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November 16, 2016
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March 29, 2000
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July 14, 1971
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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600 TARINTLIM, PA. VALLEY NEWS-DISPATCH E - CIRC. N-A 1 4 19/1- - - JUL P it'`.3 1-T e u .DISTASTEFUL as it may be, --the survival of any society, totalitarian or free, depends. to .some degree upon the quality and -.quantity of iDformation it is abie. to accumulate about the military plans anti capabilities of potential .advers-7,:ries. Fut a broad CIPSTA1 ,__acparates the business of espionage aud?those of diplotnatie au-. C:9,111eripg or military op- era OTIS and it is its routine clizegard of :-...essential ? division that has ...,prom.,:,t4'd critics both in and out of ,-,-;government .to question .the ...activities of the Cent;?al ::-Iiiltelig.estee Agency. As a matter of ordinary course, ? the CIA.,J.eportesily meddles in onriestic affairs of other conn.ries,.- : np a coup here, shoring to a, Tpathetie" government there activities which are conducted neWy.t. ? rnIA- mandate .nor :.alowledge. The CIA ever. tiles iar on what can only be presumed be largely its own initiative. me 5,00 Thai troops miller CIA :faervision. are fighting in Laos, a 7:itcynntry ? whose ? neutrality this -' government ostensibly respects. . STATINTL Senator Case has - R.r.i.efluced legislation to ry:?ovent the CA from . financing military eperations ,v7i.ic.,?,tit congressional arThoriza- tion. Sen. Case says his purpose; is to 'prevent the CIA ard the Defense Department from raa%ing ,"end - runs around the Cooper? Church and -Fil!bright amend- ments," which prohibit the use of --American groirA fc-Tces in Laos or. ,? Cambodia and the 1.U.:2- (r)i' Pentagon funds to provide military npuert to the governments of those na- tions. ? The case for the ? -measure, . hawever, is not -confined to oar clandestine activities in , Judo- China, for there is no just cation ..for the CA to carry out Inititary . o7...:?erations anywhere without. angressiOnal approval.. The ol?;tirnat-ed to 113 as much as ?e, billion dollars, is hidden among' the routine budgets --of. various ; f7.,qeral aencies. Espionage funds ? may well, have to be kept- under , cover but Congress must insist that.. the 'CIA confine its activities to gathering ?. information and not mpand them to the point of making Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 STATINTL IrlsaiticaciT POS7 Approved F9r Release 2000/05/15 : Clift9Up01rp01R000600170001-0 k, Laoticia ces Id t *Regain cJ Phalli of Jars SAIGON, July 13 (AP)?A- merican-backed Meo tribes- men were reported today- to have extended government control over all of the rain- swept Plain of Jars in north- ern Laos. . ? The Laotian Defense Minis- try in Vientiane said Moo spe- cial forces met no significant 'resistance in a week-old opera- tion to take the area from the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces. . U.S. B-52 and smaller tacii- cal bombers struck inside Laos, hitting at the Ho Chi. Minh supply trail in the pan- handle and also along Route 7 leading from North Vietnam to the eastern edge of the plain. ? Every year, the Meo forcPs, trained, equipped and paid by i the Central Intelligence Agency, have moved on to the plain during the summertime rainy season only to be pushed back by the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao during the dry season, which starts in the fall. For the most part, the plain has been Communist-held ter- ritory since 1964. [An official report issued today said that North Viet- namses soldiers massacred 51 civilians, mostly woman and Children, and wiped out much of an undefended village 'north-of the Plain of Jars, UPI' reported from Saigon. . [The slaughter was discov- ered last Saturday by the troops of Gen. yang Pao, mili- tary sources said. Charred and mutilated bodies of the villag- ers were strewn around the refugee village of Phou lila, where 70 homes were found gutted by fire, the sources said.] . Across South Vietnam, a near-total combat lull ex- tended through a ninth day iand even U.S. air strikes were heavily curtailed by tropical storins. Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 1).osl 14 'JUL 15,121 Approved for Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170 ,,E3 3-tar rl-te on tae wile-cm-0 .0/ --3,-- , -,.n if ir ? - ' ta.' ';IV T .... By FIVoi..a. Lewis . , .. '-. Al LAST the -facts Of the heroin ?\?als in. 'has testified that the only. thing that "win . . Indochina are trickling out. Many officials, save our men" from the tremendous drug . and others, have been aware of them for a problem . in Vietnam is troop withdrawal. But the supply r a3. long thne. But the officials weren't very in outes-e organized now.The high-ranking, officials, and by no means terested, and secrecy about the war th Laos ? all the highest have PS yet 'been named, still and _American clandestine operations made nave U.S. support and every prospect that A extra hard for others to pinpoint the support will continue after most troops have route of heroin from the mountaintop poppy fields of Southeast Asia to American blood- gone. So the heroin can be expected to fol- ? - ? ?-? -? low the GIs home, a continuing souvenir of- / v streams. ti The CIA, which has prime responsibility e Is?ar. . ? for the Laotian war, long denied any knowl- . cst-s) .. . . -. edge of the drug traffic. Nowa has provided TWO developments have begun to bring Congress; through the Bureau of Narcotics, into the open the relation Of , heroin and / with a report naming the sites of heroin re- the war. One is the huge increase in GI use U fineries in Burma, Thailand and Laos. Fur- , in the past two Years, while the military titer, the public report says that ''a senior were assiduously fighting marijuana and virs Laotian officer may hold an ownership M- Wally ignorins the opium-heroin trade, The ., :terest in some of these facilities." The offi- other is mounting public revulsion as each 'cer, named elsewhere, is Gen. Ouane Rathi- piece of news anpears here, kone, chief of staff of the Laotian army, But the siniation isn't very ne?,v. Capt. 7 which exists entirely on U.S. subsidy. Army Robert Masaseo, the former Green Beret units Provide a "military defense perimeter" who was aeeused of killing a double agent, Ito guard the refineries. .tells of cessiping on the Cambodian border , The report also confirms for the first time in the Parrot's Beak sector in Mat. "There cin the record that Laotian air force planes was a big market, field there; people went and Laotian and South Vietnamese commer- back and forth as though there were no hots cial planes take the drugs on to markets, der. Thi..? mice of heroin was astonishing; for - both the GI market in South Vietnam and ' $25 you could get what sells for $500,000 in . international centers which ship to Europn the United States," he told me. "It was being Air America, the CIA-operated airline in and the United States. II does not mention bought by South Vietnamese soldiers, ob- Laos and Vietnam. But there have long been viously flunkies for the higher-ups." , ... On another occasion, he trailed 30 pounds numerous reports that Air America's secret of pure opium broitght down the ilo Chi flights supporting the Laotian war also Minh Trail by Pathet Lao Communists along often transport opiUm wiht medical supplies and found they were I Rep. Robert Steele of Connecticut, an ex- sold to South Vietnamese military and sent CIA man himself, has named IMaj. Gen, Ngo on to Saigon. "I didnt pay much attention," Dzu who commands South Vietnam's Sec- :Marasco says; "that wasn't our concern." oar! Military region as one large-scale or- It is time, late but not too late, for Ameri- ganizer of the traffic. . , . , can intelligence which does know quite a lot 'about the drug traffic to make it their con- THE opium, front which heroin is refined, cern. It is time to stop defoliating Vietnam- is grown chiefly by Moo tribesmen who live es? fields and start defoliating poppy fields. It is tune to stop subsidizing high Asian offi- in what is called the "golden triangle" area of western Burma, northern Thailand and cials who use American support to deal in 17- Laos. The CIA organized the Meo of Laos drugs with impunity. John Ingersoll, director. of the Bureau of into the Armee Clandestine and has accepted responsibility for large numbers of them. Narcotics, has written Congress that "It is Although it probable that opium production in South- - normally denied having any ? -awareness or interest in the drug trade east Asia will be brought under effective, from time to time the CIA claimed progress control only with further political develop- in persuading the Meo under its influence to ? meat in these countries:' switch to food crops. Its own report now If that means that the United States can't says that "in areas (in Laos) svhere the successfully fight , heroin and. Vietnamese tribesmen have been encouraged to grow Communists at the same time because too .corn, the poppies are planted among the many allies are on the side of heroin, it coin, When the corn is cut the poppies con- s -muldn t be hard to choose the , N.VOTSt thine to, grow? until -they too can be liar- enemy. There can be no national defense. vested." even on this continent if the invasion of Vice Adm. William C. Mack, Deputy A,s?: dt?ugs is not stopped. .sistant Secretary of Defense for. Manpower,. ?3971 by Newsday. Distributed by Los ,Anyeles Times Syndicato Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 1),VEGY. VVID Approved fpr Release 2000/05/1n ClI4L146680-01601R000600170 STATINTL EvrroR THE MIN WOW) 2o5 IRWNif.jPg 1001( 'valosE orqum WAR NOW? From a third to a half of the returning S.PAsia invasion veterans have .used or are addicted to drugs. Traffic in opium is common among the gov- ernment officials who are our puppets, according to John Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Nar- cotics before the 'House Select Committee on Crime on June 1st. "He said the heroin traffic is costing the U.S. $3.5 billion a year," according to 1. F. Stone (June 14/71), and. that 173 .pounds of opium were found a few weeks ago on a plane of Air America, the CIA's airline operating illegally in Laos. Weapons supplied Chiang Kai Shek with our tax money were exchanged for opium which was sold to American soldiers in Vietnam with aid of a top general in Laos, according to Rep. Paul C. Rogers of Florida. Now, Senator Frank Church of Idaho reports that the State Dept. is opposing Con- gressional bills that would cut off aid to countries that are sources of dope. Such laws would hurt diplomatic relations, according to Washington. If Nixon is riot in the dope business, you figure it out. The morals of this administration are straight from the gutter. And now Kissinger, Laird, and Rogers are out pimping in the provin- .ces of the empire. Nixinger policy will make us a leper among nations. How stupid can the Repub- licans get, LBJ included? ? . PROFESSOR S.X., San Diego, Cal. ?/- Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 YvV., ?? Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00060017 lIT PAUL , PI SP AT CH 1:60 292 1 - r.t 4 -RI 1 'r) 'kW? 33.O.P1.1b)iOan senators, .10hyi Sherman Cooper of Kentecly and Iford Case of New Jersey, have M.,' irodneoi o-epar?y;:,:e hills to give, Con' gross naJc C011t):01. of the Cc:I-Ai:al Intelligence Agency. Li the present state of puhlio opinion, their propes:rls may have a better _ . chance of approyal than similar ef- forts made in past years, The CIA finances (from money) and directs mercenary ar- mies of hii.-ed Asian soicilelz in Laos and has been aotive in ihe politierft and military affairs of Conlbodia and Thailand. it. has engaged in b?hind- the-sec:v:3 operations in Forth v,e(,_ ham, Mat: ether poliiical intrigues it may I;(,, iimpjrc!, cls,;.?.V:hcie in the world ore. 1.11.',1).:=0.11 to ri."!CP)1:',C1.6 of Congress to the public. Sen. Cooper's bill would recinir.?, the CIA to keep Congress more Nil): in- fprme0. "to enable the Ccogcens to better able to share nith the Es;ecu.- tive Dep;,:alment its resesnsibilias 01 making witicinsii security policies." Sen. Case is more specific. re would 31m1t covert use of funds and military equipment by the CLA for supporting foreign troops in Laos or r. ? STATINTL rA.fliout prior ppprov..3.1 by Congress. Lie said his purpose is "to place some ontsirie c.oitrcI on what has lam the frec-vi-veelitig Hans of the E-_::eciutive in one niflg on foreign policy and even lorcign. roth Cooper and Cam atc, in es- sence, trying to resiOYC 1.1)3t, illnl!en.e. in foreign and to restrict sce-f,A interveAtior!lso, The CIA has I.Jgitimate junctions as on in- telligence gni-tering agency, bid over the years it has moved inn other including the implemeoling of its own recommenclotiens of into-L-11a- . tion'?-.1l policy by biring, forr,ign aymies to do ii bidding, a;-; ii Laos, ? In the CIA, as in othcr 1-57snc?hes of the Ey.oeuti-ve Department, the COO- bination of paver, secrecy ar:d cally unlinlitod bids has rftdined the potentis?I for dangerous involve- ments in foreign affairs. Co-,,,recs should assert its right. to fu.11:r edge of CIA operttior:s. As the 'Ponta-- ? gen papers have shawn, too nnieb au- thority in the liarrls of a fare men con- stantly silided from public visit' end aceountabilit.r is not suitcd to the . democratic f01111 of ttovcImne Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 .16.11.110 AKRON, OHIO . BEACON JOURNAL E - 175,468 S - 203,112 '41 611 k- [11 Ag)Li L 0 -1 [r*" r-7-114 . ft-b.,' }I k (TA E(e' 7-77, STATINTL "T71 e/ -.Admission that special mnmando battalions, led by Americans, are eon- ducting operations in northern Laos -adds new elements of deception and il- legality to the conduct of the war in Indochina. The operation is aimed at regaining .control of the Plain of Jars and de- stroying:, enemy food supplies and Somc eight ba Lialions; of Thai, Lao and Me() troops are involved. Lao- tian sources say Americans arc lead- ing the commando teams. American aircraft are also involved, This operatin is in direct viola-' tion of the State Department's pledge last Feb. 8 that no U. S. ground forces (ir advisers ?would cross into Laos. The operation also violates provi- sions of the Defense Department ap- propriations-. bill which prohibited fi- nancing by the U. S. of military opera- tions in support of the Cambodian or 'Laotian governments except for ac- tions to "promote the safe and orderly disengagement of U. S. troops front Southeast Asia or aid in the release of U.S. prisoners of war." ? The secret Nvar in northern. Laos also violates the Geneva neutrality pact ?,',962 endorsed by the United States. At a time when the U. S. in moving toward withdrawal o f U. S. troops from Vietnam and negotiations at the Paris peace talks appear to be closer to a cease-fire than ever before, .the operations in Laos are not only un7 -timely but foolhardy, Tiny could invet an already 'delicate balance that holds hope for. an end to the fight lug in Indo- china- and the return of Americans, in-, eluding prisoners of war, to their homes. It has been no ' secret :that Thai ''volunteers'' and Moo mercenaries, trained by the CIA,..have lit-en fighting, in Laos. Now American commando leaders are admittedly -there. When the Nixon admi&stration pledged that no Inericaas world be sent to Laos, we e> ported the President to keep his word. How can Mr. Nixon permit the "se- cret" war in Laos to go on and hope to retain the confidence of the American people? Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 STATINTL 'Approved For Release 2000/05/15 ? clArRpg S 107(10 ? CONGRESSIONAL evidence presented is substantially the same As that presented earlier. Subaecion (c) permits a subsequent board unlimited by previous findings or recom- mendations only if fraudulent evidence sub- mitted by the respondent formed the basis in whole or in part for the findings of the first board. Section 964(s) prescribes the standards for the types of discharges permitted. Subsection (b) provides that a member discharged for unsuitability may receive an honorable or general discharge based upon his military record considered in ehe light or his mental and physical capabilities. Subsection (c) authorizes an undesirable discharge on the grounds of misconduct after a Civil conviction for a crime involving nar- cotics or sexual perversion, where State law authorizes imprisonment for one year or more; after conviction of a crime classified as a felony under title 18, United States Code, or the District of Columbia Code, or for which the Uniform Code of Military Justice authorizes the award of a punitive discharge; or after conviction of a crime of sexual per- version for which the respondent was adjudi- cated a juvenile offender. Subsection (d) authorizes a discharge for misconduct for unauthorized absence of more than one year or for fraud or misrepre- son.tation at the time of enlistment which If known at the time would have resulted in the rejection of the member by the service. Subsection (e) authorizes an undesirable discharge on the grounds of unfitness based upon frequent involvement with authorities, sexual perversion, a pattern of shirking du- ties, or a pattern of dishonorable failure to pay debts. ? ? Subsection (f) authorizes an undesirable discharge on the grounds of security. Subsection (g) permits the issuance of a discharge other than undesirable% in cases where the respondent has received a-personal decoration by his service, or where other- vise warranted by the facts of the case. Subsection (h) prohibits the execution of a discharge for misconduct for civil convic- tion if an appeal is still pending unless the Judge Advocate General of the service cer- tifies that the appeal is frivolous or without merit. If a discharge is executed prior to the final disposition of the appeal and the ap- peal later results in the member not having been legally convicted of a felony, he must receive all pay and benefits he would have received if he was not so discharged. An undesirable discharge so issued shall be changed to a general or honorable discharge, and a general discharge may be changed to an honorable discharge if warranted by tha individual's record. Section 905 authorizes honorable or gen- eral discharges based upon grounds other than those prescribed in this chapter, as prescribed by law or provided in regula- tions issued by the Secretary of Defense. Section 966 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to issue regulations providing for the review of discharge actions to determine that all proceedings were fair and impartial and that they were conducted consistent with the provisions of the chapter. No decision on re- view may be less favorable than the action ordered by the discharge authority. Review ' by the Court of Military*, Appeals may be obtained, No decision 'upon review by the Court may be less favorable than the action ordered by the discharge authority. _ Section 3 conforms the table of chapters of subtitle A, title 10, United States Code to the changes made by the addition of chapter 48. Section 4(a) amends section 867 of title .10 to provide for review by the Court of Military Appeals of cases in which petition for review is made under section 966(b). Subsection (b) limits review of such cases to Issues of law specified in the grant of re- view or raised by the armed force. Subsection (c) specifies that cases reviewed by the Court of Military Appeals are to be returned to the reviewing authority specified by section 966(a) for further conaideratien or action in accordance with the decision of the court. The other subsections of section 4 make technical changes in accordance with these provisions. - Section 5 provides for the amendment of section-367(b) (0) to authorize the represen- tation by appellate military counsel of re- spondents whose cases are before the Court of Military Appeals. Section 6 adds the definition of "respond- ent" to section 801. Section 7 makes section 266 of title 10, re- lating to the composition of boards for ap- pointment, promotion, demotion and invol- untary release of Reserves, subject to the pro- visions of chapter 48. Section 8 amends section 1161 of title 10, relating to dismissals of commissioned offi- cers, to provide that no commissioned officer may be discharged for reasons of misconduct, unfitness, or security under conditions other than honorable, except pursuant to chap- ter 48. Sections 9-11 amend sections 1161-1165 of title 10 to make discharges under those pro- visions subject to provisions of chapter 49. Section 12 amends section 1166 of title 10 to require that in actions considering the separation of regular warrant officers the bur- den of justifying the separation is on the gov- ernment. Section 13 amends sections 3781, 3782, 3783 and 3785 of title 10 to require that in the proceedings of selection boards, board of inquiry, and boards of review considering the removal of regular commissioned officers because of substandard performance of duty, the burden of justifying the removal is on the government. All rights and procedures set forth in chapter 48 govern these pro- ceedings. Sections 14-15 make similar changes with respect to such boards considering the remov- al of general officers. Section 16-20 make similar changes in the sections of title 10 concerning analogous pro- ceedings in the Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force. Section 21 amends sections 321-323, and 325 of title 14, United States Code, to snake similar changes in analogous proceedings in the Coast Guard. Section 22 provides that the amendments made by the Act are to be effective on the first day of the sixth calendar month follow- ing the month in which it is enacted. By Mr. CASE: S. 2251. A bill to provide that the Presi- dent notify Congress of his intention to exercise certain special authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Re- ferred to the Committee on Foreign Rela- tions. NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF FOREIGN MILITARY OR ECONOMIC ASS/STANCE TRANSFERS Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I am today introducing legislation which would re- quire the President to give Congress ad- vance notice of money transfers within the foreign military and economic assist- ance programs. - ..' I have long been concerned by the so- called "flexibility" written into the For- eign Assistance Act. The President now has authority to shift large amounts of money programed for one country to another country, with the proviso that he notify Congress within 30 days. Thus, the law as presently written al- lows the administration to make a sig- nificant commitment to a foreign coun- try witho or the public in the debate. Under this authority, the administra- tion shifted nearly $100 million to the Cambodia Government during 1970. The largest portion of this transfer was made before the 1910 elections, but Congress was not notified until the end of No- vember. I firmly believe that such a large com- mitment of U.S. Government funds to Cambodia should have been widely dis- cussed in advance, for it involved a sig- nificant step toward our becoming en- tangled in that country. Then in December 19'10, the adminis- tration came to Congress for a large sup- plemental foreign aid appropriation, and we were asked to vote money for those other aid programs from which money had been borrowed in order to send the nearly $100 million to Cambodia. Frankly, I was disturbed by the whole process, and, that is why in December I introduced with Senator SYMINGTON an amendment requiring the President to give the Congress advance notice of aid increases in Cambodia. Happily, the Case-Symington amendment was ac- cepted by the Congress and then signed into law by the President. But in the case of Cambodia, almost all the horses had escaped by the time we got around to closing the barn door. So in the future, I am proposing that the President give the Congress 30 days advance?or 10 days in case of an emer- gency?before he shifts scheduled levels of foreign military or economic assistance funds to any country. If decisions are to be made that affect our country's foreign policy, let them be made with full congressional and public knowledge prior to the event?not 30 days after the fact. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that the text of my bill be printed in the RECORD. ? There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the REcORD, as follows: S. 2251 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 652 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as added by section 8 of the Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, is amended to read as follows: "Sec. 652. Limitation Upon Exercise.. of Special Authorities.?The President shall not exercise any special authority granted to him under section 506(a), 610(a), or 614(5) of this Act unless the President, at least thirty _ days (or 10 days if he certifies, in addition, that the national interest requires it) prior to the date he intends to exercise any such authority, notifies the Speaker of the House of _ Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate in writing of each such intended exercise, the section of this Act under which such authority is to be exercised, and the justification for, and the extent of, the exercise of such authority.". Sec. 2. The last sentence of section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is repealed. By Mr. CASE: S. 2252. A bill limiting the total amount of excess defense articles that all Gov- ernment agencies may make available to foreign countries; ? Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 - S 10744 Approved.FprEetIRMAIAMM agl,MK:08.041330AROD06001 clined to advertise publicly or used ads show- ing only whites some "signal that minority families were unwelcome." The commission's criticism of the 235 pro- gram was a followup salvo to a barrage aimed at the program last year and earlier this year by the House Banking and Currency Com- mittee. The committee charged that the poor ? were being swindled by unscrupulous specu- lators who unloaded rundown and frequently unsafe. houses on them at inflated prices. PLEDGE. MADE , HUD Secretary George Romney pledged to clean up the 235 program, and at one time early in 1970 suspended purchases of existing homes with FHA mortgage subsidies until appraisal and inspection practices could -be perfected to protect the low income buyers. Later, Romney announced a series of new rules were being put into effect to safe- guard the poor against real estate specu- lators trying to get rid of deteriorated houses at prices- higher than they were worth. Under the 235 program, the FHA not only Insures long-term mortgages for poor fami- lies seeking their own homes, but pays part -of the interest charges to keep the payments LAOS: SECRET SHAME Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, any- one who believes in the Christian Ethie can only read with sadness. and shame an article entitled "Laos" written by II. D. S. Greenway, and published in the July Atlantic Monthly. I would hope that every Senator would read the article. I ask unanimous ? consent that it be printed in the PvEconD. ? There being no objection, the article was 'ordered to be printed in the IlEcOaD, ' as follows: of them are children. One night, the Patlict Lao and the North Vietnamese had come to his village. The soldiers in a nearby govern- ment outpost had detected no enemies 'in the area: "So we went to be happy," the village chief said. "But at four o'clock in the morning we were attacked. Before we knew it, they were in the village shooting and the houses were burning." Squatting down on his haunches, the village chief described with his hands in the dirt how the enemy had come and the attack on the outpost?the short, sharp explosions, the flames, the rifle fire, the measured hammering of the fifty-calibers, and then silence. Death had come in the ? classic Indochina way: a small, isolated out- post overrun in the night. It was a scene that has been played a -thousand times in the last twenty-five years of war. The villagers escaped into the surround- ing woods, and for two days they marched over seine of the most impenetrable and in- hospitable country on earth. "We were so sorry to leave everything behind," the chief said, "and the march was very difficult. We walked two days, and the people cried and cried over the mountains. Two people died; one was an old person and the other was a child." There was talk that the men might be conscripted into Vang Pao's army, but the chief did not know for sure, and he dld not know what would happen to his people. "I am afraid," he said. "FOS WHAT 7" At site 272 the Air America planes con- tinue taking off and landing in a roar of red dust, bringing rice, pigs, end ducks to the refugees. But one senses the end of a decade of American policy in Laos. Ten years ago, when the Americans first began to train and equip the Meo tribesmen, yang Pao's guerrillas operated all over Northeast- ern Laos?far behind enemy lines to the borders of North Vietnam itself. Fewer than two dozen American servicemen have been killed in these mountains. Asians fight Asians. But ten years Of costly, vainglorious offen- sives and unremitting pressure from North Vietnamese counteroffensives have pushed the Mee) beyond their endurance. yang Pao's lasses in the last three years have been. so heavy that the Armee Clandestine is no longer an exclusively Meo force. Almost half their numbers are now made up of other highland peoples. And in the last three or four years, the Meo have been organized to fight in battalion-sized units of over five hundred men instead of small guerrilla units. As a result, the slaughter has been mag- nified. yang Pao's army can no longer hold Long Chong alone, and by early April it was reliably reported by Lao and American sources that no fewer than five thousand Thai troops had been flown in to bolster the Long Cheng front. (The Thai govern- ment still denies the presence of Thai troops in Laos, but their presence is common knowl- edge in Vietiane.) For ten years the Meo people have been running and dying, and today there are few mountain ranges left into which to escape. American officials estimate that fully 15 per- cent of the 250,000 to 300,000 people in the military region that makes up Northeast Laos have died within the last three years. LAOS (By H. D. S. Greenway) The spingtime in Laos is very dry. Save for the brief Mango rains, the heat is un- relieved, and shriveled green leaves lie like dead frogs in the dusty roads. The sun is dull red in the smoke and haze, for in the springtime the hill people slash and burn the brush off the hillsides. The pilots say that the haze stretches all across the north- ern marches of Southeast Asia from North Vietnam across to Burma. The Air America helicopters must pick their way carefully among the fantastic limestone outcroppings that rise like castles from the wooded hills tumbling out of China. One realizes that the misty mountains of the classical Chinese landscape paintings were not the product of artistic imaginations, but faithful reproduc- tions of nature. Here in these hills, fifty miles northeast of Vientiane, there is an airstrip known to the pilots as site 272. It is the center for ? American refugee relief in Northern Laos and the fall-back point for Long Chong, the secret CIA base twenty-five miles to the ? north. Long Cheng is the headquarters for the Meo General yang Pao's "Armee Clande- - stine," supported by the CIA. All this past winter and spring the base has been under siege by the North Vietnamese. The hill peoples, the highland Lao and the Meo de- pendents of Vang Pao's .army, have been fleeing south by the thousands, pouring into the hills and :valleys near site 272. They make temporary bamboo shelters, and Air ? America drops rice to them, for they have ? no food. There is the despair of uncertainty. ? No one can tell them what their future will be, Like Laos itself, they have long since lost control of their own destiny. In one such makeshift settlement the ? Village chief greets visitors with a -gold- toothed smile. There are over nine hundred people in his immediate area?four hundred has ,become a Lawre ce f airalna figure to the Moo, is hithself a casualty. Recovering now from a serious heart attack, burdened by overwork and worry during the last few years of disasters, Buell said: "All of this is difficult for its who have worked with these ? people since the beginning. Some of my boys are beginning to wonder, what was it all for?" ? Some Americans are beginning to wonder why, if there is to be an accommodation now, we didn't encourage one ten years ago. Perhaps the arming and supplying of guer- rillas so close to the North Vietnamese bor- der provoked greater North Vietnamese re- taliation in an area that has nothing to do with the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the war In Vietnam. Although it is true that the Meo had asked for arms in the first place, some Americans argue that they were urged to fight on for U.S. interests beyond their ca- pacity and beyond anything that could be considered in their owls interest. "You know, over two thirds of the 170,000 people we are supporting in the Northeast are refugees," said one American with many years' experience. "Few have been perma- nently located, and they are milling about in limbo. Anthropologists call the Mee) a seminomadic people, but before the war they would move only when they ran out of land. Normally, they might move only ten kilom- eters or so, and they might take a year to make the move. Put to be uprooted as they are now is a great trauma for them. "In these large refugee moves over the last four or five years we have found that about 10 or 15 percent die during the move or just afterwards," the American said. One always knew that the long marches were kill- - era. When whole populations were on the move, walking for days on end through the mountains, one knew that the old, the weak, and the very young died. But, said the Amer- ican, experience showed that about the same number of people died anyway even if they had been carried out by plane or helicopter. "We have American doctors waiting for them with mosquito nets, malaria pills, penicillin, the works. But they die anyway. It is the move itself?the adjusting to a new area, different food and water. Of course, part of the problem is that, like all Southeast Asians, a lot of these people are sick and weak to begin with. But a lot of it is psycho- somatic--bad phi [spirits]. Just the ;trauma of moving kills them. They think they are go- ing to-die, and they do." Edgar Buell expressed the phenomenon a little differently. "Just moving causes a kind of sickness," he said. "I wouldn't go so far as to say they die of a broken heart or any- think like that, but, yes?you can just about say that for a lot-of people, moving means dying." "TJI. LW THE SKY" . The official Laotian and American 7an- bassy position .is that the Long Cheng air- strip must be held at all coats, but there is a general realization that the game is almost played out as far as the Meo are concerned. Officials speak of an eventual accommoda- tion with the Communists, and say that the Armee Clandestine is all but finished 'as an eflective fighting force. Many of the Americans who have worked with the Moo have become -profoundly dis- illusioned. The senior USAID official in the Northeast, Edgar Buell, the former Indiana farmer known as "Pop," who in -ten years In the summer of 1969, in what- may prove to have been yang Pao's last successful of- fensive, the Armee Clandestine, with Ameri- can logistical and air support, captured the Plain of Jars from the overextended North Vietnamese. But some people thought that the brilliantly executed offensive was a fool- ish escalation of the conflict. By February of 1970, Vang Pao had been pushed back off the plain, with heavy losses. The raid produced one of the biggest refu- gee movements Of the Laotian war. Fifteen thousand inhabitants from the Plain of Jars were resttled in camps near Vientiane. The last airplaneload left on the tenth of Febru- ary, 1970. A silver C-130 with the American markings painted over landed in a rooster tall of dust on a: makeshift strip on the western edge of the Plain of Jars. The last terrified refugees- -it was their firsts plane ride--.were herded aboard against the hurri- can blast of the prop wash; nothing was left behind except their dogs, forming in packs and snarling, among the refuse of their en- s carnprnent. Approved For Release 2000/0?/15 : CIA-RDP80-0601R000600170001-0 25X1A Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0 H 654.0 ' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --HOUSE TRII3UTE TO LEE TREVINO (Mr. WHITE asked and was given per- mission to address the House for I minute 'and to revise and extend his remarks.) . Mr. WHITE. Mr. Speaker, I am sure my colleagues would be surprised today, - if I did not remind them that the No. 1 figure in sports, the man whose picture appears on the cover of Time magazine today, is a fellow Texan, and a fellow res- ident of the Proudest City in America to- day, El Paso, Tex. I can also say with pride that Lee Trevino is a fellow veteran of the Marine Corps. Lee Trevino made golf history when he won, in turn, within the space of 3 weeks, the United States Open, the Canadian Open, and the British Open. 'He is also making history as a great sportsman?a great, likeable human be- ing. He likes to win, and affects no false ? modesty when he is successful. He does not like to lose, but when he loses, he - blames no one but himself. Mr. Speaker, there had been comments In the press about the behavior of the British gallery, so, in his interview following his victory, Lee took occasion to comment on the good behavior of the gallery. ' The golf world will talk foryears about the calm courage of this great sportsman who rallied from a double bogey on 17 to ? a birdie on 18, to win a one stroke victory over a great competitor. Lee Trevino is proud of his Mexican- American heritage. He laughingly accepts the title `Supermex" with the rich humor that has opened ?a, new era in a game that is sometimes considered "stuffy." Today, it's everybody's game, and Lee Trevino is everybody's hero. ? (Mr. RARICK asked and was given _ 'permission to address the House for 1 Minute and to revise and extend his remarks.) ? [Mr. RARICK addressed the House. His remarks will appear in today's Ex- tensions of Remarks.] ? NEW PEACE OFFER IS FOR SENATE _ DO VES (Mr. DENNIS asked and was given ? permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his re- marks, and include extraneous matter.) Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Speaker, we may be hopeful that the allegedly new pro- posals by the Vietcong actually contain something new, but we must remember: .? First, that this is a demand for the ? setting of a withdrawal date, "without posing any condition"?a thing this House has rejected and which a current poll of my own district, rejects by ap- proximately 80 percent; and Second, that these proposals include Provision for some sort of coalition ,gov- eniment, pending elections?a thing al- ways basically unacceptable to the United States. The allegedly new Vietcong proposals seem to be directed at American doves? particularly in the other body--at least as much as they may indicate any intent of serious negotiation. I commend to the attention of my col- leagues a recent column by William S. White, which points up this situation, and which I insert in the 1ZEcorut at this point: NEW PEACE OFFER IS FOR SENATE DOVES (By William S. White) WAsmxcroisr.?The North Vietnamese have made another offer of peace in the Viet Nam war that Is ostensibly directed to the United States government, but is in reality addressed to the doves in the Senate. The Nixon administration does not dare to brand this fresh Communist thrust for what it is?a Communist demand for an uncondi- tional surrender and a total abandonment of the commitment of five American Presi- dents to South Viet Nam. IIERE ARE TWO REASONS There are two reasons for this state of affairs. One is that the administration is bruised from all too many encounters with its peace critics here at home and knows that to spurn this new Communist rubbish outright would be to open itself to their old litany that Washington is simply inflexible. The other is that the President and his as- sociates?not to mention John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower as his predecessors?are under siege by the Pentagon Papers pilfered by Daniel Ellsberg to the point where all of them have been or will be mada to appear either foolish or against peace. Moreover, there may be even a third reason why the State Department Is acting as tho there really might be some ounce of conces- sion in these latest Communist proposals. This government has been conducting some highly sensitive contacts with certain third party, and far from pro-American, nations? meanwhile hoping that the identities of these parties are not going to conic out, thus requiring them to run for cover?and is con- cerned to walk in the softest way possible on every aspect of this whole business. The Senate doves, meanwhile, are of course delighted with North Viet Name suggestions. For, like the doves, North Viet Nam is de- manding that the United States fix a precise date for the withdrawal of all American forces from South Viet Nam. Given this and an American abandonment of the anti-Com- munist government in Saigon, Hanoi would, so It says, open its cages and release the American prisoners of war. Precisely this.form of approach?let Wash- ington promise a one-sided troop withdrawal and then Hanoi surely would release our men?already has been tried in the Senate and knocked down when roll call time came, All things considered, however, the doves un- doubtedly have a better chance than ever before?and they are not slow in grasping the opportunity. - THEY MAY TRY AGAIN Sen. George McGovern [D., S.D.], a Demo- catic Presidential aspirant from the far left, and Sen. Mark Hatfield [R., Ore.], a maverick Republican, .have already said they may have a _go at. yet another resolution demanding one-sided American withdrawal. Just such a McGovern-Hatfield paper, set- ting Dec, 31 as the deadline for vihat in fact would be an unconditional American sur- render, was defeated by 55 to 42 three weeks ago. But a lot has happened in two weeks to the administration and to the bipartisan supporters of the war, all of It bad, and Mc- ? Govern and Hatfield may Just have some- thing this time. If not, there are always Senators Frank Church [D., Idaho], and John Sherman Cooper [R., Ky.]. They, too, are making ready to put In "end the-war" papers. The net of it all is simply this: This gov- ernment Is hanging on only by its fingernails NTL to its resolution not to run out on our pledges to South Viet Nam and not to leave there until the South Vietnamese have?some chance of being able to defend themselves. ? THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA The SPEAKER. Under a previous ? order of the House the gentleman from California (Mr. McCLosicsy) is recog- nized for I hour. Mr. McCLOSKEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks and to include extraneous matter.) . Mr. MeCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, a few days ago I had the opportunity to read a copy of a speech made on June 26, in the city of Burlingame in my district, by my colleague from California, the gen- tleman from Santa Clara County, Mr. GUBSER. The gentleman was kind enough to title his speech, "Neo-McCarthyism and the New Left," thereafter arguing that the McCarthyism of the early 1950's had become "McCloskeyism," and con- cluding: "Neo-McCarthyism, now Mc- Closkeyism, has served the cause of the New Left." The thrust of the gentleman's remarks was specific: in speeches about Southeast Asia I had been guilty of libel- ing the image of the United States with "half truths and distortion," in particu- lar with respect to the allegation that the United States has been guilty of first, "indiscriminate bombing of civil- ians in Laos," and second, "war crimes like those for which the Nuremberg trials decreed the penalty of death." Both my allegations and my col- league's comments constitute serious charges, and I have taken this special order today, inviting the gentleman from Santa Clara County to share in a dis- cussion of the issues involved so that the record of debate may be as complete as possible on a matter of grave national concern?U.S, policies and actions in the destruction of rural villages in Laos and Vietnam. I think it regrettable when legislators, each sincere in their beliefs, extend their' disagreement to attacks on the personal integrity of those with whom they. dis- agree. The issues on which reasonable minds differ today are too important to - the Nation to be clouded by attacks on the motives and veracity of those who espouse opposing views-. We confuse the merits of the issues when we lapse into personal attacks on one another. I believe this is why we have long had -rule XIV in the House, requiring that a Member, in speaking to the House: "Shall confine himself to the question under debate, avoiding, personality." In earlier days, accusations of un- truthfulness resulted in canings, fisti- cuffs, and duels. These hardly add to the legislative process, but sharp debate quite often can. In precise cross-examination and heated debate, I believe our demo- cratic processes achieve the highest chance of ascertaining truth, the most elusive goal of all our deliberations. Un- til his recent personal attacks, I had con- sidered my colleague a friend; I hope we can resume that friendship. He is an able Member of Congress despite our disagree- ment. I feel the Nation is particularly in- debted to him for his leadership last year Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 S 10722 STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/15 :.CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE - July 12, 1971 ? Corps merger with Action and discuss my amendment. In addition to hearing Mr. Blatchford, Director of the Peace Corps, the corn- mitee will take testimony from others who ask to be heard. They are requested to get in touch with Mr. Arthur M. Kuhl, chief clerk of the committee. The hearing will take place in public at 10 a.m. in room 4221 in the New Sen- ate Office Building. NOTICE OF HEARINGS BY SUBCOM- MITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAWS AND PROCEDURES Mr. McCLE'LLAN. Mr. President, I should like to announce that the Sub- committee on Criminal Laws and Proce- dures will continue it.s series of hearings on the recommendations of the National Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws on July 19 and 20, 1971. The hearings will begin each day at 10:00 a.m. in Room 2228, New Senate Office Building. Further information on the hearings. can be obtained from the sub- committee staff in room 2204, extension 53281. \---7 ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS LAOS?FURTHER U.S. MILITARY OP- ERATIONS IN THIS SECRET WAR ? Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, sev- eral recent news articles report a new, ? hitherto secret, military operation being - conducted in Laos by irregular units un- der the command of Gen. yang Pao, commander of Military Region No. 2. The first of these was a .story by Tammy Arbuckle, published in the Washington Star of July 7, and reprinted in the New York Times Of July 8; also an article by D.E. Ronk, published in the Washington Post of July 8. As these reporters make t clear, considerable American support has been involved. An article, by Marilyn Berger, pub- lished-in the Washington Post of July 9, reports the statements of 'U.S. and Lao Officials on the operation, statements in- dicating a certain amount of confusion as to the respective responsibilities of the Lao and U.S. Governments for the new offensive. Apparently this operation by Lao and . Thai irregulars, whose costs are paid by ? U.S. funds appropriated by Congress, has been under way since late June; but we In the Congress, who have appropriated the funds; have had to learn about it in the press. In fact, had there been no press reports, we might never have learned about it. Indeed, as Mr. Arbuckle reported in another article, published in the Washington Star, American officials In Laos did not acknowledge the true scope of the operation until July 9. Mr. ? Arbuckle notes in his article of July 7: ?It Is ahnost unbelievable that after Sen- ate censure and publication Of the Pentagon documents, a U.S. mission in Laos should ? once again resort to secrecy, particularly concerning a United States-run operation Close to North Vietnam and China. Surely we will all agree with that ' statement. _ - The press stories report that these irregular units are being led by Ameri- can military men in the employ of the Central Intelligence Agency and that top Lao military officers insist that the op- eration is being coordinated by the CIA. A State Department spokesman has said that American are not actually leading any of the forces in this opera- tion. But he has admitted that we are providing logistic and air support and I am sure he would not deny that these Irregular units are directed by U.S. Gov- ernment officials. Both Mr. Arbuckle and Mr. Ronk re- port that American Embassy officials in Vientia.nne put the responsibility for the operation on Gen. yang Pao, saying that he "is very much his own man." Mr. Ronk adds that American sources say: No matter what anyone says, he does pretty much what he wants. Knowing what I do know now about our activities in Laos, this statement is ridiculous on its face. We recruit and train these irregular forces. We provide 'them with all their equipment and am- munition. We transport them to battle in American planes, as the press stories make clear. It is further reported that American engineers were involved in clearing mines from landing strips on the Plain and that U.S. Air Force crane heli- copters were used to move heavy equip- ment into forward areas. Furthermore, it is inconceivable that offensive actions of the magnitude de- scribed could have been undertaken without directtair support by U.S. fighter bombers based in Thailand. It is, there- fore disingenuous if not actually deceitful to shift the blame on Gen. yang Pao so as to absolve ourselves of any responsi- bility for this military engagement. Actually, if we were able to accept as accurate the state ment that Gen. yang Pao "does pretty much what he wants," we should be even, more disturbed; because if this statement were true, it would mean that, despite the enormous U.S. involvement and participation in this Laotian war, we cannot control ac- tions on the part of local Lao military commanders which risk causing a new escalation of the lighting, the costs of which fighting is borne by the United States. One might well ask also about what additional risk arises from the involve- ment of Thai troops in an operation of this type and character. Given the fact that the United States is committed by treaty to the defense of Thailand, should not the Congress seek assurance that the use of U.S.-financed Thai troops In Laos will not provoke a North Vietnamese response that would result In that Thailand commitment being in- voked? The risks inherent in this new offen- sive, particularly the possibility that it may undercut the tentative progress which has been made toward talks, be- tween.Priine Minister Souvanna and the Pathet Lao looking toward a reestablish- ment of the 1962 Accords, raise once more the question: Just what are the objectives of U.S. policy in Laos? Do we intend to continue to prosecute the war in northern Laos as an adjunct, to the war in Vietnam, or do we support with sincerity efforts toward a Laotian political settlement? One explanation could be that there ,iis disagreement within the executive branch on our objectives in Laos. Would it not be interesting to know, for exam- ple, whether the principal farce behind this new offensive was the Department of State, or the influence of military planners who view Indochina as one vast American theater of operations. We of Congress have a right to ques- tion the wisdom of this latest Laotian operation, and to deplore the secrecy which surrounds it. We also have the right to resent the high-handedness of the executive branch in not consulting Congress before undertaking a major military operation with funds Congress appropriated; an operation which may seriously affect not only our interests in Laos, but also in all of Indochina as well as in Thailand. I would earnestly hope that the Sen- ate would bear this case in mind when considering the amendment I have pro- posed to the Defense authorization bill that would limit the funds which can be obligated or expended in Laos, exclusive of air operations over the Ho Chi Minh Trail area in southern Laos, to $200 million. It is only through some control of the funds it appropriates that the Congress can have any real knowledge of, or ex- ercise any restraint on, this dangerous situation, Also, I invite the attention of Sen- ators to a brief news item, following the summary of the Washington Star report from Laos, in the July 8 issue of the New York Times entitled "Cam- bodian Plan Said To End." This report quotes "United States sources" as saying that the United States has abandoned its secret program of training regular Cambodian troops in Laos, but is con- tinuing to train Cambodian guerrillas. This is a program which has hereto- fore been kept classified by the execu- tive branch. Let us hope that its con- firmation by U.S. seurces will end that ban, and that knowledge of that portion of the report on Laos by two members of the staff of the Foreign Relations Com- mittee which related to this subject will no longer be withheld from the American people. While on the subject Of declassification, the subcommittee staff was told by the State Department this morning, specifi- cally by Mr. Joseph Wolf, that the mem- orandum to the Secretary of State on the declassification of certain portions of the June 7 closed session of the Senate on Laos has not yet been acted on but is still being considered. I remind Senators that, as I have reported to them on both June 30 and July '7, by Friday, June 25, the specific points had been defined on which there was disagreement between representatives of the Foreign Relations Committee and representatives of the executive branch on the need for. con- - tinned security classification. Over 2 Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 n 00/05/1JA gIEN41 Aj8osarv6Pr1smoo600 ongre8s sia-ro-oy _ Sonie Want Information, - But House Voted To Keep Status Quo ? By GENE GISHI Washington Bureau of The Sun Washington ? Does Congress :-reany want to know everything jhe United States government ...does? On balance, the answer is probably no, despite a renewed drive in Congress to dislodge 'foreign policy secrets from the executive branch.. Resolution Rejected -In fact, the House last week rejected, 261 to 118, a reso- - lution asking the State Depart- ment for documents related to Depart- '. bombing and CIA opera- tions in Laos. Representative Joe D. Wag- ' gonner, Jr., (D., La.) said dur- ing the debate: "There are ? some things that some people in; ;this country had better not know' :for the security and future well- ;?:being of this country. Therefore, ;they [the administration) must . keep some information from me ? and they must keep some infor- mation front you for the benefit .of the future security of this country. It is better that infer- ' mation as a rule be overclassi- fied than underclassified." , Mr. Wagg,onner also ex- pressed a wilely held view that some members of Congress, if given secret information, could not resist the temptation of leak- ing f it "to the New York -Times or some other whistle blower." The debate underscored a tac- At assumption long held in Con- gress that the country is better ;served if legisjators?except for :a select few?are not told of everything the United States has 'done or is currently doing in the field of foreign affairs. Being Challe 'teed This assumption, however, is now being challenged, unsuc- cessfully in the case of the House resolution asking for more information n Laos. But an even more sweeping bill has been introduced in the Senate by John Sherman Ceop- er (R., Ky.), who wants to give every member of Congress reg- ular access to all intelligerce /reports and Amrirmextfor V for the executive branth. b;: the CIA. 9 o nTa-u. SENATOR COOPER RICHARD HELMS Seeks more disclosures Knows all the secrets Mr. Cooper is one of the mot Leverett Saltonstall, a Massa- highly regarded members of the chusetts Republican, was quoted Senate, and this is a factor of recently as saying when he was some importance in its club-like Ia member of the Senate: "They !atmosphere in which the success '[the CIA) do things I'd just a?s/ or failure of a hill can hirige on Soon not know about." who its sponsor is. ; Richard Helms, Director of ; I But Senator Cooper?a senior ICentral Intelligence, at least once a year gives separate Intel- Fgence briefings to small groups I vithin the Armed Services and ! member of the Foreign Rela- tions Committee?must get his bill through the Armed Services Committee, which together with both committees in I the Appropriations Committee ooth houses of Congress and ' has jurisdiction over the CIA. even to the full Senate Foreign . And even without national secu.. Relations Committee, even 1 though it does not have direct at committees instinctively re- ! ; rity considerations, congression- s jurisdiction over the agency. ist encroachment upon their I The annual briefings, accord- areas of competence. ; i The last time an attempt was i made to break the. Armed Serv- consist of "around-the-world" assessments of the United ices Committee's lock on the i States' military and intelligence CIA was in 1966, when then Sen- posture. Other special briefings ator Eugene J. McCarthy (D.J might deal with such topics as Minn.) made a comparatively deployment and strength of modest proposal to create a spe- I Soviet nuclear missiles. cial CIA committee, made up of George H. Mahon (D., Texas), I ' representatives of Armed Serv- chairman of the House Appro ices, Appropriations and the priations Committee, and F. Ed- Foreign Relations committees. /ward Hebert (D., La.), chair- 'he late Senator Richard B. man of the house Armed Serv- Russell (D., Ga.), then chair- ices Committee, said, as did man of the Armed Services Senate sources, that Mr. Helm Committee, blocked, the bill has never refused to answer F., from coming to a floor vote on a question during these briefings.. ing to congressional sources. 'procedural point, effectively killing the measure. The Coopee bill is not -likely to; get far in the legislative process either. Aside from the jurisdic- tional problems, most members I member of his panel. - Thhi "I took it on my own respOnsi-! erdiriP It?:P I 04100 Mr. Hebert said there was; only one exception, when he in- structed Mr. Helms not to an-1 swer a question put to him by a 4Cf Mg g much. "aM0(14146aTIROOOS na, of course, I won't tell you what the question was." "fia eeeeeo, E tt, Senate sources indicate tha senators, too, impose a certain amount of self-censorship during i these intelligence briefings. One! TATINTL source said he has never heard0 a question pertaining to the so- called "dirty tricks" aspect of CIA operations. "For example," he said, "we've never asked, 'Mr. Helms, how many people did / you lose in your clandestine service last year? f Maybe we should ask it, but we never have." But it is virtually impossible to ascertain precisely what even the select few who attend CIA briefings know about the agen- cy's activities. As Mr. Mahon, the Appropria- tions chairman, notes, he picks only those "who won't talk." Then, he refused to say who they are. He said he was 00005ed to the Cooper bill, saying, "If you give , it [CIA information) to every V member of Congress it would be like giving it to the New York Times." Chairman Hebert. of Armed Services questioned the need to know everything. "I don't know everything," he said, "and I'm not bitching about it." On the other side of the issue -critics of the present system say that congress had. deliberately I remained ignorant to avoid re- I sponsibility. Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D., N.Y.) said dur- ing the House debate last week: "I fear Mr. Speaker, that many of us did not want to know all of the facts of our involve- ment in Vietnam in 1965 or 1968 or even yesterday. I think that the Congress_ has remained much too long in self-imposed insulation .. We feared that more knowledge would mean ore responsibility for us." Others argued that the infor- mation the House was seeking was already well known to the - enemy so it could not be' with- held for national security rea- sons. As the House vote indicat- ed, they represented a minority view. For the moment, at least, the e does not want to share fully in. executive branch se- crets. Approved Fpr Release 2000/6iiIebii-RD080)-0i604000600170 1 2 JUL 1971 er-T, . 7.4 :1.),g,4.-11., Distasteful as it may be, the survival of any society, totalitarian or free, depends to some degree upon the quality and quantity of in- formation it is able to accumulate about the military plans and capabilities of potential ad- versariez,?. but a broad chasm selx-irate:.; the busi-- ?I1CSS. of espionage .and thoe of diplomatic maneuvering or military operations and it 13 its routine disregard of this essential division that has prompted critics both in and out of Govern- ment to question the activities of the Central .Intelligence Agency. As a matter of ordinary course, the CIA re- portedly meddles in domestic affairs of other - countries, setting up a coup here, shoring up a "sympathetic" government there?activities .which are conducted with neither public man- dato nor knowledge. The CIA. even wages war ? on what can only be presumed to be largely its own initiative. Some 5030 That troops under. CIA supervision are fighting in Laos, a country whose neutrality this Government ostensibly respects. Senator Case has introduced legislation to prevent the CIA from financing military opera- V tions without congressional authorization. Mr. Case says his purpose is to prevent the CIA ;-..nd the Defense Department from making "end runs around the Cooper-Church and Ioulbright amendments," which prohibit the use of Ameri- can ground forces in Laos or Cambodia and the use of Pentagon funds to provide military sup-- port. to the governments of those nations. The case for .the measure, however, is not confined to our clandestine activities. in -Indo- china, for there is no justification for the CIA carry out military operations anywhe:re uish- out congressional approval. Tha CIA budget, :estimated to be as much as a billion dollars,' is hidden among the routine budgets of various., ,feder_al, agencies.. Espionage funds .may well have, to be kept under cover but Congressi Must ? :insist that the CIA confine its activities to gathering information and not expand them to .1 ?thc. point of ..making war. STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 W:afirkWii Ziaal Approved For Release 2000/05/1&:FRIArt41flD1601R00 ?STATINTL ongress Tui Congress, in its continuing Vietnam-inspired effort to break the Executive's near moreepoly ot Vlentral Intelligence Agency. This is understand- owers in foreign affairs, is now tackling the able, and was to be expected, too. The agency's powers are great?or so one suspects; no one representing the public is really in a position to know. Yet because it operates under virtually absolute secrecy, it does not receive even that Incomplete measure of public scrutiny which the Defense and State Departments undergo. The proposals in Congress affecting the CIA fall into two categories. Those in the first category start from the premise that the CIA is essentially an operations agency and an ominous one, which Is beyond public control and which must somehow be restrained?for the good of American foreign policy and for the health of the American demo- cratic system alike. v/ So Senator Case has introduced legislation to prevent CIA from financing a second country's military operations in a third country (e.g., Thais In .Laos) and to impose on the agency the same Limitations on disposing of "surplus" military materiel as are already imposed on Defense. The thrust of these provisions is to stop the Executive from doing secretly what the Congress has for- bidden it to do openly. Unquestionably they would restrict Executive flexibility, since the government would have to justify before a body not beholden to it the particular actions it wishes to take. The 'advantage to the Executive would be that the Congress would then have to share responsibility for the actions undertaken. Since these actions Involve making war and ensuring the security of Americans, if not preserving their very lives, we cannot see how a serious legislature can evade attempts to bring them under proper control. Senator McGovern's proposal that all CIA ex- penditures and appropriations should appear in the budget as a single line item is another matter. ile -argues that taxpayers could then decide whether they wanted to spend more or less on? Intelligence than, say, education. We wonder, though, whether a serious judgment on national priorities, or on CIA's value and its needs, can be based on knowing just its budget total. In that figure, critics might have- a blunt instrument for polemics but citizens Would not have the fine Instrument required for analysis. In the House, ? Congressman Badillo recently offered an amendment to confine the CIA to gathering and analyzing intelligence. This is the traditional rallying cry, of those who feel, either that the United States has no business running secret operations or that operational duties warp intelligence production. The amendment, unen- forceable anyway under existing conditions, lost 172 to 46, but floor debate on it did bring out a principal reason why concerned legislators despair of the status quo: Earlier this year Hoyse Armed ..v7 Services chairman Hebert simply abolished the 10-man CIA oversight subcommittee and arrogated complete responsibility to himself. Congressman Badillo -is now seeking a way to reconstitute the subcommittee. This is a useful sequence to keep in mind when the agency's defenders claim, as they regularly do, that CIA already is adequately overseen by the Congress. Between these proposals and Senator Cooper's, however, lies a critical difference. Far from re- garding CIA as an ominous operational agency whose work must be checked, he regards it as an essential and expert intelligence agency whose "conclusions, facts and analyses" ought to -be dis- tributed "fully and currently" to the germane committees of Congress as well as to the Executive Branch. He would amend the National Security Act to that end. His proposal is, in our view, the most interesting and far-reaching of the lot. To Mr. Cooper, knowledge is not only power but responsibility. A former ambassador, he accepts? perhaps a bit too readily?that a large part of national security policy is formulated on the basis of information classified as secret. If the Congress is to fulfill its responsibilities in the conduct of foreign affairs, he says, then it must have available the same information on which the Executive acts ?and not as a matter of discretion or chance but of right. Otherwise Congress will find itself again and again put off by an Executive saying, as was said, for instance, in the ABM fight, "if you only knew what we knew ..." Otherwise Congress will forever be running to catch up with Executive trains that have already left the station. The Cooper proposal obviously raises sharp questions of Executive privilege and of Executive ? prerogative in foreign policymaking ? to leave aside the issue of keeping classified information secure. But they are questions which a responsible Congress cannot ignore. We trust the Cooper proposal willbecome a vehicle for debating them in depth?and in public, too. Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01691 R000600170001-0 STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : dIA-RDP80-01601R00060017000 ' FORT tiOiTFi, ?- .. it/1i" 7 ; ? 3.02,470 ? .218,`,306 - - hous'Pa of Con,Te cr ,s to et the. ac.Tii_in- r. ? ? istra-Oon. to .give do:tallod 'formation . on .4'Irrierican undercover operatiol-ls in Los and. 7istnam and,: intelligenoo activhiss in gel-123:A:: Ti House has.rejnted five Iasi?, lutibns by 12,731 -rdc'-'1-,,y canf.p.rnia eiig r..pon .Setretry of: State -1Villial".0 -CO,fr=1? to vr0v1310; ? I . mation..Thl.e is a ?the'iFic ? by 'Etin. , ? 1-11',111,-,'11-2--; genc-,:;, - . lu ....Both of by men who are 2-...-c!ent .- again::.t the ac7:n-iris.,..ti0-;.-1's that. the '2:su.7..c.le to .m'en1 hat 220 Va133mont for. the -,'veal.. Fr_ i-"_1 :.,eem. .27.tif;-1-11e:It.,t0 .Congreas, CL' there viU be nip.::.cau.-? cheering those to wl1cm, sucli information he given. Sen. ii Gravel o ..1,JaLka 17...s just d34strat,... .-ed the inadvisability OVer Secret docume.nts to 'ihe hO1C con-, gross and expecting them .to, remain confidential.. - . Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 -pAILY ORID STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/15.: 410-130119111601R000600170001-0 New U.S. offensive in Laos VIENTIANE ? The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has launched ? a new offensive against Lao patriotic forces in northern Laos and is im- posing a "news blackout" on the whole operation, the Washington Eve- ning Star and Washington Post reported on Thursday and Friday. The U.S. newspapers' reports on the massive new attacks were confirmed in radio broadcasts from Sam Neua, headquarters of the Lao Patriotic Front. The CIA's offensive began about a week ago and is focused on the strategic Plain of Jars area in northern Laos. The Washington Post re- ported that large forces of Meo tribesmen ? part of the "Secret Army" led by Gen. yang Pao ? are taking part in the operation. Command is vested in four of Vang Pao's junior officers since he is still recovering from wounds and injuries suffered last year. However, actual direction of the military operations is in the hands of CIA advisers. It is known also that about 3,500 regular Thai Army troops are tak- ing part in the offensive. The U.S. has admitted it has escalated its air war on Laos in the last few days: Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 ApproveKbEctrER0IpaSE2000/05/159 CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001 , 1 0 Wrj E ? 279,608 ? 333,807 Wiinc is ro "What we are doing in Laos is total- ly inconsistent with our kind of socie- ty." This is What a U.S. diplomat in Vi- entiane, Laos, recently told a cone- 'spondent. The official, who did not want to be quoted by name, added: "We are fighting a war by covert means and an open society cannot tolerate that." If this is correct, the administration has much to answer for to the Ameri- can public. The disclosures made so far raise more questions than they an- swer. For example: Officially the public has been told that the United States is contributing $52 million a year to the Laotians in (,.olionlie aell Unofficially, it has been relaienhat $100 million has been approved for military assist- ance. Tuesday, following a rare closed ses- sion of the United States Senate to dis- cuss our activity in Laos, different senators put total expenditures at $200 million, $250 million, and one wont as high as $350 million. Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., a for- STATINTL mer secretary of the air force, said he told his Senate colleagues that "what was actually going on in Laos was quite different in some details than we have been told." One reported activity in Laos is the financing of 4800 Thailand troops in Laos by the U.S.. Central Intelligence' A.gency. Another iT'riiitincial support for Royal Laotian troops and irregu- lars. The Republican leader in the Senate, Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, claimed that nothing new had been. disclosed .in the secret session of the Senate; that the Thai troops are not mercenar- ies; and ? the activity is justified be- cause, "If Laos were to fall it would greatly decrease the already slim chances of successful negotiations with the Communists who would then have completely outflanked the rest of Indochina." He could be right on all counts, but whY should the facts be kept from the American people? The Communists are certainly aware of much of what we are doing in Laos. The American public should know at least as much. The secrecy on the part of the ad- ministration raises the fear that the United States may be enlarging opera- tions in Laos when a majority of Americans favor a withdrawal from Indochina; that in winding down the war in Vietnam, the administration is at the same time increasing our in- volvement in other Indochina nations which would be contrary to laws passed by Congress. Specifically a law forbidding the use of U.S. funds' to support foreign forces fighting for the governments of Cambodia and Laos. Sen. Symington has urged the ad- ministration to approve release of the transcript of the secret session as well as a report on financing of Thai troops in Laos. If our society is open and, as administration supporter Scott said, nothing new was disclose d, there Ap71411pctioRtwavAtelyotilimiliSite0iA-RDP40+01601 ROO 06(1017610 QI iQ t the peo- :8, funny business- going on?' -pie know. - Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601R00060017000VIATINTL SALT LAKE CITY, UTAIT DESERT NEWS 7%1] E 84,8) vr-1,1r, i. I ? r'77, ) f \ (7-1," t Lkdb1. fr--1 e "7 r !`. ? ? i L,E1 IFA If the Uniktd States, isn't careful; it can let itself get dragged into Laos th:? same v,'ay it got dragged into Vietnam. So it's undcn;larlable that the Senate wants to set a ceil- ing $200 million bas been proposod? on. U.S, spending in Laos. And it's hard to ;.r.vallow the Pentagon's story that such a' ceiling won't work bncause nobody knows exactly how Trnich. American Money is hThig spent there. Granted that precise figures are hard to come by toca.use much of the money going into Laos is being funneled through the Central Intelligence Agency -- and C1,s,.4:44iniding is prop-. erly kept ;secret as a security matter. But the CIA ought to know how much of its funds is going into Laos, 'and lumping that amount in with overall spending in Laos could- be no breach of security. . Granted that keeping track of U.S.- spending in Laos. Could involve complicated accounjng procedures that may '? not be inexpcnsive. Bat the Pentagon ought toknow for its own purposes how much the support of Laos is costing in ,American dollars as well as possibly in American lives. Granted, too, that as more U.S. troops are brought home from Southeast Asia, more U.S. funds will have to be sent , there to help replace thern. But this can't be an open-ended ar- rangement, since America's treasure is not inexhaustible. There's room for quarreling with the specific level of the proposed ceiling, t.lready the U.S. is said to be spencliig some - .$1.74 million a year more than the proposed limit of S200 mil- ? lion. . But tho Pentagon can't be handed a. blank check on Laos. If the Defense Department really doesn't know hew much it is ,spending in LI-Jos or any other individual country in Southeast Asia, that's- sufficient reason for setting a ceiling t6 find oute Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 IMS11.1.11(.4"nN Approved For Release 2000/Q5/150 91471197-180-01601R00060 0 rf' ! f ') IT ] 0 r''] 9 Tr] ii, ,..?? ,. ... d .1. , o rril f fr?-;) co tiE'-) ic 1 i fi--) ., ,,,.t . .,,, . \....1 ?,".:-....4 ...a?,_ v.....---.0 \.....,;., ,?a r - ? By TAMMY ARBUCKLE . 1 Another five - battalions of Special to The Star ? ! Thais, Lao and Meos are in the ? VIENTIANE _ U.S. officials new positions on the plain's have admitted for the first time south rim. . that large-scale operations are The U.S. admission to the op- being conducted on the Plain of eration on the plain comes after Jars in north Laos and three a 72-hour coverup. Asked about battalions of special commandos -the missions, earlier claims that are in control of two-thirds of commandos were only on the the plain's area. south and west approaches to "Hundreds of tons" of food, the plain, a U.S. Embassy offi- ammunition, and arms have cial said, "That was a mis- been found in caches on the take." Presumably, this also ap- plain by 12-man commando plies to similar claim by State teams, officials said yesterday. Department briefers in Wash- Eighty percent of the caches ington. contain food and the remainder Gen. Thongphanh Knoksy. the arms, the sources said, mention- Lao military spokesman, tells lag one item found-25 cases of the press here to ask the Amer Vietnamese canned candy. leans about the operation. Top Little Farming Noted Lao military officers insist the The teams have seen no local operation is coordinated by the i population to date, officials said, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and this, coupled with the high Led by Americans percentage of food in the caches, Lao military men say the Indicates the 5,000 People who teams on the plain are led by chose to remain with the Corn- Americans. In some cases on munists during the 1959 evacua- some teams there are two tion have not farmed on the Americans who the Mee say plain in the past 18 months. .are "commando leaders" based With no population to grow at Site 14 Pakkao, 10 miles food, the Vietnamese were southeast of the main U.S. base forced to bring in food to the at Long Chen. There are also plain area. Hence, the large American military men in ad- caches, U.S. officials reason. visory positions. Commando teams have received It is relatively easy for report- a few rounds of mortar fire but ers to find out about American no contact by fire with Vietnam- team leaders from Meo and Lao ese troops. military personnel in conversa- U.S. officials insist the opera- tion. One must prefer these Jon is small, with no intention to sources to State Departinnet ccupy the plain. The sole ob- denials, particularly when the jective is to destroy Communist U.S. Embassy in Vientiane takes ;upplies, slow Hanoi's next every step possible, first to cover, fry-season offensive and Per" up these operations, particularly haps relieve the pressure on the present ones on the plain, Boum Long north of the plain, and, second, to prevent corre- Me? troops there, encumbered spondents seeing the operations. with 15,000 civilians, have been Thousands of Meos and Lao of taking hundreds of rounds of the Laos hill populations see shelling nightly, and at least 4-4 Americans engaged in military civilians have been killed. pursuits in their mountains. Even U.S. B52 strikes failed to Some of them . inform North remove enemy gunners. The Vietnamese troops, making non- / , plain operation appears set to . Air America --)lanes stacking up sense of embassy claims that these operations should ha continue for seine time with hidden because of U.S. national over 'commando bases near the security. The CIA has certainly ?Plain of- jars airstrip, known as run an efficient operation in Lima 22, in the central plain. north Laos in many respects, Commandos cleared land- but the fact that the agency is Ing places for the first aircraft, operatilng in the area has in ind 'U.S. engineers worked to itself become an excuse and a clear mines from the regular tool to cover up the deep U.S. airstrips. ? military and political involve- ment in the area. Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP8041601R000690170001-0 STATINTL 12.12MacLE(ar-Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-R0P80-01601R000600170 STATI NTL CHICAGO, ILL. SUN-TIHES - 536,103 S 709,12.3 'JUL 9 WI w ?,; , , (1 C.1?1.1 (f.j fi?- i By John H. Avorill Los Angeles Times Special WASHINGTON ? The Nixon , administration's feud with Sell- ? ate doves over the war in Laos ' escalated Thursday with a L Pentagon claim that a S2.00- -Million-a-year limit on U.S, aid ,? to Laos would infringe on the, . President's constitutional pow- I ers. - Disclosing the Defense De- partment position, contained in , n memorandum to the Senate ,. Armed Services . Committee, ; Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) i-. called the Pentagon arguments !- intriguing and disturbing. Strong opposition i - In the memo, the Pentagon ! Strongly opposed legislation by Symington that would Unlit- , U.S. assistance to Laos to .900 i million, exclusive of funds i spent for U.S. combat air oper- ations over the lio Chi Minh , Trail in southern Laos.. , - Although the administration, i, acknowledges spending only $52 million a year in economic -; assistance to Laos, it has been , estimated that U.S. aid is run- . ,? 'ling at a rate of at least $350 , million a year. A large portion of these . i )funds are. believed to be spent - : ;by the Central Intelligence. " Agency to finance clandestine Thai troops .and Meo tribes- k , ! men operating in Laos. . ' Challenges them-. . Symington challenged the ! ; Pentagon arguments in a Sell-, . . ;ate speech. . -"The President, as command- . ? -, eerei n-c hief, ,has the con- I stitutional authority to direct military operations," Sym- ington said, "but under our system of checks and balances he can do so only with the funds authorized by the Con- gress." Symington's attack was the. latest in a series of skirmishes between the administration and the Senate's anti-war bloc over Laos, Symington has chided. the State Department for its delay In authorizing release of the transcript of the Senate's closed-door session on Laos on June 7. During that session, Symington and others accused the administration of con- ducting illegal military Oper- ations in Laos. - A gloss-over - Thursday, State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray, asked about the ,U.S. in- volvement in a military offen- sive in the Plain of Jars, glossed over a split between pJ regular Laotian forces and the CIA-supported Moos. Bray said that the United States was providing logistic and. air support for tins oper- ation "as we have in other op- erations in Laos." ? Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 tr STATINTL NEW : N 0111CIffS Approved POI. Release 2000/05/ RAIT9P80-01601R00060017 VISZMIeweenz:ra \ ? . EXPOSE TEE CIA? Several .attacks--on'the Central Intelligence Agenc, (Richard.11elms, direcI-or) began Wednesday in the Senate Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) urged that CIA fund. . be reported in one line of th federal budget, instead of being masked as for decades past in: other budget item. Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) introduced a bill to force. / the CIA to furnish Congress regu-v larly with intelligence inform.- -tion hitherto given only to the government's Executive branch. The Cooper proposal, it seems almost needless to say, got friend- ly comments from Democratic Sens. J. W. Fulbright (Ark.), Mike Ma n sfi el d (Mont.), and Stuart Symington (Mo.). Sen. Clifford P. Case (1:-I,T.J.) premised to introduce ?bills to forbid the CI.A to sneak money to Thailand for Thai troops fighting in Laos. Some things which these and other CIA-baiters seem not to have learned in all-the years of the agency's existence: 'The CIA is a big organization engaged in the difficult, -dangerous, sometimes distasteful but utterly necessary - work of espionage around the world. It has to be as secret in its operations as is humanly possible if it is to be effec- tive. And if the CIA cannot go on being at least as effective in the future as it has been in the past, then God help the. Richard Helms Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00060017 NEW YORK, N.Y. POST EVENING 7 623,245 WEEKEND - ?354,797 rdUE 1011. -7- _ Peq" ? The more the pot bubbles, the More desperate the effort to keep the lid on. ? Day before yesterday the House tabled . Rep. Pete McCloskey's resolution call- ing for Congress to he given "the entire truth" about American operations in ?. Laos; the rejection was on the ground that it ."would not be compatible with the public interest" to explore material of such "a highly sensitive nature." Almost as the House acted, or didn't act, the cables were humming from Vientiane with word of a secret com- mando operation--flown in by U. S. -aircraft., led by__ c4-\ "employes"? against the Communists in the Plaine des Jarres of northern Laos. [Paren- .: thetical paragraph: -"In Washington, , State Dept. officials said they were checking the situation and had no im- mediate comment."] The next day--yesterday--the "sec- rots"' were official. Gen. Thongphanh of the Laotian Defense Ministry said of the commando raids: "You should ask the American Embassy. This is their affair ? . . the [Laotian] government is not responsible for this operation," The American Embassy declined comment. Not compatible, you. see, with in- terest of the American public. As Gen Maxwell Taylor says, there are some things it is better for the people not to know. Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 RIMING= POST Approved For Release 2000%45 :ZeA-RDP80-01601R00060017 n cs,c dr 11 ? ?kJ 09 a Tin e..) dia i By Marilyn Berger ? 'Washinuton Post Staff Writer Laotian government said yesterday that a new of- "ferisive on the Plain of Jars is the responsibility of the U.S. embassy, while American offi- cials in Washington sought to describe the 'action as a Lao- tian operation, .The unusual statement by a Defense Ministry- spokesman In Vientiane appeared to grow ,out of a feud within the Lao- tian government over the con- duct of military operations. 1 This statement came as Sen. Stuart. Symington (D-Mo.) was infoi ming the Senate that the Pentagon was opposing his amendment to limit U.S. mili- 0 -)Q 11(771 Tiq Li ? State Department spoke.s- man Charles W. Bray, asked about U.S. involvement in the. Plain of :Jars drive,, glossed over the split between regular Laotian forces and the ,.C1A- . . supported Meos. "We . know that the Royal Leo goverment is attempting to improve its defensive ?posi; tions by pushing the North Vietnames forces out of high ground to the west and to the smith of the Plain of Jars." Bray said. "These are the kind of actions the Royal Lao gov- ernment has traditionally un- dertaken in the rainy. season when the North Vietnamese have difficutly in supplying their forces, so that the Royal Lao government will he in a better position when the North Vietnamese ,return to tai-' assistance to Laos to $200 the offensive during the dry million -during fiscal 1972. iseason Which begins in Nov- The Associated Press re- lember" ? - ported that Gen, Thongphanh Bra said the United States Knoksy, the Defense Ministry ? was providing logistic and air spokesman, said in Vientiane support for this operation "as .1 that there was a new drive on we have in other operations in the. Plain of Jars by special Laos." forces, but he declined to dis- Bray added that, contrary to cuss detaila, "You should ask some news reports, "No Amer- the. ...American ,...,embassy," jeans of any description are f Thongphanh said. "This is leading any of the forces in their affair." - this operation or any other op- Andrew P. Guzowski, a 'U.S. eration in Laos," When ques- tioned , however, he left open comment. But, the AP re- ported, it is no secret that the Central Intelligence Agency pays, equips and advises the special forces . and the Meo tribal army under. Gen. yang _ !Pao, who is in command on the Plain of Jars region with a :base at Long -Chen. Asked whether Yang Pao had informed the Laotian gov- ;ernment about his operations, alongpha.nh. replied, "No, the :government is not responsible for this operation." - Analysts here indicated that yang Pao, who reports (I.- rectly to Laotian Premier Sou- vanna Phouma and not to the Ministry of Defense, had ap7 Parently hit a sensitive nerve. The statement attributing the military operation ? to the United States was seen here as the ministry's way of hit- ting back. the possibility that U.S. advis- ers were involved. Other American officials said that U.S. advisers stayed at head7 quarters and did not go into the field., - ? U.S. officials here said that Yang- Pao's forces have won 'control of the high points all around the Plain of -Tars ex- cept for the northeastern sec; tion, making the plain untena- ble for the North Vietnamese and Pathei Lao. . ; Symington, .whose Foreign Relations subcommit- tee has put the spotlight .on U.S. operations in Laos?both acknowledged and covert? yesterday read into the record a Pentagon statement in oppo- sition to his amendment to limit spending in .Laos. That statement said such a limit "would substantially impair our on-going operation in Laos, operations which have 0 yenaroe ? been undertaken at the re- quest of the government of Laos to assist it in resisting military takcOver by North Vietnam." While Symington sought in his amendment to put a ceil- ing of $200 million on obliga- tions or expenditures for mili- tary and economic aid, Secre- tary of State William P. Rog- ers has said that the United ,, States is spending 'in the e neighborhood of $330 million, ' exclusive of the :cost of U.S. bombing operations, in Laos. The. . pentagon statement said the Symington amend- .ment "would intrude into mat- ters properly-- Within the con- stitutional authority of the ?President; as commander-in- chief, to direct military opera- tions 'in Southeast Asia." e Symington called this an "intriguing comment" in which the TiePartment of De- fense "would appear to be say- ing that the respOnsibilities the Congress has .under the ConstitUtion to -raise and sup- port armies does not mean what it says." - , . The Pentagon aiso said the .amendment could not be ad- ministered by- the Executive Branch- ? which, . according to the statement, maintains rec- ords for military assistance service ? fon -Southeast Asia" only on an estimate basis." Symington called this a "dis- turbing" practice. "How can the. Ekecutive Branch be cer- tain that-expenditures do not exceed ? obligations in each country?" Symington asked. ? _Instead of being argu- ment against his amendment, Symington suggested that the -admission_ ? of 'this ?practice served-as -an argument for its adoption. "It could well force the Executive Branch to insti- tute procedures which will provile: an accurate account- ing .":/" he said. . ; ? :In - Vientiane,. :meanwhile, Souvanna ? sent,' a, reply to Prince- SoUphanouvong, head ,of the Pathct Lao, about the latter's cease-fire proposal of June 25. Souvanna proposed a. .general cease-fire within a ra-. STATINTL dius. of 30 kilometers -(abont 20' miles) around the' Plain of Jars and discussions at the plain to reach agreement on a full cease-fire:,? ? ? ? Souphanouvong had pro- posed a ?-- full' cease-fire that would .include an end to the American bombing. He sug- gested me.etings alternately at the Plain of Jars and in Vien- tiane. ? Informed sources here said they did not expect Souphan- ouvong to' accept Souvanna's proposal but saidthat the reply .would serve ? to keep the exchanges going,' . . . Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000500170001-0 or'r'r ? . 111471 STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : C9A=,1RUP 0-01601R0006001700 -?By TAMMY ARBUCKLE' Star Staff Viritar VIENTIANE ? Spccial .secret 'army units under the U.S. Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, but nominally controlled by Meo General Yang Pao, are report- ed hi virtual control of north- astern, eastern, and southern portions of the. Plain of Jars in north Laos. ? - - spokesman Gen. Thongplianh Knoksy admitted yesterday that friendly forces had reached the area just south of Woodpeck- er Ridge. The ridge overlooks the northeast entrance to the plain. . . The general said ? teams ? were roving over the Plain of Jars 'Searching ? for Vietmanese, and Pathet Lao 'caches with some 'success. He said three quarters :of the caches found are of food and only one quarter are arms 'caches. These proportions are directly opposite to the amounts of food and arms caches found when the government took the plain in August 1ir69. Gen. Thongphanh said he did not believe the secret army forces are strong enough to cut Route 7 entering the Plain of Jars as they did in 1969. Thong- phalli] claimed the operation was to prevent Communists at- ... iI,' ' I,z) 1 1 tacking Bouam Long, just north of the, plain, and concentrating against the joint U.S. Moo base at Long Chen. ? airpower, , according' to other sources, is active in the plain area and ?U.S. engineers are working- on. strips southof old . Meo' strongpoint Lima 22. The U.S.. Air ? Force uses flying crane helicopters to bring and remove heavy equipment. ? . Gen. Thongphanh declined to give 'further information on the Plain of Jars -operation. 'He di- rented correspondents to ask the U.S. Embassy. ? U.S. officials, however, refused. to give infor- mation.. One officials reply to persistent press queries was."go o hell.". ' In the picture of the opera- tion . which appears, however, five or six battalions, of clan- destine army forces are placed south and Southeast of the rim of the Plain of Jars centered on Banna .which Yang Pao's forces Cr271 1.11 Jr711 took Tuesday. There and at oth- er places near the rim, two spe- cial battalions were fanning out across the plain in teams searching for caches. Well in- searching for caches. ? Well informed sources say there is .no intention of taking territory, only knocking out enemy supply lines for a more effective defense of Long Chen. To hold the plain would be mili- tarily and politically unwise. Undoubtedly team sweeps is the best plan. North Vietnamese forces remain, cast of Long Chen and if their supplies are cut off Long Chen would be in a -better military position. However, informed military sources fear Yang Poa will be tempted to take the plain. This may cause another severe 'de- feat, such as in February when Hanoi troops swept him from' the plain. . - Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 E 7488 Approved FcgctliWkigeSJ"i\kigilgz:F-61Pi Perpetuation of American aid to Pakistan Is not, in fact, likely to help persuade the military regime there to move toward restora- tion of genuine democratic government any more than continuing, American support for the Athens junta has helped restore demo- cratic rights to the Greek people. It will, ? however, put the United States in the un- tenable position of underwriting policies of repression, which have led to the ruthless and continuing slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Bengalis in East Pakistan. These policies have already driven more than six million East Pakistanis into exile in :India where their presence creates grave political, social and economic tensions and a rising threat of domestic and even interna- tional conflict. ? President Vahya's recent proposals for res- . toration of civilian rule offer little hope for ? significant change since they continue to exclude the outlawed Awami League, the party which won an overwhelming majority of the votes in East Pakistan and an absolute majority of the seats in the unconvened National Assembly in last December's elec- tions. Under these circumstances, can any- - one In Washington explain how additional military or developmental aid to Pakistan can ? he justified morally or in terms of this coun- try's pragmatic self-interest in peaceful, ? democratic development on the Indian sub- continent? "THE WILD BLUE YONDER OVER LAOS" HON. MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON ? OF MASSACHUSETTS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Thursday, July S. 1971 Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. -Speaker I have just read an article detailing some of the activities of the American Gov- ernment in and over Laos. This latest piece of writing comes from Fred Branf- man and appears in the July 1971, issue of Washington monthly magazine. Mr. I3ranfman was in Laos from March of 1967 to February 1971, first with Inter- ' national Voluntary Services, and then RS a writer, researching the bombing of Laos on his own. He interviewed thou- sands of refugees who lived under the bombs, plus many American officials and pilots. My interest in reading about the effects of our bombing on the people and land of Laos is tempered with a deep sad- ness. I am saddened by the fact that I aril forced to read in the press of this Nation information my Government claims is too sensitive for the American public to be exposed to. Just as it is a tragedy for this esteemed body to be forced to rely on the newspapers of the tTnted States to break the truth to us about our present and past activities in Vietnam, so it is equally troubling that Members of Congress are forced to rely on brave and tenacious members of the press, such as Mr. Branfman, for our in- formation on what our country is ac- tually up to in Laos. As long as the House of Representa- ,tives votes, as it did on Wednesday, against being fully informed by the prop-. er official sources as to what our actual activities over Laos are, we will hz-ir1e to continue to depend on persons such as Mr. Branfman for the truth about our Nation's continuing war upon that al- 4060400640611166 ready shattered little conntry of Laos. I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Branf- ma.n's article be printed in the RECORD. 