the participants felt, are those who work in the American Em- bassies, trade delegations, and other U.S. agencies in countries around the world. ? Richard Dissel, a former depu- ty director of the CIA who left /the agency after the Bay of Pigs debacle, led the discussion. c- cording to the record made available to The Star; he. told his the classical agent used in a council colleagues agents "need to deeper cover." Dissel recounted ruefully the uproar ever the CJA's exposed . funding of the National Student Association's overseas a ctiivities Pnd said, "The CIA interface with wale:11S private groups, inc- chiding business and student groups, must be remedied." He noted that the problems of American spies overseas "is fre- quently a problem of the State Department." "It tends to be true that local allies find themselves dealing al- ways with an American and an of If i a 1 American?since the cover is almost invariably as a U.S. government employe,'" Die- sel is reported to have said. 'There are powerful reasons for this practice, and it will al- ways be desirable to have some CIA personnel housed in the em- bassy compound, if only for lo- cal 'command post' and commu- nications requirements. "Nonetheless, it is possible and desirable, although difficult and time-consuming, to build overseas an apparatus of unoffi- cial cover," Bisset is quoted aS saying. "This would require the use or creation of private organiza- tions, many of the personnel of which would be non-U.S. nation- als, with freer entry into the local society and less implica- tion far the official U.S. pos- ture." Operate under Use Non-Americans Bissel said that the United States needed to increase its use of non-Americans for espionage "with an effort at indoctrination and training: they should be en- couraged to develop a second loyalty, more or less compara- ble to that of the American staff.", Ho added that as intelligence efforts shifted more toward Lat- in America, Asia and Africa, "the conduct of U.S. nationals is likely to be increasingly circum- !seethed. The primary. change irecommended would be to build I up a system of unofficial cover. I. . The CIA might be able to melte use of non-nationals as 'career agents'' that is with a :status midway between that for ? 0ItAIIINIL and that of a staff member in- volved thlatugh his career in many operations, and well in- formed cf the agency's capabili- les." An unidentified former State *Department official -responded- to Bisset that he agreed with the! need to change coveas, noting that "the initial agreement be- tween the agency and State was intended to be 'temporary' but nothing endures like the cpLan- eral." ? ? Another participant noted that very little attention was paid to revelations of the CIA's use of supposedly. independent bpera- liens such as "Radio Free Eu- rope." he added, "One might conclude that the public is not likely to be concerned by the penetration of oversees .1.astinl- tions, at least not nearly so much as by the penetration of U.S. institutions." This participant was -quoted as- saying, "The publid doesn't think it's right; they don't know where it ends; they take a look at. their neighbors." Then he asked whether "this suggested expansion in use of private-insti- tutions should include those- in the United States, or U.S. hall- . Miens operating overseas?" In response, clear distinctions. were reportedly made between operating in the United States .and abroad, and the suggestion was made by bissell, "One Imight want CIA to expand its use of private U.S. corporations, but for objectives outside the 'United States." Fuad Demarnis Rise . The record of the discussion did not link comment and au- thor, but did give a general in- dentification of the men present: There also was a diligent remo- val from the authorized report- er's transcript of all specific ref- lercinces of agents, incidents and I the like, with one noticeable lapse. In a discussion of the effect of revelations that the CIA was fi- nancing, U.S. labor union activi- ties abroad, it was?-noted that these disclosures had simply in- creased the demand far such Ifunds from overseas labor groups. igifiiicuAdooe-4,1491 "were supported through CIA conduits, -but now they ask for more assistance than before. So, ? our expectaticns to the contrary, there has been no damage.' Those present and taking part in the disnussion included mcn who have journeyed back and forth between government and corporate work, most of whom have remained near the center of the foreign policy establish- ment. They included Bisseil, now an executive with United Aircraft Corp. in Hartford, Cohn.; former Treasury Secretary Douglas former CIA director Allen Dulles; Reltert Amory Jr., a for- mer deputy director of the CIA; Meyer Bernstein, director of in- ternational affairs for the United Steelworkers of America; cal- umnist Joseph Km-aft; former l" White House aide Theodore So- rensen of Kennedy and Johnson days; and Philip Quigg, recently, . resigned as managing editor of- Foreign Affairs. Facsimile copies of the discus- sion summary have been circu- lated by "The Africa Research Group," a dozen young scholars in-Cambridge who take a radical dissenting view of U.S.. foreign policy. Reached at his home, Eisell confirmed the authenticity of the document. He noted that in the discussion that night in New York, he had begun by saying ,that agent espi- onage was the least Valuable of three main CIA missions, behind Teconnalsance and electronic in- telligence, the two areas where, Imost CIA money is spe:nt. STATIL'\ITL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 BEST COPY Available THROUGHOUT FOLDER 6/24/98 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 A tk, 1 Approved For Relegs-fig40d-W4 : CIA-RDP8 20 S;-211-21a2111 1971 ,A7 (-,?kr-i . v-,;f 11 11 . ee ;.) the agency but are consid- sia.) topN,--77,-" ,- WI t.:',"` ,1,-; If' !., titiAit: ..)).t._) - -An4.).1.ej ercd to "overlap and inter- "After five d ' flights were act." . from the Rte - --L-The focus of classical these operation espionage in Europe and hiehiy? seerecin The written report of a confider).- other developed parts of b States, and witl tial discussion about Central Intern- the world had shifted son," reads the gence Agency ..r)perations held in "toward targets in the un- these overflight 1963, a year after the public centro- derdeveloped world." :leaked' to the versy over agency involvement with ? ____Due to the clear juris- press, the 1.1;..: the National Student Assn., sh2V,'4. zlictional boundary hee?Alave been forc the CIA was anxious to establish new tween the CIA and FBI, the' action." - contaots with other student groups, intelligence agency was The meet in foundations, universities, labor- erga- "adverse to surveillance of was not to enr?i'si nizations and corporations for its US citizens overias (even CIA missions so tpierseas wbyk. . when .specifically request- characterize gc . . ? cd) and adverse to operat- cepts and proa ? 'me discussion v.-as held in Ja1111- ?, ? ma against tar nt., in .the discussion V.:,,S 1 ary 1963 among ranking government United Sta tes, except for- of a council stu ' officials and -former officials, inclu'd- .eigners here as transients." "Intelligence a; thg several former CIA officers, " ' /u --The acquisition of a Policy. nder the auspices of the Council on by Soviet The chairim . secret speech Foreign Relations hi New York. ? . .- Premier Nikita hrush- meeting was 1 . Though no- direct quotes ore at- .chev in February 1956 was Dillon, an in v tributed in the report, the opihion a classic example of the po- banker who ha-n-0,-r. -.)., - -nitt4T-UtrUltrilln11.- 1111:112:Xtj- e was .stated by the discussion leader, laical use Of secretly ac- Washington as undersecre- the statement that "it is, Richard M. _Bissell Jr., formerly a quired intelligence. The tory of State and Secretary -notably true . of the subsi- deputy director of the CIA, that: "If State Department of the Treasury in the Ken- ?di es to student, labor and the agency is to be effective, it will the text which, according nody .Administration. ? ;cultural groups that have have 10 make use of private .institu- to cne participant, prompt- Twenty persons were recently been publicized tions on an expanding scale, thoughed "the beginning of the listed as attending ladled- that the agency's objective these relations which have `blowsre split in the Communist jog prominent former offi_ was never to control their. cannot be resurrected." ' ? . .. ... movement." Since this dials and educators -like - speech had been specifical- Harry Howe Ransom . 9c Livities, only occasionally The discussion also referred to the ' al/to point them in a Partial- . ly targeted before ac- Vanderbilt University and lar direction, but primarily continued utility of labor gvoups and quired, the results meant to Dzivid B. Truman, presi- to enlarge thcen and render American corpoiettions to CIA opera- this participant that "if yal dent of l'.1t. Holyoke. Col- them more effective." tions. No such groups or corporations . . . ? get a F-ecise target and go lege. - ? are named. ' . . '- ,In an article in the Sat- . after it you ..can change , The list 'included Allen Vrday Evening Post in May - The- written report, like otherS hiStOrY." ? ? - \V. sponsored by the council, is consid- - ?"Penetration,": by Dulles, former director 1967, Thomas Braden, who eyed by the participants as "confi- tablishing personal rola- v es- of the CIA, and Robert ?Kad helped set up the sub- ? .. dential" and "completely off the rec- tionships with _individuals Amory Jr., who had been sidies with Dulles, defend- ord." - deputy direetcr, as well as . ed the concept asa-way to ? . ' ? -. rather than simply hiring theM Bissell' .- de p- had been dep- combat the seven major 7. ' ? . ' The document is being circulated especi 'al -ly useful in the un- ' was rerfarde -d as uty director until shortly front organizations of the ' by the Africa Research Group, ?-''? derdeveloped . world. The after the Bay of Pigs Diva- . . mmunist world in which small, radically oriented organization statement ? is -made that sion, in which the CIA was the Russians through the headquartered in Cambridge,Is eecause "covert intervention on involved. use- of their international "it offers a still-relevant primer on the underdeveloped world) The discussion took place fronts had stolen tin:: great the theory and practice of CIA ma- is usually designed to oper- just a year :after revela- words such as peace, jus- " nipulations." ate on the 'internMaga- tice and freedom. al power tions by Ramparts ? balance, often with a fairly zine c o n c e r n i n g CIA-. The report shows that Shceit-terin objective." funded training of agents. the publicity had not been . The . document reflects during the '50s individual, assessments of provided "limit) the ?CIA by those present. but dramatic re: flights were let( The report includes a num- of the cancell ber of general statements: scheduled sumr ?The two elements of 4 CIA activity, "intelligence l'``yeen Fresic 'lower and collection" and "covert ac- lion" (or "intervention") - Francis G was shot down are not separated within By Crocker Snow Jr. Globe Staff STATINTL Portions of the document are scheduled to appear today in the "-University ?The reconnaissance of ? for South Vietnam. at as damaging to CIA activi- Review," a - Ne\y&p.Vm-k p-ro-ved For Rvreest 20014010*: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 ,based monthly. ^ PORTLAND, ORE Akproved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RD OREGONIAN - 245,132 S 407,186 ?EP 12 u 0?,21 Li /. .? By MARTIN SCHRAM LA Tiai,:7,7j:-;?:1!21or: r3c;1- S.liv1c=7; HAVANA Mighty Zsilcuse' as liberated i113 fcilow ro4 dents and departed.? nhre-' a in the wings,. But row the blue-gray talbe i3 beaming still another Notth Anu:nican folk hero into rooms of Havana. "An-gel-a- Davis . . ." The popular song all Cuba is singing sounds from the in- nards of the Soviet model television set. The et:slicing face and Afro ;hairdo of the young American in-- gem on 'the screen. Abrupt cutaway. to fierce lookinn. American l'olice in -riot her- mets and as mans charg- ing foranti:d wih clubs swinging. Back to Angela Davis. Then to American po- lice. Slo w I y, dramatically, throm;la still photos and Ma- tion picture uiim, the televi- sion tells the story of Angela Davis ? how she was hunted by. '-the police, how she was found in that non-Afro wig, how. she Was jailed. Again. the headshot en the beautiful ,lback revolutionary lingers ? on Cuban to is-fon screens. And ail the while, the song's refrain is heard: "Art-gel-a- Davis, Cuba wants your lib- erty!" ? Just like tha, Amt.--t-ican akid- ie cartoons lathe early eve- nings and the old Americen movies at night, the Angela . Datis .story is presented - courtesy of the government's Liberation Television Net- work. It s one of the ways entro's Cubans keep 'tabs on .life in the 'United States,. ? Propaganda dominates ; t b There is, i:er instance, the One that openwi a shot of a naked lady nonams bar brinds over breasts. It is, of cousse, an attack on the United States Central Intelli- gence Agency. The film cit-:s le CIA invol n en t in the 3051 }3a of Pigs invasion and then 'charges that the CIA was also Tespen,:i1)10 for the murder last year of army ? '1,1 Gen. 'Rene Schneider Cher- can. la another eerie merit, the OA ?z?ten clei.iss-- edt as: ne 0: a royste- rims spider web. Then there is the docnmen- tary that opens the pho? tos of President Nixon and Gen...Crejehn-ni Abrams, 'U.S. cornmaii'der in Vietnam. It features a creal'ive musical. score in the bad: road; the basic theme is en American folk singer warbling, (to the tune of Muskrat Ramble) "and it's one, two, three join that happy wry . ? ain't no time - t wonder why,- pee we're gonna elle." Ifor counterpoint, there is a dis- __ corclaat Star Spangled Ban- The film is telling the story of OIL,. U.S.-South Viennni- ce troops fleeing in appar- ent panic. Slipped into the midst of the documentary is a cartoon of Nixon fleeing in apparent panic. Here ;the theater audience, which has been. watching the documen- tarieS in silence, begins' to snicker and chortle. A few applaud. Another chunk of Ameri- cana that the Castro govern- Vent CntlinsiastiCally passed along to Cubans was the epi- sodic saga of the Pentagon papers. "The secret docu- ments," as the Cubans call it. The official government newspaper; "Gnanms" pob- lished .32 issues between June 15 and July. 21. A visi-- tor to the "Granma's" fices counted 23 issues pub- lished during this period con- tain'ing articles dealing with- some quite long. .? ? STATI NTL . _ . - - ._ ? _ ninon shot played- down . stories told of the un- . tial revelations by, the New ." 43,0 York Times, the efforts of/ . _ the U.S. governinient to halt yabilcalic,n of tho. papers, the ?ilia' U.S. Su7srethe Court de- cision, asni the legal nroeeed- ings against .Dani.el .E'llsberg (he man tho Inked the doenments) and his friends. In contrast to the covecage given the Pentagon= papers, the most recent mem land- ing mission of the U.S. 'aStro- nants received just scant at- tentien in Grsnina. Small ar- ticles tucked on the inside in- ternational page. And Presi- dent. Nixon's planned trip to maininnd China was an- nounced in one news story. There was no editosial cern- ineRt. In fact, th Cuban press did 'not bother to carry the later news of the Soviet Union's mild reaction -to the planned trip. Cubans see the U.S. partic- . ipa lion hi the war in Viet- nam from the perspective of -thee North Re- cently, for example, Cranma publi.--:1;ed an editorial from Nhan Dan, the North Viet- namese daily, under the headline: "The Nixon doc- trine is headed for complete defeat." The editorial warned that 'The Nixon doc- trine is very wicked and per- fidious." Thro,Teln-mt the headline and edit-tot-lel, as in every is- sue of Gramma, the name of President Nixon is sort of Granma's style theomits " ''Nixon." In place of the "x", C-Iranma in- serts a Nazi-style swastikt... Epilogue: In Comaguey When Cubans are not at home watching television, of- ten they are in theaters wa t chi a g movies. And among The visual fare in many of Cuba's leading thea- ters ar4 a number of "Com- mentaries" that are like the Angela Davis story, cinernat- fcalIv lyzawif.131 .anARititbV ganciically powerful. couple of weeks t,,;-;o, four Cuban youths in their early 20s stopped to talk with an American reporter along the - narrow d own t ow n main street Calle Avellansda. Two were students, one a me- chanic, and one on leave . from a three-year hitch' in the Array. Viet war discussed AU four were intensely proud of their country and ? accomplishments --- the opportunity for every Cuban , youth to attend a university free of charge, the opportun- ity for all Cubans to receive free _medical care, And at the same time, all four were intensely interested in how people can endure life today in the United States. They we:re concerned, they said, . because they like the Ameri- can peo;n1e, but not the.. American government. "It must be very- had in the United States rims'," said cue of the students. What did he mean? One -by one, the.; four started ticking c..Z.f a list of bad things: "Police hru- , talky . . . the secret docu-1 mcnts that -showed that your; government does not tell you the truth . . . illation 'I hear Negroes have to ride in a special section or the buses,' said one youth who was black . . assassi- nations . . . gangsters ? . . ? / 3/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 Approved Fg9_RkTIFrp--- a4Tilgi5P80-016 On the the Issues CIA: CONGRESS IN D L4,2 e. RK ABOUT ACTIVITIES, SPNDFNG STATI NTL Since the Central Intelligence Agency was given authority in 1949 to operate without. normal legislative Oversight, an uneasy tension has existed between an un- informed Congress and an uninformative CIA. In the last two decades nearly 200 bills aimed at making the CIA more accountable to. the legislative branch have been introduced. Two such bills have been reported from committee. None has been adopted. The push is on again. Some members of Congress are insisting they should know more about the CIA and .about what the CIA knows. The clandestine military operations in Laos run by the CIA appear to be this year's impetus. Sen. Stuart Symington (D Mo.), a member of the Armed Services Intelligence Operations Subcommittee and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee dealing with U.S. commitments abroad, briefed the Senate June 7 behind closed doors on how deeply the CIA was involved in the Laotian turmoil. He based his briefing on ,a staff report. (Weekly Report p. 1709, 1660, 1268) He told the Senate in that closed'session:."In all my committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on in Laos:We do not know the cost of the bombing. We do not know about the people we maintain there. It is a secret war." As a member Of two key subcommittees dealing with the activities of the CIA, Symington should be privy to more classified information about the agency than most other members of Congress. But Symington told the Sen- ate he had to dispatch two committee staff members to Lao ? in order to find out what the CIA was doing. - If Symington does not know what the CIA has been doing, -then what kind of oversight function does Congress exercise over the super-secret organization? (Secrecy fact sheet, Weekly Report p. 1785) A Congressional Quarterly examination of the over- sight system exercised by the legislative branch, a study of sanitized secret documents relating to the CIA ? and interviews with key staff members and members of Con- gress indicated that the real power to gain knowledge about. CIA activities and exi)enditures. rests in the hands 6f four powerful committee chairmen and several key members of their committees?Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. The extent to which these men exercise their power in ferreting out the?details of what the CIA does with its secret appropriation determines the quality of legislative oversight on this executive agency that Congress voted into existence 24 years ago. The CIA Answers to... As established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PI. 80-253), the Central Intelligence Agency was ac- . countable to the President and the -National Security Council. In the_. original Act there was no language which excluded the agency from scrutiny by Congress, but also no provision which required such examination. To clear up any confusion as to the legislative intent of the 1947 law, Congress passed the 1949 Central Intel- ligence Act (PL 81-110) which exempted the CIA from all federal laws requiring disclosure of the "functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed by the agency. The law gave the CIA director power to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of govern- ment. funds." Since the CIA became a functioning organi- zation in 1949, its budgeted funds .have been submerged into the general accounts of other government agencies, hidden from the scrutiny of the public and all but a se- lect group of ranking members of Congress. (Congress and the Nation Vol. I, p. 306, 249) THE SENATE In the Senate, the system by which committees . check on CIA activities and budget requests is straight- forward. Nine ? men?on two committees?hold positions of seniority which allow then) to participate in the regular annual legislative oversight function. Other committees are briefed by the CIA, but only on. topical matters and not on a regular basis. ? Appropriations. William W. Woodruff, counsel for the Senate Appropriations Committee' and the only staff man for the oversight subcommittee, 'explained that when the CIA comes before the .five-man subcommittee, more is discussed than just the CIA's budget. "We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the Defense Department budget that you can. get:" Woodruff told Congressional Quarterly. He said that CIA Director Richard Helms provided the subcommittee with his estimate of budget needs for all government intelligence operations. Woodruff explained that although the oversight subcommittee was responsible for reviewing the CIA bud- get, any substantive legislation dealing with the agency would originate 'in the Armed Services Committee, not Appropriations. No transcripts are kept when the CIA representative (usually Heins) testifies before the subcommittee. Wood- ruff said the material. covered in the hearings was so highly classified that any transcripts would have to be kept under armed guard 24 hours a day. Woodruff does, take detailed notes on the sessions, however, which are held for him by the CIA. "All I have to do is call," he said, "and they're on ray desk in an hour.' Armed Services. "The CIA budget itself does not legally .require any review by Congress," said T. Edward Braswell, chief counsel for , the Senate Armed Services Committee and. the only staff man used by the Intelli- gence Operations Subcommittee. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 ccrrit'i nued ti? lVi'.Y.ORK TJ1:ES Approved For Release zpginwq4/1 CIA-RDP80-01601R 7).).ss:;e?; ' '? .? ? t; t/ ses-ss ses, By C. L. SLILMEIZGER ATHENS ? Premier Pe,p?asiopoulos, Greece's strong man, likes to say he , can't understand why the West, which so strongly dislikes the Brezhnev Doc- trine used to impose Moscow's ideol- ogy elsewhere, should try to emulate What it abhors by contemplating its ..own BrezhneV Doctrine here. - ? No matter. how much we dislike his /:governing methods, Papadopoulos has a point. Why, if since the Bay of Pigs ?Washington has carefully avoided in- tervention in Cuba; why, if it scrupu- lously keeps hands off Chile; why, if it refuses to make South Vietnam pro- duce a. peace-making regime, should American opinion feel the need to intervene in Greece? The answer is partly that Americans have felt a sort of responsibility here since the Truman Doctrine, partly be- cause of the childish legend that this is an inherently democratic nation (which it isn't) and partly because of the persuasive powers of opposition it.,77,e. "Although this is a *disagreeable and leaden Government, its :opp'relzivef2(.,,v7,?above all by Greece's own _standards?is often exaggerated." ? 'propagandists abroad. All Greeks tend ;to be brilliant on politics and weave inspired tapestries. -Athens endorses France's approach on this issue enunciated last Bastille Day by its Ambassador: "Noninter- lerence in the domestic affairs of other countries which, in this part ,of the world is, like elsewhere, the golden rule of French diplomacy." . ? The United States is broadly con- vinced .by now that intervention is not our kind of game: After all, de- spite our obvious desire to keep NATO lbases available in tiny but strate- gically vital. Malta and Iceland, we eschewed any effort to influence their recent elections. One result is that our base tenure is seriously threatened. ? Many of those elements in U.S. opinion that most savagely attack the thought ofAmerican intervention else- where want to lean hard .on Greece. At the very least they would jeopard- ize Greece's military posture in NATO ?so important to American commit- -.ments in the MCditerranean and the Mid e_Fast?Jov withhold un o s nts,s1?, Approy tWekloghaa&z00 uosu 'trine but, as Talleyrand used to say, intervention and nonintervention can ? sA o FOREIGN AFFAIRS- $TATINTL This is unquestionably a repressIvo and unsatisfactory _form of govern- ment but such is also true about many governments in this wend. We have learned to our painful distaste that we can't go around imposing 'democracy Secretary of State Rogers advised Athens that U.S. public opinion de- mands "developments" in Greece. He was told: "We cannot shape your in- ternal policies and you are wrong if you think you can shape ours. And remember that Greeks react in a nega- tive way if they feel there is pressure on them." We can't make the colonels disap-, pear by tough talk. There is a current' rumor that Washington may be con- templating an attempt to install Gen- eral Anghelis, armed forces head, to replace ?Papadopoulos but this would ? be a lunatic type of intervention even if it worked: It would simply substi- tute one military boss for another. ? ' Papadopoulos has been loyal to NATO, even before heavy weapons shipments were resumed, and to his - duties as host to three thousand Amer- ican servicemen stationed at bases near Athens and in Crete. Althougk he appreciates French policy on non- intervention, he doesn't fancy French? ideas on trying to ease the superpower. fleets (Soviet and U.S.) out of the Mediterranean. Although this is a disagreeable and leaden Government, its oppressive- ness?above all by Greece's own standards--is often exaggerated. Less :than one hundred political figures are 'today in forced residence in villages or on islands. Perhaps four hundred are in prison (after martial, law con-: victions), many in connection with vio- lent acts like bombings. Freedom of expression is muffled and political freedom is stifled. The Constitution is not yet being .applied -and it .seems ridiculous that martial law should prevail after four and a half years. The people certainly aren't happsn but the great majority accommodates. itself in a resigned way to what's go- ing on. They would enthusiastically welcome a change but they want it handed to them by someone else. Still, remembering their .own bloody civil war a generation ago, they don't seem in a moodeto embark on a serious urban guerrilla campaign. Churchill described the Greeks as well as anyone: "They have survived- in spite of all that the world could do against them and all they could ?s_elsees . . smarrellin a0,701601iRON500060001-3 va,city." Is it wise for the United States to do more than stand back and dc- Approved ForRetar,12 pf0.93191),....pR75. p?po-oi 6o 22 AUGUST 1971 ?. STATINTL . Declaring communism his mortal enemy, Miami millionaire-industrialist Bill Pawley channeled his energy and resources against it, helping to organize the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Guatemalan insurrection. But now the former ambassador feels that the biggest battle of them all will be lost, unless ... By Nin:3,..2 SrnHey William D. Pawley was a kid of 11 when he went into business for himself. This isn't too surpris- ing, considering that his father, Edward Pawley, who swashbuck- led his way around the his teens, began in business, at age nine. ? It isn't that the Pawleys.were prodigies; they just had bound- less energy and drive, and Bill Pawley, now approaching 75, is still engaged. in an extraordinary number of activities, including the operation of a multimillion dollar sugar-producing plant in the Everglades. . But then, Pawley is rather an inmdible individual. His out- standing achievement was orga- nizing the legendary Flying Ti- gers, an American volunteer air force, to help Chiang Kai-shek stay in the war against Japan until the U.S. could fight its way across the Pacific in World War II. Pawley, howeypAaasaLtix4161--,ie clad kind of - life, ?tharKUMPPek-V.`ff ryi ey nas fascinating book. He was, for sev- eral years, on The New York Times' list of the 10 highest sala- ried persons in America. -Born in Florence, S.C., Pawley was reared in Caimanera, Cuba, where his father had a Contract NIXON SMILEY isa Herold Moll writer pnd cot- urnnist. He. spent several says -with Wifliorn Po'w? by for this ortide. with the Navy to. supply fdocl for the fleet at Guantanamo Bay. .Bill was just 11 when he rented a boat, filled it with goodies and hawked them to the sailors. Skin- ny, darkly tanned and able to speak Spanish like a native, young Pawley passed. easily as a Cuban. ? Pawley made his first million dollars by the time he was 29, during the 1925 land boom in Miami. Although he was to see Miami very little for the next 30 years, he has always considered it his home, and .in 1941 built a 10- room home, Where he now lives, on Sunset Island No. Two, Miami Beach. rk 0 ilti37 i een an air meg aeveaop- wnether a usiness .er, aircraft manufacturer, urban transportation owner, ambassa- dor to Peru and Brazil, and spa- ?cial assistant to the secretaries of state and defense with the title of ambassador. He is still addressed by that title. a ? rs a friend of several U.S. presidents, Pawley ?'has been called upon to do jobs that re- quired bold decision, finesse and intrigue, as well as the resources of a businessman, diplomat and soldier-of-fortune. Among his spe- cial tasks was helping to organize the intrigue that resulted in the overthrow of the communist gov- ernment of Guatemala in 1954, and he was an organizer Of the Cuban exile army which met di- saster at the Bay of Pigs in 1931. .. A slender man just under six feet, Pawley packs more energy than most men of 40. He can go all day and through the evening, conferring, buttonholing, cajoling, yakking endlessly on .the phone, mixing the pleasure of lunch or ?04E1 011013159C10860CPK3 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160114-66Ra60001-3 ? % CAMDt..11;./ N.J. ? COURIER-p,$:; fiqUi5 E - 1 1 1 ,336 - ,,?11.;=)?.?1, 9'7 (...217,11y/4 ar I rvr'Nf-'-'-' When the CentraleIntelligence Agency was established, in the iat-6-1940s the. explanation- was that we needed a spe- '' daily trained and equipped organiza- tion to gather information on political, economic, and military situations all over the world. We needed an .organiza-. lion that could give the President re- ports on these situations every day. The CIA was to be a well-camouflaged if not a secret _agency -7 so that it could go about ? its data-gathering assignment with a minimum of trouble. The CIA has, indeed, gathered infor- mation and prepared the confidential evaluations for the presidents. Some ,of these evaluations, like those that fore- cast the problems in Vietnam, turned out to be good and prescient judgments, even if they were ignored. ?The CIA would look a lot better today if it had stayed with information gathering ? instead of getting into the business of designing and executing adventures like the Bay of Pigs. It has been rumored for a long time and now is finally confirmed that the CIA has been running the "secret war" in Laos. This is the operation in which an, irregular army of more than 30,000 ? Me5 tribesmen, Thai volunteers, and men from the Royal Laotian forces has been waging nine years of relatively -unavailing war for the Plain of jars and the hamlets of the eastern half Of the CountrY.. Our attempt to keep the operation secret has made our motives ? look too much like the motives of the Communists. ? To the extent that the United States must carry on military programs in . South Asia ? and elsewhet'e ??it would seem more reasonable-and satisfactory to have them carried on openly and by the Department of Defense. We may not accomplish what we set out to do in': every case. But at least we'll know what- the United States is sdoing. That isn't too much to ask of the govern- , ment. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 Approved For .Releti?e 2(04110-3104 : CIA-RDP80- 1 3 AUG icziii i?, _ ?.....7,,,,i,-.. ..,-,.!... r),,,,,--1. r, ,r.-2( i '1 '':17'.e.".-'_; '-ittti- I" ,?-?,. r-, ;,.,:-_-,, t-,7i, .7,1 7.,, y -; fr. ,(-p ., ? :c /( '' ./. G LI .t. c i. r..$ ?,...,44 .1. k:.,-k. ''.....1 ..-'.. 1..,$' .,, 't: 'c.i i, 1. , '''''- .1- . *--1 .:- i ? $ ,'? % - ' i P P a .-: ' i , , - P \ / , $ !, -- 1 i.7rile-r1.-'. -'S1-1062-7),5-1,-.$"; 1 llieS rem-,?IIP,ras --"-pti -3t.ii,,I. 'id- :.,,,, ....,... ....,.. ,I, st.cuilLt. clearance, t, t) gathering new:, wri t- Ntl,?.7 YOfel" Tinic,s . . - ?,:. - -....- . . ...-,.: 1 ..$ , il 101....t.. woo have airioc,,Ilt," 'resident Nixon has ordered ? t.:, ..t...?,.,,,?,..t._.?,:tt ...... -,t,,:tt, ias top secret," would hsuaVel ,-,1]..'",:lchic...,r,,t trIlle . jel.j11311.rst,s t V_I.I:ol . WASHINGTON, Aug. 12 --- - ., lacee5.:s to documeilN ?nit,. 1,.. e..... in oe ..-en .at,on arly declassification of secret 0111?disclosures wcre innocent. "rovernment documents on the '-::"tt:.-:::;::::::::: t': .a strict "nced-to-knov.," basis.' He said lie could not com- forean war, the 1933 interven- - ? ctNett; restric,dons would be. ment because the. n-light ion by American troops in A 'e,etop.,:d to ettr.?.t.-lid individuals, be subject to .11.tigation. 'fhe .eirancn ..b , the :.,.ortive invasion .:,?.: rights to dupticte cla.ssiiied quest-1?31 was Pla 1)5' a rePre- f Cuba in H.51 and -the Cuban .;.:_,V matter Of to disscntimte it. sentative of one of the nev,rs- ionSe annountled tod7,y. ' t''. released antornatic.r.11y .?,--,ft?T a. Ehrljel'"an told him: c..:Ser.ra docu?,,.. shc,,lo. bc,? papers involved, and Mr. ah;sile crisis of 3-?:(32,11-,p),-k,,h'iLe ..... .... john D. Ehrliehman,. assist- ttt :?',- specified period a tii,,,, ,,,h,s in the questioner'sl .nt to the President for ...... their publication would "jeon- heart nmst lie the answer toi )ontestic Aff airs, said til.t. Mr. ardize cutrent intelli:ten;.te that que!stion.? ixon . felt that the four mill- ? sources," inTeitii relations with _ ary actions were "of Stztfa his- other governments or "nced-1 to ical importance" that sehol- lessly crnbarass individuals" krs sliould not hro;tt to it the in other nation 3. -osto-inary 25 Veal-s before the As a gelteral rule, the study ndiz of the aocoments were group is tending toward re- node public. versim.? the estabt-thed practice Mr. Ehrlichman said that the of heoping documents secret lccision to speed the removal unless it can be demons'-ratod .31 the "secret" clasification they are no lontter seni?i&e, 'roll: the documentss had grown M. Lltrliehman said. ? "The Presid,-At believe:: p3.51. int of an interP:gcncy study of practice has resulted nt classi- fication of a number of cloc.u- have been in the" as' 1.3 classified" 1.00 national security 'Classifyint2; til-;ern .11,-ttef' whc-!ther the United States F" reasons:11e l''.di.,`?-? . .1?11 what he termed a "pri,`.',- C1-711eY SYSt --='In is effective. I Restriced Cii-;:',.31atien. ress report" on the LU 1)3 :A r?ir. L." nei.nuin declined to! At the sante time, ha elnplia- Ehrliehrnan said that it was1 relat.1 the Ad.t-,inistra.tion's con.tsired that Mr. Nixon bad fol- ? it?,er dottuments1 Penta,7en papers to Pret;identthis pe.rsorc:J1 cleng with cliple- . in the futzme, but elassnying --Nnion's diplomatte rmliativelmaLi- ,Ii 'l (-1.1,---,Jc 1-,, -- ? them better." The President feels stronsly, lthrlichn-an said, that "Go?.,-; ernment has a duty to make!, disclosure of what is going onl in the Government." 