THE CIA HAS 'COVER' PROBLEMS, TOO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 79
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 27, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

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Approved For Release ,2001.f08/041: CIA-RDP80-0
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? By JAMES DOYLE
Star Staff 1';ritcr
Early in 1E63 a group includ-
ing former officials of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and the
State Department setled down
after dinner at the Ita.rold Pratt
house, on New York's Avenue,
to discuss some of the CIA's
problems.
A record of heir conversa-
tion shows that the particular
-concern of the group that night
was how to provide a deeper
cover for Americans gathering
information by using non-
governmental organitations as
? fronts.
, The participants were mem-
bers and guests of the presti-
gious Council on r01-0,12,11 Rela-
tions, men who seem to direct
foreign policy from within and
- ? s - - -
-without the government on a
permanent basis, and publishers
of "Foreign Affairs," the quar-
terly bible of American diploma-
cy. ? ?
A record of the discussion at
the council's headquarters 011
that evening, Jan. 8, 1988, has
been circulated to seine newspa-
pers by a gioup of self-styled
radical scholars based hl Cain-
bridge.
It portrays with some new de-
tails-the structure and the style
of the American intelligence
community. The document is
limelny in the wake of events last
week in London, where 105
members of the Soviet commu-
nity there, including employes
from the Soviet embassy, trade
delegation, tourist agency, Mos-
cow Narodny Bank and Aeroflot
Airline wire uncovered as espio-
' nage agents, and banned from
? the country without replace-
ments.
. It was a fear of just such an
incident, apparently, that domi-
nated the conversation at Pratt
House that night.
TM U.S. "emple,jos" whose
cover constantly is endangered,
the participants felt, are those
who work in the American Em-
bassies, trade delegations, and
other U.S. agencies in countries
around the world. ?
Richard Dissel, a former depu-
ty director of the CIA who left
/the agency after the Bay of Pigs
debacle, led the discussion. c-
cording to the record made
available to The Star; he. told his the classical agent used in a
council colleagues
agents "need to
deeper cover."
Dissel recounted ruefully the
uproar ever the CJA's exposed .
funding of the National Student
Association's overseas a ctiivities
Pnd said, "The CIA interface
with wale:11S private groups, inc-
chiding business and student
groups, must be remedied."
He noted that the problems of
American spies overseas "is fre-
quently a problem of the State
Department."
"It tends to be true that local
allies find themselves dealing al-
ways with an American and an
of If i a 1 American?since the
cover is almost invariably as a
U.S. government employe,'" Die-
sel is reported to have said.
'There are powerful reasons
for this practice, and it will al-
ways be desirable to have some
CIA personnel housed in the em-
bassy compound, if only for lo-
cal 'command post' and commu-
nications requirements.
"Nonetheless, it is possible
and desirable, although difficult
and time-consuming, to build
overseas an apparatus of unoffi-
cial cover," Bisset is quoted aS
saying.
"This would require the use or
creation of private organiza-
tions, many of the personnel of
which would be non-U.S. nation-
als, with freer entry into the
local society and less implica-
tion far the official U.S. pos-
ture."
Operate under
Use Non-Americans
Bissel said that the United
States needed to increase its use
of non-Americans for espionage
"with an effort at indoctrination
and training: they should be en-
couraged to develop a second
loyalty, more or less compara-
ble to that of the American
staff.",
Ho added that as intelligence
efforts shifted more toward Lat-
in America, Asia and Africa,
"the conduct of U.S. nationals is
likely to be increasingly circum-
!seethed. The primary. change
irecommended would be to build
I up a system of unofficial cover.
I. . The CIA might be able to
melte use of non-nationals as
'career agents'' that is with a
:status midway between that for
?
0ItAIIINIL
and that of a staff member in-
volved thlatugh his career in
many operations, and well in-
formed cf the agency's capabili-
les."
An unidentified former State
*Department official -responded-
to Bisset that he agreed with the!
need to change coveas, noting
that "the initial agreement be-
tween the agency and State was
intended to be 'temporary' but
nothing endures like the cpLan-
eral."
?
? Another participant noted that
very little attention was paid to
revelations of the CIA's use of
supposedly. independent bpera-
liens such as "Radio Free Eu-
rope." he added, "One might
conclude that the public is not
likely to be concerned by the
penetration of oversees .1.astinl-
tions, at least not nearly so
much as by the penetration of
U.S. institutions."
This participant was -quoted as-
saying, "The publid doesn't
think it's right; they don't know
where it ends; they take a look
at. their neighbors." Then he
asked whether "this suggested
expansion in use of private-insti-
tutions should include those- in
the United States, or U.S. hall-
. Miens operating overseas?"
In response, clear distinctions.
were reportedly made between
operating in the United States
.and abroad, and the suggestion
was made by bissell, "One
Imight want CIA to expand its
use of private U.S. corporations,
but for objectives outside the
'United States."
Fuad Demarnis Rise
. The record of the discussion
did not link comment and au-
thor, but did give a general in-
dentification of the men present:
There also was a diligent remo-
val from the authorized report-
er's transcript of all specific ref-
lercinces of agents, incidents and
I the like, with one noticeable
lapse.
In a discussion of the effect of
revelations that the CIA was fi-
nancing, U.S. labor union
activi-
ties abroad, it was?-noted that
these disclosures had simply in-
creased the demand far such
Ifunds from overseas labor
groups.
igifiiicuAdooe-4,1491
"were supported through CIA
conduits, -but now they ask for
more assistance than before. So,
? our expectaticns to the contrary,
there has been no damage.'
Those present and taking part
in the disnussion included mcn
who have journeyed back and
forth between government and
corporate work, most of whom
have remained near the center
of the foreign policy establish-
ment.
They included Bisseil, now an
executive with United Aircraft
Corp. in Hartford, Cohn.; former
Treasury Secretary Douglas
former CIA director Allen
Dulles; Reltert Amory Jr., a for-
mer deputy director of the CIA;
Meyer Bernstein, director of in-
ternational affairs for the United
Steelworkers of America; cal-
umnist Joseph Km-aft; former l"
White House aide Theodore So-
rensen of Kennedy and Johnson
days; and Philip Quigg, recently, .
resigned as managing editor of-
Foreign Affairs.
Facsimile copies of the discus-
sion summary have been circu-
lated by "The Africa Research
Group," a dozen young scholars
in-Cambridge who take a radical
dissenting view of U.S.. foreign
policy.
Reached at his home, Eisell
confirmed the authenticity of the
document.
He noted that in the discussion
that night in New York, he had
begun by saying ,that agent espi-
onage was the least Valuable of
three main CIA missions, behind
Teconnalsance and electronic in-
telligence, the two areas where,
Imost CIA money is spe:nt.
STATIL'\ITL
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A tk,
1
Approved For Relegs-fig40d-W4 : CIA-RDP8
20 S;-211-21a2111 1971
,A7 (-,?kr-i .
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11 11 . ee
;.) the agency but are consid- sia.)
topN,--77,-" ,- WI t.:',"` ,1,-; If' !.,
titiAit: ..)).t._) - -An4.).1.ej
ercd to "overlap and inter- "After five d
' flights were
act." . from the Rte
- --L-The focus of classical these operation
espionage in Europe and hiehiy? seerecin
The written report of a confider).- other developed parts of b
States, and witl
tial discussion about Central Intern- the world had shifted son," reads the
gence Agency ..r)perations held in "toward targets in the un- these overflight
1963, a year after the public centro- derdeveloped world." :leaked' to the
versy over agency involvement with ? ____Due to the clear juris- press, the 1.1;..:
the National Student Assn., sh2V,'4. zlictional boundary hee?Alave been forc
the CIA was anxious to establish new tween the CIA and FBI, the' action." -
contaots with other student groups, intelligence agency was The meet
in
foundations, universities, labor- erga- "adverse to surveillance of was not to enr?i'si
nizations and corporations for its US citizens overias (even CIA missions so
tpierseas wbyk. . when .specifically request- characterize gc
. . ? cd) and adverse to operat- cepts and proa
?
'me discussion v.-as held in Ja1111- ?, ?
ma against tar nt., in .the discussion V.:,,S 1
ary 1963 among ranking government United Sta tes, except for- of a council stu
' officials and -former officials, inclu'd- .eigners here as transients." "Intelligence a;
thg several former CIA officers,
" '
/u --The acquisition of a Policy.
nder the auspices of the Council on
by Soviet The chairim
. secret speech
Foreign Relations hi New York.
? . .- Premier Nikita hrush- meeting was 1
. Though no- direct quotes ore at- .chev in February 1956 was Dillon, an in v
tributed in the report, the opihion a classic example of the po- banker who ha-n-0,-r. -.)., - -nitt4T-UtrUltrilln11.- 1111:112:Xtj-
e was .stated by the discussion leader, laical use Of secretly ac- Washington as undersecre- the statement that "it is,
Richard M. _Bissell Jr., formerly a quired intelligence. The tory of State and Secretary -notably true . of the subsi-
deputy director of the CIA, that: "If State Department relea.cd of the Treasury in the Ken- ?di es to student, labor and
the agency is to be effective, it will the text which, according nody .Administration. ? ;cultural groups that have
have 10 make use of private .institu- to cne participant, prompt- Twenty persons were recently been publicized
tions on an expanding scale, thoughed "the beginning of the listed as attending ladled- that the agency's objective
these relations which have `blowsre split in the Communist jog prominent former offi_ was never to control their.
cannot be resurrected." ' ? . .. ... movement." Since this dials and educators -like
- speech had been specifical- Harry Howe Ransom . 9c Livities, only occasionally
The discussion also referred to the ' al/to point them in a Partial- .
ly targeted before ac- Vanderbilt University and lar direction, but primarily
continued utility of labor gvoups and quired, the results meant to Dzivid B. Truman, presi- to enlarge thcen and render
American corpoiettions to CIA opera- this participant that "if yal dent of l'.1t. Holyoke. Col- them more effective."
tions. No such groups or corporations
. . . ? get a F-ecise target and go lege. - ?
are named. ' . . '- ,In an article in the Sat-
. after it you ..can change
,
The list 'included Allen Vrday Evening Post in May
- The- written report, like otherS hiStOrY." ? ? -
\V.
sponsored by the council, is consid- - ?"Penetration,": by Dulles, former director 1967, Thomas Braden, who
eyed by the participants as "confi-
tablishing personal rola- v es-
of the CIA, and Robert ?Kad helped set up the sub-
?
..
dential" and "completely off the rec- tionships with _individuals Amory Jr., who had been sidies with Dulles, defend-
ord." -
deputy direetcr, as well as . ed the concept asa-way to
? . ' ? -. rather than simply hiring
theM
Bissell' .- de p- had been dep- combat the seven major
7.
' ? . ' The document is being circulated especi 'al -ly useful in the un-
' was rerfarde -d as uty director until shortly front organizations of the
' by the Africa Research Group, ?-''? derdeveloped . world. The after the Bay of Pigs Diva-
. .
mmunist world in which
small, radically oriented organization statement ? is -made that sion, in which the CIA was the Russians through the
headquartered in Cambridge,Is
eecause "covert intervention on involved. use- of their international
"it offers a still-relevant primer on the underdeveloped world) The discussion took place fronts had stolen tin:: great
the theory and practice of CIA ma- is usually designed to oper- just a year :after revela- words such as peace, jus-
"
nipulations." ate on the 'internMaga-
tice and freedom.
al power tions by Ramparts ?
balance, often with a fairly zine c o n c e r n i n g CIA-.
The report shows that
Shceit-terin objective." funded training of agents. the publicity had not been
. The . document reflects during the '50s
individual, assessments of provided "limit)
the ?CIA by those present. but dramatic re:
flights were let(
The report includes a num-
of the cancell
ber of general statements:
scheduled sumr
?The two elements of 4
CIA activity, "intelligence l'``yeen Fresic
'lower and
collection" and "covert ac-
lion" (or "intervention") - Francis G
was shot down
are not separated within
By Crocker Snow Jr.
Globe Staff
STATINTL
Portions of the document
are scheduled to appear
today in the "-University ?The reconnaissance of ? for South Vietnam. at as damaging to CIA activi-
Review," a - Ne\y&p.Vm-k
p-ro-ved For Rvreest 20014010*: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3
,based monthly. ^
PORTLAND, ORE
Akproved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RD
OREGONIAN
- 245,132
S 407,186
?EP 12
u 0?,21
Li
/.
.?
By MARTIN SCHRAM
LA Tiai,:7,7j:-;?:1!21or: r3c;1- S.liv1c=7;
HAVANA Mighty Zsilcuse'
as liberated i113 fcilow ro4
dents and departed.?
nhre-' a in
the wings,. But row the
blue-gray talbe i3 beaming
still another Notth Anu:nican
folk hero into rooms of
Havana.
"An-gel-a- Davis . . ."
The popular song all Cuba is
singing sounds from the in-
nards of the Soviet model
television set. The et:slicing
face and Afro ;hairdo of the
young American
in--
gem on 'the screen. Abrupt
cutaway. to fierce lookinn.
American l'olice in -riot her-
mets and as mans charg-
ing foranti:d wih clubs
swinging. Back to Angela
Davis. Then to American po-
lice.
Slo w I y, dramatically,
throm;la still photos and Ma-
tion picture uiim, the televi-
sion tells the story of Angela
Davis ? how she was hunted
by. '-the police, how she was
found in that non-Afro wig,
how. she Was jailed. Again.
the headshot en the beautiful
,lback revolutionary lingers ?
on Cuban to is-fon screens.
And ail the while, the song's
refrain is heard: "Art-gel-a-
Davis, Cuba wants your lib-
erty!"
? Just like tha, Amt.--t-ican
akid-
ie cartoons lathe early eve-
nings and the old Americen
movies at night, the Angela .
Datis .story is presented -
courtesy of the government's
Liberation Television Net-
work. It s one of the ways
entro's
Cubans keep 'tabs on .life in
the 'United States,.
? Propaganda dominates
;
t b
There is, i:er instance, the
One that openwi a shot of
a naked lady nonams bar
brinds over l.er breasts. It is,
of cousse, an attack on the
United States Central Intelli-
gence Agency. The film cit-:s
le CIA invol n en t in the
3051 }3a of Pigs invasion
and then 'charges that the
CIA was also Tespen,:i1)10 for
the murder last year of
army ? '1,1
Gen. 'Rene Schneider
Cher-
can. la another eerie
merit, the OA ?z?ten clei.iss--
edt as: ne 0: a royste-
rims spider web.
Then there is the docnmen-
tary that opens the pho?
tos of President Nixon and
Gen...Crejehn-ni Abrams, 'U.S.
cornmaii'der in Vietnam. It
features a creal'ive musical.
score in the bad: road; the
basic theme is en American
folk singer warbling, (to the
tune of Muskrat Ramble)
"and it's one, two, three join
that happy wry . ? ain't no
time -
t wonder why,-
pee we're gonna elle." Ifor
counterpoint, there is a dis-
__
corclaat Star Spangled Ban-
The film is telling the story
of OIL,. U.S.-South Viennni-
ce troops fleeing in appar-
ent panic. Slipped into the
midst of the documentary is
a cartoon of Nixon fleeing in
apparent panic. Here ;the
theater audience, which has
been. watching the documen-
tarieS in silence, begins' to
snicker and chortle. A few
applaud.
Another chunk of Ameri-
cana that the Castro govern-
Vent CntlinsiastiCally passed
along to Cubans was the epi-
sodic saga of the Pentagon
papers. "The secret docu-
ments," as the Cubans call
it.
The official government
newspaper; "Gnanms" pob-
lished .32 issues between
June 15 and July. 21. A visi--
tor to the "Granma's"
fices counted 23 issues pub-
lished during this period con-
tain'ing articles dealing with-
some quite long.
.?
?
STATI NTL
. _
.
- - ._ ? _
ninon shot played- down .
stories told of the un- .
tial revelations by, the New ."
43,0
York Times, the efforts of/ . _
the U.S. governinient to halt
yabilcalic,n of tho. papers, the
?ilia' U.S. Su7srethe Court de-
cision, asni the legal nroeeed-
ings against .Dani.el .E'llsberg
(he man tho Inked the
doenments) and his friends.
In contrast to the covecage
given the Pentagon= papers,
the most recent mem land-
ing mission of the U.S. 'aStro-
nants received just scant at-
tentien in Grsnina. Small ar-
ticles tucked on the inside in-
ternational page. And Presi-
dent. Nixon's planned trip to
maininnd China was an-
nounced in one news story.
There was no editosial
cern-
ineRt. In fact, th Cuban
press did 'not bother to carry
the later news of the Soviet
Union's mild reaction -to the
planned trip.
Cubans see the U.S. partic- .
ipa lion hi the war in Viet-
nam from the perspective of
-thee North Vietriarne.se. Re-
cently, for example, Cranma
publi.--:1;ed an editorial from
Nhan Dan, the North Viet-
namese daily, under the
headline: "The Nixon doc-
trine is headed for complete
defeat." The editorial
warned that 'The Nixon doc-
trine is very wicked and per-
fidious."
Thro,Teln-mt the headline
and edit-tot-lel, as in every is-
sue of Gramma, the name of
President Nixon is sort of
Granma's style
theomits " ''Nixon." In
place of the "x", C-Iranma in-
serts a Nazi-style swastikt...
Epilogue: In Comaguey
When Cubans are not at
home watching television, of-
ten they are in theaters
wa t chi a g movies. And
among The visual fare in
many of Cuba's leading thea-
ters ar4 a number of "Com-
mentaries" that are like the
Angela Davis story, cinernat-
fcalIv lyzawif.131 .anARititbV
ganciically powerful.
couple of weeks t,,;-;o, four
Cuban youths in their early
20s stopped to talk with an
American reporter along the -
narrow d own t ow n main
street Calle Avellansda. Two
were students, one a me-
chanic, and one on leave .
from a three-year hitch' in
the Array.
