U.S. ARMS HELP ENRICH LAOS WARLORD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 140
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 30, 1970
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release
?111, 11.
ler?v
? V
134.TA-RDIVNIEIRO
Arms Help Enrich Laos
By Jack Anderson
Gen. Kouprasith Abhay, the
Laotian warlord who controls
the capital city of Vientiane,
has become a millionaire by
using American-armed troops
to protect his logging opera-
tion.
The teak he cuts is deliv-
ered across the Mekong River
to Thailand where it is sold
foi, huge profits to the U.S.
military establishment. He has
supplemented his income, too,
by supplying prostitutes as a
U.S.-financed construction
project.
His enterprise is dismay-
ingly typical of the success
stories of foreign satraps who
have grown rich off U.S. aid.
The titillating details are
told in a confidential ffeld re-
port to the Agency for Inter-
national Development, which
dispenses U.S. aid and pro-
vides a front for the Central
Intelligence Agency in Laos.
The facts have also been con-
firmed by my associate Les
Whitten, who conducted an
on-the-spot investigation in
Vientiane.
The wily warlord, whose
control of Vientiane makes
him the real power behind
Premier Souvanna Phouma,
got the timber rights by hav-
ing the Laotian Assembly
falsely declare the land "un-
used." Actually, the land Is oc-
cupied by hundreds of Lao
peasants, who farm the high-
land rice plots that nestle
among the teak forests.
Gen. Abhay uses his soldiers
not to fight the Communist
kathet. 4.ao,buk to keep them
out of his forests. His troops
also cow the Lao peasants who
had gone there ahead of him
to cultivate rice. Those who
object to his logging opera-
tions, conducted in the name
of the Lao Timber Society, are
driven off..
For in placid Laos, the man
with the gun is the law?and
Kouprasith Abhay has the
guns, largely supplied, of
course, by the U.S. for the
purpose of fighting the Pathet
Lao.
The general has tried deli-
cately to keep his prostitution
business quiet. But the AID
field report alleges that he
dispatched a dozen prostitutes
to bring a little night life to
Nam- Ngum, 60 miles north of
Vientiane, where the U.S. is
brining to build a $3-million
dun.
The construction has
brought a huge influx of work-
ers, who provide the custom-
ers for Abhay's ladies of the
night. To AID's horror, the la-
dies were housed in quarters
next to AID's own leadership
training building. When AID
protested to Abhay's" colonel-
on-the-scene, he merely
shrugged and disclaimed any
connection with the women.
No Gab for Colonel
AID retaliated by cutting
off the colonel's gasoline sup-
plies, thus reducing his troops
to riding bicycles. Rather than
give up his own staff car for
an undignified two-wheeler,
the colonel capitulated. Still
Insisting that the women were
Imoncl,his jurisdiction, he or-
dered soldiers to tear down
the offending house.
They promptly rebuilt it In
another part of the village,
and the construction men
began coming down with ye-
neral disease. Absenteeism
also increased sharply.
AID sent for penicillin and,
with the cooperation of the
Japanese contractors building
the dam, set up a clinic. AID
proposed to the colonel that
the prostitutes be issued iden-
tification passes and be
treated regularly.
To do so would have been a
confession that prostitution
was practiced in Gen. Abhay's
military domain. This would
have offended the general's
sensibilities and jeopardized
the colonel's career. He flatly
refused.
The disease finally became
so rampant that the girls were
chased away?still infected?
to spread the disease through-
out the country.
Textile War
Secretary of Commerce
Maurice Stans invited Kiichi
Miyazawa, the Japanese minis-
ter of international trade and
Industry, to his apartment the
other day in a futile attempt
to head off a textile war be-
tw.-on the United States and
Taw failure to come to
terms is expected to bring pro-
tectionist legislation that not
only will boost the price of
shirts, sweaters, skirts and
scarves in this country but
could produce economic reper-
cussions around $beaworld.
ar or
Stans and Miyazawa
four hours alone, without ad.,
visers or interpreters, discuss..
ing voluntary controls on
Japanese textile imports.
When President Nixon
agreed last November to re-
turn Okinawa to Japanese con-
trol, he was led by Prime Min:
istcr Sato to understand that
Japan, in return, would accept
voluntary textile curbs.
Miyazalka seemed quite will-
ing to implement the prime
minister's somewhat vague
promise. Stans and Miyazawa
emerged from their four-hour
meeting with an understand-
ing that they would negotiate
an agreement.
But Miyazawa was accompa-
nied to the U.S. by more than
two dozen Japanese textile
manufacturers. They wouldn't
losten to talk of voluntary lim-
itations. They recalled bitterly
that they had agreed in 1964
to hold down cotton sales to
the U.S., with an understand-
ing that the arrangement
would be temporary. Now the
agreement has been renewed
for another three years.
The Japanese manufactur-
ers, therefore, flatly refused to
go along with an agreement to
limit the sales of non-cottons.
An embarrassed Miyazawa.
went back to Stans and ex-
plained that he had spoken
too soon. Sheepishly, Miya-.
zawa said he would have, to re-;
tract what he had agreed at.
their private, four-hour meet.;
Ing in Stans's apartment.
Stans immediately set about.
drafting protectionist legisla-I,
tion, and the textile wat)
seemed about ready to orol2t..4
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Approved For Release 2001/03/041E0MRDP80-01601R00
STATINTL
2 9 JUN 97O
THE PERISCOPE
i04001~1,404Whofit'
SOLZHENITSYN: INTO EXILE?
, Author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn maybe exiled from
f the Soviet Union for his bitter public protest
against the detention of biologist Zhores Medve-
dev in a mental hospital ( page 47). Soviet diplo-
: mats have sounded out several neutral European
governments as to whether they would accept
Solzhenitsyn as a permanent resident.
SINO-SOVIETS: MORE SHOOTING
Since the spread of the Indochina war into Cam-
loodia?which aroused bitter new disagreement
between Peking and Moscow?a new: series of
minor skirmishes has erupted along the Sino-
Soviet border. So far neither side has publicized
the new incidents, which have taken place in
Sinkiang and in Manchuria, but word of the
fighting has been leaked to foreign diplomats by
both the Chinese and Soviet Governments.
' MOSCOW'S MODEST HELP FOR HANOI
? ' According to a recent U.S. intelligence estimate, i
Soviet aid to North Vietnam since 1962 totals .
$370 million?$120 million in military aid and-
$250 million in economic aid. This is far less than
the previously accepted figure of $1 billion.
LAOS: OUR MEN IN MUFTI
One subterfuge that the Pentagon and the CIA
have employed to circumvent the Geneva agree-
ments barring foreign military men from Laos 1(
has worked this way: U.S. military officers and
noncoms assigned to Laos simply took off their-
uniforms, resigned their commissions or enlisted
ratings and went into the country as "civilians."
Pentagon personnel records reveal that the men '
involved were reinstated. in their military ranks
when they left Laos.
? ; 4,(A.A1
1
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
_News a ner
WASHINGTON POST
What editors and nnlitim,..
ism is
pFr eSepse 2001O3140: M-RDP8020160
with a
-14 lin 1 4 I i Commentary news p
!By Nicholas von Hoffman; TV n
?--
There' exists in the plethora of p-ubliCationi were. . conveyi
:lucky we don't have to read a magazine called Editor ground.
& Publisher. It is read or at least subscribed to,by most: Presider
executives in the newspaper business. This' makes it a'
.faithful reflection of the mentality which guides most,,
,hut not all, our daily newspapers.
? In makeup, story selection, editorial policy and use;,
,of language, Editor & Publisher consistently lives up'.
, to the best in journalism as it was practiced circa 1935. i
Leafing through its pages will tell you why so many;
newspapers are dull, uninformative and reactionary.
A recent issue of the magazine contahied a story with
this headline: Readers Split Over Reporter's Beard..
The ,article that followed in E & P's notable prose said
that, "The public image of newspapermen got perhaps
its severest test when the Dayton Daily News invited.
readers' response to photos of a bearded reporter. Ap-
pearing on the front page was a picture combo showing!
the daily growth of Dale Huffman's hirsute adornment;
'complete with a ballot for readers to indicate whether ;
. they wanted the beard shaved or saved. Readers turned
' thumbs down on the reporter's beard."
, At least it can't be said that newspaper editors 'are!
? holding out the good stuff and privately circulating it;
? among themselves. They treat themselves as badly as
!they treat their readers. Another story in the same issue:
describes a speech, given by the assistant managing.
, editor of the Santa Ana (California) Register to his!
local Rotary, Club. If you want to know more, you'll
'find it on page 22 of the June 13 number.
Editor & Rublisher isn't whollY given over to trivia:,;
,It has articles. about important topics and they too tell
, us something about the minds that edit the American,
daily press, as with the piece that was run with this
slightly paranoid headline: Attack on Objectivity
creases From Within.
The article quotes from a speech given by an im).,
portant Associated Press editor to a group of Penn-
sylvania newspeople. What he says tells more about ;
print journalism than the story about the reporter andl
'his beard:
"Those of you who read the various professional:
.journals are aware that objective reporting is coming!.
under 'increasing attack from within our own ranks.
There is abroad in the profession a movement,
un-
organized but vocal, generally known as the Newt
Journalists. Basically, their argument is that the re-i.
;porter has the right to draw eonclusions from the factsi
:he gathers. Unless he is permitted to do so, they say,.
! it is impossible to put simple, unvarMshed facts in per-,
.spective. To quote the New Journalists, the self-disci-
pline required to remain impartial reduces reporters to,
, the status of mere eunuchs , . . the catch words and',
phrases of the New Journalists betray their real con-
cern. They are not content to he observers. They are '
?
:determined to exert an influence, to be opinion makers...
. . . . .
They talk about the importance of what reporters think,
,of the reporter's right to take a moral stance, to have
firm convictions and to express them in print. Always,
:beware of the man who talks in terms of `m();.al corn-'
mitmebts.'. Invariably he is a man who has totallyi
.bought the line peddled by advocates of one cause or:
. another."
:Most American, newspaper editors would agree with
our speaker, who's not named here berause his words-
' are so prototypic. Vice President Apt-v, would agree;
so would many other politicians and niany newspaper
fuller
)and ac
STATI NTLiocal ne
your db
' The ur uuCCTITIC arrived at the reductio
ad absurdum with Agnew's attack on the media. 'News-
papers have dutifully reported the attack every time:
,he gives it, making themselves a conveyor belt for the
(impression that he and his buddies are being persecuted,
'by .a hippie-controlled national press. Seldom do these
accounts include a paragraph saying that most Amen-
,can newspapers newspapers editorially support him and his boss.
By these standards objectivity consists of limiting
oneself to accurate quotation. Let the speaker be a liar,
an ignoramus, mistaken or a truth teller, this school
of thought holds that journalism has no responsibility.
to establish the facts independently. It's left to the read-
er to get the facts to judge our public controversialists,
an obvious impossibility in a society disputing over
topics that range from the storage of pathogens in bio-
logical warfare, to monetary liquidity, to the presence of
CIA agents in Laos, to the identity of major polluter
of Lake Erie.
Our current definition of news suggests a range of
motivation that runs from extreme A to extreme B:
patriotism, honor, votes,' public service, self defense,
love of freedom and peace and a few others. In a?time
,when more people grow up having absorbed the pre-
cepts of the social sciences,-such inferences as to why
events take place are unbelievable. Only Marxists and
'Christians of the Billy Graham stamp, that is behavioral
determinants, can read the accounts of the words and
'deeds of men on most of our front pages and take them
,seriously.
?
, Objective news is not only incredible to people
;brought up in the 'contemporary mode, it's also biased.
!This kind of objectivity rejects information that tends
;to throw doubt on ancient Institutions and established,
!,practice by? calling it partisan. Editors don't want to
print that kind of bad news.
) They will print bad news that makes an evil appear
'to be the work of bad men or criminals. They will print
bad news that is the work of God, like fires, earth-
quakes, and plane crashes. They will print bad news
that may lead readers to question other country's social
systems, that may cause people to wonder' about the
'way other countries select their leaders, make their
decisions, transact their public business, but rarely and
'only in our few good papers, do they do. this in regard
,4..o ourselves.
1 When our speaker says editors should be on guard
:against reporters who have "bought the line peddled by
;one cause or another," his words mean editors should
be on guard against reporters who've not bought the,.
'line that editors are trying to peddle.
, But : editors themselves only half believe in this
'mythic objectivity. If they did they'd pay the highest
.wages to the men who most excel at this kind of formula
journalism. This isn't the case at 'all. The best paid:
writers ,are the columnists and feature writers who're
hired to express opinion.
Newspaper executives are well paid. Most reporters:
.ren't. They don't enter the business for money but for
other reasons?excitement, prestige, fascination with,
(IreaderA who 'believe the news is sIanted and wao, Ake
I our c ppromedforpRelease 200110310,48: CIA-RDP80Q17/1601,R009700030001:4 is the uplifting do-
t the -nshecl facts." ?
tn::L man chases after it long enough, he mv,
o ..7. ...
? c't.s ,cc t,,,,T;te, not unvarnished facts, but some form.
ic nounr nhinnf ;17n ,
GUARDIAN STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001i634F efORDP80-01601R
StfU,PHANOUYONG:"NDCO
GANGSTER LOGIC"
?
Civil was has raged for 20 years in Laos, situated west of Vietnam, north of
Cambodia, east of Thailand, south of China. Progressive forces, led by prince Sou-
phanouvong, chairman of the central committee of the Laotian Patriotic Front, now
occupy virtually two-thirds of the country. The remaining third) along the west-
ern border with Thailand, is in the hands of a coalition "neutralist" and rightist
regime supported by the U.S. (more than $50 million a year) which sits in Vientiane/
the administrative capital.
In the last months, the Laotian Patriotic Front has registered victory after
throughout Laos. On June 9, patriotic forces captured the strategic town of Sar-
avane. In recent weeks, the liberation army has gone on the offensive in dozens
of areas, including battles with troops from Thailand sent into Laos by the cor-
rupt Bangkok military government to bolster the shakey Vientiane regime.
During his recent swing through Southeast Asia Guardian staff correspondent
Wilfred Burchett submitted four questions to prince Souphanouvong. Following are
his answers, received last week.
What is the present military situation in Laos? The Western press mentions
that in capturing towns like Attopeu and. Saravane, the Pathet Lao forces have for
the first time violated. the 1962 cease-fire line. What is your comment?
The present military situation in Laos shows that on the one hand the American
escalation of "special war" has been redoubled and on the other that the deeper
they plunge in such escalation the greater will be the defeat of the U.S. and its
puppets. From a strategic viewpoint they were severely defeated in the Plain of
Jars. Indeed, this was the first serious defeat in Laos for President Nixon's
theory of using puppet troops with maximum American firepower.
Despite such escalation the U.S. and puppet"forces were not able to change the
situation in their favor. On the contrary, they have been driven onto the defensive
from a military point of view and politically they are more isolated than ever.
As for the Laotian patriotic forces they have retained and constantly developed
their position of active initiative. After having kicked the enemy out of the
Plain of Jars and completely recaptured the whole area, the patriotic forces diree-.
ted their attack against the hideout of the "special forces" at Sam Thong-Long
Cheng. They liberated Attopeu and other places near the Bolovens plateu. That
is to say they have punished the enemy in the jumping off points and bases for
their criminal attacks.
Right from the start the Laotian patriotic forces have serupulously respected
the letter of the 1962 Geneva agreements. But as the U.S. and puppet forces have '
tne rest ox tne country. in tact they have completely.
liquidated what the Western press refers to as the 1962
"cease fire line." Just as they have torn up the whole
1962 Geneva agreements on Laos.
Those who sow the wind reap the whirlwind. If they
don't want to reap another whirlwind the Americans and
their valets in Vientiane, Bangkok and Saigon had better
not sow any more wind. If they charge ahead, heads
down, in new criminal adventures against the Laotian
people they will have to bear the-entire responsibility for
the disastrous consequences.
The official explanation for the American bombingi
of Laos and the presence of U.S. troops there is the
existence of a Ho Chi WO trail and the presence of
North Vietnamese troops. What is the extent of U.S. and
Thailand troops in Laos and how serious are the US.
bombings? ? ?
With a view to turning Laos into a nco-colony, the
Americans have never ceased their interference and
aggression against Laos nor their trampling underfoot its
d
: 219aFteriolT 1#191191916VantetAilil aevire
introduced thousands of U.S. advisors, CIA personnel
? ? ?
undertaken a most criminal war of aggression against the
Laotian people, our armed forces have been forced to
fight back, making use of their sacred rights of self
defense.
The patriotic forces must expel the enemy from those
areas which it has illegally occupied, punish them in the
bases from which they launched their attacks and
perpetrated their crimes. In so doing we are safeguarding
the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial
integrity of Laos and effectively defending the 1962
Geneva agreements. It is in basing ourselves on these
agreements and on the concrete reality of the present.
situation in Laos and our desire kr peace that we have
put forward our five-point proposal for a political
settlement of the Laotian problem (Guardian, April 11,
1970). Although there has been no responsible reply
from the other side, we will nonetheless persevere in
seeking a political solution based on our five points. ?
The U.S. puppet forces have never respected their
commitments. Hardly were the 1962 agreements signed,
than th4pprOVedtFOr fliteletige 2eouffea4
controlled by the patriotic forces, at the same
launching terrorist "pacification" operations throughout
ontlriue
STATI NTL
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E5844 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Exteasions of Remarks June zi,
disappointed the Administration and angered in mInd?provicling enough money for the Other changes at Furman Include corn
sonic of its critica. YeL there ore indicaLlona national needs, not enough to fuel more In- pieta revamping of the curricilltim from th
the situation in improving, flit.tofl. two-nementer ayntem and the :Mitt from man
Earlier tilts week Paul W. McCracken, , There may be more spectacular ways to ? datory ROTC to optional. Previously a stu-
chairman of President Nixon's Council a play the game, but somehow we feel safer dent who signed up for ItCYPC had to corn.'
Economic Advisers, told the economld policy With four yards and a cloud of dust. ? .. plete two years. Now he can enroll and then .
? drop the program if he finds It not to hisSTATINTL
committee of the Organization for EC0110111 c .
Cooperation and Developmen of improvement includes a slowing of the ? liking.
The new system is a compromise In the ; '?' ' ?
t that evidence .
rise of wholesale food and commodity prices ROTC PROGRAM AT FURMAN sense that It is a break with the old ROTC ??
and a lower rate of wage increases. UNIVERSITYtraditions of march and drill and a leaning
As a story In this newspaper reported yes- .. ? , toward allowing students more individual-
terday, a growing number of private econom- , . ization.
ists, though still probably a minority, believe ? HON. STROM THURMOND But at the aame time it still operates on ..;
the worst of the inflation is over. That alone . the theory that the military is an integral ..
would ging.
OF SOUTH CAROLINA part of society and?whether it is good or It ?
Mr. Nixon's go-slow approach clearly was IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATS.' bad?this Is a fact. The new program con- ?, w
be encoura
the result of careful calculation. There were Tuesday, June 23, 1970 tinues to offer the college men who is faced ,-
with meeting a military obligation the best
several ways to cool the overheated economy
that the Administration Inherited, and many Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, in re- way to utilize his talents, rather than be
things to be considered in choosing a course. cent years ROTC programs all over th--
..:..
drafted as te
First, there was the matter of monet andary Nation have come under a great deal of ? serve a priva. s... _.
policy. Super-easy money had done a lot to unjust criticism and abuse. In the main,
this criticism has come from misguided
obviously more restraint WAS in order. But
, HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
I get the economy into its inflated state, so
1 how much more? students and campus radicals. A few col-
= An recently is 1066 the Federal Reserve leges in the count' y which have bowed
2 System hnd tightened up, abruptly and to this criticism have abolished the
briefly, and had caused something approach- ROTC programs from their campus cur- OT NEW YORK
ing a money panic. So the Federal Reserve . riculum. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
this time moved much more gradually, In Mr. President, on June 19, the Green-
fiscal policy the Administration also opted vile News, a leading newspaper pub- Tuesday. June 23, 1970
for the gentle approach?budget surpluses,
fished in Greenville, S.C., published a ? Mr. ROBISON. Mr. Speaker, the sixth
but not very big ones.
Now the execution of the plan h very fine editorial assessing the ROTC . article in the Christian Science Monitor '
as loft
man University, one of series on narcotics traffic traces the route
something to be desired. The Fed probably program At Fur
tightened money too much and for too long ? the outstanding institutions of higher of narcotics through Southeast Asia. One
In 1069.. And the Administration, together learning in the Nation. Furman Univer- of the difficulties in stopping the flow of
with Congress, has managed to convert those City has met this criticism headon and narcotics from this area is that some of
small budget surpluses into deflcits. has revamped its ROTC curriculum to the producers are mountain fighters who
Yet progress is surely being made. The make this experience more meaningful are friendly to the U.S. efforts against
economy is cooling, and before many more
months pass the trend will show clearly i to the individual cadet. This, of course, the North Vietnamese and who in turn
n
the price indexes. Those wholooked for means that the ROTC graduate at Fur- are keeping the Communists out of Laos.
. price declines earlier forgot that such devel- man will be better qualified to serve as Additionally, in this geographic area
opments arc usually the last signs of an eb- an officer and leader in the service of his there seems to be significant involvement
? bing Inflation, not the first. country. by high government officials in the
Some companies, institutions and individ- ? Mr. President, I wish to commend Fur- opium trade and, therefore, a firm gov-
uals ar being hurt; no one has invented a man University for the fine work that it ernmental policy to stop the illegal pro-
painless way to restore a shaky economy to
stability. Many more would have suffered is doing. ? duction of that narcotic is difficult to
much more, though, If the inflated economyI ask unanimous consent that the edi-
achieve. Nevertheless, it is an area at
had been allowed to roar on into eventual , tonal, entitled "A New Look for ROTC," which we must direct our attention be-
g:Master?or had been halted suddenly by from the Greenville News be printed cause as European sources of supply are
slamming on the fiscal and monetary brakes. in the Extensions of Remarks. dried up, these sources in Southeast Asia
Everyone may wish that the Government's. There being no objection, the editorial may pick up the slack.. In view of the
plans were producing results more swiftly. ? _
wa s ordered to be printed in the RECORD, American presence in these nations, we
pears to be adjusting to a changing situa- ,
and smoothly, but most of the public ap- as follows: ought to be able to exert pressure to curb
tion with considerable aplomb. One or the , , A NEW Loox FOR ROTC . the production of these illegal narcotics.
more interesting features of the sharp plunge An experimental ROTC program at Fur- ' The article follows:
of the stock market in April and May was ? man University appears to have bridged the ''. Tnantaxe; FOUR-LANE DRUG HIGHWAY
the scarcity of anything resembling panic military-civilian gap that has plagued the (By John Hughes) "
selling. program in other institutions. It is worth
HON. HOWARD W. ROBISON
Volume on the New York Stock Exchange close examination as an example of construe- BANGKOK, THAILAND.?FOT the junk mer-
in recent weeks has usually tended to rise tive compromise. chants of Southeast Asia, Thailand Is the
when prices rally and to subside m prices , The key to the program, which is ending corridor through which their illegal mer-
decline. The mood of investors and traders 'a two-year trial at Furman and. 10 other chandise must pass to Hong Kong and the
certainly is not overwhelmingly optimistic, ' colleges and universities, is integration, rath_ lucrative markets of America. .
but it does appear to be hopeful. When prices or than segregation, of civilian and military But to many, Thailand scorns less a cor-
turn downward there generally la a reduction elcmenta, Proof of the program's Ruccess, at Odor than a four-lane highway down which
In orders to buy?but no evidence of deep least locally, is Furman's decision to continuo narcotics ohipments roll with ease.
pessimism. It past the trial period. Of course, there are toile, The police nuint ?
Thus gradualism does Seem to be working, The program In the Army's annwer to long- be paid off. Experts In the business say the
even if it isn't delighting everybody. Bust- standing complaints from students that going price is $5 per kilo of opium at each ,
nessmen should realize now that to make ROTC courses are boring, non-academic and of five checkpoints between the opium- .
plans on the basis of never-ending inflation a waste of time. Under the experimental growing borderlands of the north and the ?
. is only to invite serious trouble. plan, freshmen are allowed to take military capital city of Bangkok. But $25 a kilo in
' The Administration fortunately seems to history courses for four hours credit and payoffs is small enough overhead in a busi-
realize that wage-price controls or other sophomores take political science and na- ness where the profit rolls in by hundreds
crash programs against Inflation would not tional security courses Instead of the tradi- of thousands of dollars.
only accomplish nothing constructive. They tonal military courses which come in the, Some Thai officials are clearly in thle busi-
would also undo much that has been done? junior and senior years. ness up to their elbows. One recent incident ?
by persuading the public that monetary- Civilian professors are utilized through illustrates the point. .
fiscal restraint la a failure, that inflation will *appropriations from the Army. The new pro- Thai residents of a Bangkok suburb noted
Indeed persist. gram underlines the fact that strictly mill- suspicious activity at a godown (warehouse) . ?
In tho circumstances the CloVernment's tary subjects are taught better outside the in their neighborhood. A helicopter kept ?
course Still ehould be to move slowly, Mead- Furman classrooms. Sturents go to summer ? fluttering down. There was furtive unload-
fly, avoid shocks. Federal Reserve Chairman camp to learn about the "nuts and bone of iv. 'They told the police and the police.
Arthur Burns Indicates that is what be has. the Army," accordi?g to officials. '. auspeotIng an illegal. liquor racket, raided,
? , ,
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-61601R0007000300131:4
vtn vi,?$.11Tyymn POf
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :-CIA-RDP80-01601R000
2 2 JUN 1970
Mariptis Chills
.Union Leader' Swing to Righ
Is. Bad News for the ilemoerats
- .
? FOR. THE ,FHIST time in between AID and the AFL- ated in the construction in-
more than three deeadeg the CIO's subsidiaries, the dustb? average a 15.5 per,
,ower bloc that has been American Institute for Free cent jump the first year and.
,i
'the solid base of the Demo. Labor. Meany, as witness, 39 per cent over, three years.'
:crane Party is cracking. For shouted angrily as Fulbright This compares with an aver-
Democratic strategists look- questioned the wisdom of age in manufacturing of 5.5
lag ahead the split in the turning over funds?more per cent for the .first year
trade union movement' is than 830 million at that' and slightly more than 15
like the initial tremors of an point?to a non-governmen- per cent for three years.'
/earthquake, with the worst tal organization. Conceding Needless to say, these in,
still to come. the right to hold a different' creases are passed on by the
14 George Meany, the vener- opinion from his on the war construction industry in the
able boss of the AFL-CIO, Fulbright added: cost of large-scale building.
with his gray eminence and "But that is a different
;secretary of state, Jay Love-, matter from supplying large
-stone, at his elbow, gave' sums of money to you to be
President Nixon blank-eheckrused with 'the freedom that
support for Cambodia. The ,this re,cord shows you use
outpouring of the hard hats it." '
.in New York and St. Louis
"MR. CHAIRMA.N,"
followed. The President in?:.
?,Meany responded, "they
ivited the New York Parad-
*ere not supplying money
ers to the White House and
the embrace wag ratified to me. This money is used to
with a hard hat for the mil-, 'carry out U.S. Government
foreign policy. Now you may
,Ing chief executive. not agree with that policy.
0 '- When Mr. Nixon made thyt
pilgrimage to the hand- But the people who approve
the use of this money' in this
.some AFL-CIO headquarters r ?
%%ay agree that it is a good
,a block, from the. White thing to ,'Tvp1nn free trade
It does not have an appreci-
able effect on individual'
home building, as was erro-
neously stated in this space
recently, since this is for the
most part a non-unionized
field.
But the strong upward
pull of such big wage boosts
is obvious. The construction
unions until quite recently!
have had the narrowest ap-
prenticeship restrictions and
the most restrictive control,
over productivity in relation;
to manhours of work.
"The inevitability of the;
;
House for an appearance be unions, that the free trade. selection of a Republican
fore the executive council, -
unions can play a part in de- candidate ? for President in
Meany had harsh things to veloping viable democratic
say about rising prices and, societies, and the develop.
the wage gam But this was iment of viable democratic
obscured by Menny's hene- !societies in Lntin America is
diction for the Nixon war in the interest of the United
Policy, a blemsing that ha States of America."
'had given to Lyndon John- , AID continues to supply
son in the years of the esca- 'funds to the AFL-CIO sub-
lation. ' sidiarles. Formerly this
. Having gone so far out for money came directly from
the Nixon policy and if that the Central Intelligenc
policy proves at least par- Agency. AID Administrator
tinily successful, the 'trade John A. Hannah recently
iunionists on the right will sold that as of today It i
Note for Mr. Nixon in 1972, only in Laos that some AID
'Tills is the dismaying pros- .funds go for CIA operations.
'Ted that more aware Demo: . The unions that are the
crats see as they peer into tore of support for the Pres-
the future;,ident's policy' in Indochina
?the hard hats in the con-
WHAT IS MORE, there is i_
struetion 'industry?have
a strong quid pro quo in the re:!!son to be grateful to the
. ?ileany-Lovestone position. administration. If. only be-
'.
? Vor several years the AFL- cause of its hands-off atti-
? ?!CIO has been getting con- ' tilde on wages and prices.
Biddable sum-s from ? the Nor are ;they likely to? be
Agency for International alarmed by the President's
Development to ! promote 'economic message and the
Meany-Lovestone foreign promise of an! "inflation
policy in Latin America, alert." The ? alert is many.
Asia and Africa through months too late.
"free trade unions." , THESE UNIONS have lecIll
7 A year ago Chairman J. the wage increase parade.
;William Fulbright of the ,rho' careful figures
.1968 was universally con-;
ceded," the head of a white0
collar union writes. "One';
force, and one force only,!
r that outcome, the
came 'within an eyeinsh ofi
reversing
AFL-CIO. Maybe there was,
a place here or there where,
we could have strained a Ht.!
tle harder but it is difficult'
'to give such consideration tol
such questioning . ," ;?1
The questitining points to:
1972 an the Meany-Love-
stone stand on the Vietnam'
war. The 'Meany front is not,
'entirely 'united?Jacob, Po-1
Itofsky of the Amalgamated.
'Clothing Workers Jiled
'dissent. But.the ideological'
'shove.Ae the. right 4i:power4
411.
?
senagtRaraaritieliVetstrirl Veit? IA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
'coal a ofi t at;
the terms of the partnership eontractik,socently? negoti.'
ii9L3 ? L. T;,15,1114
Approved For Release 2001/03/0t iCjIuWe80-01601R0007
The Secret earn
and t
Games It Plays
? ' .1 ???
, ?
L. .1,LETCHER PROUTY
"The hill costiimes of the Meo
tribesmen contrasted with the civili-
an clothes of United States military
men riding in open jeeps and car-
rying M-16 rifles and pistols. These
young Americans are mostly ex-
c./ Green Berets, hired on CIA contract
to advise and train Laotian troops."
Those matter-of-fact, almost weary
L. Fletcher Prouty, a retired A
,Force colonel, is now vice presid
;of a Washing,ton, D.C., bank. in
in the Air Force, he was a 'liais
?17tatt. with the Secret Team. His ar
0 cle is from The Washington Monthly.!
? 1
STATI NTL
secret, whose very identities as of- gion, and, quite importantly, alumni
ten as not are secret?in short a Se., of the intelligence service?a service
cret Team whose actions only those from which there are no uncondi:
implicated in them are in # position tional resignations.
to monitor. ? ? .? ? . Thus the Secret Team is not a
How determinedly this secrecy is clandestine super-planning board or
.preserved, even when preServing it super-general staff but, even more
means denying the U.S. Army the damaging to the coherent conduct of.
right to discipline its own personnel, foreign affairs, a bewildering collee- -
not to say the opportunity to do jus: tion of temporarily assembled action
tice, was strikingly. illustrated not 4ommittees that respond pretty
lona. a,-to by the refusal of the Cen- ' uch ad hoc to specific troubles in
in
r ways that duplicate the actiVities
trar Intelligence' Agcncv to provide Various part of the work! sometimes
'lit Witnesses for the court:martial that
,, was to try eight Green Beret officersiii
of regularAmerican missions, some-
" for murdering a suspected North times in ways that undermine those.
on
, Vietnamese spy, thus 'forcing the activities, and very often in wavs,
t" Army to drop the charges. that interfere with and muddle-
q
curity-cleared individuals in and ou t the speed with which it can act. The,
The Secret Team consists of. se- 'the
. .
? : .
0mne. source of the team's power is'
sentences, written late in February of government who receive secret. CIA's communications system is so
by T. D. Allman of the Washington, intelligence data gathered by th)vextraordinarily efficient, especially
Post after he and two other enter- CIA and the National Securit by contrast with State's,. that the
prising correspondents left a guided Agency and who react to those data team can, in a phrase that often gets .
tour and walked 12 miles over some when it seems appropriate to them used at such times, "have a plane in -
hills in Laos to a secret base at Long with paramilitary plans and activi- the air" responding to some situation '
Cheng, describe a situation that ,to- ties, e.g., training and "advising"?a overseas while State is still decoding
day may seem commonplace to any- ,not exactly impenetrable euphe- the cable informing it of that situa-
one familiar with American opera- mism for "leading into battle"?Lao- tion.
tions overseas, but that no .more tian troops. Membership in the ,
than 10 years ago would have been team, granted on a "need to know" A few years ago, for example,
' unthinkable. ' while the strongest member of an
basis, varies with the nature and the
: To take a detachment' of regular Asian government that the United
location of the problems that. come States was strenbously supporting
troops, put its members into dig-' to its- attention.,
(call him Marshal X) was lying sick
guise, smuggle them out of the coun- ;At the heart of the team, of course, in a Tokyo hospital, word came that
try so that neither the public nor are a handful of top executives of a group of discontented young offi-
Congress knows they .have left, and the CIA and of the National Security cers was planning a coup in his ab-
assign them to clandestine duties on Council, most notably the 'chief senee. In a' matter of hours, thanks'
. foreign soil under the command of a White House adviser on foreign poli- to the team, Marshal X was .on his'
nonmilitary agency?it is doubtful ey. Around them revolves a sort of way home in a U.S. Air ,Force jet, ?
that anyone would have dared to inner ring of presidential staff mem?fighter; he arrived at his office ini
suggest taking such liberties with bars, State Department officials, ci- plenty of time to frustrate the plot-i
the armed forces and foreign rela7 . vilians and military men from the .ters.
,with the Constitution,. to any Pres- in the intelligence services.
lions of the United States, not to say Pentagon, and career professIonalk '? The power to pull off feats like;
ident up to and especially including And out beyond them is an exten- that is more than operational power;,
Dwight D. Eisenhower. ? it; is in 'a -real sense policy-making
sive and-intricate network of power. In this particular case it was
Indeed, the most remarkable de:. government officials with responsi- the power to commit the United
velopment in the management of bility for or expertise in some speci., States to the protection and support
America's relations with 'other coun. fie field that touches on national se- 'of Marshal X. . ?
tries during the nine years since curity, think-tank analysts, - busi-
Annther source of the team's pow-
Gen. Eisenhower left.office has been'
nessmen who travel a lot or whose er is its ability to manipulate "need
the assumption of more and more businesses (e.g., import-export or to know" classifications. One way to
control over military and diplomatic operating a cargo airline) are usefuakow notvitospiil:stic;
opek4piniVgpildFborftriefSecgelel/01/104PPOUIPROP80-te
tivitlftrIcrE tetret, wnose ouoget: is, Mchnicat_suo)eq F,ge9,graph.ic
. re-fall to tell'thoso who. might oppose.
*con'Efraied'
I Ili
? ? I
14AidailiCr .1 0.1 OW.
Approved For Release 2001/q3MigftIA-RDP80-0464i10700=11.
INTERPRETIVE REPORT
Red Gains Peril U.S. Policy in Laos
, By TAMMY ARBUCKLEther
.--13-elween 1962 and 1964, then The iiew equipment supplied The North Vietnamese have To confuse things fur
Special to The Star;
Laos Ambassador Leonard by the United States, goes no-built a network of routes like Godley has implemented
VIENTIANE ? The Amen-nress policy ostensibly to pre
the battlefield,' ' the humanbody.
Unger agreed to give Laos where near e veins in e
can policy in Laos of support- Nal, ammunition and equip_Military police and general's When one is hit, they switch to ?
tect the last vestiges of Sou
ing Lao neutrality and trying mad and toprovide jet reconbodyguards carry M16s in Vi-any one of a dozen others.
In 1964 vanna's neutrality.
-
to stop Communist military naissance over the country. entiane while front-line troops The serious military situa-
expansion is in deep trouble, tion in southern Laos is a re-
U.S. and Lao officials ar
diplomats and other sources , Ambassador Wit.still have carbines. '
liam Sullivan seriously weak- And new U.S. jeeps are used suit of all these factors. instructed to stop 'America:
say. cud Laotian neutrality . byte drive high-ranking Lao offi- The U.S. Air Force did not going into comba
newsmen rreewthheemnevfreormpsoesesiinbgleiLts,
The sources base this as- agreeing to a merger of thecers' wives to the Vientiane stop Hanoi's troops. a
sessment on dramatic military rightists and neutralist ar.market. The Lao guerrilla positions prevent
gains the Communists have mks. . The Lao soldiers often are are falling like ninepins, Corn-
involvement in the fighting.
made in southern Laos in the The small neutralist army ornot even paid. munist troops run checkpoints The result is that the pres
last six weeks and the gradual less than 10,000 men was swal- Pay officers steal the sale- on the main road with impunl- writes about American activ
ties it can observe withou
shift to the right under right ist lowed up by the 60,000-mln ries and widows' pensions to Ly.
pressure of neutralist Premier rightist force, putting Souvan- build villas. . , , Lao troops don't even attack going to combat areas an
Souvanna Phoum a., Death Reports Delayed na Phouma in the position of . ,
.Communist positions in the writes little about North Vint
Since the end of April, North having to depend on the right-. forest, even when they know names? attacks on the peacf
Vietnamese and Pathet Lao ist generals. 1 For example, if a soldier is exactly where the enemy isible Laotians which the prer.
forces have taken and held Since 1961, Hanoi has been killed, there is no record of his Wing. , can't see and which is hear
two provincial capitals in , ? death made until two or three about only in sanitized ye)
I r y i n g to force a pro-
southern Laos ? Attopeu and . . months later. The pay officer sions from Lao governmer
Communist but officially neu- Failure Wins Promotion
Saravane ? knocked out seven y pockets the dead soldier's sal- In southern L ,
aos, there is nd spokesmen who omit Lao dr
tral on the Lao- P
other Lao Government posi- ? government ary for that three months pro-government organization feats and are more intereste
? tans
dons and one American posi-
tion
'
tion and are now well on the Finding Souvanna and his while his widow and family in the villages. Failure is re-in propaganda than inform
Um .1..tt.isture.i.olot 4 ec., ',Aug ?
way to trying to take over neutralist commander Kong get. nothing. warded with promotion.
Sithandone and Champassac Le would not play ball, the This has resulted in some Col. Khong, the man who
Provinces on the west bank of Beds attacked them, trigger-.
cases, according to soldiers' lost Attopeu, was immediately
the Mekong River. lag U.S. aid to the rightists. As: wives, of them having to enter made a general.
,
Despite all ' this, Godley's
Such a move would give Ha- the rightists became more prostitution to stay alive.
'Lao-Cambodian
complete control of the powerful, the North Vietnam-. Other wives say that after Policy remains the same.
Lao-Cambodian border. ese launched stronger attacks..their husbands go into actton, . Ace or din g to American
In the same period, Souvan- SuccesSive 'U.S. ambassa- they never receive any salary. sources, he is agreeable to
na Phouma ? under strong dors did nothing to stop cor- With no money despite theputting U.S. military advisory,
rightist political pressure ? ruption and poor leadership U.S. largesse and with Ms wife teams into the Lao training
has delegated the Defense which weakened the Laotians. and family left to fend forcommand in such places as
Ministry to a rightist, agreed They could think only of more themselves, the Lao soldier The artillery.sepool.
to consult with rightwingers on military aid. naturally does not feel like The only reason this has no(
important policy decisions and Charge d'Affaires Robert fighting and taking risks, been done is he cannot find ?
is now agreeing to a reshuffle Hurwitch and the present Am- U.S. officials have tried to funds following actions by the
of the cabinet which would fa-bassador, G. McMurtrie God-'get around this by running a U.S. Senate to curb Laos activ-
vor the rightists. ley, greatly worsened the situ- separate anmy and having ities.
' These sources blame U.S. ation by escalating American U.S. accountants pay the Godley's subordinates say
ammunition
has uniganyiLtahoetiasnusppwlyhict
diplomats for these develop- military help to the rightists. troops. h
meats. Admittedly, the move was The snag is that these sol-
mm
U.S. Criticized made in the face of increased diers are in the forefront of has not been budgeted yet. I
"The Americans have done North Vietnamese attacks, but the fighting in guerrilla teams He is willing to provide alti
half of one thing and half of much of the North Vietnamese in North Vietnamese rear strikes as much as the Lao;
the other and succeeded in net- success was due to weakness- areas and take heavy casual-need them, American sourcesl
? ther," the sources said. es in the Lao army which no ties. say. ,
' The United States has sup-aid could erase. CIA Tactical Failures Hanoi Not Stopped
plied close air support for Lao Support Missions Flown '
' Asked why he did not join' But these methods neithes!
forces, logistics, arms, money ?
and ground advisers in an at Under Ifurwitch and Godley, this force, one Lao officer stop Hanoi, as events in South-
tempt to stop the North Viet- the United States, flew close said: "I don't want to get ern Laos prove, nor do they
namese. This has severely air support missions for the killed." help the officially neutral. :
weakened the Lao govern.; Lao army, put in additional Many, casualties are due toftance of Somme Phouma,
ment's neutrality. 1 military advisers and distrib- tactical c failures by the U. an avowed U.S. policy objec-
On the other hand, the Unit 4 uted M16 rifles. Central Intelligence Agency,tive.
.
ed States has been unable to The North Vietnamese con- operatives. Yet at the same time, God.
give the Lao military suffi-,, tinued to throw in their infan- They put their troops In ley is protecting Souvanna
cient help to stop the Com mu.; try and the Laotians remain fixed positions, which are not from the rightists and prevent.:
nists because massive aid as they are now?in deep mill- camouflaged, so that they canin-
g the Laotians from forming
would destroy Laos' neutrality tary trouble. be resnpplied by air. ,
an alliance with South Viet-
completely. The Lao military merely The `North Vietnamese find nam and Thailand. I
Tracing events back to 196,1 used the U.S. money to build the positions easily and snuff When the rightwingers want-
, reveals the contradictions of new houses and invest in busi- them out or watch the guer-ed to topple Souvanna recent-
U.S. policy with a continual nesses. rillas leaving and, ambush
tendency of successive Amen- The Laotians refuse to ad-'them. U.S. air support inlY, Godley warned that the
'
can ambassadors to lean more vance now unless there is a terms of enemy killed or would not United States
sup-
toward' military aid to the U.S. Air Force strike or, at the trucks destroyed is just about port them. This apparently
.i.,,,,,., ?'prevented a military improve-
Rightists than toward the nee- very least, Lao air and arti142.4selesa.... ,ileas$,....7611 iment In tlis situation south::
friar. :?,,,,-;:?....4, . - ,
--Np PrbVelar3r6filb [ease 2dtPt/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-6416ePtR000700030001 4
pcsT,
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 PCNI*380-01601R
STATI NTL
Hanoi Assails U.S. Role in Laos
at Paris Peace Tal441
ks
7 ), .744
Washington. Post Foreign Service
PARIS, June 18?North
Vietnam charged today that
there are more than 12,000
U.S. military personnel, 10,000
'Thai soldiers, plus an un-
named number of Central In-
telligence agency operatiVes
now active in Laos.
The numbers came from
Nguyen Thanh Le, Hanoi's
press spokesmen at the Viet-
nam peace talks here. The
U.S. press spokesman, Stephen
Ledogar, cited recent White
House announcements in sup-,
port of lower figures: A total'',
of 616 American citizens di-
rectly employed, plus 424 on
contract. The White House
also claims there are no U.S.
"ground combat troops" in
Laos, although Hanoi has
never charged that there were.
Its accusations refer to air.'
men, military advisers, train-
ing officers, political, security
and intelligence agents.
The Laos numbers quarrel.
was one of the few new ele-
ments which emerged from
the 71st session of the dead-
locked peace talks. Observers
had the impression that wfiat-
ever diplomatic action might
be in progress was being con.;
ducted elsewhere, and the del.
egates here were marking
time by repeating well known
positions.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
'V V l'.1 'J? r?17-117..1V.r
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RBM-1R-0
THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
18 June 1970
0 Cambodia: 'My the Generals Wo
Peter Dale Scott
1 Each coup was followed by, .and .;
, helped ' to facilitate, an escalation
1- of the US military effort which the 11
' overthrown regime would not have ;I
' tolerated. As my colleagues and I tried 'I
' to demonstrate in our book, The 1
: Politics of Escalation in Vietnam, thefl
result (if not the intention) of every one ,
of these escalations was to nullify a real. .
, or apparent threat of peace at the time.' .
(I would now add that we failed Suffi-
ciently to emphasize the role of our ci-
vilian and military intelligence services
.in bringing about all of the crises in .
question, as well as the present one.) .
The second clich?f the scenario'
was Lon Nol's deliberate breach of the .
accommodation hitherto established,
between the NLF troops in Cambodia ,
iand the troops of Pnompenh, fol-
lowed by a precipitous retreat, in the ?
face of what seem to have been only
light enemy probes, bac to to the out-
,
?
President Nixon's ground operations in
? Cambodia with ? US troops will likely
. be over, as he promises, by June 30,
? .1970. The long-range strategy by
"which the Cambodian adventure was
undertaken almost certainly will not
' be. For though the invasion itself was
r unprecedented, all of the prior ele-
t mints in the scenario were often
repeated clich? from the initial mill-
! 'tary overthrow of a popular leader by
I a right-wing pro-American clique? to
the announced response to an enemy
I. "invasion" at a time when the pros-
pects for ending the war seemed to be
increasing. Most characteristic of all is
--.the likelihood that Nixon was pres-
sured by the Joint Chiefs to authorize
the Cambodian adventure .in peat
haste, and in such a way as to bypass
or overrule most of his civilian ad-
visers, as a response to an "emergency"
0 for which US intelligence agencies and
perhaps the Joint Chiefs themselves
were largely responsible.
Even if terminated by June 30, the
Cambodian adventure has confirmed
yet again what some of us have been
' saying for years: that at present the
; US military apparatus in Southeast
..Asia will work to reject a new policy
'of de-escalation as ?certainly as the
human organism will work to reject a
transplanted heart. The formula to
neutralize this rejection process has
unfortunately not yet been discovered.
?
other words words one cannot under-
stand what has happened recently in
Cambodia without understanding the
? whole history of the Second Indochina
Var. One cannot for example appreci-
ate Lon Nol's expectations in over-
throwing Prince Sihanouk on March 18
without recalling the anti-neutralist
military coups of late 1960 and April
1964 in Laos, or of January 1964 and
-June 1963 in Saigon. US personnel
were involved in (Or at the very least
?,eognizant everY one' .of these'
skirts of Pnompenh itselfy This gratu-
itous ' provocation of a much stronger
enemy hag. been treatedas irrational by
several well-established American ana-
? lysts, but it will be seen to have its
own Machiavellian logic when" Oin-
? pared to similar events in the Second
' Indochina War. By the same combina-
tion of absurd provocation and pre-
cipitous Withdrawal in previous springs, IL.?
Laotian troops (and/or their American
advisers) secured the first commitment I
of US combat troops to Thailand?the ;
first in Southeast Asia, for that matter?A
in May 1962, and the first bombings ;
of Laos?which Aviation Week cor-
rectly reported to be "the' first US
offensive military action since Korea"?
?Lin May 1964.2
Thus Lon Nol's actions, far from
being irrational, followed * a recipe
1 for US support which by now has
po icy. e mi ary pressure on ocon ?
to escalaie hastily in Cambodia recalls ,
the pressure on Kennedy to escalate in :
1962 and on Johnson to escalate in
1964, first in response to Laos and ,
later in response to the alleged Tonkin
Gulf "incident? of August 1964. In all
cases, including the present one, a key
role was played by our intelligence:.
agencies, who' first helped to.: induce
a crisis which they subsequently mis-
reported to the President.
Furthermore, all but the most rudi-
mentary forms of civilian review within
the executive branch were suppressed. ,
When the first US arms shipment to
Cambodia was announced on April 22
by White House press secretary Ronald
Ziegler, his counterpart Robert McClos-.
key at the State Department admitted
that he "knew nothing about it" (New
'York Times, April 24,. 1970, p. 3). On
April 23, the very day that "emer-
gency" meeting's of the Special Action
Group began to consider the Fishhook
invasion, Secretary of State Rogers
told a House Appropriations subcom-
mittee that if US troops went into
Cambodia "our whole (VietnamizatiOn)
program is defeated," and that "we
have no incentive to escalate into
Cambodia" (Washington Post, May 6,
1970. Al). In the wake of the Fish-
hook decision ("Operation Pro-
metheus") it was suggested that the
.Joint?Chiefs of Staff had
.... pulled an end run in their
effort to get the attack against the
.? border areas approved...-. Some
_ believed Mr. Laird found himself
? In the ? final stages of planning for
the invasion without being fully
consulted and informed during the
preliminary planning stages (Chris- ?
tian Science Monitor, May 14,
? 1970).'
,been testedmany times and never I '
1 '
known to fail. The .exigent realities of I Perhaps the most embarrassing plight
, .
.the monsoon season and the US budg- was that of Senate kepublican leader '
1,... etary process encourage an annual .Hugh Scott, who .was
cycle of escalation which by -now ca li
I be not only analyzed but predicted.' ... cut adrift with White House-
inspired statements that renewed
. . bombing of the North was a
. remote contingency at the very
r Ca. I The third and most frightening cliche
YPIL . : -
is the phenomenon of the artificially
; induced "crisis" used as a pretext
for hasty executive actions which'
Approved For Relea /
declare wars and adZe"
SerzereMeloret b.A1
time a hundred American planes'
were dropping bombs across the
demilitarized zone.4
.?.
0 Constitutional procedures under Nix-
1ROOOROS03000404 construc-
tionist," have clearly :deteriorated a
'long way since 1954, when Dulles had
STAT
?
Approved For RentaNsa2telaRKEZI 0/ABIZ1P8o-T6TIK
18 June 1970
Certified Accountant
,The Modern Corporation
and Private Property
by Adolf A. Berle
and Gardiner C. Means:
Harcourt, Brace & World, 380 pp:, $9.75
v Power
by Adolf A. Berle.
Harcourt, Brace & World,
603 pp., $10.00
.1
K. W. Wedderburn
In 1932 Berle and Means published a
major work of the New Deal era, The
Modern Corporation and Private Prop-
erty. Through or from this book
STATI NTL
Yet, as ? usual, social organiz'ation
moved on, paying scant regard to legal
rhetoric. By 1954, Berle asserted that
in practice the argument had been
settled "squarely in favor of Professor
Dodd's contention" (The Twentieth
'increased concentration of capital arid
growing managerial control in (he- mid-
..?
Sixties. But Berle's Preface rei,eals Mite
new. He restates his political thesis:
corporations are essentially "political
constructs"; their operations are "like"
operations carried on by the state. The
,Century Capitalist Revolution). Man-
1932 text of Modern Corporation .
'agers, he argued, say they consider, concluded: -
and do consider, the corporation's H.
interest in a very wide setting. The 1. The rise of the modern corpora-
managers of the giant corporations, tion has brought a concentration
have become. Berle claimed, imbued of economic power which can
- :
thereby with a social "conscience." By compete on equal terms with the'
modern state.... The future may
1959 he doubted even the desirability
- see the economic organism now' ? . ' ?
of stockholder control, which he held , typified by the corporation not
many concepts of corporations to be little more than ritualistic (Power
flowed
Without Property).-- ?
and corporation law, once thought ; ? ... - - - ?
maverick, but now fashionable, even . To those 'traditionalists, then, for
w
i conventional: the inability of thou- whom "Control" by stockholders exer-
sands of stockholding "owners" to
govern, often even to influence, the
managers actually in charge of giant
companies; the emergence of modern
management in large self-financing cor-
porations which reflects' this "separation
of ownership and control"; the grow
-
only on an equal plane with the :
state, but possibly even supersed-
ing it as the dominant form of
social organization.
?
cised through corporation meetings and Today, there are more corporations
the stock market is an integral part of in the world than there are nations ,
the model of capitalism, Berle is a with incomes greater( than the gross. ...
maverick; but he has withstood the-4, national product of Ireland. In the US? ' ?
attacks. The criticism of Professor. I some 10 percent of corporate entities
Henry Manne in 1962, for example, he ' control two-thirds of the non-farm "I
called an attempt to describe, twen- . economy (what Berle elsewhere calls. ;
legally personified aggregations to a tieth-century institutions with. "nine- "the highest concentration of econom-' ;
teenth century . economic folklsire." ic power in recorded history"). The -
CD ing concentration of capital in these
?
point where they dominate modern
Three years later he replied to the perception of Berle and Means has
capitalist societies. Since the book was
economist, Professor Shorey Pete'rkon,
written, Berle has been prominent not .
that classical economics just did not
. only in academic and legal circles but 'account for modern corporate capital- .
of the next decade will be the multi-
also in political and diplomatic life.
During the New Deal Berle was a1 ism: "A .vast 'sector of the American national or international corporation:
pioneer in the debate about the nature? economy is not, even theoretically
/ , ;National governments, said a British
of corporate power and for that he is
likely to 'be best remembered. For
instance, in 1932 he engaged in a
famous exchange in the Harvard Law:
Review , on the question?then revolu-
tionary in itsel(??"For Whom are Cor-
porate Managers Trustees?" Tradition-
ally, directors' duties relate to the
interests of the corporation and 'espe-
cially of the stockholders. Professor
' Merrick Dodd in the Review argued
that it was appropriate by then to
recognize wider duties to the commu-
nity at large. Berle was attracted by
which contains a new Preface by Berle
this view, new in 1932, but, as a i
I and a new Appendix by Means?and to '
lawyer, could not adopt it. The various
. Berle's recent,. more general work on
corporation laws in the United_ States, ?
Power. In his new Appendix Means
carefully documents the the ?for_
been justified for America. For the rest
of the. world, their conclusion was
prophetic. The dominant organization
within the classical economic system. cabinet minister in 1968, "including
Supply and demand are not what they ?the British Government, will be re-
were; prices are widely fixed, not corn- duced to the status of a' parish council
petitive; large enterprises with guaran- in dealing with the large international
teed markets 'do not behave like the companies which will span the world."
classical entrepreneur in the market r One in nine of the industrial workers
place. If the profit motive is still "reg- in Scotland today is employed by an
nant," the giant corporation's managers, i American enterprise. In 1966, 22 per-
-Berle argued, are influenced today by cent of Britain's "exports" were trans:
- ?
many new considerations, not least gov-
i actions between branches of multi-
ernment policies and'contracts. ' national corporations. Trade unions
throughout Europe are disturbed by
One turns eagerly, therefore, to the the new multinational faces behind the
new edition of Modern Corporation-- masks across the bargaining table. As a
commentator in the London Times'
wrote in April, "[II nternational corpor-
ations have now a massive power, lied: I
only financial but industrial, and
one really has the first idea how. they-
. ? exercise it." When and if we do Ic.now,
1what can we do about .
Bele and Means summed 'up the- '
program of the Modern Corporation:.
IT] he 'control' of the great corpora- ?
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did not then (and still do not) go
0-rn'ent to devote corporate assets to
much further than to permit manage-
philanthropic purposes, and the inter-
ests of stockholders still'dominate the
rhetoric of its legal duties. '
II S
atilaie o
puvrely. neui
. usailiolon sr4ei
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Reds Smash Laotian Effort
To Retake Provincial Capital
By TAMMY AftBUCKLE
Special to The Stir
PAKSE, Laos?North Viet-
namese and Pathet Lao forces
have smashed Royal Lao army
and U.S.-led guerrilla forces
trying to retake the provincial
capital of Saravane witch the
Reds captured June 9.
Lao ,milithry sources here said
the government forces fled and
split up into small groups after
the Communists hit them Tues-
day night at the village of Ban-
kok, 3 to 4 miles northwest of
Saravane.