11-o.t he as-', sated that Mr. Nixon's attempt to initiate an "era of negotia-! lion" between the United States. and other world powers re-! quired that the Government be Declassification of the doeut- able to demonstrate its ability, ments on the Korean war and to maintain confidentiality. the Ltbar.on and Cuba actions For that reason, ',tr. Filrlfr.h., would require additional fillies, man said in response to ques- but the amount was not re- lions at a White House brief- V ealed today. This effort also blot the Administration sought will require a loagter period of to block publication of the Pen_ tin-.:e and could take conSider- tagon's secret history of the ahlY more than fiye ycars, he Govcirynen's scoun:y sys- em. The. study was ordered in wnom we \till be 0- ments that need not have been anuary by the Presidc Joltn. 11.`ttzliel3Lit-tn. aimed at devising a method for' cern about the discloSuit:: of the lot,re a p(mc..p..., 3 towa:!..d Chine. _ - lincluded hi c-'11--. 2-,'-ri-t--1 cit 1 The White House asItx.ct conieulation of documents and ex- gross Jo ;t we :4: to authorize r:tren'i'-1S' limit,--Id sh:?,rilig of iri- te,'31t,900 expenditure this. ya:-.14forination with staff members. to begin a fi,?,,e-year pfocess of The "C?1-lei'Stfill? of an coal declassifying some 3. CO milliorC,of negotiations" is confiden- paes of docuir:.mts on Worm,' 'ti'Dlit"..+T> Mr- 1:::iltlichman stated. War II that are still secret. The "You people do and should entire effort it.; expected to cost elif: for eveiT l'ie'as' of ii'::?1'rla" -u'll!!ion. tion you can gct," he told the .c.' journt:lists Cl. the White House. hut he said reportetts could publish int'ormation "innocent- ly" that mh-tht have a hearing on events ttln-,t the journalists were not aware of and could thus "create a climate of doubt" about: Govenilnent _ confiden- tiality. officials said. ? . . Mr. Ehrlichmut was as1-.d if Mr. Ehrlichman said that it -the GoverninenVs unsuccessful also was possible that Ciovem- i merit secrets related to oth,r 'court ftctions to stop newspaper international incidents would publication of the Pentagon_ be given thc,-.Surta accelerated- study were unde.,rtalten toi declassification. The- li:ji: is demonstrate to other nations said, but he did not identify the, !,,(7 O. 0, CI, ,. faith.. : of the Nixon "open-ended as of now," he other possible subjects for early `A`cjinliiisidatiul" Critetda dualrie-g. -"Yes," he replied. A Federal grand jury in release. . . According to Mr. Ehrliehman, Poston has been examining the headed by William H. 17:6)317 disclosure of the Pentagonl the study group, which is General, had tentatively estab- papers and considering wheth ouist, an Asi er . sstant Attorney lished some criteria to follow, some reportet-s migh t b e liable ' He mentioned the follotving th to prosecution. Mr. Ehrlichman was asked it e Government' it/6 rsl..abilsbed,_ in light _of bis, 4 CIA-RDP80 01601R000500060001-3 Vietnam _war in June. Parts of ,tile study were published by The New York Times, The Washington Post and other newspapers. ? He said it was. unquestion- able that "probably the large majority" of the PM SC;11 1-$.9.1)01'S were "needlessly" held under restriction at the time of their disclo toe in the news- papers. Effect on 11?getiatio!:s. But, hz vieut on, the "n-mF;sive compromi,ie" of the Vietnam documents by the newspaoers "demonstrably has raised ciues- lions in the mmds tpipprbv r or elease 2001/ STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/63104 :1321A-RDP80-016 'TV No 2., ea: ? _By Don Oberdorfei- : waethieroe Post Si: If Vi President Nixon is tighten- ing government control of cur- rent secrets in the diplomatic and military fields, while mov- ing to release sonic still-claesi- fied papers from the Korean War, the 1058 Lebanon land- ing and tlie 1061-62 Cuban crises. Presidential Assistant John' Ehrlichman, in an, interim 'report on a high-level study of 'government secrecy, said new rules \ yi]l further resteict the distribution and duplication of :classified documents in an ef- fort to prevent leaks. Among t h e reasons for tightening up, Ehrlichman in- dicated, are recent newspaper disclosures of Vietnam Arar secrets from the Pentagon papers and the government's unsuccesful attempt to stop their publication through le- gal action. Ehrlichman said the "mas- sive compromise" of secrets in the Pentagon papers had raised questione in the minds of foreign governments who are to participate in future negotiations with the United States. He said Mr. Nixon is deter- mined to safeguard the con- fidentiality of diplomatic talks and asserted that confiden- tiality is "a cornerstone of an 'era of negotiation." At the same time, Ehrlich- man reported, Mr. Nixon has asked government archivists to speed the process of de- classifying historical papers. Last week the President asked Congress for $636,000 to begin a five-year job of declassify- ing World War II secrets, and Ehrliehman said this request will be expanded to cover sec- rets of the Korean War, the Lebanon landing _during the Eisenhower administration and the Cuban invasion and missile crisis of the Kennedy administration. The historical documents will be released if they do not jeopardize current intelligenCe sources, imperil United States i-elationA inCnts or cause "needless" em- barrassment to foreign be said. Ehrlichman would not say whrn the historical documents might be released, nor would he say witether some Vietnam sal to stop the newspapers' publication of the document, he said, had given new im- petus to a more discriminating yet more effective security too many people had the right - system. It is evident from the to classify documents and decision that -the government there was no workable sys- tem for review of their deci- sions to stamp them secret, the White House Bide said. The new system now evolving will seek to insure automatic deciessification of some do-eu- ments after a period of years unless there is a showing that they should remain secret. As of now, the burden is on those who . wish to remove the secrecy lehals from historical ,to principal officers on a documents?and this should ,"need to know" basis, with be reversed, Ehrlichman said, staff access extremely limited, Ee added that the "general Ilie said. approach" of Mr. Nixon is that ! The White House aide add- "the government has a duty to 'ed that Mr. Nixon has follow- make disclosure of what is go- cd the. same practice of "ex:, temely limited sharing of in- cept on in the government ex- 'formation" in some domestic cept in those cases where dis- matters, citing the recent closure would he inimical to presidential meeting manage- the national security or the merit and labor negotiators in conduct of foreim policy." On Jan. 15, Mr. Nixon or- the steel industry as a case in dered a study of government pint, procedures f o r classifying documents. On June 30, short- ly after the first of the Penta- gon papces disclosures, he or- dered government agencies to reduce the number of officials allowed access to secrets, and he ordered a "drastic" reduc- tion in the holdings of highly secret papers outside the gOv- ernment. Recent visitors to the White Home have-quoted Mr. Nixon as saying the publication of the Pentagon papers seemed for a time to jeopardize Henry A. Kissinger's secret trip to China. Mr. Nixon left the im- pression with some visitors that the Chinese had ex- pressed concern about publi- cation of the Pentagon papers ? but White House officials have said this worry about confidentiality existed in Washington rather than in Peking. . ? Ehrlichmarr would not say yesterday whether the -Peking regime was among the govern- merits concerned about the Pentagon papers discleeuresr nor would he comment on the conflicting reports regarding the Peking attitude. The Nixon administration's action in seeking court orders to keep The New York Times from publishing Pontagen pa- pers data was related to the STATINTL President's emphasis on the secrecy- of diplomatic talks, Ehrlicinnan said. The Supreme Court's refu- war paper's of earlier years would ,be declassified as part of the new policy. Under previous policies, will be able to stop publica- tion through the courts "only in the rarest of cases and only under the heaviest burden of proof: on the part of the gov- ernment," he added. According to Ehrlichman, !Mr. Nixon has ordered that current information on eliplo- f ilmtie negotiations be held very closely within the gov- ernment. It is available only PiiPokieed Obfrrl leaseh200110i3104 :ICIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 cllicAc;0 Approved For Release2Qp Ram : CIA-RDP8 71 r 77 77 0 71 , !i..L ,i4 Q'..:1 ) 11. ". . ';.. - /i. i /f,% - . c) 'T./ -11 ---7-er . 'eery 0, 77 . . . . . ii (7-1, (7...-:!=.: ,, ? , ? hi bi ii;.,-.....,- (-1? it, (17-,:,,)Qi(A.' II ./1, ,i.)' '',,,i?-_,-) Q('--:',,,, ' . .,.. ti "Tr ,..., ? I. I . - . 1 til ''-':',' 'liss, ? ' UIJC!, (.j I; t.i/ ..11-et! V,.21, .ktil ej . : .. 1 If , . i''''. ( I ( t ?1,1,1 i ../...,-..4-' W s:-.." ?...../ ea ',....../ J ,...?,... 1.1 ,. ..., ? . BY FBANK STARR I ----------.? l the -Executive Branch in the 1 of gaining approval of hiPlier .- [Washington Bureau Chief] i Ne-i',,,o' / ::-,-, rl Tur,x (.-, !persons of ernbassy sources M , allthority. 1 \ - E- 0, ..:=i,,, '...?fte),...) . . , IChicaso iritune Prt'ss Susoc?1 Laos who, when asited for the , 'iltich finally was censored; i WASHINGTON, Aug. fl - A I ---------- ! secret data, gave it. I particularly on the subject of i significant precedent in govern- I the, U. S. role in Laos a 1 tl meat secrecy was established l'possibility last week when the Central ln- I bitter debate over its secrecy : ,- , 0r- "" "teildcd ""d ree- that the' final decisIoti to ! fighting n(- -lc , To that drsgree and to the de- I ' ,' ,_,' ,' ,' , .I?trainine; among the force of U. S. support of Thal iti?eg,ulars With ClA suoo?zt. and telligenee Agency, with, white 1 if much of it weren't disclosed. , le'e.ase aS In4"" \\ aS 30,000 Laotian irret.fulars. war effort M Boos. ? was what mild or would 110T, President Nixon, the clisclo- be censore.d in a 29- 0 t. i 1..,cr:Pimt c-11111''d " 1-'(!s! . APY11; of Nixon's annolinced policy of', visit, to Indochina; fhe object of the bargaining !. yo.\ ument, well, ,,pmovcd hi \ Object of Bargaining P?=.? S-2i:i sUres do represent the effect I yestigators duriat! their 19 -day : leased, including thc CIA's in- , ? I for secrecy giveA the tvm in- not censored were the rc.,.cte,ons but among the inroemation House 05 ii coneecled. for I r the. first time its hitherto top secret role as the clandestine direelor of the United States the rather starllirig ptiblic con- , Lorwenstem and 1 Pacf?ial:? ..I. wi:itten _by._ :,:-,tineis .1..laii?.1,1i1,.,T)le ntol otirlee putilo,lifecoonation ; "Elie principal areuments we , heard for the need to continue ' Administration sources say I "( ''' , firmation of what had long been -I,`-??ste . as 1 a resiii,t t?-, 11 (r?sf ; But there is a strong belief on to maintain secreey were these: 1 li charged or assioned cotrztituted I Spit 01 0., 1,11 ,'"(,),: a, !It:: ,(I.1",(' (). : hoth the Execdtive and Legisla- , first, that Gen. Vang Pao , ? rn. cnct we oel,nlimig. 0 i. a deliberate decision to con- i ..,: -t , tive sides of the 1 the administration Vas' faced; forces] does not want to allow ar.-!,intient that ! [Cominander of the 'irregular I cede such a fact in favor of ii 'They are comoeteet ' ' "lye's' l with the possibility of ?-? strontf I the pet--zs ?to vi?zrt hoce-e, his iprotecting ?Viet' secrets ] e s s i tigators and they }mew the I ? ? - -? - ? ' ; ' ' ''-' ? !:- ? ' - ? '-' - :'-' `; 1.generally assumed. - i ritlit questions to ask because I . . ? . 1 coallonsre to the conduct of a military security would bc cont- . 1.,,ci: _ ?, ; seer-et war in Laos as opposccl I promised: second, that if re- f But the sources attribtite the . 1, ,,? y .,, .1,, .e 41 1 n..?, .110N, N5_,,.1. . LAO h. "e:, att. to , ,,o,,,,cer ,? ...,,, 4,ed no,---' ow-I-I,: Were permitted to visit idecision largcly to the Pres- : buii?,'d," one well-placed source . ". ' ' ''' " u."- ? -rI ? .,- ' ! . ? `- - . isure created by .aceurate and; said. ? , sAily over the larger issue. of I Long - Tieng [the irregtdars' ! ! " eonmetent i estiqatio by two Lowenstein Was a far CIS -- r-;?" PO \; itself in the Wal,:e of ! prine.ipal basel. they Would con- ; former foreign service officers ; service officer in the Stat he Pe gon papers e DC.- . ., m ,..?,e the CIA , State, I U . S . o v erlooh i n o: Ill an -i, Pao ' s centrate on the FC4e of the lnvn I ! tnta. . nOW WOfkilig for the Senate 1 partment from 1:1:36 to lci35. I 'II atQ' ---, I Defense Departtnent rep-I contribution: third, th:=,t the ? Foreign Relations, Committee i as was :Moose. from. ll:157 tO 1 i resetitatiyes finally coilCeded CI :\ is a C1 ii oeganiza- and the strength their material ; 19C,t3. Moose additionelly worked 1 the ClA role in Laos, the ex- I tion not used to operriting in lent to the legislators in their i as a specit.-.1 assistant of former , tent. -of the CIA-backed army I the open and that its operations confint,tdoi ... Ph t' Execu- ' Presidential adviser Walt ltos- ' . . I of Dtotion irregulars,. the ex-1 in other park of the world Inc Branch. , tow, then in the Defense De- ! tent. of the air War, and the might be compeomised i. 1.K. . . t ? ? ? . llow 'f illies Change extent of U.. S. expenditures on tec?imiques and indivich.lals. in- ? ! partment's institute of Defense "Times have changed,". said I the total effort in Laos. 'volved in Laos were to' become i analysis, and finrtlly during*the ' istration as a staff secretary year of the Nixon admin- 1 ,, ,. . , ? , inere W e r e rant* iadts, 1:nown: fourth. that were U. S. ' ore ad source sWitliii fit:4 1 Lowenstein said, w h i ch both activities American nedy had protected from public , en under Presidential adviser ! sides agreed Were and s lot, I remain secret for obvious. rea- t the Geneva. Agre-Z`IfierliS 01 1.)o- would be aecti.;cd, of violating ' recalled how President Ken- i on the NI, ational Securoy Conn- ? t/- exposure the CIA role in the 1 Henry Eissing-er. ! sons, and the first of the five I and it would thus be moee diffi-- . Had Full Authority - . i weeks . was spent narrowing \ cult to reestablish the Geneva taking the blame for it himself. k ,On the other hand, as Low-1 down to four or five- the* areas1 Agreements as a framevJerk for -1961 Bay of Pigs invasion by Two years ago the admin- I istration was ot mentioning! enstein readily a'dmits, much! on which Lowenstein and Moose i a future settlement in Laos; American involvement in Laos,' of the top sf.-?cret infoanation I held out for publication. The and fifth; that the details of the - n -another source noted; while I was given them in the -first I administration representatives i Thai presence would become now as much as 90 per cent of i place with the full authority of I' then needed to start the process! known which would [deleted]." the U. S. role there is a matter of public record. . MOSt of it became public last week after five.weelts of nego- tiations between the two inves- tigators and representatives of .the Defense and State Depart- ments :and the CIA who were laced with what is readily ad- . milled to be; an extensive, de- tailed and accurate account of _ 0 I bk I IIN I L Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01 HUNTSVILLE, ALA. TIMES ? rAUG 9 1E1V E - 53,936 B 51,803 fq? 1,--)11q n .V iti h iit-1,4 LI /7 ? P L4 4) Li El 11 La .f ti ' ? reei n 1?.? 4, 1 uP v2D ? When the Central Intelligence Agency was established, in the late 1940's, the explanation was that we needed a specially trained and equipped organization to gather in- formation on political, economic, and military Situations all over the world. We needed an. organization that could give e President reports on these situations every day. The CIA was to be a well-camouflaged if not. a secret agency?so that it could go about its data-gathering assign- ment with a minimum of trouble. - The CIA has, indeed, gathered in- formation and prepared the con- fidential evaluations for t h e presidents. Some of these evalua, lions, like those that forecast the problems in Vietnam, turned out to be good and prescient judgments, even if they were ignored. The CIA would look a lot better today if it had stayed with information gather- ing?instead of getting into the business of designing and e>iecuting ?,adventures like the Bay of Pigs. . ? -- ? It has been rumored for a long time and now is finally confirmed that the CIA has been running the "secret in Laos. This is the operation in which an irregular army of more than n,003 Me? tribesmen, Thai volunteers ? and men from the Royal Laotian volunteers, has been wag- ing nine years of relatively unavail- ing war for the Plain of Jars and the hamlets of the eastern half of the country. Our attempt to keep the op- eration secret has made our motives look too much like the motives of the Communi.sts. To the extent that the .United States must carry on military pro- grams in South As I a.?and elsewhere?it would seem n o r c reasonable and satisfactory to have them carried on openly and by the Department of Defense. We may not accomplish. what we set out to do in every case. lint at least \yell know what the United States is tieing. That ! isn't 00 much to ask of the-gove,;qyzi anent._ Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 Approved For-Releaserii0O1ia3/a4triCtIA-RDP80- 7 Aug 1971 ?fir\I -71 p ? .7 I; I/ I, r/ 'JJLi/ . By DON BC:I-In:NG HerzieLi .mCrCa ? ? . Rooerto Alejos, wealthy Guatemalan businessman- politician and honorary chairman of the Fidelity Na- tional Bank of South Miami, has been kidnaped in Guate- mala City, police sources in the Central American coun- try reported Wednesday. ' There has been DO official confirmation of . the kidnap- ing although Guatemalan Lewspapers have reported it unofficially as such. DIU/ALS ARIF, sketchy, but United Press Internation- al, quoting police soi:TOES in Guatemala, said Ale.jos was seized by two armed men in broad daylight Tuesday after his car was hailed while he driVing in Guatemala City. Alejos' alleged kidnaping, presumably, is another inci- dent in the undeclared civil war that has been raging in Guatemala for years be- tween extremes of the right and the left. A number of wealthy Gua- te.malans have been kidnaped ? 717) " 0 (c? ??-" r`\ if 77 (1?) 