Viet war discussed
AU four were intensely
proud of their country and ?
accomplishments --- the
opportunity for every Cuban ,
youth to attend a university
free of charge, the opportun-
ity for all Cubans to receive
free _medical care, And at
the same time, all four were
intensely interested in how
people can endure life today
in the United States. They
we:re concerned, they said, .
because they like the Ameri-
can peo;n1e, but not the..
American government.
"It must be very- had in
the United States rims'," said
cue of the students. What did
he mean? One -by one, the.;
four started ticking c..Z.f a list
of bad things: "Police hru- ,
talky . . . the secret docu-1
mcnts that -showed that your;
government does not tell you
the truth . . .
illation 'I hear Negroes have
to ride in a special section or
the buses,' said one youth
who was black . . assassi-
nations . . . gangsters ? . .
?
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Approved Fg9_RkTIFrp--- a4Tilgi5P80-016
On the
the
Issues
CIA: CONGRESS IN D
L4,2 e.
RK ABOUT ACTIVITIES, SPNDFNG
STATI NTL
Since the Central Intelligence Agency was given
authority in 1949 to operate without. normal legislative
Oversight, an uneasy tension has existed between an un-
informed Congress and an uninformative CIA.
In the last two decades nearly 200 bills aimed at
making the CIA more accountable to. the legislative
branch have been introduced. Two such bills have been
reported from committee. None has been adopted.
The push is on again. Some members of Congress
are insisting they should know more about the CIA and
.about what the CIA knows. The clandestine military
operations in Laos run by the CIA appear to be this
year's impetus.
Sen. Stuart Symington (D Mo.), a member of the
Armed Services Intelligence Operations Subcommittee
and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee
dealing with U.S. commitments abroad, briefed the
Senate June 7 behind closed doors on how deeply the
CIA was involved in the Laotian turmoil. He based his
briefing on ,a staff report. (Weekly Report p. 1709, 1660,
1268)
He told the Senate in that closed'session:."In all my
committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on
in Laos:We do not know the cost of the bombing. We do
not know about the people we maintain there. It is a
secret war."
As a member Of two key subcommittees dealing with
the activities of the CIA, Symington should be privy to
more classified information about the agency than most
other members of Congress. But Symington told the Sen-
ate he had to dispatch two committee staff members to
Lao ? in order to find out what the CIA was doing. -
If Symington does not know what the CIA has been
doing, -then what kind of oversight function does Congress
exercise over the super-secret organization? (Secrecy
fact sheet, Weekly Report p. 1785)
A Congressional Quarterly examination of the over-
sight system exercised by the legislative branch, a study
of sanitized secret documents relating to the CIA ? and
interviews with key staff members and members of Con-
gress indicated that the real power to gain knowledge
about. CIA activities and exi)enditures. rests in the hands
6f four powerful committee chairmen and several key
members of their committees?Senate and House Armed
Services and Appropriations Committees.
The extent to which these men exercise their power
in ferreting out the?details of what the CIA does with its
secret appropriation determines the quality of legislative
oversight on this executive agency that Congress voted
into existence 24 years ago.
The CIA Answers to...
As established by the National Security Act of 1947
(PI. 80-253), the Central Intelligence Agency was ac- .
countable to the President and the -National Security
Council. In the_. original Act there was no language which
excluded the agency from scrutiny by Congress, but also
no provision which required such examination.
To clear up any confusion as to the legislative intent
of the 1947 law, Congress passed the 1949 Central Intel-
ligence Act (PL 81-110) which exempted the CIA from all
federal laws requiring disclosure of the "functions, names,
official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed
by the agency. The law gave the CIA director power to
spend money "without regard to the provisions of law
and regulations relating to the expenditure of govern-
ment. funds." Since the CIA became a functioning organi-
zation in 1949, its budgeted funds .have been submerged
into the general accounts of other government agencies,
hidden from the scrutiny of the public and all but a se-
lect group of ranking members of Congress. (Congress
and the Nation Vol. I, p. 306, 249)
THE SENATE
In the Senate, the system by which committees .
check on CIA activities and budget requests is straight-
forward. Nine ? men?on two committees?hold positions
of seniority which allow then) to participate in the regular
annual legislative oversight function. Other committees
are briefed by the CIA, but only on. topical matters and
not on a regular basis. ?
Appropriations. William W. Woodruff, counsel
for the Senate Appropriations Committee' and the only
staff man for the oversight subcommittee, 'explained that
when the CIA comes before the .five-man subcommittee,
more is discussed than just the CIA's budget.
"We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the
Defense Department budget that you can. get:" Woodruff
told Congressional Quarterly. He said that CIA Director
Richard Helms provided the subcommittee with his
estimate of budget needs for all government intelligence
operations.
Woodruff explained that although the oversight
subcommittee was responsible for reviewing the CIA bud-
get, any substantive legislation dealing with the agency
would originate 'in the Armed Services Committee, not
Appropriations.
No transcripts are kept when the CIA representative
(usually Heins) testifies before the subcommittee. Wood-
ruff said the material. covered in the hearings was so
highly classified that any transcripts would have to be
kept under armed guard 24 hours a day. Woodruff does,
take detailed notes on the sessions, however, which are
held for him by the CIA. "All I have to do is call," he
said, "and they're on ray desk in an hour.'
Armed Services. "The CIA budget itself does not
legally .require any review by Congress," said T. Edward
Braswell, chief counsel for , the Senate Armed Services
Committee and. the only staff man used by the Intelli-
gence Operations Subcommittee.
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Approved For Release zpginwq4/1 CIA-RDP80-01601R
7).).ss:;e?;
' '? .? ? t;
t/
ses-ss ses,
By C. L. SLILMEIZGER
ATHENS ? Premier Pe,p?asiopoulos,
Greece's strong man, likes to say he
, can't understand why the West, which
so strongly dislikes the Brezhnev Doc-
trine used to impose Moscow's ideol-
ogy elsewhere, should try to emulate
What it abhors by contemplating its
..own BrezhneV Doctrine here. -
? No matter. how much we dislike his
/:governing methods, Papadopoulos has
a point. Why, if since the Bay of Pigs
?Washington has carefully avoided in-
tervention in Cuba; why, if it scrupu-
lously keeps hands off Chile; why, if
it refuses to make South Vietnam pro-
duce a. peace-making regime, should
American opinion feel the need to
intervene in Greece?
The answer is partly that Americans
have felt a sort of responsibility here
since the Truman Doctrine, partly be-
cause of the childish legend that this
is an inherently democratic nation
(which it isn't) and partly because of
the persuasive powers of opposition
it.,77,e.
"Although this is a
*disagreeable and leaden
Government, its
:opp'relzivef2(.,,v7,?above
all by Greece's own
_standards?is often
exaggerated." ?
'propagandists abroad. All Greeks tend
;to be brilliant on politics and weave
inspired tapestries.
-Athens endorses France's approach
on this issue enunciated last Bastille
Day by its Ambassador: "Noninter-
lerence in the domestic affairs of
other countries which, in this part
,of the world is, like elsewhere, the
golden rule of French diplomacy."
. ? The United States is broadly con-
vinced .by now that intervention is
not our kind of game: After all, de-
spite our obvious desire to keep NATO
lbases available in tiny but strate-
gically vital. Malta and Iceland, we
eschewed any effort to influence their
recent elections. One result is that our
base tenure is seriously threatened.
? Many of those elements in U.S.
opinion that most savagely attack the
thought ofAmerican intervention else-
where want to lean hard .on Greece.
At the very least they would jeopard-
ize Greece's military posture in NATO
?so important to American commit-
-.ments in the MCditerranean and the
Mid e_Fast?Jov withhold un o
s nts,s1?,
Approy tWekloghaa&z00 uosu
'trine but, as Talleyrand used to say,
intervention and nonintervention can
?
sA o
FOREIGN AFFAIRS-
$TATINTL
This is unquestionably a repressIvo
and unsatisfactory _form of govern-
ment but such is also true about many
governments in this wend. We have
learned to our painful distaste that we
can't go around imposing 'democracy
Secretary of State Rogers advised
Athens that U.S. public opinion de-
mands "developments" in Greece. He
was told: "We cannot shape your in-
ternal policies and you are wrong if
you think you can shape ours. And
remember that Greeks react in a nega-
tive way if they feel there is pressure
on them."
We can't make the colonels disap-,
pear by tough talk. There is a current'
rumor that Washington may be con-
templating an attempt to install Gen-
eral Anghelis, armed forces head, to
replace ?Papadopoulos but this would ?
be a lunatic type of intervention even
if it worked: It would simply substi-
tute one military boss for another. ? '
Papadopoulos has been loyal to
NATO, even before heavy weapons
shipments were resumed, and to his -
duties as host to three thousand Amer-
ican servicemen stationed at bases
near Athens and in Crete. Althougk
he appreciates French policy on non-
intervention, he doesn't fancy French?
ideas on trying to ease the superpower.
fleets (Soviet and U.S.) out of the
Mediterranean.
Although this is a disagreeable and
leaden Government, its oppressive-
ness?above all by Greece's own
standards--is often exaggerated. Less
:than one hundred political figures are
'today in forced residence in villages
or on islands. Perhaps four hundred
are in prison (after martial, law con-:
victions), many in connection with vio-
lent acts like bombings.
Freedom of expression is muffled
and political freedom is stifled. The
Constitution is not yet being .applied
-and it .seems ridiculous that martial
law should prevail after four and a
half years.
The people certainly aren't happsn
but the great majority accommodates.
itself in a resigned way to what's go-
ing on. They would enthusiastically
welcome a change but they want it
handed to them by someone else. Still,
remembering their .own bloody civil
war a generation ago, they don't seem
in a moodeto embark on a serious
urban guerrilla campaign.
Churchill described the Greeks as
well as anyone: "They have survived-
in spite of all that the world could
do against them and all they could
?s_elsees . . smarrellin
a0,701601iRON500060001-3
va,city." Is it wise for the United States
to do more than stand back and dc-
Approved ForRetar,12 pf0.93191),....pR75. p?po-oi 6o
22 AUGUST 1971
?. STATINTL
. Declaring communism his mortal enemy, Miami millionaire-industrialist
Bill Pawley channeled his energy and resources against it, helping to organize
the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Guatemalan insurrection. But now the former
ambassador feels that the biggest battle of them all will be lost, unless ...
By Nin:3,..2 SrnHey
William D. Pawley was a kid
of 11 when he went into business
for himself. This isn't too surpris-
ing, considering that his father,
Edward Pawley, who swashbuck-
led his way around the world.in
his teens, began in business, at
age nine.
? It isn't that the Pawleys.were
prodigies; they just had bound-
less energy and drive, and Bill
Pawley, now approaching 75, is
still engaged. in an extraordinary
number of activities, including
the operation of a multimillion
dollar sugar-producing plant in
the Everglades. .
But then, Pawley is rather an
inmdible individual. His out-
standing achievement was orga-
nizing the legendary Flying Ti-
gers, an American volunteer air
force, to help Chiang Kai-shek
stay in the war against Japan
until the U.S. could fight its way
across the Pacific in World War
II. Pawley, howeypAaasaLtix4161--,ie clad
kind of - life, ?tharKUMPPek-V.`ff ryi
ey nas
fascinating book. He was, for sev-
eral years, on The New York
Times' list of the 10 highest sala-
ried persons in America.
-Born in Florence, S.C., Pawley
was reared in Caimanera, Cuba,
where his father had a Contract
NIXON SMILEY isa Herold Moll writer pnd cot-
urnnist. He. spent several says -with Wifliorn Po'w?
by for this ortide.
with the Navy to. supply fdocl for
the fleet at Guantanamo Bay.
.Bill was just 11 when he rented a
boat, filled it with goodies and
hawked them to the sailors. Skin-
ny, darkly tanned and able to
speak Spanish like a native,
young Pawley passed. easily as a
Cuban. ?
Pawley made his first million
dollars by the time he was 29,
during the 1925 land boom in
Miami. Although he was to see
Miami very little for the next 30
years, he has always considered it
his home, and .in 1941 built a 10-
room home, Where he now lives,
on Sunset Island No. Two, Miami
Beach.
rk 0 ilti37 i
een an air meg aeveaop- wnether a usiness
.er, aircraft manufacturer, urban
transportation owner, ambassa-
dor to Peru and Brazil, and spa-
?cial assistant to the secretaries of
state and defense with the title of
ambassador. He is still addressed
by that title.
a ?
rs
a friend of several U.S.
presidents, Pawley ?'has been
called upon to do jobs that re-
quired bold decision, finesse and
intrigue, as well as the resources
of a businessman, diplomat and
soldier-of-fortune. Among his spe-
cial tasks was helping to organize
the intrigue that resulted in the
overthrow of the communist gov-
ernment of Guatemala in 1954,
and he was an organizer Of the
Cuban exile army which met di-
saster at the Bay of Pigs in 1931.
.. A slender man just under six
feet, Pawley packs more energy
than most men of 40. He can go
all day and through the evening,
conferring, buttonholing, cajoling,
yakking endlessly on .the phone,
mixing the pleasure of lunch or
?04E1 011013159C10860CPK3
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160114-66Ra60001-3 ?
%
CAMDt..11;./ N.J.
? COURIER-p,$:;
fiqUi5
E - 1 1 1 ,336
-
,,?11.;=)?.?1, 9'7 (...217,11y/4
ar I rvr'Nf-'-'-'
When the CentraleIntelligence Agency
was established, in the iat-6-1940s the.
explanation- was that we needed a spe-
'' daily trained and equipped organiza-
tion to gather information on political,
economic, and military situations all
over the world. We needed an .organiza-.
lion that could give the President re-
ports on these situations every day. The
CIA was to be a well-camouflaged if not
a secret _agency -7 so that it could go
about ? its data-gathering assignment
with a minimum of trouble.
The CIA has, indeed, gathered infor-
mation and prepared the confidential
evaluations for the presidents. Some ,of
these evaluations, like those that fore-
cast the problems in Vietnam, turned
out to be good and prescient judgments,
even if they were ignored. ?The CIA
would look a lot better today if it had
stayed with information gathering ?
instead of getting into the business of
designing and executing adventures
like the Bay of Pigs.
It has been rumored for a long time
and now is finally confirmed that the
CIA has been running the "secret war"
in Laos. This is the operation in which
an, irregular army of more than 30,000 ?
Me5 tribesmen, Thai volunteers, and
men from the Royal Laotian forces has
been waging nine years of relatively
-unavailing war for the Plain of jars
and the hamlets of the eastern half Of
the CountrY.. Our attempt to keep the
operation secret has made our motives ?
look too much like the motives of the
Communists. ?
To the extent that the United States
must carry on military programs in .
South Asia ? and elsewhet'e ??it would
seem more reasonable-and satisfactory
to have them carried on openly and by
the Department of Defense. We may
not accomplish what we set out to do in':
every case. But at least we'll know
what- the United States is sdoing. That
isn't too much to ask of the govern- ,
ment.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3
Approved For .Releti?e 2(04110-3104 : CIA-RDP80-
1 3 AUG icziii
i?, _ ?.....7,,,,i,-.. ..,-,.!... r),,,,,--1. r, ,r.-2( i '1 '':17'.e.".-'_; '-ittti- I" ,?-?,. r-, ;,.,:-_-,, t-,7i, .7,1 7.,, y -; fr. ,(-p ., ? :c /(
'' ./. G LI .t. c i. r..$ ?,...,44 .1. k:.,-k. ''.....1 ..-'.. 1..,$' .,, 't: 'c.i i, 1. ,
'''''- .1- . *--1 .:- i ? $ ,'? % - ' i P P a .-: ' i , , - P \ / , $ !,
--
1 i.7rile-r1.-'. -'S1-1062-7),5-1,-.$"; 1 llieS rem-,?IIP,ras --"-pti -3t.ii,,I. 'id-
:.,,,, ....,... ....,.. ,I, st.cuilLt. clearance, t, t) gathering new:,
wri t- Ntl,?.7 YOfel" Tinic,s . . - ?,:. - -....- . . ...-,.: 1 ..$ , il 101....t.. woo have airioc,,Ilt,"
'resident Nixon has ordered ? t.:, ..t...?,.,,,?,..t._.?,:tt ...... -,t,,:tt, ias top secret," would hsuaVel ,-,1]..'",:lchic...,r,,t trIlle . jel.j11311.rst,s t V_I.I:ol .
WASHINGTON, Aug. 12 ---
- ., lacee5.:s to documeilN ?nit,. 1,.. e..... in oe ..-en .at,on
arly declassification of secret 0111?disclosures wcre innocent.
"rovernment documents on the '-::"tt:.-:::;::::::::: t': .a strict "nced-to-knov.," basis.' He said lie could not com-
forean war, the 1933 interven- - ?
ctNett; restric,dons would be. ment because the. matt.er n-light
ion by American troops in A 'e,etop.,:d to ettr.?.t.-lid individuals, be subject to .11.tigation. 'fhe
.eirancn ..b
, the :.,.ortive invasion .:,?.: rights to dupticte cla.ssiiied quest-1?31 was Pla 1)5' a rePre-
f Cuba in H.51 and -the Cuban .;.:_,V matter Of to disscntimte it. sentative of one of the nev,rs-
ionSe annountled tod7,y. ' t''. released antornatic.r.11y .?,--,ft?T a. Ehrljel'"an told him:
c..:Ser.ra docu?,,.. shc,,lo. bc,? papers involved, and Mr.
ah;sile crisis of 3-?:(32,11-,p),-k,,h'iLe .....