"There is no hope of retaking
Saravfne," the source said.
In the Saravane fighting, 350
Lao troops were listed Rh dead,
wounded and missing. :
U.S. Base Hit
Now an American base, Nong
Bua, 10 miles east of Saravane,
has come under Communist fire.
Nong Bun is used by the Ameri-
cans for watching the Ho CM
Minh trail to the east. The
Americans work for the Central
Intelligence Agency: ,
"The annex' personnel have
beenwIthdrawn," informed
sources said. CIA men have
been posing as employes irkthe
"annex" of the U.& Agency for
International ; Atmelopmente in
Mae. ?
American aircraft today were
picking up refugees from Nong
Bua and flying them to this Me-
kong River town.
The military sources said
there is only a small group of
North Vietnamese inside Sara-
vane itself. Most of the North
Vietnamese are hiding In forests
around the town.
U.S. F4 jets have been hitting
North Vietnamese positions on
Saravane's perimeter without
much success. They, have been
encountering heavy ground fire.
The town itself has not been
bombed. ,
Pincer Attack Stopped
? Last Weekend, a special guer-
rilla unit with American advis-
ers entered Saravane as a pre-
lude to a pincer assault by regu-
lar Lao troops. The pincer move,
however, was broken up by
Communist forces dug in outside
the town.
The Lao were regrouping at'
Bankok when North Vietnamese
forces overran their position.
Col. &what, the commander of
the guerrilla units, and his men
have now fled to another U.S.
base, Site 29, between Saravane
and the Bo Chi Mine 'ha&
With Warne ,now, tightly,
within their grip, the North Viet-
namese are expected to ccmcen-
trate on picking off airstrips
which resupply the government
forces East of Saravane.
If Site 39 and Nong Bua, fall,
the government presence in the
Saravane area will practically
be ended.
ifanol's Fear Seen
The Ras' reason for the take-
over in Saravane Province is be-
lieved to be their fear of South
Vietnamese intervention against
the trail sanctuaries east of Sar-
avane.
.To observers, the North Viet-
namese success at Saravane
demonstrated once again the in-
competence of the Lao army,
although it is backed by U.S.
air power and ground advisers.
Lao army defenders at Sara-
vane 'reportedly fought for only
10 minutes, though the civil
home guards fought against the
Vietnamese for .five hours until
they had run out of ammunition.
? Morale is low in the Lao army
because of what critics say is
poor leadership, corruption in
the general staff (particularly
non-payment of the troops ,) no
leave facilities and. dependant
, ? .., ? .
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P80-01601R000700030001-4
STAT I NTL
Approved For ReS4r2t101/03/
EWA .140111.TOR
CIA-01601
16? JUN1:191 . CIA-
0.
Thailand
? "
.
. ? I, 77
. r: ? ? ' , ,
,
Opium pours through Thailand. It is grown in .un-
i.
reachable and little-controlled areas. of Burma, Laos,
.? . .
, ?...
and Yunnan province in Communist China., Some also
i' ,f. . .. , -
1. is grown in Thailand. In these countries narcotics' ?
...!,.,,..!..
' ' ''' traffickin involves peoplein.,high places. .
1-: . By ohn Hughes
, Publicly the government has set itself '
;
Staff correspondent of . against the opium traffic. Thailand has 200,- 0,
The Christian Science Monitor 000 drug addicts of its own. Heroin addiction
?
. is increasing sharply, particularly among t.
0 0970 The 'Christian Science Publishing Society ,?
? young Thais. The government is, as a
AU rights reserved .' United Nations report puts it, "alive to the ....
c
:?problem." .,
? It has cut back, imports of acetic an- Bangkok, Thailand : hydride a necessary agent for processing ..? .,
' . heroin. 'An Anti-Narcotic Drugs Association
. FOR THE JUNK MERCHANTS OF - has been set up to combat addiction. There IV
' Southeast Asia, Thailand is the corridor,,, are drug seizures by the Thai police. But
through which their illegal merchandise the UN report concludes gloomily that the ? t
Imust pass. to Hong Kong and the lucrative:, "situation has not materially improved" in.
1 markets of America. 4.,, recent years and has even been "exam's'.
! But to many, Thailand seems less a cor. b t d "
, c
m .1
I
ridor than a four-lane highway down which -ow d h?
narcotics shipments roll with ease. '.?Thai output rated low'
Of course, there are tolls. The police must
.
be paid off. Experts in the business say the ". ?
The Thais argue that their cotmtryis
going price is .$5 per kilo of opium at each . 'II. transit route for illicit narcotics and ..that roc,:
of five checkpoints between the opium-grow..?i. their neighbors are much bigger, option() f
ing borderlands of the north, and the capital .., producers than they are.
?
city of Bangkok. But $25 a kilo in payoffs is l The argument is valid. Of the 400 to 600'
small enough overhead in a business where ,' tons of opium which comes out of Southeast ? '
the profit rolls in by hundreds of thousands , Asia each year, Burma and Laos grow the
.
? ! bulk. Thailand produces only between 15 and
of dollars.
Some Thai officials are clearly in this 50 tons. In Burma the government is 'neap. .
1!.
able of halting production, while in Laos
business up to their elbows.. One recent '.
incident illustrates the point.
,. the Army is engaged in the opium traffic
Thai residents of a Bangkok suburb noted '
,
and the. Air Force helps transport the crop.
i
1
'suspicious activity at a godown (warehouse) II For much of this production, Thailand is
In their neighborhood. A helicopter kept
the conduit. Some Thais are profiting hand-
ii
fluttering down. There was furtive unload- ;, somely from the passage of opium through .
'
ing. They told the police and the police, their country. Law-enforcement officers
sus-
.? '
peeling an illegal liquor racket, raided the . elsewhere in Asia are divided as to how '
?
warehouse. Instead of liquor, they found it much more the Thai Government could do
stocked with fresh opium.
. ? to pinch off the traffic. Some credit Thai
The embarrassing point of the story is that'. authorities with increased effort.-
Others are harsher in their judgments..
In Thailand only the border police and the
I Says the narcotics chief of one Southeast
Army operate helicopters.. Asian country:
In earlier years, the opium traffic in Thai-
"There are only three main routes running ,
land was practically a monopoly of the,
xtended , down Thailand. If they really wanted to, the,
police. Inv I I
t a n Fain Aft tradc A
into the C . PUihrrintligillilinilleatiktrektniterbrelcIVFO1A0P0700030001-4
Ii difficult to state. says one Thai official; DO ar as e n te ates a concern ..
been a mina.
warningly: !There's a line above whicht_Southeast Ails till now has .
- ...........-..6 ?......H..*im Ilsa imonin???_" ,.
hway
he'
junk?
junk merchants:
International
narcotics traffic?I
oont I nand
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601RATYMK?b001-4
' .'ON; N J
TIMES
E - S1,55
TIME : '.'i ISR
S 1.02,q22
1_U_N 1_6 1970
Can Conorressiteouin Control?
e5 e5
While the U.S. Senate is trying
to reassert the, role of Congress in
American military actions over-
seas through Cooper-Church and
other resolutions, the extent of
secret, undercover operations illus-
trates the difficulty of exerting
real control.
There is, for. exaMple, the recent
admission of the Agency,, f or Inter-
national Development director, Dr.
John A. Hannah, that his econom-
ic 'assistance agency has been used
since 1962 as a cover for Central
Intellionce, Agency ?opergiOns in..,
Laos. Not only does such 1ong-?,..-
1
term secret involvement bring
suspicion on the AID activities,'
,
but it raises questions about how
the effective direction of the CIA.
is exercised by regularly consti-
tuted'governmental authority.
Another "secret" that recently''''1.
became known to Congress and ?
? the American public is the U.S.
payment of $50 .million a year
since 1967 to Thailand for sending
a combat division to Vietnam.
A few months back, CIA secrecy
compelled the Army to abandon
the trial of eight Green Berets on
charges of murdering a -North
*Vietnamese spy. And Congress
'learned only long after, the fact
that the Tonkin Gulf incident
upon which American military es-
calation in Vietnam was based,
involved an electronic ;Spy ship, .
not a routine patrol.
L. Fletcher Prouty, a retired Air
'Force colonel who describes in
"The Washington Monthly" some
methods by which the CIA uses
and outflanks other government ,
agencies, concludes that "more
and more foreign-policy decisions
are being made in secrete In re-'
sponse:10 immediate crises rather
than. in accordance with :long-,
range plans and all too often with'
very little consultation with.
professional foreign-policy or
mili-
tary planners."
The record suggests that Con-;
gress has its hands full in any,
effort to make American power;
Overseas accountable to the public:
in line 'with professed American'
goals.
+
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R0
19,1 N , A .
GLOBE.
'''11 7,
Foreign aid and the CIA
President Nixon has said he
places "a high priority" on the for-
eign aid program. His special Peter-
son Task Force on aid for the 70s
agreed and recommended greater
emphasis than in the past on funnel-
ing aid through multilateral agen-
cies. Yet, as usual, the foreign aid
appropriations bill took a shellack-
ing in the House.
This led Rep. Donald Fraser (D-
Minn.) to comment: "I am unable to
understand, how so many members
are able to follow our President into
a war, and defend them in the war,
41 solidly lined up behind the Presi-
dent both Democrat and Republican,
and yet lcte ,unwilling to, follow our
President in his request for peace-
ful works in the world."
That in a nub is what's wrong in
this topsy-turvy era ? unlimited
billions for military ventures, only
a handful of peanuts for peaceful
economic endeavors and, even then,
the peanuts are given on condition
that most are bought in the United
States.
- The President had requested a
total of $2.7 billion. The Howe ap-
STATINTL
proved $2.2 billion. Left untouched.
of course, was the $350 million foi
the sale of military arms on credil
and the estimated $470 million ear-
marked for Vietnam assistance na
included in the Defense budget. The
House cut $537 million from the
amount the President a3ked or eco-
nomic assistance to soioe '70 other
countries and $37 million from the
technical assistance fund.; distributed
on a multilateral basis by s:averal
international organizations.
Some of these cuts ran and
should be restored when the money
bill is considered by the Senate. But
the Administration and the Agency
for International Development (AID)
are only'. making their :appeals for
funds more difficult by the admis-
sion this week thai; the economic aid .
mission in Laos has been used since
1962 and still is being used as a
cover for CIA operations. Similarly,
the speculation that in the future
military personnel will run the AID
operatinn in Vietnam is disturbing.
If troops withdrawal and a political
solution is the correct avenue for
peace in Indochina, any move to ,
militarize economic aid missions sub-
verts and discredits this program
even beforp It begins.
go"
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STATI NTL
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COLUMBUS , OHIO
DISPATCH
E - 223,673
S 318,040
U.N.4 5 1970___._
er Su erspy Cover
pEALIC ..IIP another fumble; - .Freneh , aid was planted by
- ?--4 for this government's mos.t. -0.Loridon's spy agency.
necessary evil, the Central ' But now comes John Han-
telligence .Agency. It bs"...ge-, nalf, heat of ?the CIA, to con-
! !atedly and relUctantly admitte& fesS that the CIA has been
what thousands have. .known,,,;- .roperating under the AID cover
for a long time -- that it hasr?,...:;-?in -.Laos since 1.964. .
' b-cen using the Agertey or In,/81,12,10 flows to:
tern L ationa Developmenf, -
'i,.,
placid and peacefully oriented 11-- ether the LaOtians or. the
-.
?
help.the-innocents.. qua,si=dliar-f..,',. Communist Path Lao seek-,
ity group, as a cover for ite4: '.fing control of that miserable.;
operations in Laos;. ' A s i an country, the taint of
This fumble was multi- ...Mr. Hannah's confession will .
faceted. In the first place; we not harm the CIA.
previously .have argued that nut there is every probabil,
.the CIA is necessary, let it be ity that AID' efforts in help-
a- eompletely separate govern-'.._4i, ing ?Laotian'' peasants and
merit function operated solely 'mountain tribesmen will suffer
for its intended purpose to ..; for the Conuirunists now .can
pY on friend and foe be expeeted to capitalize on the
s
of, our national. clandestine activity. .
- We have voiced objections
?,-'SECONDLY, we ,q a ve. -..,before to the CIA's use of
,
'argued there is Melo distinc- .:,legitirnate Programa as skirts
tion to be gained by the CTA bththd whiell it can hide.. We
lasing the only spy egen6y,. :have been appalled by the CIA
using uniformed American
' admit It even
servicemen. to do its dirty,
...exists, let alone 'outlines its
let necessary work
yarious successes and failures. ".
, England can be credited with x THIS nation's foreign aid ef-
seniority in the espionage forts' have been shot through
nem and it has yet to admit 'with enough troubles, ;waste,
what -the U.S. State ; and inconclusive results to be
ment knows to be ,a 'fact !.....7.1t ,burdened with 'Covert
that during the RevolutionEiryf .genee- should
War,. Benj .min Franklin'S.),:have:. enough .?tools of ...their
Eng) 1011-Frendh-speakin g trana--;',Iiefatiabs -trade, .to ?:stand ; on
later in Paris when kus,.60:tigh ? '
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STATI NTL
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REGISIER
1.1 - , A 1 1
S - 51'1,49(
JUN 5
1970
oreign Aid 1)win.diiing..;
the,;:yiieinanf war, 'is testing reflect a military priority. All . of the
i ..Atuerica iWernal.:y.is painfully, e.vi- reduction came in - the economic assist
-
i dent. .V hat ha lot liViii:tSo Clear is the ;Ince work of AID in 77 countries:. The'
1 devasttAing imprint -the War is making on program of military ? assistance .lo . 50
one of t!,1-.4 nation's finest endeavoi?s, its countries was untouched.
iforeign assistance to have-not countries. Not included in the AID . budget . is
America's . world reputation as a goner- economic and . military: assistance in
ous, humanitarian, peace-losing nation Southeast Asia, largely..,to South Viet-
is a casualty of both the war itself and nam. This aid, set at $2.3, billion, is
! Its effect on foreign aid. . con! a Med in the defense . appropriation.
. The Nixon Administration this year Hy comparison, then, the United States
submitted the. smallest budget request would spend $3.1n aid to. South Vietuant
for the Agency ?for ,International Devel- and its neighbors next year for every- $2
. opment.(AII?) since' the program began. it provides in .' aid for the. rest of ,the
.The" .House . Appropriations Committee world.
last week reduced this record low re- * * * .
quest by 25 per cent to $1.645 billion. War This reduction and . military focus of
costs, postponed domestic needs and in- AID is occurring at .a crucial time in the
nation were cited for the decrease, world-wide struggle for .higher living
-,, n the Senate, where funds have been
? ? 'standards. The record of performance of
4restored in. the past, foreign aid has lost the developing. countries ? is clearly'
its champions. Senate Majority ,Leader promising. ,
- Mike Mansfield '(Dem., Mont..) has said Yet, the .United States is falling far-
he will vote against any foreign aid' ther behind the pledge. which it and
; appropriation, charging that aid leads other aid-giving nations 'Made in 1664 to
1
I only to foreign military involvements. contribute 1 per cent of their gross na-
4., Mansfield's -.charge need not be true, tional product to the development of , the .
The ,United States has provided cconom- third .world. ,
, ic ,. assistance ; to developing nations
. Commenting on this crisis in aid,
, where the dominant goal . has been to ter Pearson,.,a former Canadian ,prime ?.
. provide food, shelter,-jobs, medicine, not minister and author of a study of for-
to "buy" political converts, eign aid said: "A planet cannot, ' any "
' But. the AID program has been more than a country, survive half slave,
smirched by . political "strings' (often half free, half engulfed in misery, half
tied by Congress) and. by being ,used as careening along i.toward . 'the 7 :supposed
, an instrument of niilitary operations: ' 'joys of almost unlimited consumption.
contra is rd we
AID Director . John A.. Hannah admitted ,,,.
, Neither our . e.cology nor , our rnorality
,?as a cover for Central Intelligence ' ,Ig .,en. ',,? haw: perhaps ,1c. years to L,giri ,,1 T, cor- ,
j last week that the program is being used ..-, could survive , "si " 'it ? ,. .ft!t?I
cy ,(CIA) operations in Laos. ;Hannah,/:.'.,rect ?.the .imh.i2lor,ce and . to , .), ..:4.; in
,.who was, critical of the'LapS operation,T.I.ir?Ae.'!- ,,l'A'',,
.,said ,CIA ' agents have not infiltrated the ','. !Aii.'early end in, the, war is essential So.-
..AID programln any other.countries;:'but ".7.:?that the -United States can find the re-,
the result is a deepened sutpicion:of'the"...sources.and the enlightened spirit neces,- -,
, use made Of aid, activities.-...;' '.,"..'" 'i, ;;,,'";"'.:-.sary. to begin to heal the 'flivided world j
The House cuts,,iii. :the I AID .1lF,:irhicharsoii'cleScribeS . .,,,;-.
.. -. ? . ...:..-.... 4 .? .....4.-, f.i.,v. i4diei ..1...-, '.: 1.,'7.` .!, - .:',!::.L".'...!!... '-' ' A ''; ' " ? ''''''''''" !-1'
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STATI NTL
? BUFCAI,(), N.Y.
COUM. L1 ::xriU.SS
JUN i 4 1970
- 151,929
S 307 , 6 9 3
'ma Conneept Stands at the CroBsreail
Based upon a number of distressing
revelations in the past few years, there
is little doubt but that the United States
foreign-aid program needs a thorough
administrative overhaul. In this regard,
the Nixon administration's reorganiza-
tion proposals have been awaited with
more than ordinary interest.
While the presidential message, due
later this month, is expected to embrace
the general idea set forth in the task
force report from a survey headed by
the retired president of the Bank of
'America, Rudolph A. Peterson, some of
. the indicated changes are quite contro-
versial. The Peterson study recommend-
ed clear separation of economic-devel-
opment assistance from military-sup-
port- aid. This obviously derived from
irepeated instances of abuse of foreign-
aid, projects by the military or intelli-
' gence agency strategists.
,
But under ,the Nixon plan, the De-
fense Department apparently would
take over the financing and operation
of economic programs such as the South
Vietnamese xnilitary budget, public
health, refugee care and the training of
police. These are programs Which have
been under the wing of the Agency for
International Development (Alp), the
chief foreign-aid agency, with some co-
operation from defense a gencie s.
Would this 'change be a redress of pow-
er? Although the clear-break concept
between military and civilian 'functions
is eminently valid, the queetion here
?as in other areas?is how far the mil-
itary is to be permitted to go. into pro-
grams that? proPerly !should be under
civilian control., Tlui recent admission,
by Dr. John'A, Hannah; AID director,
that the Central Intelligence .A4ency
has been using the AID project in ,
Laos as a "cover" for intelligence opera-
tions is indication enough of how para-
military activities have subverted civil-
ian authority in foreign policy functions.
There is no reason to believe that Laos
is the only place where this has hap- ?
pened.
It seems almost unbelievable that
such a thing could occur anywhere
without as much as a mild challenge
from the State Department. It is equally
revealing that in his March 6 report on
aid to Laos, Mr. Nixon failed to mention
any CIA role there, a role which has -
been.a'fact since 1962, according to Dr.
Hannah. Of course, maybe the presi-
dent didn't know about it.
Although the House has passed a for-
eign-aid appropriation totaling $2.3-bil-
lion?of which, an estimated $750-mil- ,?
lion appears to be for military assist-
ance?the Senate has the obvious op-
tion of holding back on this funding.
And it should, until the president's aid-
revision plans are submitted and stu-
died. We can think of no other pro-
gram, financed with tax dollars, that ,
has come into such ill-repute--partly
because of some shady, last-minute
deals under which millions of dollars
-have been sent to dictators such as
Chiang Kai-shek so that they may buy
more warplanes. Other reasons for the
program's bad reputation lately includ-
ed its gross failure to realize the es-
teemed goals set for it, such as in Latin
America, -and the fact that funds for
economic development have been trim-
med frequently while military portions
were either unchanged or increased.
Both the philosophy of and proposed
? operational changes in the aid program
need a relentless examination. ?
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STATI NTL
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RADIO STATION WO
Your opinion is welcome-- ?
for or against these views
ile.1/142,447a
Bdcet Date)
"Well I just have to admit that ia
Title: No Help from AID to the CIA
EDITORIAL
0 I X LE FM 94,000 Warm
AM 5,000 WATTS
THE AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANY
ORANGEBURG. SOUTH CAROLINA 2111111:1
true." Newsmen had
aeked U. S. foreign-aid chief John A. ,
ly
eperat one in Lacs': (AP 6/8/70). Foreign -aid chief Mr. Hannahtold newsmen that Agency for
1
Hn o
nneh'f fundo f the Agency for International Development were being red "as a cover for CIA
International Development funds were being used "aa a cover for CIA opecationt ia ',awl" and'added
that President Nixon may propene divorcing such intelligence work frem evereeae aeeietance in the
future. Why? Soviet cultural ballet dancers are trained intelligence experts. Every Soviet
and satellite repreaentative to the United Nation e io a trnined intelligence expert. But, when
the United StAtes opond e the taxpayers money on AID fund., we jt hAve to give it away with .
"no strings attached". Now, we learn from Mr, Hanneh,n CIA agent who might serve twe ways - help
the underdeveloped peeple and at the same time help hie country - may net serve the United States.
AID chief Mr. Hannalee revelation come as a by-product of A Senate inquir7 led by Sen. Stuart
Symington (D-Mo.) into U. S. and CIA activitioc in Leos. AP reporto that it ie 'rare for nn
executive branch official to acknowledge that his organization is being uned for undercovee week "
AID chief Mr, Hannah deee not like CIA men doubling ac AID egcncy men te proviue U. S. intelligence.
Yr. Hannah states, quote "Certainly, our preference la to get rid of this kind et eperatien," end
out. Mr. Hannah may be overlook:UK U. S. intereeta in hio.dediontion to AID intereete. Aid
chief Mr. Hannah might have told newemen, That 161 CIA bueineeo. I have no commenc.."
On a U. S. State Department radio program which the State Department tapes for broadcast
(WDIX 6/7/70), the State Department explained that AID funda are spent in each ceuntry as each
country seen its need. Whatever that country think it int o to epead elle AID Ind a for, that
eae the way the funds are epent. Some of thee ways might not make much eense to the U. S.
taxpayer. But, that ie not the purpooe of AlDf, The purpose of AID ia -,o satisfy a social or
economic need of nn underdeveloped people which would make aenee to them even if it did not meet
the logic of the U. S. taxpayer. If the U. S. taxpayer ia going to epend money enewhere to make
friends and stop the Communisto, what's wrong with the person who ie handling the project being an
employee of the United States government both ae an AID man And a CIA men, to do whatever is in
U. S. intereato? Al]) intereats are CIA interesta and they both are U. S. interest - or, so the
rest of us hope.
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PITTSBURGH, PA.
PRESS
E ? 346,090
S ? 744,732
JUN 1 4 1970
CIA, And F
Any country running a big-league, foreign
policy has "clean" and "dirty" activities over-
seas. The trick is to keep them separate so the
second does not rub of on the first.
Dr. John A, Hannah, head of our foreign
aid program, has officially disclosed tha t
a gents of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) are posing as aid workers in Laos.
This regrettable practice started under
President Kennedy in 1962 and has continued
under the Johnson and Nixon admiistrations.
Dr. Harntab would like to "get rid of this
kind of operation," and Mr. Nixon would do
well to free foreign aid from association with
esp:onage and clandestine warfare.
Professional CIA-baiters will quarrel with
the operation itself. But however distasteful,
It is essential.
At great personal risk, CIA agents have
been recruiting and training anti-Communist
- guerrilla, observing enemy movements and
'acting as ground controllers for air strikes.
Their activities are in response to North Viet-
reign Aid
nam's illegal invasion of neutral Laos andlts
threat to South Vietnam.
What is objectionable is the foreign-s.id!
cover for the operation.
The U.S. aid program ad the Peace Corps
are two of this country's most idealistic, un- -
selfish efforts.
The Communist bloc has long recognized
them as such and has sought to discredit them.
Now, by, mixing aid with secret-agentry, we
have foolishly given the Kremlin a sticKto
beat us ,with. ' ,
-
The two are incompatible and ',should be
divorced as promptly as .,possible.
v/?
?
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NATIONAL JOURNAL
Approved For. Release 2001/03)044:UMAIN8P80-01601
?
State
Diplomatk notes 'r
'John A. Hannah, director of Agency for
International Development, admitted dur-
ing radio news program that AID programs
In Laos were a cover or operatiom of the
Central Intelligence Agency. Hannah said
Laos was the only suth case, end that CIA use
of AID was authorIzed by a Presidential do-
lehlon In 1911,. lune f.
1, ? ? hull,
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vazaLior:41 11)3T
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STATI NTL
dmmuntze Laos
FreSoit Sell Used to C
; By luck Anderson
k, .?
Behind the battle smoke in
.Laos, . the Communists are
quietly taking over the country-
side with the sickle instead of
colorful ropes than engage in Les Whitten; a reporter for
war or politics. Recognizing
this, the North Vietnamese
have had to set priestly exam-
ples and have bitten off their
tendency to use the scourge
Instead of the lure. .
The document notes that
"personal Involvement with'
local women seems to be rare
(and) result in a. one-way
ticket back" to North Vietnam.
Communist policy texts are
also softened when they are
translated from Vietnamese
into Lao.
"The section on incarcerat-
ing people for treason, profit-
eering, subver ion and other'
political crim?as stricken
out. Similarly, the passage on check, universal military conscription eked that Whitten talked to
It might have discov-
for men and alternative,serv-
ice for women was deleted,"
reports the,document, '
the sword. Indeed, the Ameri-
cans might pick up some
pointers .on pacification by
studying the Communist meth-
ods.
Such, a study. has been con-
ducted by the U.S. AID mis-
sion, which provides the cloak
if not the dagger for the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency in
,Laos. The hush-hush report,
written by AID . specialist
Edwin T McKeithen, has been
made available to this column..
For the first time, it dis-
closes how the North VietnaM-
ese rule the .countryside by
applying the soft sell. In Laos'
large Xieng Khouang prov-
ince, for example, the report
states, that "virtually all im-.
portant policy decisions are
made by the North Vietnam
cadresi but in a way, that the
decisions appear to be the
work of Lao officials. .
I
?
Penalties Downplayed'
The communizing 'of the.
placid and passive Laotians,
according to the document,
has met with "reluctance of
the Lae population to patepartici-
in the radical social rev?.
ution." ,
4, The., Laotland - would much
athet pit under t a Jr00, and
Itott sitivetitAAAV22
this column, not only made
full use ,of the telephone but
visited the AP's office in Cairo
to get the facts. ,
If the AP had bothered tO
'check, it would have learned
that Whitten discussed the
Mahrnoud case in detail with
the AP's Cairo bureau chief,
It would have realized our.
story was based solidly upon
the answers that the Cairo bu-
reau chief gave us. - He not
only knows' more, about the
Mahmoud case than anyone
else at AP, but he answered
our questions reluctantly but
honestly.. ?
If the I AP had bothered to
Answer to AP
,
The best evidence as td,
whether the Associated Preset
or this column is telling the
truth, meanwhile, is the AP's
own file on the Mahmoud
case. We challenge the APJO
make public all their doctti
ments and communicatiOns re*
toting to Mahmoud.
1970, Bell-Mcalur0 15yridt0110, Tel
other . sources about the Mah-
moud case. Among them was
the Washington Star's distin-
guished foreign correspondent
Andrew .Borowiec, himself an
Statement
Issued by AP
\,_
The Associated PresS issued
the following statement:
The new attack on the Asso-
ciated Press handling of the
case of the imprisoned Egyp-,
tian staff member, Aly Mah-
moud, renews charges that,
have no base.
Andrew Borowlec, the for-
eign correspondent mentioned
in the second column, has
made the following comment:
"I 'know from long experience
In the Arab world that the AP
Is doing all it, can under the ,
circumstances In Cairo. In my ,
opinion, the AP simply cannot
do any more to secure Malt-
moud's release."
Borowlee said it would be
totally incorrect for anyone to
Infer, that the AP was not at.
tempting to secure Mahmoud's
release because of the AP't
business interests' in ? the Mid.
rile East. Joseph E. Dynan, the
AP bureau chief in Cairo, has
been out of reach for the past
48 hours because of,commmiti
. .AP..alumnus, who had been in
The Associated.Press his 'ac-' Cairo 'during the Mahmoud af-
cused this column of careless fair,' I3orowlec felt that Mah-
reporting in the case of MY mend's outspokeness ? about
Malimoud, the AP's NO. 2 mats the Nasser regime, not any es-
in Cairo, who wastacquitted pionage, got him in trouble
an Egyptian court ot with the Egyptian authorities.
nage charges a year ago tnit.iA The point of our stori, Was
still languishing in an .Egyp- that AP,. rather, than .1copard-
Han concentration camp. ize its news service to Arab
The AP said we could have countries, failed to raise a
obtained 'the ,straight facts it public clamor for Mahmoud's
we had. bothered merely. ,to release. AR has .done nothing
pick up a telephone and Cheek to organiie an editorial, drive
with AP. ? for his freedom:Instead, as we
It is the Associated Preis' laid,: it has "pussyfooted
that neglected ? to make. the around" to the Egyptian for-
tight ? t; telePhotur!; .elgtt ?Mee instead. of .howling
tetN1144?,'.1
,
.191F4,16, tit ?
.44e,,011,,,,k Catkins difficulties? ?
4.1taiwi iillativii:04,tirAtil4'ttrAttitwotiodortiAlti;ti.t,.otti
4't tAS, it -
? el
? yt?
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ATLANTA? GA.
JOURNAL
E ? 257,863
JOURNAL?CONSTITUTION
S ?j 61, 971970
;Congress Comes Alive
THE U.S. Senate has failed to approve the
? 'so-called Byrd amendment which clari- '
fies the authority of the President to take
,action he considers. necessary to protect U.S.
? troops in Vietnam:
?ri The defeat of the amendment was a defeat
.for the administration.
The vote may have been political and it
may have been punitive. Ba it also reflects
. national disillusionment with the Indochinese
.,,war. including our, hiring of Thailand troops
.and the apparent free hand given to the CIA
Laos.
The vote was a victory for antiwar forces
, in the Senate, and for those who disapproved
, of the thrust into Canfto,dia....to protect our
' position in SouthNietnam.
It forecasts future congressional strictures
,on the ability of the President to conduct
such major wars as the Indochinese one with-
out the advice and consent of Congress.
If this is the way it works out, then the
long term result of this vote may be a vic-
tory for Congress and the American people.
Congress has been the silent partner in the
executive - legislative - judicial triumvirate
which is supposed to ruin this country. The
power of Congress has been declining as the
power of the executive and the judicial
branches of the government has increased.
This is neither right nor good.
The federal system is based on a division
of pow e r. Congress, al, the legislative
branch, has seemed content in recent years
as the passive partner of the trio.
If this little rebellion means Congress is
tired of its passive role and intends to assert
itself again, fine. If it intends to act as a
strong check on the growing powers of the
President and the unknown people who sur-
round him and seem to be making the major
decisions for this so-called republic, mighty
fine.
?Congress did not get us into this war, but
It. can help us get out, and we believe the ,
country will be grateful if it does.'
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STATI NTL
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TOVDO, OHIO
TIMES
L 31,347
1970
The Mercenaries
THE DISCLOSURE that since 1966 we have
-11- subsidized Thailand troops in South Viet-
nam to the amount of $200 million re-empha-
sizes the extent of our entanglement in south-
east Asia. This subsidy is in addition to our
financial support of Korean and (now de-
parted) Philippine units and, of course, is in
addition to the substantial underwriting of
the Thai military establishment in Thailand
itself, through direct military and economic
aid. Incidentally, it ?Is not inappropriate to
; observe while on this subject. that the Ameri-
can.aid program acknowledgedly has been
used as a cover for Central Intelligence Agency
operations in Laos.
It may be a little too strong to say, as
some have, that the United States is employ-
ing "mercenaries" in Vietnam, for the coun-
tries from which these other troops come do
have an interest, of one sort or another, in
what happens there. But the picture still is
far from one of southeast Asian countries out-
side Vietnam freely joining us, at great sacri-
, f ice, in the defense of liberty and freedom in
; that part of the world.
How fully we are going to subsidize the
Thai "volunteers" now getting ready to move
into Cambodia, and what other support we
are prep'fired to give them, is the question
mediately at issue. But it also is part of the
longer range question of how much support
?financial and otherwise?we are prepared to
give the South Vietnamese troops that appar-
? ently will remain in Cambodia after the sched-
uled departure of our troops at the end of this
'month,
It will be difficult, indeed, to deny. these I
forces any help that they may be consideredl
to need since, in fact, they will be fighting by'
proxy a war that actually has become our):
war?American combat withdrawal from Cam-
bodia or. not. ?IP
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STATI NTL
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1'.VA. ?
GAZETTE
? 63,294
S 106,7'75
JUN ii 1970
Editorials?
!
quoted as saying that Thai "volunteers"
in our new Cambodian adventure "will
..,...,? ! be armed and equipped from aid sup-
plied by the United States."
But, perhaps even more outrageous, is
Hannah's admission that the U. S. AID I v/
program is being used as a cover for the ;
CIA's spying activities in Laos.
The purpose of the Mn program
assist underdeveloped nations in reach-
which deprived people can find a better
life in peace. Ostensibly, the United
States is to benefit by winning .friends
through our help in bringing about such
desirable pursuits.
The intermingling of CIA and AID
operations in Laos was described by
Hannah as stemming from a 1962 deci-
sion that such activity was in the U. S.
national interest. Certainly it is anything
but that. Rather, it is a prostitution of
the AID program from a mission of
peace to a device of war?and when we ,
allow this to happen, all of our humani-
tarian efforts will become suspect in the '
eyes of the world.
The United States government soon
should awaken to the folly of its med-
dling in Southeast Asia. We go in the
name of peace only to foment wider
wars. We cannot seem to profit from\
past mistakes?for, even as President
Nixon acclaims his Cambodian gamble
as a "most successful operation," the I
enemy forces score new gains in both ,
Cambodia and South Vietnam.
The demand for sanity in our foreign
policy is written in the blood of nearly
43,000 Americans dead in Southeast Asia,
They
but our le ders lack the capacity t4 -
grasp it. just go on making more of
the same mistakes. .
"Mood. of 43,000Crying
For Sa. ne 71orelgiti roue
a stage of economic development in
? -pm ?
There appears to be no end to the
United States' penchant for getting in-
volved in the affairs of other 'countries
under the guise of building military dikes
against the expansion of communism.
This is how we originally got ourselves
into the intolerable mess..in Vietnam
when, as Sen. Aiken put it, "We invited
ourselves in."
Now, some 15 years and some 43,000
American war dead later, recent disclo-
sures bring to light new aspects of our
meddling tendencies in Southeast Asia:
ti?Under a secret agreement entered
into in 1967, the United States has been
paying Thailand $50 million a year for
sending a combat division to South Viet-
,nam.
e-Foreign Aid Chief John A. Hannah
!acknowledged that the U. S. aid-adminis-
tering Agency for International Develop-
ment is being used as a cover for
; Central Intelligence Agency operations in
? Laos.
? The broad outlines of the hitherto se-
cret arrangement involving Thailand
were made public in testimony of Statc.
and Defense department officials pub-
lished by a Senate foreign relations:
subcommittee. The testimony, taken last
November and made public only after,
State Department ,censorship, traces the,
deepening American Military Involve-I
ment in Thailand in the past 20 years as
well as the increasing commitments and
assistance demanded by Thailand.
In a further effort to encourage Thai-
land to assign the 11,000-man military
unit to South Vietnam?obviously to give
an Asian complexion to what is basically''
a civil war?the U. S. also agreed to
increase military aid to Thailand by $30
million over a two-year period and to
supply the Thais with a battery of Hawk
antiaircraft missiles.
This adds up to soniething in excess of
$65 million a year to support a merce-
nary division under the guise of, "volun-
teers"?and all of it done without the '
knowledge of the American people, who
are footing the bill. Furthermore, Thai-
land's Premier Thanom Kaittikachorn
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DETrtinic MICH.
NEWS
E - 5(12,616
S"1 0J6
klUN Pi 1970-
W rk of-
h mpere
r ?
leper lima
?
By COL. R. D. HEINL JR. THE ATTITUDE taken by
News MIIIIIT7 AnZ17111 1 Hannah, as well as by two
WASHINGTON ? The' i former Peace Corps directors,
Agency for International De- Sargent Shriver and Jack
Ilotitl Vaughan, and the pres-
velopment (AID) is a cciver lent director, Joseph H.
for the' CIA in Laos' and Blatchford, is that their agen-
wishes it weren't. ,cies are or ought to be too
Since 1962, according to its pure to dirty their hands with
'administrator, John A. Hen.. intelligence matters. It infers
nah, the mission in Vientiane that such work should be left
has maintained a "rural de- ,to the CIA which, in the in-
velopment" division which is iferonee; comes through as a
in fact a CIA front for train- ?crew of amoral tricksters and
ing individuals and units in iwarmongers,
counter insurgency and other! The increasing desire of
military skills. ivarious agencies of the gov-
Expressing the hope that emment to turn their back on
the relationship between AID the CIA (AID and the Peace
and CIA could be severed by Corps are not alone) hinders
legislation now pending, Han, and obstructs the CIA in per-
nah expressed distaste for forming , Crucially important
working with the CIA. "Our functions.,on which the sur-
preference is to get out of this vival o the United States
kind of operation," he said. iliterally depends.
If Hannah succeeds in di- i Like Hannah's AID and
qJ vorcing AID and CIA, his
agency will then make com-
mon cause with the Peace
Corps, which has always held
itself off-limits to thb mur15y
?/.1.
? .
Blatchford's Peace Corps,
Richard Helm's CIA is a
statutory agency of the
United States, provided for by
Congress and pal dfor from
?but-vitally neeessary?gante the public treasury. Whether
ot11intalligence...,.11-0!, I,? . :. ;or not given individuals,. or
.? . . ' .1 -.--' even other government agen-
das, apploud the kind of work
. CIA sometimes does, the fact
' remains that CIA business is
llgovernment business?no less
- than AID business ? and usu-
ally a good bit more import-
ant.
; Yet the stance of AID and
the Peace Corps suggests that
;there is a kind of pousse-cafe
!stratification of ? government
!functions: some at the top
i
. above --board, ,pure, disinter-
. .estedi. %ell In the Wilsonlan
17
0,iew of international rein-
tions being suitable and "re-
spectable." Others in the dark
depths disingenuous, amoral
If not immoral, covert, and
selfishly pro-American, being
"disrespectable." .
Obviously, AID would not
want its acronym tarnished
- by disrespectable associations
? inside our government ? and
that is Why Hannah withdraws
the hem of his garment.
IN ITS EARLY DAYS as ,/d its work, Hannah might
(.
Col. Donovan's Office of Stra\/
tegie Services (OSS), during
World War It, our pre-CIA
intelligence organiza-
tion planted representatives
at any point in the govern-
mental structure where re-
suits could best be attained.
l:- Since World . War II was a
patriotic, "moral" war, no ob-
jections were raised. Nor, for
the same reason, during the
Korean War, was there any
tendency on the part of U.S.
.,. government agencies ,to shun ,
i
. CIA.
It is only because of the
l domestic unpopularity of Viet-
nam and a simplistic view of
! government and its interests
1 1
and their defense, that organi-
zations like AID and the
, 'Peace Corps conclude that
ther,should be allowed to re-
;!fuse government business
I
goat some internal opinion il " disapproves.
- _._,....
This notion ? that govern- 1
ment agencies paid for by the i
taxpayer can pick and choose!
the kind of work they take in;
?is a philosophical sibling 'to(
the doctrine so popular in in-1
tellectual and even some ju-
dicial circles: that people;
enjoy the "right" to choose,
which wars they will fight and,
which they will sit outs,' 1 '2
As a practical matter, it
hardly requires a manpower, ?.
expert to recognize that thel
"right" of selective service.
(in which the individual se-
1
lects his own wars), means
that the day the bugle blows' '
will never he the day for al
lot of high-minded young men;
to go to that particular war,
Strictly on principle, you un-
derstand.
needs an answer badly, e
dCuIcAe.may not be able to pro-
duce.
Such a situation would be',
pleasing in Moscow, Peking,
Cairo, Damascus, and very,
likcly in Berkeley or Cam- !
bridge, but perhaps not so
much so to high-minded, de-
cent men like Hannah, who
has served as an assistant !
secretary of defense and
should know better.
look back to an earlier
n
Before he disdains the CIA 1
Amer-
ican, Nathan Hale, who, when
reproached in 1775 by a friend
for "dirtying himself" by spy--
ing within the British lines.
replied: "Every kind of OAP
vice, necessary to the public
good,,, becomes .honorable
being rer-esfajL:2-""
,
?.,
vrtoIrNiousngligEwo government tirtiheEent ewagAenidCieisft
venience, or because agency)
of image, administrative con-
officials are lukewarm. on, a
acquire the discretion to cold-
shoulder the CIA for the sake
foreign policy, then some fine
particular tenet of defense orl
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STATI NTL
Approved For ReleasesiROMOilbitchMer-01601,
. !
1 1 JUN 1970
Disclosure
Of CIA Work
To Help AID
: By WILLIAM K. WYANT JR.
A Washington Correspondent
Of the Post-Dispatch
4 WASHINGTON, June 11?It
, has long been reported unoffi-
cially that the Agency for Inter-
' a tional Development's pro-
/gram
v
.
in Laos was being used
as a cover for the Central Intel-
ligence Agenc y. Last Sunday
AID Director John A. Ilannah
officially confirmed the report.
??"Well, I just have to admit
that that. Is true," Hannah said
, In an interview on a Metrome-
/ dla radio news show called
V i "Profile." Actually he did not
. ? i' have to admit it unless he
: thought best. He could have de-
clined comment.
? Not only did Hannah concede
'that his agency has been front-
0; ing for the CIA, but he said he
; did not like this role and that
? only in Laos was it true. He
said the nation's economic as-
sista nce should be divorced
from its political and military mInistrator for AID In Vietnam.
? V operations. Nooter had no authority to
I. No thunderbolts struck Han- comment, and did not. He had
nah, the former president of formerly been deputy assistant
M Ichigan State University,. administrator for the agency's
when he left the radio station, East Asian bureau, which In-
eluded Laos. He told Fulbright
that he would file a secret
memorandum covering the sub-
ject, if the committee requested
It.
From the c 0110 q u y, it ap-
peared that the Agency for In-
ternational ' Development would
spend about $50,000,000 this
year in Laos. This included
help in the agriculture, educa-
tion and health fields as well as
relief for war refugees and as-
sistance in stabilizing the Lao-
tian economy.
Fulbright asked about two
small airlines that, among 'other
things, perform services for the
American f or e ign assistance
mission in Laos. The *Mined
have been described In newspa.
r.' pars u' financed, directly or. In.
As to AID's being Involved
with the CIA in LAOS, American
correspondents have been re-
porting it for months. The situ-
ation was disclosed in hearings
of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee late last year and
this ye a r. Until then, it had
? been cloaked in government-im-
posed secrecy.
The inquiry on Laos presided
over by Senator Stuart Syming-
ton (Dem.), Missouri, chairman
of the subcommittee on United
States security agreements and
commitments abroa d, delved
? Into the activities of the foreign
k assistance mission but the re-
.sponses were deleted for securi-
i
? ity reasons.
k In March, Senator J. William
V'ulbright (D e m.), Arkansas,
chairman of the full committee,. "I don't say it was wrong,
se-
tried to put the AID-CIA rela- the observer said. "It vas cret. I do say that was wrong."
tionship in Laos on the public .?.
The same source pointed out
record during the confirmation .
hearing of Robert H. Nooter of the National Security Council,
that the CIA reports directly to
St. Lot's, the new assistant ad-
an advisory body to the Presi-
dent. He said that the CIA was
run by a competent profession-
? al, Richard Helms, and did
nothing without instructions,
Hannah . expressed confidence
Sunday that President Nixon
would go along with the Peter-
son task force recommendation
for a new approach that will di-
? vorce economic help fiom mili-
tary assistance.
"I am ce r t al n," he said,
"from the standpoint of the at-
? titude of the 'American people
and the long-range well-being of
,. the foreign assistance program
? ... that these political-military
operations ought to be handled
by the 'Department of State and
the Department of D n s
',lather, than thrbttgIt'AID,rto
t,"*hatesteCtletni.,1.;;A:44414A4
? One of the difficulties, o
course, Is that Congress each
year appropriates hundreds of
millions of dollars for Intelli-
gence work. These sums are hid-
den in the budget and their
presence causes trouble, as Ful-
bright pointed out, when the
various committees try to call
federal agencies to account.
"There are enough problems
with AID without It being a
front for the CIA," Fuibright
told Nooter. ?
A Washington official familiar
with the way the intelligence
apparatus operates toldlthe
Post-Dispatch that the CIA had
"a tremendous operation I n
Laos" but that details about it
are hard to get.
He is reported to have consult-
ed with nobody before making
i his revelation, and to have been
glad afterwards to have made
'a clean breast of the Laos in-
?Ivolvement.
; "I had the direct question,"
he is said to have remarked lat-
ter, "and I wasn't going to lie
about it."
The Interview gave Hannah a
chance to argue for an expand-
ad economic assistance p r o-
",; gram in the less developed
parts of the world, and to call
!attention .to President Richard
; M. Nixon's plans for a new ap-
proach.
President Nixon is expected
4 to ask Congress In a week or so
to look at the recommendations
of the task force headed by Ru-
; dolph A. Peterson, president of
I: l& Bank of America. The task
force reported ee Nbcon,In
11.11.4'4,4k:A alkhalkie!.;:i.4,4 014.
,
?
;; ?
.intsetly?fmcOnionemt...op, - !
?
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. ? '
??1
Jo.Y.110103
Approved For Release 2001/01YLIalla
Jun w
oNixon reported
planning deeper
move inico Laos.
By JOHN PITTMAN
(Excerpts from this article were used. by Pittman In his broad-
casts over radio station WBAI June 940.)
NeWs items about Laos last week suggested Presi-
dent Nixon's administration may be moving toward .
deeper military involvement in this country of Indo-
china. United Press International's bureau in Vientiane,d
capital of the one-third of Lao territory and one-half of '
its three million population ruled by the Royal Lao gov-
ernment, reported several important announcements in
Parliament by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma.
First, the prime minister said, I These developments suggest a'
he is determined to bring back number of similarities to the
into the government the Neo Lao situation in Cambodia before the
Haksat. That is the Lao Patriotic . rightwing coup last March 18.
Front party that governs two- That coup ousted Prince Siha-
thirds of Lao
territory and
half of its
three million
11% people. At the
liar same time
poulc, prime minister of the Roy-
al Cambodian government, and
offered President Nixon a pre-
text for invading Cambodia and
expanding the war to all of In-
dochina.
Souvanna Phou- In retrospect, these similarities
ma rejected proposals to oust from are striking. We know that
low level government posts a few Prince Sihanouk had held firmly
officials whom rightwingers al- to a position of neutrality in the
lege to be members of the Lao Indochina conflict, despite the
Patriotic Front. These officials
are said to have remained in
,off ice when rightwingers six years
ago broke up the National Union
government and forced represent-
atives of the Patriotic Front to
flee for their lives.
Wants no more 'aid'
Second, the prime minister said
he would not ask for more for-
eign troops to defend Lao terri-
tory of the Royal government,
and he would not ask for addi-
tional military supplies and
equipment Ife said he felt such
supplies were already flowing
into the country in adequate
amounts from the U.S.
Third, Prime Minister Souvan-
na Phouma rejected a proposal
to give an amnesty to a former
rightwing strongman, Phoumi No-
savan, and bring him into the
government. Nosavan was. tried
Cm absentia five years ago and
sentenced to 20 years imprison-
ment on charges of corruption
and theft. He has been living in
mounting pressure of many years
by Washington administrations to
force him to side with the Sai-
gon regime against the Vietnaz
mese guerrillas and the Demo-
'cratic Republic of Vietnam.
Traitor linked to CIA
We also know that Phoumi
Nosavan, the rightwing strong-
man and convicted thief now
living in Thailand, is a longtim
stooge of Washington administra-
tions whose notoriety as a trait-
or is 'a commonplace throughout
Southeast Asia. Foreign newsmen
have compiled much evidence
showing that Nosavan has worked
hand-in-glove with the U.S. Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency. In 1959,
with the help of U.S. Embassy
of fitials in Vientiane and about
;16 million of U.S. taxpayers'
money, generously supplied by
the Eisenhower administration of
which 'Richard M. Nixon was
vice president, Phoumi Nosavan
organized an armed secessionist
movement, captured Vientiane,
Thailand, where he fled to es- and forced Prime Minister Sou-
roved 'FOr-4,043Mbt/CPSItt :
cape punishoprip
P80-01601
STATI NTL
When another coup Nosavan at-
tempted in 1965 was abortive, he
fled to Thailand where his uncle,
Sanit Thanarat, was dictator. The
London Observer on Feb. 7, 1965
estimated that his stolen loot in-
cluded a monopoly of imports
of gold, wine and spirits, and the
biggest opium den in Vientiane.
Now his patrons are demanding
that Souvanna Phouma forget all
this and bring him back into the,
Royal government.
No innocent
'.In retrospect we know also
that Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma is no innocent school-
boy in these matters. He also has
,used his several appointments as
the King's first minister to line
his pockets with 6,000 shares of
various companies also financed
by American taxpayers. He has
named himself president of the
Laos Bank of Commerce and of
the airplane transportation com-
pany now called Air of the King-
dom of Laos. He played footsie
with French colonialism and has
'been Washington's willing. front-
man whenever needed to give
the Vientiane administration a
coating of moderation and con-
ciliation..
In his statements in- Parlia-
ment last week he kept silent
about the 6,000 or more Thai
tr9ops already iii Laos, the
ilippine, Japanese and Chiang
al-shek mercenaries. And of
course he said nothing about ther
thousands of Americans serving
as Green Beret officers and
trainers and as "advisers" of the
"special warfare" puppet forces
now attacking areas under the
Patriotic Front administration.
But several times in the past
Washington thought it no longer
needed Souvanna Phouma, and
promptly replaced him with
more dedicated stooges like No-
Sayan. This happened in 1954, in
1958, in 1964 and it almost hap-
pened In 1965. As a matter of
fact, Souvahna Phouma denounced
the United States government for
betraying him and double-cross-
ulitCP8.070101041R00010.0, 30001-4
York Times report of this on
Jan. 20, 1961, said the Prime
Minister accused Washington of
consistently opposing the only
possible solution of the Laos
question, the formation of a gov-
ernment of national union as re-
quired by both the Geneva agree-
ments of 1954 and ? the Geneva
accords on Laos of 1962, although
the U.S. government had signed
this latter agreement. Souvanna
Phouma accused Washington of
having tried to overthrow his
Royal government in favor of a
government with "strong anti
Communist policies."
In the light of this background
last week's developments suggest
Souvanna Phouma's accusatior
may soon have to be up
dated. They certainly providi
substantial ground for the repor
in the Washington Post last weel
that a new coup may be in thi
;works in Laos. It will be a cm]
to oust ?Souvanna Phouma onci
again and install a military re
gime in Vientiane, headed b:
,Nosavan or esie of his ac
isomplices.
(Th
Approved For Release2.0111103494(: C3A4rEffel3-01601
, DOTHAN , ALA.
EAGLE
E ? 28,355
o 1970
Level Deci$ioniN
That the American people aren't national interest. i
- i
r always fully informed of what their ? Whether ,the government should .
l, government is doing to and for them act in this fashion brings to mind ..
1 has been underscored twice in re- an article by the United Press Inter-
cent days. Whether the government national of several months ago. The 1
i should maintain such secrecy is an- . article dealt with a book by William ?,1
other question. J. B4ds, a former official of CIA.
A heavily censored summary of a , In the book, Bards said that the peo-
:. Nov. 9, 1967 agreement between the ple's right to know is a basic ele-
', ? United States and Thailand;--made ment of a free and self - governing j
? public in a 310-page tranScript of society. "If a people are to r u 1 e ,
hearings conducted by a Senate For- themselves," he went on, "they must
., eign Relations Subcommittee ? re-. be be adequately informed to know.
i,
- vealed that the United States has "what the Y are doing", but "in a
. secretly paid Thailand more than world such as this, complete open- .
$200,000,000 to send 12,000 troops .ness and candor on the part of any. .1
: to fight in Vietnam. government is impossible." I
Under the agreement, the United ' Bards agreed that '4the govern- ;
/ , !
\,_ I States absorbed the costs for send- ment must as a general practice'
' ing a Thai combat division to Viet- ' conduct an honest dialogue with its:1
i nam and maintained and improved citizens" and argued that "there are'l
; the defense capability of Thai forces ? situations when it seems to even the j
I remaining at home. Absorbing the ' most intelligent and conscientious
. costs for the combat division in- .-..statesmen that the price of telling'
t
eluded equipping the division,, pro- the truth, or not lying, is greater ,
: viding logistic support, paying over- ,. than can be borne." 1
_
, seas allowances, assuming the ex-
;. Situations i
t
. pense ,s of preparing and training, . Stuatons n which government
Land distributing a muster-out bon- ' officials may have "not only the:,
us. Improving the capability of
right but the obligation to lie, ac- ..
,
forces on duty at home c a m e cording to Bards, are:
through a modernization program 1. To mislead an enemy about ,
which involved an increase in the wartime operations. ? .
2. To protect covert intelligence
.., military assistance program by $30,-
activities in peacetime.
' 000,000 for the years 1968 and 1969., , 1
At almost the same time this ? 3. To avoid a financial panic when -1
; agreement was disclosed, John A. currency devaluation is pending.
Hannah, head of the United States' 4. At times such as the Cuba /Infs. i
silo crisis, when officials fear that ',1
' foreign aid program, revealed under,
,r questioning on a news program that telling the, truth might lead to the
00, 1. ?..'e-the program is being used as a cover danger of nuclear war.
'I
`'.-- : for Central Intelligence Agency ac- The sad part of the foregoing, of .1
tivities in Laos. Hannah emphasiz-, course, is that public officials arel
, 'ed that he disapproved of the .CIA's only human and could be hard put 1
. use of his organization and added not to use the obligation to lie for 1
that Laos was the only place where 'reasons 'other than security. And, 1
- this is being done and that such ac- ? too, there's always room for honest i
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STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000
LANG 117ACH, CAL.
INDEPENDENT
M - 49,632
,IAPI 10 1g70
'Our policy: (deleted)
AMERICANS ARE A TRUSTING .PEOPLE who Want to !
believe their government, but their confidence has been sadly !
shaken so many times it will be hard to restore.
: ? In. the Eisenhower administration there was the lie that]
the U2 shot down over Russia was a weather plane. President v
H Eisenhower was denounced. at the time as politically naive be-
cause he cleared that one up by telling the truth. He said can !
! didly that he had authorized sthe spy plane, flights. Khrushchev
was angry. So were. ninny American liberals, who contended
that the president had strayed from .sound traditions by te1ling,...1
the truth.
. ,
'
In. the Kennedy administration, Defense' Department offi-,1
,
cial Arthur 'Sylvester contended the government had a "right to
. lie" to its citizens. Mr. Sylvester's title, so help us, was assist-
! -ant secretary of defense for public affairs.
NOW PREVIOUSLY SECRET testimony before a Senate
subcommittee reveals that the Johnson administration agreed to
pay $200 million to Thailand so that country would send "vol-
unteers" to fight in South Vietnam. Ti. S. and Thai officials
denied at the time that any such deal had been made. It now
develops not only that the deal was made but that it included
a plan to use American troops if needed to protect the Thai
.government from a Communist takeover.
? And John A. Hannah, the foreign aid chief in the Nixon
administration, now concedes that the aid program in Laos is
being used as a cover for operations of the Central Intelligence
A
Agency. Hannah says ,he disapproves.
--- Even that sketchy information is more than the public has
been allowed to find out until now about U. S. involvement in
the Laotian civil war.