77 irs77 ii, (LI) tj Robe-via, A1,-;:), .J . no ransom 7:_oto and held for ransom by left- wing extremists while rightwing groups, some be- lieved to have the support of Guatemalan security forces, have physically eliminated many known and suspected leftwing extremists and sdrne leftist intellectuals. SOURCES IN Guatemala told The Herald by phone Wednesday that there have been no known ransom de- mands yet made for Alejos, if that were the intent of the kidnaping. Alejos, 43, is well 'known in Miami business and finan- cial circles and among Cuban exiles: ? The 1951 exile Bay of Pigs invasien brigade, supported by the CIA, was trained on the Alejos coffee plantation in Guatemala. His ? brother, Carlos, was Guatemalan am- bassador to Washington at the time. ? , .? 7-7 -FT) ?9. cL.LJ I Alejos later became the government-backed candi- date to succeed President Manuel Ydigoras in 1963 presidential elections. The elections were canceled, however, when Ydigoras was overthrown by a military coup in March, 1933. ALE3OS CAT!a!: to Miami as an exile, living on Palm Is- land and acquiring business interests in Dade County. He sold his Palm Island home and returned to Guatemala after the country restored constitutional government in ' 1965. In January, 1939, Alejos, together with Carlos Hegel, another Guatemalan, pur- chased controlling interest in the Fidelity National Bank of South Miami. Alejos was named honorary chairman, a position he still holds al- though residing in Guatema- la. In. Guatemala, Alejos was a founder of the Bank of Co:nrnerce and Industry. He now operates an auto dealer- ship in the Central American capital along with other corn- mercial interests: Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 Approved For Release 2001/q/04 : CIA-RD 11241alliGT01,1 A 055i 2 AUG 1971 I /P.\ -11?71,flarl! -VT Itfe. Castro Detailed Invasion, Flop By Murray Seeger . Los .A-.1rocs Times .;WALTHAM, Mass., Aug. 1 --Two years after the Amer- ican-sponsored invasion of Cuba, Fidel Castro took two American lawyers to the ' Bay of .Pigs site and .deei- onstrated why it had failed so disaStrously. It was April 1963, just days short of .the second au- niversary of the- invasion which John F. Kennedy later acknowledged was one of the great mistakes of his - presidency, and 'Castro was -? playing host to -James B. /Donovan and John E. Nolan-- j Jr., as he had several times* in the previous five months. "He'd get out of the car and .describe diferent as- pects Of the battle: \vhere he was when he got such and such a message from the troops -and what he did, and so on," Nolan recalled in a recorded interview made for the John F. Ken- nedy: Library located in temporary quarters in this Boston suburb. This interview, recorded - - . in April 1937 by Nolan in Washington, is just one of the many revealing new pieces of history now avail- able to researchers at the. ? .- Effective Monday, the-. Kennedy Library is- Making: available 9'..* per cent 'of the 3.3 million documents it has. 'relating to the Kennedy ad- rninistrat0n. A small, rni.- tial portion of the docu-, hog. He'd ask questions, also by the brigade, if he STATINTL STATI NTL 6A\T. irr , -? ; ti IL ,11717, i LC) j FIDEL CASTRO ... explained debacle -f by- Milan MikovskY, one of . just - before . Christm, , the J us t i cc Department aides of Attorney General 1962, when Castro came ...Robert F. K Havana airport where t were under oi.deleirnsedtoy.geTththeye . prisoners were waiting f the ransom goods to arri. Cuban invaders back to the a United States by Christmas erfSlisgvh/ot f CI of so low ig fig owMovefrt Donovan negotiated an Eve. field that. the men on t agreement under which the f i e, l la pd oiilorNI, a to c ins:,o, ausc h down. standing United States would give next to Castro, elbowed him Castro food and medicine and said, in his loud voice worth $53 ? million in ex- that was clearly audible to change for the prisoners. in me Enid . other pe o p 1 e addition, Castro insisted on around, 'It's the invasion.' getting $2.9 million in cash "It seemed to Inc to be a which had previously been very jocular remark to offered by Cuban refugee make. Castro laughed at it. organizations as payment And then it seemed to me for sick and wounded brig- that the other people Ade members ? already re- around, who initially didn't leased, think it was funny at all, It was during a conversa- looked at Castro and saw tion that lasted until 1 a.m. his reaction, and they in early April, 1963, that laughed, too.? Castro announced he wou.d In the April meetings, take Nolan and Donovan to held to clean up details of the Bay of Pigs. They left, freeing the 23 Americans, . , from Castro's beach home at including three CIA agents. ,./ Verdadera, on the north side Donovan and Castro talked of`the island nation, at 5 the about improving ?relations same morning and drove to between the United States the bay on the south shore. and Cuba. . Sampled Swamp, "I think Jim (Donovan) At one point, there's a'n always had his eye on this as a possibility," Nolan said. area there which is marshy "He felt that his maximum land, swamps and - there's usefulness lay in the diree- only one road that runs, tion of providing that kind across it to solid ground," of alternative to American Nolan recalled. Castro "got out, walked off the road and policy. And I think that Castro had a similar inter- into the Marsh to see how ? est in Donovan . . ." _ swampy it was. Nolan gave another ex-- You really . had a sense of history listening to some. ample of Donovan's manner with the Cubans, describing one like Castro 'describe a -tense scene when the. *something like the Bay of Americans were desperately Pigs. And then the feeling trying to get $2.9 million that in walking out into the into a Havana bank before marsh, which was consider- 3 p.m. Christmas eve, 1962. cd impassable by him and "Look, Mr. Minister, if. you want to be helpful in. this regard, there's one thing you caro do," Donovan told the cabinet official who was driving Nolan to the airport. "When you get. out there and that big plane is waiting to take off for Miami, don't defect." In his i n t c r v i e wetlen. ' canal Cushing, the interview supplies details not pre- viously known of the- ne- gotiations with Castro. Wouldn't Square Speaking Of the mercurial Cuban leader, Nolan said, "Many of the impressions that we had, and I think that my impressions were about the same as Jim's (Donovan), would not square with the commonly accept- ed image of Castro in the United States. "During the time that we were with him, Castro was never irrational, never drunk, never dirty," Nolan recalled. "In his personal relationships with u and in connection with the ne- gotiations, he was always reasonable, always easy to deal with. He was a talker of very significant propor- tions. I mean, he would come over at midnight or 3 o'clock in the morning and stay all night talking. But he wasn't a conversationall merits was opened to. toe public in October, 1969. The Nolan interview is especially interesting for its :descriptions of Castro with whom he and Donovan ne- gotiated for the release of the 1,100 survivors of the and 23 ten for viewpoints. He was stepped in the wrong spot easy to talk to, good con- or something, that he might versationalist, hardsell guy,- just digappear beneath the constantly plugging his pro: ooze and that would be the grams, his government." end of the whole problem. Donovan, a New York at- "And he sank down and tome), who had previously it was up to his boots, but negotiated the exchange of. he got back." Soviet spy Col. Rudolf Abel 7 Castro and Donovan de- disastrous invasion for the American U2 p -ilot d arm relationship other American prisoners. velope a w Clay recalled that he was Added to other recorded held by Russia, Francis Cary that enabled the hard-drink- summoned to Robert Ken-: pants in the prisoner deal as. and id no, - the c n 1bt memories of suit') weiviediFer kellWeagq#7004)1AeltIA n a`ROPtairdi 6011.00,01$000t4 retired Gen. Lueius D. Clay a at the library. Sit that his associates could most before I knew, I signed Info 'Richard Care Nolan was-enlisted to help not. Nolan related, a note for the $2.9 miion STATIN41 L STATI NTL T-11,:73 Approved For Release 204j1/RTOtiCIA-RDP Soviet ?-- , . - 11- , ? (--; , CI t `;Crisis 1 rfi rt I-E111\IALD GWEIITZMLN speca tThE? :!;;:w York Tirics - MOSCOW, July 28--Accord- ing to Soviet archives just made public, four days before President john F. Kennedy in formed the world about the Cuban missile crisis, Premier Nikita S. Khriislchev proposed a meeting with him that Mr. oe,?,1 to sup- port but rejected later in the day. The Foreign Ministry docu- mentation dealing with the 1962 crisis over Soviet mis:iles in Cula was included in an article by Anatol:; A. Gromylro, the son of Andmi A. Grorn,ii.o the Soviet Foreign Minister, which was published in the monthly historical 'journal Vo-? prosy Istorii. Reports Meeting with Rusl.:. " The first of two articles, en- titled, "The Caribbcen Crisis," covers events up to Mr. Ken- nedy's speech of Oct. 22, 19,32, in which he reported on the discovery of Soviet offensive missiles on Cuba and demanded their withdrawal by Soviet authorities. Presumably, the second arti- cle will cover events up until Mr. Khrushchev's decision to pull out the missiles in return for an American frledge not to invade Cuba. Mr. Grom2,,ko's article re- ports on a private meeting be- . tween Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the Soviet Ambassa- dor, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, short ly before Mr. Kennedy's speech. Mt. ho;;I: gave Mr. Dobrynin a copy of the speech and a. mes- sage for Mr. Khrusheliev. 1?,1r. Dobrynin after read- ing the do:;nments that "the United States has deliberately created a dan,;erons crisis." In his article, Mr. Gromyko alan rebukea those Americans who In tOC accused his father of bad faith when he failed to disclose the presence of the missiles when he met with the Prceidcnu at the White House Ott Oct. 38. The article recalls ? the at- tempted invasion of Cul..:!a at the Bay of Pigs in April, Kell, and asserts, "The Soviet Union an::: Cuba, in full conformity with the norms of international law, in the slimmer of lt,'62 reached an accord on the strentheniri:g - of the defense capabilities of Cuba." Ca7.1s Missiles 'Defensive "Medium-range missiles were deployed the , for cle- - ,ensive purposes. This was an action aimed at exerting a so- bering influence on the advo- cates of military adventure in, Washington and the preventing of a new American invasion against the Cuban people," the article says. It does not men- tion that on Oct. 14 American aerial reconnaissance and film also disclosed plans to build bases for interme;diate range missiles. - Mr. Gromyko .is a section chief of the Institute of the: U.S.A., a research institute of the Academy of Sciences. . Accounts of the meeting be- tween Foreign Minister Gro- myko and Mr. Kennedy, which lasted more than two hours on Oct. 18, say that ir. Kennedy decided against raising the mat- ter of the missiles and that Mr. Gromyko did not mention them. Later, American writers often accused the Soviet For- sign of duplicity, some- thing his son -resents. The artLle says that the goal of these accusations "was to hide the truce character of the meeting and to invent still an- other pretext to justify the violation of the norms of inter- national law by the activity of the Government of the U.S.A. in the fall of 1962 against Cuba and the Soviet Union." It also says that the Kennedy Vininistration "consciously re- jected different diplomatic ineans, by the help of which it would have been possible to vat the confrontation." To underscore this point, Mr. Gromyko says?his brother gave Mr. Kennedy a proposal from Mr. Khrushchev--who is not mentioned by name in the ar- ticle ---- stigesting the two men meet "to settle disputed inter- national problems and the e.yannitiaticn of questions which ause divergences between the ;5?os-A Umon and the United Siate!s.." Mr. Gromyko quotes as his source the Soviet foreign nolicy archives ? ? American versions say only that such a meeting was men- tioned obliquely. The article says, "the Presi- dent reacted positively to this proposal of the Soviet Union." But, according to the article, at a dinner that evening fAven. by Mr. Rusk for Mr. Gromyko, Llewellyn E. Thompson, then a special adviser on Soviet Af- fairs to the President, told Mr. Dobrynin that "the White House would like to postpone the summit meeting." The article said that it was difficult to determine whether Mi:. Kennedy in fact wanted a summit and was dissuaded by his advisers, or whether his initial positive response was only "diplomatic camouflage" to disguise "the planned ag- gressive course against the Soviet Union and Cuba." Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 Approved For RtIteelQOAVOCK,:B9hRDP80-016 2 2 JUL 1971 STATINTL ? . A .-:).72107,11r. iffE77):PLI21-17.711717: ? r,"7,, ? ??? I 4.'") r.?1) 6 L_LirG . ? ? . ' RaInh.L. vtavinS the article that follows is part of The . _ _ Nanning of the Vietnam War, a study members of the Institute of Policy ? STATINTL studies in Washington,' including At the end of March, 1961, the CIA Richard J. Barnet, Marcus Raskin, and circulated a National Intelligence Esti- Ralph Stavins..* In: their introduction mate on the situation in South Viet- :o the study, the authors write: " nam. This paper advised Kennedy that 'In early 1970, Marcus Raskin con- Diem was a tyrant' who was confronted vived the. idea of a study that would with two sources of d'isContent, the xplaln how the Vietnam disaster hap- non-Communist loyal opposition and oened by analyziv.the planning of the ? the Viet Cong. The two problems were Var. A group of investigators directed closely connected. Of- the spreading ry Ralph Stavins concentrated on Viet Cong network the CIA noted: inding out who did the actual plan- ' ling that led to the decisions to bomb Vorth Vietnam, to introduce over a talf-million troops into South Viet- tam, to defoliate and destroy vast rreas of Indochina, and to create nillions of refugees in the area. ' "Ralph Stavins, assisted by Canta Nan, John Berkowitz, George Pipkin, nd Brian Eden, conducted more tnan '00 interviews in the course of this tudji.. Among those interviewed ,Pere many .Presidential advisers to :ennedy and Johnson, generals and . .dniirals, middle level bureaucrats who occupied strategic positions in the rational security bureaucracy, and offi- The people were not opposing these rids, military and civilian, who carried recent advances by the Viet Cong; if out the policy in the field in Vietnam. anything, they seemed to be support- ' "it number of informants backed up ing them. The failure to rally the 'heir oral statements with documents people against the Viet Cons was laid 'it_ their possession, _including informal to Diem's dictatorial rule:* . ninutes of meetings, as well as por- - There has been an increasing dis- ions of the official documentary Tee- rd *.now known as the "Pentagon . 'a per:." Our information is drawn not )nly from the Department of Defense,. ut also from the White House, the Department of State, .and the Central. bitelligence Agency.'" The study is being publishedin two' Local recruits and sympathetic or intimidated villagers have enhanced Viet Cong control and influence over increasing areas of the coun- tryside. For example, more than one-half of the entire rural region south 'and southwest of Saigon, as well as some areas to the north, are under considerable Communist control. Some of these areas are in effect denied to all government authority not immediately backed by substantial armed force. The Viet Cong's strength encircles Sai- gon and has recently begun to move closer in the city. ? position within official circles and the army to question Diem's abili- ty to lead in this period. Many feel that he is unable to rally the people in the fight against the CoMmunists because of his -reli- ance on virtual one-man rule, his tolerance of corruption extending volumes. The first, which includes the even to his immediate entourage, article below, will be published early in' and his refusal to relax a rigid August. The second will appear in system of public controls. ? May, 1972, ? ? ? The CIA.referred to the attempted coup The study is the responsibility of its :against Diem that had been led by authors and' does not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute, its trustees, or fellows,_ Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R00(95011Q60001-3 STATINTL '-General Thi in November; 1960, and concluded that another coup was likely. In spite of the gains by the Viet Cong, they predicted that the next attempt to overthrow Diem would originate with the army and' the non-Communist opposition. The Communists would like to initiate and control a coup against Diem, and their armed and sub- versive operations including united front efforts arc directed toward this purpose. It is more likely, however, that any coup attemp't which occurs over the next year or so will originate among non- Communist elements, perhaps a combination of disgruntled civilian - officials -and oppositionists and army elements, broadel'than those involved in the November attempt. In view of the broadly based opposi- tion to Diem's regime and his virtual reliance on one-man rule, it was unlike- ly that he would initiate any reform measures that would sap the strength of the revolutionaries. Whether reform was conceived as widening the political . base of the regime, which Diem would not agree to,. or whether it was to consist of an intensified counter- insurgency program, something t.11 people would not support, it had: become painfully clear to Washington that. reform was not the path to victory. But victory was the goal, and Kennedy called upon Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to draw up the victory plans. On April 20, 1961, Kennedy asked Gilpatric to: a) Appraise the current status and future prospects of the Communist drive to dominate South Vietnam. ?) Recommend a series of actions (military, political, and/or econom- ic, overt and/or covert) which will STATINIE19? mmunist domination of . a countr ! - ? STATINTL Approved For Releaset3p591/4,23/(9A: CIA-RDP80 20 July 1971 - 177 j1?, ; 11 ? ---: ? --1 ?,- p 1- l??-N ? ?,-., ' -I; '11 i1 0 l ? 