....
john D. Ehrliehman,. assist- ttt :?',- specified period a tii,,,, ,,,h,s in the questioner'sl
.nt to the President for ...... their publication would "jeon- heart nmst lie the answer toi
)ontestic Aff airs, said til.t. Mr. ardize cutrent intelli:ten;.te that que!stion.?
ixon . felt that the four mill- ? sources," inTeitii relations with _
ary actions were "of Stztfa his- other governments or "nced-1
to ical importance" that sehol- lessly crnbarass individuals"
krs sliould not hro;tt to it the in other nation 3.
-osto-inary 25 Veal-s before the As a gelteral rule, the study
ndiz of the aocoments were group is tending toward re-
node public. versim.? the estabt-thed practice
Mr. Ehrlichman said that the of heoping documents secret
lccision to speed the removal unless it can be demons'-ratod
.31 the "secret" clasification they are no lontter seni?i&e,
'roll: the documentss had grown M. Lltrliehman said.
?
"The Presid,-At believe:: p3.51.
int of an interP:gcncy study of practice has resulted nt classi-
fication of a number of cloc.u-
have been in the pz.st" as' 1.3 classified" 1.00 national security
'Classifyint2; til-;ern .11,-ttef' whc-!ther the United States F" reasons:11e l''.di.,`?-? .
.1?11 what he termed a "pri,`.',- C1-711eY SYSt --='In is effective. I Restriced Cii-;:',.31atien.
ress report" on the LU 1)3 :A r?ir. L." nei.nuin declined to! At the sante time, ha elnplia-
Ehrliehrnan said that it was1 relat.1 the Ad.t-,inistra.tion's con.tsired that Mr. Nixon bad fol-
?chIssifv.ing it?,er dottuments1 Penta,7en papers to Pret;identthis pe.rsorc:J1 cleng with cliple-
.
in the futzme, but elassnying --Nnion's diplomatte rmliativelmaLi- ,Ii 'l (-1.1,---,Jc 1-,, -- ?
them better."
The President feels stronsly,
lthrlichn-an said, that "Go?.,-;
ernment has a duty to make!,
disclosure of what is going onl
in the Government." 11-o.t he as-',
sated that Mr. Nixon's attempt
to initiate an "era of negotia-!
lion" between the United States.
and other world powers re-!
quired that the Government be Declassification of the doeut-
able to demonstrate its ability, ments on the Korean war and
to maintain confidentiality. the Ltbar.on and Cuba actions
For that reason, ',tr. Filrlfr.h., would require additional fillies,
man said in response to ques- but the amount was not re-
lions at a White House brief- V ealed today. This effort also
blot the Administration sought will require a loagter period of
to block publication of the Pen_ tin-.:e and could take conSider-
tagon's secret history of the ahlY more than fiye ycars,
he Govcirynen's scoun:y sys-
em. The. study was ordered in
wnom we \till be 0- ments that need not have been
anuary by the Presidc
Joltn. 11.`ttzliel3Lit-tn.
aimed at devising a method for' cern about the discloSuit:: of the lot,re a p(mc..p..., 3
towa:!..d Chine. _ - lincluded hi c-'11--. 2-,'-ri-t--1 cit 1
The White House asItx.ct conieulation of documents and ex-
gross Jo ;t we :4: to authorize r:tren'i'-1S' limit,--Id sh:?,rilig of iri-
te,'31t,900 expenditure this. ya:-.14forination with staff members.
to begin a fi,?,,e-year pfocess of The "C?1-lei'Stfill? of an coal
declassifying some 3. CO milliorC,of negotiations" is confiden-
paes of docuir:.mts on Worm,' 'ti'Dlit"..+T> Mr- 1:::iltlichman stated.
War II that are still secret. The "You people do and should
entire effort it.; expected to cost elif: for eveiT l'ie'as' of ii'::?1'rla"
-u'll!!ion.
tion you can gct," he told the
.c.'
journt:lists Cl. the White House.
hut he said reportetts could
publish int'ormation "innocent-
ly" that mh-tht have a hearing
on events ttln-,t the journalists
were not aware of and could
thus "create a climate of doubt"
about: Govenilnent _ confiden-
tiality.
officials said. ? . . Mr. Ehrlichmut was as1-.d if
Mr. Ehrlichman said that it -the GoverninenVs unsuccessful
also was possible that Ciovem- i
merit secrets related to oth,r 'court ftctions to stop newspaper
international incidents would publication of the Pentagon_
be given thc,-.Surta accelerated- study were unde.,rtalten toi
declassification. The- li:ji: is demonstrate to other nations
said, but he did not identify the, !,,(7 O. 0, CI, ,. faith.. : of the Nixon
"open-ended as of now," he
other possible subjects for early `A`cjinliiisidatiul"
Critetda dualrie-g. -"Yes," he replied.
A Federal grand jury in
release. . .
According to Mr. Ehrliehman, Poston has been examining the
headed by William H. 17:6)317 disclosure of the Pentagonl
the study group, which is
General, had tentatively estab- papers and considering wheth
ouist, an Asi er
. sstant Attorney
lished some criteria to follow, some reportet-s migh t b e liable
'
He mentioned the follotving th
to prosecution. Mr. Ehrlichman
was asked it e Government'
it/6 rsl..abilsbed,_ in light _of bis,
4 CIA-RDP80 01601R000500060001-3
Vietnam _war in June. Parts of
,tile study were published by
The New York Times, The
Washington Post and other
newspapers. ?
He said it was. unquestion-
able that "probably the large
majority" of the PM SC;11
1-$.9.1)01'S were "needlessly" held
under restriction at the time of
their disclo toe in the news-
papers.
Effect on 11?getiatio!:s.
But, hz vieut on, the "n-mF;sive
compromi,ie" of the Vietnam
documents by the newspaoers
"demonstrably has raised ciues-
lions in the mmds tpipprbv r or elease 2001/
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/63104 :1321A-RDP80-016
'TV No 2., ea:
?
_By Don Oberdorfei-
: waethieroe Post Si: If Vi
President Nixon is tighten-
ing government control of cur-
rent secrets in the diplomatic
and military fields, while mov-
ing to release sonic still-claesi-
fied papers from the Korean
War, the 1058 Lebanon land-
ing and tlie 1061-62 Cuban
crises.
Presidential Assistant John'
Ehrlichman, in an, interim
'report on a high-level study of
'government secrecy, said new
rules \ yi]l further resteict the
distribution and duplication of
:classified documents in an ef-
fort to prevent leaks.
Among t h e reasons for
tightening up, Ehrlichman in-
dicated, are recent newspaper
disclosures of Vietnam Arar
secrets from the Pentagon
papers and the government's
unsuccesful attempt to stop
their publication through le-
gal action.
Ehrlichman said the "mas-
sive compromise" of secrets
in the Pentagon papers had
raised questione in the minds
of foreign governments who
are to participate in future
negotiations with the United
States.
He said Mr. Nixon is deter-
mined to safeguard the con-
fidentiality of diplomatic talks
and asserted that confiden-
tiality is "a cornerstone of an
'era of negotiation."
At the same time, Ehrlich-
man reported, Mr. Nixon has
asked government archivists
to speed the process of de-
classifying historical papers.
Last week the President asked
Congress for $636,000 to begin
a five-year job of declassify-
ing World War II secrets, and
Ehrliehman said this request
will be expanded to cover sec-
rets of the Korean War, the
Lebanon landing _during the
Eisenhower administration
and the Cuban invasion and
missile crisis of the Kennedy
administration.
The historical documents
will be released if they do not
jeopardize current intelligenCe
sources, imperil United States
i-elationA
inCnts or cause "needless" em-
barrassment to foreign
be said.
Ehrlichman would not say
whrn the historical documents
might be released, nor would
he say witether some Vietnam sal to stop the newspapers'
publication of the document,
he said, had given new im-
petus to a more discriminating
yet more effective security
too many people had the right - system. It is evident from the
to classify documents and decision that -the government
there was no workable sys-
tem for review of their deci-
sions to stamp them secret,
the White House Bide said.
The new system now evolving
will seek to insure automatic
deciessification of some do-eu-
ments after a period of years
unless there is a showing that
they should remain secret. As
of now, the burden is on those
who . wish to remove the
secrecy lehals from historical ,to principal officers on a
documents?and this should ,"need to know" basis, with
be reversed, Ehrlichman said, staff access extremely limited,
Ee added that the "general Ilie said.
approach" of Mr. Nixon is that ! The White House aide add-
"the government has a duty to 'ed that Mr. Nixon has follow-
make disclosure of what is go- cd the. same practice of "ex:,
temely limited sharing of in-
cept
on in the government ex-
'formation" in some domestic
cept in those cases where dis-
matters, citing the recent
closure would he inimical to
presidential meeting manage-
the national security or the
merit and labor negotiators in
conduct of foreim policy."
On Jan. 15, Mr. Nixon or- the steel industry as a case in
dered a study of government pint,
procedures f o r classifying
documents. On June 30, short-
ly after the first of the Penta-
gon papces disclosures, he or-
dered government agencies to
reduce the number of officials
allowed access to secrets, and
he ordered a "drastic" reduc-
tion in the holdings of highly
secret papers outside the gOv-
ernment.
Recent visitors to the White
Home have-quoted Mr. Nixon
as saying the publication of
the Pentagon papers seemed
for a time to jeopardize Henry
A. Kissinger's secret trip to
China. Mr. Nixon left the im-
pression with some visitors
that the Chinese had ex-
pressed concern about publi-
cation of the Pentagon papers
? but White House officials
have said this worry about
confidentiality existed in
Washington rather than in
Peking. .
? Ehrlichmarr would not say
yesterday whether the -Peking
regime was among the govern-
merits concerned about the
Pentagon papers discleeuresr
nor would he comment on the
conflicting reports regarding
the Peking attitude.
The Nixon administration's
action in seeking court orders
to keep The New York Times
from publishing Pontagen pa-
pers data was related to the STATINTL
President's emphasis on the
secrecy- of diplomatic talks,
Ehrlicinnan said.
The Supreme Court's refu-
war paper's of earlier years
would ,be declassified as part
of the new policy.
Under previous policies,
will be able to stop publica-
tion through the courts "only
in the rarest of cases and only
under the heaviest burden of
proof: on the part of the gov-
ernment," he added.
According to Ehrlichman,
!Mr. Nixon has ordered that
current information on eliplo-
f
ilmtie negotiations be held
very closely within the gov-
ernment. It is available only
PiiPokieed Obfrrl leaseh200110i3104 :ICIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3
cllicAc;0
Approved For Release2Qp Ram : CIA-RDP8
71 r 77 77 0 71
,
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? .
BY FBANK STARR I ----------.? l the -Executive Branch in the 1 of gaining approval of hiPlier
.-
[Washington Bureau Chief] i Ne-i',,,o' / ::-,-, rl Tur,x (.-, !persons of ernbassy sources M , allthority.
1 \ - E- 0, ..:=i,,, '...?fte),...) . . ,
IChicaso iritune Prt'ss Susoc?1 Laos who, when asited for the , 'iltich finally was censored;
i
WASHINGTON, Aug. fl - A I ---------- ! secret data, gave it. I particularly on the subject of
i significant precedent in govern- I the, U. S. role in Laos a 1 tl
meat secrecy was established l'possibility
last week when the Central ln- I bitter debate over its secrecy : ,- ,
0r- "" "teildcd ""d ree- that the' final decisIoti to ! fighting
n(- -lc , To that drsgree and to the de- I
' ,' ,_,' ,' ,' , .I?trainine; among the force of
U. S. support of Thal iti?eg,ulars
With ClA suoo?zt. and
telligenee Agency, with, white 1 if much of it weren't disclosed. , le'e.ase aS In4"" \\ aS 30,000 Laotian irret.fulars.
war effort M Boos. ? was what mild or would 110T, President Nixon, the clisclo-
be censore.d in a 29- 0 t.
i 1..,cr:Pimt c-11111''d " 1-'(!s! . APY11; of Nixon's annolinced policy of', visit, to Indochina;
fhe object of the bargaining !. yo.\ ument, well, ,,pmovcd hi \
Object of Bargaining
P?=.? S-2i:i sUres do represent the effect I yestigators duriat! their 19 -day
: leased, including thc CIA's in- , ?
I for secrecy giveA the tvm in-
not censored were the rc.,.cte,ons
but among the inroemation
House 05 ii coneecled. for I r
the. first time its hitherto top
secret role as the clandestine
direelor of the United States
the rather starllirig ptiblic con- , Lorwenstem and 1 Pacf?ial:? ..I.
wi:itten _by._ :,:-,tineis .1..laii?.1,1i1,.,T)le ntol otirlee putilo,lifecoonation ; "Elie principal areuments we
, heard for the need to continue
' Administration sources say I "( '''
, firmation of what had long been -I,`-??ste . as 1 a resiii,t t?-, 11 (r?sf ; But there is a strong belief on to maintain secreey were these:
1
li charged or assioned cotrztituted I
Spit 01 0., 1,11 ,'"(,),: a, !It:: ,(I.1",(' (). : hoth the Execdtive and Legisla- , first, that Gen. Vang Pao
, ? rn. cnct we oel,nlimig. 0
i. a deliberate decision to con- i ..,:
-t , tive sides of the
1 the administration Vas' faced; forces] does not want to allow
ar.-!,intient that ! [Cominander of the 'irregular
I cede such a fact in favor of ii 'They are comoeteet '
' "lye's' l with the possibility of ?-? strontf I the pet--zs ?to vi?zrt hoce-e, his
iprotecting ?Viet' secrets ] e s s i tigators and they }mew the I ? ? - -? - ? ' ; ' ' ''-' ? !:- ? ' - ? '-' - :'-' `;
1.generally assumed. - i ritlit questions to ask because I . . ? .
1 coallonsre to the conduct of a military security would bc cont-
. 1.,,ci: _ ?, ; seer-et war in Laos as opposccl I promised: second, that if re-
f But the sources attribtite the . 1, ,,? y .,, .1,, .e 41
1 n..?, .110N, N5_,,.1. . LAO h. "e:, att. to , ,,o,,,,cer ,? ...,,, 4,ed no,---' ow-I-I,: Were permitted to visit
idecision largcly to the Pres- : buii?,'d," one well-placed source . ". ' ' ''' " u."- ? -rI ? .,- ' ! . ? `- - .
isure created by .aceurate and; said. ? , sAily over the larger issue. of I Long - Tieng [the irregtdars'
! ! "
eonmetent i estiqatio by two Lowenstein Was a far CIS -- r-;?" PO \; itself in the Wal,:e of ! prine.ipal basel. they Would con-
; former foreign service officers ; service officer in the Stat he Pe gon papers
e DC.- . ., m ,..?,e
the CIA , State, I U . S . o v erlooh i n o: Ill an -i, Pao ' s centrate on the FC4e of the
lnvn I
! tnta. .
nOW WOfkilig for the Senate 1 partment from 1:1:36 to lci35. I 'II atQ' ---,
I Defense Departtnent rep-I contribution: third, th:=,t the ?
Foreign Relations, Committee i as was :Moose. from. ll:157 tO 1
i resetitatiyes finally coilCeded CI :\ is a C1 ii oeganiza-
and the strength their material ; 19C,t3. Moose additionelly worked
1 the ClA role in Laos, the ex- I tion not used to operriting in
lent to the legislators in their i as a specit.-.1 assistant of former
, tent. -of the CIA-backed army I the open and that its operations
confint,tdoi ...
Ph t' Execu- ' Presidential adviser Walt ltos- '
. . I of Dtotion irregulars,. the ex-1 in other park of the world
Inc Branch. , tow, then in the Defense De- !
tent. of the air War, and the might be compeomised i. 1.K.
. .
t ?
? ? . llow 'f illies Change extent of U.. S. expenditures on tec?imiques and indivich.lals. in-
? ! partment's institute of Defense
"Times have changed,". said I the total effort in Laos. 'volved in Laos were to' become
i analysis, and finrtlly during*the '
istration as a staff secretary
year of the Nixon admin- 1 ,, ,. . , ? ,
inere W e r e rant* iadts, 1:nown: fourth. that were U. S.
' ore ad source sWitliii fit:4 1 Lowenstein said, w h i ch both activities pub.li:7:ized. American
nedy had protected from public , en under Presidential adviser ! sides agreed Were and s lot,
I remain secret for obvious. rea- t the Geneva. Agre-Z`IfierliS 01 1.)o-
would be aecti.;cd, of violating
'
recalled how President Ken- i on the NI, ational Securoy Conn- ?
t/- exposure the CIA role in the 1 Henry Eissing-er. ! sons, and the first of the five I and it would thus be moee diffi--
. Had Full Authority
- . i weeks . was spent narrowing \ cult to reestablish the Geneva
taking the blame for it himself. k
,On the other hand, as Low-1 down to four or five- the* areas1 Agreements as a framevJerk for
-1961 Bay of Pigs invasion by
Two years ago the admin- I
istration was ot mentioning!
enstein readily a'dmits, much! on which Lowenstein and Moose i a future settlement in Laos;
American involvement in Laos,' of the top sf.-?cret infoanation I held out for publication. The and fifth; that the details of the
- n
-another source noted; while I was given them in the -first I administration representatives i Thai presence would become
now as much as 90 per cent of i place with the full authority of I' then needed to start the process! known which would [deleted]."
the U. S. role there is a matter
of public record.
. MOSt of it became public last
week after five.weelts of nego-
tiations between the two inves-
tigators and representatives of
.the Defense and State Depart-
ments :and the CIA who were
laced with what is readily ad-
. milled to be; an extensive, de-
tailed and accurate account of
_
0 I bk I IIN I L
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01
HUNTSVILLE, ALA.