AN INDICATION of how much information the administra-
tion previously felt the American people were entitled to on ,
the subject is given by this excerpt from the Congressional
Record of Jan. 21:
"Mr. Fulbright: Nearly everyone who has spoken here has
said that they think, it was a mistake to become involved in
Vietnam or, in this instance, Laos. (Deleted) This is a major
operation. (Deletedl
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"mrAftirecitedWittcReleaSe 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
"Mr. Fulbright: (Deleted)
"Mr. Ellender: (Deleted)
"Mr. Fulbright: (Deleted)
"Mr. Ellender: (Deleted)
? "Mr. Fulbright: (Deleted)
"Mr. Ellender: (Deleted)
"Mr. Fulbright: (Deleted)
"Mr. Ellender: (Deleted)
"Mr. Fulbright: (Deleted) I think we should know how
much we are spending for this operation, which is beginning to
be a major war."
Aside from the question of the American government's
credibility in the rest of the world, the credibility of the gov-
ernment at home requires that it answer a few questions: Who
ordered the foreign aid program used as a CIA cover? By
. what authority was that done? Who authori:71717"Tle hailand
deal? How can the making of that commitment without Senate
: advice, consent or even knowledge be justified?
\ Essentially, these questions concern not military but politi-
cal secrets. The taxpayers who pay the bills and the young
Men who pay with their lives if the government strategists err
rare entitled to answers.
Ado,
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STATINTL
NEW BEDFORD, MASS.
STANDARD?TIMES
JUN 1 0 1970
E\-- 71,238
S 62,154
Repeal the Tonkin Reso
?
, President Nixon is trying to work out tions Committee, of exceeding its autbo-
a 'legislative compromise with his Sen- rity in supporting U.S. military 'activi-
ties in Laos. This Laotian arrangement
ate critics. ' stoma front a 1962 , White ;House deci-
- He has stdd he m i gilt accept the sien'. that such a setup was in "the na::
Cooper-Church proposal to restrict fu- tional interest." 'd ' ' ' ' ., ?
ture U.S. operations in Cambodia if it 5. Although existence , of . Such an ac-
were amended to let him send troops cord was denied at the time, of signing
back Into that country to protect Amer- (Nov. 9, 1967), it now has been revealed
ican forces in Vietnam. - there exists a secret inoney-for-troops
?
This is precisely the kind of weaken- pact between the United States and
? Ing of the, legislative prerogative that Thailand. Bangkok sent 10,000 men to
. has led to our present situation in South- Vietnam in exchange for $200 million.
. east Asia. It is incredible to us t h at The role of Thailand in other Southeast
Nixon would ask for such a 131ank check 'Asian nations, , and, the part played by
. to invade Cambodia again after the crisis the United States, ,has been a subject
he has just gone through over his first of growing controversy, in the ALS. Sen-
invasion of that country. ate.
These related factors that each :day.
' Consider the fact that.
1 1. Although the President of the ,. are getting us . deeper in the Southeas
' ?United States is committed to. extricat- , Asian quagmire are ',inextricably ,linked.
ing this country from the Vietnam war, to the thinking that produced the ' Ton
recent developments for which he is kin Gulf resolution.
willing to take personal responsibility That resolve, approved by Congress
have so widened the conflict that it in frantic fashion on the basis of ad
now must be called the Indochina war ministration supplied inforrnation of
, 2. Having been dislodged from some questionable accuracy, states that "the
i" ? of their eastern' hiding places, the Viet- Congress approves and supports the de-,
namese Communists now are harassing termination of the President, as COM*
and attacking Cambodian government mander-in-chief, to take all necessary
:Imps in two-thirds of that country. , measures to repel any armed attack
'They now actually control one-third. against the forces of the United States
'Before the overthrow of Prince Siha- , and to prevent further aggression . . .
1 nouk on March 18, the -North Vietna- .t-:' "The United States is, therefore, pre-
0;mese and Viet Cong had g e n e r all y . Pared, as the ,President determines, to
avoided staging attacks against Cam l' , take all necessary steps, including the
-:, bodians. of armed force, to assist any mem-,
, South Vietnamese troops were sent in , Asia Collective Defense Treaty request-,
five weeks ago' has Severely damaged , ing assistance ' in defense of it s free-1
' Cambodia's economY. Many of the rub- 'dom."
, ,
ber, plantations have been, destroyed, With that Mandate, who needs Con-
and rubber represents 40 per cent of ,, gress,.the Constitution, or a declaration
, the country's foreign-exchange earnings.' , of War? ? ,
4. Dr: John' A. Hannah, director of ?. The Cooper Church proposal, even un-
' the Agency for International Develop- ,:' diluted by Nixon's offer, is no more
' ment, has acknowledged that the U.S: 4,than piecemeal action. It is insufficient
aid program is being used as a cover , , to quarrel with the way in which the
'. for operations '...oi the C.entral,:intelli- ,`.President gets us involved abroad, as,
Ji gence Agency 'in Lao The CIA has been 'L lag' as the Congress has given him'
.! accused, of . having had a hand in the ` carte blanche to get involved.
; ousting of 'Sihanouk ,in Cantbodia, ?and I,,,, ; ,Cangress should do its part in getting
: has ? been: charged: 1)y ,,SenjEJ.yir,. ' rut; US.' out of Southeast Asia by repealing
4 bright, ichairman% iii: the Foreigi:.Rela,, thp TOnlibraulf resolution. ' .4% , ?
- , :. 0- q-t ..m.. ,,,,. ,,,, :.,... r r ,z ,;??,,,k , Ir ?,t4, , ,, ., ?4 ' ' ? :,,,, 1
3. The fighting since American' and ber or protocol state of the Southeast
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TATINTL
Approved For Release 2001432061UNCMRDP80-01601R0
NI any U.S.'Civilian Role. s "
In Asia May Go to Military
ssistance programs is said tol While there Is resistance
F.
'Tly l'Ato szttc a
among civilian officials to what
,. ? , itpoclat to TM New Tort Tim.' ' be that the Defense Department
I is viewed as military encroach-
- -: WASHINGTON,: June 9?The ? Nixon 'AdMiniStration is' la expected ?to have an easierim. ent, AID, recognizes its in-
raw up plans for the shift of ? 'numerous American time
' . ' ing getting funds from Con-i
, ability to obtain sufficient
,eonomic .
and a (rams In South Vietnam nd Laos
gress rind , where opposition to for-Ifunds personnel to finance
Nialto. a
from civilian to 'military con- eign-aid appropriation has been and operate some programs in
.0.4.,..V..,,I l i le?161k.Vid
t , . growing in recent years. Vietnam. ,
Under' the plans, the United Indications are that the newl
the United States Ambassador
Early this year, for example,
Y'ol. - ? , 0 ?
approach has support in the
to South Vietnam, Ellsworth
? States Defense Department
White House staff as well as Bunker, turned down insistent
?would gradually? take over?
--,wholly or in part, the financing, among many though not all proposals from the United
Corn-
and operation of such programs civilian and military officials' in' States Military Assistance Com-
1 the Defense Department. Top mand in Saigon that he accept
as the balancing of the South! officials in the aid agency are 135 Army officers as advisers
to the aid agency's public-
,safety program, which seeks to
build up the South Vietnamese
civilian police.
The Defense Department
plans ? to finance several proj-
ects that have been adminis-
tered and funded by the aid;
agency, among them the sup-
ply of high-protein food to the,
South Vietnamese Army. Ten-
tative estimates are that in
fiscal 1971 the Defense Depart-
ment will finance up to $50-;
million in programs that pre-
viously were paid for from aid
In tliany recent situations,
funds.
officials said, A.I.15. had to
turn to the military for admin-
istrators and physicians to run
? refugee and public-health proj-
ects because of a shortage of
civilians willing to serve in
Vietnam.
%r
Vietnamese defense budget,
pacification of rural areas, pub-
lic health, the training of the
police and the care of refugees.
Those programs are financed
and administered alone or in
cooperation with the Defense discussions only to a limited ex-
Department by the Agency for tend. The whole question is ex-
pected to be reviewed by the
International Development. In
many instances the Central In-
telligence Agency and the
'United States Information
Agency also participate. ' at the White House May 25 in
? During the fiscal year ending one of their rare meetings.
In recent public statements
en' June 39, the aid agency, it? Dr. Hannah has made it clear
Is estimated, will have spent that the "support assistance"
$365-million in Vietnam. program; would be divested
'? The Administration plans to from the agency that_would be
Incorporate some of the changes set up to handle ovemeas eco-
in its revision of the foreign-aid nomic development' 'Oder the
reorganization, expected to
Program, ? which is expected take effect in about a year. He
soon. Part of the nroeram.will has recognized that some of
require Congressional approval, the support functions would be
, The plans are expected to turned over to the Defense
generate considerable contro-, Department.
:Versy in and out of Congress , Other aid officials foresaw a
'because they deal with the sub.: tug-of-war between the Penta-
ject of civilian vs. military con-
gon and civilian agencies over
the extent to which the mill-
trol of policy. The contemplated tary establishment would as-
shift could transfer the respon-?
sumo responsibility for the ac-
sibility of Senate review from tivities now performed by the
the Foreign Relations Commit- aid agency.
tee, which has generally been They said that the State De-
critical of American operations nate the support assistance is to coordi-
parment, which
in Southeast Asia, to the Armed under the reorganization blue-
Services Committee, which has print, does not have "enough
generally been sympathetic. clout," funds or experienced
Civilian officials have been personnel to run the programs.
citing private remarks by high- ?Larger C.I.A. Role Foreseen
described as resigned to the
change, partly because A.I.D. as
an entity would disappear under
the projected reorganization of
the foreign-aid program.
Secretary of State William P.
Rogers has participated in the
National Security Council.
Dr. John A. Hannah, the aid
administrator, discussed the
problem with President Nixon
ranking officers involved in
policy planning for Vietnam, The officials also foresaw
to the effect that civilian lead-
ership is failing and that well-
trained Army men should be
increasingly assigned to posi-
tions of responsibility in the
that the C.I.A. would seek to
increase its role in the support military for the financing and
programs. They noted that in a management of certain pro-
radio interview last Sunday Dr. grams because of the inability;
Hannah conceded that the in-
had
of civilian agencies to muster
adeauate funds and personnel.
telligence ? agency been
Rapidly Growing Ability
Such developments indicate
The rapidly growing capability
of the military, especially, the
Army, to administer typically
civilian programs.
This month the newly reor-
ganized' John F. Kenhedy Cen-
ter for Military Assistance at
Fort Bragg, N. C.g?originally
established by the Army to
teach antiguerrilla warfare?
will graduate the first class of
Army officers trained in the
political, social, economic. cul-
tural and lineuistic aspects of
overseas military activities.
Commenting on the trend. a
civilian official said that "the
realities of the situation'
would increasingly force the
Administration to turn to the
?gdministration of wartime and
!postwar programs. - ---- using A.I.D. as a cover for .its The major Institutlona
activities in Laos since 1962. changes are expected to come
I
) ' A major argument among In Vietnam, the C.I.A. 9 ant in the message that President
,Administration officials favor1 active partner in the pacifies_ Nixon will send to Congress
Ing an increase in the miIitar3j tion program, which it created later, this month.' , r ,,t,-.;13 '4
..0p_le,fn Asian and Other stippnrto eight years ago, and is engagect
?-, ? ?,? - . ? - - - in:rnany othentoperatIons;7
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-1,-?-renern T Tom,.
0
Y 3ilikg
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: "
_ DP80-01601R0
10 JUN 1970
Si
Subversion by C.I.A. ? i
, The disclosure that the American economic aid mis-
, ,sion in Laos is being used a a cover for intelligencet ,/
operations in Laos is nothing less than a body blow:
.to the credibility of the peaceful presence of the
United States in neutral and friendly nations. The
decision to allow the Central Intelligence Agency to,
subvert an important foreign mission was made during
:the Kennedy Administration in 1962. The fact that it
has thus persisted tinder three Presidents dramatizes;
the extent to which the debasement of national and.
Aipromatic ethics has become a non-partisan evil. 1
; 'John A. Hannah, Administrator of the Agency f0
International 'Development, has special reason to rec-
ognize the harm done by these undercover games,:
He knows from bitter experience that they undermine
ithe universities and their scholars who, as keys to, ,
ithe success of both AID and the United States Informa=i
?ton Agency, become the unwitting accomplices to t14 ,
i
.shady business. Dr. Hannah was president of 1VTichigant
ki
State University when it became known that one om
it foreign task forces had been infiltrated by thel
iC.I.A. in South Vietnam between 1955 and 1959.
.1
;Although Dr. Hannah's candid admission is to hiv
tered:t. his claim tivtt the situation in Laos . is Ili
unique transgression strains credulity. To say, I as he;
did, that "our preference is to get rid of this kind ofl
I
operation" is an understatement that raises seriouS1
questions. What arrogance orpower ii,it tINLresifttsi
rour preference," the preference of decent AnTericans?1 \/
t What are the limits of a usurpation of -suet poweri
!bir the military and the C.I.A.? , I
[. :Unless these questions are frankly answered, the;
t.ati d
,.
?non's friends abroad and its youth at borne will
-
'beporne increasingly cynical about all American claims
an goats: It is the road to alienation andisolationisme
W ktArlittigii19,11PAPP(It A90.121.1!
STATI NTL
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i.
JOURNAL
M 66,673
S - 209,501
vt. 10, 1 't
Beneath the Cloak
So secret are moitt of the operations of the CIA!
that normally when. a government official admits
his agency has served as a cover for clandestine work,
he creates a sensation?but not when the (agency, is'
the Agency for International Development and the
place is Laos.
John A. Hannah, A.I.D. administrator, admitted
somewhat reluctantly,' on a TV interview, that the
CIA has used the AID. program in Laol as a cover
...for its operations in' Laos ever since 1Q12. He, was
unhappy about it, ad hoped that the, connection
between the two programs could be severed: But
apparently the pattern is too.old and well estabtished
in Laos to be changed at so critical a time as the
present ?
; The strange thing about all this is that Dr.1
?
" Hannah, former president of Michigan State Uni-
versity, saw no point in denying or ducking the
question. There'wasn'i any use, because the facts are
so well known, not only to Americans but to. the
Communist forces in Indochina. ,
Dr. Hannah insisted that Laos was the only
'country in which AIM. has cloaked the operations
of the CIA. He may be right. Unfortunately, many
Americans will be skeptical about A.I.D. missions
in other countries because the operations Of ,the'
CIA have become so pervasive and so many official
statements about operations in Laos and elsewhere
have proved to be less than the whole truth. Officials
in many foreign countries go to the other ,extreme
,.and suspect most Americans, regardless of their
:work or titles of beini.CIA agents. yhere's no easy
, way of remedying tie situation. The CIA wilP
(continue to plant agents wherever it feels necessary,
.with or without the knowledge of those administer-
ing.other. agencies.
If the work of the foreign aid agency is to be
effective, though, the . people in the countries re-
'relying the, aid must have some confidence that the
' aid program is genuine, that it is not merely a mask
? t,to coy& 1,p espionage work and that its workers
are'really interested in helping the underdeveloped
countri. to "achieve economic ,Or 'Cultural' growth.
4 Separation promthe CIA 4 essential to credi4ility,
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Approved For Release 4101inig4pbfitiMIMP-01 601 RO
1 0 JUN 1970
Buying Our 'Allies',
largest "allied" face in Vietnam, and the full
price of that to American taxpayers has not
been publicly determined.
Not only American, but also Filipino and
Thai and Korean leaders, have tried to keep
the facts secret and with good reason. The
money is being spent to demonstrate that Wash-
ington's war policy has tremendous support in,
Asia. But when this support has to be bought
the illusion collapses into what Senator Ful-
'mittee found that the cost of getting Thailand bright rightly called the "ultimate in corrup-
to send troops to Vietnam has been $200,000,- ,tion."
000. That is for training, equipment and allow- I The corruption is not so much in the payoffs
ances and does not include far larger sums as in the policy that promotes them and hides'
spent to build vast American air bases inside the truth. Not even King George III was that
Thailand. deceitful when he hired Hessian mercenaries
Sine e Thailand has already announced it to fight American revolutionists, and it might
would send troops into neighboring Cambodia be expected that American governments would
at American expense, the Symington gr oup have learned something from that early expe-
riaturally wants to know how much the United
States is supposed to pay for that. The sub-
committee has already discovered a 1965 con-
tingency plan which commits this country to
defend Thailand whatever Thailand does for
America.
- A few months ago the Senators learned that
,the United States paid the Philippine govern-
pent $38,600,000 for sending 2200 noncombat
What the American public has learned so far
about the policy of paying for Asian allies is
shocking enough, yet it seems to be only part
of the story. That part had to be dragged out
of Administration officials fearful of letting
either fellow-Americans or the world know the
full price of allegiance in the Southeast Asian
venture.
With diligence and persistence Senat or
Symington and his Foreign Relations subcom-
STATI NTL
rience.
Deceit has, however, become the cloak for,
the expansion of American military policy in:
Southeast Asia. John A. Hannah, administrator /
of the Agency for International Development,
has conceded to the Symington committee that,,
CIA men work in Laos disguised as AID, agents.
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam.
As facts creep to light, it is plain that the
,troops to Vietnam. Part of that money went to United States is fighting and buying its influ- ,
late Philippine defense secretary, and the ,corn-. ence across Southeast Asia. There is no longer '
?mittee never did learn how much actually went simply the Vietnamese war. There is the war
49, ?the troops, ..Meanw,hile, South Korea 41,1010,,,?An,,f?P,F..Ptatesz.:,
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ST. PAUL, MINN.
PIONEER PRESS
M ? 104,387
S ? 223,806
JUN I 0 1970
Getting the
? If a good many Americans keep
.i their fingers ,crAsed..while.-listening
to glowing predictions of coming "dis-
involvement" in Southeast Asia after -
U.S. combat troops leave Cambodia,
the3r can hardly be blamed..
TAT
al NIIH III II
War Facts \\''
programs, supposed to be nonmili-
tary, .the Cenitalletelligenee-AgencY
has maintained a mercenary army in
Laos, and stilldoes. The U.S. also has 1,
had hired Cambodian mercenaries
fighting in Vietnam, and some of ,
Evidence continues to pile up re- these have now been sent into Cam-
garding withholding of war facts from bodia to supportthe Lon Nol govern-
the public by the Lyndon Johnson Ad- ment there.
ministration. The Nixon Administra- Now Symington and other senators
tion of course was not responsible for are trying to get from the State De- .?
this. But a disquieting feature is that partment the facts about American
the Nixon Administration, through payments to Thailand for use of Thai,
- the State and Defense Departments, troops in Cambodia. Also being
has shown only reluctant cooperation sought are answers to questions about
with efforts of the Senate Foreign Re- present U.S. commitments to Thai- 1
lations Committee to uncover and land, Cambodia and Laos in connec-
make public significant hidden activi- tion with their role in providing re-
ties of its predecessors. Such a course
does not increase confidence.
Senator Stuart Symington's sub-
committee has only now been able to
, make public a partial and heavily
censored report showing how' the
1, Johnson Administration made secret
agreements to pay Thailand more
1 than $200 million for sending some
-troops to Vietnam. Johnson gave
Americans to understand the Thai
contingents were voluntary, but it
was evidently a bought and paid for
deal.
Similarly, it has previously been
disclosed that the United States paid
someone in the Philippine govern-
ment $39 million to have a small non-
combatant force go to Vietnam. A
comparable deal was made with
South Korea and there are rumors of
something similar in connection with
Australia although this is unproved.
Under cover. of U.S. foreign aid involvements.,
placements for American. forces when
the latter pull out for the June 30 Nix-
on deadline.
The fear in the Senate is that new
agreements since the Cambodian in-
cursion will tie the United States to ,
future support of "Proxy" military
operations in Cambodia, Laos and
possibly Thailand. A report by staff
employes of the Foreign Relations
Committee says the Cambodian inva-,
sion has Permanently changed the
character of the Vietnam war by wid-
ening its geographic area, and con-
cludes that peace is now more distant
than ever, despite the Administra-
tion's contrary views.
No one can be sure at this time
what the eventual results of Cambod-
ia will be, but the Senate committee
members are well justified in seeking
answers now ,to significant questions
about the dangers of future broader
;
01-4
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S AN Fl?, C t CAL.
CHRONICLB
- -130,233
JUN a wo
'-Another CIA Venture
TIIE PUBLIC CONFIRMATION that Central
1 intelligence Agency operations in Laos for the past
eight years have been masked as foreign-aid proj-
ects will not startle anyone who has attempted to
study that most shadowy of Government agencies.
The CIA track record is one of frequent duplicity, ;
I ?
, and the American people and their elected rep-
resentatives have been as often the victims as
friendly or hostile foreign governments..
?
It is the long-range effect of later disclosure
that is the most damaging and harmful result of
, many CIA masquerades. Because of its corrupting 1
! courtship with private foundations, and student
! and trade union organizations, it has made Ameri-
can university, student and union programs abroad I
suspect. Many of its quietly financed ventures
' wore the disguise of humanitarian causes, but with i
finances mysterious ' and true sponsorship con-
cealed. When sponsorship was revealed, the pro-
grams came tumbling down and, with them, much
of the belief in and support for all foreign aid pro- ;
. grams.
NOW JOHN A. HANNAH, administrator of
the Agency for International Development, has
confirmed the CIA's use of AID in Laos but has ,
also insisted that the deception is not going on in
any other nation. Officials of other underdevel-
oped areas receiving American assistance are not
apt to accept Hannah's assurance unquestioningly.
; Thus the CIA may have damaged American pro-
grams to build friendship in many nations because
it damaged credibility in one.
It has been Moscow's repeated accusation, for
instance, that the Peace Corps, one of this coun-
try's mere magnanimous and hopeful contribu-
tions, represents only an extension of CIA med-
dling. The Laos disclosure tends to lend support?
to this Soviet view. The CIA's expediency may
thus have harmed a totally innocent victim in the
Peace Corps and, with it, the long-term national
interest.
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! TAM A"^r;a, FLA.
DE11 '3CRAT
E - 29,035
S 29,006
JUN 1 0 1970
Troubile
r Aid Program
There may be instances ? like Laos
? where use of the foreign aid program
as an undercover for intelligence.
operations might be justified. There is
ample room for argument on this issue.
But such arguments may be academie
now because Hannah's open admission
may have impaired the effectiveness of
his program to a point where it no
longer will be useful .to the U.S. or the
nations we have been tryingto help.
Of course, if foreign nations become
too mistrustful of their major helping
hand, they can always say "no thanks."
It wouldn't make a whole lot of our
taxpayers unhappy.
It may have been a real mistake for
the head of our foreign aid program to?
admit publicly that the US. program is
being used as a Over for CIA
operations in Laos.
In the light of an open admission of
this clandestine use of the aid program
for intelligence work, other nations may,
take a different attitude toward
American efforts to help them.
How will a foreign nation be able to
tell an AID worker from a spy?
Obviouslywit-ean't, and that statement
from Foreign Aid Chief John Hannah,
may get a lot of foreign aid people in*,
trouble during the coming months. \
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ikliecatkiS
Approved For Release 2001......./ : - P0,0111.94.ff
1 0 JUN 1970
RIGHTIST PRESSURE
Souvanna Threatened
By Fall of Saravane
, I
By TAMNIY ARBUCKLE April under the same circurn-,1
swim to The Star stances as Saravane. 1
VIENTIANE ? The neutral- He gave the key Defense'
ist government of Premier
Ministry post to a southerner,/,
. Souvana Phourna has been Sisouk Nachampassac, and
dealt a severe blow by the promised to consult the right-,
Communist capture of the pro_ ists on any major political de-1.
4vincial capital of Saravane in cisions?
!Southern Laos, diplomats here lias a "Ghost" Army '
'Say.
The problem now is whether. Souvanna is in process of
6
"Laos will continue its official ..' falling off his "neutrality",
,
tightrope to the right just as
I`!
neutral policy or swing to an.Norodom Sihanouk of Cam-
anti-Communist alliance with ? . bodia fell off his tightrope to
; South Vietnam and Thailand, ..,
, the source said. the left.
, t This assessment came as Souvanna depends on a right-
rightist National Assembly 1st army to fight the North .
deputies and politicians at- Vietnamese and Pathelao. '
tacked Souvanna's neutralist The neutralist army, a scant,
stance. 4,00 men, exists only on pa-
They said that Saravane -- I per. The Laotians call them
l
; A 'captured yesterday?was rec "
- "ghosts. i
ognized as a rightist town. by The U.S. Air Force flies ,
:the Geneva accords of 1962 close support for the Laotians.!
which guaranteed the neutrali- The Central Intelligence Agen- :
' ty of Laos. cy employs a small army of ,
The rightists said that prior Americans and Thais in.i
to the Saravane attack, the ground combat with Souvan-,,
'Lao government had made re- na's approval. 4
, ported requests for action by Aimed at Souvanna?'
' the International Control Com- . 4
/
mission charged with oversee-
Souvanna, is being forced to
jag the accords. But the ICC. the right by constant North ,
did nothing to prevent the . Vietnamese and Pathet Lao !
North Vietnamese from taking attacks. But just why the Reds 4
'
the town. took Saravane is not clear. 1
Diplomats speculate the Red
. Discussing the Communist
:i
attack and the rightist pres-
aim could be Souvanna's
sure on Souvanna, a top diplo-
downfall.
mat said, "The crunch has Another theory is that the i
i come." - Communists are preparing to ;
, If Souvanna stands firm for' talk and, for bargaining pur-
neutrality, observers believe poses, are seeking to control a ,
he will invite a rightist take- sufficient number of provincial
over. capitals. 7
, If he makes concessions to r Reliable sources said that #
i right, he runs the risk of . possibly the Reds are continu-
ibringing down more Commu- . ing to improve their new rein--
nist attacks on Laos. forcement routes to Cambodia.
i, Souvanna previously made and South Vietnam,
concessions to the rightists fol- Meanwhile, military sources
0owing the fall of another pro- reported that a Lao air force
hArincial capital, - Attopeu, ip T28 divebomber was downed i
Llta:, '.-:L.,.,...i.................,..i...L...... over Saravane and its pilot f
was killed. i
i
A U.S. Air Force light air-
craft reportedly was badly
damaged by ground fire at
Saravane.
The Saravane airstrip is lit-
tered with bodies of Lao de- '
fenders. U.S. ground combat:
teams conducting trail recon-1,
naissance near Saravane were.
:.not attacked. ,
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?
STATI NTL
Approved For RelaltsTe121201103104?:: etAilitOP80-016
9 JUN 1970
f
; CIA cover in Laos reported
Washington
The United States Central Intelligence 1
Agency uses the U.S. foreign-aid program
as a cover for its operations in Laos, U.S.!
foreign aid chief John A. Hannah said in an
Interview. "Certainly, our preference is to .`
get rid of this kind of operation," Mr. Han-
nah said, adding that Laos is the only place
where the program is used in such a way.'
'SI ,
?ft
. t.
"si
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1 CU:W.-LAND, OHIO
PLAIN DEALER
M - 409,414
S - 545,032
JUN 0 Op
ecrecy Strains U
?
By secret agreement the United States
hs paid $200 million in four years in order
to have Thailand send a 10,000-man combat
di,Vision to fight as an ally on the side of
',?'4S4tith Vietnam,
This was abruptly disclosed in Senate .
?
?
,Fbreign Relations,Commitee testimony Sun-
',-(14y. At the same moment Dr. John A. Ilan-
?n6h, head of the 'Agency for International '
DeVelanent, ?,er AID, embarrassedly con-
The Thais are, determined to remain in-
dependent and noncommunist. But time and ?
again, Red Chinese leaders proclaim that all
' Indochina will become, country by country,
communist peoples' revolutionary
sphere.
? -- ? ,
' Without aid from the United States, nei-:
.i.',ther the Thais nor il,aotians any more than
?
'Sbuth Vietnainese can withstand the deter-
mined.China-backed and .Soviet?supPlied
?drive to overturn t..their :present govern-
H ?n his AID mission in Laos's us , s ? ,
nts .4
cl? 'agents. 'as ..a. cover for their spy
. , ,.,
'
?
Secrecy is needed, of course, in the big
inernatiOfl game of power poker. But how
/Witch- secrecy ?, Should President Johnson
lnive taid . open' the U.S.-Thai agreement
wheipitp was made in 1967? Or Would that
have, butt the :lilies, or tipped off the enemy
stielyn 'big military surprise?
,?Nmegjeans have become wary of diplo-
matic-, secrets which lead to military in-
' vOlvernenfs. Americans would tolerate a
gOod deal of secrecy if they could feel more
ccirifident'of their ? .leaders in the White
Hose; Pentagon and State Department.
I hatonfidence 'dwindled as' commit ?
yietnaiii from 1965 on.
shock a'en P r e d e et Nixon suddenly
nients ',..rirew deeper and losses gr-t,w heavier
r,Tintreonfidence stiffen(' altiother severe'',
marclicttAmerida into Cambodia. Not just
tlie;plaimcitizens were jolted by this widen-
ing .,o% t.lik War. Even Mr: Nixon's own partY',
i? leaders en Capital IliR Were taken aback.,:,
!Whatevg became Of Mr. Nixon's pledge Of
"fl openogerr '
:N9w-46Y9rY,new..e'CPPSUrCOri agree-q
mini, not passed : upoirby congress, notdis-I,
etiseirbef0re;.ihe vuhlitt'iAtis$1. sqapiel?
51r 0,k 1,,,.1.:1,1?44
If Mr: Nixon's 'Guam doctrine is to be-
come realized, so Southeast Asia can defend
' itself, Arnerican money and arms will have:
. to be coniributed. ,
Those countries cannot go it alone.
,1 Their , nu'versaries aren't. going it alone.
Their adversaries from Vietnam to Burma.:
bve help from Red China and Russia.
Therefore U.S. help will be needed, and
'agreements will be negotiated between
American mid Southeast Asian diplomats.
That should not surprise anyone: America
,is not an isOlationist country, and it has oh-
, ligations in the area.
What is needed is more openness. Our
. objections stern -from the worry of Amen-
cans, that hidden ngreeinents lvad to deeper
, commitments, commitments that take
America further than the people expected.
True, the President should not be forced
to lay, open his hand in the global poker, ;
game. But if he is to count upon Congress')
and the citizens to back him up, he Must
inform them them and consult with thein as open,Iy as:
, he can, and never give them the feel- t
1,:jag.that they have been euchered into a War,
41)ey don't fully believe In Or ,understand
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June 9, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL ..RECORu? SliN AT
Commander in Chief. Without question, The issue is no different today than it be applicable to Cambodia. There is n
the President, has a responsibility to pro- was then. On the day following the Sen- doubt in my mind that the prohibitio
tect U.S. troops in ?Vietnam?and no ate's action the junior Senator from concerning Laos could have been ex
doubt he will do so. Ile does not need a Michigan said: tended to Cambodia as well?if the spon
mandate from the Congress for this pur- . The intent and the plain meaning of the sora had only thought that there w
pose. Thus, the amendment of the Sen- amendment ultimately ntlopted by the Sen- even a remote possibility that U.S. troops
ator from West, Viltillift is both super- ate yesterday was to reaffirm the existing role might be sent into Cambodia.
mid existing policies of the United States On May 8, President Nixon told the ?
iluous and unnecessary. with respect to Thailand and Laos. American people that? '
The point that Senators should bear
h
in mind is that the Senate has consti- And he went on tO say that?
What we've also accomplised (in Cam-
tutional responsibilities also?both in the Following a meeting with the President bodia) in that by buying time It means that
making of foreign policy and in deciding and others at the White House this morning, If the enemy does come hack into those ?
sanctuaries, the next time the South Viet-
dentwith the amendment, and he recognizes that '
I mil report that the President was pleased
how public funds are to be spent. Presi- namese will be strong enough and well
Nixon, as a former Member of this it is In accordance with his announced trained enough to handle it alone. .,
body, knows that very well. I remind my policies. The Senator from West Virginia's '
colleagues of what he said in this Cham- ?
ber last November 13 during a short visit The President saw no need then. for amendment would have the Senate go
to the Senate: I, a provision concerning the protection of beyond the President's own stated inten-
I find, looking back over this period of American troops in South Vietnam. The tions, by giving him our consent in ad-
time, that this administration has been sub- sanctuaries just across the border in Laos vance to going back into Cambodia after
jected to some sharp criticism by Some Mem- have been expanded since that amend- all.
hers of this body, both from the Democratic ' ment passed and the Administration still If the Senator's amendment were ap-
side and from the Republican side. I want has seen fit to follow the restriction laid proved and the Cooper-Church amend-
the Members of this body to know that I un- down by the Congress. ment subsequently adopted, the Senate
derstand it. I recognize this as being one of would have said, on the one hand that
the strengths of our system, rather than one I ask unanimous consent to have'
of its weaknesses, and I know that, in the printed in the RECORD, following my re.. we should get out of Cambodia and stay
end, out of this kind of criticism and debate marks, a statement by the junior Seri-
out and, on the other hand, that we
win come better policies and stronger poll- ator from Michigan that appears on page really do not mean it?that the Presi-
oles than would have been the case had we 01 nonn e .4-1-.
..11,70V0 01 ......e CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for
simply had an abject Senate?or House of
1December 16, and a news article from
Representatives, for that matter--simply ap- the New York Times fOr December 17,
proving whatever !dens came from the exec-
utive branch of the Government. 1969, covering that event.
This does not mean that we do not feel The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
very strongly about our proposals when we objection, it is SO ordered.
send them here. It does mean that I, as a (See exhibit 1.)
former Member of this body, one who served Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, what has
in it and who presided over it for 8 years, been the experience under this restric-
recognize this great tradition of independ-
ence and recognize it as one of the great tion? Secretary of Defense Laird told a
'
strengths of our Republic. subcommittee of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on May 18 that?
We in the Congress have been derelict
far too long in placing adequate re-
straints on the executive branch in the
commitment of our men and dollars
abroad. As Senators we should concern
ourselves primarily with seeing that Con-
gress carries out its responsibilities, not
with the duties of the President. We
should worry, not so much about pre-
' serving the President's powers which he
I have been one who has been Insistent
all along that we live up to this particular
amendment, and the rules of operation that
were In existence at the time this anhend-
ment was adopted are the same rules, that
aro being followed today . . . the rules (are)
tied to the protection of the (South Viet-
namese and American) forces that are en-
gaged In those (Laos-South Vietnam) border
areas with the enemy : . this amendment
bus not endangered the lives of American
will faithfully uphold?let there be no soldiers in Vietnam . . . protective mac-
doubt about that?but preserving our tion which I nm referring to In Laos hixe
own. This debate should be focused, not to dp with our air interdiction campaign, .the
on whether this proposal ties the Presi- rescue of survivors, and also has to do with
dent's hands?it does not?but on
on-going combat operations within South' whether it will help to untie the knots Vietnam.
.. ?
by which CongrCss has shackled its own The Secretary went on to say that Use
powers. The Cooper-Church amendment of American ground combat troops or
is a step in righting the imbalance in our American advisors with South Vietna-
system. While the Senator from West mese forces on an attack upon the ter-
Virginia's aniundinent would not add to ritory Laos for the purpose of de-
the President's legal or constitutional stroying a sanctuary "would certainly
powers, it would have the practical effect not be in accordance with the amend- ?
of tipping the scales of political power ment which was passed by the Congress
even further toward executive domino,- last year." ?
tion. Thus the Secretary of Defense found
Passage of this amendment would also that the Laos-Thailand amendment,
be a retreat from the principle estab- pased by the Congress and signed by
lished by the 80 to 9 vote of the Senate the President?without restrictive la,n-
last year, which prohibited the use of guage on protecting American troops?
American ground troops in Loss or Thai- did not endanger the lives of the troops,
land. No Senator raised a question during since it does not prohibit minimal actions
the debate on the Cooper-Church amend- across the border defined by the Presi-
ment last December concerning the need dent as "protective reaction." But, it did
to spell out the President's authority to prohibit in Laos, without the prior con-
protect our forces. I remind my col- sent of Congress, the type of action that
leagues on the other' side of the aisle was undertaken in Cambodia.
that the language of that amendment ? The principle' that was approved so
was Worked out in consultation with, and overwhelmingly by the Senate last De-
was' fully endorsed by, the White House. cember as applicable to Laos should also
dent cap go back in whenever he chooses.
Instead, Mr. President, of taking a his-
torte step in the process of beginning to
restore the Senate to the role the Con-
stitution intended, we would have acted,
not like a great forum, but like a fudge
factory, and rendered the Cooper-Church -
amendment so largely meaningless that ,
it would then be questionable whether
we should proceed to adopt it, in its
modified form, at all.
I say to the Senate in all sincerity that
the adoption of the Byrd amendment
would blow a hole in.the Cooper-Church
amendment large enough to drive a whole
new war through, without the President ,
ever having to return to Congress for
authority or consent.
In summary, Mr. President, the pend-
ing amendment would repeat the errors
of the past and give the President a blank-
check to go back into Cambodia. It would
tip the political balance of power still
further in favor of the executive branch.'
And it would fly lin the face of the Sen- -
ate's action on Laos only 8 months ago.
I hope that it will be defeated.
. .
Emory
THE BIPARTISAN AMENDMENT
TIM PRESIDENT'S POSITION
THAILAND
Mr. Gramm% Mr. President, particularly In
the wake of Vice President's Ant.rrw'ri criti-
cism of some of the "Iowa media, there has
been considerable discussion of, and fOells
upon, the objectivity of news reports. It will
be recalled that some particular concern WAS
Indicated earlier with .respect to the New
York Times and the Washington Post.
Although I hesitate to single out these
particular newspapers again, I wish to indi-
cate my considerable displeasure with the
coverage this morning in both the New York
Times and the Washington Post of an action
that took place yesterday on the floor of the -
Senate.
A headline in the Washington Post this
morning reads, "Senate Acts To Curb Asia
Role." The story under that headline refers.
to the amendment cosponsored yesterday by
-the Senator from Idaho (Mr. Cnoneff) and '
the Senator from Colorado (Mr. Amorrl re-
lating to policy with respect to the introduc-.
tion of United States combat troops in Thai-
land and Laos.
IN SUPPORT or
ON LADD AND
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?
STATINTL
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9 JUN 1970
Truth breaks out
? Little by little the truth about Washington's involve-
ment in Indochina is' breaking out of the straitjacket of
official secrecy and lies.
The admission June 7 by Dr. John A. Hannah, direc-
tor of the Agency for International Development
.(USAID), that the U.S. aid program is a cover for Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency operations in Laos points up
President Nixon's failure to mention CIA operations in
his March 6 statement about Laos. ?
Undoubtedly Nice-President Agnew and other admin-
istration alibi artists will find words to explain this
lack 'of candor by the President of the United States in
his statements to the American peOple.
It will be more difficult, however, to rationalize the
outright lying about Washington's barbarous extermina-
tion bombing of Lao towns and villages.
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STATINTL
.K A".?:SAS CITY,
1 ST Alt
\ E ? 325,351
? S ? 396,632
.,11.1 fitl 9 14 7
Aid Will Suffer Froin That Cit.A. Tie t
The fact That the . S,,,e,conomic aid program
in Laos is a rOei or tli0,/inaireing of clandes-
tine SIA military Ativities in that Southeast
Ascan country may have been an "open secret"
for years in the embassies and among the press
corps in Vientiane. But that does not lessen the
damaging reaction that official acknowledge-
ment is likely to provoke, at home and especial-
ly among aid-recipient countries'.
Dr. John A. Hannah, head of the U. S. Agency
for International Development, says that he was
aware of the situation, inherited from two previ-
ous administrations, and considers it unfortu-
nate and unwise. The decision to end the decep-
tion, however, is not his.
All major countries (and quite a few smaller
'ones) find the maintenance of an intelligence
network one of the unpleasant necessities of get-
ting on in. the world. Spying is an unpopular
. business. The covert involvement in political
, and military affairs of other nations is more un-
popular still: But that, alone, is not a rational
case against the CIA. What sometimes amazes
! the agency's friends and foes alike is its propen-
sity in recent years for getting presidents and
the State department in embarrassing public
JAMB.' .
m?.
For the U. S. aid program, already a victim of
declining congressional and public favor, the 1;
embarrassment could be deeply damaging. Han- I,
nah said in an interview that the Laos situation
is unique?that it is the only country in which U. ;
S. foreign aid is being used as a spy-agency
front. How does he know? How do we know?
How do the countries receiving aid know? It will '
apparently have to be taken on faith.
In many of the more sensitive capitals in Lat-
in America, Africa and Asia, this country's ene-
mies make a profession of seeing U. S. subver-
sion lurking as the Motive behind every loan for 1
development?even behind the activities of the
U. S. Peace corps. The propaganda has had ef-
fect. Instead of gratitude, these programs now '
ioften are met with rancor and suspicion. Which,
n turn, makes the task of maintaining consist-
ent domestic support for them more difficult.
The Laos revelation is bound to stir new in-
nuendo, and American diplomats abroad' can
expect to be asked for assurance that all is
above-board in the local U. S. aid office. It
would be remarkable indeed if all of them 'w-
aged to make themselves believe& The credibil-
ity of the program has been compromised. ?
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STATI NTL
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THE KANSAS CITY STAR
9 June 1970
Aid Will Suffer From That CIA Tie
The fact that the U. S. economic aid program
In Laos is a cover for the financing of clandes-
tine CIA. military activities in that Southeast
Asian country may have been an "open secret"
for years in the embassies and among the press
corps in Vientiane. But that does not lessen the
damaging reaction that official acknowledge-
ment is likely to provoke, at home and especial-
ly among aid-recipient countries,
Dr. John A. Hannah, head of the U. S. Agency
for International Development, says that he was
aware of the situation, inherited from two previ-
ous administrations, and considers it unfortu-
nate and unwise. The decision to end the decep-
tion, however, is not his. "
_ Al] major countries (and quite a few smaller
, ones) find the maintenance of an intelligence
'network one of the unpleasant necessities of get-
' ting on in the world. Spying is an unpopular
business. The covert involvement in political
7 and military affairs of other nations is more tin-
popular still. But that, alone, is nota rational
case against the CIA. What sometinihs amazes
the agency's friends and foes alike is its propen-
sity in recent years for getting presidents and
the State department in embarrassing public
jams.,
For the U. S. aid program, already a victim of
declining congressional and public favor, the
embarrassment could be deeply damaging. Han- ;
nah said in an interview that the Laos situation g
I s Unique?that it is the only country in which U.
S. foreign aid is being used as a spy-agency
front. How does he know? How do we know?
How do the countries receiving aid know? It will
apparently have to be taken on faith.
In many of the more sensitive capitals in Lat-
. In America, Africa and Asia, this country's ene-
mies make a profession of seeing U. S. subver-
sion lurking as the motive behind every loan for
development?even behind the activities of the
U. S. Peace corps. The propaganda has had ef-
fect. Instead of gratitude, these programs now
often are met with rancor and suspicion. Which,
in turn, makes the task of maintaining consist-
ent domestic support for them more difficult.
The Laos revelation is bound to stir new in-
nuendo, and American diplomats abroad can
expect to be asked for assurance that MI is
above-board in the local U. S. aid office. It
would be remarkable indeed if all of them man-
aged to make themselves believed. The credibil-
ity of the program has been coMpromised.
t. ? 4 A, I. ?
-tyt"7'
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WANSF ()In)
NEWS JuLia:IAL
E - 37 , 3,)6
S
JUN 9 1970
Another Brigand'
In the Tent
THE MORE Americans learn
, about the secret aspects of the In-
r dochina war, the less savory it be-
comes.
Just now we find out about a
epact signed back in 1967 which
used U. S. tax dollars to pay Thai-
,
',land $20,000 per soldier for 10,000
Thai mercenaries who served in
Vietnam.
That fee included training, equip-
F ping, and supporting the men as
: well as paying them a bonus if
.they lived te complete their foreign
0?r. service.
t:- This was nothing short of paying
!
..? Thailand to participate in the war.
L. The fact that it was kept secret in-
dicates both the Pentagon and the
White House ? and no doubt a
'-number of members of the Con-
1. 'less ? felt the hiring of merce-
naries would not be approved by
I
the American public.
* *
r: EQUALLY TRICKY was the use
that it has become an agency de-
vising and carrying out phases of 11
foreign policy that actually have
little relationship to espionage. The
CIA acts as a separate and secret
force carrying out projects the ene-11
my probably uncovers but which
are reported to Americans only
when someone stumbles on them. ,
* * *
IF OUR government has for
three years been secretly hiring
mercenaries and using the foreign
aid program as a spy cover, whatl,
else has been going on that we ,.
know nothing about?
There was the Green Beret exe-
cution. Then came My Lai. Efforts
had been made to conceal both af-
fairs.
No doubt much of what has gone
on in Thailand, Laos, and Cambod-,
ia financed by U. S. dollars is pub-
licly unknown. Maybe it never will
be known. Maybe it's better for
American consciences that it isn't.
of the Foreign Aid Program to coy-. The people of this nation are not,
er up spying operations by the CIA children. They know war is grim
Laos. --"'"fland grubby. They know the mach-
Activities of of the CIA repeatedly nations behind it are often per
demonstrate the danger of giving fidious. They tend to accept it as
an' agency a quantity of money to better than blowing up the world
with hydrogen bombs.
spend without having to account
fit. Several years ago the CIA But the sad fact is that with an?
was discovered to be subsidizing the secrecy and money and the'
r college students in activities ques- open killing and wounding we have
tionable enough to be stopped when not been able to win the Indochina
the facts were revealed. war. Nor would it be worth any-
Spying is a part of war; it has to thing if we did win it
go on even in times of peace. It has/ We squeeze a few Communists
STATI NTL
the ultimate story of all Southeastl
Asia.
Unless we want to subdue it and I
occupy it permanently, which we
have no int4ntnion of doing, we
ought to get kit, taking our smelly
mysteries with us.
The Communists are probably
playing a far more false and vi-
mous game than we. But the an-
guished jest is that if they won,
they wouldn't win anything either. -
Moscow and Peking, sleeping un-
der the same Marxist tent, can
deal with each other only on terms
of suspi( ion and fear. A Red con-
quest of Southeast Asia would put
?another brigand in the tent hailing
- ?
from _ "Hanm,
14 1411 r
/10 11
41 dn."
1111 141i1 till II)
11.1 I ,mlititt..1 I 1,1-1, WI,
pl.1) III .i I.ii 11.,,i I I ? ..11.1 (1
? Ili], 111-1, 1?(il Hit
, 14, ,I jJ
.to be accepted. It has to ,be secret. , out of Cambodia like water out of a . ,i., \ ,,,Joid, I .411 1 W. ' , 'ILI 1
- It has to be paid for. - - s. - Sponge. The President declares a1
,t.,i.?,,.:
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._
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VI MAI FLA.
NEWS
E - 93,53S
;t4Tr4"47,737/77,MP ,r/ /4',f710,-/fg,
-"" ? 'Y 41% /4'17; //'
4 '
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? (141.
- ? ,*".? ?
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POST
E 708,180
JUN 9 1970
..,,,,SRPM111, ?r-
STATINTL.
Tales of Indochina
1. VIP HOUR IN CAMBODIA
Naturally eager to impress the
visiting memberil of,the?President's.
Indochina "fact-finding" team, U. S.
. officers in charge of one,Sambodian
sector staged a camouflage demon-
stration for the VIPs, last Sunday. It
was really no contest; they were deal-
ing with experts in concealment.
' Not that the Army men didn't try
hard. They ordered haircuts and
shaves for the sweating, bone-weary
GIs on the "Shakey's Hill" firebase
and saw to it that new uniforms were
Issued to some. Shirts and steel hel-
mets were donned as directed, despite
the steaming jingle heat. Cake and
cookies were baked and, as a special
exhibition of concern for the visitors'
comfort, a new latrine was constructed.
The piles of captured ammunition
were duly inspected, the precision of a
fighter-bomber raid on a nearby hill
was politely admired. And before long, ?
with final smiles and handshakes all.
around, the White House delegation de- ?
parted, They are now enroute home
where, with the possible exception of
one or two skeptics, they are expected
to? testify that the Cambodia operation
was a military masterstroke. The GIs
on "Shakey's Hill" were well aware that
a &Lap fraud was being committed.
How many Americans will be misled
into believing that the White House
task -eorce is really to be believed?
2. FOUND AND LOST DEPT.
'r WASHINGTON, June 8 (CDN)? and now has risen again, to 133;121.
They've invented a new game at the
? Pentagon which might be called the
"Cambodian Cache Game . . ." The re-
? ported totals for [captured' antiair-
craft rounds are also bouncing around.
k At one time, the total in official reports
-reached almost 160,000. But a few
tiaYs later it dropped back to 127,000?
,
?from yesterday's news pages 't
* *
The proposed name for the game is
not bad, but perhaps, in view of the
skillful deception and shiftiness re- ,
quired to fake artillery ammunition
figures, it could just be called the Old
Shell Game.
3. THAILAND'S BONUS ARMY
Since the official announcement last
week from Bangkok, there has been
some uncertainty, as tO why "volun-
teers" from Thailand would be willing
to enlist for military duty in Cambodia.
The explanation may simply be that the
pay is better.
Take the case of Thai volunteers in
Vietnam. Their base pay, as ascertained
by a Senate Foreign Relations suborn-
mittee in secret hearings last fall, ranged
from $26 monthly for a private to $98
for a major to $379 for a lieutenant
general?all at the expense of the Thai
government. But there were also much
more rewarding "overseas" allowances
?$39 per mouth, additional, 480 and ,
?
$450 for the three ranks respectively?
furnished entirely by the United States.
Beyond this, according to the sub-
committee hearing t r ans c rip ts just
released, a secret agreement between
Washington and Bangkok specifies that
Thai officers and men be provided ra-
tions, quarters, transportation, ammuni-
tion, death or disability benefits and
mustering-out pay by the U. S. The
cost to date: more than $200 million.
Ili the' circumstances, it is easy to
understand why Thai fighting men.-:
might be eager 'for the Cambodia earn-
paign?and why investigating Senators
are demanding to know what further
deals have been, made '
!,.?111441.?l*VC 4 11
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4. UNVEILING IN LAOS 1
The subcommittee also pursued
further inquiries on Laos. The heavily
censored transcript cited one report that
" 5000 Thai troops; were engaged there
"disguised in the uniform of the Royal
Laotian Army." More recent data indi-
i cates a more elaborate masquerade;
;Administrator John A. Hannah of the
U. S. Agency for International Develop-
ment has just publicly conceded that
the Central Intelligence Agency's opera- ' quently confounded by the CIA's
tives pose as AID ,staff In s. The ,sittliols legions ?
44W
r, ?
- -
Senate might find that disclosure worth 1
exploring at greater length?regardless 1
of Washington's apparent assurance /
that it has the best Asian allies money
can buy. If it has taken this long tb ob-
? tain acknowledgement of thearJA,?pres- ?
enee in Laos, who knows what other
surprises are still being held in re-
-serve? Sadly enough, it is the Amer-
ican people who seem to be most fre-
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RALFIGH, N.C.
NEWS & OBSERVER
M ? 130,652
S ? 148,247
.JU! 9 1970
So Many Ways In
America's clandestine en-
Aanglement in Laos and her
secret, troop deal with Thailand
- became matters of settled, fact
' over the Weekend. They form`
,. a most instructive lesson on
how to mire up in Southeast
Asia, and they indicate .how
very difficult a true extrication
is going to be.
Given a choice of several
alternatives for involvement in
? a foreign conflict, most citizens
undoubtedly would prefer the
. direct method followed in Viet-
- nam. We began with "advisers"
and went on to place hundreds
:of? thousands of -soldiers there.
.It has been tragic involvement,
but at.least it has been visible.
It Will not be as intricate to
unravel as some of the snarls
elsewhere.
For instance, we got involved
in Laos , in a way nobody was
supposed to know about. Using
, the Agency for International
Development as a
smokescreen the CIA has been
. training, fighting,'" sometimes
? dying on the side of Premier
Souvanna Phouma in what is
'basically a Laotian civil war.
Yet, when President Nixon ad-
dressed the nation in March
concerning Laos, he didn't
mention one word about this
CIA venture. Now that Foreign
Aid Director John Hannah has
- confirmed what long was
suspected, our negotiators in
Paris will just have to reconcile
as best they can their previous
claims about our respect of
Laotian neutrality, .and the
manner in which we have
-violated it. .
It is hard to tell which party
could,. get in more hot . water
from the Thailand deal ? the
U. S. or Thailand. The corn-.
mitment of Thai troops to Viet-
nam was supposed to be eviden-
ce of great enthusiasm for U.
S. policy in Southeast Asia. But
it was canned enthusiasm, cos-
ting us an estimated $200
million. Furthermore w e
bought it at the risk of weaken-
ing Thailand's native defenses, ?,
at the same time inviting North
Vietnamese wrath upon a na-
tion getting into the fray on
the U. S. side.
It must be said .on President,
Nixon's ,behalf that these"
dangerous. deals were made
before he took office. But he
has become a party to them
by helping to keep them con-
cealed. And that gives him all ?
the more responsibility for
sparing us the possibly
disastrous consequences a
these deals by getting us out 1
of Vietnam, out of Cambodia, ,
out of Laos, out of Thailand ?
? in short, out of Southeast
Asia. Withdrawal should be
feasible within months ? not,
years. And it ought to proceed; ;
at a pace accelarated enoug4
to prove that complete -- not
partial? withdrawal is, indeed'
the President's goal.
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STATI NTL
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1111.
SAN ANTONIO, TEX.
EXPRESS
M - 78,032
EXPRESS-NEWS
S - 117,132
JUN 9 1973
AID as Cover on
Only the Naive
If anybody believes Foreign Aid
Chief John A. Hannah, no harm's
done. Hannah, Agency for Interna-
tional Development ad;ministrator. for.
nearly a year, said he was displeased
to learn that the CIA was using AID
as a cover in Laos, a neutral country
by legal deanition.
The Central Intelligence Agehey
has been blamed . for many things,
some of them rightly so, bui intelli-
gence-gathering (spying, if you pleaSe)
is a part of the necessary work in a
world in 'open conflict that is fre-
quently deadly dangerous to the coun-
try without good intelligence.
If AID was a good cover, give our
people some credit for resourceful-,-
.
????=0..it
American Spying?
ere Surprised
t.
ness . . . assuming the Cl."A ?vork was .
deemed necessary for (Tiinesit in ter-
ests . (and a lively debate erupts on
that score occasionally). For. many .
years, foreign aid was mainly military.
Presid-ent Eisenhower tried hard to ;
get Americans to think Of it in terms
of "mutual assistance," but few could
find very much of a "mutual" nature
in it. If it covered intelligence opera-
tions in the tense, treacherous coldest
part of the Cold War, then there might !
have been a bit of mutuality about it.
The relevant point today is wheth-
er our government is adequately mon- ;
! itorin.g the involvements of intern-
j gence agents for appropriateness and
effectiveness of their information gath-
ering and commitments abroad. Ideally
our diplomatic missions would handle
intelligence operations but the nature
.` of some of our involvements precludes
,that.
- It is a disconcerting fact that the
program we advertise as humanitarian
helpfulness has masked the work of
our spies. We assume that most of the .!
host countries were sophisticated -
enough not to be surprised. -
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WASHINGTON
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9 JUN 1970
The CIA and2 foreign? aid
ANY country running a big-league for-
eign policy has "clean" and "dirty". ac-
tivities overseas. The trick is ?to keep
them separate so the second does not
rub off on the first.
Dr. John A. Hannah, head of our for-
eign aid program, has officially dis-
closed that agents of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA) are posing as aid
workers in Laos.
This regrettable practice started un-
der President Kennedy in 1962 and con-
tinued under the Johnson and Nixon Ad-
ministrations. Dr. Hannah would like to
"get rid of this kind of operation," and
Mr. Nixon would do well to free foreign
aid from association with espionage and
clandestine warfare.
Unlike professional CIA-baiters, we
do not quarrel,with the operation itself.,
1
STATINTL
At great personal risk, CIA agents have
?been recruiting and training anti-com-
munist guerrillas, observing enemy
movements and acting as ground con-
trollers for air strikes. Their activities
are in response to North Vietnam's ille-
gal invasion of neutral Laos and its'
threat to South Vietnam.
What we object to is the foreign-aid
cover for the operation. The U.S. aid
program and the Peace Corps are two
to this country's most idealistic, unself-
ish efforts. The Communist bloc- has
long recognized them as such and has
sought to discredit them. Now, by mix-
ing aid with secret-agentry, we have
foolishly given the Kremlin a stick to
beat us with.