11 it ` .t_4..LI. ;:_1' I W-- P. - -. While there is much that, can be criticized . in the secrets revealed in the Pentagon papers, one agency that? comes. out of them with a record for calling its shots correctly is the Cen- tral Intelligence. Agency. As Crocker Snow Jr. pointed out in last Sunday's Globe, it suggests that the last few Presidents should have listened more to the CIA than to the State Depart- ment, the Pentagon, the National Security Council and the White Rouse advisers. For it appears that if they had, there would have been no doubts about President Diem's regime in Saigon; the domino theory would not have been trotted out to justify .the war, and the war would not have been escalated. . Why were not the CIA reports given greater credence? The answer may -come only with less secrecy in Washington. But perhaps part of the answer lay in the disastrous 1961 -invasion the agency ran at the Day of J ,Pigs in Cuba (for \VI-licit President. Kennedy, nonetheless', took all the . blame). And perhaps another part lies in a deliberate downplaying of the CIA's role. It had been an operational as well as an intelligence agency when John Foster Dulles was Secre- tary of State and his brother Allen was CIA director. But after the Bay of Pigs, Robert Kennedy urged a tight control of operations and, ac- cording to what CIA director Richard. / Helms told the editors last. April, theV CIA - was urged to present options rather t.han. hard recommendations.. It is not publicly known what role if any the CIA played in futile invasion of Cambodia and IL:: abor- tive raid on an empty North. Viet- namese prison camp. Enough is known about its role in Laos to make it subject to severe criticism, how- ever. . All of this makes more attractive the proposal of Sen. John Sherman Cooper that the CIA share its intelli- gence estimates with Congress, which passes on. its secret budget without knowing, for the most part, Where the money goes. This would. help Congress reach a judgfnent on impor- tant policy questions.' At a time when Congress is rightly reasserting its responsibility, that. would he most helpful. It would be infinitely preferable to having to - vote on the basis of limited informa7 .tion designed to support administra- tive policies. . VI STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500660001-3 pp rove 1 3/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 S =WIN= VORCESTER, MASS. TELEGRAM 1-11 1 9 10,7 M ? 62,339 S 108,367 P.6'71r-c .f=r/ra CIA Congress, which is in an anti-Viet- nam, anti-Administration mood, is di- recting its attention to the Central In- telligence Agelacy. A number of bills being debated would flush some of the CIA spooks out into the daylight and give Congress more of a say in the agency's operations. ? - It is a sensitive subject, to say the least. The CIA says it must be close- lipped to be effective. But some of its critics think its curtain of secrecy gives it the power to act as an invisible government, accountable to no one. The various proposals offered at- tack the problem from different an- gles. Rep. Herman Badillo wants an _ amendment which would confine the CIA to ?gathering and analyzing in- telligence. Sen. George McGovern -wants all CIA appropriations and ex- . penditures to appear in the budget as a single line item. (CIA expenses are no concealed). Sen. Clifford Case has introduced legislation to prohibit the CIA from financing a second country's operation in a third country (as the CIA is doing now with the Thais in Laos). Senator Sen. John Cooper, who ? is a-former ambassador and friendly to the CIA, nevertheless wants its "con- ' elusions, facts and analyses" dis- tributed in full to the relevant corn- : mittees in Congress as well as to the executive -branch. This would require an amendment to the National Security ? Act. It is plain that some of these pro- -1re aimed at the executive 1/44aawaa--"" branch, which Congress has .become very suspicious of. Many congressmen have .the feeling that they have been hoodwinked by various presidents (the Tonkin Gulf Resolution affair, for ex- ample), and they are convinced that the powers and secrecy of the CIA per- mit the executive branch to do things in foreign affairs that Would otherwise be impossible under the Constitution. Congr es s' attitude is under- standable. After all, the Constitution regards- the legislative as perhaps the most important branch of the govern- ment, yet Congress does not even know what is going on in foreign affairs, halt the time, and is powerless to do any- thing when it does learn the facts. The war in Laos, for example, has been run by the CIA without congressional ape Koval or even debate. Yet, how effective can bn in- telligence agency be if its activities are exposed- to congressional scrutiny? How long would its secrets remain se- cret if they were pored over by con- gressional committees? The questions raised by these pro- posals in Congress are fundamental in their implications. On the one hand, the 'United States must have effective ways to gather intelligence ? and it .also must on occasion be able to oper- ate clandestinely. On the other, it cannot tolerate an agency that functions under too tight a secrecy curtain with ?almost unlimited funds and-powers. That way lies other Bays of Pigs. .posa s _ _ - Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 Approved For Releasea0411 04;4.CIA-RDP80 0 1 I tut.. By PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK Ever since the Bay of Pigs fiasco in. April, 131, the Central intelligence Agen- has had a bad press -in this country and abroad. The 193? -"revelations" that the agency had secretly financed the National Student ? Assot.s.lation, plus a number of university-affiliated research institutes and antieCommusist cultural fronts, came as a shock to both students and the pehlic. Professcr Blackstoelf, a learner rotiltary- jldgsee research analyst and nethor of several hooks on the intelligence proc-. .ass, now teaches at the University of South Carolina. As the United States became bogged down in the Vietnam quagmire and the student anti-war protest gathered me- . mentum, the CIA became a favorite, tar- -get of abuse. Agency recruiters were driven from college campuses. CIA-fi- nanced study centers were "trashed" at ' a cost of many thousands of dollars. Net? Left orators, armed with a sense of cut- -rage and an encyclopedic ignorance of the intelligence community and its func- tions1 instinctively assumed that the CIA was a major factor in the escalation of the war in Vietnam. But the Pentagon study of the war, recently published by the New York Times proves conclusiveli:that the Don Quixotes of the New Left have been charging at the wrong windmill. For many years and at critical stages of the escalation. the CIA and other:members: of the intelligence community, especially the State. Department Bureau of Intelli- ? gence and Research repeatedly warned against the hazards involved, including flat predictions that the strategic bomb- ing of North Vietnam would fail to ac- complish its objectives. a Deceived Themselves ? How these dstimates and warnings were ignored by top policy:makers as they carried out their deliberate and "immaculate deception" of the American public is one of the more fascinating 'aspects of the Pentagon papers. But, in deceiving the public, the decision-makers also deceived themselves, and eventually cattle to believe optimistic "military e progjess" reports, released to the public As 'a rule, th various intelligenee bt'ised on the "latest intelligence," agetleles are staffed on the ivorking level when fact at the highest level, the by thousands of anonymous civil servants estimate's were ar, ??r-, from the field, i 1 S' JUL (6-1, /1-Thi r-3., ? . , %.? r." (n.; .."'"""" Cl ? 0 ,? 1 Harold_ Wilson, -wilE.11 appointed shadow Foreign 'Secretary, rushed to. -14',7as1iington to assure President Kennedy that Labor would stand four-square behind the U.S. in the Far East. There is no evidence that he subje-eted American ?inte:ttion,3 to any yery clooe scerutiaty. He recognized a fellow Boy Scout when he saw one., and di.d. .3.iot scruple to borrow the Keu-sledy ovevhlown rhetoric in explaining to donblir,g colleagnes the nature Of Britaiii.'6 East of 'Suez peact>liet--).ving xnission., job" briefings in Saigon, deceived only those officials, either cviliaa or who, wanted to believe them. What is the ''intelligence community"'? How is it organized and what role should it play in decision-making at the national level in such foreign entanglements as the war in :Vietnam? The answers to these questions .have been cloaked in secrecy when they should be a matter of public knowledge. To begin with the basic institutions, the U.S. intelligence community is made up of the separate agencies of such key government departments as State and Defense, the National Security Agency, and the CIA, which .has the overall re- sponsibiiity efor "Coordinating, evaluat- ing, and disseminating intelligence af- fecting the national security._" "First Line Of Defense" ? It has often been said that "inteitenee is the first line of national defense." -Most citizens are vaguely aware that foreign policy and military decisions are made by the President with the advice of his seeretasies of Slide .and Defense, based, in theory at lead, on the best information available to experts- throughout the gov- ernment. The collection, evaluation and dissemination of such information none of the primary functions of intelligence, But in foreign and military affairs, strategic decisions should also take into aecouni-Careful estimates ofthe capabili- ties and probable courses of action of friends, ales, neutrals and "enemies." The production of such national esti- mates is a second major function of the entire intelligence community, although the board of estimates in the CIA coordi- nates the individual agency contributions anti disseminates the final results. Many of the men on the. CIA's Board of National Estimates and its staff have more than two decades of intelligence experience. Better than f0 per cent of the officials on this top echelon have ad- vanced academic degrees in history, po- litical science, or economics dieectly per- tinent to their work. About 75 per cent have enhanced their area and subject knowledge by living overseas. The esti- mators in State Department's Bureau of Intelligence end Research are equally competent and well-qualified. Advice To President ?. On the national level daily and weekly reports are promptly distributed to the President and his chief advisers, and special estimates or briefings are made as required in response to developing crises. In short, the intelligence COMMU- nity provides the decision-maker with carefully evaluated information and esti- mates which he can either use for guid- ance or disregard. History is full- of illustrations how na- tional leaders have ignored the estimates of the intelligence agencies with disas- trous results. Napoleon's intelligence nide, the Marquis de Caulaincoart, ex- plained why, for obvious strategic rea- sons, the planned invasion of Russia would fail. His advice was ignored. A cetintry'iter, AhOiph Hitler's ambas- sador in Russia, Count Brockdorff-Ren- tzau, used the same reasoning in his esti- mate of why ilitler's plan would fail. his warning was also ignored and Hitler launched his invasion, which was widely aa heralded as the fined showdown in his lifelong crusade against world commu: nism. The campaign ultimately floun- dered in a sea of blood-70 million Rus- sian casualties atone, not to mention Ger- man losses which also ran into the mil- lions. . Nothing quite as dramatic has hap- ? ? ?cl eat,s a ? ..e. o .1 e ; s,v, ;e _ tqtRe4x00?",2014rtimpl'.,," pp1803-butedfkotifitbdototial -3 ther government or private enterprise. cont 1:oned. STATINTI Approved For ReleM'O4/b164: CIA-RDP80-0160 13 JUL 1971 ree ressq. Free By OGDEN R. REID = Our democracy does not work well In secret. The Pentagon Papers illumi- nate the arrogance of those in high 'places and the serious erosion, if not breakdown, of our constitutional sys- tem of .checks and balances. At least two Administrations, if not three, believed that they were not ;accountable to the Congress and the American people for watershed deci- sions taken about Indochina. The present Administration has gone even further and launched the most .serious attack on the press in our history: subpoenaing reporters' notes, threatening reprisals against television and radio stations under the power to license, and, for the first time nation- ally, invoking prior restraint against the right to publish. This precensorship was claimed to be justified because of an "immediate grave threat to national security." Critical national security touching our very survival is not in fact at issue here?nor is cryptographic intelligence. While the Kennedy and particularly the Johnson Administrations' failure to Inform Congress is a shocking example of unilateral executive decision-making, the attempted effort by the Nixon Administration to prevent what is essentially past history reaching Con- gress or being published is hardly more reassuring. After six days of hearings before the Government Information Subcom- mittee of the House of Representatives, certain remedies are clearly called for If the Congress is to reassert its con- stitutional role. First, the Congress must enact a' new statute governing- classified docu- ments. This law must sharply limit that which should be labeled secret and it must provide for automatic de- :lassification and Congressional over- sight. If a matter should remain secret after a stated period, there should be in affirmative, positive finding as to Why continued secrecy is necessary. The Congress should explicitly re- serve the right to make public material Improperly classified by the executive contrary to statute when its classifi- cation is not a matter of national security and is simply a device to avoid, governmental embarrassment. STATINTL 'Equally, no Executive order on classi- fication should be issued that subverts the intent of the Congress. Above all, there must be a vast reduction in the corps of -8,000 Deefnse Department officers who now have authority, to originate top secret and secret desig- nations. Second, the Freedom of Information Act should be tightened in two re- spects. The types of information now permitted to be withheld must be sharply limited, and time permitted for Government response to a court suit must be reduced from the present 60 days. ? Third, the Congress must come to grips with executive privilege. Here we are dealing with a collision be- tween the executive and the Congress that has been going on since George Washington assumed office. It should be subject to accommodation, but that will never happen if the Congress does not assert the powers and responsi- bilities given to it by the Constitution. Fourth, legislation may well be re- quired to protect the Fourth Estate. The press often serves as a coordinate branch of our democracy, especially when a breakdown occurs between the other three. Specifically, we need a national Newsmen's Privilege Act? now law. in six states?protecting the confidentiality of sources, absent a threat to human life, espionage, or foreign aggression. Legislation should be enacted to prohibit the issuance by the courts of injunctions against publication, thereby removing prior re- straint from the reach of the executive. Congressional legislation and asser- tion of appropriate initiatives can help redress the current situation. If need be, the power of the purse can be more resolutely used vis-?is an un- responsive executive. But more funda- mentally, what we need is government. with faith in the American people and in their right to participate in the great decisions. If we do not see this ( now, after the Bay of Pigs, the Domin- ican Republic intervention and the whole tragic history of Indochina, then as a nation we do not really under- stand democracy. . Ogden R. Reid, Republican, is member of Congress for the 26th New York district. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP sAN VRANcIgco, CAL. CHRONICLE 4nt t11,11 7 IQ u 480,233 f) ? tpaL-?-_s. : . . - ?.Q11 tiu..2.t Nerai3dy arr:v es In P;zis, uE ci eneroy. 1:-. " It is" STATI NTL Vr1.?EIN-c-'0:11"4"I' ? the tanged U?e&tut,arci o to ,o n of intervt-,n11;-,n, l"resident -John 4_:f"..0n. and thil-t he niado it on Imy Per; Pa pars clat.-that month td-years ago - hi' -the development via war a."2 cat-Int-,t see the end. . 71(2:7, : `sif.t1 ?Lt.. Special 17t1OrCe3 treC?CS and ICO ItarY .7;`:(...'''cr...;02:3 to S,311t11. Vietian, also bthr U.). a carop-aign 0? clartc.-1t11-1-e to be cond:;.e-ted" by CIA-aindSouth: A;tlatrIttirles,,) arionts.. ? AnosP.--, about :Indochina that .1. underline to Presi- iicnnedy haw, much ace': policies he _ tne, United St': Les is getting ready ".; . - they -ere staiing to set.vp the ail expeditionary force under the. 1rote4 of assistanee . . John Kennedy gives me, "?ti.)" nuderstalici that the "whole business is going to : be. enlarged in -order to ::et up in th.e.Indocirinese -.Peninsula a bulwark al relitance against the Sovi- - ? - t - ? tz.,-A).1.642 r. ;Yee you,- .1 .3-3.11-.0, `an intervontion in ;.1-,t--,t al..ea ii11 1z3 an end- less tas I ta-natim ?vakei ? no its ineails raay hns -The? b-ei- has any chal-lce c. . more you involve. your.e.lvos over dc cgaInst cominunisna, the apDear as the na inc:epenence, and the inore lielp they vi-2.11 recolve, v.rst of ail ffo--Au the de:ipair - . "Vio F.ron.chL iari.;erience,t yOir".1-Inierfeanst'ant.-.-d to 'oho our pee in a. Nov you via az to e...d31.0.3 a wax. we have lm-. ued, I prahet tnat t Eticlied . . . ? ? ? : 1:12152" :Ste') bl o into a. ? ,?? 3vi Tirne.3, under- cl a bog, L-1 :.?it a of tie _ . ..ta?"..ezt by Ge-iiez;,:t 1.1ed tvans?- ? yen ruay , .? ? ,? Int.? ati hir ? p?' ' ' resio.ent?cio fi;taatlie (ins .. Kennedy." -. ? -; "-- ? ? ? . ? ? ? - ? - '? -? Ins ni:Aory: i?,.eariedy listens ? tO Me, but the ; The fateful. date is ileitthie both fo4. con le will shovi. that I 'lave not con.\--..nced ? $, cone b:.:..fore V.v.) decision and fel...what cn soon; after. John F. re:niei:ly w.sI into bis presidency; he was feeEn,,i!, ihreugh; tnad arount:1 ci the Ci.- L1.2.C3 Penta-'.Nt gort. bad taken. a coi.OLE`:::112,e,,ti-ng at. the ".