TIMES
? rAUG 9 1E1V
E - 53,936
B 51,803
fq?
1,--)11q n
.V iti h iit-1,4 LI
/7
?
P
L4 4) Li El 11 La
.f ti '
?
reei n 1?.? 4, 1
uP
v2D
? When the Central Intelligence
Agency was established, in the late
1940's, the explanation was that we
needed a specially trained and
equipped organization to gather in-
formation on political, economic, and
military Situations all over the
world. We needed an. organization
that could give e President reports
on these situations every day. The
CIA was to be a well-camouflaged if
not. a secret agency?so that it could
go about its data-gathering assign-
ment with a minimum of trouble.
- The CIA has, indeed, gathered in-
formation and prepared the con-
fidential evaluations for t h e
presidents. Some of these evalua,
lions, like those that forecast the
problems in Vietnam, turned out to
be good and prescient judgments,
even if they were ignored. The CIA
would look a lot better today if it had
stayed with information gather-
ing?instead of getting into the
business of designing and e>iecuting
?,adventures like the Bay of Pigs.
. ? -- ?
It has been rumored for a long
time and now is finally confirmed
that the CIA has been running the
"secret in Laos. This is the
operation in which an irregular army
of more than n,003 Me? tribesmen,
Thai volunteers ? and men from the
Royal Laotian volunteers,
has been wag-
ing nine years of relatively unavail-
ing war for the Plain of Jars and the
hamlets of the eastern half of the
country. Our attempt to keep the op-
eration secret has made our motives
look too much like the motives of the
Communi.sts.
To the extent that the .United
States must carry on military pro-
grams in South As I a.?and
elsewhere?it would seem n o r c
reasonable and satisfactory to have
them carried on openly and by the
Department of Defense. We may not
accomplish. what we set out to do in
every case. lint at least \yell know
what the United States is tieing. That !
isn't 00 much to ask of the-gove,;qyzi
anent._
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Approved For-Releaserii0O1ia3/a4triCtIA-RDP80-
7 Aug 1971
?fir\I
-71 p
? .7 I; I/ I, r/
'JJLi/
. By DON BC:I-In:NG
HerzieLi .mCrCa
? ? .
Rooerto Alejos, wealthy
Guatemalan businessman-
politician and honorary
chairman of the Fidelity Na-
tional Bank of South Miami,
has been kidnaped in Guate-
mala City, police sources in
the Central American coun-
try reported Wednesday.
' There has been DO official
confirmation of . the kidnap-
ing although Guatemalan
Lewspapers have reported it
unofficially as such.
DIU/ALS ARIF, sketchy,
but United Press Internation-
al, quoting police soi:TOES in
Guatemala, said Ale.jos was
seized by two armed men in
broad daylight Tuesday after
his car was hailed while he
driVing in Guatemala
City.
Alejos' alleged kidnaping,
presumably, is another inci-
dent in the undeclared civil
war that has been raging in
Guatemala for years be-
tween extremes of the right
and the left.
A number of wealthy Gua-
te.malans have been kidnaped
?
717) " 0
(c?
??-" r`\ if 77 (1?) 77 irs77
ii, (LI) tj
Robe-via, A1,-;:),
.J
. no ransom 7:_oto
and held for ransom by left-
wing extremists while
rightwing groups, some be-
lieved to have the support of
Guatemalan security forces,
have physically eliminated
many known and suspected
leftwing extremists and sdrne
leftist intellectuals.
SOURCES IN Guatemala
told The Herald by phone
Wednesday that there have
been no known ransom de-
mands yet made for Alejos, if
that were the intent of the
kidnaping.
Alejos, 43, is well 'known
in Miami business and finan-
cial circles and among Cuban
exiles: ?
The 1951 exile Bay of Pigs
invasien brigade, supported
by the CIA, was trained on
the Alejos coffee plantation
in Guatemala. His ? brother,
Carlos, was Guatemalan am-
bassador to Washington at
the time.
? , .?
7-7 -FT)
?9. cL.LJ
I
Alejos later became the
government-backed candi-
date to succeed President
Manuel Ydigoras in 1963
presidential elections. The
elections were canceled,
however, when Ydigoras was
overthrown by a military
coup in March, 1933.
ALE3OS CAT!a!: to Miami
as an exile, living on Palm Is-
land and acquiring business
interests in Dade County. He
sold his Palm Island home
and returned to Guatemala
after the country restored
constitutional government in '
1965.
In January, 1939, Alejos,
together with Carlos Hegel,
another Guatemalan, pur-
chased controlling interest in
the Fidelity National Bank of
South Miami. Alejos was
named honorary chairman, a
position he still holds al-
though residing in Guatema-
la.
In. Guatemala, Alejos was
a founder of the Bank of
Co:nrnerce and Industry. He
now operates an auto dealer-
ship in the Central American
capital along with other corn-
mercial interests:
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Approved For Release 2001/q/04 : CIA-RD
11241alliGT01,1 A 055i
2 AUG 1971
I /P.\ -11?71,flarl! -VT
Itfe.
Castro Detailed
Invasion, Flop
By Murray Seeger
. Los .A-.1rocs Times
.;WALTHAM, Mass., Aug. 1
--Two years after the Amer-
ican-sponsored invasion of
Cuba, Fidel Castro took two
American lawyers to the
' Bay of .Pigs site and .deei-
onstrated why it had failed
so disaStrously.
It was April 1963, just
days short of .the second au-
niversary of the- invasion
which John F. Kennedy
later acknowledged was one
of the great mistakes of his -
presidency, and 'Castro was -?
playing host to -James B.
/Donovan and John E. Nolan--
j Jr., as he had several times*
in the previous five months.
"He'd get out of the car
and .describe diferent as-
pects Of the battle: \vhere
he was when he got such
and such a message from
the troops -and what he did,
and so on," Nolan recalled
in a recorded interview
made for the John F. Ken-
nedy: Library located in
temporary quarters in this
Boston suburb.
This interview, recorded
- - .
in April 1937 by Nolan in
Washington, is just one
of the many revealing new
pieces of history now avail-
able to researchers at the.
? .- Effective Monday, the-.
Kennedy Library is- Making:
available 9'..* per cent 'of the
3.3 million documents it has.
'relating to the Kennedy
ad-
rninistrat0n. A small, rni.-
tial portion of the docu-, hog. He'd ask questions, also by the brigade, if he
STATINTL
STATI NTL
6A\T.
irr
,
-?
; ti
IL ,11717, i
LC) j
FIDEL CASTRO
... explained debacle
-f
by- Milan MikovskY, one of . just - before . Christm,
, the J us t i cc Department
aides of Attorney General 1962, when Castro came
...Robert F. K Havana airport where t
were under oi.deleirnsedtoy.geTththeye . prisoners were waiting f
the ransom goods to arri.
Cuban invaders back to the
a
United States by Christmas erfSlisgvh/ot f CI of
Isii.al
so low ig fig
owMovefrt
Donovan negotiated an
Eve. field that. the men on t
agreement under which the f i e, l la
pd oiilorNI, a to c ins:,o, ausc h down. standing
United States would give next to Castro, elbowed him
Castro food and medicine and said, in his loud voice
worth $53 ? million in ex- that was clearly audible to
change for the prisoners. in me Enid . other pe o p 1 e
addition, Castro insisted on around, 'It's the invasion.'
getting $2.9 million in cash "It seemed to Inc to be a
which had previously been very jocular remark to
offered by Cuban refugee make. Castro laughed at it.
organizations as payment And then it seemed to me
for sick and wounded brig- that the other people
Ade members ? already re- around, who initially didn't
leased, think it was funny at all,
It was during a conversa- looked at Castro and saw
tion that lasted until 1 a.m. his reaction, and they
in early April, 1963, that laughed, too.?
Castro announced he wou.d In the April meetings,
take Nolan and Donovan to held to clean up details of
the Bay of Pigs. They left, freeing the 23 Americans, . ,
from Castro's beach home at including three CIA agents. ,./
Verdadera, on the north side Donovan and Castro talked
of`the island nation, at 5 the about improving ?relations
same morning and drove to between the United States
the bay on the south shore. and Cuba. .
Sampled Swamp, "I think Jim (Donovan)
At one point, there's a'n always had his eye on this
as a possibility," Nolan said.
area there which is marshy
"He felt that his maximum
land, swamps and - there's
usefulness lay in the diree-
only one road that runs, tion of providing that kind
across it to solid ground,"
of alternative to American
Nolan recalled. Castro "got
out, walked off the road and policy. And I think that
Castro had a similar inter-
into the Marsh to see how ?
est in Donovan . . ." _
swampy it was.
Nolan gave another ex--
You really . had a sense
of history listening to some. ample of Donovan's manner
with the Cubans, describing
one like Castro 'describe a -tense scene when the.
*something like the Bay of
Americans were desperately
Pigs. And then the feeling trying to get $2.9 million
that in walking out into the into a Havana bank before
marsh, which was consider- 3 p.m. Christmas eve, 1962.
cd impassable by him and "Look, Mr. Minister, if.
you want to be helpful in.
this regard, there's one thing
you caro do," Donovan told
the cabinet official who was
driving Nolan to the airport.
"When you get. out there
and that big plane is waiting
to take off for Miami, don't
defect."
In his i n t c r v i e wetlen. '
canal Cushing, the interview
supplies details not pre-
viously known of the- ne-
gotiations with Castro.
Wouldn't Square
Speaking Of the mercurial
Cuban leader, Nolan said,
"Many of the impressions
that we had, and I think
that my impressions were
about the same as Jim's
(Donovan), would not square
with the commonly accept-
ed image of Castro in the
United States.
"During the time that we
were with him, Castro was
never irrational, never
drunk, never dirty," Nolan
recalled. "In his personal
relationships with u and
in connection with the ne-
gotiations, he was always
reasonable, always easy to
deal with. He was a talker
of very significant propor-
tions. I mean, he would
come over at midnight or 3
o'clock in the morning and
stay all night talking. But
he wasn't a conversationall
merits was opened to. toe
public in October, 1969.
The Nolan interview is
especially interesting for its
:descriptions of Castro with
whom he and Donovan ne-
gotiated for the release of
the 1,100 survivors of the
and 23
ten for viewpoints. He was stepped in the wrong spot
easy to talk to, good con- or something, that he might
versationalist, hardsell guy,- just digappear beneath the
constantly plugging his pro: ooze and that would be the
grams, his government." end of the whole problem.
Donovan, a New York at- "And he sank down and
tome), who had previously it was up to his boots, but
negotiated the exchange of. he got back."
Soviet spy Col. Rudolf Abel 7 Castro and Donovan de-
disastrous invasion
for the American U2 p
-ilot d arm relationship
other American prisoners. velope a w
Clay recalled that he was
Added to other recorded held by Russia, Francis Cary that enabled the hard-drink- summoned to Robert Ken-:
pants in the prisoner deal as. and id no, - the c n 1bt
memories of suit') weiviediFer kellWeagq#7004)1AeltIA
n a`ROPtairdi 6011.00,01$000t4
retired Gen. Lueius D. Clay a at the library.
Sit
that his associates could most before I knew, I signed
Info 'Richard Care Nolan was-enlisted to help not. Nolan related, a note for the $2.9
miion
STATIN41 L
STATI NTL
T-11,:73
Approved For Release 204j1/RTOtiCIA-RDP
Soviet ?--
, .
- 11- , ? (--; ,
CI t `;Crisis 1 rfi rt
I-E111\IALD GWEIITZMLN
speca tThE? :!;;:w York Tirics -
MOSCOW, July 28--Accord-
ing to Soviet archives just
made public, four days before
President john F. Kennedy in
formed the world about the
Cuban missile crisis, Premier
Nikita S. Khriislchev proposed
a meeting with him that Mr.
oe,?,1 to sup-
port but rejected later in the
day.
The Foreign Ministry docu-
mentation dealing with the
1962 crisis over Soviet mis:iles
in Cula was included in an
article by Anatol:; A. Gromylro,
the son of Andmi A. Grorn,ii.o
the Soviet Foreign Minister,
which was published in the
monthly historical 'journal Vo-?
prosy Istorii.
Reports Meeting with Rusl.:. "
The first of two articles, en-
titled, "The Caribbcen Crisis,"
covers events up to Mr. Ken-
nedy's speech of Oct. 22, 19,32,
in which he reported on the
discovery of Soviet offensive
missiles on Cuba and demanded
their withdrawal by Soviet
authorities.
Presumably, the second arti-
cle will cover events up until
Mr. Khrushchev's decision to
pull out the missiles in return
for an American frledge not to
invade Cuba.
Mr. Grom2,,ko's article re-
ports on a private meeting be-
.
tween Secretary of State Dean
Rusk and the Soviet Ambassa-
dor, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, short
ly before Mr. Kennedy's speech.
Mt. ho;;I: gave Mr. Dobrynin
a
copy of the speech and a. mes-
sage for Mr. Khrusheliev.
1?,1r. Dobrynin after read-
ing the do:;nments that "the
United States has deliberately
created a dan,;erons crisis."
In his article, Mr. Gromyko
alan rebukea those Americans
who In tOC accused his father
of bad faith when he failed to
disclose the presence of the
missiles when he met with the
Prceidcnu at the White House
Ott Oct. 38.
The article recalls ? the at-
tempted invasion of Cul..:!a at the
Bay of Pigs in April, Kell, and
asserts, "The Soviet Union an:::
Cuba, in full conformity with
the norms of international law,
in the slimmer of lt,'62 reached
an accord on the strentheniri:g -
of the defense capabilities of
Cuba."
Ca7.1s Missiles 'Defensive
"Medium-range missiles were
deployed the
, for cle-
-
,ensive purposes. This was an
action aimed at exerting a so-
bering influence on the advo-
cates of military adventure in,
Washington and the preventing
of a new American invasion
against the Cuban people," the
article says. It does not men-
tion that on Oct. 14 American
aerial reconnaissance and film
also disclosed plans to build
bases for interme;diate range
missiles. -
Mr. Gromyko .is a section
chief of the Institute of the:
U.S.A., a research institute of
the Academy of Sciences. .
Accounts of the meeting be-
tween Foreign Minister Gro-
myko and Mr. Kennedy, which
lasted more than two hours on
Oct. 18, say that ir. Kennedy
decided against raising the mat-
ter of the missiles and that
Mr. Gromyko did not mention
them. Later, American writers
often accused the Soviet For-
sign of duplicity, some-
thing his son -resents.
The artLle says that the goal
of these accusations "was to
hide the truce character of the
meeting and to invent still an-
other pretext to justify the
violation of the norms of inter-
national law by the activity of
the Government of the U.S.A.
in the fall of 1962 against
Cuba and the Soviet Union."
It also says that the Kennedy
Vininistration "consciously re-
jected different diplomatic
ineans, by the help of which
it would have been possible to
vat the confrontation."
To underscore this point, Mr.
Gromyko says?his brother gave
Mr. Kennedy a proposal from
Mr. Khrushchev--who is not
mentioned by name in the ar-
ticle ---- stigesting the two men
meet "to settle disputed inter-
national problems and the
e.yannitiaticn of questions which
ause divergences between the
;5?os-A Umon and the United
Siate!s.." Mr. Gromyko quotes
as his source the Soviet foreign
nolicy archives ?
?
American versions say only
that such a meeting was men-
tioned obliquely.
The article says, "the Presi-
dent reacted positively to this
proposal of the Soviet Union."
But, according to the article, at
a dinner that evening fAven. by
Mr. Rusk for Mr. Gromyko,
Llewellyn E. Thompson, then a
special adviser on Soviet Af-
fairs to the President, told Mr.
Dobrynin that "the White
House would like to postpone
the summit meeting."
The article said that it was
difficult to determine whether
Mi:. Kennedy in fact wanted a
summit and was dissuaded by
his advisers, or whether his
initial positive response was
only "diplomatic camouflage"
to disguise "the planned ag-
gressive course against the
Soviet Union and Cuba."
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Approved For RtIteelQOAVOCK,:B9hRDP80-016
2 2 JUL 1971 STATINTL
?
. A .-:).72107,11r. iffE77):PLI21-17.711717:
? r,"7,,
? ??? I 4.'")
r.?1) 6 L_LirG
. ?
?
. '
RaInh.L. vtavinS
the article that follows is part of The . _ _
Nanning of the Vietnam War, a study
members of the Institute of Policy
? STATINTL
studies in Washington,' including At the end of March, 1961, the CIA
Richard J. Barnet, Marcus Raskin, and circulated a National Intelligence Esti-
Ralph Stavins..* In: their introduction mate on the situation in South Viet-
:o the study, the authors write: " nam. This paper advised Kennedy that
'In early 1970, Marcus Raskin con- Diem was a tyrant' who was confronted
vived the. idea of a study that would with two sources of d'isContent, the
xplaln how the Vietnam disaster hap- non-Communist loyal opposition and
oened by analyziv.the planning of the ? the Viet Cong. The two problems were
Var. A group of investigators directed closely connected. Of- the spreading
ry Ralph Stavins concentrated on Viet Cong network the CIA noted:
inding out who did the actual plan- '
ling that led to the decisions to bomb
Vorth Vietnam, to introduce over a
talf-million troops into South Viet-
tam, to defoliate and destroy vast
rreas of Indochina, and to create
nillions of refugees in the area.
' "Ralph Stavins, assisted by Canta
Nan, John Berkowitz, George Pipkin,
nd Brian Eden, conducted more tnan
'00 interviews in the course of this
tudji.. Among those interviewed
,Pere many .Presidential advisers to
:ennedy and Johnson, generals and .