Do CIA agents really need a cover in
Laos? In Vientiane every newsman,
communist diplomat and barkeep
seems to know what the CIA is up to. If
the agency insists on a story, they could
claim to be scientists studying "the sex
habits of .elephants or the life style of
? opium smugglers.
?14
This would be as believable as and
less harmful than, calling them rural de-
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? tt.4-co,'..,iti:trt.r.qt
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8 JUN 1970
All Chief
Admits Tie
with CIA
' Washington, June 7 UP)--John
A. Hannah, foreign-aid "chief,
acknOwledged today. that the
United States aid program is
being used as a cover for. cen-
tral intelligence agency opera-
tions in Laos. He said Presi-
dent Nixon may propose divorc-
ing such intelligence work from
overseas ?economic assistance
in the future.
"Well, I just have to admit
'that that is true," Hannah said
when asked' if the program of
his agency for international de-
velopment is being used as a
cover for. CIA operations in
. Laos..
Appears on Radio Program
Hannah was questioned on
the Metromedia radio news
program Profile.
CIA and 'other United States
activities in Laos were inves-
tigated recently in a Senate
inquiry headed by Sen. Stuart
Symington it)., Mo.] but it is
rare for an executive branch
official to acknowledge publicly
that his organization is being
used for undercover work
Hannah was questioned on
the Metromedia radio news
program Profile.
CIA and other United Slates
activities in Laos were inves-
tigated recently in .a Senate
inquiry headed by Sen. Stuart
Symington D., Mo.] but it is
rare for an executive branch
official to acknowledge publicly
that his organization is being
used for undercover work'
abroad.
Nixon spelled out United
States aid to Laos in a March
6 statement which did not men-
tion the CIA. United States ac-
tivities there had previously
been kept hush-hushr.to avoid
impairing the Vietiene govern-
ment's neutral status.
Hannah made plain he disap-
proves of the CIA's use of his
agency. He said Laos is the
only place this is being done,
and that .it stems from a 1962
decision that such activity was
in the national interest.
Hopes to Shed Program
"Certainly, -our preference is
to get rid of this kind of opera-
tion," he said.
Hannah said he is sure that
Nixon will include such a rec-
ommendation in the foreign-aid
reorganization ideas the Presi-
dent plans to present soon for
congressional discussion.
"I hope it is going to be in,
the new aid legislation once
that is submitted," Hannah
added.
Hannah generally favored
abroad, splitting economic foreign de-
Nixon spelled out United velopment activities from
States aid to Laos in a March' "these political-military opera-.
6 statement which did not men- tions" which he said "ought to
tion the CIA. United States ac- be handled, by theltate depart-,
tivities there had previously Nment and the defense .depert,fri
been kept hush-hush to avoid I'ment.. ,
impairing the Vietiene govern- ' ' '
ment's neutral status.
Hannah made plain he disap-
proves of the CIA's use of his
agency. He said Laos is the
only place this is being done,
and that it stems from a 1962
decision that such activity was
in the national interest.
Hopes to Shed Program
"Certainly, our preference is
to get rid of this kind of opera-
tion," he said.
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STATINTL.
STATI NTL
INTL
June PR riMed For
:t
loses money" is a subjective Interpretation
of some old, over-g,eneraltzed figures that the
Post Office Department has publicly declared
to be obsolete and invalid. Postmaster Gen-
eral Blount hes stated on numerous occasions
that Third Class Bulk mall is a desirable,
positive contributor to the economic effi-
ciency of the postal operation. This state-
ment is supported by the Department's Reve-
nue and Cost Analysis report issued on
April 6 of this year. The report shows that
revenue from Third Class Hulk mail exceeds
its handling cost by 98% whereas the revenue
from First Class mail exceeds its respective
handling cost by only 85%. The same report
also shows that Third Class Bulk is the most
profitable major class of mall handled by the
Post Office.
To go a step further, Assistant POStITISSter
General James W. Hargrove stated on April 13
of this year that, If Third Class Bulk mail did
not exist, then the 290 million dollars in gross
profit which it produced in fiscal 1069 would
have had to come from some other source.
Ho added that there are only two alterna-
tives for 'that other source'?either a con-
gressional subsidy or an increase in First
Class postage rates.
With these thoughts in mind, I certainly
hope that you will reconsider your present
position on this subject. When I served as
? one of your county chairman in the 1068
Senatorial Campaign, I had complete con-
viction of your unquestioned integrity, ob-
jectivity. and tireless effort to seek out and
weigh all of the facts before acting on any
issue. I'm sure that this personal involve-
? ment with your past efforts tends to heighten
my awareness and concern in regard to some
of your more recent activities. However, I
certainly hope (and must assume) that these
inconsistencies do not represent your con-
sidered personal position but are simply
over-zealous campaign efforts which were
produced by well intentioned supporters.
' The voters of Iowa's First District right-
fully look to both you and your opponents
for information and interpretation on vital
issues. I am sure that you constantly strive
-.to fulfill this obligation in the most straight
? forward and unbiased manner possible and
? hope that the information which I have of-
fered will be of assistance to you in this
effort. Enolosed you will find some further de-
tails which may be of interest in exploring
the subject of Third Plass postal economics.
Sincerely,
MIKE MCSWEENEY.
U.S. POLICY IN LAOS STRENGTHENS
THE COMMUNISTS
HON. DONALD M. FRASER
11-5 i 0- /) :f17i .
has become the only viable indigenous
political force capable of providing
leadership for thousands of dislocated
and poverty stricken pea.sants.
I ask, Mr. Speaker, is this the course
the President will now take in Cambodia
after the withdrawal of U.S. troops on
June 30? If so, he must be warned that
Indiscriminate bombing, use of chemi-
cals, and other forms of massive civilian
destruction create the social conditions
which invite resistance and the growth
of communism.
? The excerpts from the four articles
follow:
WASHINGTON'S DILEMMA
(Hy Arnold Abrams)
Ironically, those most in the dark about
Laos are the American people. More than
simply being unaware of the scope of U.S. .
operations here, th .? have yet to be told by
their government that their nation is mili-
tarily involved in Laos. American officials
still seek to officially conceal U.S. violations
of the 1002 Geneva Accord, which bars all
forms of foreign military intervention in
Laos. They contend that Hanoi's refusal to
concede the presence of North Vietnamese
troops here makes It diplomatically unfeasi-
ble for Washington to act otherwise.
Consequently, everyone in Vientiane, from
the Russian ambassador to the mama.san of
the legendary White Rose, knows what the
Americans are doing here. But the American
public remains ignorant of the fact that
their government is arming, training, sup-
plying, transporting and directing approxi-
mately 70,000 Laotian troops in a war which
threatens to get out of hand.
Instead of setting the record at least'par-
tinily straight, U.S. officials here do things
like allowing Vang Pao to declare recently,
before a sizable contingent of visiting journ-
alists, that his Moo forces light with an-
tiquated weapons, inadequate communica-
tions and inconsequential American sup-
port. As he was speaking, American 1'-4
Phantom jets roared overhead, several Amer-
OF MINNESOTA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, June 8, 1970
Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, in the
midst of public concern over President
Nixon's invasion of Cambodia, we must
not forget the quiet war of escalation the
administration has been conducting in
Laos throughout 1969 and 1970.
I wish to bring to the attention of the
Congress excerpts from four articles from
the Far Eastern Economic Review which
describe how Vietnamization, a reduc-
tion in U.S. ground troops in Vietnam,
has resulted in an escalatory use of
weapons of mass destruction in Laos.
As these articles point out, massive
devastation of civilian life and property
has drastically altered the fragile politics
of neutrality in Laos. The Pathet .Lao
early days of Vietnam.
government's late-summer offensive.
"These guys are tigers," nays an American
personally acquainted with many CIA
agents in Laos ."They're tough, intelligent
guys who know how to handle themselves.
They're not afraid to mix it up out in the
jungle." The American is a civilian engineer
who befriended many agents while helping to
build airstrips on several of their, remote
outposts. "They came to Laos because they
were fed up with having their hands tied in
Vietnam," he says. "Here they're doing things
the way they want to, and getting better pay
for it as well."
An important CIA adjunct in Laos has the t/V ?
innocuous title of "Requirements Office". It is
staffed by about 00 men, most of whom also
are ex-military types. Their function may be
inconspicuous, but it in not innocuous. Sta-
tioned at field level, requirements officers--
called ROs?handie the distribution of arms
and ammunition, as well as general logistics.
They are vital to any military operation
mounted by the government.
Learning about these activities prompted V
Senator Fulbright to raise a key question
about the CIA's role here: since its function
ostensibly is to gather information, why is
this agency running a war in Laos? "I don't
approve of this kind of activity at all," Ful-
bright said. "But If It is in the national se-
curity interest to do this, it seems to me it
ought to be done by regular US army forces
and not by an intelligence-gathering agency."
He added that the National Security Act,
which created the CIA. "never contemplated
this function" for the agency.
The CIA mission chief in Laos is Lawrence
Devlin, listed as a "political officer" in the
US Embassy. Unlike most political officers,
however, Devlin flatly refuses to see reporters.
For all anybody knows, he might agree on
that last point with Senator Fulbright, who
stressed that he was not criticising the the
CIA. "The agency is just following orders,"
Fulbright said.
Cargo and military supplies?as well as
personnel?are ferried throughout Laos by
Air America and Continental Air Services,
WRA
private charter firms under contract to the
ICSII observation planes were parked nearby
US government. They are better known as
and three cargo-laden American transport
planes landed in quick succession at his of-
the "CIA Airlines", and most of their pilots
ficial Sam Thong base. After denying he
are ex-air force officers. Reporters are allowed
.
even received indirect U.S. military sup-
to accompany flights involving rice drops to
port, Vang Pao calmly climbed into an un-
refugee camps, but are banned when military
marked American helicopter, guarded by cargoes are carried.
Laotians carrying American-made M-16 au- "Why do you guys always ask about weep-
tomatic rifles, and was flown back to his se- ,ons and ammo shipments'?" pilot Jim Walsh
cret Long Cheng headquarters by a three- asked me. Walsh, 38, is an ex-air force officer
man American crew. .. who has worked in Laos for Air America since
Vang Pao and official verbiage notwith- 1962. "You know we're not allowed to talk
standing. American involvement in the La-
about such things," he said.
otian conflict takes the following principal Another form of American air service in
forms: In addition to 76 military advisers Laos constitutes the most direct US involve-
listed as embassy "attaches," about 300 men ment in the fighting. Under the euphemism
are employed in a variety of clandestine mill-4 of "armed reconnaissance flights", Thailand-
tary activities supervised by the CIA. Al based American jets and bombers have
though technically civilians, many CIA mounted aerial bombardments equal to the
agents in Laos are former Special Forces . pounding taken by North Vietnam prior to
soldiers recruited because of military ex- the bombing halt in 1068. The Ho Chi Minh
'
pert's? and Vietnam experience. trail in southeast Laos has been the prime
These ex-Green Berets train government target of American air attacks, but enemy
troops, assist wide-ranging reconnaissance ' encampments and troops on the Plain of
teams and plan guerrilla and psychological ' Jars came under heavy fire during the recent
warfare operations. They wear combat fa- government offensive,
tigues and work out of three main camps, Money for many US operations in Laos is
where they administer rigorous training in cloaked in the budget of the mammoth
jungle warfare, guerrilla tactics, communica- Agency for International Development, or
Hone handling and weaponry. channelled through other unobtrusive con
The CIA also maintains and largely con- , duns. The scope of American financial sup-
trots yang Pao's army of approximately 15,- port of the neutralist Royal Lao government
000 fulltime troops. Officials instructions to testifies to the effectiveness of such cover.
the contrary, CIA personnel occasionally fie- Total American assistance here is reliably
company these forces no combat forays. More estimated at between IIS $250 million and
than 20 agents have been killed In Loos. 11300 million per year. Of that, only the tech-
Among% tho most recent CIA casualties was nical aid budget?about $00 million?is made
Phil Werbisky, a former Special Forces cap : public. The rest, undisclosed, goes almost
lain widely known for his exploits during the entirely for military purposes.
?
?
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Iti7 =ICI=
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8 JUN tio
Of ficial Confirms
Aid Unit Conceals
C.I.A. Role in Laos
WASHINGTON, June 7 (AP)
?Dr. John A. Hannah, director
of the Agency for International
Development, acknowledged to-
day that the United States aid
program was beihg used as a
cover for operations of the Cen-
tral Intelligen9c Agency in
Laos.
He said President Nixon
might propose divorcing such
Intelligence work' from over-
seas economic assistance in the
future in proposals on foreign-
'aid reform to be sent to Con-
gress.
"Well, I just )ave to admit
that that is true," Mr. Hannah
said when asked if his agency's
economic aid 94, being used as
a cover for C.I.A. operations in
Laos." He was questioned on
the Metromedia radio news pro-
gram "Profile."
Mr. Hanah made it clear that
he disapproved of the C.I.A.'s use
of his agency. He said Laos was
the only country in which this
was being done and that it
stemmed from a 1962 decision
that such activity was in the
national interest.
Central Intelligence Agency
nrovision of logistical support
'for the neutralist Government.
, in Vientiane was reported in
the nast. and Senator J. W. Ful-
bright, the Arkansas Democrat
who is chairman of the Foreign,
Relations Committee, has ac-
cused the C.I.A. of exceeding
Its authority in supporting
United States military activi-
ties in Laos.
Mr. Nixon described United
States aid to Laos in a state-
ment March 6 hut did not men-
tion any Central Intelligence
Agency role.
? It is unusual for in execu-
tive-branch official to acItnowl-
idee publicly that his organi-.
Zatietri is ,being ustto1 for 1rd
Lcoye work ,abroad.: i
Associated Press
REVEALS C.I.A. ROLE: Dr.
John A. Hannah, foreign
aid director, disclosed use ,
of program as a cover for
intelligence work in Laos.
STATI NTL
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BA"..=It, N.C.
TIMES
E ? 25,17C)
Juni, 3 ig7t)
More Reasons to Get
Two developments reported in this morn-
ing's newspapers emphasize the importance
1 of America getting out of Southeast Asia
- at the very first possible moment.
One was the revelation of a secret agree-
ment with Thailand, dated Nov. 9, 1967,
under -which the United States has paid that
country more than $200,000,000 to send up
to 10,000.troops to fight in Vietnam.
The other was revelation of the fact that
ioperations in Laos. '
the U. S. aid program ' has been used as
a. cover for Central Intelligence Agency
?
The payment of $200,000,000 to Thailand
for sending its troops into Vietnam un-
derscores the lonely role America is play-
ing in. that Indochina war. If Thailand had
been heart-and-soul convinced of America's
role there, It no doubt would have sent
its troops there without such heavy payment
for what seems to be mercenary troops.
On March 6, President Nixon spelled out ?
U. S. aid' in Laos, but didn't mention the
CIA. The heavy involvement of the CIA
in that country can only .underscore ?the
widening circle of American problems ,in
Indochina.
' President. Nixon undoubtedly;will keep
: ?
suit Now
his promise to have American troops out
of Cambodia by the end of this month.
But, during recent days, South Vietnam off i-'
cials have made it perfectly plain that they "
will do in Cambodia just what they please., '
If they keep their troops in that country,'
American will be in the continuing position
of having to be ready to bail them out
at any time. And, American air power and '
American supplies will have to help them.
These developments simply make plain
the fact that Southeast Asia is a bottomless
pit so far as American presence there is
concerned. The first mistake was becoming
involved in what really was a civil ?war
in all of Vietnam. Another mistake was
attempting to fight a traditional military
war in a perfect setup for guerrilla warfare.
Still another mistake was the constant Ameri-
can military escalation, seeking a purely
military victory. That just hasn't worked.
President Nixon has begun American with-
drawal. The sooner he can accomplish it
completely, the better off ,America will be.
Until it is accomplished in full, there- will ,
be the-terrifying danger that the involvement 1
in the bottomless .pit will suddenly become ,
greater and greater. '
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3
Approved For RitisaaranitiO13/1110414A-ROMMV RO
8 June 1970
? *
FOREIGN AID is being used as a cover for
CIA operations in Laos, Hannah conceded.
President Nixon may propose divorcing
such intelligence work from overseas econpmic
assistance in the future, according to John A.
Hannah, head of the Agency for International
Development. Hannah made plain he disap-
proves of the intelligence aggitcy's use of AID,
saying, "Certainly, our preference is to get rid
of this kind of operation." Appearing on Metro-
media's "Profile," Hannah said Laos is the
only place where such activity is under way,
Nixon didn't mention the CIA in a
March 6 statement on U.S. aid in Laos. But
CIA activity there was aired in a Senate
Inquiry headed by Sen. Symington (D., .
1110.
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Approved For Release 2001,6NRIGMAIMP80-01
8 JUN 1970
stATINTL
ID Confirms Its Use
As CIA Cover in Laos:
By William N. Curry
Wanhiriston Post Stott Writer
' The head of the U.S. foreign and it Is the only place in the
aid program confirmed raster- world that we are." .
day that CIA agents use the He said, "We have had peom. ,
civilian aid mission in Laos as ple that have been associated .
a cover for anti-Communist with the CIA and doing things
operations, much to his dis- in Laos that were believed to
pleasure. - be in the national interest but
i But he asserted that Laos not routine AID operations.
,"is the only place in the "Our preference is to get rid
>world" where CIA operatives of this kind of operation."
masquerade as field workers Previously, the aid agency
of the Agency for Interna- has declined to comment on
tional Development (AID). published reports that' CIA
w AID Administrator John A. agents pose as AID rural de-
illannah, asked if the CIA uses velopment workers but ac-
,the mission in Laos as a cover, tually recruit and train anti-
bald: "Well, I just have to Communist guerrillas, detect
. admit that this is true. This enemy movements and act as
was a decision that was made ground controllers for air
'back in 1962 and by adminis- strikes.
Arations from now until then,
Approved For
The 1962 Geneva Conven-
tion declared Laos a neutral, "places a high priority" on the
country. foreign aid program and ex-
Hannah's remarks were'. pressed hope that the Senate
made on the. Metromedia
radio, news program "Profile."
Hannah said he hopes" the
cconnection between the two
agencies could be eliminatedl
lin a proposed revamping
AID. The separation was one
recommendation of a recent,
task force that studied
. "I am sure that it is going to
be in the president's recom-r
?
mendations for discussion," he
i
said. "I hope it is going to bei
in the legislation once that Is-'
submitted."
Hannah conceded that the
AID role in Laos, plus its war.!
related activities in Vietninh,1
"might" have an adverse afl
feet on the AID programs to
other nations. "It certainly has;
not helped . . : It distorts the:
role of AID," he said. But he;
defended the original deci-
sions to involve AID as being!'
correct when they were made
In 1962.
d_ to trai n Soutk_
Hannah, was president of
Michigan, State Universityl
ReleaSVIMINIM/64" : iAu
-RP80-01601 R000700030001-4
...,?te4/1
JOHN A. HANNAH
... defends '62 decision
Vietnamese police officers for
the. Ngo Dinh Diem regime.
The program turned out to be
run, ly:the CIA.
Hannah, who joined AID in
1969, said President Nixon
will i restore recent, House,.
,made cuts .in'AID's budget re!:
1:tue st for-,Abe,;, coming fiscal
year
rtAsnriiv.obi
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Agency is 'Cover' for CIA
hi aos,,Aid Che'5.Coifirms
The director of American aid
operations has confirmed that
his agency has been used as a
cover for Central Intelligence
Agency agents in Laos.
"Well, I just have to admit
that that is true," said John A.
Hannah, director of the Agency
for International Development,
when asked yesterday on televi-
sion about recurring reports of
CIA use of his organization in
Laos.
For months the correspondent
of The Star in Laos, Tamm
Arbuckle, has been reportin
that CIA agents pose as 4ID
officials on the ground to recruit
anti-Communist guerrillas, to
transmit intelligence on enemy
force movements, and to act as
ground control for air strikes
against enemy installations.
H nah's was the first official
nfirmation.
"Associated With the CIA"
"We have had people that
have been associated with the
CIA and doing things in Laos
that were believed to be in the
national interest," Hannah said
yesterday on the Metromedia ra-
dio news program "Profile."
He said the decision was first
made in 1962 for Laos, and that
such use of AID personnel is
now confined to Laos. He also
made clear his desire to end the
relationship there with CIA.
"Certainly," he said, "our
preference is to get rid of this
kind of operation. He added that
he thought President Nixon will
include such a recommendation
on splitting foreign economic aid
operations from "these politi-
cal-military operations" in his
promised message to Congress
on reorganizing the aid pro-
gram.
Military-Aid Link
The administration has al-
ready admitted using the AID
;mission in Laos to cloak its out-
right military aid to the Laotian
government. The transcript of
hearings last October before the
Senate Foreign Relations sub-
committee on U.S. security com-
mitments, released April 20, out-
lined how a "special deputy"
was set up in the AID mission in
the embassy in Laos to coordi-
nate U.S. military contacts with
the Laotian army and air force:
Hannah said yesterday that all
these "political-military opera-
tions ought to be handled by thel
Stale and Defense Departments
rather than through aid under ?
whatever name."
Asked if the economic essist-
JOHN A. HANNAH
ance program in Laos had been
hurt by U.S. military operations!
in Indochina, Hanah replied
that "it certainly has not
helped."
The AID director also noted
that drafting of specialists in his
agency for a year's duty in Viet-
nam had hurt his operations all
over the world. He said he wou:d
"welcome" separation of the
Vietnam operation from the rest
of AID duties.
"Increasingly, with Vietnami-
zation, more and more of what
AID will be doing." he said,
"will be legitimate aid and less
and less of it will be the kind of
thing that we shoull not be
doing."
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 pompom.' -4
ELMIRA, N.Y.
STAR?GAZETTE
D ? 51,075
TELEGRAM
S ? 55,644
JUN 7 IWO
/ Awaiting White House action is a task force report on ;
the U.S. Agency for International Development AID which
recommends, in so many words, that aid no longer boa 7'
front for CIA and other military-political operations in
foreign cola rig. An AID economic adviser just back from
Laos says he and other advisers saw the dozens of CIA -
agents assigned to AID, but actually carrying out political
and military missions In the field. The cover is fine for the
CIA, but it badly damages' AID's eredlhity and usefulness.
he said. '
- :'?
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CIA Reportedly. Maims
Its Dead on Lao Patrols
By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star
VIENTIANE ? Bodies of
American Central Intelligence ?
Agency operatives killed in
. ground combat operations in
.,northeast Laos are maimed as
. much as possible to prevent
'.the North Vietnamese from us- .
ing them as tangible proof of ,
t U.S. ground presence in the
= area, well informed Lao
sources say.
"The Americans have or-
ders they must not be cap-
tured.? If they are killed, other
. members of their patrol put a
, grenade on their face or shoot
'them up with their machine
; l,guns till they can't be recog-
nized," the sources said.
There are 10 American corn-
? mando teams of 8 to 10 men
each operating in northeast
Laos? the sources said. The
teams operate behind North
. Vietnamese lines.
Encounter Laotians First
"When the North Vietnamese
? launch a big attack, they come
. against the Laotians first. The
Lao escape around the flanks
? to the rear leaving the North
Vietnamese facing Thais or
Me? tribesmen," the sources
, said. "American and Thai
teams infiltrate the rear, hit-
ting enemy headquarters and
communications."
The Americans and Thais
operate from a small, secret
I and tightly guarded airfield
near the U.S.-supported guer-
rilla headquarters at Long
Chien, 75 miles northeast of
here.
There are now 1,800 Thais,'
including i artillery and infan-
trymen, n northeast Laos op-
erations, according to the
sources.
U.S. soncces refuse to say
how many ,Americans are in-
volved in hie military opera-
tions.
Sources Become Edgy
They become extremely
edgy when asked if the num-
ber of American military per-
sonnel in Laos has increased
since the U.S. Senate subcom-
mittee hearings on Laos last
October,
? Lao military sources say a
further increase in U.S. mill-
tary aid is coming.
The United States is being
, asked to supply helicopters
? and U.S. crews for a new
"elite" airmobile unit to be
formed from Lao paratroops
and other units.
The Lao request follows a
worsening in the over-all mili-
tary situation here.
"Militarily, the Lao are in
the worst position they have
ever been since 1964," reliable
sources say.
In northern Laos, the Plain
' of Jars is ringed by North Vi-
etnamese units offering a tight
.defense against the guerrillas.
The North Vietnamese still
are 'pressuring the guerrilla
bases at Long Chien and Sam
Thong and are to launch new
attacks when the monsoon
rains begin, probably this,
month. ?
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04 f CIA-RDPs8pA9H9jR0
MT. VERNON, N.Y.
1 ARGUS
1 E - 19,256
JUN 5 1979
Washington Marginalia
WASHINGTON (GNS) ?
Don't hold your breath waiting
for final congressional approv-
al of the Nixon Administration
though already passed by the
House, it probably won't make
It through the Senate before
'next year. Administration
'sources say they are running
Into serious problems rewrit-
Ing it to meet objections from
the Senate Finance Committee
that it isn't comprehensive
enough.
Awaiting White House action .
is A. task force report on the
U.S. Agency for international
Development (AID) which re-
commends, in so many words,
That AID no longer he a front
for CIA and other military-po-
litical operations In foreign
countries, ,An AID economic
adviser just back from Laos
says he and other advisees
never saw the dozens of CfA
agents assigned to AID, but
actually carrying out political
and military missions in the
field. The cover is fine for the \
testing the Cambodian inva-
sion, and all addressed to the
"Hon. Sam Rayburn." Not
only was former Speaker Ray-
urn a Texas Democrat, but
he has been dead for nine.
years. Hunt got the letters be-
cause the Post Off ie Depart-
ment forwards improperly ad-
? dressed mail to the congress-
man representing the place on
the postmark.
The defeat of Gov. David F.
, Cargo in the Republican State
primary in New Mexico is a
? ' mixed blessing for the Admin-
? istration. White House political
strategists had favored con-
servative Anderson Carter,
hut concede the liberal Cat-go
would have been a stronger
candidate against Democratic
Sen. Joseph Montoya,
In Mississippi, where Demo-
cratic congressional candi-.
dates inevitably run unop-
posed, Rep. Charles H. Griffin
will have a Republican oppo-
nent in November ? Dr. Al-
,
bort Lee 36. ear-old h -
CIA, but it badly damagcs P Y
si( Ian and leader in the 'Mis-
s': sippi private school move-
ment, .Lee makes it clear that
his hopes rest on the populari-
ty in the South of President
Nixon and especially Vice
Preiident Agnew, whom he
praises unstintingly.
'S credibility and useful-
ness, he said.
Former President Lyndon
Johnson apparently is still
smarting from the rough re-
:views his recent television ap-
pearances were given. Visiting'
1 here last week; he told friends
' he was working on a hook and,
although it won't be finished
: for months, "I've already re-
ceived six unfavorable reviews
of it."
When Supreme Court Justice
Potter Stewart last week voted
: exactly the opposite as he had
eight years before on a labor
decision, he took refuge in a
1 quotation from the late Justice
Felix Frankfurter; "Wisdom
too often never comes, and so
one ought not to reject It
rn er el y because it comes
' la te." From Ithe bench,
84-year-old Justice Hugo L.
' Black quipped ;that if Stewaft
had become wiser with age, he
Sen. Lee Metcalf, old foe of
the utilities, inserted in the
Congressional Record a list of
priyately-owned power compa-
nies and their "percentage of
Profit." Ills point: they're
making enough money, don't
need rate boosts. However,
many would quarrel with the
Montana Democrat's figures,
They list net profit as a per-
centage of gross income; rnost
state regulatorS, the utilities
themselves, and people famili-
ar with ordinary business
practices would figure profit
as a percentage of money In-
vested, 'a much lower figure.
?
Sen. Charles .E. Goodell,
?abad done it "inconspicuously." -
1 R.-N.Y., appears to' be pulling
becaust he didn't look any old-
er.
Students may know how the
Vietnam War should be re-
solved, but ,they don't knoW
how to reach their congress6
mane Rep. John Hunt, 11-Isf.j.,
received nine letters from res.
idents Approved otp-
-hack from his proposal to al-
low' preventive detention of
certain dangerous criminal de-
fendants. Goodell, hest known
for his views against the Viet-
nam war, put in the proposal
as part of his law enforcement
Drogratti. Instead of appealing
to the law-and-order people
however, it has only angered
some of. the Suspicious liberal
whose votes he has been court-
ing.
Clarence McKee, Sen. Jacob
Javits' staff expert on hunger
and nutrition, is making a po-
litical bid of his own this
spring. McKee, 27, is running
for the board of trustees of
I Hobart and William Smith Col-
lege in Geneva, N.Y., and try-
ing to become the first black
alto/inns, as well as the first
under 30, to get elected. A 1965
graduate of Hobart, WO* b.
roes from iSeottsville, near
Rochester.
elease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
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OSSINING, N.Y. '
CITIZEN-REGISTER
E ? 9,179
JU 1970--
WASHINGTON MARGINALIA
idents district, ail pro--,
WASHINGTC)N (GNS) ? of his themselves, and people famili. whose votes he 'has been court-1
Don't hold your breah t waitng
i b?striug the Cambodian inva-
sion, and all addressed to the ar with ordinary business dn.
' for Ting eongressiond approv. ?Hon. Sam Rayburn,- Not practices would figure profit
al of the Nixon Administration only wa's dormer Speaker Ray- as a percentage of money in- Clarence McKee, Sen. Jacob I
Javits' staff expert on hunger
Family Assisianee Plan. Al- burn a Texas DCMOCrnt, blet V C , a mue ower gure. and nutrition, is making a po-
though already passed by the yes c h 1 ft litical bid of his own this
Rouse, it Probably won't make he iras been dead for nine
years. Hunt got the letters be- , Sen. Charles E. Goodell, spring. McKee, 27, is running ?
it through the Senate efore
; RN.Y., appears to be pulling for the bohrd of trustees of
b
next year. Adanantstratann 411 P t Of flee Depart-
sources ism they are running
into serious problems remit-
ing it to meet objections from
the Senate Finance Committee
that it isn't comprehensive
enough.
Awaiting White Kouse action
is a task force report on the
U.S. Agency for Internationed
Development (AID) wallet.' re.
commends; in so many words, ;
that aid trio longer be a front
for-Cal....?and other military-po-
Meal operations in foreign ,
countries. . An AID economic
adviser Just back from Laos
says he and other advisers erotic congressional condu.
dates inevitably run lump.
never saw the dozens of CIA posed, Rep. Charles H. Griffin
agents assigned to AID, buit will have a Republican oppo.,
actually lcarrying out political neat in November ? Al-;
\and military missions in the ily:(rt Ray Lee, 36-year-old phy-\
field. The cover is fine tfor the , , sician and leader in the Mis- ,
CIA but it badly damages sissippl private school move.
ness, he said.
AID's credibility and useful-
, Former President Lyndon
Johnson apparently ls still
smarting drom ithe rough re-
views his recent television ap-
pearances were given. Visiting
here last week, he told friends
he was workimg Oa a. book and, ?
although it won't be finished
for months, "I've already re-
cetived six unfaverahde reviews
Of it."
; When Supreme Court Justice making enough money, don't
; Potter Stewart last week vottrxi need rate boosts.' However,
f exactly the opposite ns Oind , many would qunrrel with ?tho
eight year. before on a labor Montana Democrat's figures.
; decision, he took reltigiot a They list net profit as a per.
quotation frean Rho late Justice , centage of gross income: most
',. Felix Frankturtert "Wisdomi state regsltypsrs, tho
I too ofteri never comes, and ?
r one ictught, not to reject It
merelybecause it comes
itate,'-' Prom 'the bench,
84-year-o1d Jusitiee Hugo_L.
rnack quIpd tilitfirgiewarT
Pralrbecome wiser 'with age, he
; had done tilt "Ineonsptcuously,"
beearusc he didn't &oak any old-
, er.
? Students may know bow the
Vietnam War should be re-
Waved, iYut they -don't know
how Oa reach (h&c congrese.
Man.
icecethred
. back from his ? proposal to al. Hobart and William Smith Col-
.
ment tfatwards improperly ad.
low preventive detention of lege In Geneva, N.Y. nd try.
dressed mail to the congress.
certain dangerous criminal de. ing to become the first black
man representing the place on
fendents. Goodell, best known [alumnus, as well as Ur first'
the postmark. for his views again.st the Viet- under .30, to get elected. A 1905 1
The defeat of Gov. David F. nam war, put hi the proposal graduate of Hobart, McKee 410i, .
primaryCorgo in itnh eNew Republicanm e x tco Stateis
,
as part of his law enforcement mes from Scottsville, near
mixed blessing for the Ad mi program. Instead of appealing Rochester.
n.
to the law and-order people,
islration. White House political however,
it has only angered ,
strategists had favored con-
eppe,,,g.tkie suspicious liberals ntry BONDS Milldijitt.Y.,,
servative Anderson Carter,
but concede the liberal Cargo
would have been a stronger 1
candidate against Democratic {
Sen. Joseph Montoya.
In Mississippi, where Demo. ;
ment. Lee makes t clear that
his hopes rest on the popularl.'
ty in the South of President ,
Nixon and especially Vice
President Agnew, whom he.4
praises unstintingly.
Sen. Lee Metcalf, old foe of .14
'the utilities, inserted in the
Ciongressional Record a list of j
. privately-owned power compa.
rdes and their "percentage of,
loofa." His point: they're
?
iii
tit t'? 11, tit
1;tit
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June 4, 1970
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE
Our foreign assistance program was
instrumental in spreading the Green
Revolution across the fields of the needy
nations. But the job is nowhere near
finished .There is still much hunger in.
the world.
The initial task of helping to provide
the fertilizer, pesticides, seeds, irrigation
and know-how must continue. But the
Green !Revolution is also taking on new
directions. High-yield varieties a rice
and wheat have helped boost overall
food production in the developing coun-
tries by 14 percent in Just 3 years, As a
result, new problems of grain storage
and shipment have emerged. The boun-
. tiful harvests have tended to benefit large
landholders more than the subsistence
farmers.
There is an additional problem. When
we talk about hunger, we are not talk-
ing about starvation alone. Relatively
few people are presently starving to
death, but one person in every five in
the developing countries L malnourished.
The result is people physically and men-
tally below par?unhappy people who
are unable to contribute fully to the de-
velopment of their countries. One of the
pillars of our aid program is research
into ways to provide the kind of protein-
rich food to minimize malnutrition, This
program has helped develop the corn,
soya, milk blend known as CSM, which
eased the suffering of victims of the Ni-
gerian civil war. The program also
helped develop WSE, a wheat soy blend
of high protein content. U.S. foreign aid
is financing research 'at the University
of Nebraska which seeks wheat varie-
ties which will contain more of the amino
acids essential to a health diet. Already
almost 11,000 wheats have been tested
out of an expected total of 17,000. Re-
search is also underway to find strains
of corn which will supply similar basic
dietary needs.
This research, solutions to the new
problems resulting from the very suc-
cess of the Green Revolution, and the
escalation of the revolution itself de-
pend in large measure upon our foreign
aid program. It is up to us to see that
the program is not emasculated.
Mr. Chairman, the bill before the
House is not , entirely adequate to meet
the needs and challenges of helping
ourselves through help to developing
countries, but, the funds which it will
make avallable are important toward
that end and I urge its passage by the
House.
Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, I
urge a closer look a this bill which
comes before us as a foreign assistance
appropriation. I refer specifically to the'
$350 million for military assistance and
$272,500,000 for foreign military credit
sales in titles I and II of H.R. 17867. An
examination of the committee report
does not reveal much, but a study of the
hearings held earlier this year brings out
some alarming evidence of the uses to
which these funds will be put
In testimony on American military Ac-
tivity in Laos, Defense Secretary Laird
claimed that our policies have not
changed for the past # years. Re further. .
explained: ? r
/ want to Make It clear we are not send-
lug combat troops to Laos. We have a to-
tal of approximately military per-
tiOnnel litLAOS. They are nerving there an
military attaches and ea military personnel
who give military assistance. They rtro mili-
tary assintants to the Royal Laotian Forces,
Secretary Laird went on to place
the total number of U.S. personnel, mil-
itary and civilian, in Laos at 1,040.
Mr. Chairmen, I recently sent two of
my staff members, one of whom was a
military adviser to the Royal Lao Army
in the early 1900's and the other a re-
gionn,1 director of the U.S. AID refugee
i/rograin, on a 10-day inspection trip to
Loos. They reported back to me that at
least half of the Air Force's 48,000 men
now stationed in Thailand arc directly
Involved in air strikes over Laos, and that
an unknown number of 'U.S. military per-
sonnel are assigned to Laos on 'tempo-
rary duty" from military base in South-
east Asia. Air America carries personnel
and arms throughout Laos, American
pilots are served as forward? air control-
lers, and other American pilots fly mis-
sions over Laos from carriers in the South
China Sea and from other Southeast Asia
bases.
. Mr. Chairman, these observations con-
firm that the administration is fully
committing American personnel to the
war in Laos and keeping the facts care-
fully concealed from the American peo-
ple. The subterfuge of reporting a mili-
tary unit as being assigned to Vietnam
when it is actually operational in Laos
can only be called a massive deception,
one more example of executive usurpa-
tion of the congressional prerogative to
? declare where in the world American
Drilling men shall be committed, These
activities are largely carried on under
the auspices of the CIA, and theiftet that
many of our military "advisers", operate
In civilian clothing instead of khaki does
not lessen the implications of a massive
American involvement in Laos.
Furthermore the estimated American
air sorties over Laos are now placed at
approximately 900 a day, seven times the
level of 2 years ago, at a cost of billions
of dollars to the American taxpayers.
Since the administration by design re-
fuses to disclose the exact costs of our
?Laos involvement, as well as the com-
mitment of American troops, it becomes
our role in Congress to turn back foreign
military spending bills like this one until
we have a full and complete disclosure
" as to where this money is going and
why.
Furthermore, Secretary Laird testified
before an Appropriations Subcommittee
on March 10, 1970, that to the best of
his knowledge there had been only one
American military assistant killed in
Laos to that date. If it is indeed true
that this is the only combat death that
the Defense Secretary knows about, then
we must ask by what authorization and
by whom is this clandestine war being
waged. We must ask why the facts can-
not be revealed to the American people.
We must insist on being told what inde-
pendent warmaking body exists within
the executive branch of our Government.
The pertinent information is either
deleted from the hearings, or It Is not
? ??
II5123
being presented to Congress, and yet we
n,re expected to go on giving blank checks
for military ventures without any con-
gressional scrutiny rts to the implica-
tions for our foreign policy vis-a-vis
Southeast Asia. This has been the sorry
story ever since our tragic and seemingly
endless intervention in Indochina began,
and it is finally time for us in the Con-
gress to stand up and nay "The buck
stops here." If the American people aro
to be denied the facts about our foreign
policies, then it 13 indeed a gorry day for
representative democracy in this coun-
try. This appropriation bill and all others
with military funds should be defeated
until a full accounting is made to the
Congress and to the American people.
Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Chairman,
yesterday the House passed legislation
to raise the ceiling on the national debt.
I opposed this proposal because / be-
lieve what this Nation needs is sound fi-
nancial management, not just more debt
piled upon our existing indebtedness.
As of the first quarter of 1970, the na-
tional debt totaled approximately $373
billion, an $11-billion increase over last
year. The annual interest on this amount
will cost the taxpayers $18 billion.
To facilitate economic recovery Con-
gress should cut unnecessary spending
rather than raising the public debt. This
is the surest route to national financial
health.
Today, Congress has the opportunity
to facilitate economic stability not by in-
creasing tax liabilities, but by decreasing
Federal spending. It can do this by re-
fusing to appropriate additional money
for foreign aid this year. This would not
e fatal to our foreign aid program; it
ould, however, help flush out the for-
eign aid pipelines. Presently, in addition
to the requests for authorizations and
appropriations, there is approximately
$18.5 billion left from previous years
lying unspent M the pipelines. These
funds fall M the following general cate-
gories:
Unexpended balances in pipeline iirom prior
years for selected at programs
Foreign assistance (mutual
security) 34, 450, 360, 000
?
Export-Import Bank, uncom-
comitted borrowing au-
thority 4, 464, 200, 000
Export-Import Bank, long-
term credits 3, OW, 000, 000
Export-Import Bank, Regular ?
Operation 346, 100,000
Export-import Bank, Expan
Mon Program 102, 200,000
Inter-Amerierm Development '
Bank 2, 250, 404, 000
Military Asaistance (in de-
fense budget) 1,030, 000.000
Public Law 480 (agriculture
commodities) 861, 420, 000 '
Permanent military con-
struction overseas 448, 000, 000
Foreign Military Credit Sales
Fund 408, 215, 000
International Development
Association 360, 000, 000
Asian Development Bank? 140, 000,000
Overseas Private Investment ?
Corporation 136, 600, 000
Peace Corps 27. 157. 000
'Education exchange ? 20. 706, 000
International military head-
quarters
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DAILY 'CORO STATINTL
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4 JUN 1970
ur quesillonson
By JOHN PITTMAN I "As to the current relation-
ship of forces, the enemy is on
(This is the third of a series the defensive, although he is
of reports based on a lact-findingeounter-attacking fiercely in an
and gc"c'd will visit to th? "Pr- effort to change the balance.
cited areas of Laos, April 28- ?On April 16, our forces put
May 5, by a World Peace Coun- out of action General yang Pao,
cif delegation that included the the American-trained commander
author.) of its 'special forces' puppet
A LIBERATED: AREA troops. We understand yang Pao
' is hospitalized at Udon Thani,
Laos, April 29 (By air- Thailand, the main headquarters
mail) ? After a few hours.fival which the American im-
sleep under mosquito nets Pe
rialists direct the aggression
in this cave, the World st s' - . to restore and reinforce the feu- operations.
On April 24, our forces dis
Peace Council delegates ' dal strata, to monopolize Lao
imegrated seven battalions of "The Vientiane administration
these prepare for a briefing on '-...,:?:-.ial forces' at Sam Thong, trade and prevent the develop- has no control over an
ment of Lao economy, to sow forces. They take yrs o se
solely
the situation of Free Laos. hi:: they escaped to Van Viang orders sole
We breakfast on omelet, and Pak Sane, Our recent vie-dissension and hatred between from the U.S. headquarters base
toast and coffee in time tory in the Plain of Jars putour three main ethnic groups in Thailand. Royal Army troops
a 6,000 puppet 'special forces' out and our 68minorities, to pollute are used mainly for police work
to greet Sisane Sisan, our .culture with pornography and in the Vientiane-controlled areas.
f blow
and dealt a decisive
member of the Lao Com- blO e enemy. But the U.S. trivia, and to set up so-called The so-called 'civilian' ady's ers"
_mittee for World Peace. 'imperialists are carrying out'prosperity zones' and 'refugee take orders from the U.S. lE
A gracious, patient and round-the-clock bombing with B- camps' holding one-fifth of the bassy in Vientiane, not from the
Lao , population for forcibly im- Vientiane administration."
imperturbably cheerful man 52s in this entire area. ressing out young men into the The WPC delegates ask more
' "In brief that is the -currentP
c at. such an unreasonable
- military situation." speak of theen into brothels. ?
puppet army and our young worn- questions, but since we are now
hour in the morning, Si 2. When you
long past the lunch hour, Mr.
sane is the father of sev- 'enemy' whom do you mean? .."Fourth, the U.S. Imperialists Sisan suggests that wep ut these
en, an intellectual and "American imperialism in the alone have blocked and sabotaged off until another day, have lunch,
scholar, director of the ra- \first place. But also the compra- every agreerrient reached between and begin an on-the-spot survey
dio and information ser- dore and feudal elements whom dVientlane and our side to sit of some of the accomplishments
the U.S. imperialists have in_ own and negotiate a settlementof people's power in the liberated
vices of Free Laos, a play- 'stalled in the Vientiane regime. of the Lao question. In doing this areas. ?
wright and composer of And of Course the armed forces U.S. 'imperialism has violated-
songs. He is widely tray- and political cadres carrying out the 1954 Geneva Agreement
eled and speaks 4 fluent their orders ? including 12 Thai which it did not sign, the 1962
battlions, remnants of the Chiang Geneva Agreements on. Laos
Kai-shek troops, Japanese so-
French. We set upon him which it did sign, and the most
0
with questions. called 'aid' forces and Saigon elementary principles of interna-
1. - ?
1
What is the pre puppet troops. tional law." -Sent situation 4. Official U.S. sources deny
in Laos? "Up to last November there
"At present the liberated areas were 147 battalions of puppet Americans are involved in com-
form two-thirds' of the country and mercenary troops operating bat, yet you say they are. What
with one-half of its population of against us, about 60,000 men. But are your grounds for such a
roughly three million. That is after they were continuously de-
statement?
to say, people's power is estab- feted by our forces, President "We consider our information
lished in 638 of the country's Nixon has. reinforced and greatly reliable. We know that at least
,1,200 U.S. Green Beret officers
strengthened them."
1.078 villages and probably now and men are actively directing
In 8,620 of its 13,063 hamlets ?
3. Why do you consider Ameri- and participating in operations
can imperialism, rather than the
mostly in the Jungles and ,moun- of the so-called 'special forces.'
.Vientiane compradore and feu-
tains. ine U.S. imperialists con In addition, no small part of
trol through the Vientiane ad.dat elements and their Royal the U.S. Airforce personnel in .
ministration one-third of the coun?Army and mercenaries, the main Thailand are directly involved.
try with half of the population,enemY? ' And we have grounds for believ- I
mainly in the plains and deltas, "First, the U.S. ? imperialists' E U.S. Airforce personnel in i
f--- and with 1,235,000 of the coun.provide all the arms, equipMent n-
'South Vietnam, Okinawa, Guam
for paying the enemy gel-
k try's 1,729,000 acres lot arablemone7 and the Seventh Fleet are alsoi
, . ..?,. , ' , ?dbers, supplies and training for
participating hi bombing attacks ,
on Lao . ? _ , _ _ i
La. (os lairDsvi -cred
all the armed forces attacking "Besides these combat forces,
the liberated areas. They draw severai thousand Americans are
up the plans for the attacks,
provide the logistics and give engaged in indirect combat, that
is, in activities directly supple-
the orders. menting the military operations.
"Second, the U.S. imperialists These include 2,000 trainers of
are using American personnel as the 'special forces.' 200 person- /
nel for the CIA's'' Air America
tacks, and are solely responsible and Air Continental and the
v
,
well as Asian forces in these at-
for the bombings and wanton de-3,000 Americans working in
struction of our country.USAID and USIS, the agencies
"Third, the U.S. imperialists'
for ecohomic and psychological
are using their so-called 'devel- warfare. Even the 101 Peace
opment aid' to expand and also.coros people perform duties di-
strengthen the compradore strata, rectly connected with military
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. Special Sup
1; ?
-? ?
iNoam Choinsky
?
:. . , .
. i
!.inevitable ' concomitant, toward harsh begun in May, 1964, and the intensive.
* , repression and defiance of :law 'at bombardment of North and South
' home. . ; -. .. . . -. ' Vietnam that followed in February;
' 1965, make use of bases in Thailand,
South Vietnam, Okinawa, the Philip-
pines, and Guam, not to speak of the
naval units that control the surround-
ing oceans. The control center for the
i bombing of North Vietnam and North-
In Laos is in Thailand. presumably, at
..,../ti
Udorn airbase. In 1968, the bombing ,
, .
' of Laos greatly increased in intensity,
, when . aircraft formerly emplc,y(.'::
-against North Vietnam were shifted
the bombardment of Laos. In 1969, !
the- bombing of Northern Laos was .
again greatly. intensifitd as infiltration r
fell off on the so-called "lb Chi Minh !
? Trail." Most of this area has long been .
' under Pathet Lao control. - -
As a glance at the map makes clear,
the bombing of Northern Laos takes,
In 1947, commenting on the rising Ride The invasion of Cambodia by the
of "anti-Communist" hysteria in the United States and its Saigon subsidiary?
! United States, John K. Fairbank made comes as no surprise, in the light of
the following perceptive .observations:, recent events in Southeast Asia. Since
1968, the United States has steadily
' Our fear of Communism, partly as escalated the war in Laos, both on the'
an expression of our general fear? ground, as the CIA-sponsored Clandes
of the future, will continue to' tine Army swept through the Plain of
inspire us to aggressive anti-
- I Jars in late 1969, and from the air.
I Communist policies in Asia and When the report of the Symington
! elsewhere, land' the American subcommittee on Laos was finally,
people will be led to think and released on April 20, the Washington
may honestly believe that the
Post carried the front-page headline:
support of anti-Communist govern-
ments in Asia will somehow de-
US ESCALATES WAR IN LAOS,
fend the American way of life.
RILL DISCLOSES, The headline was
1:
This line of American policy will accurate; other, evidence, to which I
lead to American aid to establish .1 shall return in a later article, shows
regimes which, attempt to suppress 11 ,that the subcommittee hearings seri-
the popular movements in In- 1; ously understate the scale, and the
,donesia, Indochina, the Philip- II grim effects, of the American escala-
pines, and China.... Thus, after 1' tion.. This American escalation pro;
setting out to fight Communism in 1, yoked a response by ?the Pathet Lao
Asia, the American people will be 1' and North Vietnam, Who now control
; obliged in the end to fight the
peoples of Asia. more of Laos than ever before, an_d led ;
to devastation and population 'removal
This American aggression abroad , .
will be associated with an increas- t; on a vastscale. ?
ing trend toward anti-Communist The destabilizing event in Cambodia? t
authoritarianism within the United ? assiduously ignored by President Nix.-
Statei, which its victims will call on in his speech of April 30 announc-
fascism and which may eventually ing the American invasion2 ?was the
make it impossible to have discus-, right-wing coup of March 18 which-
sions like this one today. This'
overthrew Prince Sihanouk and drove
American fascism will come, if it
him into, an alliance with the Cam-.
comes, because American liberals bodian left' and the mass popular
have joined the American public in
movements of Laos and. Vietnam,
a fear of Communism from abroad
rather than fascism at home as the
chief totalitarian menace.' - ?
These remarks have proved to be
accurate. The events of the past few
weeks 'reveal, once again, how ,the
American policy of "anti-Commun-
ism"?to be more precise, the effort to
prevent the development of indigenous
movements that might extricate their
societies from the integrated world
system dominated by American capital
? draws the American gaernment, step.
place in a region far removed from the
"Ho Chi Minh Trail" and has no direv..'
connection to the war in South Vir?
nam. It .is, in fact, directed agai..?
civilian targets and has resulted
almost total destruction of most set-
tied areas 'and forced evacuation of
much of the population. Where people-
' remain, they live, for the most part, in
, caves and tunnel's. 'According to Amer.
ican Embassy figures, the pripulation
rema'ining in the Pathet Lao zones is
over a million, well over a third of the
population of Laos. There may be a.c
many as three-quarters of a million
',refugees in the government-controBtd
t areas. The planes that attack. Norther*.
Which are dominated by left-wing , Laos are based in Thailand, wherrios
forces. The coup,' and the events that' the bombing of Southern Laos (includ- . ?
followed, must be understood as a, ing ,the "Ho Chit Minh Trail") t;rig-.
further Step in the internationalization ::inates from Danang, Pleiku, and' the:
of the Vietnam war. However, the,' Seventh Fleet. Now the Thai bases ire
coup. should. also be seen in the, also being used to bomb Cambodia.3
context of developments internal to ' ?
Cambodia-over. the past several years.
...'
These factors are, of course, in, ter-!, The 'American escalation of the war,
'related.. ? -
in Laos provoked a response by the!
?
Since early 1964 the ?United st4ta ;'Conimunist .forces, which now control;
has been conducting its war in Indo- '4.11?1?It.M Laos than ever before. (1 shalt;
by fateful step, into. an endless warichina from sanctuaries' scattered from
against the people of Asia:.and, as'an?Thailand to Okinawa. The bombard-
_ _
1 ment of'Laos, which appears to have
? Approved or. Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
ocartJ nuts
t,
? Murray Kempton
"I suppose that some might say I was?
dered whether Hanoi, might be aroused ?
,
Washington
.1 'nervous,' but 1 knew these were simply : to reprisal by any such slash at its jugu-
...
Mr. Nixon, who has his nightmares .1
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R00
STATINTL
THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
4 June 1970
From the City of Lies
the evidences of preparing for battle. ?
? There is, of course, a fine line to be ob-
served. One mus a keyed while he is wide awake, cannot sleep at :t
four O'clock thc morning of Saturday, 2
May 9; telephones and arouses Helen
for battle but he must not be Jittery. He
f.;.1
Is jittery only when he worries about
Thomas, the United Press's White blouse
correspondent, to talk about her prede-.? the natural symptoms of stress."
cessor, who committed suicide a month
So Mr. Nixon is most confident about
ago; leaves her at last in peace to lurch
himself when there stir his interior''
off to the Lincoln Memorial and a con- ::.?
vcrsation with the young waiting, as he those symptoms which can only alarm.
puts it, "to shout your slogans in this?::: every sober person around him.
? Ellipse.? ? ?`:
Joan Polletier. a Syracuse University .r;
? ? t? student, remembers the encounter: .
? Here we come from a university that's.,
completely uptight, on strike, andel
? when we told him where we are from,
' he talked about the football team, and
when someone said he was from Califor-..'.
nia, he talked about surfing." (The N but he seems to bear his martyrdomew ?
?York Times,May 10.)
:e with marked equanimity. The day after
? r.
What was it he had said to the Negro.' if:,
? M Nixon moved into Cambodia, Kis-
singer made his contribution to the trooper in Vietnam? Something Ito the , i;
r. pub-
effect that "I guess you miss those col; lie calm by lunching for two hours at
lard greens."
, the Sans Souci. it is natural that the y like uneasy
jour-
Memories keep intrudingnalists cling to him; he is a symbol of
ghosts?memories of Six Crises,'
that - ? ' that continuity of our national policies.
..4
curious confession which Mr. Nixon
disguised as a memoir? of prideful...;?
We are ruled then by a night mind of
this sort. Its exegesis and explanation to*
the concerned arc a majOrthore of Henry
Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's assistant for Na-
tional Security Affairs. Kissinger is sup-
posed to have said recently that every
war has its casualties and that he is re-
signed to being a casualty of this one;
according to which the same advisers
counsel an infinite variety of Presidents.
.
- occasions 'and which went largely. un-
Kissinger's background briefings are
'1??
? attended in 1962 because then he had instruments to support?if not often to
J.
little place in history except as a. comport with?Mr. Nixon's public
- ; national disaster that no one though speeches. His system seems to be to of-
could ever happen.
t.,
. ter persons discontented with the public
,
? explanation the semiprivate alternative ?
? His reply, tailored to cover such
, alarms, did not remotely fit Mr. Nixon's,'
immediately previous image of North
Vietnam's "intratisigenc:c and belliger-
ence." Instead he reminded his ques-
tioners of Hanoi's fidelity to our under- ;
standing 'that its froops will not cross
the demilitarized' zone, which "is, in
fact, the only ground sanctuary from:
` which they can threaten our forces in
Vietnam."
_other monument to Kissinger's
The
flexibility of response has been his es-
tablishment of a designation for the
Cambodian venture, which is not an "in-'
vasion" but a "technical incursion."
? This term became immediately popular
with those few persons with whom the
? enterprise was popular. Senator Tower
of Texas, for example, took at once to
describing it as this "incursion," drop?
? ping Kissinger's modifier. It is curious
? that these two academicians should each
have thought that this substitute would
;'elevate the tone of the affair, "incur-
sion" being a word rather more pejora-
tive than, "invasion," inescapably echo-
ing the burglary statutes as it does.
? Higher civilizations invade while barbari-
?
'?ans incur. The New Webster definition
t) of 'incursion" is: "a running in, into, or
against; hence a hostile entrance into a
territory; a man has been through even a ?: ? a sudden invasion; raid, in
;
minor crisis," Mr. Nixon reflected then,"i of its direct opposite. On April 30 we'.
?? had Mr.
"he learns not to worry when his mus-",/ ? Nixon presenting an enemy;
1- cies tense up, his breathing comes faster, 1. "concentrating his main forces in these
; his nerves tingle, his stomach churns, his sanctuaries where they' arc building up
temper becomes short, his nights are ;?:1*
to launch massive attacks" ? on our,
' sleepless. He recognizes such symptoms troops in South Vietnath. The next day,
f..1 %Kissinger could describe this same elle-
system is keyed up for battle. Fair from as the natural and healthy signs that his
my as one who, far from threatening
;? .'.