-Elav of . . Pigs, in .Cui-)a, .19, 1961, whi ell. he ed- pit loathed huvinr: to accept). 1t.1.11 re.snonsibil "17 -*ft ? ,riet 0/. , co I and.; I o Con.rf!.ess? vhich LYndo-n Johnson t ls,ter so eh ilarned for_ eat cell:airily berriz-d otit 471). OVV- ?A 1: , ? x , e.r.4 .?-1:,i?` A . , thn war Via 11161. 122,13:00:1(.; ar;(11131-immaliti._.; liate. 'to tho Ic.erziatly\"oeirlinitineht c-' 11"v 11' 1(.131 ?1 2. AAA: V if -they turn at this !joint to the 12-1X1011S of Charies' .deGaulle, recently pu-olis ranee. Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : cIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 ? Approved For Rag01?t0j. 0 is 4-7.z . t. ii .., Ts it* If( ,?,c1 L., l -? 9 LONDON ? (UPI) ? A former Pentagon officer said that President John F. Kennedy ? incurred the hatred 13: the Central .Intelli- 'gence Agency because of his attempts to harness its power after the abortive Bay of PiZs invasion. . In an interview with British Broadcast- ing Corporation teie'vision, Lt. Col.- Fletcher :Prouty indicated that the late president's ef- forts to curb the CIA had failed. He said two presidential directives designed to limit the . agency's powers in 1961 never had been im- plemented. . . Prouty, interviewed on the. BEC 's 2 Hours" program, was Pentagon liaison off i- cer with the CIA, a U.S. Air Force colonel, and Director of Special Operations .for the -Joint Chiefs of Stnf f in 1952 and 1963. He is now a banker in Washington, D.C. . ? , , . . ? ? AFTER THE investigation into the Bay . of Pigs failure in 1961, Kennedy issued two , ? _ 84: CIA-RD national security memoranda to the CIA, Prouty said. "One of them he signed personally, ex- plicitly stating that any operational activity of a clandestine nature would be either so ? -small that .CIA agents alone could operate it, or would be referred to the J.C.S. (Joint Chiefs. of Staff)- rather than permitting the CIA to mount something as large as the Bay of Pigs again," Prouty said. . "I think he (Kenned2.:)' strongly to the defeat at the Bay of Pigs .and moved against the CIA to control them," he said. ? THE 'COLONEL said he personally liad handled ? the directives, but "for some strange reason, although they were issued and signed by the president, there was no implementation of them." Asked by interviewer Robert MacKenzie if he thought Kennedy had incurred' the ha- tred of the CIA by trying to clip its powers., ? Prouty answered "I do." STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 - WASHINGTON DAILY NE:IS Approved For Releas? R1/97)/04 : CIA-RDP8 13ay a Pigs ivh-e. rjA ?-1 " r-i- fl1P'Y L9( F73 '77;71 .,(72:3 Li . ?,117 UJJ r? 00 ? (717,:, .717, Li Li 1,1 LONDON 5.1111 A former Pentagbri officer .said yesterday President Kennedy incurred? ;the hatred of the Central Intelligence Agency because he tried to harness its power after the Bay of Pigs invasion. In an interview with BBC television,- Lt. Col. - Fletcher Prouty indicated that the late presi- dent's efforts to curb the CIA had failed. lie said two presidential directives designed to. limit the agency's powers in 1951 never had been -implemented. ? Co!. Prouty was Pentagon liaison man with the CIA, a U.S. Air Force officer, and director ,of special operations for the Joint Chiefs of. 'Staff in 1952 and 1953. He is now retired and a banker in Washington, D.C. *, After the bay of Pigs investigation lii 1931; President Kennedy issued two memoranda to the CIA, Mr. Prouty said. . "One of them he signed personally, explicit- ? ly stating that any activity of a clandestine -nature ,either would , ha so small that . CIA agents alone could'operate it or would be re- ferred to the J.C.S. (Joint Chiefs of :iaff) . rather than permitting the CIA to mount Some- thing as large as the Bay of Pigs again," Col. Prouty said. "I think he reacted strongly to the defeat at ? the Bay of Pigs and moved against the CEA to control them," he said. . - Col. Prouty said? he -Personalty had handled' the directives, but "for some saga reason, altho they were issued and sigzle! bz the Pres- , ident, there was no implement of them." , -Askerli., by. interviewer Rolm! MacKenzie IV he thought Mr. Kennedy incurred the hatred of the CIA by trying to etip its pay:era, ?Mr. Prouty -answered, "I do." STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: Clk-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 WASHINGTON POST Approved For Releasei013rinft : CIA-RDP80-01 Say. h H 01 ,..C?' P f : ? i " 0 li e, 9 IL -,i_ v ? , *9 Inv ?717.7 g. WWI 8 V 11611, 6 ' By Philip D. *Carter Washington Post Staff Writer , ATLANTA, July 2 ? For- mer. Secretary of State Dean Rusk conceded today that he had underestimated the deter- mination of the North Viet- namcse to wage war in Southa east Asia. ? . . But Rusk also strongly de- fended himself and the two 'Presidents lie served against charges that they tried to de- ceive American public opinion about the war in Vietnam. "I don't believe there was any attempt to deceive any- body during all that," he said. Rusk. -served Presidents Ken- nedy. and Johnson as Secre- tary of State from 1961 through 1968: Rusk also took sharp issue with . several conclusions con- tained in the secret Pentagon ?study on the Vietnam war. He sharply rejected one sugges- tion that he had considered using nuclear weapons against 'China in 1963. "Let me say very simply ,that under no circumstances at any time did I ever recom- mend any use of nuclear weapons," he said. "I don't be- lieve any man in his right mind could rationally make such a recommendation as a matter of policy." In the course of apparently sold-searching replies in inter- views this afternoon, Rusk conceded, however, that he had made mistakes while serv- ing as Secretary of State. "I liersonally, I think, under- estimated the persistence and the tenacity of the North Viet- namese," he said. Considering the relative sizes of the two; countries, the estimated. 700,000 casualties suffered by! the North Vietnamese, he said, was the equivalent of 10 mil- lion American casualties, and yet "they're continuing to I come" because of "the divi- sions here at home." The United States also erred, he said, in not stressing "prevention" of conflicts like the Asian ?var, and. in "not pressing much hatglaPraY U.N. intervention in the con- flict . _ And, he. later added, "one of the severe prices we may have paid for Vietnam is that it May have stimulated ... a period of isolationism" in the United States. He nonetheless insisted that those who argue 'that the United States should "get out -now" also are mistaken. And he held fast to the basic posi- tion he defended throughout his eight-year tenure in the Cabinet: that the United States had no choice but to de- fend South Vietnam against North Vietnamese aggression if the world was to be saved from general conflict. "The overriding moral ques- tion," he said, "is, 'How do we avoid World War HI?' Most of his comments came during the taping here of an hour-long interview conducted by NBC television reporters Barbara Walters and Edwin Newman which was later broadcast as a network "spe- cial." Additional comments followed during taping of an NBC "Today" show interview with Miss Walters and a subse- quent informal press confer- ence in the studio of WSB-TV, the local NBC affiliate. . With the exception of an in- ? teview published today in the Daily News in Athens, Ga., where the former Cabinet Sec- retary now works' as professor of international law - at the University of Georgia, it was Rusk's first public comment since publication of parts of the 47-volume Pentagon his- tory of the war. ? 6 71, IS 111(W - Wage 51/7 Rusk said he had not heard of the study until he read of it in The New York Times, after which he telephoned former President Johnson and former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, the man who origi- nally authorized the history. President Johnson, he said, told him that the study had just recently been delivered to the new Johnson Library in Austin, Tex., and that he had Austin, Tex., and that he had not yet examined it. , - ? According to Husk,Mc- Namara originally had in mind "a much more informal _ produced by the Pentagon re- searchers. The history, accord- ing to Rusk, was to have been more of an "in-house affair," on the lines of the kind of ma- terial usually contained in the "loose-leaf notebook" Rusk himself relied on while ap- pearing before congressional. committees to defend the war. Rusk . noted that the "his- tory" was exclusively a- De- fense Department project. "I'm curious about why the an- alysts didn't interview any of us" at the White House and the State Department, he said. "The analysts are anony- mous, so in a certain sense these have some of the charac- teristics of an anonymous let- ter," he Said in reference .to the study's authors. He called on the media to "make their names known." But he said he felt the study was fair "to some extent" in- sofar as it made clear that "we were looking at all the alternatives throughout the War. . ? Rusk said he had deliber- ately withheld comment on the study until after the Su- preme Court ruled last Wednesday that The Times and .The Washington Post could continue publishing sto- ries on the Pentagon history. He added that he did not take exception to the court's deci- sion, but that publication would complicate American diplomacy. The public's "right to know" is balanced by the govern- ment's responsibility for pre- serving diplomatic sedrets, he said. Rusk specifically challenged the charge that President Johnson secretly was planning to escalate the war while tell- ing the American :voters, dur- ing his 1964 presidential cam- paign against Sen. Barry Gold- water (R-Ariz.); that he sought ."no wider war." Any proposals to the con- trary, said Rusk, were only routine contingency plans. He said Mr. Johnson did not decide to expand the conflict ? until South Vietnam was invaded by regular troops % e r 610 ? ? STATI NTL ? ? 1 Rusk laid -he still strongly believes that there were two. !North Vietnamese attacks on 'U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin in the summer of 1964 and that the United -States did not provoke them. But congressional reaction, he ? .said, would have been "rela- aively the same" even before the second reported attack, ? after which both congressional houses ? with two dissenting votes ? approved Mr. John- son's "Gulf of Tonkin resolu- tion" extending broad war powers to the President. Rusk also countered charges that the United States was actively supporting a coup against South Vietnam's President Diem. Instead,, he said, the United States "drew aside on a wait-and-see kind of basis" after Diem failed to respond to U.S. pressure for reform of his government. "Well, he refused to do that, and the military and the Budd- hists and the students got to- gether and threw him out of office," Rusk said. He acknowledged that low- er-echelon. U.S. officials in Saigon may have encouraged the coup without high-ranking approval in Washington, . but he denied that there was any general concern that 'Diem was attempting to end the War through an agreement with Hanoi. "We had no indication that this was more than a rumor, that there were any actual talks going on," Rusk said. . While denying that U.S. . officials had lied about the war, Rusk explained that pub- lic officials are usually strong advocates of their policies. "I don't know any sector of our society that goes around poor: mouthing what they're trying to accomplish," he said. "la never saw a Buick salesman, driving arch:11d in a Chrysler." In another context, he de- dared that the nation's "great- / est mistake" was the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. : ? He tacitly endorsed Presi- dent Nixon's Vietnam policy, which he described as trying to, "bring thia war to .a. cOnclu-, 01R000500060001-3 cow med. WASHINGTON STAR Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP8 - 3 JUL 1971 _ ? CO 110 Lir:q,911 S. GyS KC-E1G-Tedy. AraLin ? LONDON (UPI) ? A former Pentagon officer says President John? .F. Kennedy incurred the hatred of the Central Intelli- gence Agency because of his at- tempts to harness its power aft- er the abortive Bay of Pigs inva- sion. In an interview with British Broadcasting Corporation televi- sion, Lt. Col. Fletcher Prouty indicated that the late Presi- dent's efforts to curb the CIA had failed. He said two presiden- tial directives designed to limit the agency's powers in 1961 nev- :er had been implemented. Prouty; interviewed on the ? BBC's "24 Hours" program; was Pentagon liaison officer with the .CIA, a U.S. Air Force colonel, land director of special opera- Tons for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962 and 1963. He now is with Madison National Bank in Wash- ington. After the investigation into the -Bay of Pigs failure in 1951, Ken- nedy issued two national securi- ty memoranda to the CIA, Prou- ty kaid. "One of them he signed per- sonally, explicitly stating that any operational activity of a ? clandestine nature would be ei- ther so small that CIA agents alone could operate it, or would be referred to the JCS rather than permitting the CIA to mount something as large as the Bay of Pigs again," Prouty said. Prouty said he personally had handled the directives, but "for some strange reason, although STATI NTL the President, there Was no im- plementation of them." Asked how the CIA could have gotten away with violating the: directives, Prouty said, "There must have been some pretty -vie- lent meetings in there between June of '61. and say the begin- ning of the buildup in Vieth/if...1, because to my knowledge the documents' were never retract- ; they were issued and signed by ed." - Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 m.11.? Approved For Relea r it klehne ant "Love los '6..2001703/0T,4 : CIA-RDP80-0 2 JUL 1971 cy cl.) 7- 1 Ca sces??L/-i:- uti, 0 I /1I IIN I L JUu 1961 Memo Envisioned Maximum, U.S. Troop level of 205,030 By Chalmers M. Roberts Washington Pozt Staff Writer On Nov. 11, 1961, President Kennedy was told that Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and the Joint. ahiefs of Staff , "assume" that if ilanoi and Peking overtly intervened in South Vietnam after the . United States sent its first troops there that he maximum American force "re- auired on the ground in Southeast !isle would not exceed six divisions, sr about 205,000 men." This assumption was contained in joint memorandum to the President by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and kIcNamara in preparation for a Na- tional Security Council . session at which Mr. Kennedy, in essence, ac- mpted.._ the Rusk-McNamara recom- mendations for a fateful step into direct involvement in the war. This is among the many Lew facts contained in the Pentagon documents made available to The Washington Post relating to the Kennedy era and the war. In actual fact, there was barely disguised North Vietnamese inter- vention some three years later, but thus far there .has been no Chinese intervention. The total American manpower sent to Vietnam reached a peak of more than a?half million men before the beginning of the with- drawals by the Nixon Administration. The 205,000 estimate was but one of the many miscalculations of the war. The available documents portray a President Kennedy reluctant, in -1951. to become fully committed to the war by sending in combat troops but be- ing advised and pushed by top efficiali :in his administration to commit the 'United States. For example, the first of 10 recom; :mendations, with many sub-recom- mendations in the Rusk-McNamara -memorandum, was that "We now take the decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism and that, in doing so, we recognize that the introduction of United States and other* SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] forces. may be necessary to achieve this objective." When the President approved a National ' Security Action Memoran- dum (NSAINI 111) on Nov. 22, how- ever, that sweeping comniitment lan- guage was omitted. . . Approved Nonetheless, the NSAM was headed "First 'Phase of Vietnam Program" and it did contain presidential ap- proval for sending to Viet- nam helicopters, light air- craft and t ansport planes, manned by American per- sonnel in uniform in a new "partnership" between the United States and' the gov- ermnent of South Vietnam then headed by President Ngo Dinh Diem. The first helicopters and their crews arrived in Sai- gon on Dec. 11, 1931, aboard the U.S.S. Core, a former es- cort carrier. Four days later, Washington and Saigon made public an exchange of Kennedy-Diem letters an- nouncing in general terms a stepped-up American aid program. These moves com- posed the most fateful step in 1961 regarding Vietnam. When John r, Kennedy en- tered the White House on Jan. 20, 1961, the focus in Southeast Asia was on Laos. Three days earlier, one' of the strongest advocates of American intervention, Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, had reported to the outgoing ad- ministration that "the U.S. should recognize that Viet- nam is In a critical condition and should treat it as a com- bat area of the cold war..." This theme, in one form or another, was to be pressed on the President from the day of his inaugu- ral to the day of his assassi- nation. The rhetoric of his Inaugural Address was that of the cold war period. His attitude toward the Vietnam problem, as is well known from what he said in public, was deeply affected by So- viet Premier Nikita Khrush- cliev's famous speech in Jan- uary, prior to the KennedY inauguration, commending "wars of national liberation in a period when nuclear debate within the adnums- war was too dangerous to tration from January to contemplate and when small November, 1961, was to pres- conventional wars could lead sure Diem to improve the to a world war. caliber and effectiveness of This led the President to his government as well as to .approve a number of covert introduce some American operations both in Laos and military personnel and in South and North Viet- equipement as an earnest of nam. It led him to Isuild in the United States commit- example,. on Nov. 3, 1961, in the letter to the President transmitting a report on his mission to Vietnam, Gen. Maxwell Taylor wrote: - "It is my judgment and that of my colleagues that the United States must de- cide how it will cope with Khrushchev's 'wars of liber- ation' which are really pare- wars of guerrilla aggres- sion." Added Taylor: "This is a new and dangerous Commu- nist technique which bypas- ses our traditional political and military responses. While the final answer lies beyond the scope of this re- port, it clear to me that the time may come in our relations to Southeast Asia when we must declare our Intentions to attack the source of guerrilla aggres- sion iii. North Vietnam and. impose on the Hanoi gov- ernment a price for partici- pation in the current war which is commensurate with the damage being inflicted n its neighbors to the 'south." ? But that time was not to come until the Johnson era, after Hanoi matched the American buildup on the ground. In the first Ken- nedy year, the problem ap- peared this way, as de- scribed in the Rusk-Mc- Maniere memorandum to President Kennedy under the heading of "The Prob- lem of Saving South Viet- nam": "It seems, on the face of It, absurd to think that a na- tion of 20 million people can be subverted by 15-20 thou- sand active glierrillas if the government and the people of that country do not wish to be subverted." The American answer, tor- tuously arrived at lengthy Fortaeleas1201031 /0r4 m 0000 tecil the advise given him. For Washington viewed it was a constant in mu of la (There is no 'evidence, in- cidentally; in the documents Post to show that the deba- cle of the Bay of Pigs in April,. 