.dniirals, middle level bureaucrats who
occupied strategic positions in the
rational security bureaucracy, and offi- The people were not opposing these
rids, military and civilian, who carried recent advances by the Viet Cong; if
out the policy in the field in Vietnam. anything, they seemed to be support-
' "it number of informants backed up ing them. The failure to rally the
'heir oral statements with documents people against the Viet Cons was laid
'it_ their possession, _including informal to Diem's dictatorial rule:* .
ninutes of meetings, as well as por-
-
There has been an increasing dis-
ions of the official documentary Tee-
rd *.now known as the "Pentagon .
'a per:." Our information is drawn not
)nly from the Department of Defense,.
ut also from the White House, the
Department of State, .and the Central.
bitelligence Agency.'"
The study is being publishedin two'
Local recruits and sympathetic or
intimidated villagers have enhanced
Viet Cong control and influence
over increasing areas of the coun-
tryside. For example, more than
one-half of the entire rural region
south 'and southwest of Saigon, as
well as some areas to the north,
are under considerable Communist
control. Some of these areas are in
effect denied to all government
authority not immediately backed
by substantial armed force. The
Viet Cong's strength encircles Sai-
gon and has recently begun to
move closer in the city. ?
position within official circles and
the army to question Diem's abili-
ty to lead in this period. Many
feel that he is unable to rally the
people in the fight against the
CoMmunists because of his -reli-
ance on virtual one-man rule, his
tolerance of corruption extending
volumes. The first, which includes the even to his immediate entourage,
article below, will be published early in' and his refusal to relax a rigid
August. The second will appear in system of public controls.
?
May, 1972, ? ? ? The CIA.referred to the attempted coup
The study is the responsibility of its :against Diem that had been led by
authors and' does not necessarily reflect
the views of the Institute, its trustees,
or fellows,_
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STATINTL
'-General Thi in November; 1960, and
concluded that another coup was likely.
In spite of the gains by the Viet Cong,
they predicted that the next attempt to
overthrow Diem would originate with
the army and' the non-Communist
opposition.
The Communists would like to
initiate and control a coup against
Diem, and their armed and sub-
versive operations including united
front efforts arc directed toward
this purpose. It is more likely,
however, that any coup attemp't
which occurs over the next year or
so will originate among non-
Communist elements, perhaps a
combination of disgruntled civilian -
officials -and oppositionists and
army elements, broadel'than those
involved in the November attempt.
In view of the broadly based opposi-
tion to Diem's regime and his virtual
reliance on one-man rule, it was unlike-
ly that he would initiate any reform
measures that would sap the strength
of the revolutionaries. Whether reform
was conceived as widening the political .
base of the regime, which Diem would
not agree to,. or whether it was to
consist of an intensified counter-
insurgency program, something t.11
people would not support, it had:
become painfully clear to Washington
that. reform was not the path to
victory. But victory was the goal, and
Kennedy called upon Deputy Secretary
of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to draw
up the victory plans. On April 20,
1961, Kennedy asked Gilpatric to:
a) Appraise the current status and
future prospects of the Communist
drive to dominate South Vietnam.
?) Recommend a series of actions
(military, political, and/or econom-
ic, overt and/or covert) which will
STATINIE19?
mmunist domination of
. a countr ! -
?
STATINTL
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- 177 j1?, ;
11
? ---: ? --1 ?,- p 1- l??-N ?
?,-.,
' -I; '11 i1 0 l ? 11 it `
.t_4..LI. ;:_1' I W-- P.
- -. While there is much that, can be
criticized . in the secrets revealed in
the Pentagon papers, one agency that?
comes. out of them with a record for
calling its shots correctly is the Cen-
tral Intelligence. Agency. As Crocker
Snow Jr. pointed out in last Sunday's
Globe, it suggests that the last few
Presidents should have listened more
to the CIA than to the State Depart-
ment, the Pentagon, the National
Security Council and the White
Rouse advisers.
For it appears that if they had,
there would have been no doubts
about President Diem's regime in
Saigon; the domino theory would not
have been trotted out to justify .the
war, and the war would not have
been escalated.
. Why were not the CIA reports
given greater credence? The answer
may -come only with less secrecy in
Washington. But perhaps part of the
answer lay in the disastrous 1961
-invasion the agency ran at the Day of
J
,Pigs in Cuba (for \VI-licit President.
Kennedy, nonetheless', took all the
. blame).
And perhaps another part lies in
a deliberate downplaying of the
CIA's role. It had been an operational
as well as an intelligence agency
when John Foster Dulles was Secre-
tary of State and his brother Allen
was CIA director. But after the Bay
of Pigs, Robert Kennedy urged a
tight control of operations and, ac-
cording to what CIA director Richard. /
Helms told the editors last. April, theV
CIA - was urged to present options
rather t.han. hard recommendations..
It is not publicly known what role
if any the CIA played in futile
invasion of Cambodia and IL:: abor-
tive raid on an empty North. Viet-
namese prison camp. Enough is
known about its role in Laos to make
it subject to severe criticism, how-
ever.
. All of this makes more attractive
the proposal of Sen. John Sherman
Cooper that the CIA share its intelli-
gence estimates with Congress, which
passes on. its secret budget without
knowing, for the most part, Where
the money goes. This would. help
Congress reach a judgfnent on impor-
tant policy questions.'
At a time when Congress is
rightly reasserting its responsibility,
that. would he most helpful. It would
be infinitely preferable to having to
- vote on the basis of limited informa7
.tion designed to support administra-
tive policies. .
VI
STATI NTL
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=WIN=
VORCESTER, MASS.
TELEGRAM
1-11 1 9 10,7
M ? 62,339
S 108,367
P.6'71r-c .f=r/ra CIA
Congress, which is in an anti-Viet-
nam, anti-Administration mood, is di-
recting its attention to the Central In-
telligence Agelacy. A number of bills
being debated would flush some of the
CIA spooks out into the daylight and
give Congress more of a say in the
agency's operations. ?
- It is a sensitive subject, to say the
least. The CIA says it must be close-
lipped to be effective. But some of its
critics think its curtain of secrecy
gives it the power to act as an invisible
government, accountable to no one.
The various proposals offered at-
tack the problem from different an-
gles. Rep. Herman Badillo wants an
_ amendment which would confine the
CIA to ?gathering and analyzing in-
telligence. Sen. George McGovern
-wants all CIA appropriations and ex- .
penditures to appear in the budget as a
single line item. (CIA expenses are
no concealed). Sen. Clifford Case has
introduced legislation to prohibit the
CIA from financing a second country's
operation in a third country (as the
CIA is doing now with the Thais in
Laos). Senator Sen. John Cooper, who
? is a-former ambassador and friendly to
the CIA, nevertheless wants its "con-
' elusions, facts and analyses" dis-
tributed in full to the relevant corn-
: mittees in Congress as well as to the
executive -branch. This would require
an amendment to the National Security
? Act.
It is plain that some of these pro-
-1re aimed at the executive
1/44aawaa--""
branch, which Congress has .become
very suspicious of. Many congressmen
have .the feeling that they have been
hoodwinked by various presidents (the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution affair, for ex-
ample), and they are convinced that
the powers and secrecy of the CIA per-
mit the executive branch to do things
in foreign affairs that Would otherwise
be impossible under the Constitution.
Congr es s' attitude is under-
standable. After all, the Constitution
regards- the legislative as perhaps the
most important branch of the govern-
ment, yet Congress does not even know
what is going on in foreign affairs, halt
the time, and is powerless to do any-
thing when it does learn the facts. The
war in Laos, for example, has been run
by the CIA without congressional ape
Koval or even debate.
Yet, how effective can bn in-
telligence agency be if its activities
are exposed- to congressional scrutiny?
How long would its secrets remain se-
cret if they were pored over by con-
gressional committees?
The questions raised by these pro-
posals in Congress are fundamental in
their implications. On the one hand,
the 'United States must have effective
ways to gather intelligence ? and it
.also must on occasion be able to oper-
ate clandestinely.
On the other, it cannot tolerate an
agency that functions under too tight a
secrecy curtain with ?almost unlimited
funds and-powers. That way lies other
Bays of Pigs.
.posa s
_ _ -
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tut..
By PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK
Ever since the Bay of Pigs fiasco in.
April, 131, the Central intelligence Agen-
has had a bad press -in this country
and abroad. The 193? -"revelations" that
the agency had secretly financed the
National Student ? Assot.s.lation, plus a
number of university-affiliated research
institutes and antieCommusist cultural
fronts, came as a shock to both students
and the pehlic.
Professcr Blackstoelf, a learner
rotiltary-
jldgsee research analyst and nethor
of several hooks on the intelligence proc-.
.ass, now teaches at the University of
South Carolina.
As the United States became bogged
down in the Vietnam quagmire and the
student anti-war protest gathered me- .
mentum, the CIA became a favorite, tar-
-get of abuse. Agency recruiters were
driven from college campuses. CIA-fi-
nanced study centers were "trashed" at '
a cost of many thousands of dollars. Net?
Left orators, armed with a sense of cut-
-rage and an encyclopedic ignorance of
the intelligence community and its func-
tions1 instinctively assumed that the CIA
was a major factor in the escalation of
the war in Vietnam.
But the Pentagon study of the war,
recently published by the New York
Times proves conclusiveli:that the Don
Quixotes of the New Left have been
charging at the wrong windmill. For
many years and at critical stages of the
escalation. the CIA and other:members:
of the intelligence community, especially
the State. Department Bureau of Intelli- ?
gence and Research repeatedly warned
against the hazards involved, including
flat predictions that the strategic bomb-
ing of North Vietnam would fail to ac-
complish its objectives. a
Deceived Themselves
? How these dstimates and warnings
were ignored by top policy:makers as
they carried out their deliberate and
"immaculate deception" of the American
public is one of the more fascinating
'aspects of the Pentagon papers. But, in
deceiving the public, the decision-makers
also deceived themselves, and eventually
cattle to believe optimistic "military
e
progjess" reports, released to the public As 'a rule, th various intelligenee
bt'ised on the "latest intelligence," agetleles are staffed on the ivorking level
when fact at the highest level, the by thousands of anonymous civil servants
estimate's were ar, ??r-,
from the field, i
1 S' JUL
(6-1, /1-Thi r-3., ?
. ,
%.?
r." (n.; .."'""""
Cl ?
0
,?
1
Harold_ Wilson, -wilE.11 appointed shadow Foreign
'Secretary, rushed to. -14',7as1iington to assure President
Kennedy that Labor would stand four-square behind the
U.S. in the Far East. There is no evidence that he subje-eted
American ?inte:ttion,3 to any yery clooe scerutiaty. He
recognized a fellow Boy Scout when he saw one., and di.d.
.3.iot scruple to borrow the Keu-sledy ovevhlown rhetoric in
explaining to donblir,g colleagnes the nature Of Britaiii.'6
East of 'Suez peact>liet--).ving xnission.,
job" briefings in Saigon, deceived only
those officials, either cviliaa or
who, wanted to believe them.
What is the ''intelligence community"'?
How is it organized and what role should
it play in decision-making at the national
level in such foreign entanglements as
the war in :Vietnam? The answers to
these questions .have been cloaked in
secrecy when they should be a matter of
public knowledge.
To begin with the basic institutions, the
U.S. intelligence community is made up
of the separate agencies of such key
government departments as State and
Defense, the National Security Agency,
and the CIA, which .has the overall re-
sponsibiiity efor "Coordinating, evaluat-
ing, and disseminating intelligence af-
fecting the national security._"
"First Line Of Defense"
?
It has often been said that "inteitenee
is the first line of national defense." -Most
citizens are vaguely aware that foreign
policy and military decisions are made
by the President with the advice of his
seeretasies of Slide .and Defense, based,
in theory at lead, on the best information
available to experts- throughout the gov-
ernment. The collection, evaluation and
dissemination of such information none
of the primary functions of intelligence,
But in foreign and military affairs,
strategic decisions should also take into
aecouni-Careful estimates ofthe capabili-
ties and probable courses of action of
friends, ales, neutrals and "enemies."
The production of such national esti-
mates is a second major function of the
entire intelligence community, although
the board of estimates in the CIA coordi-
nates the individual agency contributions
anti disseminates the final results.
Many of the men on the. CIA's Board of
National Estimates and its staff have
more than two decades of intelligence
experience. Better than f0 per cent of the
officials on this top echelon have ad-
vanced academic degrees in history, po-
litical science, or economics dieectly per-
tinent to their work. About 75 per cent
have enhanced their area and subject
knowledge by living overseas. The esti-
mators in State Department's Bureau of
Intelligence end Research are equally
competent and well-qualified.
Advice To President
?.
On the national level daily and weekly
reports are promptly distributed to the
President and his chief advisers, and
special estimates or briefings are made
as required in response to developing
crises. In short, the intelligence COMMU-
nity provides the decision-maker with
carefully evaluated information and esti-
mates which he can either use for guid-
ance or disregard.
History is full- of illustrations how na-
tional leaders have ignored the estimates
of the intelligence agencies with disas-
trous results. Napoleon's intelligence
nide, the Marquis de Caulaincoart, ex-
plained why, for obvious strategic rea-
sons, the planned invasion of Russia
would fail. His advice was ignored.
A cetintry'iter, AhOiph Hitler's ambas-
sador in Russia, Count Brockdorff-Ren-
tzau, used the same reasoning in his esti-
mate of why ilitler's plan would fail. his
warning was also ignored and Hitler
launched his invasion, which was widely aa
heralded as the fined showdown in his
lifelong crusade against world commu:
nism. The campaign ultimately floun-
dered in a sea of blood-70 million Rus-
sian casualties atone, not to mention Ger-
man losses which also ran into the mil-
lions. .
Nothing quite as dramatic has hap-
? ? ?cl
eat,s a ? ..e. o .1 e ; s,v, ;e _
tqtRe4x00?",2014rtimpl'.,," pp1803-butedfkotifitbdototial -3
ther government or private enterprise.
cont 1:oned.
STATINTI
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ree ressq. Free
By OGDEN R. REID
= Our democracy does not work well
In secret. The Pentagon Papers illumi-
nate the arrogance of those in high
'places and the serious erosion, if not
breakdown, of our constitutional sys-
tem of .checks and balances.
At least two Administrations, if not
three, believed that they were not
;accountable to the Congress and the
American people for watershed deci-
sions taken about Indochina.
The present Administration has gone
even further and launched the most
.serious attack on the press in our
history: subpoenaing reporters' notes,
threatening reprisals against television
and radio stations under the power to
license, and, for the first time nation-
ally, invoking prior restraint against
the right to publish.
This precensorship was claimed to
be justified because of an "immediate
grave threat to national security."
Critical national security touching our
very survival is not in fact at issue
here?nor is cryptographic intelligence.
While the Kennedy and particularly
the Johnson Administrations' failure to
Inform Congress is a shocking example
of unilateral executive decision-making,
the attempted effort by the Nixon
Administration to prevent what is
essentially past history reaching Con-
gress or being published is hardly
more reassuring.
After six days of hearings before
the Government Information Subcom-
mittee of the House of Representatives,
certain remedies are clearly called for
If the Congress is to reassert its con-
stitutional role.
First, the Congress must enact a'
new statute governing- classified docu-
ments. This law must sharply limit
that which should be labeled secret
and it must provide for automatic de-
:lassification and Congressional over-
sight. If a matter should remain secret
after a stated period, there should be
in affirmative, positive finding as to
Why continued secrecy is necessary.
The Congress should explicitly re-
serve the right to make public material
Improperly classified by the executive
contrary to statute when its classifi-
cation is not a matter of national
security and is simply a device to
avoid, governmental embarrassment.
STATINTL
'Equally, no Executive order on classi-
fication should be issued that subverts
the intent of the Congress. Above all,
there must be a vast reduction in the
corps of -8,000 Deefnse Department
officers who now have authority, to
originate top secret and secret desig-
nations.
Second, the Freedom of Information
Act should be tightened in two re-
spects. The types of information now
permitted to be withheld must be
sharply limited, and time permitted
for Government response to a court
suit must be reduced from the present
60 days. ?
Third, the Congress must come to
grips with executive privilege. Here
we are dealing with a collision be-
tween the executive and the Congress
that has been going on since George
Washington assumed office. It should
be subject to accommodation, but that
will never happen if the Congress does
not assert the powers and responsi-
bilities given to it by the Constitution.
Fourth, legislation may well be re-
quired to protect the Fourth Estate.
The press often serves as a coordinate
branch of our democracy, especially
when a breakdown occurs between the
other three. Specifically, we need a
national Newsmen's Privilege Act?
now law. in six states?protecting the
confidentiality of sources, absent a
threat to human life, espionage, or
foreign aggression. Legislation should
be enacted to prohibit the issuance
by the courts of injunctions against
publication, thereby removing prior re-
straint from the reach of the executive.
Congressional legislation and asser-
tion of appropriate initiatives can help
redress the current situation. If need
be, the power of the purse can be
more resolutely used vis-?is an un-
responsive executive. But more funda-
mentally, what we need is government.
with faith in the American people and
in their right to participate in the
great decisions. If we do not see this (
now, after the Bay of Pigs, the Domin-
ican Republic intervention and the
whole tragic history of Indochina, then
as a nation we do not really under-
stand democracy. .
Ogden R. Reid, Republican, is member
of Congress for the 26th New York
district.
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sAN VRANcIgco, CAL.
CHRONICLE
4nt
t11,11 7 IQ
u 480,233
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STATI NTL
Vr1.?EIN-c-'0:11"4"I' ? the
tanged U?e&tut,arci
o to ,o n of intervt-,n11;-,n,
l"resident -John
4_:f"..0n. and thil-t he niado it on Imy
Per; Pa pars
clat.-that month td-years ago -
hi' -the development via war a."2
cat-Int-,t see the end.