11,. worrying when this happens, he should e' South Vietnam, was actually "debouch.;
V worry when it does not." Ing" westward?which ought to suggest
' There had been the moment, during that he had fewer troops in this area of
the pursuit of Alger Hiss, when he.' ' massive build-up than he had had tiro
"... began to notice the inevitable weeks before. ?
,? symptoms of tension. I was 'mean' to
live with at home and with my friends. I ? "American . and South' Vietnamese
? ? was qukk?tempered with members of troops will attack the headquarters for
?
P.?
"Tonight." 'Mr..Nixon had said,
st 1
my aff. 1 Jost interest in eating and ; the., entire Communist military opera...
1, road." Dictionary instances of its usage
I run to expressions of outrage or con-
? tempt for the sort of creatures who do
?
,
such things: the?New Webster's example'
is a sentence of Justice Cardozo's from a
tort opinion involving an incursion of
pigs; the Shorter Oxford's is from Mil-
ton, ("Against the Scythian, whose in- ,
cyrsions wild I. Have wasted So
g-
").
? This is territory which is tech-
nically inside Cambodia, complete- -
ly occupied by .North Vietnamese
forces, containing very little Cant-
' bodkin population If any...
?Henry Kissinger, April 301 . t
o f ft G eittatitar talk? a kat= miggva,cgu,0 R,000700030001-4
skipped
t more difficult. ?
., , (Mons of journalists who won-
T
oonti nu Ga
?
Approved For Release
4 JUN
2ffliffital,PEIDEMITOOTR0007
Laos Could Become Second Cambodia
By jack Anderson.
The ouster of Cambodia's
Prince Sihanouk has stirred
up plots in Laos to dump
Prince Souvanna Phouma and
set up a Cambodian-style mili-
tary government. This could
repeat the Cambodian crisis
all over again in Laos, with
dangerous consequences for
the U.S.
Intelligence reports warn
that rightist Laotian leaders
have been encouraged by the
, Cambodian experience to at-
tempt a similar takeover in
their country. They are weary
of the aging Souvanna
,Phouxna who, like Sihanouk,
.has put on a show of out-
'ward neutrality. But just as
Sihanouk permitted secret in-
cursions by the North Viet-
namese, Souvanna Phouma al-
lowed the Americans to oper-
ate in Laos.
Increasingly to the U.S. to
save Laos from the Commu-
nist crunch. But Sihanouk
flew to Moscow and Peking to
enlist support in getting the
North Vietnamese out of Cam-
bodia. While he was on this
mission, he was deposed by
the generals he left behind.
Now he has joined the same
forces, ironically, that he had
tried to remove.
The Kremlin had promised
both leaders that the North
Vietnamese would leave their
countries after the Vietnam
War was settled. But as the
encroachments increased, the
two princes ,lost faith in the
Soviet promise and concluded
that the North Vietnamese
would never 'clear otit volun-
tArll
, .
Secret Understanding
Washington and Moscow
reached a seeret under-
standing, meanwhile, to keep
still about the 'U.S. interven-
tion in Laos. As long as thp
U.S. didn't officially acknowl-
edge its clandestine opera-
tions, the Kremlin agreed to
ignore them. "
The Russians, as they had
promised Sihanouk and Sou-
vanna Phouma, also guaran-
teed there would be no North
Vietnamese takeover of Laos
and Cambodia. Both the So-
viet and Americans agreed to
endeavor, at least, to confine
the war to South Vietnam.
At no time did the U.S. wish
to expand the Vietnam con-
flict into a full-scale Indo-
china war. Restricting the bat-
tlefield to South Vietnam,
for the Communists. It meant
that the U.S. could never
really win the war. for it is
impossible to defeat an enemy
who can escape across the bor-
der into sanctuaries.
In 1964, the North Vietnam-
ese began enlarging their sanc-
tuary privileges in Laos by at-
tacking the Plain of Jars and
increasing the infiltration
down the Ho Chi Minh spider-
web of trails.
and AID contracts, haul food,
munitions and' the monthly
payroll for Vang Pao's troops.
Stories have now leaked out
about his clandestine army,
describing it accurately as the
only effective fighting force in
Laos on the American side.
Yet my reporter in Indochina;
Les Whitten, reports from
Vientiane:
The U.S. countered by step-
ping up its clandestine activi-
ties and ,bombing the infiltra-
tion roul:p,?. After the bombing
of North Vietnam was halted
in 1968, the U.S. simply moved
the sorties across the border
and concentrated the full fury
upon Red targets in Laos.
CIA Secret Army
The Central Intelligence
Agency, meanwhile, has subsi-
dized a secret army in Laos
under Gen yang Pao, a vulgar
ex-French Army sergeant,
whose 14,000 fighting men
have been recruited largely
from the minority Meo tribes.
The secredit army is head-
quartered at the multi-mil-
lion-dollar CIA base of Long
Cheng. A steady. stream of Air
America and Continental Al
"The sad fact is that all the
millions expended upon yang
Pao's mercenaries have not
convinced one responsible
U.S. official in Saigon or Ven-
tiane that this land of 2.8 mil-
lion people can be defended
for more than a few weeks by
the secret army against a de-
termined Communist attack.
"The Communist Pathet Lao
and North Vietnamese control -
alf of Laos and clearly could
take over the other half al-'
most at will."
Whitten adds that "the fa-
bled CIA forces, which liberal Y
senators regard as some kind
of powerful presence in Laos,
are made up, in fact, of time
servers, a few brilliant intelli-
gence men and a larger num-,
b r of ex-servicemen who are,
harassed as . any Washing.'
on bureaucrats simply trying
to carry out routine duties. t
S t
ouvanna. Phoumn ; urned however, also bad advantages, Services ':planes,-, under. ' CIA 0 mno, seu.mecum ennuestei?ine...,
, ? ? .? ?
?
II
1
'1
? ;7,5?;:. ? "'
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STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
RAMPARTS
June TO
THE
'ETNA IZATI
N MARCH II, 1968, PATHET LAO troops overran
?
the secret American radar base at Phou Pim Thi
along the North Vietnamese border in north-
eastern Laos. The base had been constructed in
late 1964, shortly after the Gulf of Tonkin- incident, to
guide U.S. aircraft flying from Thailand to their targets in
North Vietnam and to release their bomb loads electroni-
cally. Pha Thi was also used as a base for rescue helicopters,
and according to the San Francisco Chronicle, "American
' Air Force and CIA personnel used the valley landing strip as
? the base for American-led teams of Meo mercenaries enter-
ing North- Vietnam on special harassment missions." These
? teams were also used to attack the Pathet Lao administra-
tive headquarters in Samneua province.
The existence of the base at Pha Thi, besides being a clear
?
violation of the 1962 Geneva Accords on Laos, demon-
strates an essential aspect or the war which has long been
understood by both sides (if not by the American public):
the war in Vietnam and the war in Laos, Thailand and Cam-
bodia are the same war. They cannot, as some U.S. senators
have naively, or deceptively, suggested, be fought or re-
solved in isolation from one another. As early as 1955, the
U.S. was organizing an all-Southeast Asian front against
communist revolutions (SEATO). By the late '50s, there
were U.S. armed and advised Thai and South Vietnamese
. troops fighting the Pathet Lao in Laos. For its part, the
Pathet Lao had helped the Viet Minh in the struggle against
French colonial rule in Indochina, and after the neutralist
coalition broke down in Laos in 1958-59, the Pathet Lao
once more turned to the North Vietnamese for aid as the
U.S. pushed a war of extermination by the Royal Laotian
Government (RLG) against the Laotian revolutionaries.
While they are fighting for a revolution within the context
of Laotian society, then, the Pathet Lao have historically
also been engaged in an Indochina-wide struggle, by virtue
of the very scale on which the war against them has been -
g fought.
The U.S. has consistently justified its actions in Indochina
by saying that it was defending Laos and South Vietnam
from North Vietnamese aggression. This argument has no
more validity in respect to Laos than it does to South Viet-
nam. The Pathet Lao is an indigenous revolutionary move-
ment and North Vietnamese aid to the Pathet Lao has been
S.
in direct response to American intervention in the Laotian .
;
c
virtually complete take-over by the CIA of the Laotian.
civil war. Indeed, the real. subversion in Laos has been the /
? government administration and army and the creation of an
economy which is almost totally dependent on United
States aid.
[A REVOLUTION IS BORN]
' ? ?
N LAOS AS IN VIETNAM, an anti-French independence
movement emerged immediately, after the surrender of
the Japanese, who had occupied Indochina during
World War II. In coordination with similar moves in
Cambodia and Vietnam, the Laotian resistance seized
power in one provincial capital after another, starting in
.Vientiane. On September 1, 1945, Prince Phetsarath pro-
j. the rupture of ties with France and declared the ,
independent kingdom of Luang Prabang. He appointed a
provisional national assembly, and an independent and uni-
fied Laos had a short-lived nominal existence.
On September 17, however, the King of Laos announced
the continuance of the French protectorate, dismissing
? Phetsarath, who then set up a provisional government of . 1
Lao Issara (Free Laos), in which Souvanna Phouma?later
to lead the "neutralists"?and Souphanouvong?later to lead .
' the Pathet Lao?held important posts. Unwilling to lose
their holdings in Indochina, the French began working their
way up from the south (the Allies having agreed to let the
Kuomintang occupy northern Indochina), decimating the ,
Lao Issue troops and forcing the provisional government
into exile in Bangkok. The French then resumed control of
. Laos and began to reorganize the Laotian units of the
French army, instituting a draft of Laotians to aid the
French in their fight against the Viet Minh. ..
Souphanouvong, Souvanna Phouma and Phetsarath were
all brothers (Souphanouvong a half-brother of the others),
and they had all received engineering degrees in France.
Phetsarath represented the royalist, more traditionalist
ideology and interests in Laos. Souvanna Phouma was the
republican, the neutralist; and Souphanouvong was already
a leftist.
Souphanouvong, future leader of the Pathet Lao, had
been in France durinifthe Popular Front in 1937, and had
,
7ROP80,01601iN007:0001 , 1-4
? , RAMPARTS 37
byAlkaritrigeette1itte31?4
STATINTL
E 4712 Approved For_Relme 2001/0/OA: CIA-RD.P8O-C11,60
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extenstons Kemar s ay 28, 1970
? Europe; Egeberg returned, canceling a Rus-
sian trip.
Asked about reports that ho was naked to
resign, English said, last week: "Number ono,
no continent, Number two, I don't deny (it)."
Immediately on his resignation, his job
was removed from civil service and made
? appointive. A high-level official in the same
agency said:
"The politics is getting more naked. I can
assure you there has never before been the
, political check there is now?down to the
GS-14 level." (08-148 start at $19,643 or
? more.)
? The appointment of a now director of
mental health services. Dr. Claude Thomas;
the nomination of Dr. Morris Chafetz of Bos-
ton as director of alcoholism programs; the
search for a new director of mental health
training?all have received political checks.
"I've Voted on Both Sides"
So, of course, did the appointment last
week of English's successor. Dr. Vernon Wil-
son, director of health affairs at the Univer-
sity of Missouri. Wilson says: "I don't con-
eider myself either a Democrat or a Republi-
can I've voted on both sides. From my point
of view, this is not a political appointment."
, But Wilson was clearly found "acceptable,"
said a Missouri Democratic congressional
aide. "He's a good man. He has no discover-
able politics. But he's not going to rock any
boats."
The administration screening of health
and scientific appointments is really no se-
cret, according to Dr. Stanley Yolles, director
of the National Institute of Mental Health.
"It is the stated policy of this administration
to appoint as many Republicans as possible.
There is screening of scientific appointments
throughout the department," he said.
According to repeated rumors, and many,
predictions by knowledgeable persons, both
Yolks and Dr. Robert Marston, director of the
National Institutes of Health, are currently
being screened Both are said to be "slated
? to go, inside months."
Report Denied
Marston is out of the country. An aide
called the rumors about him "untrue."
"No one has said a single, solitary thing
to me," Yolles said. "But I've heard the ru-
mors. 'There's one that my successor has
? already been picked."
Yolles is on the bad books of HEW higher-
ups for two reasons. He opposes much of an
on-going decentralization of NIMH activities
to regional offices. Opponents call this "the
start of Isr3fH's dismemberment"
? Mlles or his aides last year helped inspire
both House and Senate to insert in NMI:1
legislation a veto power for the National Ad-
visory Mental Health Council?a citizen and
expert board?over regional decisions affect-
ing one of NEV. IH's proudest programs.
This is the program to establish and partly
support community mental health centers,
Which are local clinics to give emergency
and day care to help keep mental patients
out of hospitals. By July, 490 such centers
will have boon funded.
Early in his administration, President
Nixon ordered that its many federal programs
as possible bo returned to "grass roots" con-
trol. An HEW task force under Deputy Under
Secretary Fred V. Malek is trying to do so.
"POWER PLAT"
It sees putting the mental health centers
under HEW; 10 regional offices as "better
administration, closer to the people." The
program's directors at NIMI1 see it as a
"power play" to put what has been an $80-
million-a-year program under the real con-
trol of HEW's nonmedical regional directors?
appointees close to state and local pressures.
In any case, mental health center con-
Tho national advisory council?highly dls- i THE ADMINISTRATION'S FAILURE
turbed?is to meet with Under Secretary TO LEARN FROM HISTORY
Malek in June. It also believes he intends
to regionalize NIMH trrining grants, which
support 65 percent of the training .of all
mental health professionals. OP NEW YORK
In a letter to Dr. Robert Stubblefield of
the University of Texas, council secretary,
Finch recently denied this intention. But Monday, May 25, 1970
a council member says: "That doesn't At
his directives."
"FUNDED Lasr"
NIMH is an agency with a degree of in-
dependence and strength that mental health
forces fought hard to create. Mental health,
they claim, is commonly submerged under
general medical or administrative direction,
"funded lest and least."
Take away the menial health centers and
the $116-million training program, notes
Yollort, and "about all you'd have left" is
about $67 million currently financing re-
search and a few other small programs, hard.
ly a strong NIMH.
NIMII as a whole is to be funded at just
$346.6 million in fiscal 1971 by the Nixon
budget, well below 1970's $360.3 million.
There are to be no new community mental
health center grants.
Narcotic and alcohol addiction programs
are to rise a bit front $29.4 million to $35.5
million. But "for community treatment of
narcotics in 1970, I have just $4 million
left," Yolles said, "and $111 million in valid
community requests." As it happens Secre-
tary Finch?in a memo to editors last week? ,
said, "President Nixon has designated May
24 through 30 as Drug Abuse Prevention
Week."
Staff appointments are not the only place
there has been HEW political pressure. A
year ago Dr. Jack Weinberg, director of the
Illinois Neuropsychiatric Institute, was asked
to accept renomination for an advisory com-
mittee on aging. Then he was asked about,
his politics. The articles follow:
"I said, 'I worked for Son. McCarthy'," he
reports. "I was not reappointed."
HON. ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN STATINTI.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Mr.. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Speaker,
someone said that history repeats itself,
the first time as tragedy, the second time
as farce. It is hard to say whether with ;
President Nixon's decision to invade
Cambodia we are in the tragic or the
farcical phase of the Vietnam war. May-
be we are in between, because as Mr.
Nixon recited the worn arguments that
have been used to justify so many mis-
taken actions one did not. know whether
to laugh or cry.
By now it is obvious to nearly every-
one that our course in Vietnam has been
based on demonstrably faulty political
analysis, fallacious historical analogies,
and outmoded perceptions of the inter-
national political landscape and our
strategic Interests within it.
I am ir-sdIrSing in the RECORD two ar-
ticles tht?-?. the tragicomical
nature (.f. failure
to learn from :ta reliance on
arguments and CO that have
been repudiated by events. Tr.e articles?
one serious, the other satirical?are by.
Prof. Hans J. Morgenthau, who has
been perhaps the most profound and
prescient critic of the war from its begin-
ning, and Robert R. Yoakum. They aP-
peared in the May 23 issue of the New
Republic.
SAVING rACS IN INDOCHINA:
I?MR. NIXON'S GAMBLE
? This happened "in some eases" but is no (By Hans J. Morgenthau)
longer going on, said a department source. It would be uncharitable, and redundant.
Higher-ups forced the transfer of longtime to dwell in detail upon the factual defl-
civil servant Clifford Johnson as NIH public Mendes and logical inconsistencies of Mr.
Information director, presumably to make ?Nixon's April 30th speech. What shall one say
way for a political appointee. But last week of an authoritative exposition by the Presi-
Marston announced appointment of Storm ? dont of the United States of the Cambodian
Whaley, University of Arkansas vice president situation that manages not even to men-
tor health sciences?and a Democrat?as a tion the source of the trouble, the overthrow
new "director of communications" public of Sihanouk? or what shall one make of
and scientific. . the President's statement that we are after
"Since the news got out about Joe Eng- "the heart of the trouble," the enemy's head-
lishr another source said, "people have been quarters for all of South Vietnam, while,
getting phone calls and tender care. We've when these headquarters cannot be found,
seen appointments going through in the last both the Vice President and the Secretary
few days after hanging fire since November." of Defense assure us that of course they
The screening system, however, remains? cannot be found since they are mobile?
this Republican administration's response, However, Mr. Agnew assures us on "Face the
It seems, to the fact that a majority of mon-
Nation" of May 3 that we found a "laundry
facility" and largo stores of "freshly laun-
and health types happen to be Democrats, tal health workers and academie research dared uniforms," and Bob Hope warns us OH
the "Tonight" show of May 4 that if Cam.
Health Democrats and health cloves are giv- bodia falls India will go and "before you
ing the administration atill more problems, know it we will be fighting in Staten Island."
For months, there has been an NIR-NIMH Ostensibly :Ar. Hope was not joking, but
clerk-and-professional Moratorium Commit- neither wore Messrs. Agnew and Nixon; or
tea opposing the Vietnam war?a bold move \
s were all three of them trying to be funny
in a part of the government where there was with tongue-in-cheek?
rarely political expression before for fear of
political retaliation. Yet the farcical aspects of these presenta-
tions only serve to give poignancy to the
Last week the movement spread to the tragedy present and impending. Mr. Nixon
NIMH-National Institute of Neurological is caught in a dilemma caused by two Ir-
Disease-National Eye Inaltuto Assembly of reconcilable impulses. On the one hand, he
Scientists?MDs and PhDs. They voted 164 to wants to disengage from Vietnam; on the
23 to oppose U.S. involvement in Cambodia, other hand he wants to disengage only in
? the first time this group has ever taken a circumstances which, if they don't carry
nonmedical political position. ? tho substance, at least convey the appear-
"In every way," reported an Assembly does, anco, of a political victory. And political vio-
struction decisions wore regionalized March. tor, "people hero are getting more disturbed, ? tory for hint moans the stabilization Of the
31; staff matters ere elated to be rogionithieg ,"I'd predict you haven't seen anything yet ? Thiou regime as the legitimate government
July 1,
in the way of rebellion."? of South Thtneffi. nut this conception of
Approved For Release 2001/03104 : CIA-RDF'80-01601R000700030001-4
?
Approved For Release 200110/01thal&eagrfoffifarifrfROO
27 may 1970 ?
? %r
STATI NTL
i
Laotian guerrillas CU'
Ho Chi Mink trail
py .7'. ARBUCKLE in Vientiane
, - 'S , ? . . t,
PEC1AL ? Laotian guerrilla units ? with ? American
. advisers were yesterday cutting the 1-lo Chi Minh .
. trail near Haute 23, outside Tangval village in Southern
Laos.
The mission of the two hat?'
talions in Savannakhet province
is to search for arms and food
caches.
After the guerrillas swept
through Tangvai before launch-
ing their operation, North Viet-
namese troops who had earlier
retreated re-occupied the vil-
lage.
Laos warned North Vietnam
yesterday that , any, atternnt to
capture an ' Important govern-
me.nt-beld ,town could lead to
the end of ?the 1962 Geneva ac-
cords guaranteeing, the, 'king-
dom's netitrality., , ? '
Mr Sisouk Na Champassak,
Minister of Finance and perm-
anent representative of , the
Prime Minister at the Defence
Ministry, told the official Lan
news agency that any North.
Vietnamese plans to take the
town of Sitravane could have,
.aerlous repercussions on.. the.
Internal politics of Laos, .
)1
C I A lends milts
In yesterday's operation were
"special guerrilla units h from
a secret army led anti paid
by the Central Intelligence
Agency. American advisers
with these units work for the
Agency. They are armed and
advise and carry .out similar
functions to American Army
advisers.
This use of C t A employees
permits the Nixon Adnilnistra?
tion to technically deny that
American troop- are In Laos.
I.The Tangvavsoyeration is In con-
f itinctloti WWI ? other ;South., Viet-
namese and American operations
In Laos and Cambodia.
? The Americans' ?and South
Vieioamese are hitting a Com-
munist base area in Laos close
to the " triborder," where Laos,
Cambodia and South Vietnam
meet, This is just north of re-
cent American operations in the
Se San river valley in Cambodia.
The operations in Laos are
said to be necessary to prevent
reinforcements -and supplies
reaching the Communists in.'
Cambodia and to prevent the
Communists rebuilding their
sanctuaries there. ?
It is the CI A and through it
America which bears the brunt
of all militaKmperatIons. The ,
/loyal Lae_ Aymy does nothing;
except hold defensive positions.
lI
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s:c4.
Approved For Release 2001A3ft 1%4-R6Pb -
;U.S. ADVISES ON MOVES
.Lao Guevrirda Units.
AKackin Red TvairL
By TAMMY ARBUCKLE ,
Special to The Star
- VIENTIANE?Laotian special
guerrilla units with American
advisers are cutting portions of
the Ho Chi Minh Trail in south-
ern Laos, informed sources said
today.
Two battalions of Lao guerril-
las are hitting Route 23 on the
western flank of the trail outside
of Tangvai Village in Savannak-
het Province.
"Their mission is to hit Route
23 and search for arms and food
caches," the sources said.
The guerrillas swept through
Tangvai before launching their
As in other military regions in
Laos, it is the CIA and through it
the United States which boars
the brunt of all military opera-
tions.
The Royal Lao Army does
nothing except hold a few defen-
sive positions.
The Pakse substation is run by
an American counter-insurgency
expert. He was once a colone' in
the U.S. Army, served with dis-
tinction in the Congo, retired
and was later' called back to
service. ?
The ?substation is in a white-
walled, windowless building with
a forest of communications an-
operation. North Vietnamese
tenna on its roof:
troops retreated, but then reoc-
.The building is identified as an
cupied Tangvai behind the guer-
"annex" for the U.S. Agency for
International. ' Development.
rillas. Newsmen are told by AID em-
Advised by CIA 'ployes to' keep out of the build-
The units in this operation are ing' , ? ?
ii,em More than 39 Americans work
"special guerrilla units"
. .
the secret army led and paid for there.
by the U.S. Central Intelligence Opposite the building is the
Agency. The American advisers
,quarters for U.S. Army person-
accompanying these units work
1101. our irie.n stay there..
'for the CIA. Controls Guerrillas
They are armed. They advise ?
. ,The ? CIA annex controls the
and carry out other functions
similar to American advisers 2nd and 3rd Special Guerrilla
with South Vietnamese units. Battalions, each of which has
Use of CIA e permits armed agency advisers with it
mployes
the Nixon administration to deny i
on the ground combat.
there are U.S. combat troops in These battalions and their ad-
Laos.
visors are clasterecl around air-
. ?-?
The Tangavi operation is in strips on the Bolovens Plateau
conjunction with South Vietnam. and are known by code names
ese and 'other American actions such as PS22 twenty two and
in Laos and Cambodia. Lima 166.
Americans and South 'Viet- The special guerrilla units are
namese are hitting Communist commanded by Col. Suchai, un-
Base Area 609 in Laos close to der American direction.
the tri-border of Laos, Cambodia One insignia of the special
and South Vietnam and just guerrilla units .shows a snarling
north of recent U.S. operations wolf's head, on top of Christmas
in the Se San River Valley in three. '
?
Cambodia.
South Vietnamese Near
. ,
Move on Red Base The mission of these units,
The operations in Laos are which are more highly paid than
said to be necessary to prevent the res? of the Lao army, is to gos. ?
reinforcements and s u la p Ii e s infiltrate the Ho Chi Minh Trail Although the Air Force and
from reaching the Communists area in operations such as the supply activities in Laos were
in Cambodia and prevent them present ones at Tangvai and acknowledged March 6 by Presi-
from rebuilding their sanctu- Base. Go.j. dent Nixon and more detail was
,
These operations ar:.. eGreple- released by a U.S. Senate sub-,
menteci by South Vi?,.:.-.c.se, committee, the American mis-
troops operating on the eastern sion in Vientiane is still trying to
fringe of the trail. The Lao guer. keep everything secret, appar-i
rillas hit the western fringes of, entlY under orders from Arabes.'
out of the Mekong River town oftho trail. ? 1 sador G. McMurtrie Godley. ,
sible for running the war in Lao 1 The South Vietnamese wear.
Pakse, a CIA substation respon- , The U.S. embassy seeks to
Military Region 4..,..,, ?., ? , . ,.,.,,? . I black ., uniforms. ' They tell of ,pr.evont correspondents' from;
Approved For keleag61.2602F1631eMiks eiloRD 'A kilitdoed6tdob30001 -4
and counting the passing North.
Vietnamese troops. ,
These operations do not ap-
pear to be highly successful and,
to some observers, are even run.
with a certain degree of stupidi-
ty. For example, the guerrillas'
are grouped around airstrips,
making it easy for the North
Vietnamese troops to find and
attack them.
Despite their higher pay?paid
directly by U.S. accountants hi
Laos?the guerrillas' fighting.
quality foes not appear great.
Fled Without Fight
Last week, guerrillas on the
Bolovens Plateau abandoned one
of their airstrips without a fight.[
The higher pay, of course,1
causes morale problems in the]
Lao regular army.
The guerrilla activities are
supposed to be secret but it is'
easy to find out about them.
Army meat buyers in the
Pakse market ask for meat for
exact numbers of men at such
and such a location.
The guerrillas talk freely
about real or imagined exploits.
The CIA rues a small private
airport at one end of the Payse
air base. Almost anybody can
walk in.
Reporters iVatch monks, stu-
dents and army dependents
walking around. In fact, the only
people apparently not allowed in
are American reporters.
Other U.S. Activities Too
Pakse airport is also a hive of
U.S. military activity. U.S. Air
Force forward air controllers fly
from there in Air America light
aircraft to mark Communist tar-
gets. They are followed by
flights of Lao air force T28s.
American Air Force officers
and CIA agents congregate at'
the Pakse air operations cen-
ters.
? American C123 transports roar
out of Pakse carrying arms car-
arics there.
? Part of the operation against
v/the Communist Base Area 609 is
run from Kongmei, an airstrip
used by CIA operatives working
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RD478104161t601R0
CHICAGO SUN-TINES
24 May tDO
i- radii 8' nate
f entle eo 10
'If ever a countty were .1...,-..
stores are fulrefinereliaidise and the people of Vien1--
t
.
tiane are adequately dressed and housed. Most of them{
' seem to be gainfully employed. The gin street of Vien-
tiane, ' ?
made for peace, Laos.' ,'..m(
,!. Luang Prabang Road, included several businesses ,
which by the nature of the country must have been ?CIA1
? ---.I [fronts like Air America?shipping companies in quarterT1
..1j? far too large for any business that could be developed in:1
Warfare.here is not . -::
;!.., ',Laos, wholesalers of goods the people cannot buy, pur-1
? veyors of services alien to the economy. ;
e ',
, But spooks and spies and gun-runners are only the,.;
so much a misfortun ?
?-
, , first impressions. What are the Laotians like, and what)
' kind of a country do they live in?
' as an obscenity,
.. . . The. kingdom of Laos, first of all, is a geographic, .
1
? I
.,?
' :political and ethnographic improbablity, created by the ?
4
? t. ,French administrators chiefly as a buffer state between
By F. K. Pious Jr:, Vietnam. and Burma. In the North, where Texas-like ;
.., hills dominate the landscape, the Meo tribesmen some- I
VIENTIANE. how contrive to grow rice in an area far drier than those ;
!VIENTIANE, the capital of Laos, lies almost in tla-' which normally favor, the crop. One American aid work-!
' center of the Indo-Chinese peninsula, and politically' er in the .area, Edgar "Pop" Buell, of Hamilton, Ind., 1
it Is a nexus for all the intrigue, diplomatic maneuver- described the Meo as "a bunch of tough Indiana dirt-)
ing and outright hostility now afflicting Southeast Asia. farmers?the strongest, hardest-working and most Inde4
f ,Lying directly across the Mekong from Thailand, and ,pendent people I've ever seen. They're good"carpenters,1
' - : connected by the same river to Cambodia and South good bricklayers arid terrific farmers. They came down'
, b
l
t h
Vietnam, Vientiane could not being an Important
1 here from China 200 or 300 years ago, because the people
,place. I'around them were always taxing them." The hard-work-
The evidence of Vientiane's importance greets you as ing ?Meo, said Buell, are just too productive for the taste
I soon as you land at its modest airport: the runway Is in /1
? ' of their lazlet neighbors.
. !constant use by the most varied display of aircraft 1 The Meo are evacuating now, sometimes In dan-i
side the Paris Air Show. Most of these planes are carry- 7.1 gerous, disease-haunted 30-day journeys on foot to the;
out-
i ing freight, and many are familiar to aviation en- )
, lowlands where the army can protect them against the!
i thusiasts as short-field aircraft, capable of landing on:, North Vietnamese troops who cross .the border. Today,: .
' any of the 200. airstrips maintained by the United States '?
1. .as in ancient times, the Meo are .admired for their pro-1
,in up-country Laos. It comes as no surprise to learn that , ductivity ? and coveted for their strength; to the in- i
, the aircraft, big and small, are operated by Air Amer- ' 'finite dismay of the Meo, the North Vietnamese are 1
7 Ica, a CIA front that hauls supplies of all sorts, including . , taxing their rice reserves and conscripting the villagers I
:military equipment, wherever the 'tiny Lao army needs '1 ' for service as human trucks on the Ho Chi Minh trail.1
, it to fight tile North Vietnamese who come over the ?I I That, Of course, subjects the Meo to American bombings i
;border. We landed at one of these dirt strips and found I land to raids bY _the Laotian army, causing further
more ali:eiiitieS thai i a Vontinielit Of ill'ilV trucks, a l?
? . - ------ ----- ---' desertions to the Mekong area. There the refugees are
no moi '
:detachment of soldiers and a "control tower", of un- igathered into camps (which the people erect themselves.
;painted planks that looked like a 10-hole privy:The only out of bamboo, togs and their own undiminished skill).,
:decoration was a tattered windsock. 1 As the Meo wait to be resettled, Laos develops, ? for the.
The CIA personnel ? known to the less-serious as . first time in its life, a population squeeze.
'"spooks" ? reveal very little about their actual activi- Farther south,: around Vientiane, the people are more.
'
ties, but their cover stories are more interesting than closely related by blood and language to the Thais
ac
their job descriptions anyway. One of them, a rangy ross the Mekong. Their climate and soil are more
Southerner with a blond crewcut, .described himself as hospitable, so that their culture does not reflect the
the coach of an American baseball team playing in hard-work ethic characteristic of the Meo in their hills.
Laos. Rather strangely for an athlete, he spoke fluent ., Begainie the kingdom is not of ancient origin Laos hail
i
. Lao to the waiter in the bar, and it was with no surprise iittle of what, could be called national culture or con!!
. whatever that we learned next day that there is no Lao- icioutness; its Organization reVolves around the family,l
..tian baseball team that he could have opposed. His actual tiltl..kilke; and AK VIlilge?.t1181,1148 4:041e,.. Po, litiCaloffiti
: 4. 4 ' r .11 .- ??... v. ?
??-.--i work there, in the words once used by the Johnson, &
?
:' Smith catalog to describe the noise of the. .whoopee.
:cushion, Is "better imagined than described."
" The covert American involvement n 1.4osreveAti It.:
.r self obliquelyAPPKGMed IF Lea pita Amati 03/04 :, cIA-RDP89,o101R000700Q0001 -4
cavnorts consisting .014900,000..ivorth. oLopluni..,but..itsu
is that country.
..11Approved For Release 201r1/11310444Y1A-Ratig611661R00
24. MAY 1970
)y the
Communists
In Laos
VIENTIANE, Laos ? At the;
Laotian Defense Ministry, a
,? peeling yellow building on Rue,
Sam
Sam Sen Thal here, the lobby
is occupied by six soldiers play- '
ing cards, their shirts off be-
.cause of the heat.
On .,Avenue Lane Xang, the?
. Premier, Prince Souvanna Phou-; ?
? ma, at recent ceremonies mark- '
ing the 23rd anniversary of the!
Laotian constitution, calls upon,
.
his people to close ranks and
? 'confront our enemies with an.
'1.inflarTing national unity based.
on work, discipline and the!
strongest civic duty." The re-
sponse from the reviewing stand,.
wheee, everyone important in the
Laotian Government is sitting, is
a continuation of their quick gos-'
? siping and reading of newspa-
pers. '
These cameos of Vientiane life;
? perhaps reflect nothing more,
? than the tragedy that the war
against the Communists in Laos -
has been going on so long ?
for over two decades ? that:
it excites few Laotians anymore.
The Government was, never-
theless, getting somewhat ex-
cited last week about the latest!
military drive by the North ?Viet-1
'namese and their Laotian pro-'
teig6s, the weak and often hardly;
visible Pathet Lao. In the Mgt fevt!
weeks, the Communists have, ,
seized territory in the south,!,
near the borders with Cambodia;
and South Vietnam, which had
previously been held by, and con- !
cerl(?,1 to, the Government
Comm un i it maps.
'hie wc;eks ago, the North
ff.anle(... took Attopeu, a pro-,
capital that ommands
;;.ey junction on the Kong River,i
an important supply route into!
the Communist. , sanctuaries in
Cambodia, to ? the south. Then ?
they began picking off outposts
on the noloven Plateau adja-
cent le Attopeu, ? and started :-
moving toward Saravane, anoth-,
er provincial capital which sits
about 65 miles north of Attopeu
at the other end of the plateau.
Military experts here question .
whether Saravane itself is stra-
tegically important. to the Coin?.
:munists, but they are generally 1
;agreed that the unexpected ;
;thrust in the south is designed !
to expand and strengthen the ?
?-- North Vietnamese supply trails
into their bases in both Cam- ?
bodia and South Vietnam. These t
experts interpret the moves as
a direct attempt to counter the
; current American-South Viet-
namese attack on the North Viet-
namese supply depots and sane-
r tuaries in Cambodia.
Some observers here doubt .
that the Boloven Plateau can
, substitute for the lost Cambodia: .
, sanctuaries because it is so much
farther away from the Coffin-in-,'
? .- nist enclaves in South Vietnam
! that were supplied from !Cam-
bodia. But at the same time they.
acknowledged that the fall of
'I the plateau ? which is just west
of the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos,
the . Main supply route from
!? North Vietnam into South Viet-
nam ? would mean the loss of
one of Laos's main breadbaskets,-.!
for it is a significant -source of ? -
; rice, fruit and tabacco. ?
Also, in reaction to the allied
thrust into Cambodia, North
-:Vietnamese troops have launched.
, a successful offensive in the,
northeastern part of that coun-
try, gobbling up important towns ?
and moving to within mortar.
range of the Laotian border.: -
- 'Many. Laotian military officials -
'believe the North Vietnamese -
.;will eventually cross the border.
.and attack previously safe areas
:in southern Laos (ince they have
iseized all outposts along the;
cCambodian side or the frontier.'"
All of this has markedly damp-'
!..'ened-the optimism the Americans: '
;. and Laotians were feeling only!
two months ago when; after the
`Communists had captured Saint
?;Thong and were threatening Long,
..-1?Cheng the two principal- mill.; ?-.-
:tary bases in northern Laos, the -
? _ Goyerrin,ient stopped the drive,-
? Aook Sam - Thong and began;
'forcing the enemy into a slow
retreat northward. '
American and 'Laotian militwy
source:, are still firmly cowineea
?:that Hanoi ? at least until it:
? can capture its primary objec-
Aive, South Vietnam ? is not
; interested in conquering all of ??
!Laos and occupying it, which, as
?:one source put it, "they are cap-
:able of doing anytime with the
?:requisite expenditure of blood
!and treasure."
According to these sources,
Hanoi ? afraid of spreading it-
self thin in Laos at this time?
? simply wants to use this small
. :country for a supply line and
for applying just enougn aaili-
itary scare pressure to force poli-
tical concessions that will pro-
? duce a new Laotian Government
that will not interfere with its
? activities here. Such a govern-
Meat in this view, would prob-
? ably be a neutralist-rightist-left-
1st coalition dominated by the !.
?!leftists, that is, the Pathet Lao.
The impact of these develop-
ments was heightened last week
? by Saigon's disclosure that South .
Vietnamese troops have for some
time been conducting raids into,
'Laos against the ? North Vietnam-.
eSe there in an attempt to cut
sthe Ho Chi Minh trail, and have
? :stepped up these forays since the ?
'start of the allies' Cambodian op-
'oration. This has prompted some
extreme speculation about the
possibility of using American
? ground troops in Laos in addi- ?
tion to the existing American
presence here ? the fighter-
;bombers and B-52's that fly from
?t Thailand and South Vietnam to
.? !pound enemy positions here, par-
? ticularly the Ho Chi Minh trail,
? and the American military ad- /
? visers and Central Intelligence
?i Agency men who, in many re-
spects, direct the Laotian Gov-
? !ernment's side of the war.
Although the use of American
?, troops in Laos has always been
? I considered very unlikely, a few .
? analysts are now wondering
? whether President Nixon, if the
? !North Vietnamese do build up a
j; huge sanctuary in southern Laos,.
'T will send them in as he did in
Cambodia.
"Never!" said one official...
? r here but after a moment's re-
flection, he added, ? "at least I
:hope not."
SYDNEY II. SCHANBERP
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
Approved For ReleiiisiotifibleedWDP80-01601R0007
FORT DOME , IOWA
E 26,412 STATINTL
MAY 23 1970
The opium war
in Laos
, There is no question about it, the war in Vietnam
widened into a major Indochina war. American
and South Vietnamese troops have been fighting
' In Cambodia for a couple of weeks and now we
ere told that the "secret war" in ' Laos has been
escalated.
South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Van ?
Lam has revealed that ground troops of his
country's forces have crossed the border into Ins
to strike at the Ho Chi Minh trail. He refused
to say whether or not the South Vietnamese army
Iiad been joined by American advisers and U.
r E. artillery in Laos, simply saying that this .was
v; tactical question which the "generals would have
to answer." However, we do know that the U.
S. Air, Force has been pounding away at Laos
'Iar?somo time.
At was only recently that Americans.* were told '
olything officially about our "secret" involvement
In Laos and that was when the Senate Foreign
' Relations Committee released, to the public, the r
.,Administration's censored vetsio,n of what we have
been doing there. The report was not very en ?
-
Ouraging.
Not Only has the United States had to support
the entire Laotian government but hundreds of '
! thousands of refugees ? estimates range up to
; jialf the population which is about 3,000,000.
.* Our chief instrument for waging war there has
.teen through the Meo guerrilla army of Gen.
`yang Pao, known to be a long-time tool of the
U. S. Central Intelligence Agency.
, Testimony befoye the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee reveals how the war has pushed Meo ,J
tribesmen out of their opium-grolqing areas,-
.1 providing new sales opportunities to poppy growers
'further north and west in Burma and China. It ,
'is suspected that members of the Royal Laos Army
ere engaged in opium traffic.
We have the added information provided by '4
Congressman Tunney of California who charged "
that the SLA-backed yang Pao's "sole objective
'Is to dominate other factions of this opium-
producing Meo tribe." This tribal war, Rep.
:Tunney said, has as one of is prizes an area .1
tapable of producing annually four to ten tons
t f marketable opium ? about $900,000,000 worth'
If refined as heroin and sold on the streets of
?
("America's cities.
'Why should the United ?States be involved in
:an opium war in Laos? Laos is of no importance
to us nor to the Russians or Chinese. The North ,
:Vietnamese are interested in this landlocked '
.tountry only from the standpoint of being con-it
:cerned with the security of its northwest frontier
Approved For Reloaseg2fiali04104tb QA-REDIMS141610-1R000700030001-4
Alifference to the security of the United , State
isiSawhy are we involved?
ITV BEPUBLIC.
Approved For Release 2001103/04: CIA-RDP80-01
23 MAY1970
Alex Campbell: ,
CIA on the Nile
The Game of Nations
by Miles Copeland
(Simon & Schuster; $6.95)
Beirut has always been full of spies Army's IBM machine erroneously
'but in the late fifties and early sixties wrote his birthplace on his classifica-
they were very thick on the ground. tion card as "Ukr," for the Ukraine.
The British had "Kim" Philby who After World War II Meade performed
turned out to be really working for such intelligence chores as rescuing
,
the Russians. There was also a Pales-. captured German scientists from Corn-
tinian who worked for everyone, sell- munist China, and corrupting Kurdish
ing his carbons to the Russians, the tribal leaders on the Soviet border.
7 !British, the Americans, the Jordanians 'Then "Kim" Roosevelt chose him for
and the Egyptians. And there was Cairo, where he and Copeland worked
Miles Copeland, a business consultant on Nasser as a promising replacement
who had worked for the State Depart.% for the unsatisfactory King Farouk.
,who
elsewhere in the Middle East, Soon Nasser was assuring the Amen-
.
-
was close to Teddy's grandson "Kim" cans that all he really wanted was to
1 Roosevelt, and who had joined the get rid of the ,British and that he re-
CIA. Miles's business took him often garded regaining Palestine as "unim-
0 . I to Cairo, where he seemed to have in portant." Once in power, Nasser.
i static access to President Nasser. played the Americans off against the
sentative sympathizes with the Revo-
lution," which gave Nasser all he
really wpnted in Lebanon at that time...
Ten years after that, Nasser, egged on,
by the Meade-programmed, coup-
crazy Syrians, involved the Middle
'East in a war from which it's still try-
ing vainly to extricate itself.
The goings on that Miles Copeland
describes may ?or may not ? have
been curtailed by President Kennedy's
letter of instruction , to US ambassa-
dors in May 1961, inviting them to
,take full control over all American of-.
ficial activity in the countries to which; ?
they were accredited. That looked at,
the time like a mandate to ambassa-
'dors to 'restrain CIA and other med-
.His book about the Middle East is Russians. The CIA abjectly put up dlers. No more humiliations for decent
subtitled "The Amorality of Power with this and, when the American
Politics" and is a sort of "Catch-az"' Ambassador in Cairo, Henry Byroade,
Iof American diplomacy. Quite a lot of protested to Nasser at a dinner party
,-E people get killed. Husni Zalm of about Nasser's thugs roughing up the
Syria, for instance. Washington de- US Labor Attach?Copeland says that top war lord. Copeland concludes his
cided to make hint top Arnerican Byroade was pressured into apologiz-; wry and witty account by saying that
stooge in the Middle East, by hoisting ing to Nasser in writing (not for the "our diplomats who were so naive ...
him into power in Syria .through a first or last time) for having "raised have, come ft long way and have
military coup. This succeeded, but an unpleasant subject at a 'pleasant so-I veloped ?a whole .new perspective."-
,
then Za'im refused to play. Instead ofcial gathering" None of which, o f*at per
Whspective?
T., . ?
'showing gratitude by being an obedi? r
,course, did the US the least good in ,
ent zombie, he "brusquely informed Nasser's eyes. The only way to a I,'
Men like Byroade? But the CIA is .
currently running a little war of its
own in Laos ? and the US Ambassa-
dor, McMurtrie Godley, is said to be
, (Major Stephen) Meade and myself climb-back the CIA could think of 1
that we were henceforth to leap to our wasto .
circulate .among Egyptians a i
feet as he entered the room." Copeland lot of books with titles like Moharn.
and Meade. were ready to humor their I mad Never Existed, of pre-World War
Frankenstein's monster, but Zalm's One vintage, and attempt to attribute
own Syrian associates were less corn- their distribution to the Russians. .
pliant to his masterful whims. They Copeland quit Cairo and 'set up his
. finally murdered him, buried him in Beirut office In May 1957, and about ;
the French cemetery in Damascus and a year later President Eisenhower sent:I
'coldly told Copeland and Meade,'
"We Marines to Lebanon to intervene in a I ?
' are doing you the favor of treating' civil war in which Nasser had a hand.'
him as a French agent." Eisenhower also sent Robert Murphy,
Copeland is coy about revealing how whose first act according to Copeland 1
he himself became an agent, but says' was to,be photographed shaking hands I
Meade became one by accident. G-a, with the leader of Nasser's terrorist
chuting Aga rWRA,r(McliNdeMetidM
had grabbed him for ,possiWe_ ,para-Lgr,q9,p0 iTilbertur.e Av,a4A5t6 el
ititht? tii 601R000700030001-4
Approved For litillensvada164#14gligiNfiale;91 601 RO
21 May 1970
STATINTL
Robert Hunter on the CIA
Is it a department of dirty tricks,
or an organisation of fact-gatherers?
Did it underwrite the seizure of power
by the Greek Colonels?
In the Ashenden stories, Somerset Maug-
ham put a human face on the British Secret
Service. No matter that the Hairless Mexi-
,ean killed the wrong man: this bumbling
helped soften the Image of a rpthless and
ever-competent machine dedicated to doing
His Xiajestes dirty, business, and made
Approved For Release 2001/03/04
Richard Helms, Director of the CIA
everything right. Not so with the CentraV
Intelligence Agency?or the CIA as it is
everywhere known. No humour here; just!
? the sense of a sinister and heartless manipu,
? ' lation of the democrats of a hundred mut,'
CIA-RDP80-01601 R000700030001 -4
ri anti trivt..1.
Approved For Release 2001/0310W: 01A-RDP80-01
19 MAY 1970
?. Is this Vietnam all over again?
. .
? . ,z?tirt :)44,
?
STATI NTL
:
- ? ,
?.'
1.4.1.4?40
SISOUK NA CHAMPASSAC tapped his desk lightly
with his pen and repeated my question: "What
aid do we In Laos hope to continue receiving
from the United States?" He paused. "Well, to begin
with, I hope they don't withdraw the CIA."
This is a priority not necessarily calculated to
win the hearts and minds of the U.S. Congress or .
perhaps to be expected from the finance minister
of Southeast Asia's least developed state. But it
was advanced without a hint of jest or cynicism and
with considerable point.
The Nixon Administration now faces an awful
dilemma. The Vietnam war is not contracting but ex-
pandin ? . Through n29 fabtttbpAgtAd.Stat
CIA-RDP80-0 1601R000700030001-4
war is 1;169YEP9mr MtUtiiffi
continued
; ing Laos Into turmoil and bringing Thailand?which.;
'tees neigh bArnoi rldwitp F iStiffrfelretj% es moat I
to its own secUity?into-deeper rrivolvement.
Our involvement in Laos has been visible for:
, some time. Below the thick haze of dry-season.
smoke and dust that hangs like Los Angeles smog
over Laos' mountains and jungles, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency's irregular army of Meo tribesmen,
led by tough, earthy and able Maj. Gen. yang Pao,
still stood in the path of the 312th and 316th North
Vietnamese divisions. Bloodied, sometimes nearly !
broken physically and in morale, their families driven
' from their burnt-out hilltop villages and their ranks
filling with boys in their teens, the Meo irregulars ,
were now the Royal Lao Government's only effec-
tive military prop. No one thought the North Viet-
?namese would march into Vientiane, Laos' capital, if
the Meo failed, but few doubted that the Communist. !
Pathet Lao, Hanoi's Indigenous allies, would there-
after be able to call the political tune.
Then the rainstorms came early, and some saw '
them as a sign of good omen. The rain cleared the
mountain smog for the Royal Lao Air Force's T-28's
and for the U.S. 7th Air Force jets blasting the sup-
ply routes running back to the North Vietnam bor-
der. The North Vietnamese thrust lost momentum.
Reinforcements plucked from every corner of the
1 kingdom and beyond rushed to help Vang Pap de-
fend his jet base at Long Cheng, southwest of the
Plain of Jars. And the parched and sunbaked land,.
, after months of drought, burst Into life. And so for a
time, all was as it should be.
Left to themselves, there Is little the Laos will '
not do to preserve the harmony of their lives and
their country. The attitude takes many forms. For a .
time, many soldiers of ethnic Lao origin used to fire
in the air rather than shoot their enemies. Prince
Souphanouvong, the Pathet Lao ? leader, writes a
hostile public letter to his half brother Prince Sou-.
vanna Phouma, the premier, and softens its delivery:
with a private and affectionate note.lhat is Laos?
'or part of it. Ethnic Lao who live in the Mekong River
its tributaries account for on y hal o e c un r511:? -
Max elittaRDP8V-010tildovo pv oi 4
1
estimated three million people. In the river valleys of
the north are the Tai. Stone Age Kha live on moun-
tain slopes. On the hilltops are Yao and Meo slash-
and-burn agriculturalists, cultivators of the opium
poppy and now warriors on whom the Royal Lao
Government depends so heavily. ?
When the North Vietnamese launched their late
dry-season offensive, and with it a five-potnt pro-
gram to end the fighting by negotiations, the. opium
crop had been gathered and also the fruits of the
harvest. Key to both the fighting and the plan for
negotiations were the myriad roads and tracks of the
Ho Chi 'Minh Trail In Eastern Laos and their ever-
increasing importance in the Vietnam war. '
Now secure from the bombing in North Viet-
nam, Hanoi began last November to step up the flow
of truck transports along the trail. By spring, 45,000
trucks were using the trail each month, a vast In-'
crease over the peak flow of 18,000 a month,
reached during the 1968 Tet Offensive.
Using highly sophisticated bombing devices ;
with infrared eyes that saw through the night and
the jungle cover, the 7th Air Foice leaped upon
these new targets, bringing into sharp focus the,i
present reality of the war: North, Vietnam needs.
?
free use of the trail to stockpile munitions In the
sanctuaries In order to win in the South; the United
States has to deny the trail to the North Vietnamese
or at least to minimize its use, if its Vietnamization
program is to succeed.
Thus, largely unseen and unreported, the Viet-
nam war changed character and became, for the
time being, a battle, for the lines of communication
In Eastern Laos. In this, the fighting south and west
of the Plain of Jars is an essential part. Call off the
American bombing in Eastern Laos, Hanoi's leaders
say to Souvanna Phouma, and Laos can be reunified '
The CIA's
tribal army is
the Laotian
government's
only prop'
' by negotiations to enjoy independence, freedom and
peace. Fight on and all is lost.
But the Prince does not trust Hanoi, and the
bombing can be halted only at the expense of the
Vietnamization program and the security of the large
American force still in South Vietnam. This is the
choice that now faces the Nixon Administration.
If the coup d'etat that ousted Prince Norodom 1.
Sihanouk as head of state In Cambodia posed "
a threat to North Vietnam's sanctuaries and supply ,
routes there, it also posed an even graver threat of
civil war. While Sihanouk remained in office, he .,
could exercise some restraint on North Vietnamese
use of Cambodian territory. In alliance with the
North Vietnamese, Sihanouk, like Prince Souphan- .
ouvong in Laos, may lose even the will to impose
oontinuod
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
some restraint. If this happens, the hope of confin- contributed a son or daughter to the insurgency.
Ing the war to VietngcnocLLaos_will also disaopear. "Why did your son go to the hills?" I asked.
ThrouWillr9 ctc,Boggrgpa 2.9 9 w 10 3/0 4 I PoRDFA 810 804:8061 R0007E0 OIC*000 14
conflicts slowly flows the Mekong. Traffic across know why," he said. "Perhaps he has gone to Vien-
-
the river is two-way. Families arid ethnic groups
straddle the border, and the Mekong has long been
more of a bridge than a barrier. Included in the traf-
tiane or to Bangkok and not to the jungles at all."
"You know he is in the mountains," broke in
Lt. Knit Pipithirunkarn, a strongly built army officer,
.fic are Communist guns, cadres and propaganda for
who for two years has been hunting the insurgents.
the Insurgency that increasingly threatens Northern :
Jom Saenpo nodded. "I mind my own affairs,"
and Northeastern Thailand.
he said. "I don't bother about other people." ?
Twenty-five years @go, Prince Souphanouvong
He is, nevertheless, a proud man. "A long time
fled across the Mekong from Thakhek into Thailand ??
, ago," he said, "when I first came here, there was
In a boat and was gunned by a French fighter plane. ?
only forest. I started to cut the forest and to make
Friendly Tlials dragged him from a heap of 29 dead -
this village. At first, there were few families, and
in the boat, and the provincial governor opened his
much sickness. My brother died of cholera. Every.'-
house to him while his wounds were cared for. To-
year there was cholera. People were very poor." '
day; Souphanouvong is repaying this hospitality by .
"Has the government helped the people of the .
the creation of insurgency schools for Thais and by .
. village?" I asked.
pushing new, more sophisticated military equipment ;
"Yes," he replied. "The government has helped
into Thailand for the insurgents' use. '
With 1,300 kilometers of river to patrol, neither
the Thai Second Field Army nor the border police'.
' can cope. For years, the insurgents received only
defensive weapons. Offensive weapons?AK-47's
and B-40 rocket launchers?are now coming in, and
?
incursions of up to company size have occurred in,. "But he will not talk."
Nakhon Phanom Province opposite Thakhek."I am afraid," said Jom SSenpo. "I am afraid come and kill me.". they'll
Five years ago, the Thai Government discov-1 :?
"The insurgents helped with the rice harvest,",
-ered classic indicators of incipient insurgency In the''i
District of Nakao in Nakhon Phenom. They found said the Lieutenant. "Because they helped, no' one
will talk. When they go against the insurgents, the
hard-core cadres had been at work In the villages
?
of the Northeast, organizing cells, building training people have cause to be afraid."
-
sites and beginning the traditional murder of school-
His point was well made. During the night, in-
surgents had called at the house of a pregnant wom?
-
an In the village of Dong Thong and asked for food.
When she refused them, they shot her down. '
Lieutenant Kanit suspected a trap, and his sus-
picions were warranted. By jeep, a detachment of
;.
1.. police was on its way to Dong Thong. The insurgents
i lay in wait, killing four policemen and wounding nine. ?
No wonder then that Capt. Khluan SarIboot, the
?
assistant district officer who has been in Nakae for'.
a year, seems less sanguine than many of his seniors
In Bangkok. Pontum .Village, where he makes his
headquarters, not only has a police and military post, ;
it Is also defended by one of 12 security teams In
very much. Now there is no cholera. There are
,roads, and this year we have fertilizer and the big-
gest rice crop we have ever had."
"Why do the people support the insurgents?"
"He knows everything," said Lieutenant Kanit.,
teachers, village headmen and police informers.
When I came back this time, I found that things
were Infinitely better in terms of effort and material '
achievements, in the Northeast generally and in
Nakao District in particular, though there was much
concern about a threat from Laos. ?
EW AND PROSPEROUS towns are springing
up throughout the Northeast. Dams bring
water for irrigation and electric light to ?1
'regions that used to be so poor. that even the oil
lamp was unknown. In many places, there are now;
.all-weather roads. But material progress has not al- '
ways brought the hoped-for political result, as I Nakae District. But even this is not enough to deter
learned when i visited Nal lom Saenpo In his shop in , the insurgents. The Captain pointed out of the win-
Pontum In the District of Nakae. I dow of his headquarters to a clump of bamboo no ,
Jom Saenpo Is 50. His face has begun to dry more than 100 yards 'away, and half .that distance,
out and wither like an apple left to hang too long , from Jom Saenpo's shop. "That was the scene of my
on a tree, though his eyes are still bright and pene- third ambush," he said. "I was lucky to get away." ?
trating, and his jet-black hair shows no signs of *. With the harvest In, Captain Khluan expects
gray. He sat cross-legged on the floor of his open- ' more ambushes to come. Unmarried and now 37, he
fronted shop. A checked blue-and-white sarong is philosophical about it, but he knows and every-
tucked loosely around his waist revealed a wide ex- ? one else knows that his life expectancy, is not high.
panse of richly tattooed thigh. Across the dusty He worries mpstlytabout things he hasn't been
track from his shop were the schoolhouse and the able to do. Despite the road Improvements, for In-
sandbagged headquarters of the police and military stance, two villages In the Phupan Mountains cannot
detachments. In the background, green and Inviting, . be reached by road at any time, and during the wet
were the slopes of the Phupan Mountains, season, it la extremely difficult to travel to about half
The Phupans' shady streams abound with fish. of the remaining hundred villages In Nakao District. .