1961, affected Presi- dent Kennedy's actions realting to Indochina one way or the other.) For 1931 as a whole, it is evident that two missions to Saigon ordered by Mr. Ken-' nedy were of great import- ance?those of Vice Presi- dent Johnson and of Gen. Taylor. There were other ac- tivities here in Washington that also affected the out- come, of course. And there could be additional evidence In White House and State Department records, which are sparse in the Pentagon study. Barely a week after taking office 'the Pentagon analyst noted, Mr. Kennedy ap- proved a modest counter-in- surgency program for South Vietnam drafted by the Ei- senhower Administration. There followed alternate coaxing and- pressuring, of Diem for "reforms" to make such programs work. On April 27, on the heels of the Bay of Pigs, a crisis in Laos reached Its peak. The combination, the ana- lyst suggested, led a task force headed by Deputy De- fense Secretary Roswell L. Gilpatric to suggest Ameri- can help to increase Diem's forces and what the analyst termed "a modest commit- ? ? ment of U.S. ground combat units in South Vietnam with the nominal mission of es- tablishing two training cen- ters." The President took no action on the latter, al- though he approved the 'aid to Diem's forces. A State Department re- draft of this report recom- mended stationing U.S.' troops in Vietnam but not- for combat against the Viet- cong. It also raised the idea of a bilateral American= South Vietnamese defense treaty. But on May 5 Rusk declared that "we should., not place combat forces in SVN at this time." The Vice President's visit to Vietnam is first men- MOM 001* In a ? memorandumto r. Ken-. - - - belatinied ? it 11 ,I)tne 3 0 , 1 hP Prc?veccif\ffill.A18MPfil FGEN. ROBERT L. SCOTT, JR. SPEAKS ' TO AMERICANS - HON. JOIN R. RARICK OF LOUISIANA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ? Tuesday, June 29, 1971 Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, in a speech entitled "The Bitter Ccst of a Bogus Peace," Brig. Gen. Robert L. Scott, Jr. retired professional soldier, emphasizes - in an jmphssioned tone his love of dedi- cation to God and country while elab- orating on the bitter price we pay for a tenuous, bogus peace?the erosion of li- berty and of the God-given freedoms be- queathed to us by our U.S. Constitution. Being the realist that he is, General Scott rejects the "inevitable wave of the future" propaganda being repeatedly hammered into the consciousncsses of the American people to condition them to accept apathetically without resist- ance. the "blowing winds of change" even :when they are obliterating our U.S. Constitution and traditional American Way of life. - General Scott knows from first hand experience that. people cause things to .happen. Someone is prohibiting our mili- tary commanders from winning the Viet- nam war which tetired military com- manders affirm could be won with con- ventional weapons in a matter of months The .exportation of sophisticated dee- - tronic computers to the Soviet Union end such items as diesel engines and parts, aircraft propeller assemblies, elec- tron tubes, and generators to. East Euro- pean satellites of . Russia?countries -which provide SO percent of the materials -of war to North Vietnam for use against American servicemen?just did not come about automatically or by accident. They were the result of people. Certain anti- Americans made these decisions. Just as when the dedicated patriot Otto Otepka was dismissed from his State Department security position where he exposed actual and prospective employees as security risks, one or more real persons at a high- er level ordered him purged. . - General Scott, best known for his bravery -and achievements RS a World War II flyer and for his several books, especially "God Is My Co-Pilot," re- . minds his audience that while each new administration promises changes, Ameri- ca keeps losing; and he states: At last, though, there is a faint glimmer of hope. Not that we are about to win even a scrimmage, but that finally, more Ameri- cans 'come to realize that our bungling policymakers are not stupid fools or just do- ing the best they can in their complicated thankless Job, but are part and parcel of the greatest, the most insidious conspiracy the world, has ever known. Following care- fully-laid plans for our convergenee with the Soviet Union as the base for dictatorial government of the world. (Where, as Sena- tor ? says, there'll be no armies, no navies, no air forces except those of the United Nations. In fact, there'll be no United States as we know it.) On the west side of Park Avenue in INew York City, sit two Imposing buildings sort of kitty-corner to one another. One Is the Soviet Embassy to the United Nations, the other the Headquarters of the Council of Foreign Relations, the infamous C.F.R..Prob- alonszons. o ably the most Influential, sunily the most 'secretive of societies, not only for the for- s- eign policy of the United States, but for the world. That one world. Formalmembership is composed -of 1400 of the most elite names in the worlds of government, labor, business, finance, communications, the foundations, and the academies. And despite, the fact that it, the Council of Foreign Relations, has staffed almost every key position of each ad- ministration since F.D.R., it is doubtful Unit one American in a thousand, so much as knows its name. Or that one in ten thousand can describe anYthing about Its function. Such anonymity can hardly be an accident. I insert the text of General Scott's timely and significant speech at this point in my remarks. I urge that our colleagues read this speech and get better informed with facts about the Council on Foreign Relations?CFR--the influential organi- zation which has led and continues to lead America on a retrogressive course of destruction, by reading "'The Invisible Government" by the noted writer, Dail Smoot. Since the national news media is afraid to tell the American people about the CFR, I exhort our colleagues to do so in order that the people may know . the truth, a knowledge of which is essential for taking prudent action to reverse -the present trend and to preserve our coun- try and Constitution. If the people know the truth, they will keep America free. The speech follnws: THE BITTER COST OF A BOGUS PEACE?IS THE VROHEN CROSS OUR SYMBOL OF BETRAYAL? (By Brig. Oen, Robert L. Scott, Jr.) When the man who is the President of the United States now, made the best of accep- tance speeches that ever has been made, fit Miami Beach in 1958, every American must have been not only pleased but thrilled, be- cause in the strongest of voices he said words such as these: "When the notion which can land an army upon the shores of Normandy In 1944, and capture a continent, cannot now take a dinky little beachhead of guerrillas in Vietnam, then I say this nation needs a change in leadership." And on and on he went, inspiring all Americans. There was the new Administration, the new leadership we had all been spraying for. He promised the stopping of riots in our streets, dignity would be restored to our police, our nation's cam- -puses would be freed of revolutionaries par- ading as dissatisfied sudents. We would aid the enemy no longer. We'd recognize the Communist for what he was?the enemy? and go to work. All of these things if only we elected him. There would be changes. Well, we believed bins. And we elected for America a new Commander-hs-Chlef. And now we would have leadership. Only, there has been nothing but more of the same. We still wage that no-win war of attrition bogged down right where the enemy wants us, using weapons that enemy carefully selected for us, and back home we are torn apart inter- nally, primarily because there Is no leader- ship. So, disgusted at all this, we sit down and write letters to Mr. Nixon asking why, and sometimes there are-replies such as this one. . ? "THE WHITE HOUSE, "November 5, 1970. "DEAR SIR: On President Nixon's behalf, I wish to acknowledge your letter and to thank you for letting him have your views. You may be sure your comment A on problems facing our Nation at home and abroad have been fully noted. - "The Administration believes that the massive destruction of facilities in the cities of North Vietnam would not spell victory but would Instead admit defeat by the Inabliity of the United States and its allies to cope with 'a war of national liberatiom' This sophisticated ferns of aggression nses terror and subversion to gain the allegiance or the submission of those it purporta liberate. . ? "Such aggression must not be allowed to succeed. Our objective therefore Is not the annihilation of one country hut the protec- tion of another. This is the victory we seek." Oh, there was more of the double-talk in "the reply that I received, given gratis in the name of the President, but surety as you let those words rattle around in your mind, there's no need to further bore you with ad- ditional quotes. I can only im respectful to the White House 'and the President, even With this idealistic gull. Yet what frightens me, given as it is, it has to be the policy of this Adtninistration. Signed by one Noble N. Melionkamp, Staff Assistant to the President of the United States. Wishing me best re- gards, and adding finally, "you may be sure that President Nixon is determined to con- tinue the pursuit of our country's goal of a just and lasting peace in Vietnam." Ladies rind gentlemen, as a professional soldier, I feel flattered when I receive any communication, even Indirectly, from the Commancier-in-Chief. But after reading and re-reacting such utter drivel, I arn astounded that we are so naive. Can it be that we are already in the hands of the enemy? We are not only being buried as Khrushchev shouted while he beat his shoe upon the U.N. desk; we are helping the dirt being shoveled into' our own graves. - Now my mother used to say to me, those last years of her life when I was Director of Information of thes?United States Air Force, and I dared even Cheinto find fault with the way the White lise se was?running this same no-win war: "Son, she would admonish me, please don't criticize the President. I'm .cer.. tabs he does the best he can.". And she would terminate the discussion by adding, "though things may look dark, I truly be- lieve everything will come out alright in the end." ,sIn fact, that last is just about the essence of the opinion I hear voiced across the United States as I cover this land making speeches. And there comes upon me the horrible reali- zation that the way things are going, the President of the United States does not run this country. Doesn't run it as my mother used to think, and as the average American rests assured of today. What a blatant thing to say! What would my mother say if she heard me now? Administrations come and go with elec- tions?particular heads vested in the Nixons and Johnsons and Kennedys, promising changes and improvements?but nothing really Changes except the name. The riots and the treason and the no-win fiasco bleed- ing us to death continue. America keeps . At last, though, there is a faint glimmer-of hope. Not that we are about to win even a scrimmage, but that finally, more Americans come to realize that our bungling policy- makers are not stupid fools or just doing the best they can in their complicated thankless job, but are part and parcel of the greatest, the most insidious conspiracy the world has ever known. *Following carefully-laid plans for our convergence with the Soviet Union as the base for dictatorial government of the world. (Where, as Senator Blank says, there'll ? be no armies, no navies, no air forces except those of the United Nations. In fact, there'll be no United States as we know it.) On the west side of Park Avenue in New York City, sit two imposing buildings sort of . kitty-corner to one anothnr. One is the Soviet Embassy to the United Nations, the other the Headquarters of the Council of Foreign Relations, the infamous C.F.R. Probably the most influential, surely the most secretive of Approved For Release-2001/03/04 : CIALRDP80-0.1601R00050006000-14 STAT! ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0 ACO, TEX. En-TRIBUNE. . , JUN 3 0 toT2 - -26,686 , What this frarneWOrk, he adds, is thot o Orr: Klo pl,/ ?:,1 ;,-b T.Firr ig, ? i v L,-.L., 1;- ii t.,U Ili- tt-oo r -'i-; . ji. ileZe 1.1.6:11,S guerrilla warfare is GO per cent pc,litics, 15 per cent ad- ,777--g . 1 ministration and 4 per cent military action, and that Ho :?..? rroi .r.. b? .F.7 -r? ,-, -!5- T, ,r- , - ,,,,,, i -^ -r- 1,7-1,7,--r, .,-, n r Chi Mirth had won the political scramble when he took ? 1 a LA, MO' l'' Lit; ''i tli ..o_U, Li olt '4 :i t3 " ii. d over the Vietnamese independence movement in MI5 and mercilessly subverted it to COTalTalniSnl. '? ? By far the most perceptive analysis of how the . There will be millions of woros written ano.s! icon United States role in Vietnam grew under the Kennedy on the Vietnam war but the essence .pf how it grev., is and Johnson administrations has come from the pen ofd I outlined clearly in the above analysts. ? ,: o William R. Polk, who was on the policy planning coun- 'V./Olt:LE IT IS POPULATt. NOW to ktbol Vietnam cil of the U.S. State Department IK1-65. disaster, there is a strong body of opinion among the . statesmen of non-Communist Southeast Asia, as report- 11: :! A feeling ofexcitement and pride in the supposed ed from Malaysia, by Robert S. Elegant of the Wash-/ 1; -.capacity to act pervaded the ranks of those brought into ini_2;ton Post, that. ! , the Kennedy administration, writes William R. Poll:. "1. Ameriean intervention in Indochina has CLC-_,CIS^ The normal machinery of government -was ignored and ively.stabilized Southeast Asia and prevented external 11 bypassed, he adds, while "all of us who had come into conquest while encouraging internal progress and re- .1, the government from the outside were fascinated with gional cooperation, and NI the techniques and toys of power. . .- ,, Army, Air "2. Th United States has won in a limited, political Force and Navy each offered a gimmick to solve the war. American has attained its chief goals by nurturing e mysterious and ' complex dilernmaS before us. . . The a Republic of South Vietnam with a much better than CIA .constantly informed us that it had assets capable even chance of survival; by stabilizing the area; and by of restructuring politics almost anywhere in the world." catalyzing internal change which makes the People's Republic of China: less aggressive and more inclined to- THE' FIASCC TN C-CiSO. kno,Nn vs Bay of In and ward normal diplomatic interchange." 7 the hardnosed confrontation between Nikita Iihrush-? chev and John Kennedy in Vienna heightened an urge So the verdict of history may be far different from to show the world something about American power, that being glibly repeated about Vietnam in current the writer says. - ' hand-wringing clamor. ? This urge was fed by a "war gaming concept," ? Polk writes, in which "the world was assumed to be a place of inherent conflict and jostling for pow:cr. There ? were only two serious contenders, the Soviet Union and the United States: The result of the gamingb scenarios ? was to clarify the options of the players and to attempt to define ways in which ambiguity can be clarified and miscalculation by the superpowers avoided." This led the Kennedy administration, he. adds, into a Startling misconception of the world as it really' -exists: . . . ? - .. .; ...._ .?. . "In the international arena we attempted to substi- _ tute a disembodied view of the world for the reality. In place of politics, we sought an 'intellectual vision of strategy. In place of the rough and tumble. of the marketplace, we sought abstract plans. .All of us - sought, in short, to pass our individual responsibility as ' citizens on to some imagined expertise." - VIEWING THE DIITTERICRATi.ON of Vietnam urrder Communist bloodshvd, the Kennedy and Johnson advisers recalled that military assistance and civilian aid had enabled the Greek government to defeat com- munist insurgency in 1948-4G; that the British had de- feated the Communists in Malaysia through ruthless use of force, and the fortified village concept though it took 11 years; that civic action had enabled the philiD- , pines government to destroy the I-luk. movement. By . combining these lessons with the bag of tools in Uncle Sam's kit ? the light-weight rifle, the helicopter,..delo- liation agents, etc.; and by lacing the admittedly cor- rupt, inefficLent and backward army of South Vietnam with our ovAPprcsaved,For Reless*200140344:57. CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 were there," Polk writes in retrospe.ct. STATI NTL 1 , , it STATI NTL ? ,-----AppTOVed For Release:2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80- 'CHIC1iG0 , ILL. SUN-TILIES - 536,108. S ? 