. 71(2:7,
:
`sif.t1
?Lt..
Special 17t1OrCe3 treC?CS and ICO
ItarY .7;`:(...'''cr...;02:3 to S,311t11. Vietian, also bthr U.). a
carop-aign 0? clartc.-1t11-1-e
to be cond:;.e-ted" by CIA-aindSouth:
A;tlatrIttirles,,) arionts.. ?
AnosP.--, about :Indochina that .1. underline to Presi-
iicnnedy haw, much ace': policies he
_ tne, United St': Les is getting ready
".; . - they -ere staiing to set.vp the
ail expeditionary force under the.
1rote4 of assistanee . . John Kennedy gives me,
"?ti.)" nuderstalici that the "whole business is going to :
be. enlarged in -order to ::et up in th.e.Indocirinese
-.Peninsula a bulwark al relitance against the Sovi-
- ? - t - ?
tz.,-A).1.642 r. ;Yee you,- .1
.3-3.11-.0, `an intervontion in ;.1-,t--,t al..ea ii11 1z3 an end-
less tas I ta-natim ?vakei ?
no its ineails raay
hns -The?
b-ei- has any chal-lce c. .
more you involve. your.e.lvos over dc
cgaInst cominunisna, the
apDear as the oharn2k.ms na inc:epenence,
and the inore lielp they vi-2.11 recolve, v.rst of ail
ffo--Au the de:ipair - .
"Vio F.ron.chL iari.;erience,t
yOir".1-Inierfeanst'ant.-.-d to 'oho our pee in
a. Nov you via az to e...d31.0.3 a wax. we have lm-.
ued, I prahet tnat t Eticlied
. . .
? ?
?
: 1:12152" :Ste') bl o into a.
? ,??
3vi Tirne.3, under- cl a bog, L-1 :.?it a of tie
_ .
..ta?"..ezt by Ge-iiez;,:t 1.1ed tvans?- ? yen ruay , .? ? ,?
Int.? ati hir ? p?' '
' resio.ent?cio fi;taatlie (ins
..
Kennedy." -. ? -; "-- ? ?
? . ? ? ? - ? - '? -? Ins ni:Aory: i?,.eariedy listens ? tO Me, but the ;
The fateful. date is ileitthie both fo4. con le will shovi. that I 'lave not con.\--..nced
? $,
cone b:.:..fore V.v.) decision and fel...what cn soon;
after. John F. re:niei:ly w.sI
into bis presidency; he was feeEn,,i!, ihreugh;
tnad arount:1 ci the Ci.- L1.2.C3 Penta-'.Nt
gort. bad taken. a coi.OLE`:::112,e,,ti-ng at. the ".-Elav of
. .
Pigs, in .Cui-)a, .19, 1961, whi ell. he
ed- pit loathed huvinr: to accept). 1t.1.11 re.snonsibil
"17 -*ft ? ,riet 0/.
, co I
and.; I o Con.rf!.ess?
vhich LYndo-n Johnson t ls,ter so n.lu eh ilarned
for_ eat cell:airily berriz-d otit
471). OVV- ?A 1: , ? x ,
e.r.4 .?-1:,i?` A
. ,
thn war Via 11161. 122,13:00:1(.; ar;(11131-immaliti._.;
liate. 'to tho Ic.erziatly\"oeirlinitineht c-' 11"v 11' 1(.131 ?1
2. AAA: V
if -they turn at this !joint to the 12-1X1011S of Charies'
.deGaulle, recently pu-olis ranee.
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-? 9
LONDON ? (UPI) ? A former Pentagon
officer said that President John F. Kennedy ?
incurred the hatred 13: the Central .Intelli-
'gence Agency because of his attempts to
harness its power after the abortive Bay of
PiZs invasion.
. In an interview with British Broadcast-
ing Corporation teie'vision, Lt. Col.- Fletcher
:Prouty indicated that the late president's ef-
forts to curb the CIA had failed. He said two
presidential directives designed to limit the .
agency's powers in 1961 never had been im-
plemented. . .
Prouty, interviewed on the. BEC 's 2
Hours" program, was Pentagon liaison off i-
cer with the CIA, a U.S. Air Force colonel,
and Director of Special Operations .for the
-Joint Chiefs of Stnf f in 1952 and 1963. He is
now a banker in Washington, D.C.
. ? ,
, . .
? ?
AFTER THE investigation into the Bay
. of Pigs failure in 1961, Kennedy issued two , ?
_
84: CIA-RD
national security memoranda to the CIA,
Prouty said.
"One of them he signed personally, ex-
plicitly stating that any operational activity
of a clandestine nature would be either so
? -small that .CIA agents alone could operate it,
or would be referred to the J.C.S. (Joint
Chiefs. of Staff)- rather than permitting the
CIA to mount something as large as the Bay
of Pigs again," Prouty said.
. "I think he (Kenned2.:)' reacte.cl strongly
to the defeat at the Bay of Pigs .and moved
against the CIA to control them," he said.
? THE 'COLONEL said he personally liad
handled ? the directives, but "for some
strange reason, although they were issued
and signed by the president, there was no
implementation of them."
Asked by interviewer Robert MacKenzie
if he thought Kennedy had incurred' the ha-
tred of the CIA by trying to clip its powers.,
? Prouty answered "I do."
STATI NTL
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13ay a Pigs ivh-e.
rjA
?-1
"
r-i-
fl1P'Y L9(
F73 '77;71 .,(72:3
Li . ?,117
UJJ
r? 00 ?
(717,:, .717,
Li Li 1,1
LONDON 5.1111 A former Pentagbri officer
.said yesterday President Kennedy incurred?
;the hatred of the Central Intelligence Agency
because he tried to harness its power after the
Bay of Pigs invasion.
In an interview with BBC television,- Lt. Col. -
Fletcher Prouty indicated that the late presi-
dent's efforts to curb the CIA had failed. lie
said two presidential directives designed to.
limit the agency's powers in 1951 never had
been -implemented. ?
Co!. Prouty was Pentagon liaison man with
the CIA, a U.S. Air Force officer, and director
,of special operations for the Joint Chiefs of.
'Staff in 1952 and 1953. He is now retired and a
banker in Washington, D.C. *,
After the bay of Pigs investigation lii 1931;
President Kennedy issued two memoranda to
the CIA, Mr. Prouty said. .
"One of them he signed personally, explicit- ?
ly stating that any activity of a clandestine
-nature ,either would , ha so small that . CIA
agents alone could'operate it or would be re-
ferred to the J.C.S. (Joint Chiefs of :iaff)
. rather than permitting the CIA to mount Some-
thing as large as the Bay of Pigs again," Col.
Prouty said.
"I think he reacted strongly to the defeat at ?
the Bay of Pigs and moved against the CEA to
control them," he said. . -
Col. Prouty said? he -Personalty had handled'
the directives, but "for some saga reason,
altho they were issued and sigzle! bz the Pres- ,
ident, there was no implement of them." ,
-Askerli., by. interviewer Rolm! MacKenzie IV
he thought Mr. Kennedy incurred the
hatred of the CIA by trying to etip its pay:era,
?Mr. Prouty -answered, "I do."
STATI NTL
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WASHINGTON POST
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? , *9 Inv ?717.7 g.
WWI 8 V 11611, 6
' By Philip D. *Carter
Washington Post Staff Writer
, ATLANTA, July 2 ? For-
mer. Secretary of State Dean
Rusk conceded today that he
had underestimated the deter-
mination of the North Viet-
namcse to wage war in Southa
east Asia. ? . .
But Rusk also strongly de-
fended himself and the two
'Presidents lie served against
charges that they tried to de-
ceive American public opinion
about the war in Vietnam.
"I don't believe there was
any attempt to deceive any-
body during all that," he said.
Rusk. -served Presidents Ken-
nedy. and Johnson as Secre-
tary of State from 1961
through 1968:
Rusk also took sharp issue
with . several conclusions con-
tained in the secret Pentagon
?study on the Vietnam war. He
sharply rejected one sugges-
tion that he had considered
using nuclear weapons against
'China in 1963.
"Let me say very simply
,that under no circumstances
at any time did I ever recom-
mend any use of nuclear
weapons," he said. "I don't be-
lieve any man in his right
mind could rationally make
such a recommendation as a
matter of policy."
In the course of apparently
sold-searching replies in inter-
views this afternoon, Rusk
conceded, however, that he
had made mistakes while serv-
ing as Secretary of State.
"I liersonally, I think, under-
estimated the persistence and
the tenacity of the North Viet-
namese," he said. Considering
the relative sizes of the two;
countries, the estimated.
700,000 casualties suffered by!
the North Vietnamese, he said,
was the equivalent of 10 mil-
lion American casualties, and
yet "they're continuing to I
come" because of "the divi-
sions here at home."
The United States also
erred, he said, in not stressing
"prevention" of conflicts like
the Asian ?var, and. in "not
pressing much hatglaPraY
U.N. intervention in the con-
flict
. _
And, he. later added, "one of
the severe prices we may have
paid for Vietnam is that it May
have stimulated ... a period
of isolationism" in the United
States.
He nonetheless insisted that
those who argue 'that the
United States should "get out
-now" also are mistaken. And
he held fast to the basic posi-
tion he defended throughout
his eight-year tenure in the
Cabinet: that the United
States had no choice but to de-
fend South Vietnam against
North Vietnamese aggression
if the world was to be saved
from general conflict.
"The overriding moral ques-
tion," he said, "is, 'How do we
avoid World War HI?'
Most of his comments came
during the taping here of an
hour-long interview conducted
by NBC television reporters
Barbara Walters and Edwin
Newman which was later
broadcast as a network "spe-
cial." Additional comments
followed during taping of an
NBC "Today" show interview
with Miss Walters and a subse-
quent informal press confer-
ence in the studio of WSB-TV,
the local NBC affiliate. .
With the exception of an in-
? teview published today in the
Daily News in Athens, Ga.,
where the former Cabinet Sec-
retary now works' as professor
of international law - at the
University of Georgia, it was
Rusk's first public comment
since publication of parts of
the 47-volume Pentagon his-
tory of the war.
?
6 71,
IS 111(W
-
Wage 51/7
Rusk said he had not heard
of the study until he read of it
in The New York Times, after
which he telephoned former
President Johnson and former
Defense Secretary Robert S.
McNamara, the man who origi-
nally authorized the history.
President Johnson, he said,
told him that the study had
just recently been delivered to
the new Johnson Library in
Austin, Tex., and that he had
Austin, Tex., and that he had
not yet examined it. , - ?
According to Husk,Mc-
Namara originally had in
mind "a much more informal
_
produced by the Pentagon re-
searchers. The history, accord-
ing to Rusk, was to have been
more of an "in-house affair,"
on the lines of the kind of ma-
terial usually contained in the
"loose-leaf notebook" Rusk
himself relied on while ap-
pearing before congressional.
committees to defend the war.
Rusk . noted that the "his-
tory" was exclusively a- De-
fense Department project.
"I'm curious about why the an-
alysts didn't interview any of
us" at the White House and
the State Department, he said.
"The analysts are anony-
mous, so in a certain sense
these have some of the charac-
teristics of an anonymous let-
ter," he Said in reference .to
the study's authors. He called
on the media to "make their
names known."
But he said he felt the study
was fair "to some extent" in-
sofar as it made clear that
"we were looking at all the
alternatives throughout the
War. . ?
Rusk said he had deliber-
ately withheld comment on
the study until after the Su-
preme Court ruled last
Wednesday that The Times
and .The Washington Post
could continue publishing sto-
ries on the Pentagon history.
He added that he did not take
exception to the court's deci-
sion, but that publication
would complicate American
diplomacy.
The public's "right to know"
is balanced by the govern-
ment's responsibility for pre-
serving diplomatic sedrets, he
said.
Rusk specifically challenged
the charge that President
Johnson secretly was planning
to escalate the war while tell-
ing the American :voters, dur-
ing his 1964 presidential cam-
paign against Sen. Barry Gold-
water (R-Ariz.); that he sought
."no wider war."
Any proposals to the con-
trary, said Rusk, were only
routine contingency plans. He
said Mr. Johnson did not
decide to expand the conflict ?
until South Vietnam was
invaded by regular troops
%
e r 610 ?
?
STATI NTL
? ?
1 Rusk laid -he still strongly
believes that there were two.
!North Vietnamese attacks on
'U.S. destroyers in the Gulf
of Tonkin in the summer of
1964 and that the United
-States did not provoke them.
But congressional reaction, he ?
.said, would have been "rela-
aively the same" even before
the second reported attack, ?
after which both congressional
houses ? with two dissenting
votes ? approved Mr. John-
son's "Gulf of Tonkin resolu-
tion" extending broad war
powers to the President.
Rusk also countered
charges that the United States
was actively supporting a
coup against South Vietnam's
President Diem. Instead,, he
said, the United States "drew
aside on a wait-and-see kind
of basis" after Diem failed to
respond to U.S. pressure for
reform of his government.
"Well, he refused to do that,
and the military and the Budd-
hists and the students got to-
gether and threw him out of
office," Rusk said.
He acknowledged that low-
er-echelon. U.S. officials in
Saigon may have encouraged
the coup without high-ranking
approval in Washington, . but
he denied that there was any
general concern that 'Diem
was attempting to end the War
through an agreement with
Hanoi.
"We had no indication that
this was more than a rumor,
that there were any actual
talks going on," Rusk said. .
While denying that U.S.
. officials had lied about the
war, Rusk explained that pub-
lic officials are usually strong
advocates of their policies. "I
don't know any sector of our
society that goes around poor:
mouthing what they're trying
to accomplish," he said. "la
never saw a Buick salesman,
driving arch:11d in a Chrysler."
In another context, he de-
dared that the nation's "great- /
est mistake" was the Bay of
Pigs invasion of Cuba. :
? He tacitly endorsed Presi-
dent Nixon's Vietnam policy,
which he described as trying to,
"bring thia war to .a. cOnclu-,
01R000500060001-3
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- 3 JUL 1971
_ ?
CO 110 Lir:q,911 S. GyS KC-E1G-Tedy. AraLin
? LONDON (UPI) ? A former
Pentagon officer says President
John? .F. Kennedy incurred the
hatred of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency because of his at-
tempts to harness its power aft-
er the abortive Bay of Pigs inva-
sion.
In an interview with British
Broadcasting Corporation televi-
sion, Lt. Col. Fletcher Prouty
indicated that the late Presi-
dent's efforts to curb the CIA
had failed. He said two presiden-
tial directives designed to limit
the agency's powers in 1961 nev-
:er had been implemented.
Prouty; interviewed on the
? BBC's "24 Hours" program; was
Pentagon liaison officer with the
.CIA, a U.S. Air Force colonel,
land director of special opera-
Tons for the Joint Chiefs of Staff
in 1962 and 1963. He now is with
Madison National Bank in Wash-
ington.
After the investigation into the
-Bay of Pigs failure in 1951, Ken-
nedy issued two national securi-
ty memoranda to the CIA, Prou-
ty kaid.
"One of them he signed per-
sonally, explicitly stating that
any operational activity of a
?
clandestine nature would be ei-
ther so small that CIA agents
alone could operate it, or would
be referred to the JCS rather
than permitting the CIA to
mount something as large as the
Bay of Pigs again," Prouty said.
Prouty said he personally had
handled the directives, but "for
some strange reason, although
STATI NTL
the President, there Was no im-
plementation of them."
Asked how the CIA could have
gotten away with violating the:
directives, Prouty said, "There
must have been some pretty -vie-
lent meetings in there between
June of '61. and say the begin-
ning of the buildup in Vieth/if...1,
because to my knowledge the
documents' were never retract-
; they were issued and signed by ed."
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r it
klehne ant "Love
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cy cl.)
7- 1 Ca sces??L/-i:-
uti,
0 I /1I IIN I L
JUu
1961 Memo Envisioned Maximum, U.S. Troop level of 205,030
By Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Pozt Staff Writer
On Nov. 11, 1961, President Kennedy
was told that Defense Secretary
Robert S. McNamara and the Joint.
ahiefs of Staff , "assume" that if
ilanoi and Peking overtly intervened
in South Vietnam after the . United
States sent its first troops there that
he maximum American force "re-
auired on the ground in Southeast
!isle would not exceed six divisions,
sr about 205,000 men."
This assumption was contained in
joint memorandum to the President
by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and
kIcNamara in preparation for a Na-
tional Security Council . session at
which Mr. Kennedy, in essence, ac-
mpted.._ the Rusk-McNamara recom-
mendations for a fateful step into
direct involvement in the war.
This is among the many Lew facts
contained in the Pentagon documents
made available to The Washington
Post relating to the Kennedy era and
the war.
In actual fact, there was barely
disguised North Vietnamese inter-
vention some three years later, but
thus far there .has been no Chinese
intervention. The total American
manpower sent to Vietnam reached a
peak of more than a?half million men
before the beginning of the with-
drawals by the Nixon Administration.
The 205,000 estimate was but one of
the many miscalculations of the war.
The available documents portray a
President Kennedy reluctant, in -1951.
to become fully committed to the war
by sending in combat troops but be-
ing advised and pushed by top efficiali
:in his administration to commit the
'United States.
For example, the first of 10 recom;
:mendations, with many sub-recom-
mendations in the Rusk-McNamara
-memorandum, was that "We now take
the decision to commit ourselves to
the objective of preventing the fall
of South Vietnam to Communism and
that, in doing so, we recognize that
the introduction of United States and
other* SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization] forces. may be necessary
to achieve this objective."