'The Washington Monthly, July 2, 1971] THE WILD BLUE YONDER OVER Laos (By Fred Branfman) War is no longer the despeiate annihilat- ing struggle that it was.. . . It is a warfare of limited aims. This is not to say that . . . the conduct of war . . . has become less blood- thirsty or more chivalrous. On the contrary. . But in a physical sense war involves very small numbers of people, mostly highly trained specialists. The fighting . . takes place on the vague frontiers whose where- abouts the average man can only guess at ... George Orwell, 1984 Conventional land warfare, George Orwell predicted, would inevitably give way to auto- mated war as military technology developed. The war in Indochina today appears to be undergoing such a transformation. Perhaps unaware of this, AmeriCans who watch the war have not yet learned to look up in the air. While most people believe that bringing the troops home is synonymous with getting out of Vietnam, ground troops are becoming irrelevant to the war effort. The real war has taken off. The skies are being filled with American planes as the land is emptied of its foot soldiers. The Nixon Administration has accom- plished massive aerial escalation, perhaps more devastating than President Johnson's troop buildups of 1965, with minimum public notice or concern because the country still thinks it is fighting with the Green Machine? the ground army?of the 1060s. But the war of the 1970s is that of the Blue Ma- chine?U.S. air power?several thousand feet above the grunts, climbing away from any American agony. With the inexorable de- velopment of American air technology, Indo- china is already becoming Orwell's battlefield. Since Nixon took office, and as ground troops have been withdrawn, more than 2.7 million tons of bombs, by Pentagon estimate, have been dropped on Indochina. This is more American ordnance than was absorbed by both the European ancl Pacific theaters during World War II, plus the Korean war. We are dropping six million pounds of bombs a day, 4,000 pounds every minute. The people underwent another war: the air war. They learned another form of civil- ization: the holes. We dug day and night, the planes bombed day and. night. Our village was filled- with bomb craters, the land made barren. I grieved very much to see my village in ruins, my animals vanished, my crops destroyed. . . . Each day, news came about such and such a village being bombed, more and more deaths and wounded . . .---from essay by teenage refugee, Laos The bombing of Laos has doubled, erasing whatever restrictions on striking civilian targets that formerly existed, Hundreds, per- haps thousands, of villages have been de- stroyed. Tens of thousands of peasants have been killed and wounded, hundreds of thou- sands have been driven underground. The Plain of Jars, formerly a thriving society of some 50,000 people, has been leveled and emptied of its inhabitants. The Laos pattern has been repeated in Cambodia. Numerous towns and villages :lave already been decimated. As The Wash- ington Post reported on January 21, 1971, "the United States is now waging a full-dress air war across Cambodia [that] now rivals In scope, although not in intensity, the air war in Laos." The bombing of North Vietnam has also resumed. By June 1, air raids had 6ccurre.d on 43 days since the first of the year, an average of twice a week. As Randy Floyd, a Marine pilot who bombed North Vietnam 37 times, puts it, "Anywhere in North Vietnam is basic-ally a free drop zone . . . if you U- y 8, 1971 'didn't find any particu ar targets you wantedI to hit, the ri normally you'd just drop your STATINTL bombs wherever you. wanted to." One may or may not accept Hanoi Radio claims that civilian targets are constantly struck. But all infoemed American sources say that "pro- tective reaction" strikes are going far be- yond enemy missile sites. During these escalations, there has been a significant decrease or U.S. air activity within South Vietnam, both because of the slowdown in ground activity there and be- cause some 500 aircraft have been trans- ferred to the Vietnamese Air Force. Monthly American air sorties have been about 70 per cent lower this year in South Vietnam than they were in 1968. It is assumed, however, that should fight- ing flare up again, American squadrons will be returned from their present resting loca- tions in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Tai- wan, or the United States?squadrons that can be made operational in three clays, ac- cording to a Seventh Air Force information ?Meer. Most Air Force personnel I inter- viewed tended to minimize the importance of the reductions in Vietnam itself. In any event, more than 350,000 tons of bombs-200.000 pounds every hour?will be dropped before the end of the year. Clearly, as they say out in Cam Ranh Bay, "The name of the game is air." There wasn't a night when we thought we'd live until morning . . . never a morning see thought we'd- survive until right. Did our children cry? Oh, yes, and we did also. I just stayeri in my cave. I didn't see the sun- light for two years. What did I think about? Oh, I used to repeat, "please don't let the planes come, please don't let the planes come, please don't let the planes come ?Refugee from the Plain of Jars Many Americans believe that the pattern of the war fought on the ground in Viet- nam will spread to the other countries. Actually, the opposite seems to be true. The air war in Laos has beets going on for several years, a concurrent experiment with the land war in Vietnam. Neither experiment has been successful in stopping guerrilla forces, but at least the air war has a possibility for surviving the domestic politics while at the same time delaying communist takeovers in Indochina. It is perhaps the only solution for an Administration that wants to keep from losing wars abroad and eh:atoms at home. The air war also involves a change in the tactics of battle. If a guerrilla is a fish among the sea of the people, the objective of the land, war is to remove the fish. The air war, however, drains the sea. It has para- lysed the civilian populations. Vietnam is net the future of Laos, but Laos may be the future of the war all over Indochina. The Era of the Blue Machine has arrived. This is my daughter. Khamphong. She's three years old. I was fishing in a stream with all seven of my children on February 23, 1969. Suddenly jets came and dropped anti-personnel bombs all around. Six of my seven children were hit. See, you can still feel many pellets in Khamphong's legs and beck. There was no soldiers nearby?refugee from Plain of Jars. For the last two-and-a-half years, bomb- ing has been the heart of U.S. policy; His- torians may conic to date this era from January 20, 1909. In it, war is waged pri- marily through the aerial bombardment of populated areas. Heavy bombing of civilian targets has, of course, occurred during other wars, and in the Vietnam war before 1060. But in each of these cases, the bombing pacers have also deployed large numbers of pound troops, with the bombing seen as a support effort. What the Era of the Blue Machine means Is no better illustrated than in portions of Laos controlled by the Pathet Lao. Pathet Approved Fdr, Release 2000/05/15 : ClAjRDP80-01601-R000500170001-0 1 U2 Approved For Release 2000/05/15-PdA4(40-01601R0006 c. p. - - -k.J .11 - - ?. ? By GENE 01S1li ?? Washington. Euriou of The Stin ? WaShington, July 7?The House rejected. today a resolu- tion asking the administration for information about its mili- tary operations in Laos, while in the Senate two bills were intro- duced to provide Congress with .CIA information and greater budgetary control over the agen- cy. The rejected House resolution , was offered by Representative Paul N. McCloskey, Jr. (R.,. Calif.), , It would have directed . the secretary of state, "to the extent not incompatible with the public interest," to turn over to the House documents containing policy instructions given to the U.S. ambassador in Laos. ? The period covered by the res- olution was from January 1, ? 1964, to June 21, 1971. Specific information the resolution sought pertained to: ' 1: Covert CIA operations in ' Laos. . 2. Thai and other foreign armed forces . operations in Laos. 3. U.S. bombing in the coun- try, other than along the Viet- nam-related Ho Chi Minh trail. 4. U.S. armed forces opera. tions in Laos. ? 5? U.S. Agency for InternatiOn- , al Development operations in Laos connected with CIA or mil- itary operations. ....e_The' House voted to table, or lay aside permanently, the reso- lution by a 261 to 113 vote. The House Foreign Affairs Commit- tee opposed the resolution on the grounds that the information ? sought Was of a "highly sensi- tive nature," that its disclosure "would not be compatible with the public interest-'and that the administration already has pri- vately briefed appropriate com- mittees on the subject. Cooper Proposal I ? In the Senate, John Sherman tz? Cooper (R., Ky.) introduced a bill to require the CIA to give to certain congressional commit- tees all information, including intelligence analyses, that the agency gives to the executive branch. Approved For R ectei On 1 AaOS - t The' committees would be the House and Senate Armed Serv- ices Committees, the House For- eign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee. These committees, in turn, would be required to make available the CIA information that they receive to any mem- ber of Congress who asks for it, in accordance with rules and procedures each committee may establish. ? Senator Cooper's proposal is drafted as an amendment to the 1947 National Security Act. Mr. Cooper noted that the law does not prohibit the CIA from giving, intelligence information to Con- gress,but it does not require the agency to do so. At present, the CIA reports ? regularly to a small group of senators and representatives within the appropriations and armed services commitee of , both houses. But other members of Congress are not given acceaf, . . o sinformation. In introducing his bill, Senator Cooper noted that Congress is asked to support the adminis- tration's foreign and national curity decisions by providing , money for the deployment of weapons, stationing American troops abroad and sending them into combat, and by approving binding commitments to foreign countries. Such congressional approval, he said, "should be given upon the best information available to both the executive and legisla- tive branches." ? Right To Secrecy Senator Cooper said his bill would not touch upon the consti- tutional question of the govern- ment's right to secrecy, which was raised recently by the publi- cation of the "top-secret" Penta- gon papers. But he. said he be- lieved that his bill, if enacted, would "result in much declassi- fication of information for the Congress and the public as a whole." - ? Senator George S. McGovern '(D., S.D.) introduced a bill to propriations for the CIA to air' pear as a single line in the exec- utive .budget. The measure would require the CIA to dis- close only its total annual budg- et. ? At present, CIA expenditures are hidden in the budgets of other agencies, and only a few members of Congress?mem- bers of small subcommittees: ? within the appropriation com- mittees - of both houses?know how mueh the CIA is spending.1 McGovern"s Complaint believe that CIA funding is I now so substantial," Senator McGovern said, "that such a single-line item for the agency in the budget would not commu- nicate usable information, to po- tentia!adversaries." Because Congress does not know how much it is actually appropriating for the CIA, he 1. said, it cannot set priorities and I balance expenditures' intelli- gence operations with other do-' mestic and defense needs. Senator Clifford Case (R. N.J.) said he will introduce to- morrow three other bills, all de- siged to restrict CIA activities abroad. The bills, which Mr. Case outlined last month, would place congressional controls over CIA military operations abroad, including the hiring of foreign mercenaries and the use of U.S. surplus weapons. In the House, several other resolutions requesting more in- formation were rejected by voice vote after the roll-call on the first McCloskey resolution. Other resolutions, also offered by . Mr. McCloskey, asked for documents related to U.S. bomb- ing operations in northern Laos, together with aerial photographs of 196 Laotian villages that Mr. McCloskey says have been dam- aged or destroyed by the bombing, and documents per- taininu to ,the U.S.-supported pacification, program in South Vietnam. But the main fight was over the first McCloskey resolution, which its supporters said would turn over to the House only in- formation that already is well STATINTL Maiylaad ?? , ? Opponents contended,. how- e'er. that disclosure of the in- format& could'endami,er na-; tional security: - Reprosentative. retcc 11. B. .Frelinglim?sen ? N.J.) kt-gued further lint if the iinfo:anation were made avail- able to members of Congress, 11-ierf might he those who WouU 1-1Lal:". it to the public. ? ? ? On the roll-call. the 'Maryland ? delegation voted as follows: - ;Goodbe E. Byron (D..), Edward A. Garmatz (D.! and William 0. 2ainsl the res- Cilbort Gude (H.. Mr- I enu D. Long (D.,. Parren J.1 iMitchell (D.) and Paul S., Sar-, I banes (D.) voted. for it. ler,v- irence J Hogan (H.) 'V.ras ni).C111. LealSig.e26108edilitgir:eselnA14611584M1?661 W66001-70001-0 ? zp.s j-NCELES Approved For Release 2000/05/15,: Ce-111110P44101601R000600170001 !AIL. 1;:r1 r ? ? - 1- OUSe. 1(:\;lea IY irAiNtA/4 up. . . , -1-k, ? for s oah BY THOMAS J. FOLEY . Times Staff Writer WASHINGTON ? The House Wedne.sday knocked down an .attempt- by Rep. Pal N. feClos- key ar,? (R-Calif.) to foree-,- the State Department to reveal -? details of secret. operations in Laos.. .? Men)f)ers voted 261. tn :118 - against MeCloskey'S i'i2so1ution of inquiry that would have asked the State Department to fur- nish documents "compati- ''ble with the public inter- s t" (OntaInm?olicy guidelines to L.S. ambas, -eadors in Laos over the last seven ; and one-10f years. ? , A short time later,: Mc- Closkey and Deputy Un- dersecretary of .State- Wil- liam 13. Macomber Jr. en- gaged in an exchange. at House freedom of informa- tion subcommittee hear- ing when the congressman -Sought to question Mac- Othber on. the same sub- . -ject, ? Hearing Fc C loskey's ; repeat ed- quetions at-- the _.televised. _hearing' about Laotian Iv/ bOrnbing policies brought a., reminder' from. Macom- ber. that he .had appeared .betore the subcommittee .1.6 1(2:J1(y on State DePart-- ment-classification proce- dt;treS. ? didn't come up here to engage In dis- ' cussion -With you, he told McCloskey. When McCloskey re- phracd _ the questions in terms of whether Congress' had the right to know. about U.S. policy in Laos, Macornbcr finally said sharply: "I'm not an expert on . Laos, Pete, and I must Say, this is the kind of thi:Ag that makes it difficult to cooperate with the legisla-: five branch of govern- ment. If you Want to use television time to belabor the Stat Department on this, I suggest you wait until you get somebody up here who is prepared to testify on Laos." 'Out of Order' Rep. Frank Horton (R- N.Y.)- called McCloskey "out of order" for his ques- tions. Sub co nunittee Chairman William ....foor- head (D-Pa.) said William Sullivan, former U.S. am- bassador to Laos, will teS- tify later this month and s?uggest!;:d that McCloskey wait until then to ask his que'stion. McCloskey, who plans to run against President Nix- on In the 1972 GOP ,pres- idential primaries, h a s been seeking release of in- formation on CIA and oth- er government activities in Laos since he made an i1-day trip to Indochina last April. ? His resolution of inquiry that the House turned down is a seldom-used de- vice designed to give the .legislative braneh a' lever to obtain information from the executive branch. If approved by the House, t he department w o u id have had 15 days to reply. ? ? Laos Bombing ? ' McCloskey told the House the United States has been involved in the war in': Laos for seven Years. He said mere bombs have been dropped there than on Germany in World War H. Noting that the anal has held a secret sestio on the Laotian war, M Closkey 'said it was "incr dible" that the Hens should not also be in formed.' Red. Peter Frelingimys- en (R-N.J.) replied that it would be naive to 'think that 4.35 members of the? House could have access to classified information and that none of it would be made public. Meanwhile, in the Sell:- ate: . ?Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) introduced legislation that would re- quire the executive branch to give appropriate congressional committees Central Intelligence Agen- cy reports and analyses now available only to the _Administration. ?Sen. .George S. Mc- -Govern (D-S.0.)* proposed that t Ii e total amount spent each year by the CIA be made public: Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : ClAtRDP80-01601R000600170001-0 STATINTL Coo 1'rE3 YpRic Timt5 E JUL 1971 er 'Pe lite '145P P6P.Ptit (a15.PA-PV0 ?_" ? By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM much better position to make Speo44.1 ta The New York Times' WASHINGTON, July - 7 ? John Sherman Cooper of Ken- tucky, one of the most in- fluential Senators on foreign Policy matters, introduced legislation today that would require the Central Intelligence Agency to give detailed intelli- gence information to Congress regularly. -? Mr. . Cooper, a Republican, said ?that Congress needc-d this kind of evaluation andanalysis, now available only ecutive branch, to participate In the formation of foreign policy. . Meanwhile, the House re- jected a series of resolutions demanding that the Nixon Ad- ministration provide Congress with additional information on United. States operations in Laos, . Two other Senators also of- fered proposals relating to the C.I.A. 1 Senator George McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota,- sug- gested that exfeenditures and appropriations for the intelli- gence agency appear as a single-line item in the budget. Agency funds are now con- cealed in . other items in the budget. Senator Clifford P. Case,. Re- publican of New Jersey, said he would offer measures that would prohibit such C.I.A. activ- ? ites as the funding of Thai troops to fight in Laos. Senator Cooper emphasized In a Senate speech that his proposal was not aimed at any C.I.A. operations, sources or methods, but was ? "concerned only with the end result ? the jority leader. "Anything John facts and analyses of facts." Cooper says would be given "Congress. would be in a the most serious consideration by me," Mr. Mansfield said. Regular Reports Asked Senator Cooper's proposal ? would require the C.I.A.tomake regular reports to the Senate ? Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees and to the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees. The .agency would also be re- quired to make special reports in response to inquires by these committees. Mr. Cooper said that the agency would have to decide for itself what information to present to hte committees, but he specified that the data wool. have to. be "full and current." There are now ? "oversight". committees in the House and Senate, composed of senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Corn- mittes, that review the C.I.A. budget and operations. But ? ,these conrittees are not con- Approved For Relitilailtagt41*esegg P80-01601R000600170001-0 . !gathers. - .? In the Hotise. debate today,. ;An fiqbt cam7t over a judgments from a much more informed and ?broader perspec- tive than is now possible," he said. Senator Cooper, an aide said, had been considering the legis- lation for three years but dis- closures in the Pentagon papers on United States involvement in Vietnam had now provided an impetus. The aide referred specifical- ly to C.I.A. analyses during the Johnson Administration that to the ex- full-scale bombing of North Vietnam would not be effective in halting infiltration or break- ing the will of Hanoi. - Senator Cooper's proposal was supported on the floor by Senator J. W. Fulbright, Demo- crat of Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Com- mittee, and Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Mis- souri, the only Senator belong- ing to both the Foreign Rela- tions and Armed_ Services Com- mittees. - Mr. Symington said that it was "no secret that we on various committees have not been entirely satisfied with _the intelligence information we have obtained. 'If the proper committees are not acquainted with what we're doing," Mr. Symington went on, "how we can func- tion properly?" Because Senator Cooper is so influential, it seemed likel that his proposal would bdthe subject of hearings and, per-, haps, floor debate this year. A measure of the respect said his views came from Mike Mansfield of Montana, the ma- documents dealing with opera- tions of the United States mili- tary and the C.I.A. in Laos from 1061 to the present. The resolution, which was sponsored by ReprE.,Sentative Paul N. McCloskey Jr., _Repub- lican or California, was set aside by: a vote Of 261 to 118. Critics of the measure con- tended that the information was too .sensitive to be given to Congress. ? Following this vote, the House, without 'ffate A I 1-N L STATI NT ? ' aside resolutions seeking in- formation on bombing opera- tions in northern Laos and or. the Phoenix program, which is designed to neutralize the ef- fect of underground Vietcong operations. Th House also set aside a resolution ?seeking an- other set of , the Pentagon papers that the Administration. made available to Congress last week. The supporters of the resolti-'. tion were, for the most part,. Democrats opposed to. the war: I 1110. XU.W. TIML6 8 JUL 1971 Approved For Release 2000/05/15.: CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001? C, I. A. Aides Reported Leading . Commando Raids in North Lelos,. The Washington Star VIENTIANE, Laos, July 7? A secret operation involvin commando raiders, some led by employes of the Central Intel ligence Agency, is reported un- der way against the Com- munist-held Plaine des Jarres in northern Laos. According to well-informed sources, United States aircraft have been landing on the plain, and one C-123 transport was stranded with its . American crew there for a night. The informants said the com- mandos had penetrated as far as an airstrip in the cast cen- tral part of the plain called Lima 22. United States and Laotian of- ficials here have refused to comment on the reported op- eration. [In Washington, State De- partment officials said they . were checking the situation and had no immediate com- ment.] ? One American source said privately that the Meo .leader, Gen. Vang Pao, whose C.I.A.- backed forces are based at Long Tien, southwest of the lain; was "strengthening and Improving his defensive posi- tion." Some military sources sug- ;gested that the reported opera- 'tion was being conducted by the Meo base of Bouam Long, north of the plain. Informants said two Thai battalions and six Meo bat- talions were involved. The Pathet Lao radio said the oper- ationwas being conducted by three regiments of General Vang Pao's forces. In 1969, a joint' United States-Laotian operation took the plain from Communist Ths New York Times July 8, 1971 troops briefly but this, led to a large North Vietnamese coun- terstroke, which drove the Meos back and almost resulted in the fall of Long Tieng. . Cambodian Plan Said to End PNOMPENH, Cambodia, July 7 (UPI)--The United States has abandoned its secret program of training regular Cambodian troops on Laos, United States sources said today, but is con- tinuing to train Cambodian guerrillas. The sources said that the program, financed by the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, ended last month when a' 500-man Cambodian army battalion wound up a three-month train- ing course in the Laotian pan- handle. STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 140.0-1. -,?_05'.!::::-.01;:L'LTCil. Approved For Release-2000/05/15 ? CIA-RDP80-01601R0006001 JUL 1.)77 , ;:, 0 11 h w_ D cLA .1)ce 1 4?:\ i . -I ,, , il i, 1.,._), ,J t: (1,74(1,...../ ..,,, .,..,...L. . ...___- - ...By RICHARD DUDIVIAN Chief Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch WASHINGTON, July 8? Sen- ator John Sherman Cooper (Rep), Kentucky, has obtained strong bipartisan backing for a proposal to require the Central Intelligence Agency to report to ?Congress as well as to the Ex- ecutive Branch. Cooper, a moderate opponent of the Vietnam War and of the antiballistic missile system, in- troduced his proposal yesterday , as an amendment to the Nation- -al Security Act of 1917, which created the Department of De- f en s e, the National Security Council and the CIA. Senators Stuart Symington (D e m.), Missouri, J. William Fulbright (D e m.), Arkansas, and Jacob K. Javits (Rep.), New York; announced their . ... support for the measure On the. Scea te floor. Fulbright spoke Or -holding hearings on the propos- al. - Symington, chairman of a for- ? eign relations subcommittee on overseas commitments, told of difficulties he had had in oh- taming full information about se cr et U.S. military prepara- tions and operations abroad, in- cluding the clandestine warfare being conducted in Laos. Symington noted that he was a member of the Foreign Rela- tions, Armed Services and Joint Atomic Energy committees. He said that his best information had been obtained from the last of these, attributing that fact to a requirement in the Atomic Energy Act that the Atomic En- ergy _ Commission keen Con- gress "Tully and currenry" in- formed. Cooper used that phrase in his proposed amendment on the IA. An aid said that Cooper' had found CIA information gen- / erally reliable on such matters as Soviet military preparedness and the Indochina War but had rioted that. it was rendered only in response to specific ques-, Cons. , , Under his amendment, the CIA would have to take the ini- tiative in sending Congress its analyses of problems of foreign policy and national security. The aid said that Cooper had been considering such a mea- sure, for several years. He said the publication of the Pentagon papers had demonstrated once more the value of CIA reports a n d probably had broadened ? support in Congress for a re- quirement to make them availa- ble. In a Senate speech, Cooper proposed that the CIA be re- quired to make r egul a. r and special reports to the House A r in e d Services and Foreign Affairs committees and to the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees. Additional special reports could be requested by the commit- tees. Any member of Congress orl designated member of -his staff' would have access to the infor- mation. All such persons would .be subject to security require- ments such as those in the Ex- ecutive Branch. Cooper said that the best in- formation should be available to the Executive and Legisla- tive branches as a basis for na- tional decisions involving "vast amounts of money, the deploy- ment of weapons whose purpose is to deter war yet can destroy all life on earth, the stationing of American troops in other countries and their use in com- bat, and binding commitments to foreign nations." Two other Senators offered proposals relating to the CIA. George S. McGovern (Dem.), South Dakota, suggested that expenditures and appropriations for the intelligence agency ap- pear as a sin,:le line item in the budget. Agency funds now are concealed in other items in the budget. Three bills were introduced by Senator CI if f ord P. Case (Rep.), New Jersey, to limit covert use 'of funds and mili- tary equipment_ by the .c)-?\ for fielding foreign troops in Loos o r elsewhere -without specific approval by Congress. Case said they were designed :',`to place sonic outside control !'oit what has been the free- wheeling operation of the Exec- utive Branch in carrying on for- eign policy and even waging foreign wars." Meanwhile, .the House reject- ed a proposal that the Adminis- tration be required to tell it; ' John Sherman Co a pr what the military and CIA were doing in Laos. Dy a vote of 261 to 118, mem- bers tabled -- and thus killed ? a-t resolution introduced by Rep- resentative Paul N. McCloskey (Rep.), California, that would have ordered the Secretary of State to furnish the House. with the policy guidelines given to the U.S. ambassador in Laos.' .The ambassador has responsi- bility for overseeing the clan- destine 'military operations in Laos aimed at assisting the roy- al Laotian government in its struggle with the Pathet Lao.. Will B. Macomber Jr., deputy under secretary of state, clashed yesterday with Mc- Closkey over whether the De- partment of State was directing U.S. bombing attacks in Laos. Macomber denied the allega- tion and suggested that if Mc- Closkey wanted to pursue the issue he ought to invite an East Asia expert from the State De- partment to testify. Tb e exchange occurred -as. Macomber testified be 1 o r House foreign affairs subcom- mittee on ways to improve de-1 classification o f Governmentl, records by the State Depart-1 ent. .Macomber said 10 to 12 years' retention ought to be ad-) equate to protect Government Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-Ralaci60441444 001-0 know about operations. 11 STATINTL ? 01/-illINIL Approved For Release 2000/05/t5APMDP80-01601R0006001700 00E1 W anes;. - From News Dispatches .) SAIGON, July 8 (Thursday) ..--American B-52 bombers re- .sumed bombing* near the De- militarized Zone in South Vietnam last night and this morning after having been .kept away from the area for -one day by rough weather from Typhoon Harriet, mil-, nary sources said. But U.S. battle communi- ques showed the lull in enemy attacks against - American ground forces continuing. There have been no Com- munist ground attacks on GIs: anywhere in Vietnam since just after midnight Monday, when a rocket barrage killed five American soldiers and wounded more than 30 at the ; .Danang air base. Military sources said the ; north Vietnamese army kept a trickle of supplies moving ' down the trail system in Laos. ? But fewer then 200 truck 'movements were ? detected Tuesday night compared with well over 2,000 at the height :of the dry season. Meanwhile, military sources said battlefield action in South Vietnam dropped to one of the lowest levels in the war laSt week. ? News agencies reported .these other developments: ? In Phom Penh, American sources Said the United States ,had ended its secret program of training regular Cambodian troops in Laos, but are con- tinuing to train Cambodian U.S. Officials declined to say -how many Cambodian troops were trained by the CIA, but other sources put the number at "several thousand.". 3.A1 -- .0 .. Raid Capt. Ernest L. Medina, accused of murdering ..102 South Vietnamese civilians in the 1969 My lai massacre, flew into the U.S. airbase at Bien- Hoa near Saigon with his army lawyer, Capt. Mark J. Kadish. Maj. William Eckhardt, the Army prosecutor at Medina's court-martial set for July 26, wanted to question two South Vietnamese army sergeants in connection with the case and asked Medina and his attorney to accompany him to South Vietnam. ?In Paris, France indicated today it played some kind of behind-the-scenes role in bringing about the latest Viet- cong peace initiative on Viet-. nam. At the weekly cabinet meet- ing Foreign Minister Maurice - Schuman noted that the peace formula presented by the Viet- cong contained new elements favorable to a solution of the war. Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 144.3;4;A Approved For Release 2000/05/15-:. il/aDP10-01601R000600170 1Eilz e V-ECIUtnNiffiW Ora , 1 p ri?, ..) ,...-4,,ri 1..,r--Aiti '3 V " ' t 14 A Cijia .? ? ? , By SHIRLEY ELDER ? 'Star Staff Writer ? ; Deputy Undersecretary of State William B. Macomber Jr. has declined to answer .insistent questions from Rep. Paul N. (13..e t e) McCloskey, R-Calif., about U.S. bombing in Laos. ? . ? Macomber told a House free- doth of information hearing yes- terday he knows little of what ioes on in Laos. He said he was invited to tes- tify- about the State Depart- ment's system of classifying clocuments and any further ef- fort to try and get him to talk about Laos would further strain relations between State and Con- tress. ? . ? McCloskey has been hammer- ifIg at what he feels is a calcu- lated administration effort to hide a clandestine war in Laos from Congress and the public. He said each bombing strike in that country is personally con- Wiled by the U.S. ambassador. ? Rebuffed by House : ? Earlier yesterday, McCloskey, Iihti has vowed to oppose Presi- dent Nixon's bid for re-election next year if the war is not over, was rebuffed by his own col- -leagues in an information-gath- ' ering effort. :.?? On a 261-118 vote, the House .hilled a McCloskey resolution "that would have directed the secretary of state to tell Con- Iress about U.S. involvement in Laos.. ? : Then, by voice votes, the Mouse tabled similar resolutions of inquiry seeking data about -:Other U.S. activities throughout Southeast Asia. ? 1.-Pne resolution sought copies ...of. the once-secret Pentagon pa- pers, which already have been ;made available on a top security 'basis,' and another sought a re- / ;port of the so-called Phoenix aspult against Viet Cong agents. . ? . ? 7-Year War Claimed McCloskey told the House that the United States has been at -war in Laos for seven years and more bombs have been dropped in that one country than were rained on Nazi Germany. But Rep. Peter H. B. Frelin- ghuysen, R-N.J., argued that the resolution was an unwise at- tempt to obtain highly sensitive 'information. Although Macomber, in his testimony before the subcom- mittee headed by Rep. William Moorhead, D-Pa., declined to talk about Laos, he agreed that many State Department docu- ments are over-classified. Half of the approximately 400,000 documents accumulated at State each year, he said, are marked Top Secret, Secret of Confidential. - About 6,000 State Department officers have authority to classi- fy documents, Macomber said, and some misuse that power to simply limit distribution of the papers involved. He suggested there should be some kind of automatic system for declassifying documents aft- cr. A period of time, perhaps 10 years. A shorter declassification peri- od?some have suggested two years?would be unrealistic, Ma- comber said, and just lead to new and bigger bureaucratic problems. ? -In the Senate, meanwhile, Sen. John Sherman Cooper, R-Ky., introduced legislation reauiring the Central Intellgence Agency ! to provide Congress- regularly with detailed intelligence infor-i 'nation. - Cooper said Congress needed this kind of evaluation and anal- ysis, now available only to the executive branch, in order to participate in the formation of foreign policy. Two other senators also sug- gested proposals relating to the. .CIA. Sen. Geotge S. McGovern, D-S.D., suggested that expendi- tures and appropriations for the intelligence agency appear as a single line item in the budget. Agency funds currently are con- gealed in other budget items. - Sen. Clifford P. Case, R-N.J., said he would offer Measuers prohibiting such CIA activities S the funding-of Thai troops to ? fight in Laos. I STAT I NT L Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001 -0 Approved For Release 2000/05/15-: CIA-RDP80-01601R0006001 STATINTL ? STATINTL Lit louse of (eseE,. kra,-A!yrves . The House met at 12 o'clock noon.. ' Rev.. James Clark Brown, the First Congregational Church, San Francisco, Calif., offered the following prayer: ? Let us pray. Let us remember the words of our Lord Jesus Christ when He said: "Those unto whom much has been given, of them will Much be required." - 0 God, mighty, merciful, mysterious, before whose judgments nations and individuals rise and fall, inspire the leaders and people of this land that we May more faithfully know and do Thy holy will. 0 God, there is a hunger in our land; a hunger for moral heroes; for Men and women whose passion is to bring ? Into being the kind of world where every ? privilege and dignity which is enjoyed by the few may be made, available to be en- joyed by all people. To that end, direct, ? comfort, and guide Members of the Con- gress. "0 Thou, whose Spirit fast fashioned life, Intending all creation Thy love to . share, Use us, 0 God, to do Thy work ? Until the earth be fair." Amen. - ?" THE JOURNAL 'The SPEAKER. The Chair has ex- amined the Journal of the last day's pro- ceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof. Without objection, the Journal stands approved. There was no objection. . THE REVEREND JAMES CLARK BROWN, OUR CHAPLAIN FOR TODAY (Mr.. EDMONDSON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, and to revise and extend his remarks.) . . Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, I am Proud today that our opening prayer has been given by an Oklahoman whom I have known for many years, a young man Who grew up in Okmulgee County in the city of Henryetta, and who once served here in the House of Representatives as one of the staff rendering faithful service to. this country, . Today James Clark Brown is minister of the First Congregational Church of San Francisco, and carrying. on there a great ministry.' Many Washingtonians will remember him as the pastor for a number of. years of the Cleveland Park Congregational Church here in Washington, D.C. With his wife, Verne, and their lovely children,. David Edmond and Edith Louise, he Is -"doing a great work in the State of Cali- fornia. _ ? - ? WEDNESDAY, JULY 7, 1971 ? Again I say I am proud a.nd pleased that that he could be with us today in a. place he has always loved, te lead the House of Representatives in -today's devotions. ? ? . . A SALUTE TO WADE LUCAS (Mr. HENDERSON asked and was ? given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. Speaker, scarcely a day goes by without our na- tional news media publicizing a conflict between Indians and civil authorities over the title to Federal property, alleged violations of legal or moral commitments or other .basic differences of opinion. It is refreshing to know that on Satur- day of this week, Mr. Wade Lucas, a con- stituent of mine will be visiting Niagara Falls, N.Y., as a guest of the Tuscarora Indians. While there, he will be made an honorary chief and, with the authority of Gov. Robert Scott of North Carolina, will sign a formal peace treaty with the Tus- carora Indian Nation. I might add that Wade Lucas, unlike so many "Honorary Chiefs" we see at campaign time, is not a politician run- ning for office and seeking to court, favor with Indian voters. Instead, Wade is a retired newspaperman with no aim or purpose in mind other than to cement a personal and official friendship with these Indians which dates back to Me- morial Day ; ore than 8 years ago when he visited the.Tonawanda Reservation in an official capacity as public information officer for the State of North Carolina under the adrrnnistration of Gov. Terry Sanford. The Tuscarora Indians of the Tona- wanda. Reservation are a lot like many other Americans of all races and creeds throughout our Nation. They respond warmly to a genuine show of friendship and interest. Wade Lucas' longtime per- sonal friendship with them is the kind of "people to people" relationship which will solve our international differences if they are ever to be solved. INTRODUCTION OF .LEGISLATION INCREASING FEDERAL SHARE OF EMPLOYEES' HEALTH BENEFITS PRO GRAM (Mr. WALDIE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.) Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased today to introduce a bill calling for increasing the Government's share of the Federal employees' health benefits program. Under the present cost-sharing system, the Federal Government pays 40 percent of the basic Cost of the health insurance of Federal employees. . This 40-percent figure was reached only last year. The House of Representa- tives had passed legislation calling for increasing the Government share to 50 percent, but after considerable pressure from the administration, including the threat of a Presidential veto, House- Senate conferees agreed to a reduced figure. Mr. Speaker, I believe that the attitude of the administration may have changed in the course of the past year. On Febru- ary 18 of this year, President Nixon called for private employers to provide 65 per- cent of the cost of basic health insur- ance coverage for employees as of July 1; 1973, and '75 percent of the total cost 3 years later. The President based this appeal on the need to spread health insurance cov- erage to more of the Nation's citizens. Mr. Speaker, I fully agree with the President on this matter. Further, I believe it to be fully con- sistent and proper for the Federal Gov- ernment to lead the way for the private motor in meeting the President's goal of '75 percent of the costs; for employees' medical insurance. I hope that the Retirement, Insurance, and Health Benefits Subcommittee, which I chair, will hold hearings on this important legislation in the very near future, and I am hopeful of administra- tion support for this proposal, which in- corporates the President's own sugges- tions. DIRECTING THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO FURNISH TO THE HOUSE CERTAIN INFORMATION RESPECTING U.S'. OPERATIONS IN ?LAOS Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I call up House Resolution 492 and ask for its immediate consideration. ? The Clerk read the resolution as fol- lows: - ? H. RES. 492 Resolved, That the Secretary of State, to the extent not incompatible with the public interest, is directed to furnish to the House of Representatives, not later than fifteen days following the adoption of this resolu- tion, any documents containing policy in- structions or guidelines given to the United States Ambassador in Laos for the purpose of his administration of those operations con- trolled or directed by the country team In Laos, between January 1, 1964, and June 21, 1971, particularly with regard to? (1) covert Central Intelligence Agency op- erations in Laos; (2) Thal and other foreign armed forces operations in Laos; ? H637'7 Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : dIA-RDP80-01601'R000600170001-0 S 10508 would perform the function of governing the local agencies, as the Farm Credit system now operates. ? Another agency, the Rural Development: Investment Equalization Administration, would handle the subsidy end of this pro- P ? osal It would be handled separately to avoid ?' problems of getting loan and grant money Mixed into the same financial pot. ? It has been alleged by those who claim that industry will not move to rural America that - it costs more money to operate away from the population centers, and as a result, the chance for a major dispersal of .industry is doomed to failure. . The sponsors of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act do not necessarily ? agree with.this conclusion, but a number of States have proved that investment incen- tives do draw industries. ? Rather than provide under-the-table or backdoor subsidies, this legislation would ? make open subsidies available, but only un- der stringent and controlled circumstances, and this would be done on a national basis rather than the state-by-state effort now go- ing on. It must be stressed that these would not be relief payments to fieca'lly healthy industries, ' but they would be incentives to American --industry to disperse. There would be two kinds of subsidies: : 1. Interest supplements: If a firm cannot ? pay his interest out of local earnings without ? dipping into its capital, the company can be given an interest supplement by the Rural Development Investment Equalization Ad- ministration. Th?i payment could not bring -the firm's interest level lower than one-per- - cent. . 2. Rural Development Capita! Augmenta- tion Payments: If a community wanted to - build a sewer system, a calculation would be made of how much such a system would cost, and then it would be determined how much the people in the community could reason- ably be expected to pay for it. The difference between these two figures would be the Rural Development Capital Augmentation payment. The same formula could be used for develop- ment of new industry, but again it must be stressed that this procedure would be under - strict controls so that this money would not ? be used for fly-by-night or doomed-to-fail businesses. THE REORGANIZATION Under this bill farm and non-farm credit - would come under a new Assistant Secretary Of Agriculture. Under him, in two separate agencies, would- be the Farm Development Administration, which now handles all farm credits (under the title Farmers Home Ad- ministration) and tho Rural Enterprise and Community Development Administration, ?, Which would handle all non-farm rural credit. The ? The new assistant secretary would be as- signed to no other duties than to oversee ?? all rural credit. At present, the assistant -. ? secretary handling this task, must also super- vise a wide range of other activities. ?