709,123. jUri ?tf,,, 21 - CINCACO Sunc 27, `19YI ..; _., ; 11 I, . h ; .., - II 4 'i '?.7''' I 1 1-7 1:7-7.} ril , ;177\ C- ii.17-1.71 fe:-C-) : i'.. ii., _i .. ,..JH ,,0_,.?1 ::.L,Jt.. - i I I 1 ? I i i 1 i '-.7:-::., . I 1 t (--7 -1 r.---- lif 1 c-,,Hil lk :iW, !.1 ik 11,,?:'.- fl.,:------f'r- .11i ' rn,,Itl , c-,i \1:-.:1 LI \.._'2, v_-_,..:,.--1 - \,--,..i Li T.1 k::,L.1 L.:1 \,:::::. \:.-..:1 tc1:1 \-:1 'C',. . . ? _ .? . William R. Polk, president of the Adlai Ste- e-ctien e, a wal and a philoso of it S own. An V\ fe7 (;) - - e oa .- loser, of - n . venson Institute of International Affairs and a incoming, administration had only a few ?, \ .1 1 ---- - - 1 rj- '7'"- c7-7N I i ., 1 1 ' ? -:) professor at the University of Chicago, was months to stamp it persOliality upon the bu- \ \ ,' i ? . , ,rach of t I ii,,--.iiii en the Policy Phu-ming Council of the u.s. intleriley.. Thereafter, the pattern became k. i ? I k- , '1(iii-: ti'ri . i lug is his insider's analysis of the foreign poi- dr2a. The. Kennedy administration largely IA ' iti 'a.teel let Li State D rt t_ epamen t from . nCil to l955 . F ollo w- hai-dened and beyond the. ehe Presl - ' v ., . '::3 icy that led to involteinent in Vietnam. . : missed its opportunity. The jolmson ad minis- in the first blush of concein with thought-t-T. -: pla tratIon never had a .chance, and the Nixon . nning analysis never really .got undsulflay. - . adantstracon never tried. In the formative early 111031ths of the Kennedy by William R. Polk The Ketundy team had no major programs, administraticni, the r' hey Planning Council. went through a bureaucratic "exercise Publication of government decuments about It had not identified appropriate numbers of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War pro- persons. to implement the ideas that it had such lamentably 'poor quality as to convince ? the entire government apparatus that the: vides-an occasion to raise fundamental queee and it was prepared to give away to its ndtu- Kennctdy lions op U.S. political action in recent years. enemies positions of great opportunity. . .a.dministration was interested .7 only in show and not in the realities. Months were The first of these difficult-to-ansvser ques- It is stavtline that President Kennedy 'did spent Miming out turgid, rehashed and in- tions is: Why did the new Kennedy adminis. not knn'w two of his principal top aides, the , applicable "guideline papers". tration (and later President Lyndon B. John- Secretaries of defense and state, before his son) continue so much of the foreign policy election. Mile he constantly complained of -- It never gets off greund . Admin- conceived by President Eisenhower's s.cere. the State Department, he undercut the two The second trap was created by the Admin- . tary of state, Jelin Foster Dulles? principal of; of his own party, Adlai E. .istratien's need to establish . its international Stevenson II" and Chestex Bowles; allowed "credibility." We had. received a black eye in The-second question is: Why did successive U.S. governments appeared so insistant?at the senior bureaucrats of the State Depart- Cuba, and in the Vienna test of wills, the . times eager?to be committed to the Vietnam "machinery"t to maintain intact the "machinery" of- 2 young President Kennedy appeared to have ' been faced down by a tough, experienced and War? . . policymaking he. despised, and brought in so wily Nikita S. Khrushehev. Running through all the memoranda so far Bradt, heterodox and unco-ordinated a team All of us who bad come newly into the goy, publishedLand riViny that have not been Pub- 01 new people as to make virtually no irapact.. ernment from the outside were fascinated lished?are feelings of excitement and a pride on the vast a.nd vawieldy organization. .. with the techniques and toys of power. Touts In a capacity to act. Both for better and for worse, this WEIS the Frustrated, without clear guidelines, Ken- from the Air Force, CIA and the Army and nedy and his close circle of associates simply Navy each offered a gimmick to solve the mood of the leWs. After dull, gray years of a neglected or bypaese.d the machinery of gm:7 mysterious and complex dilemmas before us. lackluster Eiseithower administration, a new eminent. Forawhile, this appeared to be. a The. CIA constantly informed us that it had team, bright, alert and sophisticated, arrived to take charge. - pragmatic, sensible approach. In many "assets" that were capable of restructuring What were the maor elements areas, however, the Kenne.dy administration' politics almost anywhere in the world. j in this new allowed decisions to be taken, often almost ' Even the laborious and somewhat pathetic Mood? The first, undoubtedly, was_ set during the absent mindedly or with little appreciation of efforts of the Agency for. International. De-. campaign. President John F. Kennedy cm- their tong-term importance, have. set the velopment could be orchestrated into diplo- p - phasized The so-called missile gap to demon- course of subsequent U.S. oliey. - matic and other efforts to control, damp down Strate that a fumbling, inept Republican ad- ,Th3 Bay Of Pies. fia.sce blither called lur or redirect the energies of a score of - na- ministration had allowed U.S. capacities to question in the Presidents. minti -the' ki,,,--.E;I:.-,tinns.The bewildering statistics of speeds and wither. The new administration went to great mental "m a c 11 in e." He particularly dis- capacities of high-performance aircraft, to rellIS tO prOject an imag of zest and energy. trusted the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Celt- which we were all treated to rides, were se- -- ' 4 . ' . It is not, perhaps, an exaggeration to say that tial Intelligence Agency. Ironically, however, ductive. Independent brartches of the ser- a key element in the Democra.tic victory in the casualty- in the CIA,tyas not the culprit. vices, even the chemical and biological war- WO. won the farMliar manazine program of Rather, it was the knaTyileal, "overt" part of faro groups, dangle.d before us their capac- the youthful, handsome and -dynamic Massa- CIA, which had not been informed of the Bay 'ities and begged only to be used. :The. new of Pigs operation until the 11 hour and which weaponry offered itself as "surgical," precise chusetts senator and his glamorous wife. _ -;- steadfastly opposed the operation. - and disembodied. And, of coui st., we- knew .0 : - Administration in 3 traps .. ' The whole procedure of appreciations of in- m U CII . Communications intelligence and .../ Yet, no sooner had the administration taken telligence that emanated from the U.S. Na.. /glamorous cla-gsified documents, whether power titan it found itself caught in three Canal Intelligence Board was largely ney worthy of the designation or not, dominated . traps. . ? . . lected throughout the rest of the Kennedy- our thinl:Ing. ,The first was its failure to understand a Johnson period. .17r0111 the academic community had come f u n d a m e n ta l fact cy-haft- a.-pattern'R- - - m.c of?Department---which hadbeeCnIA-ROP8Ot4100fiR, , tagtoggwroili,p4t. on a "promoted" -se ,- f a) tfc5 IffilYiSillir;':2 largely abstract or uninteresting and highly self-cone - Approved Forli4iireig-WOoiltiikk : CIA-RDP80-0 2 4 JUN 1971 against their Soviet-backed goverinnent in 1956: without giving them any real help. -Cubans complain of U.S. double-crossing in the -abor- tive Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. Iranian stu- dents claim that . Savala ?their country's secret police, cooperates with the CIA and the FBI to spy on them here. And Haitian exiles are in- censed with. the U.S.'s black ambassador to Haiti, Clinton Knox, who they insist wore Du- valier buttons in his lapel at the recent funeral of the late dictator Papa Doc. (The State De- partment Says it knows nothing of that.) , Politically active exiles sometimes are in danger. A few years ago, Jesus de Galindez, an. exiled college professor, was kidnaPped near a subway entrance allegedly by agents of Rafael Trujillo, late dictator of the Dominican Re- public. He is presumed dead.. Though many exiles keep up running propa- ganda battles against their governments, few are well-financed. "Few people bet on an exile even if he has the best of contacts," says Mr. Marinho, the Brazilian, who claims that Ameri- can officials and, ?businessmen can get what they want out of his country from .the "crooks In power." Passion Dwindles The exiled governments of the Baltic States --Estonia', Latvia and Lithuania?are, how- ever, relatively flush. They kept reserves in the U.S. when they were occupied by the Soviet Union just before World War II. A State. De- partment official says the U.S. "uhfreezes" some of these funds each year to finance the governments in exile, still officially recognized by .the U.S. - ? Militantly anti-Communist Lithuanians used to show a lot of fervor here, especially during Captive Nations Week. After some 30 years in exile, though, many now are fired up only by extraordinary events, such as the recent re- fusal of the U.S. Coast Guard to give asylum to a Lithuanian seaman who jumped his Soviet ship off the East Coast. "We're Americans, we have plenty of things tO change here," says a lyoung Lithuanian. Yet some exiles Use violent means in their. "liberation" warfare here. Bombs and Molotov cocktails have. exploded Or been found undeto-. nated in the U.S. at eth/sulates and offices of governments including those of South Africa, Portugal, Haiti and the Soviet Union. Often the actual bomb plantings are undertaken by American sympathizers of the exiles. - As the chance to return home and seize_ power keeps eluding many political exiles, they tend to form and re-form into querulous, suspi- cious and back-biting factions. They bandy about a large collection of epithets against their fellow exiles: "pro-American," "CIA man," "State Department running dog," "Sta- linist," "revisionist," "Nasserite," "Guevar- ist" and plain old "fascist," to cite a few. Nevertheless, some exiles remain potent po- litical figures. One is Theodore Stathis, a math- ematics teacher who is unofficial representa- tive of Panellinio Apeleftherotiko Kinima (Pan- hellenic Liberation Movement), headed by An- dreas Papandrebus, son of the late Greek pre- mier. The group has helped generate _diplo- matic pressure? but not from the U.S?on the military government. A few exiles eventually may. meet with as much success as the Russian who .used to tell lands. Sornpp for e2 like U.S. foreign relations with their honie- Ws_ New Yea !it AgrovedtnRelease 13-01M/ Political Exiles Flock. To NewYork io Plot Fall of Home Regimes Greeks, Haitians, Dominicans Join East Europe Refugees; ManyDeplorcU.S.Diplomacy .By RAYMOND A. JoSEPTI Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL_ NEW YORK?Vaclovas Sidzikauskas, 77, is Minister Plenipotentiary of Lithuania. Mario Marinho, which is not his real name, advocates guerilla warfare in Brazil and approves of the kidnapping of American diplomats there. Phintso Thonden, 32, is the New York Perma- nent Representative of His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, of Tibet, and runs a three-man Office of Tibet on Second Avenue. These three. men are political exiles. New :York is. their home, but not their homeland. IBut they aren't lonely here. Whenever there's a :political upheaval somewhere in the Nv or] d, the ? U.S.?and New York in particular?stands to get a new batch of political refugees. Not even U.S. immigration officials can tell just how many there are here, because many don't bother to go through the formality of register- ing as residents of the U.S. once they've en- tered: For example, only 16,541 of the more than 150,000 Haitian refugees believed living in :New York have registered with the U.S. Immi- gration and Naturalization Service ? even though all resident aliens are required by taw to register with the service each January. a:. Dictatorships in the Caribbean?Cuba and Ilaiti?have-produced the most refugeeS in the past decade. About .50,000 Cubans still come to the U.S. each year, and a big proportion of them settle in New York and New Jersey. The Haitian population here grew to its present pro- portions from fewer than 5,000 when the late dictator "Papa Doe" Duvalier took power in 1957. The Dominican Republic also. has pro- duced a lot- of exiles; one big influx came in 1963 after the overthrow of President Juan Bosch, and a new contingent came when the U.S. intervened in 1965. Old-Timers and Parvenus . Refugees from Chile now are adding to the South American ranks here, joining Paraguay. aria, Brazilians and Argentinians. Greeks are arriving in force, too, fleeing their military re- gime. All these folks are joining a long-estab- lished group of Eastern Europeans who left their countries because of Soviet takeovers be- fore and after World War II. At times, exile status amounts to a state of mind. A Cambodian student already was in the United States when Prince Sihanouk was over- thrown last year. "I wasn't really an exile," he says, "but for six or eight months I heard noth- ing from my parents, and I was afraid." He since has heard from them, hut he still isn't sure that it's safe for him to go home. Though exiles normally find the U.S. a se- cure haven, many display pronounced anti- American attitudes, largely because they dis- . e. . . --1 -M mit ? --.-- --- U.S?for--- seemingly?encouraging?theire-revolt--atalked with took my words assa--jolte;" he said. I His name was Leon Trotsky. - - - STATI NTL 000600060001-3 .117i.SHING TON DAILY 1TEWS Approved For Release 2001/0(2/04 RDP80-0 4 Jurliuti Pi:7'17'17'4)110v Q.-2)iitidi:1U ? Factsicnored I H I IN I L - ! A. MOST worrisome aspect: of the Pentagon Vietnam pap- ers is their evidence on how frequently high officials of the government have igno red facts presented by their own professional subordinates, whether these professionals were in the Pentagon, the ?Li 1 State Department or the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency. Sometimes the unpleasant Or '!non-conforming" data was screened out by :White House assistants, sometimes by the .-PreSident. The Vietnam papers don't of whole story. o o o I HAVE knowledge of one reasonably high official with access to President Johnson and with some considerable technical skill at onalyzing military action reports who, in a face-to-face session, warned the President that the Tonkin Gulf messages from the officers in that affair were too vague and. inconclusive., and-that they should be treated with extreme caution. President Johnson looked up and said sharp- course, tell the ly: When. your advice is wanted you will be asked for it. Good day. . There followed shortly after a transfer to a post out of the direct line Of action. Those who said what pleased the President were moved in closer to his ear.. .000 _ BUT there' are other examples from one ad- , ministration and another. The evidence of the technicians was largely? ignored in the Bay of Pigs invasion. They 'were, in the main, overruled by men with little or no experience in this type of operation. _ the techUical evidence of thd Defense De- partment's own top experts in guerrilla strate- gy and tactics was largely passed over in planning and fighting the Vietnam war,. Search and destroy sweeps, aerial bombings of the . type routinely ordered, the use of large num- bers of conventional troops ? all were anathe- ma to those high officials and officers most experienced in guerrilla operations. More recently, the Pentagon's own official. research study on the lessons learned from the Vietnam war to be applied in any future simi- lar situation has been put on the. shelf. It hasn't been contradicted; it has been ignored. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP LONGVIEW, WASH. NEWS E ? 22 , 775 luN 23 ion Withbolcthqs/ news seldom Good STATI NTL ? 'THERE IS THIS to consider: the action - I of the New York Times in publishing the Pentagon's Vietnam documents may, ? by ripping away the curtain on.these sordid details, help immeasurably in ending our involvement in the war. ? The current flap over what the Justice Department says is the "defense interests of the United States" is not the first and will probably not be the last. There are times, and occasions when voluntary cen- sorship is advisable, with emphasis on the "voluntary." This the press has given, and at least once a President of the U.S. noted afterward that it would have been better had the newspapers not heeded requests for this voluntary withholding of news. The occasion was .the ignominous Bay of Pigs incident, when Cuban exiles under control of the Central Intelligence Agency embarked on an ill-prepared inVasion of Cuba. President John F. Kennedy com- plained that newspapers had leaked infor- mation about the invasion and suggested self-restraint. But five years later it was disclosed that the New York Times had indeed known the 1961 invasion was imminent, but refused to publish it because of national security con- siderations. Also disclosed was the fact that President Kennedy had told officials. of the Times that, "If you had printed more about the operation, you would have saved us from a colossal mistake." Newspaper people also recall the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, when the Defense Department deliberately issued false in- formation. It was justified by Arthur Sylvester, then Assistant Secretary of De- fense for Public Affairs, on the' grounds that the government had a right to lie to mislead the enemy and protect the people. Amazingly, when he was criticized for this position, he declared that failure to expose these lies meant newsmen had failed to do their job. Which would seem to mean that if the government has a right to lie, the press has ? a duty to expose the lies ? which is just what the New York Times and other news- papers are trying to do ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3 vt-7- ? ) v antay Approved For Release80483%1: CIA- 0, I _il r y ia 116.3,1. Operations ? Cr Officials in three administrations were ? interviewed for the following .analysis which ? discloses how once Secret military information led to sometimes secret policy-making deci- sions. ? ? BY WILLIAM ANDERSON - [National News Correspondent] STATINTL -T.)) o _17 ? 0 It 17 11 1)71)... 7117(P, 1,