Their forests are filled with game?and with elusive, The population of tho district is about 30,000, and
bands of Communist insurgents, one of whom Is one doctor at district headquarters cannot cope with
Jom Saenpo's 22-year-old son and the eldest of his the needs of the people. In 12 of the mountain
six children. There are about 300 families in Pontum ? schools, the only teachers even now are policemen.
Village, ileio?ei with Ng ?bop, lot Saenpo kin a Thirty-one villages still have no schools at all, and
better li 4NtrAlro Wag% a C11149 M14363 G I 4- Ma RHree 11R0.01170110241110 1-4
3
continued
?
APPEAVOefighrtIgfillOMPAQ011421,0
Captain Khluan said. "Though there are not many of
them in the mountains, there are enough for them to
operate in teams of 30 to 50 men." This is enough to
give the insurgents the initiative.
There are many other areas in Northeastern
Thailand where the people live in absolute security,
but all around the frontiers, pressures are mounting.
The situation is deteriorating In the northern moun-
tains where the Meo tribesmen get support from the
Pathet Lao. West of Bangkok, a small group of in-
surgents uses the sanctuary of the Burma border.to
strike into Thailand. Two separate Insurgent forces
' have erupted with bloody violence in the south.
Two years have passed since the Chinese an-
nounced the formation of a unified command to co-
ordinate widely scattered Thni ieriurgent groups..
? Although it would be wrong to give the impression
that something like Hanoi's command post in South
Vietnam is at work here, more and more insurgents
are beginning to wear uniforms with red-and-yellow
flashes, proclaiming their membership in the Thal
Liberation Army. Comparisons with Vietnam are In-
vidious, but to pretend that a serious threat is not
developing is to ignore the facts,
HIS IS NOT TO SUGGEST that Thailand is about
to become another Vietnam In the sense that ;
American forces will become deeply In-
volved. Yet Thai troops are fighting in Vietnam;
? Thailand provides the major air bases for American
air attacks over South Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh
, Trail, and a Thai artillery battalion; protected by Thai
Infantry, took its place with Vang Pao's men for the
defense of Long Cheng. In short, American commit-
ments to Thailand are heavy and, it is difficult to be-
lieve otherwise, binding.
Like the Nixon Administration, Thai leaders
would prefer to find a peaceful way out of the im-
passe, if they can. Men like Seni Pramoj, wartime
leader of the Free Thal Movement and now leader of
the opposition, and Thanat Khoman, the foreign min- -
,Ister, have begun to think In terms of "bending with ?
the breeze," and if need be, realignments. "What
can we do? What else can we do?" Seni Pramoj
asked me. "Bamboos bend with the wind, But it's
more than a breeze now. It's a storm."
"Can you bend with such a wind?"
He sighed. "Can or cannot, we must try."
In 1941, when he was a young minister in Wash-
ington, Seni did not bend when the message came ?,
through from Bangkok to declare war on the United
States, and I reminded him of this,
"I didn't bend because my situation was favor-
able. I went to Cordell Hull and told him I was In-
structed to declare war but didn't see any reason
? why I should. It was all silly, very silly. Hull looked a '
bit shocked and said, 'You know what you're do-
' ing?' " Seni laughed as he recalled Hull's surprise.
' "I said, 'Yes, I think so.' Cordell Hull hummed and
replied, 'Mr. Minister, since you won't declare war,
?I don't know how to declare it: all by myself.' And so
, that Is the way it was. It was all a great help."
Thailand's special relationship with the United
States dates from this decision of Seas. Thailand
allied itself with Japan at horse, and Seni refused to .
declare war on the United States abroad, and Thal-
la
nd bentAracefullv I AA riir
pprovAmoreftWase 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
4: C KAP? Pro9v1IP 9v fleMPRZ PoRnaCCC)a 1;4
adapted to existing circumstances. Seni, who did
not go to Russian cocktail parties before the United
States began to withdraw from Southeast Asia, now
accepts invitations and confesses that "their vodka
and caviar taste better every time."
Thanat let it be known publicly that Thailand
would welcome the chance to enter into friendly re-
lations with China, most feared of all its neighbors. ,
There has been no response. For Thailand, for Viet-
nam, Cambodia and Laos and for the United States,
the path to peace with honor in Southeast Asia is
still paved with pun)i sticks,
END
Approved For Release 2001iO3/0.4c401A2ROP81:8Q1430,ITQO
1 7 MAY 1970
Reds in Stung Treng Attack'
Entered Carnbodia Via Laos
By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star
PAKSE, Laos?North Viet-
namese forces attacking Stung
Treng in North Cambodia en-
tered Calyibodia via Laos, ac-
cording to the military com-
mander of Region IV in the
southern half of the Laos pan-
handle.
Gen. Prasouk Somly said six
North Vietnamese battalions
crossed the high Bolovens Pla-
teau in southern Laos, picked up
? supplies, floated on rafts down
the Selchong River, and crossed
Into Cambodia north of the Cam-
bodian town of Siem Pang and
went on to Stung Treng.
Thousands Fleeing
1, The North Vietnamese also
'took advantage of supplies
cached in the Cambodia-Laos
iborder area originally destined
ifor South Vietnam.
Lao military mums said
,tthousands of refugees are cross-
ing into Laos at the Lao-
Cambodian border post of Ken-
30 .nulea north of Stung ,
Treng. The refugees include
Cambodians, Vietnamese and
Laotians who lived in Cambodi-
an border areas.
One refugee was a Cambodian
officer commanding a subdivi-
sion at Kratie south of Stung
Treng. Kratie already is in Com-
munist hands. Many refugees es-
caped in small pirogues up the
Mekong River into Laos.
Estimates of their number
range as high as 17,000.
In south Laos, the Communists
presently are shelling the town
of Saravane and probing the
guerrilla outpost on the Bolovens
Plateau in what appears an ef-
fort to take over the plateau as a
sanctuary for the fighting in
Carabodia and South Vietnam
and to open new Infiltration"'
routes into these countries
through Laos.
Could Topple Lou Nal
If the Communists succeed in
these maneuvers, they could top-,
pled the government of Lon Noli
in Cambodia. by fighting from
bases in northern Cambodia and
southern Laos.
This possibly could leave Pres;
ident Nixon the choice of putting
ground troops in Laos, or
strengthening the present U.S.
military advisers, air support
and Central Intelligence Agency
operations, or leaving South
Vietnamese permanently in
Cambodia. ?
Lao military say they would
accept American troops but not
Vietnamese, who are their tradil
tional
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
Approved For Relean
004
, 0 1
? 1:
4: CIA- 601
LETTER. FROM WASHINGTON
'reaso
of the war into Laos?an earlier de-
.
MAY 9 - -all who question their judgment. There velopment, but one that is hardly dif- ?
IIIRL is King, and Richard have been and will continue to be rcs Ierent in principle or lack of principle.'
Nixon is First Minister. Except ignations, perhaps in unprecedented: (It differs in being smaller and in he-!
1 as Commander-in-Chief of his numbers. Two hundred and fifty Statelmg largely clandestine and under the V
vast armies and armadas of ships and Department officials have formally reg.- 'management of the C.I.A.) But he-.
.
aircraft, he seems powerless, or nearly .
so. He can, speak more civilly of and to
1 his critics, and perhaps he can leash his
snarling deputy, who last night in Ida-
. -i ho dropped some ugly lines from his
I text?not, Spiro Agnew explained, he-
1 cause they were ugly but because they
! had been written by a ghost and did
not reflect his unique sensibility. Nixon
I: has twice this week listened to and
i talked with some student protesters,
.. , and he did not berate them. But he
c
cannot gain control of events by hon-
.; bonne or civility, or by forbearance in
the face of incivility. What is at issue
. is not matTer or style but policy. In his
. I appearance on television last night, he
seemed conciliatory, and even apolo-,
.? getic, but the policy remains substantial-
ly unaltered, and his detractors remain
-:'.--unpersuaded and unappeased. They
would prefer a rude peacemaker to a
t? polite warmaker. And one suspects that
istered their opposition to the CamboH fore Cambodia there seemed at least al.
dian adventure, which they are em-!chance that tensions in the government"
ployed to justify and defend. If there; and in the country might somehow he .
is widespread opposition in State, there. lessened. Few observers here took "Vi-
must be at least as much in most other etnainization" seriously as a plan for
the South Vietnamese, but it seemed to
? _ .
branches. If it is true that Robert Finch'
be going over in this country, and de-
has as much as suggested any kind al escalation was slowly taking place. Spiro
complicity. on the part of Spiro Agnew A
?
gnew. was still talking, but fewer
in the Kent State killings, it scarcely !
seems possible that he can continue to Lwc"e? 1" "mg' and he seemed sonic!.
serve. The Secretary of the Interior's
letter to the President amounted to an
accusation of .gruss Presidential negli
gence and dereliction, and Was thus an -;
.1 uttered. Efforts were being made to
i
act of patent insubordination. The Sec-
compose differences within the Ad-
retary of State is reported to have en-
;ministration. The Attorney General
couraged his colleague in this act. The
wenti
as far as to defend the Supreme
ourt and, by mplication, some of the
Secretaries of State and Defense have-
C
said little about the parts they played or decisions the President had denounced
did not play in the decision 1968. What was predictable all
. to go' into in
Cambodia, but it is plain that their en-' along, !however, was that one more
thusiasm was and is limited and that
""would be disastrous, ever! if it
their participation was minimal. Most, could he
defended by the argument that
thing of a spent force except in those
redoubts of reaction that used to ap-
plaud every sentence Joe McCarthy
it
I' he lost some favor with those who con- of what discussion there was seems to Would ease the withdrawal process in
'
1- tinue to support his policies; to anyone ' have taken place not in the National . Vietnam, and even if it could he said
who opposes conciliation, his efforts at
..1 Security Council hut in somethin ' that the Cambodians welcomed our in-
i' :
? it must reveal not strength or dignity:.
. called the Washington Special Actiontervention. Coming from the Nixon
i
l of character but weakness under pres-I Gr?tip, to which neither William Administration, such defenses would
;
. sure. There is as yet no measure of his i Rogers nor Melvin Laird belonged. ' have ken judged it-cording to their
losses in congressional support, but While this group was holding regular I 'nut.",
1' not according to their merits?
the young and by millions
[there will be within the next feW, dais;' sessions late in April, Rogers told a con- if any?by
' Without doubt, the invasion of Cam-1 gressional committee, "We ? recognize! ,of their elders. Nor would they he ac-
' t
many other governments,
hodia has produced defections 'in. the that if we escalate! and we get involvedl.eePted- hY
legislative branch, and it now seems- in Cambodia with our ground troops1 sonic of which might subscribe to the
-
, entirely possible that for the first time 'that our whole program military rationale but would neverthe-
n
is defeated."'
? ? a anti-war majority exists in the Sep- And four days before the Cambodian! less feel compelled to oppose the action
ate. NVhether it could force, or stay, announcement was made, at a time'' for political and diplomatic reasons. It
the President's hand in Indo-China is when the President is said to have al-' was presumably ? the dumestie and in-
questionable, but an effort will be made ready made up his mind, Laird, in a ternational considerations that weighed!
'
-next week. ! most heavily ,with the Secretaries of taped interview for U.S. Newt f...4
There is almost as much trouble World Retort, said that the: Cam-
State anti Defense and with other
?within the palace as without. The Ad-, bodians should defend themselves, and skeptics within the government. To
? ministration that Nixon formed nearly 1 that, for his part, he would even "rule what extent they conveyed their mis-
? a year and a half ago now seems less an .!. out the use of U.S. advisers" with the givings and the reasons for them to the
Administration than a jerry-built gov- Cambodian Army.
lernmental .conglotnerate in the process I The Administration was, to be sure,
? of dismantling itself. The department in poor shape before Cambodia.: There
heads and the 'lesser bureaucrats are had been an uncommon amount of in-
.
President may never he known. But
they -wonld have been derelict if they
had not given him their assessments at
some point. In any case, he reached his
having at one another in intemperate ; fighting since the early days?much of . decision on military grounds and put
and impolitic language, and seem i it the inevitable product of Nixon's ef-
aside all other considerations. This-can of .
, united mainly in their resentment of the % fort to put together a government be said with some assurance not because
is
treatment accorded them by members!, factionalists. The revolt in the State anyone privy to all his thoughts but
of the White H because of an abundance of evidenceouse staff, whom they 1; Department over Cambodia is led by i!
accuse of lying to the President and to I:men that the reaction took him greatly by who were opposed to war any- i!
them an** 011. et*y#45 inptkupeats6wlee, iirokt4c.ht1polwpobt:04:01M-0700030001-4
--4--14324
.STATINTL
Approved taRiigHATVE9iri -C-ILUOU ?970i9 0 1970
COMER Pit.or rims IN' AIR CRASH
IN VIETNAM
CWO Robert W. Gardner, 22, of Wheaton,
was killed when his helicopter was shot
down April 27.
"Ile said he was over so that the kids with
long hair could have the freedom to dem-
onstrnto here," Donald M. Gardner said yes-
terday about his son.
"He was bomb on a 30-day leave earlier
this month and there were demonstration%
and I remember him saying that's what he
was fighting for?freedom," his father said.
- The chief warrant officer had already had
two helicopters "shot from under him" and
expressed foreboding about his return to
, Vietnam April 18, his father said.
It was not immediately known to Mr.
Gardner where his son's helicopter crashed.
All four members of the crew were killed.
? Mr. Gardner had been in Vietnam since
?"- February, 1069, and was serving an extra siX
' 1 month hitch there when he was killed.
Re was a member of the 3d Platoon, of the
281st Assault Helicopter Company, stationed
, in NhaTrang in the Central Coast region..
."
His unit supplied Special Forces camps.
HOT ROD PAN
Born In Washington, he grew up in
Wheaton, where he graduated from Wheaton
High School in 1965. He attended Montgom-
ery County Community College and the
. University of Maryland before joining the
Army in 1067.
A hot-rod enthusiast, Mr. Gardner owned
dragster, which he named "Honest Injun."
He wan a familiar figure at local drag meta
and in 1007 he raced in the Hot Rod Inter-
national in Pomona, Calif.
? t
Besides his father and mother, he Is sur-
vived by three brothers, Ronald Gardner, of
Kansas City, Mo., and Steven and Paul
Giirdner, both at home. ?
?
LETTER TO INDOCHINA
tempting to win a war that is subject
only to political settlement.
Mr. Simplon states:
The prospects for pence are . ? , gloomier
than ever. And what is happening in Saigon
today, on the government side, scarcely im-
proves the outlook. The rebellious attitude
of South Vietnamese students and war vet-
erans, and the friction between President
Nguyen Van Thieu and the National Assem-
bly, which has worsened the already bad
economic crisis, threaten to cancel the gains
that have been made in the country over
the past year.
Mr. Shaplen concludes that the present
problems in Saigon can only aggravate
the problems surrounding an American
withdrawal and more importantly will
create a broader war that will further
Intensify the painful disillusionment of
the American people in their Govern-
ment. This is the real cost of the present
action?the alienation of more and more
Americans front their system of govern-
ment. We cannot afford to fight a War
abroad which is destroying us at home.
The full text of the *article follows:
LETTER FROM INDOCHINA
(By Robert Shaplen).
Saloom May 2.?In the entire Indo-China
area during the last two months, the Com-
munists of Poking and Hanoi have been giv-
. en, and have employed to their advantage,
a whole now set of options and opportuni-
ties. which, it seems, President Nixon's use
? of American strength in Cambodia will do
little to alter. Tho events that have, so far,
worked against us began with the overthrow
? of Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia
by pro-Western generals and politicians,
then continued with this group's almost im-
mediate errors of judgment and action?par-
? ticularly its brutal actions against Cambo-
dia's Vietnamese minority and its overeager-
ness to join battle with much stronger and
more experienced Communist forces?and
HON. MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON included renewed heavy Communist pressure
in Laos and a serious deteriorating political
OF MASSACHUSETTS and economic situation in South Vietnam. In
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES that country, although our stated policy of
Thursday. May 11, 1970 Vietnemization was reaffirmed when the
.President announced, on April 20th, the
e' Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speakers the withdrawal?against the advice, not surpris-
, steadily worsening situation in Southeast ingly, of his generals?of another hundred
and fifty thousand men in the next year,
Asia and particularly the introduction of
American ground combat troops into the "low profile? our policymakers have
Cambodia are both alarming and repug- sought to maintain had been elevated con-
s
nant. Our invasion of Cambodia can only .on abrol yb oemn bbye f on tahbei pPrur eesul eno ft 'sarms to
speech
serve to get us more deeply involved in Phnom Penh and by our troops' increasing
an unending, enervating, and immoral involvement in operations around the Cara-
conflict unless we act now to take back bodian border. When conditions are as vola-
our constitutional prerogatives and to tile as they now are, it is difficult, if not im-
prohibit further involvement in South-
possible, to be guided by something as vague the doctrine enunciated by the President
east Asia. In this regard, I would like to as on Guam last July, emphasizing our inten-
? bring to my colleague's attention an tion of limiting our Involvement and do-
article by Robert Shaplen entitled "Let- pending on Asian initiatives, Now, Instead of
? ter to Indochina which appeared in the ,viothamizatton, we are faced, in effect, with
, May 0, 1970, issue of the New Yorker n new Indo-Chinazation, including the p05-
magazine. eibility that both Leos and Cambodia may
soon be dominated or controlled by the Com-
. The article traces the events surround-
' ing the widening conflict which is now iTC,ICUlk! T13;3 This r lebmelawteedhly brings into clear
being referred to not as American in- , to face?the unrealismaovef fightingall ng refused
an iso-
volvement in Vietnam. Or the Vietnam lated war in one small country in. the middle
war, but a situation so broad that it is of a largo racially mixed area without sum
termed the Indochina War. It is the thesis dent understanding of the over-all politica
of this article that the United States is or military consequences.
not moving toward disengagement. The principal beneficiaries of recent events
would appear to be the Chinese Communists
Rather, the present Cambodian action '
sets the stage?indeed necessitates?
Peking Is the military and political bulwark
' further attacks of this nature. I shar?.. be the emerging now Indo-China United
Frhind ont Against American Imperialism, created
- ? Mr. 8haplen's fears. ? after a meeting on April 24th and 25th some-
The article recounts the abysmal fail. where In Chins: This hastily called "summi
lire of Um Nixon administration in at... conforenel of the Ihrlo-Chine PeePleeir sit*
parently convened at Sihanouk's instigation,
forged an alliance of the New Revolutionary
Movement in Cambodia, headed by the
ousted Prince, with the Hanoi regime and
the already established Communist rebel gov-
ernments of South Vietnam and Laos.
With their growing support of insurrec-
tionary movements in Thailand and Malay-
sia, and to a lesser extent, in Burma and the
Philippines, the Chinese are now in a strong-
er position to control the revolutionary ap-
paratus throughout Southeast Asia than they
have been at any time since 1065, when the
Vietcong Were stopped by American troops
from winning the Vietnamese war and when
the Peking-backed coup in Indonesia failed.
The response so far of the non-Communist
Asian states to the new crisis has been slow;
Indonesia has called for a meeting at which
Thailand, Japan, and about fifteen other
Asian nations can discuss the matter, but
that is all. While the Americans have found
themselves being inexorably drawn Into Cam-
bodian operations, in which the chances for
any sort of decisive military engagement
will probably prove as evanescent an they
have for ten years in South Vietnam, Peking
and Hanoi have determined to gain as much
as possible from the confused state of affairs.
There is little reason to expect them to
cease doing so, particularly in Cambodia,
especially in view of Hanoi's decision, indi-
cated in enemy documents, to "re-guerrilla-
? Ise" the war In South Vietnam and to pro-
long the conflict there until after the de-
_ parture of the bulk of American forces. No ,
one with any experience in Vietnam, includ-
ing Hanoi's top experts, has minimized the
? dialculties of achieving this goal, but no'
one doubts the will of the Communists or
their patience and endurance. In any event. ?
the recently increasing number, in several '
South Vietnamese provinces, of young men
abducted and sent to North Vietnam for ,
training and indoctrination underlines the
long-term approach that Hanoi has again
adopted. Another. Indication of this Is the
vast amount ..of materiel that has poured
down the Ho Chi Minh Trail from the North
during the last several months.
Only about twenty per cent of this traffic ,
has been interdicted by American bombing.
The coup in Phnom Penh has momentarily
denied the North Vietnamese access to the ?
southern Cambodian porta of Sihanoukville,
Kop, and Ream, through which most of the
Chinese materiel used in the Mekong Delta
of South Vietnam was previously shipped
? with the agreement and profitable conniv-
ance of the Sihanouk regime. However, the
Communist forces in Cambodia are showing -
every intention of trying to regain access to
? those ports and supply routes. In the mean-
time, they are already extending the branch-
es of the Ho Chl Minh Trail deeper into Laos; ?
through the border area where Laos. Cam-
bodia, and South Vietnam come together;
and farther into Cambodia, as well as into
the Vietnamese Highlands and the Delta.
This extension, though it will be no easy'
feat, will undoubtedly oerve to strenehen
the arguments of the American military
leaders who have been against halting the
, bombing of the Trail in Laos?in return for
which Hanoi and its local Communist sup-
porters of the Pnthot Lao have indicated
their willingness to limit military operations
In that country and to start political nego-
tiations there, which would inevitably lead
to stronger Communist representation in any
new coalition government. This is bound
4 to come eventually anyway, and some Amer-
I leans have felt that a break in the Laotian
situation now could produce some movement
in tho deadlocked peace talks in Paris, and
. perhaps bring to an end at least some of the
fighting in Vietnam. The intense mixture of -
political . accommodation and competition
would certainly continue, accompanied by -
terrorism and guerrilla warfare, but the '
, Americans would be out of It sooner rather
than later. The whole merles of developments
?
STATINTI
?.Approved ,POr kelease 2ool1p$,to4 : ,ADP8041:601Rolo7ooin0001 -4..
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP6-01601
WALL cinga 8248
15 MAY 1970
STATINTL
F.Reds Attack Lao Town
On Routes to Cambodia
By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
'Special le The Star
SARAVANE, Laos?Commu-
? nist forces today started their
'expected attack on this town
'of wooden shacks which is
'astride several routes through
southern Laos to Cambodia.
In doing so, they appeared to
':be seeking to establish sane-
: tuaries in southern, Laos for the
'Cambodian war. .,,.
While townspeople clustered
' outside some shops here, Lao
?'. government 150-millimeter how-
' itzers fired at some 300 Com-
munist troops advancing 6,000
yards west of the town.
Reds Attacked by Air
? Lao Air Force dive bombers
also pounded the Communists.
Communist gunners were us-
ing mortars.
Four Communists troops were
.1 killed, according to the town
commander, Col. Yang, but when
a reporter asked to see the bod-
ies he said they were "carried
j away."
As the Red mortar rounds hit
close to a wood hut which serves
I as the Saravane airport termin-
al, townspeople awaiting evacu-
ation dived for cover amid their
possessions.
Many persons have been evac-
uated already, mostly the civil
servants, and many have fled to
outlying villages to avoid Red
shelling.?
The um) positions aro poorly
constructed, making it unlikely
they can hold Snravane in the
face of a Communist assault.
The Communist attack was
seen as the opening phase of a
battle for Saravane and for pos-
session of the Bolovens Plateau
to the south.
North Vietnamese forces on
the plateau are moving to the
rear of Lao Special Guerrilla
Unit No. 2, a force paid for by
the United States and led by the
Central Intelligence Agency.
The unit's positions line the
eastern lip of the plateau, over-
looking the Sekhong River, a
new North Vietnamese supply
route into Cambodia.
The unit is supported by .40
American advisers?mostly lo-
gistics personnel.
.According to the Lao regional
commanders here, the Commu-
nists are floating bamboo rafts
loaded with munitions down the
Sekhong, which flows into Cam-
bodia.
The rafts are camouflaged as
clumps of brush. The river is
full of brush following recent
rains, making these rafts diffi-
cult to spot. Pathet Lao soldiers
with long poles line the river
banks and push these rafts out
of snags.
If the Reds can take the pla-
teau, they will gain a sanctuary
from which they can strike into
both South Vietnam and Combo.
,
:
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CIAIRDP00-01601R000700030001-4
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIAM50601-01601
GUARDIAN
12 May 19/0
0
LAOS : 'VIETNAM WAR IL
?'
Editor's Note: Jacques DeCornoy has travelled to a certain cave that. is hidden not too far from Sem
? extensively throughout Southeast Asia reporting for Le, Neua you find the school where they train their
, Monde. LNS recently interviewed him in Berkeley. -;:l. teachers. Lots of the students are Meo women and men.
It is true that there are Meos with the Royal Laotian
forces. For instance, in Pati which is about 30 kilometers
west of Sem Neua, there were Meos with U.S. officers
and Japanese, Thai and maybe Filippino mercenaries. It
was a kind of U.S. and Meo outpost right in the middle
of Pathet Lao-controlled territory.
At the beginning of 1968 Pati was taken over by the
communist? forces. Several Americans and Asian
1,112eration News Service ?
t LNS: Are they bombing all over in Laos, or just along
the lb o Chi Minh trial?
r ? JDC: I have not been on the Ho Chi Minh trail at all.
I was in Sem Neua province, through which. there is
not such a trail, and when I was there in March of 1968
we were constantly bombed. I remember one day being
either attacked or overflown by U.S. planes every 30
minutes. The landscape really looks like the moon. It I mercenaries were killed and the helicopters and radar
also looks like the southern part of North Vietnam and system were destroyed. It was a civil defeat for the U.S.
some provinces of South Vietnam. Sem Neua is very
close to Nortii Vietnam, northeast of the Plain of Jars
and Vientiane.
LNS: What was the purpose of the bomibng?
JDC: I wish I knew. I personally think (and I wrote
it) that the bombing aims not at destroying the North
radar network in Southeast Asia because the radars that
had been put on the hill in Pati helped the U.S. planes
'that went to bomb North Vietnam. They missed those
radars badly. afterwards.
LNS: Why is the U.S. interested in Northern Laos?
JDC: Well, as I said before, I think that they are
. Vietnamese forces in transit through Laos or the forces - mostly interested in destroying the Lao left. That's what
, based in Laos, but aims at destroying the Pathet Lao I . they are trying to do. I would even say that they are
i of Sem Neua?it has been entirely destroyed. And I , trying to physically destroy the Pathet Lao leadership. 1 '
t, infrastructure. For instance, I was in what was the city ' \
0, could see?because they had not exploded?lots of," met Prince Souphanouvong, the President of the Central,
anti-personnel bombs. Now it is obvious that those '? Committee of the Pathet Lao in a big cave. This cave is
:.',, anti-personnel bombs were aimed at killing people and I " surrounded by craters?everywhere craters. And the
guess not only Pathet Lao soldiers, but also civilians. Americans must know where the Central Committee
And there are civilians that have been killed. All the '1 meets. It cannot be a secret. And they are trying to kill
? -
'civilians have had to leave the city. They now live in the ' se I ' tho people. They didn't succeed yet, but they are
' I
- woods or in caves a few miles from Sem Neua where ' ' obviously trying to destroy the political infrastructure. '
? absolutely everything has been destroyed. All the villages' And in a way, the U.S. has succeeded, because the'
I saw in the province of Sem Neua except two have been
detro ed
. It's very hard to (lave in this region, not only because
, :\ it's dangerous, but because there aren't any roads any ' nothing. It's terrible. . . ,
{ more. You have got to drive from crater to crater and ? ' LNS: Is it true that there are a lot of North
i L. it's quite dangerous. ' Vietnamese in the area? .
LNS: What about the massive displacement of''.JDC: Well it is true that there are North Vietnamese,
people? It seems that the U.S. is clearing people out. ? ' but I don't know how many there are. A few weeks ago
JDC: Yes, there is the same process that they do in - the U.S. embassy said there were 50,000 North.
South Vietnam. Some American right-wing political Vietnamese troops and suddenly President Nixon said
scientist wrote one day that actually it was not bad' that there were 67,000.1 don't know how they got their
. because it accelerates the natural process ' of , figures. There is one thing I'm sure of?the more the U.S.
.. urbanization. I think Herman kahn wrote it. Now it is bombs the Pathet Lao zones, the more pro-communist,
, obvious to me that in Laos there are hundreds of 1 peasants are scared of the bombing and are obliged to
? thousands of refugees. Those people had to leave their flee down - to the Mekong Vagey, the more the Pathet
villages and their !anti because they couldn't cultivate ' Lao will require military aid from the North
their land any more, because the buffalos had been = Vietnamese?because they need men.
i killed, and because they were too afraid of the bombs. It reminds me of what happened in South Vietnam
? They are now living in camps and they don't join the before the landing of the Marines in Da Nang' in July
? Royal armed forces. If they were that much 1965. There were very. few North Vietnamese troops in
, anti-communist, and that much anti-North Vietnamese South Vietnam. But as the American expeditionary
, and that much anti-Pathet Lao, I guess they would ask , corps grew and grew In South Vietnam to more than a
for rifles and go and. fight, but they don't. They are just ' half a million, it was obvious that the NLF needed
troops from the north. and the same process might
happen for the Pathet Lao. The more the Americans.
bomb the Pathet Lao zones, the more the Pathet Lao%
, will need foreign troops. ? .
4
' So I think it Is not very honest to say that the North .
Pathet Lao economy has suffered a lot fromthe
bombing. The people are very poor. I was amazed by
their lack of books, of drugs, of penciis?they've just got;
waiting for the end of the war to go back to their land. ?
LNS: Do you know what the situation is with the
? CIA-trained Meo tribesmen around the Plain of Jars, and
the so-called mercenary army?
JDC: I could see in the province of Sem Neua that '
lots of kilos are working together with the Pathet Lao
1 and belMN v1, haroFirelease(29114/113104 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
oontinued
Vietna
voctsPtorfbet1 ogee 2004183164 : VAIROR4306134f6D1R00017E000210001144
be more h n t to say that the Pathet Lao has had to ask use anti-personnel bombs, but what can you do against
the North Vietnamese for more aid because the B-52s?
American intervention has, grown bigger and bigger as LNS: There were reports recently that the
time has gone on. government of Thailand sent troops into Laos to help
LNS: Could you say what the political structure of the Royal Laotians. Has this been going on for a long
the Pathet Lao Is like? Do they have a government like time?
the NLF? You mentioned a Central Committee. JDC: Yes. There have been some Thai artillery groups'
JDC: No, they don't have a government like the NLF, 'fighting for a long time in Laos, and last year it was
and I don't think that they want that now. No, there is, reported that Thai soldiers were dressed with Royal Lao
just the one organization, the Pathet Lao, with the uniforms and fought in the southern part of Laos. This
Central Committee, and actually it works like a wasn't confirmed, but it wasn't denied either. It is true,
government of its own. Of course they said that they there are more and more Thai connections between the
want to one day or another come back into a national right-wing military leaders in Vientiane and the military
union government but they won't do it now. They establishment of Bangkok. And if things go on there as
, administer their zones just like an Independent they have been going on for two or three years Vientiane'
government. They've got their own ministries. .; will become a kind of suburb of Bangkok and the
For instance, they started in 1967 or 1968, I don't ? American bases of Thailand?which lots of Laosdon"t .
, ?
remember exactly, a kind of five-year plan to develop ?.,11ke, even right-wing people.
their regions.
I remember, I think it was in 1968, one of the
In my opinion, in Laos there are two toughest right-wing Lao leaders was seen in Vientiane in
movements?there is h. reactionary movement backed by the armed forces parade together, not with his wife, but
the U.S. and there is a communist movement, the Pathet with Miss Thailand. And a few days later young
Lao and its friends?that's all. That is, I think, the end of lieutenants and captians, right-wing people, but
any middle-of-the-road movement. And what's true of nationalists, put out a pamphlet against him and this
Laos is true of South Vietnam. And what's true of South Miss Thailand, Saying, "We are Laos and we are in
Vietnam I think will be true of Cambodia pretty soon. Laos?we don't want to become slaves of this big and
The people don't have any choice. You are on one side wealthy pro-American Thailand." Now those people
or the other. You can't be in the middle of the road any
didn't join the Pathet Lao ranks. Still, for the first time
more. If you want to be?and there are people who
maybe, they understood where this pro-American policy
wanted to be in Saigon?you are put in jail or you are
of Vientiane might lead their country. That is, the total
forced to go into exile in Paris or somewhere else. Look,
destruction not only of their country, but also of the
at the student leaders that are being arrested right now
values of their country. That is what they don't want
in Saigon. Look at the Buddhist monks. You must go to
even if they are right-wing people.
the jungle, abroad, or join the right-wing forces?there is
But the general doesn't care. He just wants to make
no free middle-of-the-road position any more;
LNS: What does the Pathet Lao structure look like at money. Everybody knows, for instance, that the
commander-in-chief of the right-wing forces is at the I
the village level? ?
head of the opium trade between Saigon and Vientiane
JDC: Well, it's hard to say, because as I said, most of and Bangkok. He never goes to the battlefield. You can
the villages have been destroyed?and so has the usually see him in the afternoon in a Vientiane bar.
' organization. But in the few villages in which I lived and LNS: Several returned or ex-U.S. servicemen have '
which have not been bombed, they've got a People's said that U.S. military and Air America flights fly gold
Committee at the head of the village, and several bricks into Laos which are in turn traded for opium
commissions?one for the battlefields, one for the produced by the Meo tribesmen, and that the opium
buffalos, one for health and education, that's all, eventually winds up in the United States and France.
They've got, of course, their, political commissar, one .
from the Central Committee. When I travelled JDC: Well, I really don't know much about it. All
throughout the country there was one political
know is that there are planes that take off from
commissar with me who was fluent in French?he had Vientiane and fly to South Vietnam with opium and
studied in France?and he was with me not only to help gold. I know one thing?it was very funny?I was in
me understand what the people said; he was also with
Vientiane during the Tet offensive in South Vietnam,
me to indoctrinate the people, and he told me so. Every and a few people at least were very much annoyed, not
now and then he left me and said, "Well, now I've got a because - it was a military victory - for the
meeting with such-and-such section of the village, I've *' communists?they didn't care at all?but because the-.
got to explain to them what we are doing at the Central .., airport at Saigon was closed, and the planes that usually'
Committee," and he left me and he came back an hour bring gold and opium from Laos to Saigon couldn't land
later after he talked to the people. :there any more, and they were losing money. I met one ?
LNS: In the areas where the villages have been of those gold traders, and he told it to me very frankly.
bombed, what kind of organization do they have?or LNS: Can you describe the circumstances around
have they all been dispersed? r. which the Pathet Lao left the coalition government back:
JDC: Yes, they have been dispersed into caves. If in 1963? There's been a lot of discussion in the
they don't live in caves, they live in miserable huts in the community here that the CIA had something to do with'Vi/
woods, and just like in North Vietnam, they've got some assassinations.
shelters all around. As soon as they hear the jets they go JDC: I think In 1961 one member of the coalition
down into the shelters and wait. It disturbs everything, government was assassinated in front of his house in
because when the planes come every 30 minutes or every. Vientiane. He was a left-wing neutralist. Other members
hour you 'cannot seriously work. And you never knew,-, .of the left-wing neutralist movement were killed later
at least in 1968, when you were in the Pathet Lao zones,-I. on. And then you had the right-wing coups and so on. It
whether the planes came for you or were just flying over ? was absolutely impossible for the left?whether Marxist
. you to go to bomb North Vietnam. You had to go down:., left or non-Marxist left, to work in Vientiane any more.
La the shelter and stop your work. You had to. - Officially this man was killed by one of his soldiers.
LNS: Don't they have a canopy of jungle foliage to' Nobody has ever explained why the soldier killed him.
protect them? . What I can say is that he was a left-wing neutralist and
?
his daughter, whom I know, has joined the Pathet Lao.
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cannot be in the middle of the road. 'This family tried to
be honestly neutralist in Vientiane. The father was
killed, and the family joined the Pathet Lao. They had
no other choice. Now the daughter, after some studies in
France and then in Moscow?she is an engineer?lives in a
cave very close to Sem Neua. ThEt's where I met her.
And the uncle, the brother of the assassinated minister,
as far as I know, is the official doctorfor the Central'
Committee of the Pathet Lao and he also lives in a cave.
He is married to a French woman, by the way, who is
now back with the children in France because it's very
hard to raise young children in caves.
Very few people know how those people live in caves.
It's really terrible, especially during the rainy season,
because everything is humid. You cannot bring the
children out of the cave because of the bombing, so they
lack sun, they lack food, they are white, they are very
unhealthy. Very few people know even in Vientiane. .
There is something I want to say here. In Vientiane I
met a very young, a very brilliant Ameritan diplomat,
graduated from one of the best American universities.
He said to me once, "If we want a really strong, free and
democratic anti-communist Laos to be built, we must
help the Laos to get rid of their traditional cultural
values, bring them back to zero, and then build a new
nation." And I'm really quoting. And he said, "Before I
was in Laos I was in Africa, and their cultural values here
are even worse than the cultural values of those iarkiins.6.
Vientiane is becoming more and more a small Saigon
or a small Bangkok?a mixture of prostitution, or
corruption?I mean really, it's in chaos. The young Laos
who live there are forgetting their heritage more and
more?they speak broken English, they can speak a few
words of French?it's really a pity to see them. They
don't know where they go. They try to forget about the
war, but it's hard, because they have families on the
other side. It's not a new Laos that's being built in
Vientiane. It's nothing. _ -
LNS: Are the Pathet :Lao_ aware of the antiwar
,movement here in the U.S.?
JDC: There is something I must tell you, because I
think it has not been reported by the American pre.
For the first time, five or six weeks ago, the Pathet Lao'
in a communique mentioned the American movement,
asking the antiwar movement to put some prewure on
the. U.S. government so the U.S. government will stop
the U.S. intervention against the Pathet Lao. I think It's
a kind of sign. And it shows that for the first time (like
-the North Vietnamese did a few years ago) the Pathet
Lao may start to "make some contacts with American&
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Approved For Release 20191/Betii$V4RDP80-01601
1 1 MAY1970
.S. Ground Attack
rcre y a flans
By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star
PAX SE, Iaos?Laotian right-
ist leader here said the United
States should hit the Ho Chi
Minh trail in south Laos at the
same time it is attacking Cam-
bodian sanctuaries.
They said as long as the Com-
munist Vietnamese are using the
Ho Chi Minh trail in eastern
Laos to send reinforcements and
material to Combodia and South
Vietnam, the U.S: effort in
Cambodia cannot be fully effec-
tive.
"This is no time for half mea-
sures," Prince Boun Oum, the
rightist leader in South Laos,
said.
"It would be a good thing for
the U.S. to cut the trails now," a
Lao military official said.
"But," he added hurriedly,
"we wouldn't want South Viet-
namese troops. Americans would
be all right."
Nixon Criticized
The Lao military criticized
President Nixon for setting time
and territorial limits on Ameri-
can actions in Cambodia. "The
North Vietnamese will withdraw
to the west, then return and re-
build the base areas when the
Americans leave," a Lao gener-
al said.
Laotians said they expect the
Communists to become active in
northern Cambodia and to try
and build up the Red Cambodian
indigenous movement in these
areas, supplied from new sanc-
tuaries in Laos, Cambodia bor-
der areas.
The Lao military reaction was
sparked by Red moves in mili-
tary region IV, the southern half
of the Laos panhandle. Pak Se is
military region IV headquarters.
? Heavy fighting is going on now
at Phou Luan, the highest point
?
of the rice-rich Bolovens
Pla-
teau, 30 miles north of iheLao-
Cambodian border.
Reds Regroup
"If they get the Bolovens!they
can hide and feed five
the south Laos. com-
mander, Gen. Bounphone Maha-
parak said North Vietnamese
forces are grouping west of Sar-
avane, which is the best access
route to the plateau.
The Laol ost the province capi-
tal of Attopeau last month;o pen-
ing the Sekhong River Route
into Cambodia.
Current U.S. military help to
Laos in this area is confined to
Army advisers, Air Force for-
ward air controllers, air logis-
tics and Central Intelligence
Agency operatives who lead trib-
al guerrillas from small. air-
strips on the eastern edgeo f the
Bplovens Plateau. ?
The number of Americans en. ,
gaged in these operations-totals'
less than 100 ?
STATINTL .
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Approved For ReleaNWPWO?FRAKIRAB80-01601R
STATI NTL
9 MAY 1970
ESuhstantial US, hacking. of Nol
? .govermn.ent expecte
, ?
,.without large Fiound
,)
` By George W. Ashworth ? success uncertain. Certainly, ' the South ? ?
,??Vietnamese could help in?some slight ways..
r ?
Involvement
?roes forecast
Staff correspondent of
0 The Christian Science Monitor ,' However the mutual antipathy of the Cam-'?
. bodians and ? Vietnamese would be a bin:.
1
I Washington drance, as would the still freshly remem-,'!
1 I bered killings of the Vietnamese' in Cam.-
If the Lon Nol government survives in bodia. ?
1,)Cambodia, indications here are that Ameri-'' ? 1
..!. ?
.. can support of that government will build Situation,1 assessed
; to substantial proportions.
' Some sources here are predicting the vir- Perhaps the best hope at present is that
i:tual "Laoization" of the war in Cambodia? the Indonesians will be able .to provide ad-,
.
.U.S. involvement without massive ground visers and some combat troops as a last i
!lorces. resort. ? 1
In his April 30 speech to this nation, Pres-
,
? As sources here 'assess the ,Indonesian.
t.
.. Went Nixon said, "With other nations, we situation, the multination parley on Clio- ?
bodia (expected to be held in Jakarta 1.1? ay ..I
:shall do our best to provide the small arms .16.,17) will possibly?if not probably7-fail I
'and other equipment which the Cambodian .10
').Army of 40,000 needs and can use for its ' yield any solutions: Subsequently, the i'
' defense." 4
stand of Indonesian Minister Adam Malik:
'? The President continued, "But the aid will be weakened, and the way will be
l?we will provide will be limited for the pur.., opened ? for the Indonesian military, now!
pose of enabling Cambodia to defend its .champing at the bit, to blossom forth withi
> neutrality and not for the purpose of making .their, aid proposals for Cambodia..
,
it an active belligerent on .one side or the , Another possibility would be Malay police-';
I: other."
.. . ,.. . .
" or some other small form of aid. The Thais t
!',Trick of the decade' ? .possibly would be willing to help, but they
-
,;are beset by a steadily growing insurgency
Making the easygoing, predominantly ,in their northeastern 'frontiers ? that shows' ,
?Buddhist Cambodians belligerents on one signs of growing rather than diminishing, f .,
:side or the other would be the trick of the now, as the Chinese demonstrate the moral !
i, decade. The Americans, most sources be- willingness to keep the pressure on and the ;
rlieve, will be doing extremely well indeed,' physical readiness to push their road' across?.1
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STATI NTL
9 MAY 1970
I .
Laotian Tragedy
The Long March
Vientiane
' After twenty years of sporadic, semi-secret warfare,
Laos has a serious refugee problem. At least half the
population of three million has been displaced by the
fighting, according to government officials in Vien-
tiane. At least i8o,000 are living in "refugee villages."
At the end of 1968, American bombers were di-
verted from North Vietnam to Laos and began syste-
matically depopulating Pathet Lao-controlled territory.
Air strikes were no longer limited to the network of
North Vietnamese supply routes twisting through the
, sparsely inhabited mountains of eastern Laos on their
way to South Vietnam (the "Ho Chi Minh trail"), nor
, confined to "combat support missions," as President
Nixon would have it. Everything that stood and was
not controlled by the government became a target.
''Tribesmen and peasants began to flee to the relative'
.. safety of the government-controlled lowlands. The US
Embassy, having persuaded itself that the people were
escaping "Communist? terrorism," was enthusiastic ,
about this "voting-with-the-feet." Yet it was not ? and
is not yet ? eager to advertise the refugee situation.
, In mid-1969 air strikes were escalated to their pres-
ent high level of 15,000 sorties a month. In support of
secrecy-shrouded offensive by. the CIA-financed
"Clandestine Army" of Meo mercenaries:the US car-
red out a saturation bombing campaign on the Pathet
Lao-controlled Plain of Jars in northeastern Laos. After
seizing the Plain, the Clandestine Army rounded up the
inhabitants, culled out the prosperous farmers and mer-
chants ? the main contributors to Pathet Lao tax cof-
fers ? and shipped them to the Vientiane lowlands. The
'poor peasants were allowed to remain behind, not in
, their original homes, which had been reduced to rub-
ble by the bombing, but in the "refugee villages."
I asked a young. man what happened when the
Clandestine Army took over his village. "The soldiers
gathered us together," he said. "They told us we had ,
one hour to leave. We didn't know where we were
, going. The soldiers took whatever they wanted from
our houses, and then they burned the village down. An
officer told us that if anyone asked, we should say we
were escaping from the Communists. We walked zo.
miles to an airstrip, and then American planes brought
? us here. I was lucky. I'm half-Chinese, so they didn't
make me join the army. The Lao boys were drafted
right there. I haven't seen them since."
. When the dry season came at the end of last year,
Intelligence iztrz::1'adicated that the North Vietnam-
. ese and tlik
that the rag-tag Clandestine Army could hold off a
determined Communist advance, but the US Embassy
. here wanted two guarantees: that the peasant-refugees
? indispensable producers of rice ? would not again be
available to benefit the Pathet Lao; and that American
bombers would have a free hand to pound the oncom-
ing, troops. So it was decided to evacuate all civilians
from the Plain of Jars. ?
Between February 5 and 11, some 15,000 bedraggled
Laotian peasants were loaded onto Air American cargo
planes and shipped to new "refugee villages" in the ,
, Mekong lowlands. The Plain of Jars became a free-
strike zone. The US-Vientiane planners, unable to
carry their government to the people, had chosen the
Vietnam-tried course of bringing the people to the
government. "We could work in the fields only at
night; by day we slept underground in the bunkers,"
? explained one old woman in a camp near Vientiane.
"Everything that moved was bombed. Our village was
bombed three times. The second time my daughter was
killed. Then we left and went to live in the forest. It's
'very difficult to live there. There's not enough to eat."
Though more people live under government control
since the bombing, American officials here deny that
was the intent of the bombing. They claim that "Com-
munist terrorism" is responsible for the influx of refu-
gees. When the mass evacuation from the Plain of Jars
?
I '
. Vs.
-rt.,
4.t0,0?.. ?????,$
. .
1 . '' - ?.., ....4""te-L.C.R.44..
gag' plaint@ amptuggi4 ! C.IA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
?4'Preaie,
sive to recapture the Plain of .4 -lam No one believed I not .1tvelican. I are etliCtly rocal talent.' ,
?.., .1
? . .
.nont InTlocz
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
was begun in February, US AID officials who super-
vised the operation maintained that the people all free-
ly chose to leave their homes. Other US AID officials,
who do not wish to be identified, now admit, however,
that the decision was made in Vientiane and that the
people were moved regardless of their wishes. Natu-
rally, when confronted with the choice of being
bombed at home or surviving in a far-away camp,
many people chose the latter. But it seems devious to
' call that choice "free."
The plight of refugees here is not yet as grim as that'
'of their counterparts in Vietnam. Camps are small and
usually contiguous to an established village. The idea
is that , the old villagers will help dispossessed new-
comers; so far it has worked well, to the great credit of
the Lao villagers. But refugees do not have enough .
land to support themselves, arid the land they do re-
ceive is usually the least fertile!. The thatched, barrack
housing is depressing even to peasants accustomed to
primitive conditions. Medical care is rare; so is school-
ing. US AID this year will spend some $7 million on
. refugee relief (about one thirty-fifth of the estimated,
$250 million spent to wage the war); most of that will
be used for rice crops.
The worst suffering is not cri the camps. By the time
, people reach them, the worst: is over. Their villages
have been destroyed; their relatives killed or drafted;
? they have walked, sometimes for months, through. ,
some of the most rugged country in the world. Only
? the lucky ones ride Air America. The others, by the
tens of thousands, put their belongings on their backs ,
and set out across the hills on foot It is an agony diffi-
cult for an outsider to imagine. American and Laotian
, officials 'estimate that over the last lo years 20 percent
'of the people of northeastern Laos have died in these
, refugee marches. The verdant limestone mountains
that seem to have been lifted from a delicate Chinese
scroll are a cemetery for 100,000 peasants! Random air
strikes are always a threati countless unexploded
bombs lie scattered half-buried in the hills; exhaustion
7 claims the weaker marchers; epidemics, especially of
measles, are common; and of course there is never
enough food.
. The US Embassy downplays the dimension of the
tragedy by counting only those currently living on re-
lief in recognized "refugee villages" ? the i80,000 I
have mentioned. The Laotian government, however,
reports 543,000 refugees and says there are at least
? another 150,000 unregistered. Now ? because of heavy
fighting and bombing near the Plain of Jars ? another
100,000 are trudging southward through the roadless
mountains to safety. One out of five will probably die
before reaching the lowlands.
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ST_ATINTL
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E 4084 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?Extensions of Remarks May 7, 1970
explosion of anger and despair and bitter-
ness?hence violence and counterviolence,
rebellion and repression.
WHAT IIAS BEEN GAINED?
It may be argued by those politicians and
commentators as concerned as Mr. Nixon
about manhood, humiliation and American
Vanity that, even had he known his people
Well enough to expect the reaction he is
getting, he still would have had no choice
but to act in the national interest, as he
saw it. But none will be able to explain
What Interest is worth having pushed so
Many of the educated and concerned of a
Whole generation into hatred and mistrust
- of their own Government; and who can say
how the future can be protected abroad if
a nation must club and shoot its children
In the streets and on the campus?
? What, in fact, has re-escalation gained
lis? A chilly diplomatic reaction, for one
thing, including quite possible a setback to
the nuclear arms limitation talks. For an-
other, the most severe Congressional reac-
tion in decades against the exercise of Presi-
dential powers.
? The Administration itself is divided and
'wounded at the top, with Mr. Nixon?like
Lyndon Johnson only two years ago?nud-
? denly unable or unwilling to travel among
his own people. Secretary of State Rogers
is shown either to know little of what is
? happening or to have minimal policy in-
.,? fluence; Secretary of Defense Laird was ap-
parently overruled and?worse?uninformed
about what his own bombers were doing. Is
, It an accident that these two, with Robert
- ' Finch among the ablest men in the Admin-
istration, now Join Mr. Finch in the kind
? of public embarrassment to which he has
; had to become inured?
On the battlefield itself, no supreme Corn-
. munist headquarters has been found, al-
though its presence had been advertised as
If it were Hitler's bunker. In fact, not many
". Communist troops of any kind have been
, found, according to reporters on the scene,
,although captured rice tonnage amounts
daily and the body count is predittably in-
? elated. Destruction is wholesale, of course, but
mostly of Cambodian towns and farms, not
of Vietcong or North Vietnamese soldiers. ,
? BEGGING THE Qt7ESTION
To cap this futility with absurdity, Mr.
Nixon now pledges to let the invaders go no
further into Cambodia than eighteen mike
from the border, a guarantee which if hon-
. ored makes the rest of that sizable country
a real sanctuary easily reached; and he fur-
- ther promises to pull the troops out within
, eight weeks, a period that probably ems be,
survived by an enemy that has been fighting
; for more than twenty years. These public re-
? ? ?
strictions beg the question what the in-
vasion can accomplish.
Whatever the anewer, the dead at Kent
State are far too high price for it. Like
the dead in Cambodia and Vietnam, they can
, be buried; but aomehow the nation has to,
go on living v4th Itself. Mr. Hickere coil.
repent; letter to the President shows that
even within the Administration, Mr. Nixon
and Mr. Agnew have only made that tirade!
THE UNILLD STATES VIOLATES
CAMBODIAN NEUTRALITY
?
HON. DONALD M. FRASER
OP MINNESOTA
? ,
/f4 THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
. Thursday, May 7,1970
? Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker. tomorrow
the President will speak to the Nationon
the background and details of the Amer-
ican invasion of Cambodia. I expect he
will focus on the military aspects of our
Involvement In Southeast Asia as dis-
tinct from the political implication of our
action. It needs to be emphasized that
the United States has Invaded a neutral
state without prior consultation with its
Government. This reveals a disregard for
Cambodian sovereignty. It is my under-
standing that this disregard for the.
legitimate aspirations of the Cambodian
state has a long history. The following
article from the Cornell Daily Bun de-
scribes this well: ,
THE UNITED STATES AND CAMBODIAN
NEUTRALITY
(By Laura Summers)
The United States invasion of Cambodia is
a blatant and irrevocable confession of our
government's lack of understanding and In-
tolerance for Cambodian neutrality. Since
Cambodia's decision to adopt a neutral for-
eign policy in December, 1954, the United
States has sought to undermine that neutral-
ity by overt and covert means?first, by re-
fusal to restrain the actions of our allies,
Thailand and Vietnam, and second, by dis-
torting tho legitimate aspirations of the
Cambodian people to suit our own ends in
the prosecution of the Vietnamese war. His-
tory speaks for Itself.
The Eisenhower administration treated
Cambodian neutrality with hostility. Secre-
tary of State Dulles, who perceived Commu-
nism as an evil to be combated everywhere
hi. Southeast Asia, was suspicious of Cam-
bodia's renunciation of the SEATO pact and -
. Its persistant criticism of American interven-
tion in Diem's Vietnam and Sarit's Thailand. .
Cambodia matched each threat from the
, West with a concession to the, East to gain'
'international leverage in its struggle to pre-
. vent domestic intervention.
, . Dulles was thoroughly convinced that neu-
tral nations were a danger to the "free world"
cause when the Pathet Lao won the only free
, elections in Laotian history (1958). One ?
month later, the South Vietnamese army in-
vaded' a Cambodian province, occupied two
villages, and moved a border marker before
returning to their own country. Sihanouk
protested directly to the United States. The
U.S. promised to counsel moderation to the
Vietnamese but also warned the Cambodians
? 'not to use any weapons provided by American
aid against the invaders. One week later
Cambodia Initiated negotiations for fun dip-
/emetic relations with China. Washington's
response was to begin plane to remove
Siha-
nouk from poWer.
Shortly thereafter, the Khmer Sorel Move-
? ment was founded. Presumably supported by
Thailand, South Vietnam and the American
CIA, thin group of approximately one thou-
sand Cambodian dissidents attempted a "Day
of Pigs" typo invasion in early 1059. Sihanouk
, was warned of the plot by three foreign am.
beeendoral Confessions of the captured par-
, ticipants implicated Marshall Sarit of Thai-
land; Ngo Trong Hien, Diem's representative
? In Phnom Penh; and Victor Matsui of the
American 'Embassy, widely rumored to be
? CIA agent.
The Kennedy administration was some-
what more sympathetic to Cambodia's desires
to practice a true neutrality. But by 1961, the
U.S. was so committed in Thailand and South
?-Vietnam that Kennedy's conciliatory attitude ?
toward Cambodia was not well-received by
..our anti-Communist allies, Thus, Kennedy
was unable to promise United States partici-
? potion in an international conference to
guarantee Cambodian neutrality. In urging
? Diem to support such a conference, Sihanouk '
'said Cambodia would agree to complete In-'
?ternational control If Mouth Vietnam IrChld
agree to recognize Cambodia's present bor-
ders. Diem refused.
In 1004, Adial Stevenson, U.S. Ambassador
to the United Nations, expressed American
apologies and regrets for the damage and
death caused by an attack on a Cambodian
village staged by a South Vietnamese army
unit with an American advisor. Later he
denied numerous other complaints submitted
by Cambodia dealing with military raids.
American policy took a sharp change in
late 1001 after the first infiltration of a large
North Vietnamese regular force through
Cambodia. In December, Khmero-American
negotiations in New Delhi ended abruptly
after one clay. Tho American ambassador re-
ported he had made the American position
absolutely clear. After further American-
South Vietnamese violations of Cambodian
territory, Cambodia severed diplomatic re-
lations with the United States in April, 1905.
Simultaneously, Secretary Rusk announced
the United States would be glad to partici-
pate In an international conference to guar-
antee Cambodia's neutrality.