- The 19 members of the Rural Development Credit Board would have five members ap- pointed by the President of the United -States; five nominated by the-President Pro tempore of the Senate; and five nominated after consideration of the recommendations of the Speaker of the House. ? The Secretary of Agriculture would appoint the same, person who is his representative to the Farm Credit Board: The governor of the Farm Credit Administration would be another member of the board. The Execu- . tive Director of the Rural Development Credit Agency, and the Rural Development Investment Equalization Administration would sit on the board as ex-officio members. - ?f.RfliVE RI- Release 2000/05/15,:-CIA-RDP80-01601R . CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENAT the Congress better Informed on mat- by, the Committees on ArdiedSeric?and ters relating to foreign policy and na- Foreign Affairs,of the House of Representa- tional security by providing dt with tives and the Committees on Armed Services -in- telligence information obtained by the/Ind Foreign Relations of the Senate regard- ing, intelligence information. collected by the STATINTL Central Intelligence Agency and with Agency concerning the relations of the tUnited analysis of such information by such States to agency. Referred jointly to the Commit- national security including full anmdatcteiris-etoit for countries d tees on Armed Services and Foreign Re- analysis by the Agency of such information. lotions, by unanimous consent. "(h) Any intelligence information and any Mr. COOPFR. Mr. President, the for- analysis thereof made available to any com- mulation of sound foreign policy and na- mittee of the Congress pursuant to subsection tonal security policy requires that the (g) of this section shall be made available by such committee, in accordance with such best and most accurate intelligence oh- rules as such committee may establish, to tamable be provided to the legislative as any member of the Congress who requests well as the executive branch of our Gov- such information and analysis. Such informa- ernment. The approval by the Congress tion and analysis shall also be made available of foreign policy and national security by any such committee, in accordance with Policy, which are bound together, whose such rules as such committee may estab- support involves vast amounts of money, lish, to any officer or employee of the House of the deployment of weapons whese pur;- Representatives or the Senate who has been pose is to deter war, yet can destroy ll (1) designated by a Member of Congress to a life on earth, the stationing of America.n and 2 e access()et dteor such b th chinformation and analysis, y e conunittee con- troops in other countries and their use earned to have thenecessary security clear- in combat, and binding commitments to ance for such access." foreign nations, should only be given The bill would, as a matter of law, make upon the best information available to ' both the executive and legislative available to the Congress, through its appropriate committees, the same intel- There has been much debate during b7anches. ? ligence, conclusions, facts, and analyses the past several years concerning the re- that are now available to the executive spective powers of the Congress and the Executive in the formulation of -foreign policy and national security policy and the authority to commit our Armed Forces to war. We have experienced, un- fortunately, confrontation between the two branChes of our Government. It is my belief that if both branches, execu- tive and legislative, have access to the same intelligence necessary for such fateful decisions, the working relation- ship between the Executive and the Congress would be, on the whole, more harmonious and more conducive to the national interest. It would ? assure a common understanding of. the, purposes and merits of policies. It is of the great- est importance to the support and trust of the people. It is of the greatest im- portance to the maintenance of our sys- tem of government, with its separate branches, held so tenuously together by trust -and. reason. It is reasonable, I submit, to contend that the Congress, which must make its decisions upon foreign and security pol- icy, which is called upon to commit the resources of the Nation, material and hu- man, should have all the information and intelligence available to discharge properly and morally its responsibilities to our Government and the people. I send to the table a bill amending the National Security Act of 1947, which, I hope, would make it possible for the leg- - islative branch to better carry out its responsibilities. I read the amendment at this point:. branch. At the present time, the intel- ligence information and analyses devel- oped by the CIA and other intelligence agencies of the Government are avail- able only to the executive es a matter of law. This bill would not, in any way, affect the activities of the CIA, its sources or methods, nor would it diminish in any respect the authority of already existing committees and oversight groups, which supervise the intelligence collection ac? tivities of the Government. My bill is concerned only with the end result?the facts and analyses of facts. It would, of course, in no way inhibit the use by the Congress of analyses and information from sources outside the Government. It is obvious that with the addition of intel- ligence facts and their analyses, the Con- gress would be in a much better position to make judgments from a much more informed and broader perspective than is now possible. The National Security Act of 1947 marked a major reorganization of the executive branch: This reorganization made it possible for the executive branch to assume more effectively the responsi- bilitieS of the United States in world af- fairs and the maintenance of our own national security. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense and the united services as we now know them. Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, established the Central In- telligence Agency under a Director and Deputy Director, appointed by the Presi- To amend the National Security Act of dent, by and with the advice and consent 1947, as amended, to keep the Congress better of the Senate. Under the direction of the informed on matters relating to foreign National Security Council, it was di- policy and national security by providing. it rected to advise the National -Security With intelligence information obtained by the Council on matters relating to national Central Intelligence Agency and with analy- security and "to correlate and evaluate sis of such information by ?uch agency. intelligence relating to national security, That section 192 of the National Security and provide for the appropriate disse.mi- Act of 1047, as amended (50 U.S.C. 403) , is nation of such intelligence within the amended by adding at -the end thereof the following new subsections: . Government using where appropriate "(g) It shall also be the duty of the Af.,,ency exng agencies a.nd facilities." r--- By Mr. COOPER: to inform fully and currently, by means of The languagedoes specifically S. 2224. A bilv4citnFitibi e !al 'o of intelligence to the Security Act of 194'7, as amen e , to -cep SgfrptENVolg frigniogozoloono WO/ tlifidoes not provide that - ' it V C.i '.1": ON :717V2L Approved For Release 2000/05/i5 ditlIAL9g3P80-01601R000600170 ? [A- ar Jul rdis -Vitt [1.4 d [1-3 (.3 [Tied .? 1.1 ff o ' "71: - By TA?,IMY AriBUCKLE ?? Special to The Star VIENTIANE L. The United States has launched a new se- cret operation against the Plain of Jars, a Communist - held area In. northern Laos, well - in- formed sources say. "Comman- do raiders, some led by Ameri- can military men in CIA employ have penetrated as far as Lima ?22, an air strip in the east cen- tral plain. U.S. aircraft are landing on the . plain. An Air America C123 transport was stranded with its American crew on the plain for a night, according to \veil - in- formed sources. U.S. officials, however, refuse to discuss the operation making it difficult to assess the operation's exact magnitude or objectives. One American source claimed 'Moo Gen. - Vang Pao was "strengthening and improving his defensive position." Sources .said Vang Pao took Ban Na, key hill overlooking the plain last Tuesday. Unfortunately this claim of strengthening defenses . does not jell with the U.S. pres- ence on the plain or the exces- sive secrecy cloaking the opera- lion on the part of U.S. and Lao officials. Fraiight With Danger To clear North Vietnamese from the hills South of the plain and establish positions on hill- tops overlooking the plain would be excellent, as it would give . yang Pao's forces a breather until the next dry season. However, to go onto the plain Is fraught with both military and political danger. In 1.969, a joint U.S. and Lao , operation, About Face took the plain from the Communists briefly, but resulted in massive :Hanoi- retaliation Which drove CIA-led Meos back farther than . ester before and almost resuted In .the secret base of Long Chen :falling. A new offensive could Ornean that final end to feelers ..lor talks between the govern- ilent and -Communists and lead ? to fresh Hanoi offensives Hanoi has frequently made clear it will riot tolerate a U.S. or govern- jars and has stifficidit force to push the corrupt, ill-managed Lao forces off plain again when- ever it wants. . Some military sources have suggested that the Plain of Jars push is to relieve the pressure on the Tao base of liouam Long, north of the plain.. - ? . When correspondents tried to find what the operation was about, Gen. Thongph Knoksy, t h e government spokesman, dodged into the corridors of Lao-headquarters. U.S. officials adamantly refuse to speak un- less Thong Pun h speaks first. It is almost unbelievable-that after Senate censure and publi- cation of the Pentagon docu- ments' a U.S. mission in Laos should once again resort to se- crecy particularly concerning a - U.S. run operation close to North Vietnalu and China. The operation previously re- stilled in tough Communist retal- iation and caused considerable government and civilian loss in 1939. There can be no doubt the operation is considerable in size. , The Pathet Lao radio which, al..' though it is Communist., has been most truthful to date On Lao operations, says three.regi- ments of Vang Pao's forces are tnvolved. Vientiane military sources say two Thai-battalions and six Lao'1\leo battalions are involved. U.S. air power is again extremely active over the plain, where Some 5,000 civilians are still living. American embassy officials are trying to blame Vang Pao for the operation. "yang Pao is very much his own man, _three American officials said separately. As all three used the same words, one can only assume somebody told them to say this. Yana' Pees' formes are advised, paid: armed, clothed and some- times led by CIA employes and it is impossible for the general to ?.do anything big without Af-,;Zrican approval. Some mid- dle-level Americans are already having second thoughts. They fear that if Yang Pao finds no early Hanoi? opposition he may continue to advance, bringing the U.S. into a new znent presence on the plain of northern Laos debacle.- ?5 STATI NTL Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0006001 ATLANTIC CITY, N.J. JERSEY TIMES JUL 2t97 WEEKLY - 497 Much has been said lately about the effort of Congress to reassert and redefine its author- ity in the liold of foreign policy. 1 am much interested in this, not as an exercise in congres- sional, but as a Means of forcing our gov- ernment to conduct foreign policy in the open sc.) that the PI-1ft may know what is going on and have, the controlling, voice in important. decisions. Our recent history in South- east Asia shows that wars ap- proved by simply a handful of presidential advisors may well be not only unconstitutional but relatively unsuccessfulz too. .? 'Like most AnlerieTanS, I have been shocked by the. .cynical Manipnlation of our political proceues revealed in The New York Times series on the or- igins of the Vietnam War. I be- lieve that our country should not go to war as part of a care- fully plotted scenario which in- volves secret attacks on-' the other side -- some apparently With the aim of prevc*ing re- taliation against us and .our , . . TM I do not mut to get into an extended post mortem on Vietnam. Our primary . task should not he to ugage in re- criminations or assign blame but to bring an end to the war. That is why last year, had this. I voted for the llatteld- McGovern proposal to set a def- inite date for U. S. withdrawal from Vietnam. The. term "secret \Val." has now come iota our national vocabulary. We started off in Vietnam operating in secret and we are currently fighting a war in -Laos in the same. way. We are spending annually about 350 million on the ground in Laos, not to .mention an esti- mated $2 billion to tomb that country of less than three mil- lion people. AU this is done Nr,tt.ii- out any real congressional or public knowledge or approval. ? .., Successive ? administrations have been able to carry. oi t_le secret war in Laos, as they oid in Vietam, by tsa vast billion.dollar tre-astico chest which Congress has ap- propriated, but never controlled, for discretionary intelligence and. military programs. And it has been the Central Intelli- gence Agency.. (CIA) which has 1 been assii;ned?t"J'Z,-;',':.-y out the \- . administrations' policies suc-li as the running of a `n,Cca-roari ,private army, and the funding or ........ STATINTL Thai troops in Laos. do not direct ?criticisin against the CIA, for it has only _wit following orders issued by. several , l'resients. 1 simply question whether a secret in- Lelligence organization should be assigned a .?var-making role abroad. This is why 1 have recently; proposed thrc-o bills which would: increase congTessional control over certain CIA p10grams.1 These are: 1. A bill to extend all existing limitations ?,on Defense Depart- ment funding such as the pro- ihhitiiiS against payment ef mercenaries in Laos and the Cooper-Church proviso s for Cambodia to all U. S. govern- ment agencies overseas, includ- in,..; CIA. 1),. A bill to prohibit the fund- ing, by any U. S: government agency of foreign moreenaries. operating out'side their countries without specific congressional authori?4.ion. I would hope this would "eliminate the confusing trail of Thais in Laos, Cambodi- ans in Laos, and even Thais in Cambodia. 3. A bill to extend eNisting limitations on .the of mili- tary surplus materiel to all guy- erilmdnt 'abroad, in- cluding three proposals would close soin.c: loopholes in. the law. llut the e:::::as,tive.crot find ways if it is sa nrth rfie solution to the pi.ebiem. lies, lii i`,4ong run, not in a tighter' drafting of the law but in the acceptance by the executive of Congress and, the public as partners in the conduct of the people's vital business. Approved For Release 200'0/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 F V IrIIIN I I- Approved For Release 2000/0kEMP80-01661R000600170001 ? ? ?? ri )(37-1 .1") cc'?' , I j L, Li L L,?, ? rt0 . ? . 1.1 J ? \N \./ .By STLIZELS'il ? ? WASHINGTON, D.C., June 29----rte1). Joln E. Moss (D-Calif:) watned the Nixon Administration today that government officials could be cited for ``contempt of Con- ress" for refusing to furnish information on U.S. foreign policy decisions vital to the Interests of the American people. In a sbarp. exchange with an of- ficial of the .Justice Department, ? Moss, during hearings before the .Sub-ComMittee on Government Operations took the confrontation between Congress and the execu- -tivel?ranch One step further. Evidence that the U.S. has en- gaged in 20 years of cold war by a systematic policy of presiden- tial deceit is spurring both Sena- tors and Representatives toward a Congressional crackdown on the . executive branch. . The immediate issue is Execu- tive Branch secrecy but the larger issue is the untold cost of the cold war policy itself?hun- dreds of thousands of dead. and wounded GI's in two undeclared wars and one trillion dollars in taxpayer funds since World War II. ? - ? Plans shrouded in secrecy The hearings before the Sub- committee, sparked by the 47-vol- ume Pentagon study on how the U.S. gOt into the Indochina war, Is revealing to. the people that the government systematioally con? cealed its policy aims. ? ? Rep. Moss told Assistant Attor- ndy General William H. Rehn- quist, that the use of "executive privilege" has shrouded from the people the foreign policy plans of five consecutive administrations. - He said that "executive privil- ege," first claimed by President Nixon in Exectith,T Order 1001, is subject to be overrided by Con- gress. . Executive privilege,. he declar- ed, "is e not a constitutional au- thority. . . Congress is not with- Out pciwer to punish for contempt of Congress an official Who refuses tci furnish information to Repre- sentatives of the people." Rehnquist admitted that "con- gress could supersede Executive Order ROI by passing 1gislation stipulating rules for classification .and declassification of secret in- formation. But, he added the Pre- sident would have to. decide whe- ther or not the act was constitu- tional. .? Moss bridled at this suggestion demanding, '.'The President? .Not the ,.courts? Are you saying that the President could suspend the . _ Rehnquist flushed and correct- ..ed himself. The President, he saki, could seek a ..ruling from the courts on the constitutionality of the measure. . - Meanwhile, Sen. Clifford Case' (R-NJ)) accused the Nixon Ad- ministration of "overt manipula- tion or suppression" of a scientific report that could lead to quick rati- fication of a ban on underground nuclear tests. ? Case said scientists have invent- ed an instrument that can detect explosions as low as 4.0 on the Richter Seale, making unnecese sary "on-site inspections" which have been a stumbling block in negotiations. New findings suppressed . Case said the findings were sup- pressed because they "conflict With entrenched interests or cause the government embarrassment., . Case_ has . also taken 7steps to prohibit the 'Central Intelligence Agency from engaging in "secret wars," such as the war in Laos. ? Hewitt shortly introduce a bill denying any funds for CIA secret wars: said his purpose is 'to force "our government to conduct foreign policy out in the open so that the public may knew Ant is going on .and have the controlling voice in important decisions. The Constitution does not give the Pre- sident authority to declare. a se-. ? cret war.", Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 -? E6926 Approved&sftm in the future, it will be decided upon later through consultation by the liaison personnel of two sides." 1, "A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of America," People's Daily, ? March 8, 1963. r ? vSpeech made by Chtao Kuan-hus? Peiping's "vice. minister" of foreign affairs, at a cocktail party hosted by the Yugoslav "em- bassy" in Peiping on November 27, 1970. - 10 Mao Tse-tong, "On People's Democratic Dictatorship," Selected Works (Foreign Lan- guage, Peking, 1931) , Vol. IV, p. 41'5. r The 13 "theories" include those of ?!limited sovereignty," "socialist big family," justified aggression," and "economic unity." 1,, Speech by Yugoslav "ambassador" to Peiping at a cocktail party on November 27. 1970. 12 A dispatch filed by the Agence France Presse from Belgrade on January 5, 1971. ? Yugoslavia and Albania were locked in a feud over the question of Stalin. In 1958 the two Sides exchanged charges d'affaires. Since the Czech incident in 1938 the relations between ? the two countries have gradually improved. 20 "Revolutionary Storm of the Polish I'm- pie," People's Daily, December 22, 1970. NCNA clisPatch from Peiping on Decem- ber 21; 1970. '.'Welcome the Establishment of Diplo- matic Relations Between China and Canada," editorial, People's Daily, October 14, 1970. ttEdgar Snow, a pro-Communise American journalist, and author of Red Star Over China, in a telegram sent from Peiping to Milan on February 3, 1971, mentioned some production figures which he said had been disclosed to him by Chou En-lai. For the last ten years, the Chinese Communists have not .revealed any production figures. The figures revealed by Snow greatly exceed even the most optimistic estimates made by the free world. ? According to an Agence France Presser ,C -011S10,25 0 2' NOEL dispatch from Peiping,. Novem- ber 9, 1970, the, Paltiatani president arrived mainland China on November 10 and stayed there until November 14. ? u "All Anti-U.S. Imperialism Forces in the World Unite!" editorial, People's Daily, Janu- ary 21, 1964. 2' An AP dispatch from London on Decem- ber 9, 1970 disclosed that during the previous year at least five Soviet trade officials, three Polish foreign officials and several unidenti- fied Communist delegates were ordered by the British government to leave Britain. "What Does the Conference of British Commonwealth Prime Ministers Show," People's Daily, February 2, 1971.' 23 See NCNA report from Peiping on Febru- ary 2, 1971, concerning the coup In Uganda. 30.A CNA dispatch from Hongkong, on Jan- uary_ 30, 1971 cited some figures from an article by Harvard economics professor con- cerning the economic situation on mainland during the past 10 years. He said 'that 'even the highest estimate would put development rate of Peiping's agricultural and industrial production from 1957 to 1967 at an yearly rate of only 3 to 3.5 per cent, while the economic growth of the most of other Asian countries has already reached the rate of 7 to 9 per cent. 3, See note 25. 39 See news reports and statements Issued by Peiping following its nuclear tests as well as the editorial of the People's Daily, Au- gust 1, 1970. 40 NCNA dispatch from Peiping on Decem- ber 5, 1970. The diplomatic personnel were "ambassadors" from Mattritarla and Mali and the charge d'affaires from Guinea. 41 NCNA dispatch from Peiping on Janu- ary 2, 1971. NCNA dispatch from Peiping, Janu- -ary 27, 1971. ? dispatch from Peiping on October 25, 1970, an NCNA correspondent wrote a long article CONGRESSMAN PAUL McCLOSKEY'S pointing out that the Japanese are not satis- fied with their pre-war imperialist status. They are now trying to join the club of "su- perpowers" consisting of "U.S. imperialism" and "Soviet revisionism." w Mao Tse-tung, "People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and Their Running Dogs," Peking Review (special issue, May 23, 19'70), p. 9. ?so This point was stressed by both Lin Plao and Chou En-lai in their speechs during the "National Day" celebrations on October 1, 1970. However, earlier on July 14, 1970 _ Chou in an interview with French correspon- dents already pointed out that the time when big countries can dominate the world had already passed and could never return. 2% Speech by Ceylonese minister of trade at ar reception on January 15, 1?71, in honor of Pal Hsiang-kuo, Peiping's "minister" of for- eign trade, who led a trade delegation to visit Ceylon. - ' - ? 28 See the "Joint Communique Between the People's Republic of China and the Islamic ? Republic of Pakistan," November 14, 1970. ''.The Chinese Communists opposed the ap- . ? plication of r.principle of "peaceful coexist- ence" to the relations between the "oppressed ? people and the oppressing people," between "the oppressed country and, the oppressing country," and between "the oppressed class and the oppressing class:" (See "A Proposal ? Concerning the General Line of the Inter- national COmmunist Movement," op. cit.) Even while chanting the slogan of "peaceful r-ealstence," the Communists never -forget to stress the necessity to oppose the "aggres- sive policy and war, policy of imperialism." Actually, this is a united front tactic against "Imperialism." Peking Review, op cit., p. 16. - ? 2' Two dispatches filed by NCNA from Tokyo on October 24, 1970. TESTIMONY BEFORE ?THE SUB- COMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PA- CIFIC AFFAIRS HON. DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR. OF IvIICIIIGAN IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Thursday, July 1, 1971 Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. Speaker, yesterday, our colleague from California (Mr. Mc- CLosKEY) testified before the Subcom- mittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. His testimony related to the need. for Con- gress to be fully informed, and described a series of incidents where the execu- tive branch over the years, had withheld Information from the Congress or delib- erately deceived the Congress. While reasonable minds may differ as to the "course this Nation should now pursue with respect to terminating our involve- ment in Vietnam, I believe all of us can ?agree on the need for Congress to de- mand that it be fully informed on all as- pects of the situation in Southeast Asia. For this reason, I am inserting in_ the RECORD ME. McCloskey's testimony in full: STATEMENT Or. PAUL N.. INTcCr.osKar, JR., BE- FORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE' ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, HOUSE-COMMITTEE'ON FOR- EIGN Arrants, JUNE 29, 1971 Mr, Chairman and Members of the Subcom- mittee: I had hoped originally to testify be- fore you today with respect to the Viet Nam Disengagement Act of 1971, urging, the bone- rmar July fits of an end to our Involvement n anti over Indochina by-December 31, 1971, Conditional solely upon the. safe return of our prisoners of war. Arguments favoring this view already have been made by a number of our col- - leagues, however, and accordingly, I would like to limit my testimony today to an issue which is equally important, the obligation of the House to be fully informed by the Execu- tive Branch on the great issues of foreign af- fairs, and particularly the Intervention by the United States in the affairs of foreign nations, either by covert CIA-operated action as In Laos or military Intervention as in Viet Nam. There . is ? reasonable disagreement in the House over what our course of action in Southeast Asia should be There should be no disagreement, however, on our need to know, and our right to know, all of the facts which may bear on our ultimate decision. ? It is true that Congress Is not suited to negotiation and clay-to-day decision making in intelligence and military operations. We do hold,- however, the sole constitutional power, and. I might add, constitutional re- sponsibility, for providing for the common defense, declaring war, funding the standing army, but for a period not to exceed two years; we in the House of Representatives who face our constituents every two years, not four or S1E, must initiate the revenue measures necessary to support the nation's expenditures for -war ancl foreign operations 'of every, kind. ; All of these provisions were clearly intend- ed by the framers of the Constitution to give Congress the controlling decisions in matters of war and peace. We make the laws; the President as Commander-in-Chief only ex- ecutes those laws. If Congress is to make wise decisions, how- ever, we must be fully informed. We cannot authorize a war without complete informa- tion; we should not permit a war to continue without complete information. The recent excerpts from the Pentagon documents published in the New York Ti712CS and other newspapers bring home to us most forcefully that we have not met our consti- tutional obligations to keep fully informed. Who amongst the Members of the House were aware,?for example, that country team mem- bers in Viet Nam aicled and encouraged the overthrow of Premier Diem in 1933? Who amongst our Members knew the true facts of U.S. military and covert activity in and over Laos, and in the coastal waters of North Viet Nam prior to the Tonkin Gulf Incidents of early August, 1964? Or that dur- ing October, 1964, prior to the re-election of President Johnson over Senator Goldwater, that 'Two of the teams (of U.S./South Vietnam- ese agents operating' mettle North Viet Nam) carried out successful actions during October. One demolished a bridge,, the other ambushed a North Vietnamese patrol." (This quote was taken from -a State De- partment memo, dated November 7, 1964. for Assistant Secretary of State Bundy, and Is noted at page 115107 of the Congressional Record of June 14, 1971). If these facts had been known to the Con- gress, would it have affected subsequent votes on appropriations for Viet Nam, or the ap- proval of escalation of the war implicit in the House appropriations process? What' would have been the House's reac- tion, for example, had we been fully in- formed in March, 1965, before U.S. troops were sent to Viet Nam, that our true goals In Viet Nam were those described by Assist- ant Secretary of Defense McNaughton in a memo to Secretary McNamara in March, 1965: "70%?To avoid a humiliating, U.S. defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor). "20%--To keep SVN (and then adjacent) territory from Chinese hands. Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-Rth80-01601R0006001.70001-0 STATINTI I t I pommay.??=1.???elt NEVI YORX 71173 Approved F9r Release 2000/05/15.1CARMO-MAIRM I( ..ri, p T. ,' ., vr. I\ ' er .11:riA .N '?4 , .A ,L .. 1 \\I A, i 1, nde,' I-1 1 \\ v JH 1 3 V 11?1.- I 1 i , 3.. e `L.P `N.....-:/- ..) \I i...._4',J i ..I1 Following are texts , of key documents accompanying ( the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam, war, dealing with the Ad- klic sue 'ministration of Pre.sident John F. Kennedy up to the events that rk:013, . brought the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh, Diem in 1963. nth . Except where excupting is specified, the documents are printed ma mo , verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corr.- ( 1 , rectal. . inn, ? . ? ? - anc S toit',._19-'c'---nri)0 '60 .1 ? t. Of .4.1).1?s7,ctl.0 to 1, - ? arr A 1 "ReC'itriP Cabiegrant from Ethridge Durbronn United States Ambassador in Saigon, me to Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Sept. 16, 1960. fer I . . ? ? ? ? - ? - As indicated .our 493 and 533 Diem normal. Diem in quite. regime confronted by two separate but serious danger. Therefore, in my opinion ? related dangers. Danger from demon- prompt and even drastic action is called : ?strations or coup attempt in Saigon for. I am well aware that Diem has in could *occur earlier; likely to be pre- past demonstrated astute judgment and ? dominantly non-Communistic in origin has survived other serious crises. Pas-. but Communists can be expected to sibly his judgment will prove superior e endeavor infiltrate and exploit any such to ours this time, but I believe never- attempt. Even more serious danger is theless we have 110 alternative but to ? ? gradual Viet Cong extension of control over countryside which, if current Com- munist progress continues, would mean loss free Viet-nam ? to Communists. ? ; These two dangers are related because 'Communist successes in rural areas embolden them to extend their activities _ to Saigon and because non-Communist temptation to engage in demonstrations or coup is partly motivated by sincere desire prevent Communist take-over in Viet?nam. ? ? Essentially [word illegible] sets of measures required to meet these two ' dangers. For Saigon danger essentially political and psychological measures re- quired. For countryside danger security measures as well as political, psycho logic:31,11nd 'economic measures needed. ? However both sets measures should be carried out simultaneously and to some extent individual steps will be aimed at both dangers. ?. Security recommendations have been ; made in our 539 and other messages, Including formation internal security council, centralized intelligence, etc. This message therefore deals with our poJiticlil and economic recommenda- tions. I realize some Measures I am recommending .are drastic and would be most [word illegible] for an ambassador to make under normal circumstances, nut conditions here are by no means ? give him our best judgment of what we believe is required to preserve his gov- ernment. While Diem obviously resented my frank talks earlier this year and will probably resent even more suggestions outlined below, he has apparently acted on some of our earlier suggestions and might act on at least some of the following: ? ' 1. I would -propose have frank and friendly talk with Diem and explain our serious concern about present situation and his political position: I would toll him that, while matters I am ? raising deal primarily with internal affairs, I would like to talk to him frankly and try to be as helpful as I can be giving him the considered judgment of myself and some of his friends in Washington- cnn appropriate measures to assist him ? in present serious situation. (Believe it best not indicate talking under instruc- tions.) I would particularly stress de- sirability of actions' to broaden and increase his [word illegible] support prior to 1061 presidential elections re- quired by constitution before end April. I would propose following actions to President: _ 2. Psychological- shock effect is re- quired to ?take initiative from Commu- nist?propagandists as, well as non-Com- munist oppositionists and convince population government taking effective ? Approved For ReleaggiMIMA .5'441140* 1 ? u. g t .of hand. To achieve that effect follow- ing suggested: f be, ;To: are Coen pOS run 'tan beli est bet ,? cou gov sac sug app ( hen gen dipl ing alle pre opp ons ermi aga 3 ban its of Pur atri red cor COV 4. Permit National Assembly wider legislative initiative and area of genuine debate and bestow on it authority to conduct, with appropriate publicity, public investbsations of any department of government with right to question ROQ0640471004) President himself. This step would Jaye three-fold pur- pose: (A) find some mechanism for dis- ?1.0.111 ? n1,73 Approved .For Release 2000/05/15.: ellikRDWID-01601R00 0 . r-1P Ii 11 ? . ?AI MD160. J. A.i.11)k 000 "\f,?. . S[..)2cks1 Coyrespe.n:-Ioni- in .RECE,N. events. have again fticussed ? public attention on the Valley of, Jars. Once ? this green valley framed by a chain of rocky hills presented en Idyllic scene: rice fields, peaceful vii- lager: drowsing in the shade of coconut' reduis, small flourishing towns, and scat- ? tered' oyer the fields the enormous toughly fashioned stone jars marking the burial places of an ancient civili7 zation. Now all of It has been reduced to ashes. For many years under the control of Olt:, *Laotian guerillas, the Valley of Jams was the. target of mas- sive strikes by the U.S. 13-52 super- bombers,, of "total defeat bomb strike.s," to use Washington's lingo. Every B-52 strike meant 30 tons of bombs, a rain of fire and iron, the total killing of .hurnireds of Laotian peasants with their wiVeS and children. Those who 'sur- vived hid by day In deep bomb craters, only emerging at night to bury their dead. and find food. Carly this month the Americans resumed their air raids While simultaneously transport planes Chartered by the CIA landed the cut- throat rangers It had hired in the Valley. The flames of war have flared up with renewed force In the heart of long-suffering Laos. ? ;' Little Laos lies on a major strategic crossroads of 'war-torn Indo-China, but why has it again become the object of Washington's criminal aggression at this Particular ? moment? If the American press Is to be believed, President Nixon and his close assistants are not inclined to. .challenge .public opinion and re- Jed' out of band the new proposals put forward by the patriotic forces of Viet.- ham, which open the way to peaceful settlement In 'all of Indo-China, not only Vietnam. This peace programme Is strongly supported by broad sections of the American people /as.. well as world 'public. opinion. Vet It Is report-, from: Washington that the CIA he submitted to President Nixon a spacial C -1 I NA cs, L:-c, Gal Lanz; D. R. V. .,,,;(.- \ ? . c. ...c-n-n--ic.- c,a-'?? HA.Noc) ' ..C\ ,,,,,,,,,,,c,? .., k' a .;,2 ... ...,.i,t,,i.ALsc,..;t:0:1,2;0:s , "i;:ox'.-&-c?- i(1-rijoLeFrA l!rtr-r:E' . ....I . 1 . "LV'I.onrcs,".'.1)..?..,` i 1 -osc1 1 ? ---- t, V l -.,:?_;-_-f.,,,;,,...,;:. '',,,,.. . ,..,...7....,,,_ ..,...\,,,. hat,114 e .? ?,,, -.:r7A Ud. oQn Tito: t!!-Ii. ? \I .- 1 ? . ?...1='-%LEVP--'1'",afj. TilE WAINC,*_mryiErr_o-Ly Approved For Release 2000/M RDP80-'01601R00060017 STATINTL 'frhe VAIL:, a:Ali" iir \-59 This This drawing and those on pages 32 and 33 were (lone by people from the Plain of Jars, Laos, depicting their life as it was during the bombing of their villages by American planes. They arc presently living in refugee camps around the capital city of Vientiane. The bombing continues. ? A bomb hit the hole and people died inside it. ?by a man, age unknown Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 5 ot,g,t IrU ed 17h_SITIVOTO:fj POST Approved- Fpr Release 2000/05/151 cwRigpp0-01601R0006001700 , CENERAL LElt?INITZER ? . . ..a grim chart talk. .. ...? . . - -?-: ? By Chalmers M. Roberts Washington Post Staff Writer The year 1P02 bpened for President Kennedy with the :grim word that he had not 'done enough to save South Vietnam. . According to documents 'from the Pentagon study Some-. of the projects available to The Washington listed,. such as defoliation Post, the chairman of the - Joint Chiefs of Staff .had were characterized as hay- ing "all the earmarks of prepared one of those gimmicks .. that' cannot and 'Pentagon flip-chart talks for will . not win the war .in Mr.- Kennedy. Although there is no direct evidence, South 'Vietnam." The docu- ments do- not show that the ? it? seems a reasonable as- ? ?sumption that. the talk was President had yet commit- 'delivered. In any case, it is ted himself to "win the war" . likely that. the dreary word but that was the clear premj ise. The "commitment of US reached the President. units". in support of Presi- ? ? Gen. Lyman L. Lerrmitzer, k then. the JCS Chairman, was dent Ngo Dinh Diem's . , prepared to discuss China's forces in one form or an- ? On Jan. 20, -the 'State De- nist . aggression in SouthVietnam. . The immediate - problem's - (things must be other- "should make it oh- partment came up with . . bad because wheat had been vious to the Vietnamese: and some.. SuggestiOnS. Deputy strategic imPOrtance of .. Southeast Asia lies in the the rest of the world that Under Secretary U.- Alexis "(purchased from Canada and States is commit- d Sta t U the. United Australia), the setup of the Johnson' suggested td Dep- political value that can ac- . crue to the Free World . ted : to preventing Commu- uty Defense' Secretary- Ros- 16,500-man Vietcong military through a successful stand -, nist domination of South well -Gilpatrie that if the .: establishment and the li,slief in that area. Of equal im- Vietnam, . and Southeast Vietnamese armed forces : that ? North' Vietnam then portance is the psychologi- : was running a training cen- Asia.' - .? . ? , wore, to be increased at the cal impact that a firm posi- ? : .ter near the city of Vinh Yet "all- of the recent ac time "we . would envisage , "where pro-Vietcong 'South lions :we Jiave taken may rtrateg,,ic Plans made in Sal. tion by the United States i 'Vietnamese receive an 18- still . not: :be . sufficient to 'gon giving priority to areas will have on the countries of i' month military course inter- stiffen the will, of the g,rov- to be cleared and. held and the World.--both free and : spersed with intensive Corn- ernmerit and the people of setting forth general meth- communist. On the negative \ munist political indoctrina- SVN sufficientlY? .th resist' ods to be used. We believe side, a United States politi- tion." - Communist pressure and these. should 17e aecom7 cal and/or -military with- "Two 600-man battalions . win the war without the US plishbd by numerous small drawal from the Southeast ' already have completed' committing. combat forces." tactical actions planned and Asian area would have an adverse psycholog,ical im- , training," saile#14iliFOr bill, .u.exiliiiiikia.,,ailaijie- executed by American and mectin with the. Pi- Moves Lemitzer was to put spot to meet the local. situa- 1. i 9:,11A&ICI,PoRDIROOOftetrtR0001600104fll greater propor-. ' ",talking paper ' r t le an. de fMt911F17.cutiii-Y . 0, a 1 I One fro which re- .. A . - ?g . rin a' - dent, "and another two bat- to..Mr. Kennedy. But a Na- lio t-t-he moment." _ _ ?m . . . . .. .... .. . , t Try) 1 i LT(rii-;? II11, iieti ,,i.J U-111)67 ,,,,Th fsr`si talions began training in _ . .. -, - - . . _. tional Security Action I1leni - ? - May, lf)61." Here were signs 1 orandum of Jan. 18, , nine . . - 1 Johnson wrote. that Stat'e of danger. ;felt "OW' trainin& program - - ' days later, 'shows that the ? ' President was focusing not f_.").i.s,A, 11, " (ArmV of the Re-- Then Lemnitzer, if he fol- . t lowed the "talking paper" Vietnam) be based prepared for him, was to on sending in combat forces l'u`-nc, of primarily on the concept' but on ebunterinsurgencY. ' quote the President to him- - --- ? ? ? - that the Vietnamese army: self: He ,ordered establishment. will start winning - on the "The President on 22 Nov of "a Special Group (Count- day when it ha S obtained . er-Insurgenc ember 1961 authorized the ) to `assure the Confidence of (he Viet- - y" unity ,of effort and the use narnese" peasants. As :a spb. Secretary of State to in- of all -available 'resources cifie example 1 suggest that struet the US Ambassador with maximum effectiveness we . immediately seek Viet- to resisting Vietnam to inform Presi- namese implementatitm of a subversive insurgency and : dent Diem that the U.S. Gov- policy of promptly giving a related forms of indirect ag' sthall reward in rice %salt or ernment ? was prep-arcd to gresston itis friendly conn- , money - - (commodities in join the GVN (Government: tries.", The new grotip 'was which -the Vietcong nYe in of South Vietnam) in a: to. be headed by (Sen. Max- short supply) to every per- sharply increased effort to well Taylor. An annex to the son who gives information avoid a further deteriora. memorandum listed . the to the army. Similarly, vii- tion of the situation in SVN' "critiCal areas" assigned to iages which show determin a- (South Vietnam)." Next; it - as :Labs, South Vietnam lion to resist the Vietcong . were listed the military' an Thailand. , , should receive the promp- : steps the President had ap- The same day Gen. Lem- t ,st possible support." ' 'proved less than two months nitzer sent a memorandum The Joint Chiefs were :? earlier. to Brig. Gen. Edward Lans- coneerned with the larger ' One chart showed "ap- dale, who had been dealing view. Defense ? Secretary proved and funded construe- with insurgencies for years, ? Robert S. 'McNamara sent tion projects" including Sm- stating that "now a strong the ? President a men-loran- ' provements at airfields at case can be made for in- dum that illuminated their Pleiku, Bienhoa and at Tan- creased direct participation frame of mind. sonnhut (Saigon). Here was by US personnel in the plan- 'Entitled "The Strategic the. commitment th'u:s far.. fling and supervision of Vi- Importance of the Southeast But, the "talking paper" in-' etnamese counterinsurgency Asia Mainland," the Jan. 13 ? (Heated, that _was not operiitions. Inherent in such paper was signed by Lent-, enough. - : increased direct participa- nitzer for all the chiefs. ',It i tion 'should be some assur- began this way: . *ance of US support for "1. The United- States has Diem personally." - clearly stated and demon- , Lemnitzer was responding stratcd that one .of its .unal- td Lansdale's statement that ' terable objectives is the pm- Diem was worried about a vention of - South Vietnam, coup. against him and that. falling to communist aggres- till? had made him reluctant' sion and :the subsequent loss to let his field comthanders of' the remainder of the "implement the taak fbree Southeast Asia mainland. concent that was: an impor- The military objective, tant part of the over-all plan therefore, must be to take: of operationsa?ainst the . expeditiously all action s - neeessary to defeat commu- Vietcong." s = oontinuptl STATINTL TEE ATLANTIC 1.101Ir.OHLY. Approved For Release 2000/9j5 94-RDP80-01601R000 LAOS 11Th fl T) COIMD i..17,7r7r1:=Ff7=2."=', -6?kriNTL them, for they have no food. There is was an old person and the other was .. the despair of uncertainty. No one a child." There was talk that the men can tell them what their future will might be conscripted into Vang Pao's . ? The springtime in Laos is very dry. be. Like Laos itself, they have long army, but the chief did not know for Save for the .brief Mango rains, the since lost control of their own des- sure, and he did not know what _.. heat is unrelieved, and shriveled tiny.- would happen to his people. "I am green leaves lie like dead frogs in the In one such makeshift settlement afraid," he said. dusty roads. The sun is dull red in the village chief greets visitors with a ? the smoke ancl haze, for in the' gold-toothed smile. There are over ? burn the brush off the hillsides. The diate area?four hundred of them At site 272 the Air America planes pilots .say that the haze stretches all are children. One night, the Pathet cOntinue taking off and landing in a across the northern marches of Lao and the North Vietnamese had roar of red dust, bringing rice, pigs, . village. - h- 1 l'er- in a and ducks to the refugees. But one . springtime the hill people slash and nine hundred people in his imme- ? For \\That?" 'Southeast Asia from North Vietnam across to Burma. The Air America helicopters must pick their way care- fully among the fantastic limestone outcroppings that rise like castles from the wooded hills tumbling out of China. One realizes that the misty mountains of the classical Chinese _landscape paintings were not the product of artistic imaginations, but faithful reproductions of nature. *Here in these hills, fifty miles -:northeast of Vientiane, there is an airstrip known to the pilots as site 272. It is the center for American refugee relief in Northern Laos and come to his nearby government outpost had de- senses the. end of a decade of Amen- tected no enemies in the area: "So we .can policy in Laos. Ten years ago, went to bed. happy," the village chief when the Americans first began to said. train and equip the Mc? tribesmen, "But at four o'clock in the morning Vang Pao's guerrillas operated all over we were attacked. Before we knew it, Northeastern Laos?far behind enemy they were in the village shooting and lines to the borders of North Viet- the houses .were burning." Squatting nam itself. Fewer than two dozen down on his haunches, the village chief American servicemen have been described with his hands in the dirt killed in these mountains. Asians how the enemy had come and the at- fight Asians. But ten years of costly, . tack on the outpost?the short, sharp vainglorious offensives and unremit- explosions, the flames, the rifle fire, the ting pressure from North Vietnamese measured hammering of the fifty- counteroffensives have pushed the calibers, and then silence. Death had Meo beyond their endurance. Vang in I last three years the fall-back point for Long Cheng, come in the classic Indochina way: a ao sos Jthe secret CIA base twenty-five miles small, isolated outpost overrun in the have been so heavy that the Armee to the north. Long Chen; is the night. It was a scene that has: been Clandestine is no longer an ex- headquarters for the Meo General played a thousand times in the last elusively. Meo force. Almost half Vang Pao's "Arm6e Clandestine,' I twenty-five years of \var. their numbers are now made up of supported by the. CIA. All this past The villagers escaped into the sur- other highland peoples. And in the. - winter and spring the base has been rounding woods, and for two days last three or four years, the Meo have under siege by the North Vietnam- they marched over some of the most been organized to .fight in battalion- ese. The hill , peoples, the highland impenetrable and inhospitable coun- sized units of over five hundred men Lao and the Meo dependents of try on earth. "We were so sorry to instpd of small guerrilla units. As a Vang Pao's army, have been fleeing leave everything behind," the chief result, the slaughter has been magni- south by the thousands, pouring into said, "and. the march was very ciilfi- fied. Vang Pao's army can no longer the hills and valleys near- site 272. cult. We walked two days, and the hOld Long Cheng alone, and by early . They make temporary bamtioo shel- people cried and cried over the April it Was reliably reported by Lao tens, and Air America drops rice to mountains. Two people died; one and American sources that no fewer Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 oont.": Approved For Release 2000/05/15 :.CIA -RDP80 -01601R000600170001 -0 4. ' -4k? l'* '?. _,,. ?,,N ',... Ki- ,i-i I r? , ?.',A 1 ? 1;;-j". .?. _ v ._,,,, f ..\ S^-,-a 1 r-, , ,- , - 77) er.,-:\'?..\?4 ,v , ? ? ('. .. , \ 1 LY ; t."( L.,4.,,? rs"-N \--: v V.--NI V V -. ?cs \A \,:,'. All 4117710471T/1,77YE All/iLYSIS OF AS141.1 AFF/11S . . LETTER. Co. Tokyo }long hong \Vashington Lo:-,? Ange .,,/ ---.....---7----7-- ? -------- ? STATINTL NuSITATIN01 29 June 1971 Dear- Sir: THE C.I.A. IN ASIA (II): No intelligence operation in Asia is as well- heeled as that. of the U.S. .Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.). The annual working budget of the C.I.A. runs over US$600 million. Thatust? a starter. The agena spends far more than that in Asia alone if you count the cost of some of the "borrowed" from othtr r. S. Government agencies. For instance: --U.S. Air Force planes are used to monitor foreign nuclear tests and ? collect air samples. The agency,. ,while having its own cryptographers, draws on the Army's .corps of 100,000 code specialists and eavesdroppers to tap Asian communications. ---C.I.A. specialists often operate off U.S. Navy ships in the Pacific, usually involved in electronic surveillance. . ---The agency also is privy to information from the Defense Intelligence Agency (D.I.A.) which has a substantial operation of its own in Asia. The D.I.A. spends from its own budget more than US$1 billion a year flying reconnaisance planes and keeping satellites aloft. Those satellites anew C.I.A. analysts to know more---from photographs. .taken 130 miles up---about China's topography than do the Chinese themselves: ---The U.S. State Department's intelligence section also feeds a considerable amount of cofidential data it collects through its embassies, consulates and travellqg diplomats to the Th..I.S includes information gathered by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) the Justice Department and the U.S. Treasury (Secret Service) often attached to diplomatic missions abroad. The C.I:A. also works closely with the' intelligence services and police forces of the countries considered AMericar7-71lies in Asia, exchanging information with them. Where des all the C.I.A. money go? It funnels out in myriad direction's: To pay for the agency's overt intelligence gathering actiVities, to-finance "dirty tricks" and other clandestine capers, to prop up ousted or failing politicians and to pay for "disinformation" and other psychological, warfare ploys. Despite the C.I.A.'s oft-deserved sinister image, a good deal of its funds are expended on open intelligence gathering operations. These go for ?subscriptions to newspapers, periodicals and other publications and salariesfOr those who must scan them for intelligence tidbits. It is estimated that more than. 507. of the C.J..A.'s world-wide intelligence .input comes from such overt sources. ?(An estimated 357. comes from electronic .spying and less than 157. from JAMES BOND-type,-cloak-and-dagger operations.) An exception is Asia. A greater amount of. the C.I.A. funds expended in Asia go into covert activities.., STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : GlIAERRP8011. ,0 1,601RO 1001 GO 101 aooto (FOR SUBSCRIBERS ONLY ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS. WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION./ Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 -2- C.I.A. "bagmen" ride regular circuits in Asia making monthly payoffs to informers, subsidizing "friendly" politicians or now-outsted political leaders who onte served U.S, interests, or dropping off funds to under-Write businesses-used as Covers for agents.. In Indo-China, some of thee "bagmen" move around with hardly any attempt to hide what they are up to. In places like Djakarta or Hong Kong .or Tokyo, more sophistication is attached to the game. C.I.A. funding 'activities in' Asia cover a wide and varied scope. Despite a pledge by President Nixon to remove the C.I.A. from such 'activities, it is still engaged in supportim, foundationst institutes and other ostensible research oranilations and stud grouos. -----Quite a few Asian students are enjoying educational opportunities as a result of C.I.A.-supplied "scholarships", sometimes without the students' knowing where the money originates. It's no secret that more than a few of those young American Ph.D. candidates doing sociological studies in the jungles of the southern Philippines or the highlands of Malaysia are full-time agents. Another activity falls under the category of "disinformation" or counter-intelligence and ranges from the spreading of rumors to the under- writing of publications in local languages, both aimed at swaying opinion in a certain direction. That grey-haired Thai scholar ensconced in a small but comfortable . Bangkok house writing a book on the historical reasons why Thais should stand firmly against Communism might well have more than a publisher bank-roiling his effort. Gathering'documents o1.tical and otherwise, also accounts' for some of the C.I.A.'s large expenditures in Asia. More than a few Canton-Macao ferry crew members pocketed healthy- sums / during the Cultural Revolution by selling Red Guard and other documents to cl C.I.A. agents. And then there are, the covert and quasi-covert, Military or para-military operations financed by the C.I.A., including the 25,000-man force in Laos-" once known as the "opium army"---commanded by Meo tribesman Gen. VANG PAO and advised by 1511-175 C.I.A.. men, and the continuing C.I.A. supply of arms and ammunition to Tibetan rebels who .make Periodiej'raids on Chinese Communist troops in Tibet. As is the usual practice, funds come bV circuitous routes. Nearly half of all American aid earmarked for war refugees in Laos is in fact C.I.A. funds beinb sorplied to CV.e Vanb Pao forces. And then 'there's that shadowy airline known as Air America, which someone once described as the worldr-s-mmOst shot at airline" and which is partically funded by C.I.A. money. ' With millions of dollars to work with, the C.I.A.'s hand is felt in taa and many ways. Next: The C.I.A. In Asia (III)---Modus Operandi. BIRTHDAY GREETINGS TO: (1) The Communist Party of China (50on July 1), the largest political party in the world. (2) Ourselves, THE ASIA LETTER, (7 'this week),, the best and most informative publication specializing in Asian affairs. DESPITE THE PURGES during the past few years, the Chinese Communist Party still is by far the world's largest political party. As theParty celebrates the 50th anniversary of its 1 July 1921 founding, however ,Prtc"liesd refirTerffSPANTNIA %IWIDAP- 91WWW0870903- larirtual. destruction of the Party organization during the Cultural Revolution. STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00 GOLDSBORO, N.C. NEWS-ARGUS JUN 29 1Dii] E - 16,034 S - 16,322 Pnce. 1T9/7 TG - O a-eg Whether the Pentagon papers contain anything that might jeopardize national security remains a topic of international debate. But there can be little debate over the impropriety of a story printed Sunday by the Philadelphia Bulletin and the Seattle Times. The newspapers reported that the Central Intelligence..Agency is sending Laotian hill tribesmen on spying missions from Laps into Communist China. Their purpose ? is to obtain in- formation as to troop movements and political developments. . Publication of a story informing an avowed enemy of this country of such activity, it seems to us, is a reckless from of irresponsible journalism. It could jeopardize the acquisition of intelligence information necessary to competent planning. It could jeopardize the lives of intelligence agents. . If the-two newspapers regard this as some colossal "scoop", it wasn't big enough to justify the potential cost. ? Approved For ReleaSe 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 ? NEW BRUNswirK N. NE1,7,1 AprIroved:Fpr Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00 nos JUN 29 19:11 :E 50,927 'S ? 52,421 r,f2, has ICY ?not go to war as a part of a ic a r ef ul 1 y plotted scenario Which involves secret attacks On tht,'' other side ? some ap- parently with the aim of pro- - yoking retaliation against us end our allies. - But I do not want to get into an extended past mortem on Vietnam. Our primary task ? should not he to engage in' re- criminations or assign blame, . but to bring' an end to the war. That is why last year, i and this year, I voted for the IHatfield-McGovern proposal to , set a ' definite date for 'U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. The term "secret war" has '110\V come into our national vo- cabulary. We started off in Vietnam operating in secret, 'and we are currently fighting i a war in Laos in the same way. ' We are spending annually : about $300 million on the ' ground in Laos, not to mention ? an estimated $2 billion to bomb Lthat country of less than 3 mu- lion people. All this is done with- out any real Congressional or ; pnblic knowledge or approval. Successive administrations ;.have been able to carry on the ?secret war in Laos, as they did earlier in Vietnam by use 1 i of ? that vast billion dollar treas- ure chest which Congress has ! appropriated, but never con- trolled, for discretionary intel- ligence and military programs. . And it has been the Central In-, ' telligeneo. _Agettcya_(OA) -Wiii-EN' 'has' been assigned to 'carry out - the administrations' policies ? such as the running of a 30,000 ? man private army and the funding of Thai troops in Laos. I do not direct criticism ? against the CIA, for it has only i been following orders issued, by,. several Presidents. I simply? _ question whether a secret intel-- ligence organization should be assigned .a war-making role " . abroad. : . . Three Proposals ! This is why I have recently ; ' proposed three hills which ? j would increase Congressional , control over certain CIA pro-7 ; grams. These are: a 1. A bill to extend all exist- ing limitations on Defense De- partment funding such as the ? , prohibitions against payment of ! mercenaries in Laos and the , By SEN. CLIFFORD P. CASE , Much has been said lately about the effort of Congress to ;reassert and redefine its au- thority in the field of foreign ! I am much -interested in this, not as an exercise in congres- :'sional self-aggrandizement, but as a means of forcing our gov- ? irnment to conduct foreign fol.-. .!icy in the open so that the ..public may know what is going con'and the controlling 'sioice in important decisions. Our recent history .in South- east Asia shows that wars ap- proved by simply a handful of presidential advisers may well be not only unconstitutional but relatively unsuccessful, too. _Shocked 01/-illINIL 2. A bill to prohibit the fund- ing of any U.S. government agency of foreign mercenaries operating outside their countries without specific Congressional - authorization, I would hope this would eliminate the confusing trail of Thais in Laos, Cambo- dians in Laos, and even Thaisa in Cambodia. 3. A bill to extend existing limitations on the use of mili- tary surplus material to all government agencies abroad, including CIA. My three -proposals would ? close some loopholes in the law. But the Executive can find ways to skirt almost any prohibition, if it is so inclined. The solution to the problem lies, in the long run, not in a ? tighter 'drafting of the law but in the acceptance by the Exec- utive of Congress and the pub- - lic as partners in the conduct of the peoples' vital busir ? Like most Americans, I have Cooper - Church provisos for , teen shocked by the cynical Cambodia to 'all. U.S. 'govern- ' manipulation of our political ment agencies overseas, includ- ! processes revealed in Tao New : , big CIA. ? . York Times seripabbtcAirrFOr Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 gins of the Vietnam'War, be- lieve that our country should , BAtxol CW Approved For Release 2000/05/15.; CIA-RDP80-01601R00060 2 8 JUN 1971 CIA Is Rep :Ma .1 ? Send tag Liaoblart3 ? To Spy In China 'Philadelphia, 'June 27 (i11---The Philadelphia Sunday Builetin has quoted "qualified sources" as saying the Central Intelli- gel-lee Agency has been sending reconnaissance teams from Laos into China to obtain information on, troop movements, political deilelopments and other data. "Those forays," the Bulletin said in a copyright story, "in- volve sending reconnaissance teams from northern Laos as much as several hundred miles ;into seuthern China's Yunnan province." The newspaper said the - sources reported that United States officials in Vientiane, Laos, discounted any potential. threat to slowly improving rola: tions between Washington and. Pel(ing. The members of the intelli- gence teams, the Bulletin said, are native hill tribesmen of the same ethnic stock prevalent in . southern China. . "They have been recruited, .cequipped and trained by the CIA to infiltrate Chinese territory and obtain information on troop movements, political develop- ments and other data." .Officials at CIA headquarters in McLean, Va., declined any ?7 comment on the story, as did American Embassy officials in Vientiane, the newspaper report- ed. The Bulletin said its sources reported U.S. authorities believe local security needs and the in- telligence value of such opera- tions justify their continuation. ;1 Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 --------- STATINTL STATINTL encogon _ To see the conflict and our part' in it as a tragedy 'without villains, war crimes 'without criminals, lies without liars, es- pouses ?and promulgates a view of pro- cess, roles and motives that is not only ? grossly mistaken but which underwrites deceits that have served a succession of ; Presidents. ?Daniel Ellsberg .v THE issues were momentous, the sit- uation unprecedented. The most mas- sive leak of secret documents in U.S. history had suddenly exposed the sen- sitive inner processes whereby the John- "son Administration had abruptly esca- lated the nation's most unpopular?and unsuccessful--war. The Nixon Govern- ment, battling stubbornly to withdraw from that war at its own deliberate pace, took the historic step of seeking to suppress articles before- publication, and threatened criminal action against TIME /1 964-50pitRi)1601 R000600 upers: I11,719 - that the. Government 'was fighting so fiercely to protect. Those records af- forded a rare insight into how high of- ficials make decisions affecting the lives of millions as well as the fate of na- tions. The view, however constricted or incomplete, was deeply disconcerting. The records revealed a dismaying de- gree of miscalculation, bureaucratic ar-, rogance and deception. The revelations severely damaged the reputations of some officials, enhanced those of a few, and so angered Senate Majority Lead- er Mike Mansfield--a long-patient Dem- ocrat whose own party was hurt most ?that he promised to conduct a Sen- ate investigation of Government decision making. The sensational affair began quietly with the dull thud of the 486-page Sun- day New York Times arriving on door- steps and in newsrooms. A dry Page One headiine----VIETNAM ARCHIVE: PEN- John Mitchell charged that the Times's disclosures would cause "irreparable in- ! jury to the defense of the United States" and obtained a temporary restraining order to stop the series after three in- stallments, worldwide attention was in- evitably assured. A Study Ignored The Times had obviously turned up a big story (see PnEss). Daniel Ells- berg, a former Pentagon analyst and su- perhawk-turned-superdove, apparently had felt so concerned about his in- volvement in the Viet Nam tragedy that he had somehow conveyed about 40 volumes of an extraordinary Pen- tagon history of the war to the news- paper. Included were 4,000 pages of documents, 3,000 pages of analysis and 2.5 million words?all classified as se- cret, top secret or top secret-sensitive. The study was begun in 1967 by Sec- JULY 1965: JOHNSON DISCUSSING VIET NAM POLICY BEFORE TELEVISION SPEECH Always.tho secret option, another notch, hut never victory. the nation's most eminent newspaper. T..kooN STUDY TRACES 3 DECADES OF retary .of Defense Robert McNamara, The dramatic collision between the GROWING u.s. iNvoLvEmENT--was fol- who had become disillusioned by the fu- Nixon Administration and first the New lowed by six pages of deliberately low- tility of the war and wanted future his- York Times, then the Washington Post, key prose and column after gray col- torians to be able to determine what . raised in a new and spectacular form umn of official cables-, memorandums had gone wrong. For more than a year, -the unresolved constitutional questions and position papers. The mass of ma- 35 researchers, including Ellsberg,- Rand about the Government's right to keep terial seemed to repel readers and even Corporation experts, civilians and uni- ? ? its planning papers secret and the con- other newsmen. Nearly a day went by be- formed Pentagon personnel, worked out Ilictino right of a free sress to inform fore the networks and wire services of an office adjoining McNamara's. With the public IAIMVP43?14rnclreFOIRPISffic200PA5/15td. Qiiik-litlaPaOhOti6n$R00000117Ct01044, they were able to obtain ' tioned (see story -page 17). Yet, even action was to refrain from comment so Pentagon documents dating back to ar- -__-.rnore fundamental, ..the legal_ battle, any greater "ex- ,_guments within the Truman Adminis- -4 tl,,t ??11-,,,,, A ttnrnow nonr-rn1 trnt inn nn whether the IT.S. should hell) STAT I NT L SI.V.,th'ET JOURNAL Approved For Release 2000/05115:C1A-RDP50-01601R000600 8 JUN 1971 W orld-Wide ? CIA reconnaissance teams from Laos have been sent into Communist China to obtain in- formation on troop movements, political devel- opments and other data, the Philadelphia Sun- day Bulletin said. The intelligence team mem- bers are native tribesmen of the same ethnic stock as is prevalent in southern China, the paper said, quoting "qualified sources." The sources said U.S. officials in Vientiane, Laos, discounted any potential threat the operations pose to slowly improving U.S.-China relations. CIA officials declined any comment. ? Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0' V4,W-fc.i14:2'1 Approved For Release 2000/05115: - 1601R00060 STATINTL - 1'1 A [ I _."5) FT , L 12 ? ? F') 1.1'`' (7i) !.7"s (;.isj (714 rrn u t=" , ,.,? r-,4 1 ? AssociatfA Press The Central Intelligence Agen- cy has been sending Laotian hill tribesmen on spying missions from Laos into Communist ,China to obtain information on troop movements and political developments, according., to a re- port published by the Philadel- phia Bulletin and the Seattle Times. "Those forays involve'sending reconnaissance teams from northern Laos as much as. sever- al- hundred miles into Southern 'Vliina's Yunnan Province," said a top:,?tright, story written by Ar- nold Abram, published by the two newspapers yesterday, ? The dispatch, as published in The Bulletin, said ualifieci. soiirces reported that U.S. offi- z dials in Laos discounted any po- tential threat the o:jeations may post to slowly improving rela- tions . between Washington and Peking. 'They believe this threat is small, according to reliable sources, because the operatio,--.s are not commando raids or sab- otage efforts and Americans do not participate in them, the Bulletin said. Native. hill ,tribeS'inen_ are of the same ethnic stock as found in southern China. 'They have been recruited, equipped and trained .by the CIA to infiltrate Chinese territory and obtain in- formation on troop movements, political developments and other data," the Bulletin said. ...- Abrams said his sources claim such intelligence missions have long been known to Chinese au- thorities and that several teams have been captured in recent years. "Consequently, American offi- cials reason that Peking will continue to tolerate these terri- ; torail incursions as long as they are conducted solely to gather intelligence.'' Officials at CIA headquarters in McLean, Va., declined any comment on the story, as did. American Embassy officials in Vientiane., the Bulletin said.. 1 Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-0160.1k00 PEILADFLPHIA, PA. DULLETIN E - 640,783 S - 681,831 ' JUN 2 7 10` dil,.... ??? '-'"'1?? AiLlail*"9i .-, ? ?-,, ' 0.:: argely -discount a,ny potential /.,? 0 ????:-,-. -v 1 i'-?, T A. IVI, ' ' ' ? - ' ....?11-'1: .;`7,...1, - threat .the operations. pose to .. .. iy:.- .-7%??? ----- --77-Prir,317 , c,'? alm'ily improving relations be- tween Washington and Pelting.' . - STATINTL A 7 ???"" ? these operations. ?-nuaified ' , sources report, howeVer, that ? U. S. authorities believe Io ii ? ? security - need's and . the intel-- about the road's potential aS supply route for ? Communist- led guerrilla forces in northern - beeline value such opera - Thailand. ? ?? t'f 11 %. ions jus i_y American officials privately -110'51rPIT ? ? ? _1011, ? . ? ? ivioreover, U. S...atithorities believe this threat is PrnInery;, t.)?? . small, according ? to . relia ble sources, because the opera-. tions are not commando raids or sabotage efforts and Ameri- . . . ,Reds AVItire ? /no - 4, ? - ? MI 7", ? . ? ? fi,-% ,,,7;v i(?J - . a By ARNOLD ABRAMS , ethnic stock prevalent in southern China. .They., have : Special .to he ..bulletin been recruited, equipped arid . 0.mi Thn ..ElIctin .Co. . . trained by the CIA to infiltrate VientianenLaos---intelligence, Chinese territory 'and obtain operations that penetrate deep information on troop move-. :into China have been directed merits, political - developments. from here for years by the an other data. , Central -intelligence 'Agency u.s..11.?,??,t.-1??11,- ..t.nd are continuing. . - ...... ? . [A- Bulletin inquiry at the . . n ?These forays involve sending Central Intelligence. Agency . reconnaissance . teams from headquarters in McLean, Va. northern Laos as much as brought this .response; "The structing a roaa network lead- -several hundred: Miles into CIA never comments .a.bout. inn toward the Thai border. ."Southern China's Yunnan - news ? stories .? ?: Thai concerning its . . .isturoed Province. . . ' ? - operations. "J ' . . . .. . s D . The team-- members ? are as- American embassy officials -Thai authorities repeatedly' i five hill tribesmen of the -same , iii Vientiane ..refu,s4.=._to discuss have expressed deco concern . .. . _..... ? ? '1 ' p n4r-''./ A rilk cans do not participate direct- ly in them. ? ? ? ? Sources note, in addition, that such intelligence missions ? have long been known to Chinese authorities; several voice 'similar concern. While conceding that Chinese forces in Laos have not been acting hostile, they insist the project must be kept under scrutiny. Peking's construction proj- ect originally was requested by the tripartite government established in- Laos with the signing of the lt.n2 Geneva Ac- cord. While technically. still existent, the cealition was? abandoned in 39D- by Com- munist. Pathet Lao represcnta- tives. ironically, while American teams have been captured in, officials privately fret about recent e - Chinese intentions in Laos, yars. . ? Pd-ring a pingpong difilnmacy Consequently, ?Hi: . has .prompted positive reac???? dials reason that Peking will tiOn -from the leader of this continue to tolerate these ter4. ration's neutralist govern-. ritorial incursions as long as me.nt. In an interview, Prime Mie- rather are conducted solely to. ister.Souvanna Phourna stres- vather intelligence. -sed China's historically no:lag- Verse. Threats Elsewhere - .? - igiessive attitude toward Laos. U. S. authorities also be- Prince Souvanna noted that lieve that, if the Chinese want the -unhappy history of this an excuse. to reverse the landlocked 'kingdom includes friendly trend of their ping- invasions by neighboring pong diplomacy, they can .do Thais, Cambodians, Burmesc. better than focusing on these and Vietnamese ???-?-? but not by operations, ,the Chinese. ? --? "We're still fighting in Viet- nam, we have a military prcs- . . ence on Taiwan,- and we are k 1-1 rice. cs? standing by our treaty corn- mitments to Chiang Kai-shek," ? observes one sourcia close to U. S. policy-makin'g levels. "If the Chinese are looking for something ? to whip us with, any one of those three will do." ? In Laos; American officials' major security concern about the Chinese stems from a Pe- king road-building project in t le north. An estimated 14,- 00 Chinese, including several thousand soldiers, are con- Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 IN I L GWEN CITY , N.Y.< NEWSDAYBV751 FliKlielease 2000/05/15.: CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001- E ? 427,270 7:1 riebt17.3-Welni,CI.Q Newslay Map by. Philip Di0(116i0 Chinese Communists aro building a road ne.twork, inditafed by the dotted line, in norihern!Laos toward Thailand. At the same fitne, intelligence +earns trained and financed by the CIA are entering Yunnan Province. in China.; . - .pk Arnoil Abrams -. ...14.1.ewsciay Special Correspondent 1 . , ' Vientiane,- Laos?The recent thaw in Sino-Ameri- . an relations has not halted U.S.-directed intelligence operations that Penetrate . deep into Communist hinese territory. . ? ? - ??-? ? . - --. - - .-- .:Those operatiOns, which have been conducted for Nears here by the Central Intelligence Agency, send rtpconnaissance teams from nothern Laos as far as Eleveral hundred Miles into southern China's Yunnan -.. A3rovince. , ... . -.I.' The agents are native hill tribesmen of the same . Alinic..stoek prevalent in southern China. They have v/t :een-recruited, equipped and trained by tho CIL:to' infiltrate Chinese territory and obtain information on. in:x:9 movements, political developments and other Pertinent security matters. , American embassy offieials in Vientiane refuse to discuss the intelligence operations. Qualified- sources report, however, that U.S. authorities belieVe that local security needs and the intelligence value ofsuch Opera tions j us tifiNIPEIMtli tE00. Reiettre,200019545 authorities largely discount any potential threat. that the operations may pose to the slowly improving relations between Washington and Peking. - American officials believe that any such threat is? small, according to reliable sources, because the oper- ations are not commando raids or sabotage efforts, and Americans do not participate directly in them. The missions supplement activities of the Laotian government's so-called secret army, which has been covertly directed and supported by the CIA for the Past decade. Informed sources add, moreover, that the intelli- gence missions have long been known to Chinese authorities; several teams have been captured in re- pent year. Consequently, American officials reason that Peking will continue to tolerate the territorial :incursions as long as they are conducted solely to gathar information and do not pose a direct security ithrea%. . U.S. authorities also believe that if the Chinese Want an excuse to reverse the friendly trend of their cliR !pail rthM,M, 11.9A2AV-Tnth all f0C1.1. - jite 1*,:i 145$1a- IMIhWAISIUS-VIV ti It /11Th g in Viet- qoatinue d NT AGRI F S N. -Nap-re:wed -r-Dr Release 2000/05/15.; CIA-RDP80-01601R000600 GAZETTE E ? 35,280 S ? 35,969 JUN 25 107i ? STATINTL By JACK BELL ; Garmett News Service WASHINGTON ? President Nixon is making a tragic mistake In his assessment that the use. of 'drugs by U.S. servicemen in Vietnam is "by no means a majoi. part of the American narcotics problem", as he said in his drug abuse control message to Congress. . The 'accelerated movement of- , the bored or seared "grants" into ? the legion of thoae who smoke or ? snort herion strikes at the heart ' - of the narcotics cancer of the future, if not of the present. :a What happens to those young ? amen when they come home- hooked with a habit they can stand off for $5 a day in Saigon, r where the dope is pure and cheap? They will find the price of 7 their habit has gone up to $100 a ? day in the United States, where, the drug is so cut that to get any a charge from it they will have to ? I pump it directly into their blood. , ? ; CHAIRMAN Vance Hartite, D- l Ind., of ? the &nate Veterans Affairs Committee, estimates 7 there are more than 375,000 men ? ? ? ? re tuff from Vietnam now looking for jobs. Almost none of them ?and those who arejoining them weekly are likely to latch on to any payroll check that would support an addict's habit. The addiet will turn naturally to crime. Nobody really knows how many uniformed young Ameri- cans in Southeast Asia are mortgaging their future lives by using dangerous drugs. Only Fe- cently and belatedly has offi- , cialdom become grudgingly alarmed at the Spread of this menace. Rep. Seymour Mb e ro ,R-N.Y., who bought heroin easily on the streets of Saigon to demonstrate , its availability, estimates there are 00,000 users of the drug in uniform. This works out close to one quarter of the U.S. troops ? in the war zone. Reps. Morgan F. Murphy, D- n., and Robert H. Steele, R- Conn., who made their own in- vestigation in Vietnam, think 30,000 to 40,000 have a serious heroin habit. - I NIXON'S new program is aimed primarily at reducing the number of GI addicts who will come home untreated and at providing folowup treabnent for - them. Urine tests will be given all returning veterans. Detected addicts will be put, through a seven-day course of detoxification in Vietnam, followed ? by three weeks .of ? treatment at home. , ? This is all very well as far as it goes. But, it does nothing for the thousands of addicts who still .have time to serve in Vietnam. Steele's suggeslion that all U.S. servicemen be tested at least once a month ought . to be ? 'followed. Nixon.has promised to attack the narcotics supply on an inter- national plane. He is having some success in Turkey, where the government is struggling to ..cohtrol the growing of opium poppies. Smuggled opium from Turkey is said to be the source of three-fourths of the heroin en- tering this country. THIS progress in Europe, however, has not been matched in Asia. . There, the friendly countries of Burma, Laos and Thailand produce about 700 tons of opium annually, about half of the world's illicit output. Production of the raw drug and its refining is carried on in the "Golden Triangle" border area that feeds heroin into South Vietnam. There it is Sold on the streets ? often by children -- to American servicemen. The Nixon administration has put the screws on Saigon's President Nguyen Van Thieu to crack down, on the traffic. But this fails to get at The supply.. ? a Discussions with the govern- ments of Burma, Laos and. Thailand are not going to get very far. Unfortunately, these governments have very little" clout in the Mekong River tn- border area, where irregular ."armies" and Chinese buy the !,opiurn crops, run the refineries and transport heroin. ? . ? 0 .71 .71 .1 ti h ? CIL CD it I; The U.S. Central Intelligence', Agency, under fire for its para- military activities in Laos,i knows about these operations. What would be wrong if it were! commissioned to buy up the opium harvest of the area at premium prices? Opium has le_i gitirnate medical uses and the.; project would not be a total loss. I This would be no more costly; nor fantastic in its concept than, the CIA's equipping, training and transporting troops that won ,one revolution (Guatemala) and lost, another (Cuba). And if it could be . carried out, it might salvage great many twisted lives among; the Americans who remain in South Vietnam. ? , ?? Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 . WASIMGTOIT POn Approved For Release 2000/05/fp 4 CAtifpfr40-01601 R000 STATINT The News Bushiess 'W 661.[RevelintRons99 f(11)Zr Jim) !,_. T, ?THE continuing storm over.publication of . -secret Pentagon papers contains lessons for all of us in the news business and for the country and the government as well. The newspapers are learning from this, episode and from the national loss of memo- ry that has occurred since 1964 that their .Impact on public opinion in the United States Is tragically limited. The substance and in - some cases the precise details of virtually everything The Washington Post and The. .New York Times have printed from the Pen- tagon papers is ancient history. It was near- ly all published while it was happening. And it was largely a futile enterprise; neither the public nor the-congressional politicians were listening. ? The government is learning something, too. It is learning that policy is poorly com- municated and public opinion is poorly shaped by proxy. All through the early' - 1960s, government officials were anonymous- ly "leaking" their fears and "options" for Vietnam through the press as a substitute ? for public candor and direct communication with the people. This produced considerable support for the government's zig-zag policies by most of the major newspapers, including. The Post and The Times. But newspaper editorials are not necessarily the voice of the people, and newspapers, as is now evi- dent, are inadequate instruments for public education, . What tile public and politicians could learn from this experience is that if they sit there asleep in the back row while their ? destinies ere being debated, they are In a poor position when the slumber ends to cry foul and search for ? scapegoats. ? 6-4-9 ? THE FACTS of this particular case are . that The Post and The Times and other large IlOWS organizations published: thou- sands of stories, editorials and essays in - 1901 describing the deteriorating military and political situation in Vietnam?just as it was described in the official memoranda. and cables in the Pentagon papers. The vari- ous options' and contigency plans being put before- the President at that time were re- ported-. repeatedly and accurately?as they are now reported hi the official papers, . The growing combat role of American forces was laid out in impressive detail on front. pages all over the country?the first use's of napalm against suspected enemy ..villages, the commitment of U.S. helicopters - 'and crewmen to the battlefields, the recon- naissance, bombing and strafing missions of ? US. aircraft in South Vietnam end Laos, the 'U.S. role in the training and transport pf. South Vietnamese raiding parties into North Vietnam, the participation of U.S. 'advisers and Special Forces teams in major battles, the use of U.S. troops in perimeter : defense at military bases. The circumstances of the TonkinAWO?fd-iti 43bl-414164Se-11)0 prior raids by ,e?outa ldjetnarnese forces _against North Vietnamese territory,, were_ By Richard iirwoocI ? reported accurately at the time. The pos- sibi1itie:,1 of U.S. air raids on North Vietnam were reported and discussed in the press repeatedly far in advance of the event. U.S. casualty lists and the new funerals at'Ar- lington National Cemetery received increas- ing prominence in the news as the war revved up in 1964. "Today," one of our correspondents wrote ? in February, 1964, "there are 15,500 military personnel in South Vietnam; some 275 Amer- icans have died, about 100 of them in com- bat, but there has been no outcry what- soever at home for pulling out our, troops. "rhis attitude, one hopes, is an expression of maturing American opinion, of a willing- ness to face pp to wars that are neither 'won' nor 'lost'; to accept the fact that the ,Korean War was the first of what probably will be a host of 'mean, frustrating and- uerve-wracking wars,' the term Secretary of State Dean Rusk applied last April to ? the Is,trug,gle in South Vietnam." c?-f-E3 FOLLOWING the Gulf of Tonkin inci- dents Time Times editoralize.d: "United States determination to assure the inde- pendence of South Vietnarin if ever doubt- ed before, cannot be doubted now by the Communists to the north or their .allies." A few days later The Times said: 'rho Americans went into Vietnam in 1954 to fill the vacuum left by the French and to contain the advance of communism in that part of Southeast Asia. The motives are exemplary and every American ? can be proud of them, but the crucial questions are: Can it be. done? . . Is this war neces- sary?" These readings of "mature" and "united" American opinion toward the war were probably wrong. What the evidence from that time suggests is that despite, the pre- occupation of the newspapers and of the ? government with Vietnam, the public was both ill-informed and not greatly interested. The Gallup Poll in May, 1964, reported that 63 per cent of the American people had no opinion about the war or how it was going or what the United States should do. .The reason for that, Gallup explained, was that this 63 per cent were paying no attention to developments in Southeast Asia; neither the newspapers nor the government had gotten their attention. Six months later, when the war fever in Washington and in the press was rising, the Council on Foreign Relations reported the results of another poll, One in four adult Americans, the council found, was not even aware that, a war was going on in Southeast Asia, What had they been told by the press? If Met' CiAaRDP ?,1140t66CHROGOM017?0001 -0 haul been told in February that Secretary Rnsleewas._.saying., that ,,retaliation- against - ? JLJL eei." ?? , 0 1, giiro T.; - ? L., -0,-, STATINTL _______Approx0341-F-9r-Release 2000/05/15.: CIA-RDP80-01601R000600 CLEVELAND, 01110 PLAIN DEALER MIN 2)r, Ic?--j 1 14 - 409,414 7 ? S - 545,032 .",,-?1Pip-iAl By Michael Morrow 0 Dispatch pews Service Iniernotional VIENTIANE, Laos ? U.S.. intelligence, operations in- clude the sending of armed Laotian reconnaissance t earns into China from northern Laos. Teams are reported to have gone as far as 200 miles into China, dis- patched froni a secret CIA outpost. 15 minutes' flying ' time north of the Laotian opium center of }Joliet Sal. According to sources dose to the Central Intelligence 'Agency, and confirmed by Western diplomatic sources in ?Vientiane, the CIA is sending out hill tribesmen armed with American weap- tons:. a_ thre.e,pound radio with a range of 400 miles and equipment to tap ' Chinese telegraph lines, . watch roads . and do other 'tyPes of intelligence gather- ing. "There is -always a team . in China,'.!accordingto . sources close to the CIA.' Staging area for the oper-. ation is a small, Luritain- Valley - airstrip called Nam Lieu (also known as Nam Yu). The strip, which one Air America pilot describes as ."difficult as hell to get i n.t. o," is surrounded by 'Mountains. It is serviced by both Air America and Conti- nental 'Air Service and is also away-station for opium traders from northern Laos and Burma enroute to drug factories at Houei SaL , . .. eD U R.I N G 1968, five Chinese functionaries, caught up in the purges of the cultural revolution de- fected to a Nam Lieu trecon- naissance 'team. They were treatedwell by the Ameri- cans for a time but eventu- ally were turned over to the Royal Laotian government. 0 py 4771 rin) 04 ? ..1 1"71 71174 41 ci.Ly According to sources close to the CIA, the five were thrown into a 12 by 12 by 12 loot pit exposed to the ele- ments. They were eventual- ly executed. Like most CIA operations in Laos, the one out of Nam Lieu is directed from a headquarters at Udorn Air Base in northeastern Thai- land. There are sever al Americans at Nam Lieu, however, including CIA and military intelligence person- nel. Source close to the CIA report the number has in- creased recently from 4 to more than 10. In addition to activities in- side China, the Nam Lieu Americans also help direct a joint operation of "SGU" (Special Guerilla Units) and. the Thai army at Xieng Lem south of Houtei Sat on the Lao-Thai border. They also run intelligence gather- - Ing missions, on a road being built by the Chinese g o-v e r n in e n t (under an agreement reached with the now defunct coalition gov- ernment of Laos) in the same .vicinity. ' UNTIL MID-SEPTEM- BER of last year, the Nam Lieu, operation was headed by a tough-and-tumble vet- er an guerrilla organizer ' named Anthony. (Tony) Poe. -Poe is a legendary figure in Laos known best for his dis- like of journalists, disregard for orders and radio codes, capacity for Lao whisky and expertise a t. clandestine guerrilla operations. Poe was removed almost .immediately after an article last - September by Dispatch News Service International on the Nam Lieu operations, ? ostensibly because the arti-! de "blew his cover." Ac- cording to sources close to the CIA, however, this rea-:. son was an 'excuse used by the Am eric a nEmbassy here to get rid of Poe; whose dashing style has been a source of long-term ,friction with members of the American Mission in Laos, including A in bassador McMurtrie Godley. As for the missions into China, howeve r, sources close to the CIA and West- ern diplomatic sources both 'report that to their know- ledge they continue. Since leaving Nam Lieu ? Poe bas spent most of his .time at Udorn Air Base, al- though one source reports Poe continues to do "odd jobs" on the Thai-Cambodi- an ? border. Those who know him say he is unhappy away from Nam Lieu. POE - IS AN ex-Marine noncommissioned officer, wounded at Iwo Jima, who remained in Asia after ,World War II. In the 1950s he helped organize CIA- ,rained Tibetan insurgents, :escorting them to Colorado :for training and going back :with them into Tibet. Later he worked ,in the Thai-Cambodian bord area with the Khmer Serai ? anti-Slhanouk gui iiIi re.- ceivinn assistance 1; ora, the Cl.'. and other parts of- Thailand. I ie has been and out of Laos sihe bofore ? the Geneva a?neerds uf lf.)(.;2 and was one .of tne Americans involved in arm- ing and training paramili-; tary groups in Laos. Poe is considered ? stub- born and- brusque, some- r times going into fits of an- ger over the radio, his life- line with the outside world. He is said to prefer working with hill tribes to working with Americans and looks down on most Anierican op- erations because of their heavy reliance on American personnel. ? He has been wounded at; least once during his career in Laos and reportedly a price has been put on his headby the Pathet Lao. He is perhaps the only Amen- cart legally married to a woman of the hill tribes. L.A. Times/Washington Post Service e.20.00105/154-GIA-RDP80.-01601R000600170001-0 S 9552 Approved For R ? - ? initiated to solve problems of interven- tion on the high seas in cases of oil pol- lution casualties and the civil liabilities' for oil pollution damage. International conventions on those subjects are now ? before the Senate for its advice and con- ' " sent to ratification. However, previous efforts have con- ? - centrated on action after the pollution _ casualty has occurred. What is needed how is action to prevent casualties. And that is what Senator 1VIAcNus0N's bill is .? designed to accomplish. It is a tough bill, ? that goes to the root of the problems? construction, maintenance, and opera- - - tion of tankers and other vessels carry- ing certain liquid cargoes in bulk, and regulation of the movement of all vessels 'and placement of structures in navigable waters of the United States. These are essential actions that we must take, par- , - ticularly in the face of the rapidly in- creating amount of ocean transport of - liquid cargoes in bulk. At the same time, it is important that other countries join us in applying -.equally stringent regulations on con- struction, maintenance, and operation of vessels, and on their movement in inter- national commerce, The problems are of . international magnitude. And while strong domestic legislation such as the Magnuson bill will contribute enormous- ly to their solution, the problems can- not be solved unilaterally by-the United ?-States. International agreement is CSSC11- . tial, and I urge that immediate. steps be taken by the United States to strengthen our efforts to reach agreement in IMCO on these important problems. And to strengthen our international negotia- tions, I urge passage of the Magnuson . bill and swift establishment of its en- forcement, particularly in those areas? such as vessel traffic control systems? ? where we are lagging behind other coun- tries.: ATR.1, INCREASED CONGRESSIONAL - CONTROL OVER CIA Mr. CASE, Mr. President, much has been said lately about the efforts of Con- gress to reassert and redefine its author- ity in the .field of foreign policy. For myself, I am scarcely at all interested in ? this as an exercise in congressional self- -- aggrandizement. I am very much inter- ested in it as a means of forcing our Gov- .- eminent to conduct foreign policy in the open so that the public may know what is going- on and have the controlling voice In important decisions. In a moment I shall mention briefly several measures I shall soon be propos- e Ing to allow Congress to exercise in- creased control over certain Central Intelligence Agenpy?CIA?and Defense Department programs. My purpose is to place some outside control on what has been the freewheel- ing operation of the executive branch in carrying on foreign policy and even wag- ing foreign wars. ? To be perfectly honest, our system has gotten out of whack, and it is time to restore a better balance. The Constitution does not give the President authority to declare a secret war, and I do not accept that there are any precedents in our history 'which would penApprioved tEor-Release 2 e V .7 I V.119iiil Moreover, our recent history in South- issued by several Presidents. I simp y east Asia shows that .wars approved by question whether a secret intelligence simply a handful of Presidential advisers organization should be assigned a war- may well be not only unconstitutional, making role abroad. Certainly this was but relatively unsuccessful; too. not the intent of Congress when itSTATINTL originally voted to establish CIA. . So I come to my three proposals to limit the Executive's authority to wage asSecret war. These are not all-inclusive, but they are an attempt -to get at the questions of the circumvention of con- gressional intent and the hiring of mer- cenaries. The specific proposals are: First, a bill to extend the limitations which now apply to. the use by the De- fense Department of its funds overseas to all U.S. Government agencies, including CIA. This would prevent the circumven- tion of congressional intent in the fund- ing of activities such as the Thai troops in Laos through CIA rather than through more open Government agencies. It - would also eliminate the possiblity that the Cooper-Church prohibitions against the use of American troops or advisers in Cambodia could -he skirted by using CIA personnel. Second, a bill to prohibit the funding by any U.S. Government agency of mili- tary operations by any country outside its borders without specific congressional authorization. This would eliminate the confusing trail of Thais in Laos. Cam- bodians in Laos, and even Thais in Cam- ? bodia. It would not affect the present programs for U.S. payments to Koreans, Thais, and Filipinos in Vietnam, since Congress has specifically voted money for these troops. My bill would, how- ever, require the administration to in- form the Congress., on a confidential basis, if necessary, of the details of any ? argreements with foreign governments to. finance their military operations abroad. I would hope this would prevent our Gov- ' ernment ? from offering lavish induce- ments to foreign governments in return for the use of -their troops. As you may remember, it was revealed last year that the U.S. Government in sonic cases had been secretly- paying Koreans and prevented it from being made known to Thais in Vietnam higher levels of corn- the public. bat. pay than were being paid to Ameri- Even today, the Government tries to can troops fighting in the same country. maintain a thick veil of secrecy over TI ? id, b' ll t l .t; g 't some of its programs in Laos. Every so tions on the use by the Defense Depart- often news trickles out in driblets as an ment of surplus military materiel to all Depart- energetic newspaperman digs out a story Government agencies. I make this pro- or a government official leaks out a reve- posal because of reports I have received lotion. ur- after they have somehow gotten into the Hut essentially, we are only told things of the relatively unrestricted use of s plus materiel by_ CIA. I have no Means of verifying these reports, but if they are public realm, despite the $350-odd mil- untrue, my bill would not interfere with lion in taxpayers' funds which are- be- any existing Government programs. ? ing spent annually in Laos, to say noth- The three proposals I have outlined ing of the estimated $2 billion annual cost of U.S. air activity over Laos. would serve to plug some loopholes in the law. Of course they would by no Successive administrations- have been - means close them all. The Executive can able to carry on the secret war in Laos, find ways to skirt almost any prohibi- as they did earlier in Vietnam, by use t of that vast billion dollar treasure chest than if it is so inclined. The solution to which Congress has appropriated, but the problem lies, in the long run, not in a tighter drafting of the law but in never controlled, for discretionary Intel- the acceptance by the Executive of .Con- ligence and military programs. And the ge U.S. Government agency assigned to car- ress and the public as partners in thconduct of the peoples' vital business. rying out the administrations' policies such as the running of the 30,000 man Our country was founded on the prin- Secret Anny?Arm6e Clandestine?gond ciples of democracy, and the essence of the funding of Thai troops has usually a democracy is the participation of the been the CIA. people and their representatives in the I do not direct criticism against the decisions which affect their very nation- OONCI5M5taledA4RDR8 090 diliAtROGO6 001100114,4 ? ? - Like most Americans, I was shocked by the cynical manipulation of our po- litical processes revealed in the New York Times' account of the McNamara study on the origins of the Vietnam war. I believe that our country should not go to War as part of- a carefully plotted sce- nario which involves secret attacks on the other side?some apparently with the aim of provoking retaliation against us and our allies. This approach has no place in our open society. ? I do not want to get into an extended postmortem on Vietnam,- however. Our primary task Should not be to engage in recriminations or assign blame, but to bring the war to an end. That is why, last year and earlier this week, I voted for the Ilatfield-McGovern proposal to set a definite date for U.S.. withdrawal from Vietnam. The Vietnam- war, at least during the last several years, has been waged essen- tially in the open. The same cannot be said for the war in neighboring Laos. A top American diplomat was quoted re-- cently by the Washington Star saying: What we are doing here in Laos is totally inconsistent with our kind of society. We are fighting a war by covert means and an open society cannot tolerate that. I agree with this diplomat's appraisal and consequently I have done everything I can to bring the facts on the war in Laos before the American public. For example, I stated several weeks ago that there apparently was an agree- ment between the U.S. and Thai Gov, ernments for the financing and support through CIA of thousands of Thai troops in Laos. Only when the administration became aware of my speech did the Sen- ate receive any kind of explanation of what was going on. And the explanation was incomplete and partially inaccurate despite its secret classification which NEVIswEEK 2 1 JU1.1 . Approved For Release 2000/05/15.: CIA-RDP80-01601R0006001 a ". Li1:::: INA t7I Pr..7 f g=i l'. 