When the President approved a
National ' Security Action Memoran-
dum (NSAINI 111) on Nov. 22, how-
ever, that sweeping comniitment lan-
guage was omitted.
. .
Approved
Nonetheless, the NSAM
was headed "First 'Phase of
Vietnam Program" and it
did contain presidential ap-
proval for sending to Viet-
nam helicopters, light air-
craft and t ansport planes,
manned by American per-
sonnel in uniform in a new
"partnership" between the
United States and' the gov-
ermnent of South Vietnam
then headed by President
Ngo Dinh Diem.
The first helicopters and
their crews arrived in Sai-
gon on Dec. 11, 1931, aboard
the U.S.S. Core, a former es-
cort carrier. Four days later,
Washington and Saigon
made public an exchange of
Kennedy-Diem letters an-
nouncing in general terms a
stepped-up American aid
program. These moves com-
posed the most fateful step
in 1961 regarding Vietnam.
When John r, Kennedy en-
tered the White House on
Jan. 20, 1961, the focus in
Southeast Asia was on Laos.
Three days earlier, one' of
the strongest advocates of
American intervention, Brig.
Gen. Edward Lansdale, had
reported to the outgoing ad-
ministration that "the U.S.
should recognize that Viet-
nam is In a critical condition
and should treat it as a com-
bat area of the cold war..."
This theme, in one form
or another, was to be
pressed on the President
from the day of his inaugu-
ral to the day of his assassi-
nation. The rhetoric of his
Inaugural Address was that
of the cold war period. His
attitude toward the Vietnam
problem, as is well known
from what he said in public,
was deeply affected by So-
viet Premier Nikita Khrush-
cliev's famous speech in Jan-
uary, prior to the KennedY
inauguration, commending
"wars of national liberation
in a period when nuclear debate within the adnums-
war was too dangerous to tration from January to
contemplate and when small November, 1961, was to pres-
conventional wars could lead sure Diem to improve the
to a world war. caliber and effectiveness of
This led the President to his government as well as to
.approve a number of covert introduce some American
operations both in Laos and military personnel and
in South and North Viet- equipement as an earnest of
nam. It led him to Isuild in the United States commit-
example,. on Nov. 3, 1961, in
the letter to the President
transmitting a report on his
mission to Vietnam, Gen.
Maxwell Taylor wrote: -
"It is my judgment and
that of my colleagues that
the United States must de-
cide how it will cope with
Khrushchev's 'wars of liber-
ation' which are really pare-
wars of guerrilla aggres-
sion."
Added Taylor: "This is a
new and dangerous Commu-
nist technique which bypas-
ses our traditional political
and military responses.
While the final answer lies
beyond the scope of this re-
port, it clear to me that
the time may come in our
relations to Southeast Asia
when we must declare our
Intentions to attack the
source of guerrilla aggres-
sion iii. North Vietnam and.
impose on the Hanoi gov-
ernment a price for partici-
pation in the current war
which is commensurate with
the damage being inflicted
n its neighbors to the
'south." ?
But that time was not to
come until the Johnson era,
after Hanoi matched the
American buildup on the
ground. In the first Ken-
nedy year, the problem ap-
peared this way, as de-
scribed in the Rusk-Mc-
Maniere memorandum to
President Kennedy under
the heading of "The Prob-
lem of Saving South Viet-
nam":
"It seems, on the face of
It, absurd to think that a na-
tion of 20 million people can
be subverted by 15-20 thou-
sand active glierrillas if the
government and the people
of that country do not wish
to be subverted."
The American answer, tor-
tuously arrived at lengthy
Fortaeleas1201031 /0r4 m 0000 tecil
the advise given him. For Washington viewed it
was a constant in mu of la
(There is no 'evidence, in-
cidentally; in the documents
Post to show that the deba-
cle of the Bay of Pigs in
April,. 1961, affected Presi-
dent Kennedy's actions
realting to Indochina one
way or the other.)
For 1931 as a whole, it is
evident that two missions to
Saigon ordered by Mr. Ken-'
nedy were of great import-
ance?those of Vice Presi-
dent Johnson and of Gen.
Taylor. There were other ac-
tivities here in Washington
that also affected the out-
come, of course. And there
could be additional evidence
In White House and State
Department records, which
are sparse in the Pentagon
study.
Barely a week after taking
office 'the Pentagon analyst
noted, Mr. Kennedy ap-
proved a modest counter-in-
surgency program for South
Vietnam drafted by the Ei-
senhower Administration.
There followed alternate
coaxing and- pressuring, of
Diem for "reforms" to make
such programs work.
On April 27, on the heels
of the Bay of Pigs, a crisis
in Laos reached Its peak.
The combination, the ana-
lyst suggested, led a task
force headed by Deputy De-
fense Secretary Roswell L.
Gilpatric to suggest Ameri-
can help to increase Diem's
forces and what the analyst
termed "a modest commit- ?
? ment of U.S. ground combat
units in South Vietnam with
the nominal mission of es-
tablishing two training cen-
ters." The President took no
action on the latter, al-
though he approved the 'aid
to Diem's forces.
A State Department re-
draft of this report recom-
mended stationing U.S.'
troops in Vietnam but not-
for combat against the Viet-
cong. It also raised the idea
of a bilateral American=
South Vietnamese defense
treaty. But on May 5 Rusk
declared that "we should.,
not place combat forces in
SVN at this time."
The Vice President's visit
to Vietnam is first men-
MOM 001* In a ?
memorandumto r. Ken-.
- - - belatinied
?
it
11
,I)tne 3 0 , 1 hP Prc?veccif\ffill.A18MPfil
FGEN. ROBERT L. SCOTT, JR. SPEAKS
' TO AMERICANS -
HON. JOIN R. RARICK
OF LOUISIANA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
?
Tuesday, June 29, 1971
Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, in a speech
entitled "The Bitter Ccst of a Bogus
Peace," Brig. Gen. Robert L. Scott, Jr.
retired professional soldier, emphasizes
- in an jmphssioned tone his love of dedi-
cation to God and country while elab-
orating on the bitter price we pay for a
tenuous, bogus peace?the erosion of li-
berty and of the God-given freedoms be-
queathed to us by our U.S. Constitution.
Being the realist that he is, General
Scott rejects the "inevitable wave of the
future" propaganda being repeatedly
hammered into the consciousncsses of
the American people to condition them
to accept apathetically without resist-
ance. the "blowing winds of change" even
:when they are obliterating our U.S.
Constitution and traditional American
Way of life.
- General Scott knows from first hand
experience that. people cause things to
.happen. Someone is prohibiting our mili-
tary commanders from winning the Viet-
nam war which tetired military com-
manders affirm could be won with con-
ventional weapons in a matter of months
The .exportation of sophisticated dee-
- tronic computers to the Soviet Union
end such items as diesel engines and
parts, aircraft propeller assemblies, elec-
tron tubes, and generators to. East Euro-
pean satellites of . Russia?countries
-which provide SO percent of the materials
-of war to North Vietnam for use against
American servicemen?just did not come
about automatically or by accident. They
were the result of people. Certain anti-
Americans made these decisions. Just as
when the dedicated patriot Otto Otepka
was dismissed from his State Department
security position where he exposed actual
and prospective employees as security
risks, one or more real persons at a high-
er level ordered him purged. . -
General Scott, best known for his
bravery -and achievements RS a World
War II flyer and for his several books,
especially "God Is My Co-Pilot," re-
. minds his audience that while each new
administration promises changes, Ameri-
ca keeps losing; and he states:
At last, though, there is a faint glimmer
of hope. Not that we are about to win even
a scrimmage, but that finally, more Ameri-
cans 'come to realize that our bungling
policymakers are not stupid fools or just do-
ing the best they can in their complicated
thankless Job, but are part and parcel of
the greatest, the most insidious conspiracy
the world, has ever known. Following care-
fully-laid plans for our convergenee with
the Soviet Union as the base for dictatorial
government of the world. (Where, as Sena-
tor ? says, there'll be no armies, no
navies, no air forces except those of the
United Nations. In fact, there'll be no United
States as we know it.)
On the west side of Park Avenue in INew
York City, sit two Imposing buildings sort
of kitty-corner to one another. One Is the
Soviet Embassy to the United Nations, the
other the Headquarters of the Council of
Foreign Relations, the infamous C.F.R..Prob-
alonszons. o
ably the most Influential, sunily the most
'secretive of societies, not only for the for-
s- eign policy of the United States, but for the
world. That one world. Formalmembership
is composed -of 1400 of the most elite names
in the worlds of government, labor, business,
finance, communications, the foundations,
and the academies. And despite, the fact that
it, the Council of Foreign Relations, has
staffed almost every key position of each ad-
ministration since F.D.R., it is doubtful Unit
one American in a thousand, so much as
knows its name. Or that one in ten thousand
can describe anYthing about Its function.
Such anonymity can hardly be an accident.
I insert the text of General Scott's
timely and significant speech at this point
in my remarks. I urge that our colleagues
read this speech and get better informed
with facts about the Council on Foreign
Relations?CFR--the influential organi-
zation which has led and continues to
lead America on a retrogressive course
of destruction, by reading "'The Invisible
Government" by the noted writer, Dail
Smoot.
Since the national news media is afraid
to tell the American people about the
CFR, I exhort our colleagues to do so in
order that the people may know . the
truth, a knowledge of which is essential
for taking prudent action to reverse -the
present trend and to preserve our coun-
try and Constitution.
If the people know the truth, they will
keep America free.
The speech follnws:
THE BITTER COST OF A BOGUS PEACE?IS THE
VROHEN CROSS OUR SYMBOL OF BETRAYAL?
(By Brig. Oen, Robert L. Scott, Jr.)
When the man who is the President of the
United States now, made the best of accep-
tance speeches that ever has been made, fit
Miami Beach in 1958, every American must
have been not only pleased but thrilled, be-
cause in the strongest of voices he said words
such as these: "When the notion which can
land an army upon the shores of Normandy
In 1944, and capture a continent, cannot now
take a dinky little beachhead of guerrillas in
Vietnam, then I say this nation needs a
change in leadership." And on and on he
went, inspiring all Americans. There was the
new Administration, the new leadership we
had all been spraying for. He promised the
stopping of riots in our streets, dignity would
be restored to our police, our nation's cam-
-puses would be freed of revolutionaries par-
ading as dissatisfied sudents. We would aid
the enemy no longer. We'd recognize the
Communist for what he was?the enemy?
and go to work. All of these things if only
we elected him. There would be changes.
Well, we believed bins. And we elected for
America a new Commander-hs-Chlef. And
now we would have leadership. Only, there
has been nothing but more of the same. We
still wage that no-win war of attrition bogged
down right where the enemy wants us, using
weapons that enemy carefully selected for
us, and back home we are torn apart inter-
nally, primarily because there Is no leader-
ship. So, disgusted at all this, we sit down
and write letters to Mr. Nixon asking why,
and sometimes there are-replies such as this
one.
. ?
"THE WHITE HOUSE,
"November 5, 1970.
"DEAR SIR: On President Nixon's behalf, I
wish to acknowledge your letter and to thank
you for letting him have your views. You
may be sure your comment A on problems
facing our Nation at home and abroad have
been fully noted.
- "The Administration believes that the
massive destruction of facilities in the cities
of North Vietnam would not spell victory but
would Instead admit defeat by the
Inabliity of the United States and its allies
to cope with 'a war of national liberatiom'
This sophisticated ferns of aggression nses
terror and subversion to gain the allegiance
or the submission of those it purporta
liberate. . ?
"Such aggression must not be allowed to
succeed. Our objective therefore Is not the
annihilation of one country hut the protec-
tion of another. This is the victory we seek."
Oh, there was more of the double-talk in
"the reply that I received, given gratis in the
name of the President, but surety as you let
those words rattle around in your mind,
there's no need to further bore you with ad-
ditional quotes. I can only im respectful to
the White House 'and the President, even
With this idealistic gull. Yet what frightens
me, given as it is, it has to be the policy of
this Adtninistration. Signed by one Noble N.
Melionkamp, Staff Assistant to the President
of the United States. Wishing me best re-
gards, and adding finally, "you may be sure
that President Nixon is determined to con-
tinue the pursuit of our country's goal of a
just and lasting peace in Vietnam."
Ladies rind gentlemen, as a professional
soldier, I feel flattered when I receive any
communication, even Indirectly, from the
Commancier-in-Chief. But after reading and
re-reacting such utter drivel, I arn astounded
that we are so naive. Can it be that we are
already in the hands of the enemy? We are
not only being buried as Khrushchev shouted
while he beat his shoe upon the U.N. desk;
we are helping the dirt being shoveled into'
our own graves.
- Now my mother used to say to me, those
last years of her life when I was Director of
Information of thes?United States Air Force,
and I dared even Cheinto find fault with the
way the White lise se was?running this same
no-win war: "Son, she would admonish me,
please don't criticize the President. I'm .cer..
tabs he does the best he can.". And she
would terminate the discussion by adding,
"though things may look dark, I truly be-
lieve everything will come out alright in the
end."
,sIn fact, that last is just about the essence
of the opinion I hear voiced across the United
States as I cover this land making speeches.
And there comes upon me the horrible reali-
zation that the way things are going, the
President of the United States does not run
this country. Doesn't run it as my mother
used to think, and as the average American
rests assured of today. What a blatant thing
to say! What would my mother say if she
heard me now?
Administrations come and go with elec-
tions?particular heads vested in the Nixons
and Johnsons and Kennedys, promising
changes and improvements?but nothing
really Changes except the name. The riots
and the treason and the no-win fiasco bleed-
ing us to death continue. America keeps
.
At last, though, there is a faint glimmer-of
hope. Not that we are about to win even a
scrimmage, but that finally, more Americans
come to realize that our bungling policy-
makers are not stupid fools or just doing the
best they can in their complicated thankless
job, but are part and parcel of the greatest,
the most insidious conspiracy the world has
ever known. *Following carefully-laid plans
for our convergence with the Soviet Union
as the base for dictatorial government of the
world. (Where, as Senator Blank says, there'll
? be no armies, no navies, no air forces except
those of the United Nations. In fact, there'll
be no United States as we know it.)
On the west side of Park Avenue in New
York City, sit two imposing buildings sort of
. kitty-corner to one anothnr. One is the Soviet
Embassy to the United Nations, the other
the Headquarters of the Council of Foreign
Relations, the infamous C.F.R. Probably the
most influential, surely the most secretive of
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ACO, TEX.
En-TRIBUNE. . ,
JUN 3 0 toT2
- -26,686
,
What this frarneWOrk overloolce.cl, he adds, is thot
o Orr: Klo pl,/ ?:,1 ;,-b T.Firr ig,
? i v L,-.L., 1;- ii t.,U Ili- tt-oo r -'i-; .
ji. ileZe 1.1.6:11,S guerrilla warfare is GO per cent pc,litics, 15 per cent ad-
,777--g .
1 ministration and 4 per cent military action, and that Ho
:?..? rroi .r.. b? .F.7 -r? ,-, -!5- T, ,r- , - ,,,,,, i -^ -r- 1,7-1,7,--r, .,-, n r Chi Mirth had won the political scramble when he took
? 1 a LA, MO' l'' Ci.io Lit; ''i tli ..o_U, Li olt '4 :i t3 "
ii. d over the Vietnamese independence movement in MI5
and mercilessly subverted it to COTalTalniSnl.
'? ? By far the most perceptive analysis of how the . There will be millions of woros written ano.s! icon
United States role in Vietnam grew under the Kennedy on the Vietnam war but the essence .pf how it grev., is
and Johnson administrations has come from the pen ofd I
outlined clearly in the above analysts. ? ,:
o William R. Polk, who was on the policy planning coun- 'V./Olt:LE IT IS POPULATt. NOW to ktbol Vietnam
cil of the U.S. State Department IK1-65. disaster, there is a strong body of opinion among the
. statesmen of non-Communist Southeast Asia, as report- 11:
:! A feeling ofexcitement and pride in the supposed ed from Malaysia, by Robert S. Elegant of the Wash-/ 1;
-.capacity to act pervaded the ranks of those brought into ini_2;ton Post, that.
! ,
the Kennedy administration, writes William R. Poll:.
"1. Ameriean intervention in Indochina has CLC-_,CIS^
The normal machinery of government -was ignored and ively.stabilized Southeast Asia and prevented external 11
bypassed, he adds, while "all of us who had come into conquest while encouraging internal progress and re-
.1,
the government from the outside were fascinated with gional cooperation, and
NI the techniques and toys of power. . .- ,, Army, Air
"2. Th United States has won in a limited, political
Force and Navy each offered a gimmick to solve the war. American has attained its chief goals by nurturing
e
mysterious and ' complex dilernmaS before us. . . The a Republic of South Vietnam with a much better than
CIA .constantly informed us that it had assets capable even chance of survival; by stabilizing the area; and by
of restructuring politics almost anywhere in the world." catalyzing internal change which makes the People's
Republic of China: less aggressive and more inclined to-
THE' FIASCC TN C-CiSO. kno,Nn vs Bay of In and ward normal diplomatic interchange."
7 the hardnosed confrontation between Nikita Iihrush-?
chev and John Kennedy in Vienna heightened an urge So the verdict of history may be far different from
to show the world something about American power, that being glibly repeated about Vietnam in current
the writer says. - ' hand-wringing clamor.
? This urge was fed by a "war gaming concept," ?
Polk writes, in which "the world was assumed to be a
place of inherent conflict and jostling for pow:cr. There
? were only two serious contenders, the Soviet Union and
the United States: The result of the gamingb scenarios ?
was to clarify the options of the players and to attempt
to define ways in which ambiguity can be clarified and
miscalculation by the superpowers avoided."