Cambodia refused to participate in a con--
ference on its neutrality where the issue of
nonintervention by SEATO powers would be
ignored while the United States and South
Vietnam attempted to cut off North Viet-
namese infiltration. On April 28, 1965, Ma-
'11051k requested that the SEATO powers make
a formal declaration that Cambodia was not
Included in its "perimeter of intervention."
The request was ignored.
In contrast to Johnson administration
policy, Nixon's statement on Vietnam in his
luldress to the nation on May 14, 1969, omits
any reference to an American guarantee of
Cambodian neutrality and territorial integ-
rity. Significantly, Nixon notes that his four
.month review of the war revealed a "wide
gulf between Washington and Saigon." Was
Cambodia part of this gulf? His carefully
measured comments on Laos and Cambodia
read as follows:
We ask only that North Vietnam withdraw
its forces from South Vietnam, Cambodia and
Laos into North Vietnam, also in accordance
with a timetable. We include Cambodia and
Laos to ensure that these Countries would
not be used as bases for a renewed war,
? This language was echoed by Nixon and
Thieu in their Joint communique after the
Midway conference and by the United States
, delegation, to the Paris peace talks.
This, then, is the historical prelude to in.
.v a sn.
at diNouoaT t
student in government, specialises
.?Laura Summers, a third-year
in the area of Southeast Asia.) ?
DOCUMENTS
Either House may order the printing of a
document not already provided for by law,
but only when the same shall be accompa-
nied by an estimate from the Public Printer
an to the probable coat therent. Any execu-
tive depnrtinent, bureau, board or incirpend-
ent office of the Ciovreninent submitting re-
? ports or documents in response to inquiries
from Congress shall submit therewith an
estimate of the probable cost of printing the
usual number. Nothing in this section re-
lating to estimates shell apply to reports or
documents not exceeding 50 pages (U.S.
.Code, title 44, sec. 716,82 Stat. 1200)?
Resolutions for printing extra copies, when
? presented to either House, shall be referred
Immediately to the Committee on House
Administration of the House of Representa-
tives or the Committee on Rules and Admin-
istration of the Senate, who, in making their
report, shall give the probable cost of the
*proposed printing upon the estimate of the
Public Printer, and no extra 'copies shall be
printed before such committee has reported
?ode. title 44,550. 708,112 Stat. /247)1, :
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1 ? ?
,
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RER-INF6L01
_.
May 7, 1970 . CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENAT
will not bow before protracted aggres- Communists have been.beaten back into , say here now truly "will lightus down,
sion from Communist powers. a strategy of protracted conflict does in honor or dishonor, to the latest gen-
I believe the most significant passage not confront the American people with eration."
in the President's speech of April 30 was a new experience. The American people
the following: have been directly involved in open pro-
, ,, :, - ORDER OF BUSINESS
We live in an ago of anarchy both abroad traded conflict with Communists at
'
and at home. We gee mindless attacks on all least since the Berlin blockade. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I sug-
the great institutions which have been communist rulers have always under- "'gest the absence of a quorum.
created by free civilizations in the past five ? stood one thing: All that stands j)owcp-1; ; . The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BUR-
hundred years. Here in the United States, them and the success of their vieious mot). The clerk will call the roll.
great universities are being systematically plans is the determination of the Amer- The assistant legislative clerk called ' ' I
. . t
find themselves under attack from within lean people. The American people dare_ the roll.
? destroyed. Small nations. all over the world
and from without. not?they will not?falter now. Our en- Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President,.I ask ?
If when the chips are down the U.S. acts emies are in the process of learning, to unanimous consent that the order for the ' * '
, like a pitiful helpless giant, the forces of their sorrow, a lesson that other ty- quorum call be rescinded.
A.P., totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten rants have had occasion to learn during The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without _
. free institutions throughout the world, the last 194 years. It is dangerous to un- , objection, it is so ordered.
It is not our power but our will and char- dercstimate the American people. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
actor that is being tested tonight. The ques- My friend and colleague, the Seri- unanimous consent that I may be recog-
tion all Americans must ask and answer to- . ator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS), nixed pending the arrival of the distin-
night is this: Does the richest and strongest
concluded his moving and eloquent Law guished Senator frOm New York, who is .
character to meet a direct challenge by a Day address with a quotation from ' next on the agenda, without any loss of ,,.
nation in the history of the world have the
group which rejects every efforts to win a Tom Paine. I would like to conclude my time to him,
just peace, ignores our warnings, tramples prepared remarks with the same words: ? 'The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
on solemn agreements, violates the neutral-' Those who expect to reap the blessings of objection, it is so ordered.
. ity of an unarmed people and uses our prison"' freedom must, like men, undergo the fatigue
are as hostages? . of supporting it.
LAOS?HEARINGS CONDUCTED. BY
?
In this passage the President inten- Mr. President, one of the great Sen- SENATOR SYlVIINGTON
tionally and correctly relates the violence ators of this Senate in the past was the
4., exported by Communists in -Asia to a Honorable Edwin C. Johnson who served Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the -
...... . general decay of confidence in the ea- as U.S. Senator and then as Governor of 'distinguished senior Senator from Mis-
; pacity of the great free nations?and Colorado. ? souri (Mr. SYMINGTON) has been con-
especially the United States?to defend: I have in my hand a copy of a letter . ducting a number of most interesting
themselves and their best institutions. '-he has written to the President, which IS hearings affecting various parts of the.
A score of retired university presidents printed' in the Denver Post. world. The results of those hearings
In this country can testify to the fact The title is "Courageous Action: Mes6' ? When they are finally published?and I
that it is dangerous to earn the con sage to the Honorable Richard Milhous ? use the word "finally" advisedly?will re-
tempt of determined enemies of civility. Nixon, Washington, D.C." It reads: ? .:?ceive a good deal of attention. Perhaps. The President understands that it is dari- Your courageous action did not surprise ,. . __
aOtherwise they might have been lost in .
gerous for a nation to earn the contempt : me. It will shorten this cruel war many.liplc,Straille.
of those nations whose very raison d etre . months. I refer particularly to the 'Symington
is the destruction of free nations. committee hearings on Laos and the
One hundred and eight years ago, on C. p length of time it took to get clearance
It is signed Edwin C Johnson a Demo- ?-
crat and former Colorado State Gover- ,
. December 1, 1862, in his segond annual ,from the administration so that at least
nor. and U.S. Senator.
- message to Congress, Abraham Lincoln Mr. President, I think I have just a few' some parts of the. report could be pub-
said this to an embattled nation: minutes remaining. I would like to fished.
Pollow-citizens we cannot escape history. speak extemporaneously for those few It is good that this committee held ?
We of this Congress and this administration,
moments. these hearings on this forgotten war, this
will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No hidden war, this secret war which, while
personal significance, or insignificance, can Mr. President, in response to a question
spare one or another of us. The fiery trial from the distinguished Senator from Lou- ? tied to the war in Vietnam, insofar as the? .:
through which we pass, will light us down, in ? isiana (Mr. LONG), I want to say?as I ? Ho Chi Minh Trail coming down from? .
---'honor or dishonor, to the latest generation. , said at that time?that this was not a the Laotian panhandle is concerned,
. speech for the administration. This .nevertheless was in other respects an .
What was true of. Congress and of the
. American people in that day is also true. speech was not made at the request nor auxiliary and separate war because it was . _
- ? ?s.
of Congress and of the American P00- with the-knowledge of the administration, tied to the army of yang Pao, the chief
- :
pie today. Totalitarianism challenges us ? I have seen history distorted so many of the Meos and the Royal LaotianForces, away and apart from the Ho Chi
times and for such a long period
o on
the floor of the Senate and in the news '
In several regions. How we respond to- Minh Trail.
' day and In the wearisome years ahead
media and other places that I felt it Now, With what is developing in Cam- ,
will determine whether we earn the re- , -
spect or the opprobrium of succeeding was incumbent upon me to enter into a bodia, which is a war on a war on a war,
generations, discussion not only with respect to the
and marks an extension and enlarge-
Itmcnt of the conflict, I think it is most
has been said that a politician Cambodian situation but also with re-
'
thinks of the next election while a sPect to the situation, as I see it, in the important that the situation, as it exists
world in the next decade and perhaps in Laos, should be brought out and given '
statesman thinks of the next generation. ..:
, .In this time of testing those who hold for the next two decades. consideration by all Members of theSenate.
In this Nation? Mr. President, it is for this reason 1 . .
Mr. President, in order to help that ,,..
, real
the American people?must measure up' have made this address this morning. I
to the standards of true statesmanship. feel seriously about this matter. I only along, I ask unanimous consent to have
If Americans understand the nature of hope that within the structure of these printed in the RECORD certain news
the challenge they face, and the conse- remarks there will be some help to those stories having to do with the publication
.. quenccs of weakness, they will respond people who feel frustrated and that those of the report. '
as they have in the past?with courage, who suffer trepidation will find cause for ? There being no objection, the material
and with success. . ;courage. Those who disagree and dissent was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
Twenty-five years ago this week the . can do this in an atmosphere of quietness as follows:
guns of the Second World War tell silent. and they can be heard and listened to. , (From the Washington Post, Apr. 20, 1970]
,. But Peace did not follow. For a guar- I believe that the future of this country mum SKATES IC/MA'AM WAR IN LAOS, Him
ter of a century the American peo-. is going to lie in the actions of the execu- DISCLOSES .
-t ple have borne the burden of supporting tive branch of Government and particu-? (By Murray Marder)
...' :. ' ? ? resistance to expansionist communism, larly the actions of Congress in the next The United States Is engaged In "heavy
? The feet that the North Vietnamese few years..Linooln said what we do and escalation" 01 UM air War in Laos while try-
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LOA.= WORLD
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Ere
V, '
t: - Daily World Foreign Department ?
r
Prince Norodom Sihanouk, ousted Cambodian chief of state, who in Peking an-,
nounced formation of a government in exile backed by the recently formed United
National Front of Cambodia, said the Front includes coramunists as well as other'
political groups. , More than 4,000 KKK mercen-' ?
,
.s! The U.S. and the Saigon puppet ,.aies were brought into Cambodia
,in the last few days by helicop-
',..regime yesterday launched three
. new offensives into Cambodia, ter and air transport. Nearly all'
are
4..bringing to ? more than 50,000 the.. dian capital. in Phnom Penh, the Cambo-'
: number of U.S. and Saigon troops.
there. Lon Not said Tuesday that his'
I
An armada of U.S. Navy river regime "welcomes" the U.S. in-
vasion. . ,
, gunboats went up the Mekong
River into Cambodia, while along. , In Paris yesterday, both the'
Provisional Revolutionary Goy-
a 200-mile .front in Cambodia's
ernment of Soyth Vietnam and
eastern provinces, heavy U.S. air
l
laic Democratic Republic of Viet-Iand ground operations continued.
i
U.S. and foreign newsmen re-, nam boycotted the 66th session.'
:
of '
marked on the low number the' peace talks. ? A DRV ,
, of
.
' U.S. casualties produced by such spokesman said this action was.
a huge invasion 18 dead and
taken "to express their firm pro-'.
?
nearly 60 wouridd. Some of "test against the extremely grave ;
those killed were victims of , acts of the U.S: ,in Indochina."1
1 Nguyen ..Thanh Le, the DRV
0 their own troops' gunfire or air ,
crashes unrelated to any hostile.
, ? !
spokesman, read the formal DRV-1
? ,:PRG statement, which accused
action.
The U.S. invaders are still 'the U.S. of violating ,its commit-
hunting ? apparently somewhat 1
'. 1
..'ment . to. cease.- the air .war.1
, against the .DRV and of expand- '
-desperately now ? for the allegl, ing the,- Vietnam' war 'into Cam-'
*ed "Central Office for South,bodia. .. ,
; etnam" ICOSVN), of a claimed; ? ?If the Nixon administration
!"Vietcong" setup. Destruction of .continues its bombardments
,COSVN was the major. reason i
given for the invasion, it must . bear full responsibility
against the territory of the DRV,,
"What's COSVN?" a puzzled. for all. the serious consequences
bodia asked Tuesday, as he look-
%
U.S. Army lieutenant in Cam- for
from its acts," the joint.:..
.
ed at some captured office equip- DRV-PRG statement said.' TheDRV said the next meeting of
ment. "It's just a bunch of type-,' the talks should be held en May:
,writers." 1 14, but the U.S. delegate, Philip'
I The U.S. and the CambodianI Habib, refused to say whether:
!regime of puppet Lon Nol con-;
the U.S. would attend. Habib,
firmed earlier reports that sev-', after a brief talk with reporters.
eral thousand Cambodian tiler- started making preparations to
? cenaries trained by the CIA have leave for Washington on a trip
- been integrated into the Lon Nol '
: he alleged had been planned,
'armed forces, some time ago.. .. . f
The Cambodian mercenaries
are. called "Khmer Kampuchea
? Krom" iCambodians from Lower :
Cambodia 1. or. KKK. The KKK)
troops are from the Lower Megl
kong area in South Vietnam. They',
were trained by the CIA to man,
er8) Special Forces .camps' in Southj
..'....". Vietnanig? ..????-.. a.m.,. ., . _ _::__?,...1. f ?I
STpkTINTL
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LOWELL, MASS..
SDI
E - 47,948
S - 3b,570
mAY 6 1970.
r?
[Vietnarnization
With the recent events in Laos and
Cambodia, the question for the Nixon Ad-
ministration and the American people is
whether now is the time to stop talkingl
about Vietnamization as' an end-all and !
cure-all for U.S. involvement in Southeast '
Asia.
Vietnamization is the promise and
hope that the Saigon government of Presi-
dent Thieu is becoming strong enough to I
maintain itself in power. But the question:.
is
is never answered: Against whom?
Vietnamization implies that a great;
majority of the people in Vietnam have a
fondness and respect for President Thieu
and his military regime. If that were true,
the 450,000. American troops in Vietnam.
could start leaving for home today.
r If Washington will ever ask itself why:
t, all those Vietnamese people keep strugg1-1
ing against the tremendous firepower of
450,000 U.S. soldiers and devastating air 1
it.power, there will be finally an understand- ,
frig of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as
areas of civil conflict.
In Laos, two half-brothers are contest-
ling for' control of the country while the
main fighting force is made up of Meo ,
tribesmen recruited by the Cei...iitrallatalja, \7"
ggamiAgiowyt.
In Cambodia, the situation is not yet? !
clear. But there are disturbing questions
about U.S. involvement and CIA intrigue.
It is obvious that President Thieu
would profit through the spread of fight-
ing throughout the former Indo-China
area. It would mean that withdrawal of
,U.S. troops would have to be slowed down
or even halted.
Certainly the Vietnamization policy
would be made meaningless if President
,Thieu's troops become involved in fighting
beyond their own borders. ?
The-reports are disturbing for the
American people who see their sons sacri-
ficed at the rate of 100 a week in an Asian
'civil war 10,000 miles' away.
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Approved For Release,R04,62,gol,Firgthee>hif641661R00
6 may 7o
ue r
os Has
r NY Times service (c) embarrassing. The 1962 Geneva ; who holds a master's de- - glens, is also generally believed
' WASHINGTON?As the Amer- accords, for instance prohibit gree from the school of busi- to have been financed and op- :
Jean-supported clandestine army? foreign military aircraft in ness administration at Har-
vard Be ore joining Air Am eri- erated by the CIA in recent
went .on the attack in Laos years. Air America took over -
again, pilots of a flamboyant
:airline called Air America took
, to the skies once again to
move its troops, provide its sup-
plies and evacuate its wounded.
( .
? . Air America is a flight char-
(j company that, like the
clandestine army, is widely con-
sidered to be the, servant of the
?United States Central Intelli-
ence Agency.
With its assorted fleet of 167
aircraft, Air America performs
? Laos but they say nothing about ca in ;1953 he was the chief pilot CAT in 1950.
civilian planes. The facade also I for Pan American and pioneered
;
averts public attention in couni' transatlantic air routes bethre WHEN THE CHINESE nation-
tries such as Japan that are , World War II. alists wanted to establish a Chi-
sensitive to the American mili- In Asia the general man-
nese-run airline, CAT had to get
out of the passenger business.
tary presense.
? Then too, intelligence services
the world over, have always used i
business as a cove r., Air ;
America gives the CIA and oth. 1
er government ' agencies con-
trolled and secure transport. On
the economic side, commercial '
d,!yeFse.. Missions ...across East work enables the company to
11
Asia from Korea to Indonesia. keep its large fleet busy when
, It is believed to be a major link part might be idle.
for the CIA's extensive activi- THE OUTFIT EXUDES an
7 ties throughout Asia.
air of oriental adventure out of t
Air America parachutes MEC( Milton Caniff's comic strip "Ter-
The Nation
Approved For Release 2001/018APY:M-RDP80-
?EDIITOMALS STATINTL
More Flimflam
America, etc., but on our violation of the Geneva /
The President's address on the Vietnamese War Accord of 1962 Mr. Nixon is silent.
was more of the same?evasive, misleading, blandly, He told the radio-TV audience that Vietnamization '
dishonest?a pitchman's effort. Yet, with few excep- was working, and that progress was likewise being .
tions, it received a good press. It may be that made in pacification. Both claims are contradicted
this is the kind of pap , the people wish to hear?or by informed journalists such as James McCartney,
the kind that the media now feel obliged to endorse. the American reporter whose column appears in
, If so, the country is in for a worse time than even ,4.110 Toronto Star, among other papers. McCartney
I pessimistic prognosticators have envisioned. casts doubt on the efficacy of Vietnamization and
The speech purported to promise a withdrawal of says that the enemy is present in substantially the
: 150,000 men over a period of one year, but this was same numbers as two years ago. He said that U.S.
made conditional on the good behavior of the Viet- officials, measuring everything by computer and
cong and the North Vietnamese, and on Mr. Nixon's statistics, are capable of fooling themselves as well
interpretation of his duty as Commander in Chief to .as the American public. Writing from Saigon, Evans
safeguard the troops. If 150,000 effectives are actu- 'and Novak describe the ruinous inflation in South
ally brought home during the next year, the rate of 'Vietnam, with the price . of rice ?rising 60 per cent
withdrawal will be about the same as 'in the earlier during the past year, and quote a high government ,
reductions, which were on a shorter timetable. The official as saying that if South Vietnam cannot get
extended timetable may be a compromise between its economic house in order, "it is a sick society that
General Abrams' reported request for a six-month . no number of M-16 rifles can cure."
suspension of withdrawals (the Joint Chiefs are said , The omission of ' Laos and Cambodia from the'
to have asked for only a two-month suspension) and President's speech, and the incomplete report that '
the President's need to convince the public that the Senator Symington has succeeded in prying out of
boys are streaming home in ?great numbers. One the State Department, shows that the Pentagon and
hundred and fifty thousand is a good round figure to whatever administration is in power (whether John-
toss about on TV and radio, but it commits Mr. Nixon son or Nixon makes no appreciable difference) is
to nothing. capable not only of waging undeclared wars but also
The President likewise ducked any commitments, 'undisclosed wars. We know that this has happened in
or even informative discussion on Laos and Cam- Laos; it may happen in the future in Cambodia, un- ?
bodia. However, he repeated his threat to take less the media should prove less compliant there
"strong and effective measures" against North Viet- 1
i than in Laos. If the State Department could be forced
nam should Hanoi increase military action in South , to disgorge the information about Laos that was,
Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia. Since the overthrow of 1
' omitted from the report publicized by Mr. Syming-
Norodom 'Sihanouk, the situation in 'Cambodia has ton, it would be some protection against a repetition .
radically changed. The rightists who seized power in Cambodia. Mr. Nixon gave no such assurance.
have attempted to oust the approximately 40,000 The only hopeful element in the speech was a
North Vietnamese'from their Cambodian sanctuary. peripheral suggestion that a political settlement
These efforts, ineffectual so" far, were performed in should reflect the existing relationship of political
concert with American blocking forces on the South' forces within South Vietnam. This was contradicted,
Vietnam side, attacks by American gunships from. 'however, by the President's insistence that the will
across the border, and the invasion of Cambodia by of the South Vietnamese people is what the Thieu
South Vietnamese units. North Vietnamese resist- government says it is. He keeps repeating that the
ance can be construed, at Mr. Nixon's pleasure, as an South Vietnamese people must be allowed to deter-
enlargement of the war, and ground for "strong mine their future without outside interference. That.
and effective measures." Even if he floes not resort the installation and maintenance of the Thieu govern-
to a resumption of bombing in North Vietnam, he: ment is outside interference he refuses to recognize.
can thus excuse a 'postponement of withdrawals of: His efforts to persuade the American people of his
our forces from South Vietnam. good intentions are all at this level of duplicity.
? Mr. Nixon painted the? standard picture of a wicked Anyone' who is taken in by such tergiversation must
? enemy who refused to meet us halfway when we be a willing victim?but isn't that the principle on
stopped 'bombing North Vietnam, and who now re- which Mr. Nixon has always operated? ? ?
. fuses to match our troop withdrawals with with-
' drawals of his own. He says nothing, however, about
; the stepped-up American bombing in Laos which we '
have been 'conducting at the rate of some 18,000
sorties a month. The wicked enemy has sent his
troops into Laos, in collaboration with the Pathet
Lao. ,SA013Yeaft ralgO&SgVgb
I
CPf1itiS3?44.1'tIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
Approved For Releaseire0/51/6fficetteND-M-RaQ1R0
. 3 MAY 1970
The 'Cool' Prince
????????.',S
Laotian Premier Sidesteps Political Trap
Set by Pathet. Lao to End U.S. Presence
I:: By Rowland Evans
and Robert Novak
. VIENTIANE ? THE reit-
.ance by the United States on
Prince Souvanna Phouma, sly.
and skillful prime minister of,
,LaoS, to prevent total deterio-
ration here was shown by a
i backstage political episode 1
during the peak of the Com-
Munist offensive in March.
With invading North Viet-
namese troops nearing this
worried capital city, a star-
tling (and quite accurate) re-
port circulated through Vi-
entiane: Gen. Phoumi Nom-.
van, the "rightist" leader,
was returning from his long
exile in Bangkok. That could
mean only one thing: "righ-
tist" generals were plotting a
coup to substitute Phoumi
for "neutralist" Souvanna
Phouma.
The coup was stopped be-
fore it started. The "rightist"
plotters were flatly informed
? that the United States could
not tolerate Souvanna's
;ouster. Since the United
States picks up half this
country's budget and is essen-
otial to armed resistance
? against the Communists, that
was that. "Rightists" who
? had been babbling about
' Phoumi on one day were at-
tributing the talk to some-
body else the next day. -
? This American sponsorship
for Souvanna represents a
complete turnabout since
1 1001 when a coup temporarily
: replaced Souvanna with a
government supported by
?Phoumi and aided covertly
'by U.S. military and intelli-
gence officers. In the subse-
quent turbulent decade, the
lingering "rightist" and "neu-
k.,-) ' tralist" labels have lost ail
meaning. Souvanna has be-
come the best, perhaps the
'only hope to hold North
viethameAgifeWeerFor
? ,1%1?,
thermore, he similarly re-
jected additienal seats for the. 4
Pathet Lao in the country's
non-functioning coalition gov-
ernment.
, Souvanna is without illu-
The indispensability of the
69-year-old prince reveals the
fragility of the Lao political
structure in a war that is
vital to the U.S. overall in-
terest in Indochina. Any
other Lao in power could
upset the precarious balance
of political forces to the ben-
efit of the Communists.'
SOUVANNA'S VALUE was
demonstrated during the
period when the "rightists"
were plotting against him a
few weeks ago. With North
Vietnamese bearing down on
Gen. yang Pao's base at
Long Tieng, the Communist
,Pathet Lao came up with a
clever ploy. They demanded
total expulsion' of the U.S.
military presence here and
the bombing of the Ho Chi
Minh trail in southern Laos
ended, but offered deceptive-
ly easy terms to the Lao gov-
ernment as preconditions for
negotiations.
A , good many Lao poli-
ticians, "rightists" and neu-
tralists" alike, were eager to
step into the trap. Some may
have been panicked by highly
undiplomatic maneuvers
? from Viktor Menin, Soviet
ambassador to Laos. Menin
sions about the Pathet Lao.
He views Prince Souphanou-
vong, his half-brother and.';
longtime chief of the Pathet 4
Lao, as utterly without power
to make decisions because
the Pathet Lao's decisions
are made for them by Hanoi. 1
As long as the United
States supports him, the
pipe-smoking old prince can
be expected to talk softly and .
concede nothing important to
the Communists. This forces _
Hanoi to keep four combat ,;
divisions Of North Vietnam-
ese troops tied down in Laos
,and gives the United States a
'legal, right' to bomb the Ho .4
Chi Minh trail.
,0 1070, Publithers-Nall pa.tleatt.-
warned prominent Laos that;
this might be the "last
chance" to negotiate. The im-
plication: If the Pathet Lao
offer were not pounced ?upon,'
North, Vietnamese troops
could force a military solu-
Souvanna, kept cool. He re-4
plied to the Communist,
proposal with a masterpiece,
of doubletalk. In fact, he
realizes fullY that withdrawal
. of U.S. help would insure his
? eventual replacement, sooner
rather than later, by a Com-1
munist dictatorship.
. In an interview at his villa 1
here which doubles as the
prime minister's office, he ')
told us there would be no ne-
FNMAtngtOthatt..01A-R DP80-01601 R000700030001 -4
agree to their precondition of
? an ee ? 'e?Dinbing. Fur!'
Lkir
DAILY WORLD
Approved For Release 200,2*43/C470
... , v,
thcir a ,
a 0 ii ef
.
0 .
.,consgillWoon:
?tary means. Having failed to force
, ? .
! NEW YORK ,May 1?The .". costs of the escalating war in
.,.,,
following statement con- y lives and broken families. Run-
such a solution at the conference
away prices and taxes win in-;?.? table or in fact on the battlefield,
,..demning U.S. aggression :'
,. crea?e further. ? Paychecks and I.: it has sought to exhaust the Viet-
.?..'even as unemployment grows: : ..namese in a war of attrition.
A 'rising tide of opposition at ,.
' contract settlements will 'be cut
1 ? against Cambodia was is-,
i National ,Committee of the . Programs for schools, hospitals, , home and around the world forced .
1 ' sued today on behalf of the
,. ' . welfare, etc. will suffer even :i, the Nixon Administration to try ?
:
1 Communist Party by James .-
sharper slashes. ? ? ...,, to achieve the same results by, .
Jackson international al- ' - ? ??.? scaling down U.S. ground forces,'
I , . ?? Jingoism, racism and repres;
s secretary, and Daniel ..sion will be further stimulated. ,i'.?': with puppet troops increasingly ,
Rubin, national organiza- .; In our country where racism 'has 1..:Aaking over the ground fighting i
' tional secretary: - ' . been the main tool of reaction for i
.,
.and casualties. The ? attempt is to
In launching his criminal ag-
.,' ?
.. so long, it is not possible for Pres- .. deceive public opinion and reduce
gression against Cambodia, follow- ident Nixon to' rattle the saber. *;,,the
jingoistically in justifying the ? '.,while pursuing the same aims.
massive popular opposition,
log the bombardment of Laos, : ?
, .
: slaughter of darker peoples in :1Y Such a policy was bound to fail,-'
'President Nixon is violating the
Constitution of the United States.- ' Southeast, Asia, treating them as for it does not recognize that the .
.
and defying the expressed will" mere pawns of U.S. imperialism, I. Thieus and Lon Nols can achieve ....
.
without promoting racism at :';? no stable popular support because '
'of the Amdrican people. He Is vio- ? home. ? . ( they serve the interests of U.S.
lating Cambodia's sovereign , It was no accident that at the
' '
. ,
;., imperialism and not those of their :' -
rights and is recklesSly gambling '.'
moment U.S. troops were being. ,own people'. "Vietnamization" .
f with moving to a world nuclear
sent into Cambodia, other federal was, therefore, both immoral and
war. Be tries to cover up the deed - 'doomed to failure because the .
troops were being sent to bonnec- :??
and the danger by a series' of lies"
,and false promises. That disas-
? lieut. They were sent there to !! Provisional Revolutionary Gov- ?
,, ',Intimidate and ? provoke a mass ?:? ernment represents the popular 1
: trous course must be reversed. 'rally oppoSing a repression which ;, will for national freedom and the
. The most massive and militant '
has especially singled out the ;'.;Thieu-KY regime is nothing but a '
response by millions of our peo-
Black Panther Party and the black ' .. fascist, dictatorial creature of
pie must be mounted to the new:. ? '
community for victimization. 1 ? the CIA.
criminal expansion of agkression ' Vietnamization" immediately
In Cambodia. The mask has been
dent Nixon to couple his announce- ' required military buttressing of \
. ,- Such a course requires Presi-
Nixon is the continuous exp
an- an ,threats not only to university atu-
. ? ment of expanded aggression with :, the Thieu clique to have any hope
of success. These steps included 1
,
removed. The policy pursued by ,
? slim of the brutal aggressimi inY Y
. dents but even to the Senate' and ..
4 stepped up bombing in South Viet-
' Thousands of U.S. ground troops ' Supreme Court. It requires lying, nam, increased bombing and mil- ? '
? t . itary action in Laos and the CIA- '
Vietnam, Laos and now Cambodia.?
t as well as planes and supporting 'about' 'U.S. involvement to the" '
r units have invaded Cambodia to- .. country in the TV speech ten days ,..
engineering coup in Cambodia
But the CIA coup in. Cambodia
Igether with Saigon puppet troops, l' before and to the Senate two days . ?
1 The inevitable result will be in- .. before the April 30 announcement.. ' rapidly suffered the same fatal
tensif led fighting throughout the , . it requires acting contrary both ...weakness. The Lon Nol regime; a ,
k entire area and a grave new ? . to the 'will of the people ex- tool of the CIA, had no popular' 1,
j threat to world peace. To the . ' pressed in actions and polls and to ..
,support and was rapidly collapsing
325000 admitted U.S. casualties
, ? the opinion of Congress and, there- .' 'before the wrath of the Cambodian.
? will be added new thousands in by, violating fundamental princi. peoples. A new crisis then con-
'
the stepped-up war. The toll of' pies of the Constitution he has ;
the next .?.
? ' ;
fronted the military preparations
sworn to uphold. for "Vietnamization'
. Vietnamese, and now Cambodians ? . .
....!?logical step in its pursuit is being
.. and Laotians, predominantly ncui- :,. ' ? . '. taken, military action to save the,
combatant women and children, . The new aggression arises out Lon No puppets.
Is of genocidal proportions. Song of a crisis in the policy of so-called .
: r President Nixon acknowledged ,
' mys will increase ? . .' . "V ietnamization." US. ruling .,?
.that the military support had to be '
In the U.S. the mass of workers, ,, imperialist circles have sought to i, U.S. forces and Saigon puppet ;
I particularly black. Chicano and maintain control of south vietnarn i 4 troops because /4141.Not could mut, j
Puerto Rican, will pay the heavy, which can only, be done by mai-3-
Approved. For Release 2001/0 . RD
-3/04' CIA
. - P80-016,0 00
1 R0007030001 -4
. ,
, coral:mod
? ?TATINTL
Approved For Release/kW/M*4 CIA-RDP80-0
, 2 MA191970
RO)
?
le-tteouraelogal
Nixon tilocht (be oilly peace ? plan ? ?
ii) l'ilAt VOl.I.A. , Nixon has been able W limier 111111 is now insisting that the bomb-
,
The American people were .., what little support he has for his ,,, Ing cannot be halted.
I never asked beforehand whether ,; so-called "Vietnamization" pro- ?:?< The Pentagon and the U.S. mil- .
they wanted to get involved in ... gram, because he promised it ,. itary command in Saigon both ,
1 Vietnam. They were presented": would get the U.S. out and bring ''..have argued that they can "win"
? ..with an accomplished fact. ala- ' the troops home from Vietnam. :4n South Vietnam within a year if
' tant fraud was used to get the .:.. Yet' it is clear today that those ,?,1 they go into Cambodia. As a re-.
,Congress to agree to the Tonkin, : . who were misled at first by "Viet:. Lsult, "Vietnamization" as a mill-
i':'Gulf Resolution, which was then?P?-namization" are growing increas- ..t? tary solution has come to mean
i.
' 4?:' "Vietnamization" is a military ..:. over Southeast Asia.
stretched to the breaking point :-. ingly unhappy about it. . -. ':.spreading the Vietnam war all
to cover anything the Pentagon` .
t; felt like doing. ..; program, not a political one. It '' The peace movement in the
,. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution has ' means that Nixon will continue to';'? ' U.S. has got to get busy in order
i now been repudiated by Congress, ' ignore the Ten-Point Peace Plan ;7'.to prevent thousands more Amer- !
..and most strongly of all by the ''. made public by the new Proisional , ; lean GIs from dying in senseless'
,?
.,,man who got it through in the :.., Revolutionary Government of . battles in Vietnam, Cambodia - .. .
i
first place ? -Sen. J. William .. South Vietnam in the Paris peace ... and Laos. It must insist that the
1 .
I* Fuibright. I think few observers , ,,talks last May 8, although in real- ,.only solution to the war is a poli-
' ' would disagree with the state-,Llty this plan is the only way of end-;,. tical one which recognizes the
j; ment, that the Arribrican People; 7,:ing the war. . ' points put forward in South Viet-
'.,.are heartily ,sick. of .this, war to. i :. What Nixon and other members ., . nam 's Provisional Revolutionary
1 day, and would do ,almost anr!,:i.: of his administration most of ,:,..Government's peace plan almost
Wiling Wend it. ,, .' - '. -4, ,f, 4,4?, ',i;?4': : '''..', all would like to see in South Viet- .;; a year ago, which. the Nixon
.....
_ -_ _ ?? , 71nam is a "solution" based on the ? administration has been evading
'a
South Korean Model: a . CIA- .......ev ... .. l..' ... ?
backed military dictatorship, sup-. !!1"154,-,!31,:----7'
ported by Asian troops used as; r -
:., cannon fodder pure and simple. .1 ,
No matter who does the fight?, ,
;Ing. the Pentagon is clearly corn-
..mitted to "winning" a military i
victory in Vietnam and is in fact.;
c .responsible for spreading the war 1
,r with much greater intensity than!
(ever before into Laos .and Cam-.'
!, . t...bodia. It was the Pentagon:
..which insisted on stepping tip thei
1... bombing. of Laos in conjunction :1.
with the CIA-directed assault
i.'the Lao Patriotic Front hist 'fallej
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DA/LT WORLD
Approved For Release 2001na/.04 ? CIA-RDP80-01601
i MAY 1970
r.r n.151
By WILFRED BURCIIETT
.. ? ? Special for Prensa Latina -I , ... ,.
i .?
,?:'' ' PARIS ? Norodom Sihanouk's concept of Cambodian -neutrality ? which has keiA?
Cambodia neutrar, independent and relatively peaceful while war raged on the other side i
of her frontier ? has fallen victim to Nixon's "Vietnannization" policy. . , . . . .,
_
'? Sihanouk's concept of neutral- tion government and an in e-
ity was based on opposition to pendent neutral South Vietnam,
t U.S. imperialism, ? friendship to- Sihanouk's ? position would have
wards the ? countries of social- , been unassailable and the right-
tism, good neighborly relations ists would not have dared emerge
with the Peoples Revolutionary , from their holes. There would
Government of South Vietnam liave been
and the Democratic Republic of for a neutralist block of states
immediate prospects
class trading community which
Prince Sink Matak is said to
represent, was to try and secure
a big slice of. a potential dollar
pie. But even when the U.S.
embassy was reopened the ex- ,
pected offers of dollar aid fail-
, ,-
' ed to materialize while attacks
Vietnam. . including South Vietnam, Laos
f on the frontier villages, includ-
Nixon's insistence on continu-. and Cambodia for a start and';
Ing chemical war against the
Ing the war in South Vietnam ' probably Thailand fairly soon.
rubber plantations, was intensi-
? .,
\
i
r by other means is "Vietnami- ? This bloc Would represent no , ified. .? . .
. zation" and of striving to main- '.? threat to legitimate western in-, ; - "people think we're getting the
:
tam n in power indefinitely the ,, Wrests. ' '-big stick ani carrot treatment,', ?
'-corrupt fascist regime of Thieu- '.I Sihanouk's policies would have i one top official told me in Ph- .
,Khiem-Ky encouraged right-wing ... been vindicated; he would have : inom Penh in February. "In fact
:elements in Cambodia to try and:' . been honored by his people as,1 we're only getting the big stick.
0 i reverse the trend of Sihanouk's .'''., the leader whose stubborn ' de- 'No 'sign of the carrot."
, policies and place Cambodia in f fence of Cambodia's independence , pi
The inference was clear:
: the U.S. camp. . . , and neutrality, kept -the country ? "Show your change of hearts by.
It was no accident that the'.. out of the war. But U.S. im-
i concrete acts" was the message
sacking of the Democratic Re- ' perialism is not interested in ?
1 1 Washington was flashing.
i public of Vietnam and the Pro- .,
'neutralist prince. Under his lead- It is in this context that the
? visional Revolutionary Govern- ?
1 ershlp, the Cambodian govern- Vietnam embassies and the sub-
. lu
.': ment had: i sequent rernOval of Sihanouk must
ment embassies in Phnom Penh
took place 24 hours after
? be seen. The presence of Viet-
nouk had announced that DRV' -, 1) Closed down a U.S. mill- nam troops in the border areas '
, ' "(any mission when it was dis-
Premier Pham Van Dong would. was of incidental importance
. covered that mission members .
be visiting Cambodia during the only. The timing and sequence
month of May and on the very of events makes this clear. ?
, .. were involved in a plot to over-,
eve of Sihanouk's departure for, Sihanouk and the Cambodian
: throw and assassinate Sihanouk.,
Moscow and Peking. . :'. 2) Cut off U.S. military aid people nowwe
.k full well that any
Envied Saigon boodlers ... then it became clear this could..
North Vietnamese or NLF troops
,... not be used in defense against 1
,' Thailand and the Saigon regime in the border areas are there
? the thought of aid from the so-
? The rightists could not bear-
1. . which represented the only mill- without hostile intent as far as
cialist countries. All their hopes
tary threats for Cambodia. Cambodia is concerned. They ,
. were based on the Yankee dol- ',s. were there fighting the common ,
,
3) Took the extraordinary threat to both peoples?a hostile ,
lar. ,..
Elements within the upper
, _action of being the first coun-
strata of the armed forces eyed ;,try to halt U.S. economic aid
with envy their opposite . ? when it became clear tnis was
..bers in South Vietnam stuffing ? . being used to strangle the coun- I. sed 'with the idea of filling the .,
? \ 1
,their pockets and foreign bank `, try's economic development. ,"power vacuum" caused by the
accounts with U.S. dollars. Right !,? 4) Took no action when the', departure of the French; ? ? . 1
wing elements among the bour- '': U.S.' embassy. in ?Phnom Penh . It is not the North Vietnam or i
geoisie wanted an end to. na-.
tionalization of the banks, of irn-. i
, port-export companies and dream-"
0 : ed of the rake-off from dollar i
I aid which they hoped would ' I
1
, come pouring in once diploma-
: tic relations with the USA were ,
restored last June. ,
; cere at the gal Vrtlefh-c ease 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
tiating political settlement in ' ,
'South Vietnam based on a coali-
Saigon regime with avowedly I
expansionist policies towards
Cambodia and the U.S.A. obses- I
.,14;
Approved For Release 2001/0,3/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
STATI NTL
OPAND RAPIDS'
PRESS
E 133,419
$ - 13b,539
MAY 1 1970
Sees U.S. on Familiar Road
To Second Viqnam War
EDITOR OF THE PRESS: While
',President Nixon placates public opinion
,with promising rhetoric about the ill-fat-
"Vietnamization" program, he is
foolishly committing the U.S. to the
Second War of Indochina. Secreka,40
, operations in Cambodia and Laos have.
expanded into covert military entangloi
ments. And, contrary to overly-optimisA
tic reports, the, U.S. is becoming further!
,enmeshed in a disastrous war no one
'wants.
Until the U.S. adopts a more realistic -
and flexible foreign policy there seems
little hope of abandoning the costly role '
' of world policeman. The 440 U.S. mili-
tary bases on foreign soil will be jum-
ping-off points for future Vietnams. Andl,
a reordering of national priorities,',,
beginning with reduction in military
? spending, will remain just a lingering'.3
' dream humanists and ecologists discuss..l '.'?
President Nixon's escalation of the A
Second War of Indochina illustrates that
' there has been no significant change in'
: Our combat troops have penetrated . , U.S. foreign policy since 1954, when he:
Cambodia repeatedly, while the CIA :' .advocated direct American inyolvemerik)
searches for soldiers-of-fortune willing, ? in the Original war of IndOchina.
N'to fight in the jungles for $1,000 a week. 13:. ....'''''''!' ;?4 ("4: ,..11'1i0MAS MINN ' IC
American aircraft are dropping napalm
on Cambodians, and artillery continually',
.. pounds the countryside. In addition, the -
,Nixon administration has agreed to send
. military aid to the, right-wing Cambodi-
,. an government.
Thousands of CIA-sponsored "advis-
ers" are directing the clandestine army
; of Meo general yang Pao, in the Plain of, i
'Jars, Laos. During the past year, Nixon\,
? has escalated the air war over Laos to \
'a greater intensity than it once was over
-North Vietnam. U.S. aircraft based in
, Thailand, South Vietnam and on carriers.
In the Gulf of Tonkin fly more than 500'I
sorties a day, 24 hours a day, although ,
,'.. bombing Is only marginally effective at.,
best?perhaps counter-productive .(as 'it .,,.
rwas over North Vietnam).'
I.
:, The mistaken policies in Southeast:'
'Asia are tragic symptoms of a bankruptl
,
foreign policy based upon )1 blind con-
, tainment of Communism, 2) expanding
4:foreign investment, and 3) military.
Intervention. Instability is .automaticaW
, ly. rgaponded to militarilyL 1 't: ,,,'q.,
rord4rioiariloW 4 :.
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RtgiskRNTRO
,
? .
HAIFPHTLL
GAZETTE
E - 22,571
WAY 1
. '
1970
, ? ,
1
.,...., Cambodia . lleaction A,
,
Corigressional opposition to the entrance of Amer-,
lean, troops into Cambodia this week was far differentl
froi*,,the favorable response made to the Gulf of Ton-
kin.story ;which put U,S. troops in South Vietnam.
py.1- Senators .and House members alike were strong in
their repudiation of the decision by President Nixon tol
.:*endAnilitary units into Cambodia. Support for the de-,1
,? .
rision;wai numerically small and comparatively weak..
:Public reaction to the spread of the war was prac-'1
AiAllY instantaneous. Telegraph offices were beseiged.1
There were calls to Gazette workers, asking where to i
- end? letters and telegrams of protest.
Appearance of the President on television last,
? night will not, we feel, have the same effect on Amen-1
..s
laiiiihs, , as the wehwenortdhseoffalPl reefsfiedcetsntoJf othhnesaocntidoind haeftpelranTnoen-
d1
'? could not be foreseen.
A,
Where promises were made during ,the campaigry
4A1,get American troops out of Vietnam, and where ai
'withdrawal program was Initiated, hope had been)
aiged that U.S. participation in the?warwas closing. 1
..
i We must now ask about the role of. theSentr.al,;;
'Intelligenc e
e Agncy in these Southeast Asia develop-I ,
'meas. Until' a -16w weeks ago, Cambodian neutrality,
?however shaky, had been maintained. Then Prince
Sihanouk, its ruler, was deposed in a coup, and the war
Immediately. escalated. The CIA in,
been functioning i
3n Cambodia and Laos for some time. Questions shoukr
( i
be asked about its activities by Congressmen, like our.A
own Rep. Michael J. Harrington, w h o oppose, thel
Fbroadening of the fighting. ; '. '. ' - ' ?? .
.Denial of funds, as proposed by Harrington,, ap-
pears to be the only way for Congress to regain. its role
in feitining national polipy, ,,. :'..1' ? A? ,.?/,\ . .' - '
41.d.?.... 1. b.016.40. 4LifidAW. A 4 ':., ..,.0?441:44ji.1-.1:14kki4111:74,1:4' V: `44' '.
.{
?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 CIA-RDP8O-01601R000700030001-
raz TrimmugnoN POST
? Approved For Release 2003/6/0197:0CIA-RDP80-01601R
'Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
-
'U.S. Penny Pinching in Laotian?
? Is Too Fine to Stop Red Offensive
military spending in Viet4on administration envisions
STATI NTL
ar
/ VIENTIANE, Laos ? A?
.5,000-man increase in the
'hard-P r eased Royal Lao
army _is being blocked be-
cause, the war in Laos,
!though vital to the enor-
mous U.S. commitment in
;Vietnam, is financed on a
pinchpenny basis by Wash-
ington. / .
The 5,000 new soldiers, ou
Evans
top Of the present 55,00(1:rConsidering tnese s a e
t k s ?
'
e nam war priority.
man Royal army and 40,000 the shoestring America ni cordingly, when a recent
:
irregulars, are needed t./:t budget in Laos ? less than
cope with the greatly esca- $500 int'Mon a year?makesi truck convoy
Communist
.
was spotted heading toward'
latcd invading army of near-1 the operation a model. in 'Vang Pao's embattled base;
ly 70,000 North Vietnamese1 cost effectiveness. For ' ek- at Long Tieng and an air
;
(plus ineffective Pathet Lao ample, the 40,000 irregulars: s rike ? was, requested, no
Communist guerrillas, van- (including Gen. yang Pao's lilanes were made available.
ously estimated between 20 he chance was lost. It was
/7 Meo guerrillas) are advised!
000 and 50,000). But so great' by fewer than 250 operatives1
not the first such lost op-
are Washington pressures to of the Central Intelligence portunity.
, hold down spending in Laos Agency. Actually, there are ?incipi-
that chances are Uncle Sam more m ort a n t, .Laos. ent signs of self-sufficiency
won't ?produce the money. demonstrates that the U.S.. ',3y the Lao. army. A North:
;? The? problem is by no, can effectively fight Com- Vietnamese assault , on Pak-
means limited to troops.' ;munist insurgency without; sane last week was repelled
and Lao air-
'U.S. officials, slowly losing sending nine U.S. army divi-? or Lao troops
ground against the North sions into battle. No con- ? ft (dispatched
from Vien-
Vietnamese invaders, must , script U.S. soldier has bee ' ''cl a
t ane) without a single
American adviser in the act.
obody is calling the Lao
soldier a tiger, but there
hasbeen improvement. Lao
nam is stunning. Vietnam, Ca m b o d i a and
' Laos as part of the same
? ALL THAT HAS really war will determine the ulti-
kept the Lao army in the, mate outcome here. Having
fight has been airpower, es' unsuccessfully attempted a
pecially b o m b i n g strikes covert operation in Laos,
flown by, Americans. But Washington now confronts
this too is a hand-me-down the need for greater spend-
affair. Req'tiests from U.S. ing
here just as political,
officials here for bombing pressures at home are run-
are handled by Gen. rung in the epposite_ direso,
, Creighton Abrams in Sal-tion. , / ?:. , i
. gon, who naturally gives the ',:; 0)970, Publiabers-111 evetigtt 1
Novak 't 1 .
coax and tease for weapons,,.killed in Laos: The Amer-
aircraft, and other equip.'
. leans taking the risk here
meat. What's worse, with ,
the new isolationism run- are Army and CIA 'profe 1
? ning high in Washington slonals.
, ' troops?at least those with
:and the Senate Foreign Re-i But Washington may be. an M-16?no longer run at
'lations Committee's unveil.' drawing the pinchpenny. ,
h ?the sound of Vietnamese
ling of the previously covert -concepttoo . ' footsteps..
:U.S. operation here, money Communist of ?e n s i v e in,
:, Far into the future, how-
:available for Laos? may be- northern Laos. Lao forces ever, U.S.id ill b
' are outgunned as well as
tial. If ? it ends,: the North
'sen-
come tighter still. .
. Yet, Laos is critical to the outnumbered. In a pleading Vietnamese w 6 u 1 d need
:over-all fate of Indochina. As tone, political figures and ?
barely four months to liqui-
1its problems mount in South generals from Prime Minis- :
date the war in Laos. Even
Vietnam, North Vietnam has ter Souvanna Phouma on ? .the present level of U.S. aid
nearly four rerular divisions i down stressed to us the des-, "'_ay.
be inadequate to pre;
?pinned down in Laos. With-, perate need for better arms.'
vent disaster. ?:
out the U.S.-financed Lao ; Only 21,000 M-16. rifles I
' The only recent relaxel
resistance, Hanoi not only! ,have been squeezed out of ; Hon in this pressure was a
' could transfer most of these ; Washington, and at least 10,- move by some North Vietna-
troops to South Vietnam but.; 900 more are essential right i mese regulars from south-
also might pressure. the! now. For budgetary reasons,. ern ?Laos into Cambodia,
'Vientiane government into 1 ,Washington has '. flatly re, .again demonstrating t h a t:
demanding an end to U.S.! ::fused to supply. the ? potent! this is one large Indochinese
:bombing of the Ho Chi Minh: M-60 machine-gun.'iThe con-, ,pwar.. ,. ,.; . .
ItrIll-kl--eutherli .14"1";;i":11 aratAi.t14:41.2/14"lk "Mfaill ild,;;Ullii?111.1.1*.?11C00:414?
, ?
A.01??
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
St*.
The Washington Winthly
Approved For Release 2001/0431/0197(SIA-RDF'80-01
The Secret Team:
0 and the
Games
They Play
sTATO-L
was strikingly illustrated not long ago
by L. Fletcher Prouty,
..
. i "The hill costumes of the Meo tribes-
men contrasted with the civilian clothes
of United States military men riding in
. open jeeps and carrying M-16 rifles and
pistols. These young Americans are
mostly ex-Green Berets, hired on CIA
contract to advise and train Laotian
troops." Those matter-of-fact, almost
? weary sentences, written late in Feb-
? ruary by T.D. Allman of The Washington
Correspondents left a guided tour and,
, walked 12 miles over some hills in Laos
' to a secret base at Long Cheng, describe
the refusal of the Central Intelligence
Agency to iiThvide witnesses for the
court-martial that was to try eight Green
Beret officers for murdering a suspected
North Vietnamese spy, thus forcing the
Army to drop the charges. ? ,
The Secret Team consists of security-
cleared individuals in and out of govern-
ment who receive secret intelligence data
gathered by the CIA and the National
Security Agency and who react .to those
data when it seems appropriate to them
"--
t paramilitary plans and activities,
Post after he and two other enterprising h
e.g., training and "advising"?a not ex-
actly impenetrable euphemism for "lead-
ing into battle"?Laotian troops. Mem-
bership in the Team, granted on a "need
a situation that today may seem coin-
to know" basis, varies with the nature
mon place to anyone familiar with ?
I American operations overseas, but that
no more than 10 years ago would have
been unthinkable.
? To take a detachment of regular
troops, put its members into 'disguise,
smuggle them out of the country so that
neither the public nor the Congress
knows they have left, and assign them to
, clandestine duties on foreign soil under
tary men from the Pentagon, and career
the command of a non-military agency
professionals in the intelligence services.
?it is doubtful that anyone would have And out beyond them is an extensive
? dared to suggest taking . such liberties and intricate network of government of-
ficials with responsibility for or expertise
in some specific field that touches on
national security: think-tank analysts,
up to and especially including Dwight D. businessmen who travel a lot or whose
Eisenhower. Indeed, the most remark- businesses (e.g., import-export or operat-!
able development in the management of ,ing a cargo airline) arc useful, academicl
America's relations with other countries experts in this or that technical subject;
during the nine years since Mr. Eisen- ?or geographic region, and, quite impor-i
hower left office has been the assump-
tantly, alumni of the intelligence ser-!
tion of more and more control over mili- vice?a service from which there are no;
tary and diplomatic operations abroad 'unconditional resignations.
and the location of the problems that
conic to its attention. At the heart of, the
Team,of course, are a handful of top ex-,
ecutives of the CIA and of the National
Security Council, most notably the chief "
White House adviser on foreign policy. ;
Around them revolves a sort of inner
ring of Presidential staff members, State
Department officials, .civilians and mili-
with the armed forces and foreign rela-
tions of the United States, not to say
with the Constitution, to any President
by men whose activities are secret,
,
whose budget is secret, whose very iden-
Thus the Secret Team is not a clan-
tities as often as not are secret?in short destine super-planning board or super-'
a Secret Team whose actions only those general staff but, even more damaging to
implicated in them are in a position to the coherent conduct of foreign affairs, a
bewildering collection of temporarily ;
monitor. How determinedly this secrecy,
is preserved, even when preserving it assembled action committees that,
means denying the United States Arm)/ respond pretty much ad hoc to specific ;
the right to discipline its own personnel, troubles in various parts of the world,
WaYS_Plet_ duplicate
not to say the opportunity to do justice the
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Approved For Release 201R/RI/VniLSIA-RDP80-01601R0007000I30001T
2,0 APR 1970
Out of the quagmire now!
Public and Congressional anger is rising over White
, House and Pentagon attempts to spread the Vietnam war.
'.into Cambodia. Rarely has ,there been such wide agree-
ment in Congress that the U.S. should not get bogged down..,
. in another quagmire in Southeast Asia.
Congressmen. whatever their reasons for opposing
:Nixon, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency, .
should get massive public support to steady their resolve :
when the warmongers begin putting on the screws. threat-:
ening to Cut war contracts in their districts.
The generals in South Vietnam have been unable to
4top the steady growth of the heroic Vietnamese peoples'
resistance. And this military zero has been accompanied
by 300.000 American casualties?.dead and wounded young
,Americans from every part of the U.S.
Will this figure double or triple as the Pentagon tries
to get out of the trap it laid for itself by spreading the.:
war into Cambodia? By intensifying the dirt. war.in Laos?
A powerful resistance here in the U.S. is rising up
against these scherdes. because more people are coming
'.1.0 realize -what a total fraud Nixon's -Vietnamization-
plan is it is a plan to -win' in Vietnam. by purely
tarv solution which will keep American GIs in Southeast
' 'Asia for years to come, and may require hundreds of thou-
' -4ands of young Americans to die in Laos and Cambodia as::
well as Vietnam
It is time tor all Americans. to demand that the mili-
? oars) not onl% get out of Vietnam. Cambodia and Laos.
hut get our ot:the U. government, as well and stop any
attempt 'to' impose miLitar olution on the American
Congress
STATI NTL
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? Approved For Release 20111003004M01419580-01601
29 APR 1970
Rowland Evans and. Robcirt N'T"JT
,?N Laos Guerrillas ave I aeks to Wall
STATI NTL
After a lecade of Fighting the Reds
? SITE 37, Laos?Here in
the rugged mountains of
northern Laos, the Meo
guerrilla army of Maj. Gen.
Vang' Pao?underfed, under-
manned, and undergunned
,?is nearing a confrontation
with invading North yiet-
;namese regulars, with poten-
tially , conse-
quences in the struggle for
Indochina.
The immediate stake is - A
' While the Communists.r.'
, Even though it is criti-
have been methodically pre- ,
? cally Important to Vietnam,
7
1 paring the assault on Long the United States supports
this war on a shoestring that
might get stringier yet if
critics in Washington have.
..
their way?a strange state
Meos are drifting back to re-
'` join Vang Pao. Regular Lao Oration in a future column. ., ,
of affairs worthy of consid-,
? , Tieng, Vang Pao's guerrillas
I have pulled themselves to-
gether considerably. Having
relocated their families,
troops as well as other irreg.:, 01970. rubitstioia-maU silnuest?
ulars from southern Laos .?"?? 1??:-'-4.""."?"
Evant Novak have reinforced him, and he ??? ?
.- now commands 5,000 men in 43*.
ins ?mignt ne willing to ac- A
Long Tieng, strategic base cept a Communist-domi-
. the Long Tieng perimeter.. .