0: C i.?-i7EN'L Vialthlg the Fulbright- amendment. It ? ----._._.7:--------__._-- was, in fact, simple, enough for Adminis- ? T ho Nui:-So-S.ecre,,; War tration spokesmen. to point out that the amendment also contained a clause stat- ? ? For good reason, the U.S. military in- that nothing . in the amendment volvement in Laos has often been called, lug should be construed as prohibiting mili- ; the "secret war." Unlike Vietnam, wllere tar)' actions designed to insure a "safe , most of the American military role is out and orderly withdrawal from Southeast : in the open, the U.S. activities in Laos? Asia or to aid in the release of Ameri- ', a supposedly neutral country ?have nee - cans held as prisoners of war"?a loop- , cssarily been obscured by successive Ad- bole if ever there was one. :ministrations. And withequally good As a whole, the Senate treated Sym- reason, Congress from time to time has ington's secret session with a massive ? grown uncomfortable over the lack of -yawn, and as it rambled on, inure and elearcut information about Laos--a rest - more legislators rose and strolled out of lessness that was manifested once again the chamber. "I must say that I heard last week in a rare secret session of the nothing yesterday that I had not heard / , Senate Republican leader Hugh v United States Senate. The meeting was called by Sen. Stuart before, Scott reported the day after the three- Symington, chairman of a subcommittee and-a-half-hour meeting. "I believe that on national commitments basing his what we had was a rather lengthy tem- charges Tiartly on a report compiled by pest in our ancient and honorable teapot." two stibeommittee aides who recently" And Sen. J. \yilliam Fulbright summed visited Indochina, Symington contended up Symington s performance with the oh- that the U.S. is spending far more money servation: "It was very disappointing that in Laos than the $52 million a year voted the Senate as a whole ... [was] not more by Congress in economic aid and the mterested in it. They are apparently estimated $90 million allotted for military reluctant to be interested even as to the assistance. The real figure, claimed the [acts of what is going on in Laos." y cloves ' Missouri senator, was Closer to $100 iii- The whole experience left man . lion a year, with the differenceg wondering what had happened to the comin ? from secret Central Intelligence A"e"ct'v "no more Vietnams" movement. The an- funds not controlled by Congress'. S);-- swer to that question seemed to be that, mington also pointed out that B-52s are as long as President Nixon continued to bombing Communist forces in northern wind the war clown visibly by withdraw- Laos an'C't that the U.S. is supporting Thai Mg U.S. troops from Indochina, few sen- troops fighting there. The latter program, ators of either the hawkish or dovish per- the senator charged, was a breach of the suasion were disposed to question what l Fulbright amendment to this year's de- -ie did in the invisible" sector of the fense appropriations bill prohibiting the conflict.use of Congressionally approved mon C)' for the funding of "mercenaries" in Laos or Cambodia. "1 have been hoodwinked," ...?. Symington thundered. "I don't want to serve as a figurehead, and I don't want to be in the Senate if we write laws that are flouted." Loophole: Unfortunately for the doves, there was little new in the information put forth at the session. That the 13-52s1 have been bombing northern Laos has been common knov71cdge?even to sena- . torsi-for some time. That the CIA is sup- porting Thai mercenaries at enormous cost has also been discovered and redis- covered. And it was not so easy to estab- lish thijt- the Nixon Administration was STATI NTL Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 STATINTL "BtatfaMO_RE Approved For Release 2000/0g/95416PailbP80-01601 R000600 e a -6 or lie- said he. has also received reports that the CIA has rola- Vin -a g tr-7 77:4),-rs-r 1-1 tively unrestricted use of sur- U U4/ ' V, Si/ (Lif Li t., . plus arms in its covert military operations. , g. Only Following Orders Ori T, 'L-,( Iry 1z, ... lr 11 do not direct criticism ?- against the CIA," Mr. Case said, 1 ' "for it has only been following CIA ti roYa Case Seeks o Prevent Secret 'Wars .Founit S T orders issued by several Presi- 0 , dents. I simply question whether ? By Agency Behind Congress's Back a secret intelligence organiza- . By GENE OISHI Washington Burcau of , The Sun .. ? ? Foreign Mercenaries The House, in fact, also reject- ed by a 172-to-16 vete an amend- ment similar to what Senator Case is proposing. The defeated amendment would have prevent- ed the CIA from using Defense Department funds for conduct- ing "paramilitary" opertions or hiring foreign mercenaries to fight in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand.. . Washington, June 19?Senator Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.) an- nounced today that he. intends to 'Introduce legislation to prevent the CIA from secretly engaging in military operations. - The legislation will be drafted I as amendments to the foreign aid authorization bill, which is expected to reach the Senate I floor next month. The series of amendments would: 1. Extend congressional re- strictions on the use of Defense , Department funds overseas to all government agencies, includ- ' ing the CIA. Specific Authorization 2. Prohibit any U.S. govern- ment agency from financing military operations abroad with- out specific congreSsional au- thorization. 3. Extend the existing limita- tions on the. use by the Defense Department of surplus arms to all government agencies. -Mr. Case said he did not be- lieve his proposal would com- pletely cut off the executive branch's ability to wage secret wars, but said he was approach- ing the matter "piecemeal" be- cause he did not believe Con- gress was ready to pass more comprehensive legislation. - The reluctance of Congress to assert its full authority was de- monstrated, he said, by ?the 'de- feat in both houses earlier this week of legislation to impose a deadline for total withdrawal of. forces from Indochina. ? Representative F. Edward He- bert (11, La.), chairman of the House Armed Services Commit- tee, opposed the amendment, saying its enactment would be "very dangerous to the security of our country." Mr. Hebert, as chairman of the Armed Services Committee, is one of a handful of congress- men who have access to infor- mation pertaining to the CIA. While all CIA operations are officially secret, there have been numerous newspaper re- ports as well as statements by congressmen and senators on the agency's operations in South- east Asia. The most publicized activity of the CIA has been its opera- tions in Laos, where the agency reportedly has equipped and trained a secret army of Meo tribesme nand now is supporting Thai mercenaries. to fight there. Without disclosing. his sources, Mr. Case also suggested that the , CIA is financing Cambodian troops in Laos as well as Thai troops in Cambodia. ? STATINTL tion should be assigned a war- making role abroad. Certainly. this was not the intent or Con- gress when it originally voted to establish the CIA. The rationale behind secret military and paramilitary oper- ations is that the United States should have some means of mili- tarily protecting its interests abroad, short of engaging in open warfare. Mr. Case said that while he agreed that secret operations might in certain instances ba. useful he felt they were incom- patible with "an open system of government." Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 LOS ? AKELES TIMES Approved For Releaee 2000/05115: CIA-RDP80-01001R000600 ? I -2 0 JUN 1971 d p 4C B u ge_t_ +.1,27.- The' CIA . budget, esti- lnated. to, run annually anywhere from $500 mil- lion to $1 billion, is hidden ? .ameng the budgets of Va-. ?rio u s departments 'and' :only key Members of Con- gress are aware of its mag-, .11itude. and the purposes .for which it is intended. .' :In his speech; Case de- . ? (...???,3 ..-...,,,, ., .._.., i A elbie l' w 7 ill,l'''t\ o o 111 6:Ai [1 6 IL / . LI .,..! k.t. 1.i V J1.1 ?- : :: ?????? .. ....,1, - ..:. - - - -:1-. -... ' ? Case's Move Pronnte,c1 by i)isc,..losure Spy' ? ? Agency Is Phiancing 'Operations in Laos. -;?????'...?-?' .Wi i01-T1,.1 -II. AVT.TMLL e. - ? - ., . c Tim :s Staff Virila ? . ? . - _ .scribed his proposals as "a , ? - . ? . ? . .. _ _.. _. . . .. WA SIIINtITON L--. In ..a. : Both amendments were means of forcing our gov- move to end ..clandestine' enacted into law last year. ' ernment to conduct fo- U.S. military involvement The - first, sponsored: .by . reign policy in the open so In Laos, Sen. Clifford P. Sens. John Sherman Coop- that the public may know . Case' (fl-N.J.) .p r-o posed or (R - Ky.) and Frank . what is .going on and have legislation Saturday to bar Church (D-Ida.), prohibits ? the controlling" voice in i .the 'Central -. Intelligence the use of U.S. ground important decisions." : Agency from financing combat forces in ?Lao s . or ? . .Tobe -perfectly, frank," military operations' in any Cambodia. . .' LT-zef:e_,I . ? Case, continued, "our sys- : . , . country without congres- - The second, by Sen. J. tem has -- gotten out of - o- . sional -authorization. W iI liam Fulbright (D- whack and it is time t re- . Case's proposal w a s Ark.), prohibits use of store a better balance. .he prompted by disclosures Pentagon funds " Constitution does not give to sup- . 'that the CIA is financing port Vietnamese'or other the President authority to and supeiwising the use of free-world forces , in ac-. declare a ;secret war arid.I ? between 4,500 and 5,000 tions designed to provide do not accept that there ? ments of Cambodia and 'history which would per- 'are any precedents flour That troops against Corn- military support and as- ) Itinlst forces in Laos. ? r:?-"I do not direct criticism - sistance to the- govern- :_ : rnit him now to do so:" ? - - . , - ...- ? .. _. i.g?ainst the CIA, for it has Laos. ^ : . ?. :Dovish Comm! t tco? only been following orders Fulbright contends the ' It .has been disclosed in - .issued by several Piesi- U.S. financing of Thai recent Weeks ? that the dents," Case said: -. ' " ? troops in Laos is a N'iota- United States is spending ?-?? "I s I in Ply-. q n .es Lion tion of his amendment. Al- at, least. $350 million an- whether a secret intelli- ? though the 'State Depart-- nually. in Military and eco- * pence organization -should rnent reluctantly acknowl- . nomie assistance' to the ? ? be assigned a war-making .edge.d Thai troops are in :royal Laotian ,,,,bernment. role abroad. Certainly this Laos, it denied any viola- This presumably includes vas not the intent of Con- .tion of the Pulbright 016. cost of financing the gross when it originally. amendment on grounds ,That mercenaries. The Ad- . voted to establish t,h c the . That troop program . ministration acknowledg- * CIA.". ? was inherited from the. . es spending only $52 roil- .Case, who has become an Kennedy Administration. ' lion in Laos and that for !bore asingy outspoken .With his proPosed ? economic .assistance. &Ric of U.S. involvement amendments, Case said he . By attaching his amend-. in Indochina, advanced his hopes to prevent the CIA . ments? to the foreign aid proposal in a speech be- from claiming exemption *bill, Case 'would put. them fore the New Jersey Press f r o m? the Fulb right within jurisdiction of the Assn. at, Spring Lake, N.J. amendment. Since Fut- predominantly dovish Fe- The text was released bright's amendment ap- reign Relations Commit- here. ? :plies specifically to De- tee rather than the lia,-- ? ? An an interview, Case fense Department appro: kish Senate Armed Servi- iatd he planned tOOffer.hiS priations Case .proposed .ces Committee, which has legislation as amendments that the :Fulbright ban be jurisdiction over the' CIA.. to P' the Administration's: broadened to include all Case said, however, that, .foreign aid bill pending be-: funds and all government he might' offer his propo- ? fore the Senate I''?ereIgri? agencies -----. including the :" sals as amendments to the Relations Committee, of. CIA: _ - ? Armed Service - Commit-. Which Case is a :senioi."- . , rnember. " .-..i. . ?.-- . NO End Runs ? My Purpos"e," he said, to prevent the CIA and the Defense , . ? fifbra iriaki Departmentng Appriqiygd For Release.2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80--01601R000600170001-0 :around the Cooper-Chtkreh a n d Fulbright a in e n cl- STATINTL TRENTON, N.J. TIMES ? 81 8T4Iproved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601R00060 TIMES?ADVERTISER S ? 102,422 r. - JUN 2 0 Igri OII-kI IINIL By KNIGHT KIPLINGER 'limes Washington Bureau WASHINGTON ? Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) charg- ed yesterday that .the Nixon administration is conducting .4 CIA-funded "secret war in Laos," the extent and cost of which is unknown to Congress and the American public - 7. The Senator made the charge while announcing plans to Introduce three bills to "limit the executive's authority to wage a secret war" overseas without congressional e. approval. One bill would extend .to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activities similar, requirements of congressional approval that now exist for Defense Department spending :overseas. TheSecond bill, a broader version of the first, would ' :prohibit funding by an U.S. government agency of. the military operations of a foreign nation- without. congres- sional approval. - A third proposed bill would extend to all government ? .agencies present limitations on the use of surplus mill-. tary material by. the Defense Department. :% Case made the announcements in a brief. speech before' a meeting of the New Jersey Press Association at Spring lake. ? As. A Preventative He said he hopes his bills will "prevent our government From offering lavish inducements to foreign, governments tfor the use of their troops" as mercenaries. ;In a? speech on the Senate floor May 20, Case said that the CIA is currently paying for the military operations of silaout 4,000-6,000 troops from Thailand operating in Laos. In the same speech, which focused national attention on :U.S. policy .of funding Asian mercenaries, Case said CIA 'operations in Laos are a "Widening of American involve- ? Inent in Southeast Asia" and are a violation of the . .Cooper-Church Ameridment. oThe briefing, Case said Saturday, s as ncomp and partially inaccurate, despite its secret classification which prevented it from, being made known to the., public." He continued, 'Even -today the government tries to maintain a thick veil of secrecy over some of its programs in Laos." ? The senator told the New Jersey Press audience he was ."shocked, by the cynical manipulation of our. political processes revealed in fhe New York Times account of the _ McNamara study of the origins of the Vietnam War." He said he believes the United States "should not go to war as part of a carefully plotted scenario which involves secret attacks on the other side ? some apparently with the aim of provoking retaliations _against us and our allies. The "secret attacks" to which Case referred were the August, :1.964, raids on North Vietnamese islands, revealed by the Pentagon study to have been executed by South ? Vietnam on the orders of U.S. officials in Saigon, Tonkin Story The raids provoked North Vietnamese attacks on a U.S. ship in the gulf of Tonkin, which were used by. the., -.Johnson administration as a rationale for requesting. the carte blanche powers that Congress extended in the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. ? The truthfulness of the government account of the Gulf - of Tonkin incident has long been disputed, with many - authorities charging that the second of two alleged North Vietnamese attacks never occured, but was later fabri- cated. -Case and 97 Senate colleagues, including all the major. opponents of the war policy in subsequent years, voted for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The .only two negative votes were cast by Sen. .Wayne Morse (D-Oregon) and. Sen. Ernest Gruening (D.-Alaska), who were later defeat- ed in reelection bids. ? ' :The. Cooper-Church legislation prohibits .U.S. payment. for the use of mercenaries in Laos or Cambodia, except :to protect ;U.S. troops as they withdraw or to aid in the ;release of American POWs. .The senator has charged that covert CIA funding has Fenabled the adininistration to circumvent Congress' de-- ? -1 !trees -against broadening the war. ? . ? .1 rCase estimated that nearly $2.5 billion of U.S. money is I ,being spent annually in ground and air operations ill; Secret Briefing . . Soon after Case's May speech, the Nixon administration- isent officials up to Capitol for an unusual- closed-door" ;:briefing of the entire Senate on the subject of operations Laos. Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600170001-0 STAT I NT L SHINC T0'41 POST 080-01601R0006 f,/ ? ? -!1.- 14 1 as e ?? di _ ? ? By Bernard D. Nossiter ? j ? tee in February 1968. Chairman FuThright asked WashiNgton Post Staff Wiiter . News /A CilyS I g . The Commitlee was cx- Wheeler whether in the pe? e A eernParison of the John. :feirCeg-IdEet?witlraggreSSIVe 'ploring the on of the Hod around July 1964 the , ;son administration's public , attack . . . " .1'011.kin Gulf Resolution, the military had recommended remarks with the material Thus, the last two pare.- :authority :on which the extending the war to the , graphs, although still avoid- Johnson regime relied to en- !north by bombing or other : that has - been published : log the full truth, soften the ; large the war. Sen. William 'means. .1rem the Pentagon's private impact of the first and pat- ' Fulbright (D-Ark.), the.. Gen. Wheeler replied: .1 study of the Vietnam war entleefalsearagraPh. chairman, was attempting to "I don't believe so, Mr. ! . 0 Chairman. I think that the discloses a public record in late November ' discover whether the admin- ; ? istration had decided well in ? proper answer would be ? marked by half-truths, care- 1964 the Am inistration's - ton ? ? z advance .of the August inci- t Most circle,' ' according to dents in the Tonkin Gulf to telllalt therei g e ilc ea evtrievri were ecse(rdtealine t ell- Jul ambiguities, and mislead- . : lug and reients rather than flatfooted deceptive state- published material, agreed ask Congress for a broad I but to the best of my knowl- ' - ? - . i. "ined ac? grant of authority The diae edge and belief during that i.untruths. to adopt a determ ' gue went like this: period there was no thought What appears at first .' tion Program" aimed at put- lo The Chairman: Mr. Secre- of extending the war into :glance to be the grossest ting preSsure on Hanoi end tary did you see the contin- the North in the sense of misstatement in public ire- raising South Vietnamese gency draft of what became our participation in such ac- ! ? quently turns out, on close ? 'examination, to contain a lions, activities." morale. A draft position the Southeast Asle. resolu- ? paper of Nov. 2, q Chnts a . tion befere it was ready? : Then, for the record, the i phrase or word that saves it Secretary McNamara: ,Mr. Pentagon supplied an inser- . from the label "lie." tworphaSe bombing program ? ? I es. 1 . .1 Chairman, ? 1 Lac in the 1965, according to the pub- tion: For example, on April 1, as a key element in this newspaper a few weeks ago "We have identified no , plan?possible r e p r i s a 1 there had been such a con- such recommendation. A [ lished documents, President . .. treee, against North Viet. ting,ency . draft. I don't be- check of the records of the ' f Johnson secretly made a - ' " ' ? lieve I ever saw it .. , But I Joint Chiefs of Staff is con- 'fateful decision, ordering the.: nein and A U.S. readiness to can't testify absolutely that Waling." . ' 3,500 Marines in Vietnam to conduct sustained bombing ?I didn't. My memory is not shift from a static defense of against the North. . clear On that. ? the base at Danang to offen- At a press conference on -; sive actions. This was the be- - ginning of an offensive coin- Nov.. 28, a prescient reporter Ni at role for U.S. ground asked the President: EX.Centie .: troops. ' "Is expansion of the Viet- Committee ? top brass sent McNamara a The fir Commist public hint of nam war into Laos or North e lengthy memo saying: , this change came on June 8 Vietnam a live possibility at 'when a State Department this point?" ' - 'In fact, the Executive "Accordingly, the Joint spokesman said that "Ameri- Mr. Johnson, in a lengthy Committee of the National . ' Chiefs of Staff consider that ? - ' ? - . Security Council ? which :Can forces 'would be availa- reply, allowed that his top ? the United States must ble for combat support." advisers were then meeting, - included McNamara ? had The next day, the White but in the operative part of :decided after its meetings make ready to conduct In- House put out a statement his response said: . :on May 24 and 25, 1964 to creasingly bolder actions in Assertin .seek a Congressional resolu- : Southeast Asia to: . : g: "I anticipate that there ' will be no dramatic an- tion authorizing "all meas- '.?. . . . h. Conduct aerial "There has been no ' , .- ures" to assist South Viet- - nouncement (emphasis add- bombing of key North Viet- bat 'change in the mission of ? nam. Thus, 11,1cNamara and Cd) to come out of these nam targets, . using U.S. re- ; United States ground com? . the others had approved a meetings except in the form bat units in 'Vietnam in re- ' - draft of the Tonkin Gulf res- sources under. Vietnamese of your speculation." :- cent' days or -weeks. The President has issued no This was literally true but olution nearly ten weeks be- i cover, and with the Viet- '-' ' fore the attack on the Amer- , nameSe openly assuming ' substantively misleading. No order of any kind in this re- ,. ? jean destroyers in those wa- - . sponsibility for the actions re- dramatic announcement was In fact, published records ? show, as early as Jan. 22, 1964 ? six months before" the period about which Ful- ' bright, was inquiring ? the gard to Gen. recently or 'at any other made but the meetings all -time.".. but sealed the dramatic dc. This appear mi s to be the lie ' ? en to launch the two- direct. But the statement ?has? bombing program 1' that began in February. 'continued: l 'The primary miesion of y madeAdministration leaders saw the draft and it is con- ;?. :these troop Is to secure and rare outrieht mis- ceivable that he approved safeguard important .mill- statements about the crucial the substance without read- events in the 20 months up lag all the language. Moreo- 'tary Installations like the to July 1965 when, as the al- - ver, he tells the committee ? airbase at Danang. They ready published Pentagon that his memory isn't .clear 'have the associate.d., mission documents say, the United , on the crucial point and he of activelY patrolling and se- States entered into an open- won't "absolutely" deny hay- curing action in and near ended commitment and an ing seen it. 'the areas thus safeguarded." Asian land war. At the same hearing, Gen. . "If help is requested by Perhaps Defense Secre-: 'Earle Wheeler, chairman ot appropriate Vietnamese'tr Pobert McNamara the Jount 'Chiefs of Staff, commanders, Gen. West- moreland also has authority Within the assAPPrOliellbF to employ these troops in support of Vietnamese ters. - Even here, McNamara's choice of words to the Sen- ate Committee is artful. He says he didn't believe he "j. Commit U.S. forces as ! necessary in direct actions against North Vietnam ...". t Wheeler was stretching the truth to say the Chiefs harbored "no thought" of extending the war North. On the other hand, he could argue that a proposal "to ' make ready" northward ac- tions is less than a recom- mendation and that he .1 equates "thought" with an . : unqualified proposal. The gap between public ! came as close as any to corn- skirted perilously close to ,oratory and private belief is 't?alsification in his tes- untruth. ? Whether he, strikingly illustrated by Mr. rt Pylsifib2a001/05/15nntelAaRlanatal 601 R013615010171101(20's State of the Union Foreign Relations, Commit- higher semantics, - J a rcss on Jan. 4, 1965.. STAT I NT L FAR EASTEM ECONOMIC REVIEW Y Approved F.9r Release 2000/05AR :kblik-Ri5IT60-01601,R0006 Chop of bile BY ARNOLD ABRAMS Vientiane: The thaw in Sinn-American relations has not halted .US-directed ;intelligence operations which penetrate ideep into Chinese territory. These operations, whicli have been conducted for years by the CIA (Central Int elli- 'sena Agency), involve the sending of reconnaissance team& from northern Laos as far as several hundied miles into southern China's ?Yunnan province. Team members are native hill tribesmen :whose ethnic stock ? Meo ? is pre- valent in southernShina. ? ? The tribesmen have been recruited, equipped and trained by the CIA to in- filtrate Chinese territory and obtain in. formation on troop movements, politi- -eeeeeee turalavo..4 . -- ? - ? ? -Chinre,e authorities have known for some- time about. the mise,ions; several teams have been captured in recent ; , years. Curt sequently, Michelin Officials reason that Peking will continue to tolerate such territorial incursions as long as they are conducted solely for intelligence-gathering purposes and do not pose a. direct security threat. US authorities also believe that, if the Chinese want an excuse to reverse the friendly trend, they can do better than - simply focus on these operations. "Americans are still fighting in Viet- nam, they have a military presence on Taiwan, and they are standing by their 'Peaty commitments to Chiang Kai- Ade:: obsefves one source close to the US einbassy here. "If the Chinese are looking for something-to whip them witheany one of those three will do." In Laos, American officials' mejor security concern about the Chinese stems from a Peking road-building pro: pet in the north. An estimated 14,000 Chinese personnel, including several thousand soldiers standing guard and manning ar4i-aircraft batteries, are con- structing a route leading toward the Thai border. Thai authorities repeatedly have ex- pressed deep concern about the road's potent la as a supply Jim for commu- nist-led guerilla forces in northern Thai- land. American officials privately voice . similar concern. While coneeding that Chinese forces in Laos have not shown g ? hostility, they insist the construction project must be kept under closest a ? scrutiny. The Peking project originally was re- quested by the tripartite government, established in Laos with the signing of the 1962 Geneva Accord, which col- lapsed in 1963. Ironically, while Amer-jean officials fret about Chinese intentions in Laos, Peking's new diplomacy has prompted a positive reaction from the leader of this nation's neutralist government. In a recent interview, Prime Minister Souvan- na Phounia stressed China's historically non-aggressive attitude toward Laos'. The 70-year-old prince noted that the .unhappy history of this landlocked kingdom is replete with tales of invasion by neighbouring Thais, Cambodians, . Burmese and Vietnamese ? but not by. Souvanna Phouma:, Strussing China's non- ? aggrossh/17 towards Laos. cal developments and other pertinent security data. American embassy offi- dals in Vientiane refuse to discuss these ? Opera lions, but qualified eouices report fliat the officials believe local security needs and the intellieence value of such ?operations justify their continuation. American authorities largely discount :any potential threat these operations :pose to slowly improving relations be- tween 1Vashington and Peking. They be- .lieve this !bleat is small because the :operations are not commando reids or possible Sin -American r pproc would restrain further North Vietnam-. CSC aggression in Laos. Altlionep otivanna Phuuma is still said to harbour private fears about Peking's fonerange designs on this region, his current public stance marks a depaiture limn the position he assumed earlier this year, prior to the US-sup- - ported South Vietnamese invasion of his country. Then, he warned that the allied move might prompt open intervention by Peking in the Indochina war. Now, his tune is different. Like everyone else, - he can only guess about the intentions of China's leaders. FacAtil rioweving BY A CORRESPONDENT Vientiane: Asia's latest opium war Is hotting up. East of the Annamite moun- tains, the US military is reported to be reeling:linder the effects of heroin, and in Saigon US leaders have been pressing the government into a series of emer- gency measures to stop the flow of sup- plies ? including a mass:transfer of cus- toms agents from Ton Scin Nitta airport, the centre of large scale trafficking, and sweeps through the city to arrest sus- pected peddlers. A widely publicised amnesty-cure programme has been offered addicted soldiers. All chemists and known ped- dling centres have been placed "off limits" and medical tests instituted to detect addicts among homeward bound troops. But these measures are preliminary iskirmishes in the great \var. The pro- ' blem of stamping out or otherwise con- trolling opium can ()illy be solved by an international campaign of which Laos is already feeling the impact. An American narcotics investigator is in Vientiane tracing the legend that heroin is pro- duced in Laos and seeking information to map out strategy in the war against Opiates. Early this month Laotian !Ia..; timed police were pressured into a gen- eral round-up of Vientiane's opium den Operators, must of whom have a licence front the Laotian eovernment. More than 120 operators were held for ques- tioning. But Laotians find it difficult to take seriously a campaign which conflicts with local customs, tolerances and eco- sabotar effort and Amelareeedo not wilily. The opium den operators were oarovea Q Kelease 4134p1 s4' li`ii:1660600170001-0 paeticinate direay tnem..eforeover, - tat una s' a i e, coup el wit a _ _ - coctinued ....1111 11 STATINTL Release 2000/ 0170 . June. , CONGRESS]: NAL ,RECORD -- HOUSE \..--.AMENDMF.NT OrFERED BY MR. M BATALLO - .. - r. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment. ?-? . The Clerk read as follows: Amendment offered by Mr. BADILLO: Page . ? .. 7, line 4, before the quotation marks alsert the following new sentence: "Nothing in clause (A) or (B) of the first sentence of ? this paragraph or in the immediately pre- ceding sentence shall be construed to au- thorize the use of any of such funds by the Central Intelligence Agency (or by any ._ agency or person operating on behalf of ' the Central Intelligence Agency) to engage, - in any manner or to any extent, in the or- ganization, supervision, or conduct of any ?. military or paramilitary operation of any ? kind in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, or Thai- -? land (Including any operation of the kind ' commonly called 'guerilla warfare' opera- , ? ? tion) which?will be executed by forces com- posed in whole or in part of (i) mercenaries, . (ii) regular or irregular personnel of any - ,-? armed force of any foreign nation. or area, .. or (ill) personnel other than those listed in clause (I) or (Ii) who are under arms and _ -are indigenous to any foreign country or i rea." ' Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, this is a ? very specific amendment limiting the - ? . activities of the Central Intelligence Agency to the gathering of intelligence, and specifically prohibiting the Central Intelligence Agency from conducting guerrilla operations in Southeast Asia. . The necessity for the -amendment arises - because the enabling act which created - the Central Intelligence Agency pro- vides that the CIA may perform "such other functions and ,duties related to in- telligence and affecting national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." There has been clear evidence from news accounts over the years, which I am sure all of you have read, that the Central Intelligence Agency is conduct- ing guerrilla operations in Laos and Cambodia. This last week, as you know, the Senate had a secret session involv- ing our activities in Laos and Senator - _SYMINGTON in the CONGRESSIONAL Rae- Cal) indicated as follows: In the case of Laos one is unable to cite a figure for the total cost of this war to the United States. First, because what the United ' States is doing, and the cost of what we are doing, continues to be cloaked with of- ? ficial - secrecy by the executive branch. - Second, one cannot cite a figure for the total cost to us of the war in Laos because, it must -be said in all frankness, neither : you, nor I, nor any Other Member of Con- gress is in position to know what those costs actually are. ? Yesterday, my colleague the gentle- man from California (Mr. WALDIE), questioned the chairman of the commit- tee as to whether this bill specifically -.included funds for the Central Intelli- gence Agency, and the chairman an- e ? swered that it does. The chairman also refused to say what the amounts were. . and said that only he and the ranking . -minority member of the committee knew. ? The gentleman from California Mr. WALDIE) also asked the charmain as fol- lows: What is the purpose of the CIA activity in Laos? The chairman answered as follows: . Mr. HEBERT. The activity of the CIA in East and everywhere is the gathering of In- telligence for the protection and security of the United States. - If that is the understanding Of the activities of the CIA by the chairman, then he should be in aupport, of this amendment, because all I am saying is that that should be precisely the activity of the Central Intelligence Agency, to gather information, and not to engage In guerrilla activities. But because we do not know exactly what funds are available either in this body or in the Senate, and we do not know exactly to what purpose they are being put, this amendment is prepared so that we can be sure that the activities are limited. I seek only to insure that the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency be limited to those specified in the law, and that is to the gathering of intelli- gence. Certainly after the recent disclos- ures it becomes all the more important that we insure that the agencies of the executive department comply with the mandates of the Congres.s.. ? Even before the New York Times pub- lished parts of the Pentagon study of. our involvement in the Vietnam war, it had become apparent that the CIA had liter- ally been running the entire military op- eration in Laos, including the hiring, training, and leading of a mercenary army of Thais and Meo tribesmen and the tactical control of an air war which has made the Laotian people refugees in their own land. ?. , . As early as 196,1, the CIA recruited Thai pilots to fly planes with markings of the Royal Laotian Government against Communist forces hi Laos and there is evidence these Thai pilots are still flying missions in Laos, under CIA control and supervision. Reliable esti- mates given recently to the Senate indi- cate that the CIA currently is -paying about 5,000 Thais to fight in Laos. Enactment of this amendment is neC- cessary if Congress is to regain some measure of meaningful control and over sight in the field of foreign affairs. Re- gardless of how individual Members might feel about the recent articles in the New York Times, it is clear that the nature and extent of our involvement in Southeast Asia has repeatedly been hid- den from and misrepresented to the American people and their elected Re- presentatives. I strongly suspect that the pattern of subterfuge and outright mis- representation continues. This amend- ment represents a step toward squaring with the American people. I urge its adoption. - Mr. LEGGETT, Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question? Mr. BADILLO. I yield to the gentleman from Calif ornia. Mr. LEGGETT. Would the amendment preclude the CIA from supporting such things as have been reported in national magazines, such as the pay for person- nel in the Saigon Police Force, which police force is being used, of course, for campaign purposes to support the Thieu government in Southeast Asia? Mr. BADILLO. Yes it would, because it would seek to limit the Central Intel- ligence Agency to the gathering of Intel- 61/AIINIL by the Congress. Specifically it exclude:3.MM, the support of activities commonly called guerrilla warfare, support of Merce- naries; support of regular or irregular personnel of any armed forces of any foreign nation or area within Southeast Asia. Mr. CO-NYE,RS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? - Mr. BADILLO. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan. Mr. CONYERS. I want to commend the precision with which the gentleman has formulated this amendment.. I believe it is an exceedingly, important one. I ap- plaud his courage and support him. Mr. BADILLO. I thank the gentleman very much. (Mr. BADILLO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. The gentleman's amendment seeks to place a restriction upon the use of any funds authorized in this proposed act for military or paramilitary operations in Southeast Asia organized or supervised by the Central Intelligence Agency. ThraeCentral Intelligence Agency was established by the National Security Act. It functions under the National Security Council under the President of the Unit- ed States. It initiates no activities of its own without direction from the Presi- dent and/or the National Security Coun- cil. I do not propose to debate on the floor of the I-louse the activities or functions of the Central Intelligence Agency. I will state categorically that the intelli- gence activities conducted by our Gov- ernment are essential to the security of this Nation. The amendment offered by the gentle- man from New York, as I read it, seeks to prohibit the Central Intelligence Agency from organizing, supervising, or conducting any so-called military or paramilitary operation of any kind in Southeast Asia which would be executed by mercenaries, regular or irregular per- sonnel of any armed force of any foreign nation or area, or any other personnel of a foreign nation. I will not go into the ramifications of such a restriction should. it-be enacted. I will merely tell the House -that in my opinion, as well meaning as this amendment may be, it is very dan- gerous to the security of our country. Secrecy is one of the prices we must pay for survival. Today, there seems to be a penchant for exposing Government secrets which wittingly or unwittingly give aid and comfort to the enemy. The amendment offered by the gentle- man from -New York would seriously restrict our intelligence activities in Southeast- Asia and would certainly most seriously affect, and perhaps even pre- - vent, the further withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. I am not going to expand upon my statement any further. I urge the House to overwhelmingly defeat this a,mendment. Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. . (Mr. WALDIE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his I'd- all sections of' ?the world in Laos, the Middle loPonce gladdv itkeigigeras 26s filkijitiag diat Approved For Release 200 7 5/1 : A- - 1 0 0 1-0 STAll - , S 9320 Approved FOr-Re ea In the end, millions of Americans go with- out adequate medical care. They cannot af- ford it. The' are afraid it will break them. Or they cannot find a doctor. Sonic of them die. Others are left destitute_ And most of them fall victim to needless pain and need- less suffering. They are your parents or mine?your children or mine?our friends and our fellow citizens. The disaster we call medical services makes most Americans forgotten Americans. It be- trays each of them and all of us. Our system of medical care is in fact a system of medi- cal neglect. It is in the deepest sense un- American. ? Despite our power and our strength, de- spite our trillion dollar G.N.P., we have let young people die before their time and old people die when there was some precious time left. How will history judge us, a coun- try which was first in the wealth of its re- sources, but far from first in the health of its people? And more importantly, how will we judge ourselves in those quiet, inner mo- ments, when we remember that what finally counts is not how much we have, but what we are? It is time for us to do more until we have done enough to sustain and enhance the health of our nation. Countless medical students and some doc- tors have already answered the call to a new kind of service, In the early 1990s, student health organizations from Los Angeles to Boston pioneered concepts for comprehen- sive health care. In the summer of 1967, stu- dents like you joined together in New York City to found the student health project of the South Bronx. Their historic initiative was a sign of a new generation's determina- tion to make medicine work for people. 'But the young and the concerned in the the medical profession cannot do the whole job alone. Your voice-s have been heard?and sometimes even heeded. But your own efforts will take too long. And the results will be too uncertain. The only certainty is that en- trenched and established forces will oppose you every step of the way. We cannot wait or gamble on the outcome. Human life and human health hang in the balance. Four decades after organized medicine al- most adopted a report favoring uniform fi- nancing for medical services?four decades and a hundred million illnesses too late? we must enact a medical bill of rights for all Americans. The Constitution commits our country to .protect political freedom. Now, by legislation, the Congress must commit America to protect the physical health which alone makes possible the exercise of liberty. The first medical right of all Americans is care within their means. Admission to a hos- pital or a doctor's office should depend on the state of an individual's health, not the size of his wallet. And we cannot depend on reform on half-way measures and half- hearted compromise. A right to medical care .which left the burden of cost on the poor and the near poor would mock its own pur- pose. The only sure security is federally funded universal health insurance. That Is our best hope for the future?and a pri- ority' goal in 1971. We must take the dollar sign out of medi- cal care. We must destroy the financial bar- rier between deprived 'people and essential medical services. We must end the terrible choice so many Americans face between los- ing their health and losing their savings. The second medical right of all Americans Is care within their reach. Even if we guar- anteed the payment of health costs, millions of our citizens could not find sufficient medi- cal services. The system is not only inequit- able?it is also undermanned and inefficient. It is on the verge of collapse. The Nation must now respond with Federal financial incen- tives that will Insure real reform. ? There are not enough doctors. I3u.t Federal Incentives can persuade medical schools to follow Einstein's lead and expand their en- rollment. New schools can be created and sustained by Federal loans and grants. And Federal funds must also be provided to help medical students who should have something better than money to worry about. A pro- gram of scholarship aid must include all who are in need?and it must encourage minority students who intend to return to the old neighborhoods. - Yet the number of doctors is not the whole answer. If we produce 50,000 additional physicians and plug them Into the current structure, our efforts for reform will certainly 'fail. Some of the health manpower legislation now before the Congress would do just that-- and the result would be too many more doc- tors serving too few people at too high a cost. Here, too, Congress must set up financial incentives that can move medicine in a new direction. We must encourage a shift from a system dependent on the individual doctor to a system built around the concept of the health team, composed of primary care phy- sicians and other medical professionals. Teams would allow us to allocate medical re- sources with maximum efficiency and to maximum effect. They would employ para- professionals to relieve nurses and doctors from routine, time-consuming tasks. They would gather together diverse skills?from internists to pediatricians?and patients would deal with the team, not just a single physician. Einstein has experimented with the health team concept. The Federal Gov- ernment must make Einstein's experiment national policy. And health teams must be sufficient in dis- tribution as well as in number. Federal. bonuses must make it worthwhile to prac- tice in the inner city and in rural America. Medical care cannot reach people unless peo- ple can reach doctors. And people must have more than geographic reach. A health team should also be subject to the reach of loca influence. Location incentives for health service must be designed to create responsive, per- sonal structures'. It was never right?and it is no longer possible?to satisfy Americans with distant, impersonal medical care. The system must respect everyone's identity?: and sacriffice no one's dignity. And we must always remember that it is easier for a patient to reach a health team that he - knows?than a shining new medical center walled off from surrounding rural poverty or a nearby urban ghetto. The third medical right of all Americans is care with,in their needs. The present health insurance system is heavily biased toward high-cost hospital treatment and against preventive health care. That is in- credibly expensive--amid incredibly insensi- tive to the real needs of people. It has filled hospitals with patients who should not be there and would be better off elsewhere. A new national health program must reverse the old priorities. It must guarantee a ranee of medical services, comprehensive in scope, preventive in emphasis, and restricted_ only by the scope of scientific knowledge. America's concern_ over the quality of health care has reached a high water mark in 1971. You are graduating from medical school at a time when the whole medical profession may be profoundly altered. You should welcome change?and work for change. Only in the context of a medical bill of rights for every American, can each of you truly and in the most literal sense profess your profession--which is nothing more and nothing less than the protection of human life. And that requires not just a medical bill of rights, but a social bill Of rights. The real cure for lead poisoning is not hospital care, but decent housing. The most effective treat- ment for malnutrition is adequate food. And the besf guarantee of good health is a physically and emotionally health environ- ment. As health professionals, you must commit - yourselves to total health care. And total ' care Includes virtually everything that de-STATINTI termines whether we are sick or well. You cannot confine -yourselves to the technical skills you have learned here. You must also practice the fundamental human concern of a school like Einstein. You must speak out for a fair arid sensible - medical care system. You must stand up for social progress and for people--whether they are your patients or migrant workers two thousand miles away. You can cure individuals--and you must help America build a compassionate society. It will take time. There will be setbacks ad frustrations and defeats. But men and women who come from Einstein have good reason to believe that we can finally fashion a country that is great enough to be good. -- You have seen in your own lives what a dif- ference one school can make. Now all of you have a chance to make a real difference in - the lives of others. The practice you choose and the practices you follow may not change our country over- night. But you can remind' us by example of Aristotle's ancient truth: "Health of mind and body is so fundamental to the good life that if we believe men have any personal rights at all as 'human beings, they have an absolute moral right to the measure of good health that society is able to give them." That is our challenge and our chance. Two thousand years after Aristotle wrote, we must secure a medical bill of rights for our own people. We can wait no longer--in health care or in society. In our individual lives and in our national life, whatever we can do, and whatever we dream we can do, we must begin now. THE CIA FIGHTS ILLEGAL DRUG TRAFFIC Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, earlier this year I had the pleasure of addressing an ROTC group who was in the audience, questioned me in regard to certain 'alle- gations made in Ramparts magazine that the Central Intelligence Agency encour- aged the opium traffickers of Indochina. I doubt that such allegations have been given credence by many Americans, but apparently Mr. Ginsberg either believed them to be true, or chose to pretend that he believed them. But because I do not take such serious charges against our Government lightly, and believe that none of us should allow unjust criticism of our Government to stand - lenged, I recently asked the Bureau of ? Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to set the record straight on these accusations. - Bureau Director John Ingersoll replied' this week, -and his remarks are timely in view of the major initiatives President Nixon is expected to announce today to help deal with the illegal -drug problem. Mr. President, Mr. Ingersoll has re- ported to me that the CIA is his Bureau's strongest ally in identifying foreign sources and routes of illegal trade in narcotics. I ask unanimous consent that his letter of June 15 be printed, in the RECOltD, followed by a report on recent trends in the illicit narcotics market in Southeast Asia, and my telegram of May 11 which was printed in the final spring semester edition of the University of "Wyoming student newspaper, the Branding Iron. . _ Approved For Release 3000/05/15 :-CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 - . ,li 5271 Mr. \T XE. Can the gentleman tell me in what portion of the bill those funds are contained? ? . Mr. IIEDERT. No, I cannot tell the , . gentlemen that. Mr. WALD-LE. Is it available so that a Member of this House of Representa- tives can go to the committee and ex- amine the classified. documents involving ? the amount of money available for the Central Intelligence Agency in tins bill? Mr. HEBERT. No, sir, it is not. The chairman takes the full responsibility of not discussing the matter further. Mr. WALDIE. So whatever those sums are and, to whatever purpose they will be put, that is' only known to the chair-. 'man of the committee? : . Mr. IIfilBERT. It is known to the chair- man. and the ranking minority member of the committee. This is a policy which _ has prevailed throughout the years in all administrations. Mr. WALDIE. *S.'es. Mr. Chairman, I think I understand the policy that no other member of the committee knows that information: . . - . Mr. 1-T11113EilT. That is correct.. Mr. WALDIE. May I ask this question? In title IV there is a prohibition against using any of the moneys appropriated in this bill for the payment of free world . ' forces serving in Laos. Are there any funds being appropriated by this bill for the payment of any forces in Laos? _ Mr. IIft',ERT. No, there is not any ? provision for the payment of those forces. The only moneys that are involved in this bill are those providing for the in- telligence -agencies of this country. , May I make a further correction, I do not want to mislead anybody by saying that the chairman and the ranking Minority member know about these funds and only them, because the entire committee is briefed by the CIA on its functions. So I do not want to have that misconception carried away that the Members of the committee do not know of the activities of the CIA and of the other intelligence agencies, this we do know. This year, for the first time in the history of the committee, at the chair- ? man's request, the CIA was invited to 7 appear before the entire committee. Its - . director, Mr. Helms, appeared and sub- jected himself to all kinds of questions . and all the questions were answered by the director, Mr. Helms. ? Mr. WALDIE. May I ask the chairman . one final question? . What is the purpose of the CIA activity 111Laos? . . . ? Mr. Ilki:IERT. The activity of the CIA In all sections of the world, in Laos, the . Middle East and everywhere is the - gathering of intelligence for the pro- tection and security of the United States. Mr. WALDIE. I thank the gentleman. . Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. (Hon- CATE). ,(Mr. HUNG= asked and was given . . permission to revise and extend his re-; that in essence my construction would Marks.) . be meaningless and then it came out ? Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Chairman, we will for it. - ? . - seen be called upon to vote on the Nodal- Whalen amenAwi.osidanftovcritaai-e Apprillill.2000/05/15 : C STAT I NT L ?CONG111SSIONAL sion of the McGovern-Hatfield amend- ment. Since I fear there may have 1..;e2-11 a considerable amount of high-paessure, oversimplific.ation of this .problem, I believe the following editorial in the Washington Post is illuminating: coNssass VOMS ON THE WAR The McGovern-Hattleld and Nedzi-Whalen amendments, v.-hich are to be voted on today in the Senate and House respectively, would not "end the war" or automatically retrieve the American POW's or guarantee the safe exit of American forces or, least of all, as- sure a Vietnamese reconciliation. Any such claim promises more than either amendment can deliver and invites further frustration and disillusionment. Not only does fulfil- ment of claims like these lie to a great extent In other than American hands. But the Amer- ican system of Government gives the Presi- dent broad authority to conduct a war. It is Idle to pee tent while the fighting goes on that Congress can remove that authority; in fact, McGovern-Hatfield explicitly concedes the point. So it is misleading the public to talk of these proposed congressional ? restraints' in terms of a "date certain" for our withdrawal, however comforting and convenient that piece of shorthand may be to supporters of both measures; Vietnam has given us enough deceptive shorthand, and also enough easy? and offensive?sales pitches-- - My colleagues, as you-are well aware, I voted in favor of fixing December 31, 1971, as the date for withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Southeast Asia. I have voted three times this year to end the draft on June 30, 1971, in the belief that if wars in Southeast Asia can be fought with volunteers, they Will prove they have the popular support of the American peo- ple. If they cannot, and I would assume this one cannot be fought with volun- teers since 80 percent of combat troops are draftees, then the President could come to Congress and ask us for troops a-nd prove his justification for the request. Then we could restore to Congress a meaningful voice in foreign-policy. ? However, since a majority of this Con- gress sees fit to draft our young men and ship them halfway around the world to fight 10,000 miles from home, I find it diflicult to vote against funds to provide them with supplies, equipment, arms and ammunition they need to defend them- selves and our country's position, even though we might not have selected their mission in Southeast Asia. As one who served in the combat infantry in Werld War II, would consider it irresponsible to send a draftee into a combat zone Without providing him with all the sup- port those fortunate enough to stay at home can provide. ' Therefore Mr. Chairman, I must op- pose the Nedai-Whalen amendment. - Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? , Mr. IITINGATE. I yield to the gentle- man. Mr. NEDZI. Did the Washington Post editorial recommend voting for or against? Mr. MENIGATE. The Washington Post wrote these very skillful lines, I thought, with which I sgree and found I think it is very much like the story 7, 2. ? ,. i __ imamm. the House and spea riang P:",)011' mill- ? ales, and another Member said I heard -25X1 A you speak and I cannot tell where you stand. Can you tell me whether you are for or against it? The guy speaking said-- I watched the gentleman when he came In this House and raised his hand and took tile oath to become a Member and I said, "There is a man, and no ' matter how long he IS hare, he will never know what's going on." Mr. GUBSEIZ. Mr. Chairman; will the gentleman yield? ? Mr. HUNGATE. I yield tot-lie gentle- . m an. ? Mr. GUBSER. Would you not summa- rize the Washington Post editorial this way?that they gave all the reasons for voting against Nedzi-Whalen Ill order to justify their point that you ought to vote for it.? Mr. HUNGATE. The gentleman's point seems accurate to me. Mr. WHALV.N. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. HUNGATE. I.yield td the gentle- man. Mr. WHALEN. I would just like to read for the RECOTtn the editorial's conclusion. 'The. amendments as written are by and large thoughtful and - responsible, though limited. A wise Congress would enact them, and a wise President would welcome them as reinforcement of his own policy and his own concern for the Nation. Mr. HUNGATE. I appreciate the gen- tleman's contribution, but I would say as to the expression "a wise Congress," I presume its wisdom will be revealed in the future hours today. Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. HUNGATE. I yield to the gentle- Man. Mr. ARENDS. When you must make a decision on what the Woshington Post article sets forth as to whether this is a wise Congress or , not?that is. a far stretch of imagination. Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. A-ewe) . The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from New York is recognized. Mrs. ABZU(L Mr. Chairman, We have all been very concerned about the shock- ing revelation in the last few days, that there have been secret military and polit- ical decisions by our Government with- out the consent or knowledge of this great body. These d n ecisios were all the y indicate that Lu aria was con- y lies and de- iscussion that debate between ommittee, Mr. more shocking because the Government policy on Vie structed and conducted b ceptions. There was a d took place earlier in the two members of your c Chairman, in -which they suggested that ing the needs ble for inspec- this House. classified material concern of our defense wa.s availa tion to the Members of n inquiry was Subsequent to this a made of you, Yr.. Chairman., by the ia (Mr. War, rmation avail- and you ailable for in- her the Armed e House. ir, is this: Is gentleman from Cialiforn ma) with respect to info able concerning the CIA, eaten that it was not av sPcction by Members of eit Services Committee or th My question to. you, s classified material concerning the needs ( se and the matters about MootiliSni lediA44151501-6ildbiiii:1066(feti -0 T MI GUARDIAN Approved For Release 2000/05/15 ? CIA7RDP80-01601R0 16 jUN STATINTL F (-7-1r !:e) r Fir-7;A ti p E "7} 11 . 1 ; I I 11 n I ; k,,\ ? \\,1 :7-? Ns) -I I ? t El;i:i L1 j : By Richard E. Ward '1;571 c) Ij ; As nas been previously noted by the Symington subcomittee,' Second of two articles - ' the lid of U.S. official secrecy conceals little that is not known by A rare secret session of the Senate was held at the request of ' informed journalists or "the other side." Certainly the Pathet Lao Sen. Start Symington (D-Mo.) June 7 to hear a report on U.S. knows what is happening in Laos. They are obviously fully aware / clandestine- activities in Laos. Following the 'session, Senators of the bombings by the'Air Force as well as the army of CA Symington Vic] J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) openly charged that the programs. Although no reliable figure had been released on U.S. use. of Thai mercenaries, just admitted that same day by the State spending on its Laotian programs, the 'Pathet .Lao accurately Department which calls them "volunteers," was violating congres- estimated it last summer as greater than $300 million (again apart 'sional restrictions on U.S. operations in Laos. . .. from bombing). ? Some -details of the nearly 31/2-hour closed door meeting were Number of -11-.,ai 'a:04,s crowing given in the June 8 Washington Post M an article by Spencer Rich- . Concerning the use of Thai troops, the Pathet Lao stated last Who reported:. a Year that they numbered about 1000 during the Johnson ?Symington, who revealed that the administration wants S3/4 ? ? administration (a figuge that has recently been corroborated in million for military and economic programs in Laos for the 1972 . $2 billion- the press and by Sen. Fulbright)and that the increase- in Thai fiscal year (a figure which does not include the forces was undertaken by Nixon. However, according to ft:Lc' estimated costs of bombing), said that he wanted the Senate to Pathet Lao, the number of Thai troops now exceeds the' 4800,. know the details of "the secret war" before appropriating funds forit. ?Of the request, Si 20 million is said to be ea, ??-. ed for funding CIA operations in Northern Laos, including the use of Meo mercenaries from Laos as well as at least 4800 Thai troops. ? ?A major issue in the secret debate centered upon whether the ;use of Thai forces Was in contravention of the 1970 Fulbright amendment to the 1971 Defense Appropriations Act, signed into Jaw by President Nixon Jan. 11 this year. The amendment barred ? use of Defense Department funds to support what the Pentagon calls "free world forces" in actions "designed to provide military'. support and assistance to the government of Cambodia or Laos." ?The massive bombing of NOrthern Laos, which has nothing :to do with the movement of supplies from North Vietnam to the South or Cambodia, was questioned by several senators, including Fulbright and Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.). ? i Nixon the lawbreaker ; After the Senate meeting, Rich reported' that Syming,tOn stated: "My personal opinion is...that the law has been contravened. The amendment said you couldn't spend money to train and put people of foreign .governments into Laos or into Cambodia.". That was also Fulbright's view. State Department ' sources later said, according to Rich, "that the Thais being used aren't recruited on a government-to-government basis, but were individuals recruited from the borderside Thai population." The Post report obviously left out many details of. the Senate discussion, assuming the legislative body got a full account of U.S. activities. Symington's disclosures were based on a report by two staff members of his subcommittee of the Foreign Relations committee, James Lowenstein and Richard Morse, who had ? recently made an inquiry into Laos. - '. activities in Northern Laos lacked constitutional authority, which ' ? ? Reportedly the. Symington subcomittee now has a relatively' seemed to be implicitly saying that the U.S. was conductinia war ? .accurate account of U.S. activities in Laos that is more complete r against the Laotian people without a declaration of War o authoiit y. than was provided by the administiation at secret hearings m congressional October 1969, release'd after "security" deletions by the adminis- . g? Li tration in April 1970. What might be called the battle of Laos in , ? Washington, concerns tile attempt by antiwar senators to get U.S. Among the facts to emerge from the recent congre sional activities in .Laos itself into the public record. Initially and debate is the acceleration of U.S. bombing in Laos, or rather, of perhaps still, 'some senators' have been reacting against the the liberated zone since the autumn of last year, and the administration's deception of themselves alon with the public, increased use of B-52s, a plane whose bombing reaches the peak However, the issue of Laos is now being put forward to g of indiscriminate destructiveness. The step-up in P.-52 acti\lity in administration policy in Indochina as a whole because it oppose Laos has largely coincided with the accelerated "protective clearly reveals the White House aim of maintaining?if not so reaction strikes" being carried out against North Vietnam, and it ? expanding?the war, This point remains clouded during discus- . is quite possible that one of the real purposes of these attacks is : .sions focusing on Vietnam because troopan effort to prevent the DRV from utilizing its potent aerial withdrawals are still' figure. used by Fui bright. In April of this year, Prince. Souphanouvong, head of the Lao Patriotic Front (Pathet Lao), charged that the number of Thai troops was being augmented by the U.S. Shortly after this, George W. Ashworth reported in the April 17 Christian Science.. Monitor: "Nixon administration officials have hammered out an agreement with the government of Thailand for sharply increased. use of Thai forces in Laos." Thai troops were previously used in the ill-fated U.S.-backed attempt to hold the Plain of Jars, which ended in an important Pathet Lao victory in February 1970. Presumably the losses then were .an element leading to the more formalized agreement for use of Thai troops. Bangkok may relinquish some of its sovereignty to Washington, but not Without a price. Thai "volunteer" troops used in South Vietnam were given a bonus 1)/ the U.S. considerably augmenting their regular pay while Bangkok received military hardware and Other considera- tions from the Johnson administration to agree to use of Thais in Vietnam. There is no reason to assume that Bangkok's price has gone down, more likely it is up. Confirming this, a Senate source has noted that the cost of the mercenaries was high. Symington on June 7 referred to both regular and irregular Thai troops:being. used in Laos, so it is possible that part of the deal with Bangkok e involves freedom for the CIA to recruit directly in Thailand.'" Taking all evidence into account, Thai troops in Laos may now number 10,000 or higher. Senators Symington and Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) attacked administration activitiesin Laos in statements issued day before the secret debate. Symington emphasized the adminis- tration furtiveness while Kennedy charged that U.S. military ? used by the AprotvedoFdtReleasec2000005/15 !ICIAIROPif620icdocilksolobg0011111doil0i':'hbors' aims of U.S. policy. c.:,c)ret .: 5 Approved For Release 2000/05/15.: CIA-RDP80-01601R00060017 POTTSTOWN , PA. MERCURY JUN 16 Weil ? 25,483 Stroll() indictriient Long 'after the last American has , ''been withdrawn from Indochina, the ,t-United States will still be facing the con- Lsequences of .its participation in that _theater in terms of human misery. [ Hundreds of thousands of wounded, ':.many with permanently crippling in- Juries, will remind generations yet un- burn of, the cost,America paid. . Perhaps more destructive, in terms, of human lives, are the thousands return- ing from Machina with sound limbs but bodies hooked on narcotics. .Reports of drug usage by American . servicemen serving in Vietnam have appeared al- :most frem the beginning of the involve- ment. But the full extent of addiction on drugs such as heroin has not been revealed until recently. - A report prepared by two congress- men who toured Indochina and prepared their findings on drug usage for the -House Foreign Affairs Committee re- /veals how widespread the problem has become. The study by Rep. Robert .Steele of Connecticut and Rep. Morgan F. Murphy of Illinois backs up earlier allegations by the House Armed Services ? 'Committee on widespread corruption ;among Asian officials in drug traffic. "In Laos, government armed forces 1 STATINTL are major wholesalers . of opium and ? heroin and have been directly involved in large scale smuggling .activity," the two congressmen reported. . "Reliable sources rep6rt that at least , two highranking Laotian officials,mili- tary and governmental, including the ! chief of the Loatian _general staff, are : deeply involved in -smuggling activity," they said. - I `1.11 Thailand, a former diplomat and member of one of .the most __respected Thai families is reported to be one of . the key figures in the opium, morphine , base and heroin Operations in that coun- try and throughout Southeast Asia." South Vietnamese and Laotian Air. Force planes are used to Move the illicit cargo into South Vietnam, Steele and Murphy charged. They also said there- ' is evidence some of the narcotics are being shipped by diplomatic pouch on Air America, a CIA-backed -airline. Steele estitiTAtes as many as 20 .per- cent of Americans in Vietnam have used heroin. If only half the charges made by this latest study are true ? and thus far no part of the report has been re- futed ? it. is a damaging' indictment of the allies America has paid such a high, price to defend in Southeast Asia. Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00060017000V0 ( . E 5872, Approved For Release -01601R000 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks ment in Veterans' Administratign hospi- tals. The VA has made plans to provide 30 special units to cue for narcotics vic- tims by July 1972, with five units already In operation capable of treating 200 ad- dicts each. Yet those dishonorably dis- charged prior to the enlightened Pen- tagon policy still ? cannot receive VA treatment. ? Therefore, I am introdcing today .a bill which would authorize the Administrator .or Veterans' Affairs to provide care and -treatment for ceraain former Members of . the Armed Forces addicted to narcotic s? drugs. The "certain" members are those - who Viere discharged dishonorably, be- cause of drug addiction. I believe it Is importantfor the Armed - Forces to assert national leadership in Identifying drug abusers, and once recog- nized, insure that treatment and re- habilitation are available to all who have served their country. This is no less im- portant for those addicts now serving on active- duty who are now receiving treat- . merit as it is for those who were treated punitively in being released dishonorably from the Army. Military leadership in handling the drug problem would be a distinct contribution toward the abate- ' meat of this national tragedy. The bill which I am introducing today provides the possibility of treatment for . thousands who have been sent home with an addiction which is all too often sup- ported by regular 'criminal activity. It Is madness to allow the military to return ' addicts to civilian life and not provide . for their treatment. OPIUM TRAFFIC IN INDOCHINA HON. JEROME 11. WALD1E OF CALIFORNIA . IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, June 15, 1971 Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I would . like .to include in the RECORD a neWs ar- ticle on the recent testimony of John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Nar- ? 'cotie:s and Dangerous Drugs, before the House Select Committee on Crime (lur- ing hearings on the importation of opium Into the United States. The article was written by Tom Foley and appeared in the Los Angeles 'nines on June 3. Mr. Foley's coverage of the proceed- ings of that day are excellent and de- scribe some of the startling findings we ? learned on the involvement of the gov- ernments and some high officials in many ? Southeast Asia countries in illegal drug traffic. I commend this article AO the atten- tion of all who have an interest in this ? subject. (From the Los Angeles Times, June 3, 10711 - ASIAN OFFICIALS PROTECT HERoisz SAr,I1, PANEL ? TOLD?THEY MAY PROFIT FROM SUPPLYING DRUGS TO U.S. SOLDIERS, NARCOTICS CHIEF SAYs (By Thomas J. Foley) have an interest in heroin traffic to American servicemen in Vietnam. In testimony before the House Crime Committee, ,l`ohn E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, also said Heroin had been unwittingly smuggled into South Vietnam on airplanes of the CIA-operated Air America. CI Committee Chairman Claude Pepper (D- Fla.) and other members urged the Ad- ministration to take a stronger stand with foreign friendly governments to force a halt to illicit drug traffic. These included Turkey and France, which respectively grow and process the overwhelm- ing amount of the Opium smuggled into the United States as heroin. RIGHT TO ASK AID "We're committed to risk our own cities In a nuclear war if any French city is at- tacked by the Communists," Pepper said, "and we have the right not only to ask but to demand that the French take emergency action to help us." Ingersoll, who recently returned from dis- cussions with Southeast Asia leaders on the heroin problem, said he doubted that any policy-making officials of the countries? Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam?are in- volved in the illicit drug traffic. Burma, Thailand and Laos account for about CO percent of the world's opium pro- duction, he said. But he told newsmen after the hearing that many lower-lever officials, including members of the South Vietnamese Legisla- ture, deal in opium. He said some legislators have friends in President Nguyen Van Thieu's cabinet. Ingersoll told, the committee that heroin refineries were under control of insurgents in Burma and Thailand but that those in Laos are protected by elements of the royal Laotian armed forces. RAMPARTS DISCLOSURES He said that while management and own- ership of the Laotian refineries appear to be primarily in the hands of ethanic Chinese citizens of that nation, l'some reports sug- gest" that a senior Laotian air force officer may have an ownership Interest in some of the plants. When Rep. Jerome R. Waldie (D-Calif.) noted that Ramparts magazine had identi- fied the official as Gen. Ouane Rathiqoune, Ingersoll replied that "general speculation" conceded, this. - Ingersoll denied, one contention of the Ramparts article. It maintained that rem- nants of Chiang Hai-shek's Kuomintang army left in the area are involved in heroin production and are in the employ of the CIA for operations on the China mainland. But Ingersoll conceded that Air America planes had been used in the past for smug- gling heroin?just as regular commercial airliners have been used to smuggle It into the United States. He told newsmen later that 80 .kilograms were seized on an Air America plane at the huge Tan -Son Hut Air Base outside Saigon only three or four weeks ago. - During the hearing, Waidie also asked Ingersoll about a Ramparts report that the secret CIA base of Long Chong, used to sup- port the U.S.-paid Moo tribesmen, was a dis- tribution point for heroin to be shipped into South Vietnam. Ingersoll said he had not heard of that. However, he later said he had discussed the general illicit drug problem with CIA Direc- tor Diehard Helms. He said Helms denied the CIA was involved in any way, and that he believed him. "The Mao tribesmen are something else," Ingersoll said, "but I don't blame the CIA WAsurricTorr.?The government's chief for what the tribesmen do. narcotics enforcement officer said Weducs- 5003 CIA -SECURITY day that officials of friendly Southeast Asia Waidie said CIA security was apparently fume 15, 1971 ploy 'used he flies anc facilities for the illicit . traffic." clam by congressmen of U.S. efforts to getSTATINTL The narcotics chief sought to allay criti- the cooperation of the Asian governments to g crack down on the drug traffic. He said the United States had virtually no leverage over the Burma government, since ' the last existing aid program is being phased out. The opium-growing area in Thailand is In the hands of insurgents, Ingersoll said, but the Bangkok government is taking steps to try to control it. He said Laotian officials were "most respon- sive" even though seine high-ranking offi- cials were involved. VIETNAM SMUtGLING Ingersoll said the Saigon government had taken several steps to crack down on the smuggling, including a shakeup of its cus- toms officials, an increase in the size of its central pollee force dealing with the problem and the appointment of a special task force by President Thieu. He also said he WEIS assigning three addi- tional agents to the Far East and that the Defense Department hacl placed off limits ,areas of open heroin dealing. A SYMBOLIC FLAG CEREMONY HON. FRANK HORTON OF NEVI YORK IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ? Tuesday, June 15, 1971. Mr. HOR,TON. Mr. Speaker, during these times, when, on one hand, the pa- triotism of seine of our Nation's finest leaders is questioned; and when, on the other, it is often scorned to be patriotic, we must stop to.. consider what, the flag and patriotism actually mean. Sunday, in Rochester, N.Y., in my con- gressional district, I attended a flag cere- mony at the Rochester Polish People's Home. It was the first flag raising at the home. I would like to share the ceremony with my colleagues for it vividly made the significance of the flag clear to all who attended. Mr. Ray GaAs, pre.sident of the home, introduced the guests, who represented local, county, .State, and Federal legis- lative bodies, as well as the Polish-Amer- ican and American Legion Posts. Officials included Rochester Mayor Stephen May, State Assemblyman Ray- mond Lill, City Councilman Urban Kress, Monroe County Legislators Nicholas San- taro and Sam Poppick. ? County Judge Arthur Curran also at- tended. Judge Curran was especially aware of the value of the flag. He re- cently received the flag from the coffin of his son, a marine, who was killed in Japan. Also present were James O'Grady, com- mander of the Michalski Post; Joseph Zabuchek, commander of the Pulaski Post; Joseph DeMeis, commander of the Monroe County American Legion Post; and Edmund R. Przysinda, president of Hudson Avenue Area Association. During the ceremony, I presented a flag which had flown over the Capitol to Mr. ? Gatz. It was blessed by Father Pietrzys kowski and raised by Mr. Cats. County Commander DeMeis led the Pledge of governments IlreAlgirkoWCIT6 taiRblVS'Se`2000X16'/Igr.: dite-146P bbt-0e1 tit1W0 0 a 66 eth 0 1 -0 E587( Approved For Release 2000/05/15' ciA-Rbp8bTo41?K109p600 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensloils of Remarks Jun.15, 1971 , Our world Is made up of individuals, and. His humane Spirit pervades all who know (which remained la the SP.Iite place for five I. think that in the. Individual is where any hint Let me offer my warmest thanks for ' years while men were rotated) WaS OVerl'1113. . land of a change or solution must start. It his derroted Service and wish himcon- hen North Vietnameae tanks broke through can't stop there, though, because it inust timed personal fulfillment in the future. the neutralist Lao troops. eventually reach the top. For example, if a ' Following this. attack, In which at least person is happy he won't mind separating hi ---'''' .....??????,lb en.,15_ V.Tes. u........ .4130 Thais were killed, Bangkok insisted on h away some aving Thai troops protect the Thal gun- garbage for recycling, giving his food or money, thinking of the oth ners. Thai gunners also were sent to Long . party before be demands more rights THAIS "VOLUNTEERS" IN LAOS !Chong, further south, but this time several throws a bomb. If he is happy he will have hundred--some sources say COO?Thal infan- -a concern for other' people. If everyone did . HON. JEROra rt. WAIDIE trymen were sent to inotect the artillery. his individual part in helping to solve such Part of these units now are at Fire BaS0 major problems', and took down just one oF CALIFORNIA Zebra northeast of Long Chen. brick that wall would be gone in no time. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Recently That troops have served on the That is a lot of if's. How can a person be . Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos P.Ild on happy so he will want to do his part? As Titesdall, June 15, 1971 . operations against Route Seven, the main I've already said, happiness means different 2v7tr. WALDIE, Mr. Speaker, I would Hanoi resupply route to its troops in north- things to different people, but a. full stom- ,,, , , ? , ,., ? .tia.0 to include in the 1-,riCoite Ft second em LaC'3.- - soh, a roof over one's head, and a feeling e. 1,,, , Tammy All troops under American control who article by Arbuckle on his recent of acceptance and security among one's peers need 'medical help are sent to Thailand di- findings in Southeast ASia, which ap- usually helps. For those of us who arelucky rectly, American officials say, so Thais have enough to have these. things already, happi- Pe-axed June 7th in the Washington no worries if they ere sick or wounded. ness should be helping others to find them, livening Star. 00 . The Communist Lao radio claims over 3 also. Happiness is contagious, and even if I believe it sheds further lig lit Ori the Thais have been killed in action in Laos, but you can't give a person what he needs most, military interests and activities Of the American officials say it's less than 200. a smile or a hello can sometimes mean just Thai Army in Laos and the correspond- The Thal role, according to U.S. officials is Medias much. Then maybe he will pass that smile . m to make up for heavy losses among, the Medi - g role of the United States. . on to another perion. tribesmen of (len. Vang Pao, who have been Sometimes I have to stop to think, and The article follows: fighting since 1960 against the North Viet- assure myself that WC, the people of this Tams IN I_,-'iOS IDENTIFIED AS REGULARS namese, suffering in the last three years over 8000 killed in action. planet, are not going ' backwards?or be-- (By Tammy Arbuckle) , coming more violent, egotistical, and antag- VIENTIANE,- LAOS.--DOSPite official state- The Lao army claims it's under strength istie. I alwa?es manage to convince my- fala unable to substantially help yang Pao on meats that the Thai forces serving in TAROS ugh somethnes it ap- because it's spread the length of Laos, fac- self that we aren't altho are volunteers wtihout official sanction from pears that way because it's always the nega- the Bangkok government, informed sources in the enemy. This claim, however, is sits- pears and liceo say they are regular Thai army troops. not the positive things that we hear pect. Hundreds of unemployed young men roam around Vientiane in motorbikes. about. The number of people who truly care The sources said the troops sent here keep ? When Con. Koupraisith Abhay, the Vientiane about other people is growing, and man is their Thai army rank and salary as well as d his concern over a wider military boss, tried to conscript them, ho beginning to sprea the salary paid by the Americans, Lao- circle of humanity. We ususlly care about . Some Thai units come hole in a group, said found they are the sons of influential Lao- d friends and we want them to tians who protested conscription and forced our family an the sources, addling that Thailand's 9-10th he years go by there are Ir-ouprasith to cease his activities. be happy, but as t Battalion' presently is garrisoned on Hill 1663 and more of us who care about the Also, several thousand Lao troops are not snore west of Ban Na on the southwest rim of people in our city, state, county, and world the Plain of Jars in northern Lacs. gainfully employed but act as bodyguards, individuals. By caring, I mean wanting Thechauffeurs, office personnel or are building as Thais are sent to Laos on temporary each person to be happy and secure amid, detachment for six months or E4 year, the new vill RS for Lao officers. wanting this bad enough to do something sources said. There are cases where units are Despite all this, it may be said that Laos still is woefully short of manpower as well about it. If each inhabitant of this earth formed from Thais of- different units who he rest of mankind as good field officers and some military dis- cared about t have volunteered for certain duties in Laos, duals our brick wall would disappear, and eipline. Therefore, Lao needs help from its vi the sources said. However, these units re- destroy it before it crushes ethnic neighbors, the Thais. I hope that we can main part of the Thai army on loan to the us.The Lao however, don't want their neigh- U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the sources I'd- just like to see everyone here really said. - bors in the western provinces .of Champas- happy and able to show it. Sometime--try ? are and Sayaboury, which the Thais covet The only voluntary aspect of their duty is saying 111 to someone you don't know?take nor in Mekong River towns v.there the Thai that Thai soldiers are anxious for assignment propensity for the spoils of war may match off the mask for awhile?really feel the to Laos because of the financial benefits, that of Saigon troops in Cambodia. There smile you arc giving everyone?forget your Officials of the United States and Thailand - problems--make someone else happy?anctif fore, they are in the mountains of northern governments insist That troops in Laos, you can't do that at least you can be happy. Laos where the Thais can do the most fight- numbering at least 3,200, are volunteers. In and the least mischief. Well, I know what I can do to make every- Thai officials, in particular, claim the troops _ one happy now?that is to end this speech have no official sanction from Bangkok. so that we can all get out of this wind. Have (Even the number of troops is in dispute. a happy day tomorrow! and make It happy As a result of U.S. -Senate inquiries into the ? for someone else too. The world is only what operation, the figure of 4,800 troops presently we make it?so let's make it happy! is given in Washington as the number , of Thai troops on duty in Laos.) . The Lao military attributes the official Thai ..--..........,,,,..,.......___ ' ? position to corruption. They say only certain ? ANNIVERSARY -CONGRATULATIONS members of the Thai government are pocket- . r TO FATHER WALSH lug payments from the 'United States, So the ? OF NEW YORK .. I ? - entire Thai cabinet may no-b be informed N THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES - noN. PETER W. RODIN?, ilk. of the entire U.S. arranements for Thais to light In Laos, - Tuesday , June 15, 1971 ? ? .. OF' mw JERSEY , Thai troops have been fighting in Laos Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, during since late 1964. The first Thai unit in Laos IN THE HOUSE or IlLPRESEI.VTATIV.ES these times of protest by our Nation's - . was a battery of 155min howiters based near Tuesday, J7411C 15, 1971 Ban Khay village in the Plain of Jars. outh, the very philosophies upon which ? . Thai officers 'and men then were sent sopa- this country was established are being Mr. RODIN?. Mr. Speaker, congratu- rErfely to guerilla units run by the CIA. tlileStioned. At Urn es, a?nti-American l latiOnS are in order for Father Gerald On Feb. 1, 1967, a reporter met one of sentiments and acts seem to overshadow W. Walsh who celebrated the 25th an- these Tlitis at NAM Bac, Lao fortress. 40 positive feelnigs for this country and our niversary of Ms ordination to the Holy miles southwest at Dien Pion Phu. The Thai leader's goals. Priesthood on June 1, 1071. Father Walsh seta he was a captain in the Thai army and There is little doubt that we must do I to St. Mary's Church in Nutley, . came fr?111 Thzulgkok' What we can to . barer respect for and N.J. where be had spent his early priest- Air Arnericz.n in civilian clothes was cons- Understandi ng of this echo try among manding his mat and v.`riS responsible for hood to perform a special mass with St. peopl-e of all a.ges, especially among our payment, he said. Mary's pastor, Msgr. John J. Feeley. There v.rere at least 20 That with the cap- youth. ? Father Walsh is an ardent contributor thin at Nam Bac and Site 217. Concerned about the destiny of this I io both his parish and his community, On June 25, 1939, the That Artillery unit country and about the young people who Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001.-0 HORTON PRAISES MRS. DONALD LOETZER FOR ? HER AFFIRMA- TION OF AMERICA HON. FRANK HORTON -- Approved For Release 2000/05/15.: CIA-RDP80-01601R000600 AKRON, OHO DEACON JOURNAL 'ON i 5 rt./ E 175,468 203,112 fri 0 t 611113-14-1' ej? t? 0 STATINTL p,r) . -jr3) 9 IP\ U. ? -.1 e lc: 71 if- -/T-) 71-- ,(rY . ? By JAMES NeCARTNET ? . Beacon Journnl Vhshinglon FIvreou ? WASHINGTON ? Secret. studies of U. S: involvement in Vietnam have confirmed -- in spades -- the worst suspicions anYbody in this town ever voiced about government lying. T h e so-called Pentagon papers show that the Johnson administration ? literally talked peace and planned war in 1964 ? the year of decision. They show that officials led the -public deliberately and ?carefully into war ? without leliing what they were doing, They show that U. S. involvement in . the war was?planned ? orchestrated by U. S. officials over a long period of time. All this is laid out In meticulous detail in ti-e 7,000-page. analysis, ex- cerpts of which have been made public the the New York Times. L.r....... Barry Coldwater ?": 'NIOST SKO(..TINC is' the careful documentation of be- '.hind-the-scenes ? war planning in 1961 while Lyndon Baines Johnson was campaigning for re-election as a "peace" candi- date against Barry Goldwater. The studies say that a..!!,E,,eneral consensus" was reached at the White Bouse as early as Sept. 7, 1934, that air attack's probably would have to be launched against North Vietnam. s Yet long after the Sept. 7 meeting ? LBJ was Specifi- cally disCouraging the notion that the U. S. had any Tian to .enlarge the war. ? In a campaign speech on Sept. 28 in Manchester, N. II., he said: "As far as I am concerned, I want to be very - cautious and careful, and use it (bombing) only as a last resort ? when I start dropping bombs around that are likely to involve American boys in a war in Asia with seven hundred million Chinese. "So just for the moment, I have not thought that we were ready for American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys." THE "SECEET WAR" had been going on for months with no '.nnouncement at all to the public. ? , A major phase of the "secret ?.var" had begun on Feb. 1, 1964. The studies describe it as "an elaborate program of eovert military operation against the state of North Viet-. nam." The operation included: ATTACKS by 25 to 40 U. S. fighter-bombers in Laos, most - flown by CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) pilots. U-2 SPY-PLANE flights over North Vietnam. KIDNAPPINGS of North Vietnamese citizens. PARACHUTE' DROPS by sabotage and psychological warfare teams. COMMANDO ,RAIDS to blow up bridges. BOMBARDMENT of North Vietnamese coastal installa- tions from the sea. ? ? The Pentagon papers ? prepared three years ago by a team of 30 to 40 government officials and vivate histc:lans ? say that the war, actually was slowed down so LIU could run as a "peace candidate." Officials were agreed on the need of military operations', against North Vietnam but held back on open action because of the election campaign. VIE U. S. ELECTION was considered a "tactical" prob- lem which prevented the start of bombing in the North.. The studies say action was delayed because LBJ "was in . the midst of an election campaign in which he was presenting himself as the candidate of reason and.restraint." . "Trigger-happy" Barry Goldwater at the time was pub- licly advocating full-scale bombing of North Vietnam. THE STUDIES convey an impression: say the Times, "that the war was . . . considered less important for what it meant to the South Vietnamese than for what it meant to the position of the U. S. in the Nvorld." One secret Memo said that 70 pct. of the U. S. objective in Vietnam was "to avoid a humiliating U. S. defeat," 20 pct. to keep South Vietnam out of .Chinese hands, and 10 pct. to bring a better life to the South Vietnamese. ? The U. S. has consistently taken the public position that it wants a negotiated peace in Southeast Asia ? a position still taken by the Nixon administration. The studies indicate that behind the scenes, officials did not want negotiations with the Communists in 1904 and often pursued policies deliberately designed to discourage negotia- tions. ? What's the real truth now? ? Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 17-72,? WILY I,Ditf.$)) Approved For Release 2000/05M nitA-I19!80-01601R000 ra-1 ? ?-? V7-71 1 1. ) / r"T? ri r----- r -----'\ \ i 1 t it ,,, .Ii 1 I-1- 1 I. 1.,,. , ti ( .1 Id -1-) ) .? 1-.7)) F ' :I ? f - 1 1 1.i 'I 1, ? 11 , i i I, \ . ' , ? 1.; 1 ' j i --7,-? - I b. - If 1 1 ... r t i Li. J . I i'al---' 1 : 1 \ \ ? I : - 1,I 1 t I 1 I. ! .1 L. I . t_i Li LItl.....1 Li , ..,._____ 1_/- I. .t . . i Li , .? ? t t, r7-71 I ? : 11, - ? I Ai 1.1 By S.W. GERS'ON NEVV YORK, June 14 -- fr-.7 l? I ? L ? of the World Bank, had corn- missioned the study in June, 1967. Despite President Nixon's About 25 to 30 Pentagon experts helped craft the report, along with feeble denials, official some figures in the academic Washington is in a tailspin world, according to the Times: over publication of top se- The revelations come shortly cret Pentagon documents before a key vote Wednesday in revealing massive govern- the Senate on the amendment to set the date for withdrawal from ,ment deception to sell the the war, sponsored by .Senators American people on 'U.S. George McGovern (D-SD) and 'aggression in Vietnam. Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.). - Impact on the government at The McGovern-Hatfield meas- home and abroad was regarded by ure would order withdrawal of all most political observers as meal- U.S. forces from Vietnam by the culable; In another country, such end of the year. revelations would have. brought Tracing the steady escalation down a government. :of -. the war -- beginning with Repercussions of the exposure President Truman's. -support to of systematic lying to the Amen- the French colonialists in 1950 -- can people by a succession of the Pentagon document also re- American presidents to carry on veals details of the C1A-run war an imperial aggressive policy in Laos. On this score, Sen. Stuart were not clear as of today, but Symington (D-Mo) in a- televised that official Washington is in a NEC interview yesterday termed state of alarm was evident. De- the revelations "startling." tense secretary Melvin Laird Senator Symington apparently Called for a Justice Dc.partment had missed the series of exclusive Investigation of the "leak." article in the Daily World in June, The New York Times yesterday 1970, by co-editor John Pittrnan, and today published -- apparently the only American newsman to after some soul-searching in its have visited the liberated areas editorial sanctum ---- detailed of Laos. stories on and excerpts from a . Pittrnan'S first article, pub- 40-volume, 7,000-page Pentagon lished more than a year ago in the report on the origin and develop- Daily World, are today corrobor- ment of the war.. ated by the secret Pentagon study. Commissioned in 1937 Other . facts that emerned from tary of Defense James For Mc m er R.e,sf.Q uke EeA-F Robert S. ItIMHfinVae,Mea -Kuv80-01601R000600170001-0 Na ugh- 7doiitInos,a \ ? i 1 i I -.4 1 . \ [ I.. k?)/? --- E ?1-. CI1. 1. : ' 1 1 I ' 1 i L' 1 ) f I - 1 i L3 ___. 7'1 o President Truman gave mili- tary aid to France in her colonial war against the Vietminh and "set" U.S. policy. o President Eisenhower sought to support the puppet South Viet- nam regime, undermine the Dem- ocratic Republic of North Viet- nam (North Vietnam) led by Ho Chi Minh, and helped upset the 1934 Geneva settlement. ? o President Kennedy moved from his inherited "limited-risk gamble": to a "broad commit- ment" to back the South Vietnam- ese puppet rcgime:? -- Johnson deceived voters * President Johnson stepped up covert warfare against North Vietnam and began planninp; in the spring of 1.964 to .wage an overt war against Hanoi. In his lection campaign that year, when he ran against Sen. Barry Goldwater. the Republican can- didate, Johnson sought to reassure the Anierican people of hi;-; peace- ful intentions. o Long before the Tonkin Gulf resolution. was adopted by the Senate in 'August, 1934. the John- son Administration was planning provocative .moves to create a justification for escalating the war and for heavy bombing at- tacks on North Vietnam. In fact. the term "provoking" appears in a number of the official memoran- da - made public. Assistant Sccre- 'V DP.RIA!N CITY, N.Y. NEWSDAY Approved For Release 2000/05/15.: CIA-RDP80-01601 E - 427,270 31111 1. 5 1971!- ? . ? ?...errals.:6eszni4-4 were -deploy,ed on ambush patrols- alm B 3, Donald Kirk the Ho Chi Minh Trail network, ov Newsclay Speciat Correspondent ? 'which North Vietnam sends men an ? Vientiane, Laos?The U.S. Central material through southern Laos te 1 lig en ce Agency has armed, 'South Vietn ' or ia. jt TrocrT).-1 ? . ? - ,,?-? 0 .71 ????'i 0 et. to. -equipped and helped to train a 2,000 "They go on foot in groups rang,in man .guerrilla foroe on and near the up to 18 or 20 men," an experience ,Communist-controlled Bolovens Pla- teau in sotithern Laos. Highly informed sources here report that the CIA has built Up the force, compased mainly of local tribesmen, in the past: year in re-sponse to the threat 'posed by North. Vietnamese troops, who Overran the Bolovens a month ago ..and now are menacing the Mekong -River, loWlands. Acording to those sources, the CIA ? :Is trgining tribesmen in half a dozen 'centers west of the plateau. from Sayan- 1-akhet Pakse, IN-yrnilitary and corn!. ? inercial towns-on the Mekong still held STATINTL g The Central Intelligence Agency d avoids much as passible an appear- ance of direct involvement in the op- eration. "it's done by remote control,"- d an American said, explaining the CIA's e , relationship to the guerrilla units. "The I-. direct commanders are Royal Lao Army d officers. The Americans are well in 3 the background." CIA operatives, in y fact, work out of offices in Savanna.- d khet and Pakse ostensibly run by the z civilian U.S. Agency for International Development ,(AIQ),;rhe official CIA I cover is the Research Management Bureau to which CIA -personnel are often assigned. Research Management headquarters for Laos is on. the main g AID compound here. ? CIA operatives also participate di- rectly it: certain training and ambueh missions, according to some informants. Analysts said that a "hard core". of one-time Special Forces officers, un- til recently aseigned by the CIA to train the Meo army in the North, has moved to southern Laos to assist in forming the Special Guerrilla Units. The CIA, besides, is reported to be training Cambodian and Thai guer- rillas to penetrate regions controlled by North Vietnamese troops in North- ern and Northeastern Cambodia. One such camp purportedly,is on an island in the Mekong River south of Pakse. -A -bitter irony in the creation or guerrilla units in Laos, however, is the ittlc. appreciation shown there by the. lowland Lao, who view all tribal mem- bers as racial, social and intellectual inferiors. In southern Laos, for in-. stance, Lao refer to tribesmen, regard- ;ess or their tribal affiliation, as "kha." "The word meant 'slave' an American in Pakse said. almost as bad as calling a black. man a 'nigger.' `kha' are the only people fighting on our side beyond the Mekong River valley, but the Lao don't. give a damn as long as they don't have to do the _fighting themselves." . military source said. "They carry clay .more mines and other weapons, estab lish themselves in likely places an wait for something to come. They'r supposed to ambush trucks and .co umns." The various sources admitte that they were uncertain of the succes of such expeditions. "Sometimes the really do well," one analyst said. "An sometimes they sit around for a weet and hit nothing.. Other times it's_ hair to get accurate reports on just wha they do hit." Officials estimated that "a dozen teams of guerrillas were generally ., vide - the basic training, by Lao troops. Lao Army othflfeice.srosmper'"es..-. posted on?the trail network all the time. said, but CIA operatives advise them Still other teams ambush North Viet- : and supply _arms and ammunition pamese trocees further .west, where the ,- daily. . , . Communists are attempting to solidify - ? The sources compared the buildup in - ? their gains on the nolovens Plateau and .. southern Laos of the Special Guerrilla enlarge their road. system. i Unit Battalions, as they . are known, One 'prime inducement for joining a ,. with the formation a decade ago of a Special Guerrilla Unit-i5 the pay, which _ -',, much larger force of Meo tribesmen in is considerably higher than that granted ' the north, The .Meo anny, after reach-. to Lao army soldiers and astronomical .ing peak strength of 40,000 men in the compared to the subsistence income on -rIaid 1960s, has dwindled to approxi- which most tribesmen manage to live. .' :mat* 6,000 after suffering a series of The sources Said that the average was ...crushing defeats at the hands of North around $30 a month when the guerrillas . Vietnamese troops. Informed. sources were engaged in full-time field opera- - here and in Pakse indicated. that the tions. That figure compares with an .1-10:=:: clandestine battalions' ? Would ne average Laotian per capita income of. itte-mpt to nfront- the North Viet- approximately $65 a year. \ - _ liamese directly?or to recapture _._ Another inducement is the assigning - ground lost to the enemy on the Bob- of Jecruits to the regions where they ? 'yens Plateau. Unlike the Mew in the- were born and have lived all their lives. ;nOrth, the southern tribesmen special- "They're fighting for their ancestral ize entirely in hit-and-run guerrilla lands," an official said. "They know the- tactics aimed at harassing and frustrat- terrain, and they're highly motivated." Ing the .Communists in regions never . Other Sources, however, noted that .pdnetrated by regular Lao troops. - tribesmen tend to desert quite frequent- ' 'e "These-guerrilla units are much mo413' and return to their homes and visit -.aggressive than the Lao . soldiers," an Iriends and relatives. "There isn't too 'American official said. 'They kilow much can be done about desertions or .the jungle: They're bush/nen: They can long leaves," a military analyst said. . . operate with a pocketful Of bullets and They have a way of coming and go- :a pocketful of rice." The official said ing when they please." Lao officials?. ,that the guerrillas, drawn 'almost en- and their CIA advisers?attempt to lin- .:tirely from two tribes on the Bolovens, bue some sense of national spirit into .th.e Lo. Ven and the Nghia Huen, often g u err i I la s during their training. _ _ _. ? .. ... ? There's not that much you can tell them about jungle fighting," one source _ said, "But you can try to _propaaaredize Approved For Reltihig 1(001)705/15.: :..c1A-.Rpj? 0:0-91.:62?6_1R00060017000141 -7/ Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00060017 nACKENSAdlt' ? N J R4CORD ? ,dijA1 i- El 8 -.144,254 4 8 -.164,o48 . ? Sm. Clifford Case is tli.stlirl3ed, ane rightly -so, ARA the paw,a of the Central IntOligence tg havehicolleagues f_:-En;vaie,A,,, My:dolly incerAng Mr. Case is the subterfugki by timh all the manbcrs of the Senate, including those tlr: Foreign Affairs and Appropriatips. Committcses, 1::(pt in the dark on the United States ft- ita'oing of me-A:cu.:ales fighting in Laos. It searrc, that a tight lithe Senate watchdog sub- cOmmitte was privy for more than a year to the feet that QA. funds were being paid to the Timis but rewor tom their eolictpzacs. This watchdog group was appointed oyigimlly to OVE.:i';;ee CIA 1.1Sf-; 'of funds that are never spscifid in the agency's budget. The CIA is a curious organism whose intelligence activities have a considerable effect on United States foreign policy. Often the ogemT acts as a govern- rant within a government. It gathers intelligence tInta, digests it, and uses the conclusions to mount operation or its own, sometimes without consulta- tion even with. the military. Its operation phase is not divorced from its gathering of data. There is; therefore,no cheek on whether the operations being carried out are consistent with the data gat.1-:,z-.Ted or STATINTL ? 0 ??,7- rii (tf ya. ? t even wheflicr 'they are hi the inter,:a of U.S. global - To curb this almost limitlessiceway ths congers,- sikal watchdoggroup .was appointed in 1.SEi. Tha committee hats met o4 three times in the past two years. li'ar' from being watchdogs, the corornnac,, ? member appear to. have become coconspirators, a ( role never intended. Sen. Case's, Te!oint is well taken. There is room for secrecy in a. democracy when the defense of the na- tion is at stake. There is little rtgAil for a kind of secrecy that not only. doesn't trust. the elected Con? : gross of the United States but causes individual memhers to keep sccretFi from one another. If the public doesn't have a right to know what the CIA is doing, its elected representatives should he presumed to be patriotie,:enough to know and keep the information to themselves, unless.. what.. ? they discover 'runs -counter to the established policy - and law of this country. In the..easc or. the Thai mer- cenaries this was information that concerned .the: conduct of the war in Indochina. Congress did not d.,-clarc this war. Its ini-Jr.hers should at least have th7: right of access to. inforrop.tim on how and foe what rea3ons it is 1.?:e. ing cilytumzed. Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 Approved For Release 2000/05/155. CIUK41410P130-01601R0007 ? Li ?.\\-v \N?) .L. A.\ -)11:17' , , v?." ? Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, covering the opening of the sustained bombing campaign against Nor,th Vietnam, in,the first half of 1965. Except where excerpt ;ng is indicated, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typo- 0aphical errors corrected. Advo and etter ,From Rostovv Fai vorng Comr.nitillei-it of -Troops by Personal latter from Walt W. Rostow,.cltoirinan of the State Department's. Polley Planning Council, to Secretary McNamara, Nov. 16, 1964, "Military Dis- positions and Politica( Signals." a, Following on our conversation of last night I am concerned that too much thought is being given to the actual damage we do in the North, not enough thought .to the signal .we wish to send. The signal consists of three parts: aai a) damage to the North is now to be inflicted because they are violating the 1954 and 1962 accords; ? b) we are ready and able to go much further than our initial act of damage; C) we are ready and able to meet any level of escalation they might Mount in response, if they are so -minded. Four points follow. ? 1.-I am convinced that we should not ?? go forward into .the next stage without a US ground force commitment of some ;kind: a. The withdrawal of those ground forces could be a critically important apart of our diplomatic bargaining posi- tion. Ground forces can sit during a con- ference more easily than we can main- tain a series of mounting air and naval :pressures. . . b. We must make clear that counter ? escalation' by. the Communists will run directly into US strength on the ground; , and, therefore the possibility of radically .1y extending their position on the ground at the cost of air and naval damage ?alone, is ruled out. c. There is a marginal possibility that in attacking the airfield they were think? '. lug two moves ahead; namely, they might be planning a pre-emptive ground force response to an expected US retali- ation for the Bien Hoa attack. The first critical' military action against North Vietnam should be de- signed merely to install the principle ? - that they will, from the present forward, without raising seriously the fear in .be vulnerable, to rciA06.14,?6416tacfr61. tkei0k#Migitikyl.V. t400101,_. tit46 7 , ? 0 0400 the belief ly,that .north for continued Viaalations for tne 1, a au, YllrTst irreversib in 1954 and 1962 Accords. In bther words, Delta, in 'China, or seek any other ob- their favor in South Vietnam, they might we would signal a shift from the prin- jective than the re-installation of the sponse. This means that the initial use of force in the north should be as lim- ited and as unsang,minary as possible. It 'is the installation of the principle that we are initially interested in, not tit for tat., 3. But 6ur force dispositions to ac- company an initial retaliatory move against the north should send three further signals lucidly: a, that we arc putting in place -a' capacity subsequently to step up direct and naval pressure on the north, if that should be required; ? ' a b. that we are prepared to face down 'any forni of escalation North Vietnam .might mount on the gromid; and . . . -C. that we are putting forces into place to exact retaliation directly against Communist China, if Peiping should join in an escalatory response from Hanoi. The latter could take the, form of in- creased aircraft on Formosa plus, per- haps, a carrier force sitting- off China ?distinguished from the force in the South China Sea. 4. The launching of this track, almost certainly, will require the President to explain to our own people and to the world our intentions and objectives. This will also be perhaps the most persuasive form of communication with Ho and Mao. In addition, I am inclined to think the most direct .communication we can mount (perhaps via Vientiane and War- saw) is desirable, as opposed to the use of cut-outs. They should feel they now confront an MU who has made up his mind. Contrary to an anxiety expressed at an earlier stage,. I believe it quite possible to communicate the limits as well as the seriousness of our intentions Alemc _ ? . ,,,Nov. 23, 1: "to -the- Crum I leave CIAP and in early D Oil Southe therefore, observatio ready corn .1. We ?minds -a ouL appreciation of the view ,in Hanoi and 'Peiping of the Southeast Asia problem. I agree almost .completely with SNIE 10-3-64 of October 9. Here are the criti- cal passages:. ? "While they will seek to exploit and encourage the deteriorating situation in Saigon, they probably will avoid actions that would .in their view unduly in- crease the chances of a major US re- sponse against North Vietnam (DRV) or Communist China. We are almost cer- tain that both Hanoi and Peiping are anxious not to become involved in the kind of war in which the great weight of superior US weaponry could be brought against them. Even if Hanoi and Peiping estimated that the US would not use nuclear weapons against them, they could not be sure of this..... "In the face of new US pressures against the DRV,, further actions by Hanoi and Peiping would be based to a ;considerable extent on their estimate of US intentions, i.e., whether the US was actually determined to increase its pres- sures as necessary. Their estimates on. this point are probably uncertain, but we believe that fear of provoking severe 'measures by. the US would lead them to temper their responses with a good deal of caution. ..., / - "If despite Communist efforts, the. US attacks continued, I fanors leaders would have to ask themselves whether it was not better, to suspend their support of Viet Gong military action rather than suffer the destruction of theirmajor military facilities and the industrial sec- STATINTL nfrag,, 1.1Eig GRK. r,e? DI ES Approved For Release 2000/05/15:: St11-119R6p-71331/111:1400(160. 1 ''? \ ri..i, .,, .:.,.....7),.,:12 .il. , ...I. ,I.-...,,,.....6:: 1.>:-.,,... ., k-,....47 ? A 1 ,.; ...f.-,,, 7 9 4,-,,,,tei. - i", ...-r 1,a I .....,,,, ....-, \-- ......,....) Yr k 4 v - ) i '') -,..--.0'.: ,,se ....., -ea.., , , I ... ?,... i ..-,,..i ,e.e. ee ' - 'Following are texts of key documents from the Pentagon's Wlistary of the Vietnam war, covering events of August, 19646' to February, 1965, the period in which, the bombing of North Vietnam was planned. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typo; graphical errors correted. Ros1P C-11)1 I-nssy in Labs , to hall .011-Search-and .RPc'Tce 7:11:01-1/-'s ' ? ? : . ? ? . . . Cablegram from Secretary of State Dean Rush to the United States Embassy in ?Vientiane,.Laos, Aug. 26,-1964. A copy of this message .was. sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific. , , ? . 7 and that stn. precondition fe:rence. Quel ritorial gains .vided they c practice two equilibrium ? no longer ii. . Lao witluira 'Lion to lsl-n fact though curred to So is also touc Butler (. Souvanna PDJ withdi evitably ins gains and present fa ? .; ' division. I be desirable in wider picture. On other side, we naturally recognize T-28 opera- tions are vital both for their military and psychological effects in Laos and as negotiating card in support of Souvanna's ?position. Request your view whether balance of above factors would call for some reduction in scale of op- erations and-or dropping of some of better-defended targets. (Possible exten- sion T-28 operations to Panhandle would be separate issue and will be covered by septel.) On central problem our understand- ing is that Thai pilots fly missions strictly controlled by your Air Com- mand Center with [word illegible) in effective control, but that this not -true of Lao pilots. We have impression latter not really under any kind of firm con- trol, Request your -evaluation and reconi- mendations as to future scope T-28 op- erations ? and your comments as ? to whether our impressions present con- trol structure correct. and whether steps could be taken to tighten this. - - We agree with your assessment of Importance SAR operations that Air - America Pilots can play critically im- portant role, and SAR efforts should not _ discriminate between rescuin?,.. Amen- = cans, Thais and Lao. You are also hei e- = by granted as requested discretionary ? authority to use AA pilots in T-28's - for sArt operations when you consider 7this indispensable rpt indispensable to :success of operation and with under- _standing that you will seek advance Washington authorization wherever sit- -ration permits. At same time, we believe time has coma to review scope and control ar- rangements for T-28 operations extend- ing into future.- Such a review is especi- ally indicated View fact that these op- ' orations more or less automatically im- pose demands for use of 'US personnel SAR operations. Moreover, increased -AA capability clearly means possibilities of loss somewhat increased, and. each loss with accompanying SAR operations involves chance of escalation from one action to another in ways that may not Rtisk Query to ? lenti an e iddin o ss On Desirabilit Cease ireLaos ? ? ? ?-? Cablegrant from Secretary of State flush to the Wtiled States Embasv: in Laos, Aug. 7, 1964. Copies were also sent, Ivith a request for comment, to the American missions in London, Paris, Saigon, Bangkok, Ottawa, New Delid,. Moscow, Pnompenh and Ilong Kong, and to the Pacific command and the. mission at the United Nations. .. ? . - . . ., , . .... ? - -. ... . .? . : . ? _ .. . , I. As pointed out in your 219, our that recent RI.G.:neceSses :tad reported ' objective in Laos is to stabilize the situa- low PL morale may lead to some escala- . Con again, if possible within framework tion from Communist side, which we do of the 19 Geneva settlement. Essen- ! not now wish to have to deal with. ' ? tial to stabilization would be estalllish- 2. Until now, Souvanna's and our po- ' ment or militafy equiliAPPriNAUmpr rceiett..'21)?"511151i'L A41FS3P8?t-b try. Moreover,- we have some concern. from 'areas seized in I'DJ since May 15 would require Pathet Lau withdrawal were to be 'best be don it might be usea by bouvanna as mai-gam- -Ing counter in obtaining satisfaction on his other condition that he attend con? ;femme as head of Laotian Government. Remaining condition would be cease- fire. While under present conditions cease-fire might not be of net advantage to Souvanna----we, are thinking primarily of T-28 operations---Pathet Lao would no doubt insist on it. If so, Souvanna could. press for effective ICC policing of cease-fire. Latter could be of hnportance in upcoming period. . ? 3. Above is written- with thought in enind that Polish proposals [one word il- legible] effectively collapsed and that pressures continue for Geneva [word-il- legible) conference and will no doubt be intensified by current crisis brought on by DRy. naval attacks. Conference on Laos might be useful safety valve for these generalized- pressures while at same time providing some deterrent to escalation of hostilities on that part of ,the "front." We would insist that con,. 'ference be limited to Laos and believe. that it could in fact be s6 limited, if necessary by b ur withdrawing from the conference room if any other subject brought pp, as we did in 1961-62. Side discussions on other topics could not be avoided but we see no 'great difficulty with this; venue for informal corridor discussion with PL, DRV, and Chicoms could be valuable at this juncture. 4. In censidering'fbiS course of action, - key initial question is of course whether Souvanna himself is prepared to drop his withdrawal precOnciition and wheth- er, if he did, he could maintain himself in power in Vientiane. We gather that answer to first question is probably yes but we are much more dubious about 1601R000600170001-0 Approved For Release 2000/05/15", 01/-kIIINIL -AlikitiP80-01601R0006001700011111== i4 JUN 1971 Hanoi Spreads Out . Despite its proximity to the main theater of operations in Indochina, the 13olovens Plateau in southern Laos long remained one of the war zone's most tranquil oases. For years, a spirit of ao- commodation between the highlanders and the local Communists kept the lush, coffee-rich region comparatively peace- ful. And even the presence of a few bands of U.S.-sponsored guerrillas did not drag the plateau into the larger con- flict. Last month, however, in a series of well-coordinated attacks, Communist bat- talions suddenly swept into the area, forcing Laotian units into a hasty retreat and taking full command of the plateau. And by last week, the North Vietnamese were busily carving out storage areas in the plateau's deep, dark gullies and building new roads that seemed destined to become part of the growing Ho Chi Mini' Trail network. 'The effort to expand their north-south supply system seemed to be at the root of the North Vietnamese thrust. Since the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville (now Kompong Som) was closed to Com- munist ships early last year, Hanoi has had to rely almost exclusively on trails through the Laotian panhandle to supply its forces in South Vietnam and Cambo- dia. And four months ago, the U.S.-sup- ported South Vietnamese invasion of southern Laos placed an added strain on Hanoi's narrow logistical pipeline. For , although the operation by no means succeeded in wiping out the durable Ho Chi Minh Trail, it did momentarily disrupt the eastern portion of the intri- cate n etwork? an d sparked apprehension in Hanoi that the South Vietnamese might come back again and again. Rout: Confronted by that fear?and the fast-approaching monsoon season? the North Vietnamese had little alterna- tive but to expand the trail westward. Using firepower and manpower that have long been more than a match for even the best units of the woefully weak Royal Laotian Army, the Communists routed some thirteen Laotian battalions that /were guarding the approaches to the 13olovens Plateau. Even the CIA-trained Jungle Tiger mercenaries were no match for the advancing Communists. In less than a day of heavy fighting, the North Vietnamese captured the key city of Pak Song. They also gained firm control over Routes 23 and 16, leading from the eastern trails to the Mekong River, and over other open roads to the south. For the time being at least, few ob- servers expected the North Viet'namese to push any farther. In order to take the strategic Mekong River towns of Pakse and Savannakhet, the Communists would have to fight through stiff Laotian fortifi- cations?and might risk a tough .reaction from the neighboring Thais. And with the plateau and the provincial capitals of Attopeu and Saravane (both seized last year) under North Vietnamese com- mand, IIanoi seemed to have achieved its primary goal: securing reliable supply lines to its forces in the south. Hot Water: Yet despite the Commu- nists' apparently limited objectives, the latest North Vietnamese thrust has caused unusual reverberations in the sleepy Laotian capital of Vientiane. Even the politically sure-footed Laotian Prime Minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, has found himself in hot water. In the wake of the fighting, a powerful group of right- NORTH,, VIETNAM THAILAND Bakst Champassako @ pakSciq otovevs? PLATEAU . Allopeu CAMBODIA MILES Fens, & Liurlso, tz Southern Laos: Expanding the trail wing generals and politicians urged the neutralist Prince to "get tough" with Ha- noi. Instead of trying to placate these power brokers, however, Souvanna is- sued his most conciliatory plea yet for peace negotiations with the pro-Commu- nist Pathet Lao. Souvanna's policy of quiet moderation has left him at odds with Prince Bonn Oum, the influential head of the Chain- passak family, which owns virtually all of southern Laos. An ardent neutralist in the past, Bonn Own was reported to be outraged over the North Vietnamese take-over of his plateau. In fact, some observers believed that the loss of his private "plantation" might just push B011n Oum into joining with the generals to oust Souvanna. That still appeared to be only a distant possibility. But even be- fore the North Vietnamese launched their wide-ran Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CWIRCIRaila-WilOWAVAYMMTAWM" some time, but if the Bolovens falls, Sou- valuta Phouma is finished." 14 AN 197i Approved For Release 2000105115: CIA-RDP80-01601R0006 . "! ? I .\"7 ...., _ .. ,.. ,, . ,.. ? :.:1 TI \ 6n ',) ,e, i ?ri . \t' t..1).11 IA ..' d . . . ? ? . , .... . By Murrey Mauler . . ' A M- Kona): Security A.ctic)n . and Chalmers 1\1. Ttoberts ? Memioranclum of March 17 - 1064, presumably the result of wastalo.,:t0,-, Post soul Writers It was charged by then Sen, 17N c? ? (D-Ore..) that the '1i n. ! 7- SOUth iititinEno. attacks on k' i '`--\. North Viettraroc.:!se fooces in the Gulf of Tonkin caused the ? 11 Tri Ci ..:1 .11 North Vietnamese to lire upon 1, on 1 t ; t..ol .-1 o 6 .? .. ..-7- U.S. destroyers Maddox and C. 11 -4 ; _ i - 2,0 0.,,.j.i ,l,j1n7,.) .1._ J.i..lLoL JL-_)- :-.?__.) 11 - \f' \'-i Tn rner Joy. McNamara, ia . . J Ng, told the Senate commit:- .. ? , tee, however, that it was action"- then was "preinatUre.' "monstrous" to insinuate that Mr. Johnson offered as one the United Slates "induced re: ,son that Stateinent that the incident" t,...s on "we expect " E'llor'dew" be" to take retaliatory action. The tween the Chinese and Soviet retaliatory action was the: . planned for major A 110 iii hticod aims and the basis for Cornitnniist parties and action- oimling rounds. of U.S. bomb- military action tigainst North its militarY plannim-t. A cable against the North will be more ,in,,, attaas upon North Vint- Vietnam nearly five months be- sent three days later by the predicable after than before a nam. fore the lf.l64. Tonkin Gulf in- President to Henry Cabot showdown." , Aceordin to the information ? cident, according to secret goy; Lodge, then the. American am- The President also told) disclosed 'hy the Times, the offline:at documents made. pub- bass odor in saigon, ill Inca- Lodge that part of Ids job Plan 34-A operations against lie yesterday by The Now ork.nate5 his intent L011:1;. - then was "knocking dcoon the the North during 1,N1 ranged Times. i The memorandum says that idea of neutralintion" of Viet- froot u..2 spy plane nults to v These plans were made, the ' "we seek an iodependent Don- Dain, an idea advanced by parachuting sabotage z-nd psy_ documents Show, at a ' time Communist. South Vietnam then French President Chrodes! Choi agical warfare) teams into when tile UnitediStates al- but md? h,et require that it deGaulic, "wherever it rears' the North Vietnamese citizens, IC' ClY Was directing clandes- !serve as a Western base or as its ugly bead and on this point sea-launched conunando raids tine sabotage operations in the a member of a 1 \Testern alli- I think that notinaLt 3S lilOrt,' 011 l'ail and highway bridges North. lance. South Vietnar:1 must be important than to stop neutral- and bombardment of. coastal Two months before the at-, free, however, to accept out- . i 'tack on two American destron side assistance as required to 1St l'ik wherever w'-' c'll by installations by PT boat:-. whatever means we can. ers in 'the Gulf of Tonkin On maintain its security." The resulting conliimency These attacks Were de- Aug. 2 and 4, li)64, the achnin- Bepeating language from a yoaiming is shown in several, scribed as being under the Mcnimara T.,gernoninclurn. of '.: Saigon control of Gen. Paul -.1-?.. istraGon sent zi Can dip- ciocuments. But i)oltaliter;,sci(:,.ortcrili 1); then ehtaf of the us. secret rciission to liaeol Whefe : (language in Pale- drawn in '.! as Dec. 21, 1.9i13, a inemorali.- will-. fISSiStr.:nee command, lomat, J. Blair seaborn, 011 a Much 16 to the President z ments also show, ? Pro_ turn , from a memorai?-,a)lum to. joint pkinning by the mier Phalli Van Do1U-i, that nin 'McNamara on Jan. ).:_, 1Troni 1 delft: Johnson South Vietnamese who carried he is 'quoted as telling chum from McNamara to Presi-; the event of escalation (of t h'e ! tliC chairman of filer., ..:oint 1 "plans for covert action into referred t?! out the oprationS themselves' war) the gl'ealCSt COVastation ors , , ' Chiefs of sc iff Gen -P. o,xv,,,,.,11 North Vietnam" that "present .or with "hired persoimel." , Would result for the D.R.v. JJ. '-i.'IYJor) the National Se- a wide variety or sabotage al .-id . Yvon before tlie,-.0 covert op- l (North Vietnam) itself." -- ellritY C011lItjl (10ClIrtlellt. re- p3ychological. opciration S." tilld: er a lions begzin, however, the .. jt Nw., the ,i: 0 nk. iii incident. fleets the prevailing belief in shmild "provhie maximum Joint Chiefs of Staff Were pressure with minimum risk." 1 ) reported recomracmcling "in- creasingly bolder actions" in- cluding "aerial bombing of key North Vietnamese tar- gets" and use of "United States forces as necessary in. direct actions against North Vietnam." - presidential decision, set out The Johnson administration both thc) administration's po- STATINTL _called totally unpro\oked by what President Eisenhower the achninistiodion-----vohich led had cal,ted the "domino effect Th cla " is ndes tine pr CJ 'fl Congress on Aug. 7, 1.961, to of the loss of ?Scmt-11 Vietnam era ' became "Option Plan 3 1- Unless the objective is A," launched on Feb. 1, 1534. achieved in South Vietnam, it It was described in a National says, "almost all of Southeast Security memorandum .the Asia will probably fall uner next month as "a modest 'coy- Communist. dominance" or ae- ert" program operated by commodate to Communism. South Vietnamese (and a few The Philippines, it was Chinese Nationalist)---a pre- judged, "would become shaky" gram so limited that it is un- and "the threat to lndia on likely to have any significant the west, Australia and New effect ..." Zealand to the South, and Tai. one source yesterday said, wan, Korea, and Japan to the ht. in retrospect, that these covert,l north would- be greatl.y . operations were in fact "very creased." Ibled under the direction of , N modest--and highly unsuccess- f.,ine policy decision, , then, 1 ' was to "prepare immediately fill-'' But theY can to have I then Secretary of Defense I . McNamara. profound significance in the Robert S. The' to be in a position on 72 hours' bulk of the documents dis- Tonkin Gulf incident. Mc- closed thus far by the Times notice to initiate toe full C\rell ill VG3 testi- range Of IAtotian and Carob?. Namm'a, are of military origin but in- molly reexatnining the 1961 dian 'border control actions' " elude some 'White noose i lid a S Well as "the 'retaliatory ae- Touldn affair, professed to epartment papers that lrnon, little abmit the plan State D 34- tions' against North Vietnam reached the PentaL-ton. Other and to be in a position on 30 A operations. Ill'e toll Senate documents Wr n ee oly alluded days' notice to initiate the pro- Foreign Relations Committee to or quoted from in the IlOWS- gram of `graduated overt mill- Chairman J. W. FUlbright (1)- .p''S story. Ark.) that they were carried ipel tory pressure' against North out by South Vietnamese Vietnam . . ." against the North, "utilixing to - The President's cable to some degree U.S. equipment.". Lodge says that "our planning "I can't describe the exact r actionacnqns_t the North is Approved For lecase,200g/05/156411A- , - ogrotinds?thato-"overt--military pass a resolution declaring that the United States was "prepared, as the President di- rects, Etc) 'take all necessary steps, including the use of Armed force," to.. assist South Vietnam. It was on this resolu- tion that President Johnson subsequently leaned heavily to widen the war, 'The documents are part of a mulli-volumeci. collection of ,recorcis and comments assem- RurtiefitiTopfhttivratiftti yrighc, a_Lnouga e happy to try to obta!n- the in- formation 10)- you." After the August, 1f)61, Gulf of Tonkin breakthrough to more open -U.S. involvement in the fighting, the published documentation shows recom- mendations for considerably expanded covert operations against the North. A memorandum prepared for Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy shows that part of the clandestine operations against the North wore suspended immediately "after the first Tonkin Gulf in- cident" on Aug. 2, 1961, but that "successful maritime and airborne operations" Were car- ried out in October. The documents discuss clan- destine operations carried out not only from South Vietnam but from Laos, against North Vietnam and against enemy- bi- cbare[,s. of 1..,?os. 01-,!?. (lout_ STATI NTL Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170 -11. CaUMBUS , OHIO - DISPATCH E 223,673 ? 318,040 JU 131971 Oversight of CIA Ik Vilal MERICANS are fully aware 1-1- their government, like every other nation, has an in- telligence gathering apparatus and while the whole business of spying is inherently evil, it : is necessary. The primary U.S. spy group is called the Central Intelli- gence Agency and it operates pretty much in the dark as it eeks to provide its own unique - 'kind of shield against any threat to this nation's security. f' Because of the very nature of ' ? the spy business, the CIA -writes its own rules and laws and they very well may be in conflict with established stat- utes and mores. . - EVEN THOUGH the CIA -nocessarily must operate in its own shadowy sphere, it re- quires financing. That comes from the American taxpayer, yet these funds are entirely secret, being seeded here and -there in various departments of the federal budget. Congress does attempt to 'maintain some contact with the CIA's doings through a little- known Senate watchdog sub- committee established in 1955. But thiS panel has met only three times in the last two years and not once So far in ? 1971. A RECENT closed door ses- sion of the entire Senate delved into the doings of. the CIA in Indochina. It was then re- waled the CIA, using Amen-, can tax money, had been fi- nancing 4,800 mercenaries from Thailand to cross their , border and fight Laotian and North Vietnam C o in munist troops in Laos. Sen. Clifford Case of New Jersey is incensed by the rev- elation, contending this activ- ity is not only a violation of a 1970 congressional ban against such incursions but is an ex- ample of the CIA "setting ma- jor policy." ? THE INCURSION aspect of the Thai-Laos operation is nothing new on the CIA agenda. Witness history's re- cording of such places as the Bay of.Pigs and an earliei. bit of action in Guatemala. But if the CIA is "setting major policy" by its Indochina program, then ,Americans are faced with a touchy problem. It well could be a case Of one government agency creating a ' new "front" in one part of Indochina while the President is making a concerted effort to extract the American presence from another, Vietnam. . AN OVERSIGHT of the CIA: is necessary. Its secrecy must' be protected.. But it cannot be permitted to "set policy" while' carrying out its intelligence-' gathering duties. Policy must be established by duly elected and appointed officials operat- ing clearly in the open. Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 S-7 I rA I I I NI I L HousTAlprend For Keiease 2000/05/15-: CIA-RDP80-0160i R000600 el-111?Ni= E ? 2N,L1e 319?:11 r S ? 333,807 ? ? ??":" BY MILES BENSON Q1971, Newhouse News Service Washington?When the Sen- ate barred its doors, Monday and sat down to hear details of how the United States was financing mercen'ary 'Thai .troops fighting in Laos, it was ..the first most senators had .? heard about the operation. ? But a privileged handful ap- parently had known all about for more than a year. They just never had told their col- leagues. This incenses Sen. Clifford i P. Case, R-N.J., who 'feels his T. colleagues k e op too many "major policy" secrets from t each other?and from the pub- lic. ? Watchdog Panel The "insiders" were mem- hers of a little-lmown subcom- mittee set up in 1955 to act as a watchdog over activities of the Central Intelligence Agen- ? ty. The conisinittee has net I only three times in the last two years. It is the CIA that has been financing 4800 Thai mercenaries?the State De- partment calls them "volun- teers"?in violation of a 1970 congressional ban, critics con- tend. tThe secrecy surrounding the [-operation was defended by j Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D- t Wash., who argues that if all ; the other senators knew of it, tit would not have been a se- i?cret.. I But Case insists such a ma- jor policy move should be public business. Burying Information . Case 'challenges the useful- --ness of the CIA commiittee, saying that it "serves as a means for burying informa- tion rather than bringing it out into the open." ? And it'd .no-t just the CIA committee, Case contends, that is guilty of such "institu- tionalized secrecy." Another . special panel operating the same way, he charges, is the Joint Committee on Atomic . Energy. " "Sen. Stuart Symington, D- Mo., for instance, never knew anything about the location of ' missiles around the world un- til he got on that committee, and he was startled by the in- formation he got," Case de- clared. The AEC committee is giv- en access to classified infor- mation on the location and power of nuclear warheads the United States keeps at the : ready around the world. . ? - "The point is that informa- tion on major policy ought to be public information," Case said. "And the public's- partic- ipation in these matters, through their representatives in Congress, is the real goal i? we are seeking." Prior to the closed Senate session on Laos, Case doubted. 1 that even the CIA oversight ! commitee had been informed of the mercenary operations. Case's criticism of the CIA :?and AEC committees is count- ered by Jackson, who served on both panels: Ile says they; -work so well that he wants another one set up to oversee: the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation, a Proposal he has been quietly pushing: "These committees were set , up on the theory that certain ; Sensitive things should be on a 'need-to-know' basis," he said.. . "If you let everybody know, . ther is no longer a secret." - .1, Asked if the CIA committee had been informed of the CIA support for Thai mercenaries in Laos, Jackson replied:, "Yes, we were told. They : have kept us currently ,in; formed," The CIA oversight subconi= mittee, chaired by Sen. Johti Stennis, D-Miss., who also heads the p a r eu t Sonat Armed Service Committee, has yet to meet this year. It , last met March 20, 1970. It also sat Jan. 30, 1970. In 1960 j it met only once, on Feb. 21f, At each of the three ineetings ? the only witness was ? CIA. Director Richard Helms.' The committee met twice in 1958- ? and five times in 1067. ? Besides Stennis and Jack"- son, other members of the committee are Symington, Pe terII. Dominick, R-Colo., and Barry M. Goldwater, R-Ayer' Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 .E.F100: . 1E11 YORT) TIMES - Approved For Release 2000/0g/425.:JithA-VOP8AT146-61M00600 " ? ters of Congress as to whether forces from 'Indocbiaa, ne point, in a t; American bornbitic; is not con- At o letter -; tributing to the Lflow of refu- Senator Edward_ M. Kennedy, g cos. They now total at least the State Department argued 700,000 Laotians out of a pop- that the president's authority to ulat.ion of fewer than 3 million. engage in a war In northern 0 On White House orders go.- Laos was based upon Mr. Nixon's Ing beck to the -F;(,,i?inady? and: p.Owers as Commander-in.- Chief Johnson Administrations, the, o take reasonable "measures" y -yr -i- ? 7. 0 1 Central Intelligence 11,- ? to carry out the withdrawal of VV ar, vy been supporting a' ir`x)Ps' ? " ff State De- ht 0 ID JO, How I o Fight ? - force of at least 30,000 mountain ? But tliat was no rmramIlitarY t Alto justifi- ' .-? tribesmen. With the Meo tribes- cation?- - men decimated by heavy- fight- pnrtment for the recruitment Dill. .. the Thai "volunteers." Rathz-x, ing in the past two years, Th.,is, - nov,,, numbering 4,g,00, have ,4,.its justification WaS that the - been recruited ' with United Nixon Administration had inher! ., States financial assistance to ited . a . program' "initiated". by the Kennedy Administration and which 'evolver in the two sue- ending' Administrations. Since: this program of - "volunteers" was already in effect, the de; pertinent argued, it was ' _ not banned ' by the Fulbright amend, ment? ? . . Legislative 1.-Iayrnal;:ev The more the State Depart- ment weaved and bobbed with its legal justifications, the more apparent it was that the _Execu- tive Branch was on the- defen.: sive about continuing surrepti- tious military activities in Northern Laos. And now .Senator Symington is about to throw his; , legislative haymaker. He plans to introduce this week an amend- ment to the Defense Procure- ment Bill?an amendment stipu- lating that no more.. 'than. to the Senate the fast detailed,S200-million can be spent. an- , "aro recruited in Thailand," giv- comprehensive report on how en "special ,rivil,ges" for goint, madly for military and econorn- the United States got involved to Laos and "are under the in ic activities in Laos without . in a clandestine war in Laos mediate tactical command of, Congressional consent. I - ? without the knowledge, much' Thai officers." . . ? With that limit, virtually ? all less the consent, of Congress. -,... - The Laos iSsue is. becoming the secret. military activities ' . Out of the Symington report . would have to come to an end,. emerged these principal facts another test ease?.fn the foreign-? Win or lose With his amend- about the American involvement policy power struggle between- at me in. a war . between the Royal too Executive Branch and. the , Senator Symington will ? have forced the secret war out : i . ? Laotian Government on the one Senate. What bought ti-us issue Into the , open ? and that - has . _side and the pro -Communist to ,a head wa.s the into Thai ,.\,ohint,cers,,_an been one of his objectives 'ever ' Pathet- Lab and North Vietnam; or - tin : since an Athbassador said he ' eso troops on the other: - - .action that may violate the spa- couldn't visit.Laos. , '? ? : 0 The. United States is spend: it, if not the letter, of an "anti- - ?JOHN W.. FINNEY. log at least $350-million annual-' mercenary" amendment by Sea- ly .in:.military- and economic as: : ator Eulbright that was in- ?sistance to the Royal Laotian corported into this year's Defense forces.. Tbe,. Administration. has ' Appropriations Bill. publicly _ acknowledged 'only The Fulbright amendment pro- some $52- million in . economic vides that no defense funds can aid. . . ' he used 'Ito support Vietnamese ' , . ? ? ..0 For nearly -10 years,- Amnri- , or ether free-world forces in can . planes based in Thailand; actions designed to provide have been providing combat air military support and assistance support in northern Laos. In the' to the Governments of Cam- past year, increasing reliance bodia or Laos." The amendment -has been placed on the satura- contains an escape clause that tion tactics of 33-52 bombers,' says that such support is Per- raising a question in some guar-. missible if required to insure the 'safe withdrawal of American _ Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0 . , . 0017Y-)CY WASHINGTON?Senator Stn-- supplement the Paramilitary art Symington of Missouri, who force. ' has something of the single; ? Th,'-' SYminglon report was mindedness of the bulldog Inas. cnoiTh to force. a 'public ac- cot of Yale, his alma mater, hIkowledgement by tbeT,' State Dc- 'likes - to recall how be wanted partraent that the United States . to go to Laos in 1955, only to was giving support to some be blocked by the American "ethnic Laotians" from Thailand Ambassador in Vientiane._ The and "some Thais" who were Ambassador, it seems, did not fighting in Laos. But the way want a Senator poking around the State Department described in the clandestine war that that it, they were just "volunteers" the United States was waging ?the department took deep uin- there. ? . brage at use of the word "mer- : . Senator Symington eventually cenaries"---who were in Lao: at got to Laos a couple of years "the request" of Prime Minister later, and in the past two years Souvanna Fhotima. ? he has sent staff investigators Fulbright's Comments from his Senate Foreign Rcla- "A misrepresentation of the -Cons su'ocormnittee to that iso- faets,,, sputtered senator J. W. late(' Indochinese country. Last Fulbright, chairman of the Sen- - week, before an unusual secret ate Foreign Relations Commit- session, Mr. Symington presented tee, The "volunteers," he said, Approved For Release 2000/05/1154. CIN-RtIP80-01601R00060p i f.,.."--,? ,..".a ...,....,,,,,,e..), `,,.",:: ' '-ir 1,,,,,, -..:\ ;,,,,,A 5.%=?,-..-1, .m-,... .....;,,, , .:71. .. , ( ' ? N.. P i k Ir.-.., ? ? . ., ? 11 -,...\ t; - ? 1 . ? ij 1 -453\ 1;:r'l li'''-?c' i ) ? etl, .;i, ..-!.L.-...,--4 4_, ' . .-- ..?:,.. : .? ,.-