This led the Kennedy administration, he. adds, into
a Startling misconception of the world as it really'
-exists: . .
. ? - .. .; ...._ .?. .
"In the international arena we attempted to substi-
_
tute a disembodied view of the world for the reality. In
place of politics, we sought an 'intellectual vision of
strategy. In place of the rough and tumble. of the
marketplace, we sought abstract plans. .All of us
-
sought, in short, to pass our individual responsibility as
' citizens on to some imagined expertise."
- VIEWING THE DIITTERICRATi.ON of Vietnam
urrder Communist bloodshvd, the Kennedy and Johnson
advisers recalled that military assistance and civilian
aid had enabled the Greek government to defeat com-
munist insurgency in 1948-4G; that the British had de-
feated the Communists in Malaysia through ruthless
use of force, and the fortified village concept though it
took 11 years; that civic action had enabled the philiD-
, pines government to destroy the I-luk. movement. By
. combining these lessons with the bag of tools in Uncle
Sam's kit ? the light-weight rifle, the helicopter,..delo-
liation agents, etc.; and by lacing the admittedly cor-
rupt, inefficLent and backward army of South Vietnam
with our ovAPprcsaved,For Reless*200140344:57. CIA-RDP80-01601R000500060001-3
were there," Polk writes in retrospe.ct.
STATI NTL
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STATI NTL ?
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'CHIC1iG0 , ILL.
SUN-TILIES
- 536,108.
S ? 709,123.
jUri
?tf,,,
21
-
CINCACO Sunc 27, `19YI
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; 11
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. .
? _
.? .
William R. Polk, president of the Adlai Ste- e-ctien e, a wal and a philoso of it S own. An V\ fe7 (;) - -
e oa .-
loser, of
-
n
. venson Institute of International Affairs and a incoming, administration had only a few ?, \ .1 1 ---- - - 1 rj- '7'"- c7-7N
I i ., 1 1 ' ? -:)
professor at the University of Chicago, was months to stamp it persOliality upon the bu- \ \ ,' i ? . , ,rach of t I ii,,--.iiii
en the Policy Phu-ming Council of the u.s. intleriley.. Thereafter, the pattern became k. i ? I k- , '1(iii-: ti'ri
. i
lug is his insider's analysis of the foreign poi- dr2a. The. Kennedy administration largely IA ' iti 'a.teel let Li
State D rt t_
epamen t from . nCil to l955 . F ollo w- hai-dened and beyond the. ehe Presl - ' v ., . '::3
icy that led to involteinent in Vietnam. . : missed its opportunity. The jolmson ad minis- in the first blush of concein with thought-t-T. -:
pla
tratIon never had a .chance, and the Nixon . nning analysis never really .got undsulflay.
- . adantstracon never tried. In the formative early 111031ths of the Kennedy
by William R. Polk
The Ketundy team had no major programs, administraticni, the r' hey Planning Council.
went through a bureaucratic "exercise
Publication of government decuments about It had not identified appropriate numbers of
the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War pro- persons. to implement the ideas that it had such lamentably 'poor quality as to convince
? the entire government apparatus that the:
vides-an occasion to raise fundamental queee and it was prepared to give away to its ndtu-
Kennctdy
lions op U.S. political action in recent years. 7..al enemies positions of great opportunity. . .a.dministration was interested .7 only
in show and not in the realities. Months were
The first of these difficult-to-ansvser ques- It is stavtline that President Kennedy 'did
spent Miming out turgid, rehashed and in-
tions is: Why did the new Kennedy adminis. not knn'w two of his principal top aides, the
,
applicable "guideline papers".
tration (and later President Lyndon B. John- Secretaries of defense and state, before his
son) continue so much of the foreign policy election. Mile he constantly complained of -- It never gets off greund .
Admin-
conceived by President Eisenhower's s.cere. the State Department, he undercut the two The second trap was created by the Admin-
.
tary of state, Jelin Foster Dulles? principal of;lck.ls of his own party, Adlai E. .istratien's need to establish . its international
Stevenson II" and Chestex Bowles; allowed "credibility." We had. received a black eye in
The-second question is: Why did successive
U.S. governments appeared so insistant?at the senior bureaucrats of the State Depart- Cuba, and in the Vienna test of wills, the
. times eager?to be committed to the Vietnam "machinery"t to maintain intact the "machinery" of-
2 young President Kennedy appeared to have
'
been faced down by a tough, experienced and
War? . . policymaking he. despised, and brought in so
wily Nikita S. Khrushehev.
Running through all the memoranda so far Bradt, heterodox and unco-ordinated a team All of us who bad come newly into the goy,
publishedLand riViny that have not been Pub- 01 new people as to make virtually no irapact..
ernment from the outside were fascinated
lished?are feelings of excitement and a pride on the vast a.nd vawieldy organization. .. with the techniques and toys of power. Touts
In a capacity to act.
Both for better and for worse, this WEIS the Frustrated, without clear guidelines, Ken- from the Air Force, CIA and the Army and
nedy and his close circle of associates simply Navy each offered a gimmick to solve the
mood of the leWs. After dull, gray years of a neglected or bypaese.d the machinery of gm:7 mysterious and complex dilemmas before us.
lackluster Eiseithower administration, a new
eminent. Forawhile, this appeared to be. a The. CIA constantly informed us that it had
team, bright, alert and sophisticated, arrived
to take charge. - pragmatic, sensible approach. In many "assets" that were capable of restructuring
What were the maor elements
areas, however, the Kenne.dy administration' politics almost anywhere in the world.
j in this new
allowed decisions to be taken, often almost ' Even the laborious and somewhat pathetic
Mood?
The first, undoubtedly, was_ set during the absent mindedly or with little appreciation of efforts of the Agency for. International. De-.
campaign. President John F. Kennedy cm- their tong-term importance, have. set the velopment could be orchestrated into diplo-
p -
phasized The so-called missile gap to demon- course of subsequent U.S. oliey. - matic and other efforts to control, damp down
Strate that a fumbling, inept Republican ad- ,Th3 Bay Of Pies. fia.sce blither called lur or redirect the energies of a score of - na-
ministration had allowed U.S. capacities to question in the Presidents. minti -the' ki,,,--.E;I:.-,tinns.The bewildering statistics of speeds and
wither. The new administration went to great mental "m a c 11 in e." He particularly dis- capacities of high-performance aircraft, to
rellIS tO prOject an imag of zest and energy. trusted the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Celt- which we were all treated to rides, were se-
-- ' 4 . ' .
It is not, perhaps, an exaggeration to say that tial Intelligence Agency. Ironically, however, ductive. Independent brartches of the ser-
a key element in the Democra.tic victory in the casualty- in the CIA,tyas not the culprit. vices, even the chemical and biological war-
WO. won the farMliar manazine program of Rather, it was the knaTyileal, "overt" part of faro groups, dangle.d before us their capac-
the youthful, handsome and -dynamic Massa- CIA, which had not been informed of the Bay 'ities and begged only to be used. :The. new
of Pigs operation until the 11 hour and which weaponry offered itself as "surgical," precise
chusetts senator and his glamorous wife.
_ -;- steadfastly opposed the operation. - and disembodied. And, of coui st., we- knew .0
: - Administration in 3 traps .. ' The whole procedure of appreciations of in- m U CII . Communications intelligence and .../
Yet, no sooner had the administration taken telligence that emanated from the U.S. Na.. /glamorous cla-gsified documents, whether
power titan it found itself caught in three Canal Intelligence Board was largely ney worthy of the designation or not, dominated .
traps. . ? . . lected throughout the rest of the Kennedy- our thinl:Ing.
,The first was its failure to understand a Johnson period. .17r0111 the academic community had come
f
u
n
d
a
m
e
n
ta
l fact
cy-haft- a.-pattern'R- - - m.c
of?Department---which hadbeeCnIA-ROP8Ot4100fiR, ,
tagtoggwroili,p4t. on a
"promoted" -se ,- f a) tfc5 IffilYiSillir;':2 largely
abstract or uninteresting and highly self-cone
-
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against their Soviet-backed goverinnent in 1956:
without giving them any real help. -Cubans
complain of U.S. double-crossing in the -abor-
tive Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. Iranian stu-
dents claim that . Savala ?their country's secret
police, cooperates with the CIA and the FBI to
spy on them here. And Haitian exiles are in-
censed with. the U.S.'s black ambassador to
Haiti, Clinton Knox, who they insist wore Du-
valier buttons in his lapel at the recent funeral
of the late dictator Papa Doc. (The State De-
partment Says it knows nothing of that.)
, Politically active exiles sometimes are in
danger. A few years ago, Jesus de Galindez, an.
exiled college professor, was kidnaPped near a
subway entrance allegedly by agents of Rafael
Trujillo, late dictator of the Dominican Re-
public. He is presumed dead..
Though many exiles keep up running propa-
ganda battles against their governments, few
are well-financed. "Few people bet on an exile
even if he has the best of contacts," says Mr.
Marinho, the Brazilian, who claims that Ameri-
can officials and, ?businessmen can get what
they want out of his country from .the "crooks
In power."
Passion Dwindles
The exiled governments of the Baltic States
--Estonia', Latvia and Lithuania?are, how-
ever, relatively flush. They kept reserves in
the U.S. when they were occupied by the Soviet
Union just before World War II. A State. De-
partment official says the U.S. "uhfreezes"
some of these funds each year to finance the
governments in exile, still officially recognized
by .the U.S. - ?
Militantly anti-Communist Lithuanians used
to show a lot of fervor here, especially during
Captive Nations Week. After some 30 years in
exile, though, many now are fired up only by
extraordinary events, such as the recent re-
fusal of the U.S. Coast Guard to give asylum to
a Lithuanian seaman who jumped his Soviet
ship off the East Coast. "We're Americans, we
have plenty of things tO change here," says a
lyoung Lithuanian.
Yet some exiles Use violent means in their.
"liberation" warfare here. Bombs and Molotov
cocktails have. exploded Or been found undeto-.
nated in the U.S. at eth/sulates and offices of
governments including those of South Africa,
Portugal, Haiti and the Soviet Union. Often the
actual bomb plantings are undertaken by
American sympathizers of the exiles.
- As the chance to return home and seize_
power keeps eluding many political exiles, they
tend to form and re-form into querulous, suspi-
cious and back-biting factions. They bandy
about a large collection of epithets against
their fellow exiles: "pro-American," "CIA
man," "State Department running dog," "Sta-
linist," "revisionist," "Nasserite," "Guevar-
ist" and plain old "fascist," to cite a few.
Nevertheless, some exiles remain potent po-
litical figures. One is Theodore Stathis, a math-
ematics teacher who is unofficial representa-
tive of Panellinio Apeleftherotiko Kinima (Pan-
hellenic Liberation Movement), headed by An-
dreas Papandrebus, son of the late Greek pre-
mier. The group has helped generate _diplo-
matic pressure? but not from the U.S?on the
military government.
A few exiles eventually may. meet with as
much success as the Russian who .used to tell
lands. Sornpp for e2
like U.S. foreign relations with their honie- Ws_ New Yea !it
AgrovedtnRelease
13-01M/
Political Exiles Flock.
To NewYork io Plot
Fall of Home Regimes
Greeks, Haitians, Dominicans
Join East Europe Refugees;
ManyDeplorcU.S.Diplomacy
.By RAYMOND A. JoSEPTI
Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL_
NEW YORK?Vaclovas Sidzikauskas, 77, is
Minister Plenipotentiary of Lithuania. Mario
Marinho, which is not his real name, advocates
guerilla warfare in Brazil and approves of the
kidnapping of American diplomats there.
Phintso Thonden, 32, is the New York Perma-
nent Representative of His Holiness, the Dalai
Lama, of Tibet, and runs a three-man Office
of Tibet on Second Avenue.
These three. men are political exiles. New
:York is. their home, but not their homeland.
IBut they aren't lonely here. Whenever there's a
:political upheaval somewhere in the Nv or] d, the
? U.S.?and New York in particular?stands to
get a new batch of political refugees. Not even
U.S. immigration officials can tell just how
many there are here, because many don't
bother to go through the formality of register-
ing as residents of the U.S. once they've en-
tered: For example, only 16,541 of the more
than 150,000 Haitian refugees believed living in
:New York have registered with the U.S. Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service ? even
though all resident aliens are required by
taw to register with the service each January.
a:. Dictatorships in the Caribbean?Cuba and
Ilaiti?have-produced the most refugeeS in the
past decade. About .50,000 Cubans still come to
the U.S. each year, and a big proportion of
them settle in New York and New Jersey. The
Haitian population here grew to its present pro-
portions from fewer than 5,000 when the late
dictator "Papa Doe" Duvalier took power in
1957. The Dominican Republic also. has pro-
duced a lot- of exiles; one big influx came in
1963 after the overthrow of President Juan
Bosch, and a new contingent came when the
U.S. intervened in 1965.
Old-Timers and Parvenus .
Refugees from Chile now are adding to the
South American ranks here, joining Paraguay.
aria, Brazilians and Argentinians. Greeks are
arriving in force, too, fleeing their military re-
gime. All these folks are joining a long-estab-
lished group of Eastern Europeans who left
their countries because of Soviet takeovers be-
fore and after World War II.
At times, exile status amounts to a state of
mind. A Cambodian student already was in the
United States when Prince Sihanouk was over-
thrown last year. "I wasn't really an exile," he
says, "but for six or eight months I heard noth-
ing from my parents, and I was afraid." He
since has heard from them, hut he still isn't
sure that it's safe for him to go home.
Though exiles normally find the U.S. a se-
cure haven, many display pronounced anti-
American attitudes, largely because they dis-
. e. . . --1 -M mit
? --.-- ---
U.S?for--- seemingly?encouraging?theire-revolt--atalked with took my words assa--jolte;" he said.
I His name was Leon Trotsky. - - -
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I H I IN I L
- !
A. MOST worrisome aspect:
of the Pentagon Vietnam pap-
ers is their evidence on how
frequently high officials of the
government have igno red
facts presented by their own
professional subordinates,
whether these professionals
were in the Pentagon, the
?Li 1 State Department or the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency.
Sometimes the unpleasant
Or '!non-conforming" data was screened out by
:White House assistants, sometimes by the
.-PreSident.
The Vietnam papers don't of
whole story.
o o o
I HAVE knowledge of one reasonably high
official with access to President Johnson and
with some considerable technical skill at
onalyzing military action reports who, in a
face-to-face session, warned the President that
the Tonkin Gulf messages from the officers in
that affair were too vague and. inconclusive.,
and-that they should be treated with extreme
caution.
President Johnson looked up and said sharp-
course, tell the
ly: When. your advice is wanted you will be
asked for it. Good day. .
There followed shortly after a transfer to a
post out of the direct line Of action.
Those who said what pleased the President
were moved in closer to his ear..
.000 _
BUT there' are other examples from one ad- ,
ministration and another.
The evidence of the technicians was largely?
ignored in the Bay of Pigs invasion. They
'were, in the main, overruled by men with little
or no experience in this type of operation.
_ the techUical evidence of thd Defense De-
partment's own top experts in guerrilla strate-
gy and tactics was largely passed over in
planning and fighting the Vietnam war,. Search
and destroy sweeps, aerial bombings of the
.
type routinely ordered, the use of large num-
bers of conventional troops ? all were anathe-
ma to those high officials and officers most
experienced in guerrilla operations.
More recently, the Pentagon's own official.
research study on the lessons learned from the
Vietnam war to be applied in any future simi-
lar situation has been put on the. shelf. It
hasn't been contradicted; it has been ignored.
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E ? 22 , 775
luN 23 ion
Withbolcthqs/ news seldom Good
STATI NTL
?
'THERE IS THIS to consider: the action
- I of the New York Times in publishing
the Pentagon's Vietnam documents may,
? by ripping away the curtain on.these sordid
details, help immeasurably in ending our
involvement in the war.
? The current flap over what the Justice
Department says is the "defense interests
of the United States" is not the first and
will probably not be the last. There are
times, and occasions when voluntary cen-
sorship is advisable, with emphasis on the
"voluntary." This the press has given, and
at least once a President of the U.S. noted
afterward that it would have been better
had the newspapers not heeded requests
for this voluntary withholding of news.
The occasion was .the ignominous Bay of
Pigs incident, when Cuban exiles under
control of the Central Intelligence Agency
embarked on an ill-prepared inVasion of
Cuba. President John F. Kennedy com-
plained that newspapers had leaked infor-
mation about the invasion and suggested
self-restraint.
But five years later it was disclosed that
the New York Times had indeed known the
1961 invasion was imminent, but refused to
publish it because of national security con-
siderations. Also disclosed was the fact
that President Kennedy had told officials.
of the Times that, "If you had printed more
about the operation, you would have saved
us from a colossal mistake."
Newspaper people also recall the Cuban
missile crisis in 1962, when the Defense
Department deliberately issued false in-
formation. It was justified by Arthur
Sylvester, then Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for Public Affairs, on the' grounds
that the government had a right to lie to
mislead the enemy and protect the people.
Amazingly, when he was criticized for
this position, he declared that failure to
expose these lies meant newsmen had
failed to do their job.
Which would seem to mean that if the
government has a right to lie, the press has ?
a duty to expose the lies ? which is just
what the New York Times and other news-
papers are trying to do ?
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vt-7- ? )
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ia 116.3,1.
Operations
?
Cr
Officials in three administrations
were ? interviewed for the following
.analysis which ? discloses how once
Secret military information led to
sometimes secret policy-making deci-
sions.
? ? BY WILLIAM ANDERSON
- [National News Correspondent]
STATINTL
-T.)) o _17 ? 0
It 17 11 1)71)... 7117(P,
1,