'
- for Vang Pao's irregtilars. Nevertheless, Vang Pao is.
if ;
rated coalition government. 4.(.1
,Before the deadline (proba- ' the four divisions of .4 badly outnumbered. On the
bly mid-June) set by the I so
North Vietnamese, regulars , day we talked, he was con-
rainy season, the Commu-
1
pinned down in Laos would ' cerned that, of the four sites 4
alists- will attempt to both '
be freed ?for South Vietnam north of the ? Plaine des ?
capture' Long Tieng and ,and the United States might .,
Jarres he still holds, three
'knock the Meo guerrillas, by .'
far their toughest foes in I encounter a government re- ' were under heavy Commu- 14
, . quest to stop bombing ?the . , nist attack that morning.-'Laos, out of the war. Chi Minh Trail in south- ., Most worrisome was Site 32 .1
0 As we interviewed Vang .,1 ern Lane'. ',.at Boun Loin where 500 Meo
Pao at this Meo refugee cen- i Actually the danger
was home guards commanded by
. ter not far fromLong Tieng, ' .7more acute -a month ago 1
.; Yang Pao's father-in-law had
he was clearly apprehensive if when reinforced North Viet-I:withstood a siege by vastly il
?his back to the wall after ' more numerous North Viet- ,,
Jarres and were headed for ,
a decade of fighting the ,I1 namese troops swept the 1
namese. Now, however, the'.;
Meos from the Plaine des '
Communists. Explaining ,J Communists were tunnelling,?
.
how his' people had been i
Lon Tieng. Facing under the bunkers .at Site
.driven down from the North ' g cng over- 1 32. Unless needle-threading': ..
' aircraft could stick .a bomb v
in the tunnel,' Boun Lom
was lost.
? , w e m ng y Stronger forces,
.Vietnam frontier over the
;
years, Vang Pao told us: Vang Pao's army disinte-
"There is nowhere else f ,(1 grated with Meo tribesmen
us to go. This is our last de- ?
fuge for wives and children I IF THOSE northern sites"
fense." ?
.1' The North Vietnamese at fall, the Communists can :
leavi ? ng the war to seek re.
..
t Nor did he contradict the ,,.' , that point could have corn- ', concentrate on Long' Tieng,
general assessment that his . ,,,.. pleted their successful new ' massing close to 20,000 :
, prosnects at Long Tieng are .? strategy. In past ?dry' sea- there. To prevent this, Vang
barely even. We will de...,,
i. sons, they had moved south: Pao last week resorted to
, fend Long Tieng as long ae : eastward only to be 'slashed guerrilla tactics: Sneaking -1
. possifile, but I cannot ,abso-
: brutally on the flanks by back of No Vietnamese
lutely guarantee at we can '!.Vang Pao?one of them the' forces to edge em away !
that ' North I
i do it," he said. "My soldiert44, ' world's great guerrilla chief- from Long Tieng. ,
are brave but are versr;,. tains in an age of guerrilla ' ..
:,. It could work. It probably
?tired."
' ? :' warfare. This year, the Com- 'would were the Meos de- ....,
' LOSING LONG TIENG 1 munists decided that the, cently equipped. Vang Pao ?
' could be catastrophic be- 1. key to success, military and told us he needs basics; first
I
, cause' of the destructive psy. I. political, was to grind down! of all, food for his troops ..1
chological impact on the i .Vang Pao, and their families, then .
Meos. Whether they would . r.
? THANKFULLY, however, ' ,more M-16 rifles and' M-79,
continue in the war in any,. grenade launchers. But the.
fact that the Mc? guerrillas,"t
.ably advised by U.S. Central
Intelligence ,Agency ?per...,
atives, are so badly ? equ,tp-?
Important way after losing !alit, vu mitt, tsua.g
Tieng in force a month ago
Long Tieng is open to ques-and instead waited for sup-
': tion. , plies to catch up, acting like
If unrestricted by Vang ' a muscle-bound conven-
. Pao, the North Vietnamese ped for their coming test' is
? ; tional army, fighting guerril-
would wheel southeast to-, symptomatic. of the Laos ?
I las, Indeed, the Communist .
ward the capital of Vienti- logistical crisis was trig- ad.g1,2,,,.&,(.......00.? 0 . ?
ane to apply pressure for a ? get .ed last December when
, political capitulation. Neiv- mellow
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Approved For Release 20541410?V 6FORDP80-0
29 APR 1970
?
IReds Driving
On Capitol of
Lao Province
By TAMMY ARBUCKLE 1
Special lollidSlar
VIENTIANE ? Communist
forces this morning launched
concerted attacks against the
Lao province capital of Attopeu
near the Cambodia-Laos border,
military sources reported.
Sources said they thought the
Communist attacks was aimed
at opening new supply lines
from Laos into Cambodia.
Communist infantrymen over-
ran a government artillery posi-
tion and captured a 105-milli-
meter howitzer on a hill out-
side the town.
Other forces overran the gov-
ernment command post next
to the Attopeu airstrip and other
positions a thousand yards out-
side town, sending Lao infantry
troops fleeing into the streets.
Heavy fighting was repdrted
to be continuing around a moun-
tain position 3 miles outside At-
topeu.
Attopeu is th3 capital of At-
topeu Province in southeast
Laos, close to the tri-border of
Cambodia, Laos and South Viet-
nam and only 10 miles west of
the junction of the Ho Chi Minh
Trail with the Sihanouk Trail.
From Attopeu, 'Communist'
trucks can be heard moving
along the trails, and government
troops occasionally fire mortars
at the trucks.
Attopeu is sometimes used by
secret army guerrillas operat-
ing against the trails. A major
part of the trail surveillance is
carried out from an American
Central Intelligence Agency
camp south of Attopeu and close
to the Cambodian border.
This camp has not yet been,
attacked, military sources said.
The Pathet Lao attack against,
Attopeu possibly is a Commu-1
rust move to gain a political
victory by taking a provincial
capital. The Communists hold
three of 16 provincial capitals.
If so, this would signify a
major political change in Red
tactics in Laos. Attopeu is
recognized by the Geneva Ac-
cords as rightist terrain.
By attacking it, the Commu-
nists could be trying for a new
political balance?a move sig-
naling further hard fighting' in
Laos.
Military sources said, how-
ever, that the Communist as-
sault at Attopeu may be linked
with a drive to enlarge the Red
trail network into Cambodia, so
the North Vietnamese can move
more reinforcements and sup-
plies there to make up fog losses
caused by the closure of the
Cambodian port of Sihanoukville
to the Viet CoaL,.?
1Year of Battle
Sources said Attopeu has been
encircled for more than a year
by Communist forces. Pathet
Lao gunners have shelled its dirt
airstrip sporadically, forcing
U.S. resupply helicopeters to
land on the town's only paved
street.
V "It's been withering on the
vine," the sources said. "They
could have taken Attopeu any
time."
Sources fear the Reds also,
may try to take Saravane, the
capital of Saravane Province
north of Attopeu. Like igtopeu,
Saravane has been surrounded
by Communist forces for over a
year. Also like Attopeu, Sara-
vane is on the west flank of the
Ho Chi Minh Trail
all
?
,
Attopeu, a town of thatched
huts on stilts, in normal times
had a population of 10,000 peo-
ple. Most of those remaining are
Lave tribesmen.
CIA Camp Is Near?
North of the town on the Bo-
lovens Plateau are Central Intel-
ligence Agency hideouts where
Americans pay Naheung tribes-
men to watch Vietnamese boats
on the Mekong River.
American trailwatchers lie on
grassy slopes above the Ho Chi
Minh Trail, usually with a circle
of tribesmen around them for
protection from North Vietnam-
ese patrols and attacks by pro-
Communist Kasseng tribesmen.
Attopeu and the CIA posts are
resupplied by an undercover air-
line known only as "Boun Oum
Airlines," named after its own-
er, Prince Boun Oum.
The airline is based at the
Mekong town of Pakse, which
Bonn Oum runs like a fiefdom.
Pakse is called a substation by
intelligence officers. From there
activities against the Ho Chi
Minh Trail in the south panhan-
die of Laos aro coordknated.
p.
A
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STATI NTL
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T.,MOSOR D t.) , .
I\IEWS
E & s - 7,425
APR 28 1970
World Tightrope
National leaders must always walk a tightrope between
the world as they would like to see it for the good of their
policies, and the world as it really exists. Often the twd
worlds are not the same thing, and from this disparity
arises decision-makers' problems.
If a leader can convince the public that the world exists
.in a certain way and that his policies ?are a response to
this world, he is in good shape. When this proclaimed world
comes into conflict with the real world, he is in trouble.
These generalizations are relevant to the uproar caused
by President Nixon's recent moves in Laos. For some time
the Nixon administration has maintained that the United
States was not involved in the conflict there. The President's
now famous statement that there were no American ground
forces in Laos was supposed to attest to this non-involve-
ment.
The truth is that in one degree or another the United
States has been involved in Laos. Our military advisers
have woked for years with the Royal Laotian army. Air /
America, ostensibly a civilian-owned airline, is an important
arm of the Ce nal Intelligence Aaency.
Until the reccn nierican B-52 raids in the
Plain of Jars, President Nixon was technically correct in "
saying that the United States was not violating that part
of the 1962 Geneva agreements which prohibited foreign mil-
itary aircraft in Laos. The point is that during this period
companies such as Air America have served the same
purpose in Laos as regular Air Force planes would, such as '
parachuting Meo tribesmen and other secret agents. behind
' North Vietnamese lines.
The North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao, of course, re-
spond to this real-world involvement of the United States
and not to the non-involvement formally proclaimed by the
President. Mr. Nixon, however, is forced to juggle these two
, worlds. He appears to act from altruistic concern over the
welfare of the Laotians. What he is actually doing is re- ?
, acting to Communist moves against our previous?and un-
announced?clandestine involvement.
Surely no one desires another floundering into a second
Vietnam. To avoid this, the President should steer clear of
trying to construct a picture of the situation in Southeast
Asia different from what is really happening there. Evidence
to date suggests that the juggling act has not been success.
ful.
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000O3500 -4
g4wilacapn STAB
????'
2 8 APR 1970
U.S. BASE IN LAOS OVERRUN,
OTHER OUTPOSTS ENDANGERED
spteimovmmar
VIENTIANE?An American guerrilla base known as "Three
Peaks" was overrun by North Vietnam infantry yesterday,
sending 1,100 refugees fleeing, military sources said today.
One U.S. helicopter was downed and the crew reportedly
was missing,
Three Peaks is a guerrilla base run by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in Sam Neua Province hi northeast Laos. The
, base had been used for interdiction of the route Hanoi has
used to supply the Plain of Jars from North Vietnam.
The refugees were airlifted by helicopter to another air-
,
strip but were coming under heavy fire once more as their
new resting place was expected to be overrun at any time.
"These outposts up there are starting to go like nine pins,"
, an informed source said noting that Bouam Long, an important
government outpost, was coming under heavy North Vietnam-
ese fire and was not expected to hold.
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Approved Fpr Reittag.2101(03/04 : CIA-RDE_80A-+:111N6_0i1R0
LONG BFACH, CAL.
? INDEPENDENT
I
I M
?49,632
APR 2 't 1976
: ?
01.
;
E x- ?' ? '
in Laos Sees
`Viet-Like'
?
By WALT MURRAY
Staff Writer
Unless strong public
' opinion is brought to bear
on U. S. policymakers,
Vietnam-like wars will
? A likely break out Iry other
N Southeast Asian nations, a
former U. S. cultural offi-
cer in Laos said in Long
' Beach Sunday. ?
? Dr. Frank Thompson,
now minister of the First
Congregational Church in
? Alameda, warned that con-
tinued step-ups of U, S.-
backed clandestine war- ,
fare in Laos and Cambod-
ia will mean disaster.
He spoke to about 50
persons at a United World
Federalists meeting at the
East Long Beach home of
Abe Zucker.
Thompson, who resigned
as cultural officer for the
U. S. Information Agency
in Laos in 1967, charged
there was "tremendous U.
S. involvement" in the
Mar. 18 ouster of Prince
Norodom Sihanouk of
Cambodia.
Largo amounts of U. S.
weapons and material aid
are being supplied to Lao-
tian forces who are fight.
mat
ore
ars I
lug the Nationalist-Com- r
munist Pathet Lao, he ?
said. The U. S., he said,
also supplies many spe-
cialists.
"Much of this is clone by
the Central Intelligence
Ageney," he charged.
"The QT.A....2 works beyond
censorship, below control
and with unlimited funds..
Congress is unable to
' check its operations effec-
tively."
The CIA gets its budget
from many hidden
sources, he said, including
?in at least one year ?
$10 million from the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs.
?, Thompson said the;
`Agency for International
? Development ? "once a '
noble concept to build the
economies of underdevel-
oped nations" ? has lie=
come a front for political
and military operations in
Laos. ?
He said the U. S. should
have lived up to a 1962
treaty between the U. S.
and ,the Soviet Union
which "guaranteed iron-
clad neutrality for Laos."
If the U. S. had honore
such pacts in Vietnam, he
the Vietnam w
might- never have nap-
pened.
He conceded that North
Vietnam and the U.S.S.R.
. broke the treaty, too, but;
said:
"We could have effec-7
lively called the world'al
attention to that perfidy if;
we had kept our own
,skirts clean."
Thompson said that
Southeast Asian leadersi
had repeatedly asked him;
to convey their desire fori
U. S. economic aid ? "the,
kind of aid they want, noti
the kind of aid we think,
they need, such as bases
for U. A. military opera-;
? ns." .;
"I'm against,' Isolation-I
ism," he .said, ?:
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27 APR 1970
Hanoi Troops Gain Ground in Laos
Special to The Star
VIENTIANE?Fighting, i n
some places heavy, is continuing
in northeast Laos with North Vi-
etnamese forces gradually gain-
ing ground from Meo guerrillas
and Lao government forces.
The fighting is centering
around Bouam Long, an airstrip
used by American aircraft north
of the Plain of Jars.
The north Vietnamese are us-
ing what military sources said
are "18th Century tactics" by
digging rings of trenches around
Bouam Long, then pushing for-
ward with zigzag trenches.
The trench digging efforts
have been blasted by U.S. jets,
Lao sources said; causing the
Reds heavy losses, but the North
Vietnamese are continuing to
edge closer.
The North Vietnamese, backed
by four 105mm howitzers, want
to take the position, which is a
jumping off point for Gen. yang
Pao's guerrillas against Hanoi's
supply lines in the northern
area.
U.S. Strikes Called In
Meo guerrillas with radios are
searching for them .and calling
In U.S and Lao air strikes and
Thai artillery fire.
American military advisers
are flying forward air control
_
and coordinating forward air
guides on ground.
The Meo guerrillas, and Lao
special guerrilla units are by-
passing Hanoi valley positions,
hitting ridges. Sometimes they
are pushing North Vietnamese
machinegunners off these ridges
at a cost of high government
casualties.
At night the North Vietnamese
are launching ground probes,
reaching within 2,000 yards of
the Sam Thong airstrip and trig-
gering an action 8,000 yards
northeast of Long Chien.
Although yang Pao succeeded
in widening his defensive perim-
eter around Long Chien, this is
no indication the government is
winning.
Reliable military sources,
however, believe the probes and
shelling are a prelude to new
North Vietnamese attacks.
They say the North Vietnam-
ese are resuppling, reinforcing
and regrouping their forces.
Situation Bleak
Although the North Vietnam-
ese are concentrating on Militar-
y Region II in northeast Laos,
the situation of the government
forces in the rest of northern
Laos is dismal. North Vietnam-
ese and Pathet Lao forces in
northwest Laos have reached
the Thai border near Pak. Tha
and gradually are picking off
government outposts near the
Chinese-built road In the area.
he U.S. is continuing to main-
am n what is called Site 118 west
I the road, a military and Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency base
similar to Long Chien.
Pathet Lao forces have driven
government troops out of out-
posts 30 kilometers northwest of
the royal capital of Luang Pra-
i bang. These areas west of the
LChinese road have been normal-
ly held by government forces.
Red troops are clearing the area
around Pak Beng, the terminus
of the Chinese road, apparently
Indicating the Communists are
planning future actions in the
area
In the southern portion of
North Laos, Hanoi troops seem
content for the moment, having
driven government forces back
to Snake Ridge, northeast of
Paksae. This leaves the Reds
free to start work on a new
communications system linking
the Plain of Jars in northern
Laos with the Ho Chi Minh Trail
In the south.
In northern Laos, where the
fighting is part of a political
struggle for Laos cabinet seats
between rightists and Commu-
nists, with the neutralists no
longer a viable military force,
U.S. officials still hope to hold
Long Chien and Sam Thong, in-
suring the survival of Van Pao's
effective guerrilla forces in the
northern mountains.
In southern Laos, where fight-
ing centers basically on the
North Vietnamese attempt to
keep the Lao from interfering
with the Ho Chi Minh frail, there
is a lull in fighting.
Intelligence reports say some
North Vietnamese units guard-
ing the west flank by the trail
have pulled out to the east and
then moved down the Ho Chi
Minh trail where it joins Route
110, also known as the Sihanouk
trial.
North Vietnamese troops have
moved into the tri-border area
where Laos, Cambodia and
South Vietnam join, but it is not
clear whether they crossed into
Cambodia or South Vietnam.
The U.& Mr Force, meanwhile,
_
is attacking the trail system '
prevent suspected movements.
Pathet Lao forces near the
Cambodian border have been
foraging heavily, the military
sources said, indicating they
may be hurt by the Cambodian
blockade of their food supplies.
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ittiftl"
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27 APR 1970
STATI NTL
F ibright'Prepares Challenge'
n j Iiicy
, ..
'
krt e 1. ?
.,, By JAMES DOYLE ? 1: Laos, Chairman J. Wi tam
, The testimony showed in de- , When Sullivan was ambassa- '
,
d the tail how a small American .' dor, Godley was assistant sec-
commitment multiplied, while retary of State for Southeast
successive administrations fol- . Asia. Last year they ex-
lowed a deliberate policy of ? . changed positions. "This is an
denying American military in- - indication of what a tight shop
'. er confrontation with the . the secret warriors ran," said
to convince either the adminis-
:White house over American volvement.
involvement in Southeast Asia. tration or the senate to cancel Committee sources, by use a committee source.
U.S. military commitments, of newspaper clippings and . ? "S u 111 v a n made himself
: It could become a major chat- Through a series of recent similar dispatches, make a quite a reputation as an 'edit,-
' lenge to the President Nixon's
Conduct of foreign policy. actions the committee has pre- telling case that the only 1st' ambassador. You can be ?
pared itself to in
wide- group deceived was the Amer- sure that Mac Godley is not
Secretary of State William
spread support in Congress to '' going to be the first ambassa- i
P. Rogers was appearing be- lean public.
block any attempt by the Pres- The report tells of secret ' dor to preside over an Amen-'
. fore the committee this after- to extend military aid to American actions to continue can defeat in Laos," the i
noon?apparently to testily,
Cambodia, or any country, , military activities after the source added. ,
among other things, on the
without congressional approv- . signing of the Geneva Accords' The public facets of the Laos e
U.S.-approved dispatch of au-
tomatic weapons to Cambodia al. . of 1962. The Soviet :Union tacit.' war were just beginning to un- I
t
r
Star Stalf Writer . Ful rig , -
members of the conn-
The Senate Foreign Rela- ,.11(Tding
mato) found themselves re-
. tions Committe is preparing
acting to policy after it was
the groundwork for yet anoth-
firmly established, and unable
from South Vietnam last week. One of these was the suc- ' ly approved the continttance, ' fold when Cambodia was add- '
1 The administration has dig- cessful passage in the last. apparently to maintain an
counted the importance of this session of a National Commit- anti-Chinese balance in the
' ;military aid to the beseiged ments Resolution, expressing
area.
government of Cambodia, and the sense of the Senate that "a
It also showed that after the
assured members of the corn- 1 national commitment by the 'cessation of bombing over
mittee that the weapons were I United States results only much of North Vietnam in No-
captured AK47s of Chinese
from affirmative action taken
I
the legislative and execu- vember 1968, U.S. B52 bomb-
manufacture, and not Amen- I by ens began flying their bombing
Live branches...." raids over northern Laos, near
ed to the strategic balance in ;1
Southeast Asia by the over- ;
throw of Norodom Sihanouk.:
At least some high adminis-
tration officials are reported .
to view the pro-American gov-
ernment and its request for .
aid as a golden opportunity to ,
force the exhausted North
can On Wednesday two commit-" Another was the establish- the North Vietnamese border. Vietnamese to overextend their ;.
arms.
' tee staff members, James G. I ment of a new subcommittee Committee ; sources insist i lines.
'Lowenstein and Richard M. under Stuart S y m i n g to n ithat this mist have had a I, The argument is
that a trick-'
, Moose, are scheduled to leave D-Mo., to investigate the ex!
marked impact on the unwill- j. le of aid to Cambodia now .
: for a two-week inspection tour tent of American commit- ?r
I in f th North
gness o eVietnam- i might shorten the Vietnam
of Cambodia to report on the d ' enemy troops
, extent of the American pres-
ence there.
7 Lowenstein andMoose
I caused some displeasure with-
in the administration after a
I. similar trip to Vietnam last
! December.
Their published report
called into question the Presi-
dent's1, public optimism con-
! ductions. It said most officials nain war among congressmen, country nationals as groun
I of the American and South Vi- and led to the passage of a. , troops in Laos, financed by the I
1 details of the secret war in j
I When confronted with the
li caning large-scale troop re- ,
. gon were presuming that 250,- ? amendment forbidding the fl- On release of the transcript, ' Laos, administration officials I
often note that leading mem- 1
I, etnamese governments in Sal? ? defense appropriations bill United States.'
000 troops would remain in the . nancing of American troops in Fulbright said "I have never
bers of the Foreign Relations '
the country "for years." Laos or Thailand. I seen a country engage in so
There is an important differ- This reassertion of legisla- I. many devious undertakings as Committee, and especially
Symington, knew many of the
? tive prorogative is expected to This, and Symington charged
' that the amhas.4adors to Laos, details, but declined to oppose
? ? ? S ili an and . the situation until recently.
meats around the world.
It has completed hearings on ese to negotiate in Paris. w y
the Philippines, Taiwan, Thai- ' Excised from the report, but 1 their traditional Cambodian
land and Laos, and last week readily available through dis- sanctuaries and staging areas.
succeeded, after months of , Patches from journalists on I ' Other officials are fearful of
the scene, was information on bath the public consequences
the use of the Laos AID mis-
sion as a cover for Central i
Intelligence Agency opera-
tives, the use of Thailand to This is the position that the
fly bombing raids over Laos, I Foreign Relations Commit- 1
and the introduction of third tee's senior members lean to- :
ward.i
struggle with the administra-
tion, in publishing 90 percent
of the secret testimony Take-
non Laos.
The debate and study has
spread disenchantment with ?
the past conduct of the Viet...,
home and the possibility of
cw entrapments in the battle-
field should aid be extended.
? ence in the committee's quit
r action to make an independent have some effect on the Presi-1
h, judgment on conditions in dent's actions in Cambodia.
WCambodia, where Prime Min- But committee sources believe
\ ister Lon. Nolte government the recently published Laos
i has , asked for massive 1.1.3 transcript may have the great-
. aid. . est Influence on how Nixon
1 I In the capes ft Vietnam and proceeds..
;? . ;14i ? .1 1 ? : ? ?
se
firs i .
now G. McMurtrie Godley, . This underscores the fact
were turned into "military that the possibility for a stmt. i
proconsul" by their role in di- lar secret war in Cambodia is I
recting the Isecret war, induct- slight, , and- probably -doesn't 1
lag the selection ?Margot' for ..._,?. ' . ,?
American pilots to bomb. . . .F4`1.- I .1,. . ,,I I. ). I I '111 11,..
?1
1.1 ? ? smivi?utlei
700030001-4
Approved For ReleasSUM6V64 !3udaitp_80=016_01
5IAHNIL
26 APR 1970
0 wPoint of Vie
War in Laos Pidured
As American Wunder
new coalition ? as in effect it is
\
now doing ? by Insisting that
Prime Minister Snuvanna
I phourna avoid' such newels-
tines until the Vietnamese war
ends.
Buffer Wanted
? The writer, an international by (de matched by) Increases Ia1eve diversions of troops to
affairs fellow at the Council in North Vietnamese ground Laos, Hanoi has been able to
On Foreign Relations. IS the forces, raise the specter in Washington
author of "The Arms Race" I These 'struggles have been of a widening Indochinese war.
This has permitted Hanoi to
outflank psychologically the Ad-
ministration policy of Vietnam-
ization and withdrawal.
Thus, in Ilanoi's view, 'the
fight for control of central
northern Laos provides a ready
arid necessary tool to keep the
and "Strategic Persuasion.
By JEREMY J. STONE..
Washington ? In the northern
highlands of Laos, the United
States Is fighting a secret war
Ithat is totally unnecessary from
!every point of view.
! Our willingness to do it plays
Into the hands of the North
Vietnamese and undermines
our policy in Vietnam.
There is no treaty require-
' nient for it and "no defense
? commitment ? written, stated,
or understood."
? The fighting is taking place
without any overall congres-
sional authorization, but solely
under the "executive authority
of the President."
These conclusions, and offi-
cial quotations, are based on
Symington Committee testi-
mony just released after six
months of wrangling with ,the
State Department over its decl-
, assification.
I Two Separate Wars
over territory of no strategic
significance. They have
stemmed from the vlew ' that
military victories Would be
translatable into "political ad-
vantages" that 'would deter-
mine the "character of Lao
neutralism" at some future
settlement on a coalition gov-
ernment. Nixon Administration off bal-j same white paper conceded
Argument Recalled ance. ,
i, ,that Hanoi's goal was to pave
Counter Productive the way for the eventual estate
?
It is startling to see what the
The defense of Thailand Is
sometimes given as "one of the
reasons" why we are In
Laos." But, in saying so, Assis-
tant Secretary Sullivan was
careful to indicate that what
was wanted was a buffer. The
Mekong Valley, which lies be-
tween Thailand and the high-
lands, could serve as a buffer,
making it unnecessary to fight
over the highlands.
The President's only other
white paper reason for this
fighting was to support the "in-
dependence one neutrality" of
Laos, as set forth by the Gen-
eva accords of 1962. But the
s
U.S. Government spokesman As the Administration itself li hment of a government
responsible for all the quota- asserted in these hearings, the . "more amenable 'to Communist
Control."
tions thus far, Deputy Assistant North Vietnamese "orches-
Secretary of State William H. trate" the Laotian struggle and This is, as noted above, only
a question of the political char-
Sullivan, Was arguing in 1968. consider it "part and parcel" of consider it "part and parcel" of of the Laotian govern-
He argued that the extent of1
t h e then-current Communist
gains should be discounted, be-
cause "75 or 80 percent" of the
population were under Laotian
government control in the Me-
kong Valley! He indicated it
would, be .easy to defend the
valley. ?
A Communist invasion of the
lowlands -would have to be in
"quite considerable force" and
mould be "susceptible to" effec-
tive Lao air force action. And
such Communist attacks would
be further deterred by the rea-
lignment that they would
present such a "direct threat"
to neighboring Thailand as to
force America into hard choices
Involving risks for all con-
cerned.
In other words, we could sim-
ply have refused to play this
game of challenging Commu-
nist control of less-populated ?
and much harder to hold ?
highlands in which the fighting
was taking place. Secbrely
holding a clear majority of pop-
ulation, we could have denied'
that any important change in
I The Senate hearings reveal
:two separate wars.in Laos.
In the southern part of Laos,
massive American bombing
strikes attempt to reduce the
Infiltration of men and supplies
into South Vietnam along the
Ho Chi Minh Trail.
In the northern highlands of
Laos, the United States also is
engaged in massive bombing of
Pathet Lao and North Vietnam-
ese forces, which are fighting
the royal Laotian army and the
American-sponsored clandestine
Men army.
And shire before the 1962
Geneva accords, the United
,States has been feeding. shel-
tering, equipping and advising. the internal political balance
:the only army in Laos that can had taken place.
fight ? the Mao army for Blunder Charged
use in northern Laos. f Indeed, it is increasingly evi-,
In central noithern Laos, 'dent that It has been a political-
there have been several years
strategic blunder to place such
o I seasonal offensives and emphasis on territory which the
counteroffensives in 'which in-1' ?
' royalist and Mao forces patent.creasIng.American air and !
y cannot hold, even with the
the effort to achieve a Vietnam-
ese settlement.
After all, from Hanoi's point
of view ? and from that of a
sizeable segment of American
opinion ? the Administration
intends, if it can, to withdraw
troops from South Vietnam only
by such fits and starts as will
maintain our military pre-
ponderance.,
Thus, we have waged an un-
necessary struggle, with tactics
increasingly counter produc-
tive, This struggle has made
one Laotian in ten a refugee.
And, by many accounts, it
has reduced the Meo. who have
borne the brunt of the fighting,
to a society without able-bodied
men, mounting an army of the
ton young and the too old, and
questioning whether they joined
the right side in the first place.
ment. It is a question of how
many government ministerial
portfolios, and which ones, the
Pathet Lao forces get. Such
questions are not treated in the
1962 accords, which simply
guarantee and impose upon
Laos the kind of military neu-.?
trality we know in, Switzerland.
tittle suppnlotelg
sm$,RISittnalrarL
Previous Chaos
We are making again the
mistake we made in 1959-1961.
Scholars agree widely that it
was our CIA-financed effort of
that time to supplant Souvanna
Phouma's ? middle-of-the-road
regime by a clearly pro-West-
ern regime which brought on
the political chaos that made
the 1962 Geneva conference
necessary.
We should pay much less at-
tention to the internal political
character of the Laotian gov-
ernment and to the negotiations
that precede its coalition gov-
ernment.
The Symington report makes
It evident that our goal should
be simply to prevent the mill-
Coalition Feared
The Administration has no
justificatinn for this northern
war. In' the President's white
paper of March 6, the Adminis-
tration nrgued that Its goal in
Laos "above all" was to save
American and Allied lives in
South --loam by bombing the
traik -lithern Laos.
The Administration fears that
a new coalition under Commu-
nist control might call upon the
United States to stop bombing
the trails. "
But the United States need
not fight in the highlands to
rev btgation. It can
ade
&IRMO
new coalition..? se In effect Ills
tary conquest of the Mekong
Valley, pending an 'end of the
Vietnamese war.
There is no moral, political,
or strategic reason for our
fighting, or encouraging Lao-
tians to fight, in the north.
This fact has been long hid-
den by the failure of the Execu-
tive Branch to permit ? and of
the Congress to demand ? a
antrwethiesnn licsivery.
-otookittn sm.?_servIce
Approved For Release 2001/03/04D:ABIAMY1380-0
2 5 APR 1910
. ? ,STATINTL
Tao
4]-)
By TIM WHEELER
WASHINGTON, April 24?The SANE Committee sent a telegram yesterday urging ,
. that President Nixon refuse arms to the Lon Nol junta in Cambodia.
. "We urge you to reject Cam- , of war and 45,000 Americans.- Vietnam war would be strongly .
bodia's request for military aid., dead. ? 'v.. opposed in Congress and the na- -
I direct and indirect," says the ? Nixon meanwhile, in a play ',.? tion as a whole. In strictly mill-
I telegram, addressed to Nixon's,. for time, canceled a National:4tary terms, 'victory' would . like...1
: foreign policy adviser, Henry.: Security Council meeting today.N ly prove to be at least as Ulu- ,.?
A Kissinger. It was signed by Observers believe that Nixon e.?,?sory in Laos and Cambodia as it. ,
NI I Sanford Gottlieb, executive di- ?'.would prefer to set up a puppel?7;?las proven in Vietnam." ? ai
I rector of the anti-war group. . , ?,..., operation to cover expanded U.S.. ..., ? '.'"' 4
I The telegram 'said that U.S.''' aggression in Indo-China rather. ./ ?WINGER CHARGES CIA ? '';
' military aid "would lead to Cur-," than send U.S. troops. ..; ? PUSHES SECRET LAOS WAR '.
, ?
?
, ther embroilment in widening ''? But Sen. Frank Church (r)...?NEW YORK, April 24 (UPI)? '1
i war and violate the sense of the ?; Idaho) warned recently, ../t, has .
:...Re_p. today accused the CIA of . Richard L. Ottinger, D- '
,. '
?
1 Senate (Commitments Resolu-!:;.been reported and photographs ?NY
I
tion)."
. have been made showing that ::'
conducting, with Presidential ap-.., ,
.'?,
This was the resolution pass..., armed American military per- .._ proval, a "secret, illegal war in.
3',:
ed 70 to 16 by the. Senate- last: . sonnel have already crossed hack. Laos" that ? could plunge the:'
...
United States into "another mai-'!
year forbidding the President to. : Cambodian territory several, I,
or, bloody land war in Asia." I
commit the U.S. to military . times in recent days." Presum- ., .
He said he based his charge'-,
: ' actions abroad 'without the con- '' ably this refers to Green Beret ,
?
and CIA advisers who ar lead-
on on-the-spot information gath- ,
, e
: sent of Congress. ? . ered by his aides.
' , ing forays against pro-Sinahouk.' ., for the
While the peace movement and.,!. liberation forces in Cambodia. - Ottinger, a candidate
?? ? ...
: .
'a large fraction of the' ? Senate ': .
. Church, a member of the For-
Democratic nomination, for the.
warned Nixon against interven-
Ing in the Cambodian, crisis, U.S. ?.'? eign Relationslthso John Sherman'"
C nnmitte hast - the CIA with ? working out "a?,1 V
U.S. Senate, charged Nixon and , ,..
' advisers and arms were already' ? joined.w en. .
;new formula" for conducting a :
rman''''
I embroiled in expanded .aggres-? :, Cooper (R-Ky). to 'introduce a .;,? secret military operation in Laos.,
1 sion inside Cambodia. ,r. resolution "prohibiting the, in-.: ? :
' The peace movement here"'
troduction of American combat'.1,-:, i .1 geniurivr ... -, . ...... ? .1 '
..!"without risking public or
troops" into Cambodia. He said ?r- I. ? -7-7-- ? '' ",, ? ,
warned that this is an exact re- .. the developments in Cambodia 1 '
play of the Vietnam, war scena-, "create dangerous pressures for ?. ?
rio in which the Pentagon secretly,' ? deepening America's ?involve- .
sending so-called...,
embroiled the IJ advisers. then
in war by .. ment" and will "add fuel to this' .
.i! . spreading fire." . .
' ? ' ,, -
'handed the peoRle a fait accon1-..: . 'The Joint Chiefs' of Staff, nip,. '
pll. ,The result was five 'years happy with. the level of .interven-1
tion, are stepping up pressure.. '
here for a full scale adventure
in behalf of the Lon Nol junta. I.
, Alarmist reports, inspired by
"top 'officials" in off-the-record
.'
Interviews with the press Corps,
;predict the imminent collapse of '
r the junta and a "Vietcong 'take-
over."? ?
, ? I The hysteria-mongering is cou-
pled with arguments by the Joint
i Chiefs of Staff that "swift and
.. . substantial" intervention in Cam-
bodia will enable the U.S: toJ
I "smash the Vietcong sanctuaries"
-
... and bring quick victory for the
1 U.S. in 'Indo-China. But Sen.s.la-'
Approved For Release 2001/03104 (ROA-FM P11001601 R000700030001-4
'411Clearly an ' expansion of the
. ._ ._... .. ..J ?
? II.
' ; ,?,711!01%,
?
Ii'
Guardian
'Approved For Release 2001/03/delelORIM6R-01601
STATI NTL
?.... .. ? . ? .
?
ihoculine.._ .carimroodap
lEdifillert
By Wilfred Burchett
? ' ?
? Guardian staff correspondent ,
?
Paris
/
The horrifying massacres of Vietnamese civilians in
'. Cambodia arc being carried out by American CIA-
trained "Khmer Serci"("Free Cambodia") traitor
. troops until recently stationed in Thailand.
..
The U.S. organized them, paid them, armed them
and most probably sent them on their mission of
death against thousands of unarmed Vietnamese with-
in Cambodia's borders. - ..
According to Cambodian sources in Paris and
travelers reaching here from Phnom' Pcnh, these
commando-type mercenaries are playing the same
role in Cambodia as the CIA-trained "Vang Pao'
Meo" mercenaries in Laos, which were also stationed
in Thailand, - . -
The Khmer Screi, brought back to Cambodia to
lead in the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk's
, neutralist regime last month, had previously been
? based in South Vi ..nam. Their main bases were
over, on by the NLF and they were transferred to
Thailand. . . -
Their previous raids into Cambodian territory inv-
.
ariably failed. Large numbers were captured, a few,
. leaders executed, others jailed. ? ?
, In 1969, there were mysterious large-scale'
:defections?whole companies and even battalions?to'
the Cambodian government. In one day, 700 crossed,
the border, from Thailand and gave themselves up.!
Credit for the "defections" was given to Gen. Lon.
Nol, then Defense Minister, now heading the largest,'
group that overittr_ew Sihanouk. The deserters werei
welcomed by the Cambodian government at the time,.
given cash awards and even decorations.
In fact they were decisive CIA contributions to the!
Lon Nol-Sirik Matak conspiracy. They were the.
stormtroopers who spearheaded the attack on the
embassies of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
and Provisional Revolutionary Government in"
Phnom Penh and on whom Lon Nol mainly relied for
his coup.
One of the first acts of the new regime was to re-' '
lease "political prisoners." It was claimed that "pro-
gressives" jailed by Sihanouk were being freed. In fact'
a few were, but the majority freed were the Khmer, !
Screi recruits for the Lon Nol stormtroopers. And for.;
every progressive released a dozen more took their:
places in the jails or concentration camps to await:
execution.
?
The counterpart of the lie that it is "North Viet-.
namese" and "Vietcong" troops that have liberated:
large areas of Cambodia is that it is "only" Viet-
,?.,namcse who, are being executed. In fact, although the
Lon Nol regime has incited Nazi-type racial pogroms
against anyone of Vietnamese origin regardless of'sex
or age, Cambodian leftists are also being rounded up;
and murdered in cold blood by Khmer Serei execution'
souads. . ? I .
Approved For Release 2001/03/0'
STATINTL
;
'. The Lon Nol regime in Cambodia is trying to re-
peat the type of bloodbath that General Suharto per-
petrated, in Indonesia, substituting Vietnamese for'
'Chinese. But Cambodia is not Indonesia. 'There are,
two important differences which even President Nix?
-
on's CIA experts must take into account. Cambodia
is, neither geographically or politically isolat&I as was.
Indonesia. And the general staff of the Cambodian ;
progressive movement never came out into the open!
to reveal itself and be decapitated a.s did the leaders of'
The old resistance bases which the French were
never able to liquidate in Cambodia have remained
? intact since going underground in 1954. So has the old
;political and military infrastructure,including its key!
cadre. So too, has the traditional solidarity between
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and their resistance
!movements.
'intact since going Underground in 1934. So too, has
Ithe traditional solidarity between Vietnam, Cambodia
and Laos and their resistance movements.
' It is for this reason that vast areas of Cambodia
have already been converted into liberated zones, con-
trolled by the National United Front. Even Lon Nol
has had to recognize that the key provinces of Ratam-
mikiri, Mondulkiri and Svay Rieng, which adjoin
South Vietnam and Laos are "almost entirely" con-
trolled by the Cambodian resistance forces. Another
? live provinces which have common frontiers with the
:rest of South Vietnam and the southern coastal areas
of Cambodia arc "half controlled."
All battalions of Lon Nol's forces, including the
. battalion assigned to the defense of Phnom Penh jt_,
self, have defected to the Cambodian resistance move-:
mem., Virtually all the territory cast of the Mekong
I River is now firmly in. the hands of the Cambodian'
National Liberation Army.
, The massacres are a measure of the frustration of:
the Lon Nol regime and the refusal of an increasingly;
large part of his armed forces to play the part of U.S.:
puppets. in a civil war. The armed forces in the past:
have shown little enthusiasm in fighting against their
compatriots who had taken to arms and even less to-
day when their resistance has the official blessing of
Sihanouk and is clearly aimed against U.S. imperial- ,
ism.
In a little over one month after the coup the situa-
tion has developed exactly the .opposite to that '
planned by Lon Nol and his American backers. In-:
stead of catching NLF forces in the frontier areas in a i
trap, and cutting off their quite legal rice supplies'
from Cambodia?paid for in hard cash at top prictsl
when Sihanouk was in power?these areas are now:
firmly in hands friendly to the NLF. It is the Lon Nol
troops that are caught in a trap between the South'
Xietwria
-: ; UM- ?
II ir-titeobffttitillifefe8M44
the Indonesian Communist party'......"..
continied.
Approved For'Releese AR1 YelRaktailtiktiP8Or01
5 APR 1970
STATI NTL
mem err: aA.finudved in Laos
By THOMAS POSTER
?
Westchester Rep. Richard Ottinger charged yesterday that the Central Intelli-;
gence Agency, with President Nixon's approval, is directing secret mary operations
1,
in Laosthat may provoke "another major, bloody war in Asia."
Ottinger, a Democratic con-
tender for the United States
Senate nomination, called for a
congressional investigation based
on reports brought home from
Laos by two of his aides.
Sees Violation of Law
He said that 30,000 American
< ?troops are now involved in com-
bat operations in Laos in viola-
tion of the National Security Act
of 1949.
Ottinger's aides, Peter Decker,
34, and Ronald Riehenbach, 26,
spent several years in Laos
before making their three-week
study of U.S. military involve-
ment last month.
"I'm going to blow the whistle
on what's happening because we
are no* on the brink of another
Rep. Rieheri Ditherer total war like Vi tnn Otti
Fears anetkor,_Aalan
?????144 41.1relmai I ?44
?
?
On another front, some sup-'
porters of former Controller
Mario A. Procaccino began circu?
lating petitions for him to enter,
the June 23. Democratic primary.
for governor. Procaccino said they,
were doing so without his ap-
proval and that he is still con-.
sidering running.
Spokesmen for the three guber-:
atonal contenders, Arthur J.'
Goldberg, Howard Samuels and
Robert M. Morgenthau, said re-
sponse to the candidates' first tel-
evision debate Thursday night on
WPIX 'was "less than enthusias-
tic.".. Samuels and Morgehthau
Urged more debates. ,
A Goldberg aide said only two
more are- plinne4 before the Jane
141101,1444iZ,
Jimiraag?
? 4 ?
? Approved .F Or Release 2 001 /p 3/04 601. 100 7,0 00i 0 001 L4 ?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :.CIA-RDP80-01,601
STATINTL
CHICAGO, ILL.
NEWS
E ? 461,357
APR 24 1970
' I
,
? ",l'sk,k, ?
' ?
:?.
'
? ?
? ; ; ?
? ,
za.fa:44'....i.0 ? "
,
eat*?:;- surprise,
even aenerals who .ousied Sihanouk :may be sorry now
By Keyes Beech .
Daily News Foreign Service
? PHNOM PENH, Cambodia ? "It is per
fectly clear," Prince Norodom Sihanouk wrote
to the Paris newspaper LeMonde in 1968
"that Asian communism does not permit u
nine? It also is legitimate to ask Harms ale-
will do the trick. No experienced observe
lvhcr has seen the Cambodian army in actio
-
1 or inaction can doubt that it would be a pusl
? over for disciplined Vietnamese Communis
.Tegulars.
,
I s
any longer to stay neutral and withdraw front
?
? ,the conflict between the Chinese-Vietnamese ,
?and the Americans.
"Not being able to make us into allies offer-
ing unconditional support, Asian communism ?
strives to overthrow our regime from within. ?
"The tournament has only just started."
THE TOURNAMENT ENDED for Sihanouk'
on March 18. While he was in France on one
of his periodic "health cures," he was stripped:,
of power. He had ruled his country almost
singlehandedly for nearly 30 years. ' But Siha- .
riouk's ouster ? and he may yet 'return to
Cambodia to reclaim what lie considers right-'.
fully his ? 'does not dim the luster of his
!prophecy. "
? ? ?
With the possible exception of Singapore's
, irascible Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew,. Si-
5. hanouk was the shrewdest judge of cominit-
i nism in Southeast. e was also shrewd
enough to predict his own downfall.
"When resistance will no longer be -pos-;
Sible," he said, "Sihanouk will withdraw and
the army, which is anti-Communist, will take
over."
Sihanouk did not withdraw. He Was kicked
.out. But with that difference, his forecast was
'correct. The army, headed by pen,. Lon Nol;
?is in. control of the government, and Cam-
bodia, , which for more than a deeade;rnaii.
liaged ,remain a tranquil island in the heart
,.of eethipg Southeast''Asia, has at last been
' .
'drawn into the wat.it sought so,desporately to
.. ? ? ? ? ." ? ? ". ? ? "
?X9.!.Ck Onikiteit P?baR: et eite:1?
? ?- .
Mass Red intrust?. ns
J...., Veteran correspondent Keyes Beech has,
,
' . been coverihg the deepening ,trists, in . All this woe(1 seem to be a high price t
, Cambodia for The Daily News. .In this ?Pra.3r for the overthrew of Norodom Sihanoul
?' ,. ' 'dispatch, ha puts Prince' Sihanouk's ' So it is,
but it isn't all that simple.
?i' 'ouster in perspective and explores 'its.' ' ' Disastrous as the events of the last mont
",,I.. ? effect on the war in . Vietnam. .? : ? en'ay.be, they should not be allowed to obscur
1, , ,
.one very important thing. Cambodia is in th
,-- ? mess it is today because of mass Vietnames
1 , ONE MONTH AFTER the event, it hems Communist intrusions, not because of th
that Siharieu.kis ouster: Was not a very good United States or South Vietnam or for tha
I '?:idea., Cambodians have turned against Cam- :matter Thailand. Except for occasional hot
1. bodians; ? more Cambodians are fleeing the 'der incursions in the heat of battle ? fo
1-,Vietnamesa Communists, and Vietnamese Which the United States duly apologized an,
?,1 civilians are fleeing a vengeful Cambodian' often paid indemnities ? the United State
1 :Moodbatii.' Nobody is , happy. Not Peking, respected Cambodian neutrality and ten-ite
I.: which regards the new 'regime as downright rial integrity. The Communists did not.
J I - '1
By Sihanouk's own estimate, Hanoi poure,
More than 40,000 North Vietnamese troop.
into their Cambodian sanctuary to wage thi
. 'I C certainly, no the NorthVietnam-
1, ese and the Viet Cong, who have reacted vig-
't
?;?orously to the threat to their Cambodian sane-
r.,tuary. Four of Cambodia's most populous war in South Vietnam. If Cambodia manage(
.,'provinces bordering on South Vietnam are for to stay out of the Vietnam War during the-las
? the most part under Communist control.
. five years, it was as much due to Americar
If the Communists aren't happy, neither arej forbearance as it was to Sihanouk's politica
?,' '''Ithe Americans. The United States is faced cunning.
.
,
, 'with, a 'wider war 'a1. a time when it is dis-r?
.
NOR CAN SIHANOUK escape blame for his
) engaging from South Vietnam, and President; country's agony. Intoxicated by his own clev,
' -Nixon is faced with the agonizing decision on. emess, he played oneside against the other it
Arius at the risk of provoking a flare-up
, whether to grant Cambodia's request flare-up
in r; a. dazzling.display of diplomatic Pyrotechnics,
. 7 ? g
I$domestic 'antiwar diSsent. It is difficult;how,-When he thought the Communists were goin
,
,, to' win in South Vidtnam;he compromised his
ever, to see how he can refuse if his Gnarri: own neutrality Iv giving them sanctuary. Not
Doctrine is to mean anything, for if ever a !
he supplied them with rico and
ceentI7' was the 'Weft of Communist eggre- only that,.1.7illowed Chinese-owned trucks to move arms
sion from both within and without, It Cr -
I 11 ?--,-,m. . Slhanoultville to
1.RCommunist staging
.0001004y,.(14.8(11... , & Sib* U.S. bOlt Frien4ship
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601RE9NER30001-4
? BliFFAPJ, N.Y.
NEWS
APR 23 1970
; E -- 213 1 , 982
r...........-
Disturbing Facts On Laos
At last -- long after most of the story mission in Laos took an active role in '1
has been ferreted out by newsmen ? the selecting targets and carrying out bomb-
details of the secret American in- lag runs.
i
1 volvement in Laos are being officially This incredible state of affairs started
released. It was already, known that the under the Kennedy administration but
1 United States had been providing air developed mainly during the Johnson
tl support to the Laotian forces and that
V
i
, the1,-- and the G r e e n Berets had administration. President Nixon, while
CIA, overly reticent about revealing the facts,
11. -trained a supposedly elite Laotian army. has apparently 'been waiting to scale it
Now the released testimony to
a down. The U. S. claims no vital interests .
i Senate subcommittee reveals that in Laos, and even if we had them it;
- American participation dates back to would be inexcusable to mount such a
t, 1962, the year when Laos was supposed military operation without the knowl-
to be netttralized tinder the 'Geneva edge of Congress or the American pea-.
, agreement. Since then about 100 Amen- pie. It is easy to imagine how our
cans have been killed in Laos?half, of creeping involvement in Laos could have
ithem pilots b'ased in Thailand, but the become another Vietnam-type war.
rest stationed right in Laos. , Under the new Nixon Doctrine, that pro-
I, Far from maintaining an aloof ? ad- spect is now remote, and presumably
't visory role as .officials of the past two .o r 1.4tos adventure will be phased out
Achninistratrions haye ,implied,, the U. S.,"albngyith,the Vietnam war.
.,.. -1.-...,...4...4- ..,.. _4 'Y ,II: t Le ;11 ,. 'ti +qt i A. I u: .,,l,b,?'A,.,?o..P..1 ,,',-,p,0]?tt- *. t i ...11
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
STATINTL STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
S6136 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
? the child feeding programs; fortunately, the the Foreign Relations Committee is that
funding of lunches served free or at reduced of the questionable nature of that die-
prices to needy children actually is raised closure when it came to U.S. activities
? by about $94 million.
However, $94 million Is not nearly enough.
If 2.8 million more needy children are to be
supplied lunches free or at reduced prices,
the projected increase In program costs will
. be $300 million, Some of this may be trimmed
by new developments which will lower pro-
? duction costs, although the escalating costs
of food, labor and equipment will make it
difficult to achieve net savings.
It Is the deficit between the Administra-
tion's $94 million and the actual cost of $300
, million which must be supplied by the Con-
gress, or the states, or local governments, if Laos.
_ the Christmas promise is to become edible, ? ? It also is particularly pertinent today
assist-
lion, The fiscal 1971 budget estimates the ? to any present or planned military The gap may be even larger than $200 mil-
special assistance program will reach 5.5 mil- ? ance activities the United States may
? , :' lion children a day. This program is budgeted undertake in Cambodia.
for $200 million in fiscal 1971, or an average I would remind the administration
t ? federal reimbursement of 20 cents per meal, that the Foreign Relations Committee
Assuming the U.S. Department of Agricul- expects to be consulted before this Gov-
, tura will provide seven cents in commodities ernment takes that first step?however
for fiscal 1971 just as it did in fiscal 1970, the small it seems.
total federal contribution for these 5.5 mil- The history of Vietnam and the re-
? :-... - lion daily lunches next school year will be 27 ?cently disclosed story of Laos reveals a
cents, leaving a total of 33 cents per meal to
be provided by state and local governments. pattern of constantly escalating involve- self is misled by artful or deliberately techni-
... ? This will cost $299 million that must be pro- ments which grew uncontrolled from cal official replies to questions. ?
. , vided from sources other than the ohildren. , small steps first taken without full public In 1968, the Laos transcript reveals the
If the number of free and reduced price debate of future consequences. parent committee was informed that: ". . .-
? lunches is increased to 6.8 million?still too I ask unanimous consent that 'the .We do not have a military training and ad-
few?as pledged by the White House on articles be printed in the RECORD. ?visory organization in Laos," The Laos in-
Christmas eve, the additional cost to statequiry confirmed that there are hundreds of
? and local governments will be $392 million. ' There being no objection, the articles .V.S. "advisers" in Laos and at training bases
For almost one quarter of a century, the were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, for Laotian fortes in Thailand. The Syming-
country has been on record with a pledge to . as follows: ton Subcommittee demanded an explanation.
"safeguard the health and well-being of the (From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Apr, 21, ' There is no Inconsistency, government
'nation's children" through the school lunch19701 . . witnesses responded; in military parlance,
.sirooram, We went even farther. We promised . DECEPTION IN Laos A DELIBERATE ONE '
in Laos.
This issue was discussed on Tuesday,
April 21, by two perceptive Washington
journalists, Murrey Marder, of the
Washington Post, and Tom Wicker, of
the New York Times.
I recommend both articles to Senators
for the problem they discuss is as appli-
cable to facts developed or held by the
administration on ABM capabilities as it
is to our military adversaries' activities in
but not telling.gur poop e w a w. . 6
That would Mem the characteristic of
closed society."
The situation recalls a comment made In
private, by a Western European friend whoSTATINTL
Is extremely pro-American and who was trou-
bled by the international moralistic conse-
quences of the American military Interven- ?
tion in the Dominican Republic In Aprli,
1965. When the Johnson administration wits
caught lying about Its original rationale for
.the intervention ("to save American lives"),
this man remarked in dismay:
"This will secretly please a lot of Euro-
peans."
"Because," he answered. "they always have
resented the holier-than-thou American atti-
tude about intervention, about imperialism, ,
about your claim to a 'higher morality.' Now '
? U-2 (spy-plane flights over the Soviet ? :
you are down In the gutter with us. The'
Union) affair was the first blow to American '
'virginity': this is the second. Now we are
all moral prostitutes."
? Later that year came the major American
slide into Vietnam, then afterward, increas-
ing unofficial disclosure of the clandestine
? American involvement in Laos.
Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee
hearings on Laos showed how Congress it-
"an advisory group's" sole mission is "to
'provide advice . . . down to lower unit
levels," came the explanation. U.S. military
'personnel in Laos provide "advice," but of-
.ficially do not constitute "an advisory
,group."
, His committee, Sen. Fulbright protested,
, was victimized by "semantics.
It is argued by many officials, members
of Congress?and even newsmen as well?
that nothing vitally new has been disclosed
about U.S. operations in Laos that was not.
? or should not have been, known to any care-
ful reader of his daily newspaper.
? This is basically correct. But there is a
? fundamental difference in a nation that
claims a standard of "higher morality" be-
tween admitting its actions officially, and
having knowledge of them seep out.
? In fact, this is precisely the case that the
United States government argued for main-
taining officially secrecy for six years, as the
testimony shows: to take "official oogniz-
?ance" of what it was doing in Laos carried a
whole range of possible international reper-
oussions.
? Newspaper accounts can be disavowed; a
' report that is inaccurate even fractionally?
as accounts of secret operations are very
likely to be?can be officially dismissed as
containing "Innumerable inaccuracies." This?
often has been the official response to enter-
prising news reports about Laos?or Viet- .
transcript Sen. Stuart Symington, who is
anything but anti-military, and who knew nem, or Cambodia. It is hardly a satisfactory
? to provide lunches free or at reduced prices (By Murrey Mauler)
without discrimination to all children "who ?
'
? are determined by local school authorities to ? For more than six years, the Symington ?
. . be unable to pay the full price." The quota- ? Subcommittee's report on Laos shows, the
tions are from the National School Lunch ? United States practiced a policy of official
Act of 1946. deception about Its extremely extensive mill-
' The Congress Is moving to help the Pres'. ?tary operations In Laos,
. dent carry out his pledge. In the week follow- It did not do so idly or haphazardly. The
?? frig Washington's birthday, the Senate passed policy of official deception was carried out
a bill proposed by Senator Herman Talmadge, deliberately and systematically, for what offl-
with amendments submitted by Senators Mc- ? cials at the highest levels of government
Govern, Javits and Kennedy. The legislation, were convinced were sound reasons of na-
which now goes to the House, shifts most of tional security. Many of those officials are
the cost for free lunches to the federal gov- still just as convinced that the reasons for
ernment, makes these lunches available to deception were and are fully justified, and
children whose parents earn less than $4,000 that U.S. operations in Laos are a "model" of
a year, and requires a plan to be developed ? an efficient, successful, relatively low-cost,
and sent to Congress for extending food serv- effectively clandestine, counter-guerrilla op-
ice to all children in schools. The legis- ? eration.
? -.? lation struids a good chance in the. House, On the last count, the officials may be
which last year passed a bill submitted by ? right?the Laos operations may be a model
. Representative Carl Perkins containing Mini- ? of A. successful, secret operation against
lar proposals. It will face a far better chance tough odds. But that by no means answers
with a push from the White House. 'the real question which is whether a handful
The White House has moved us onto rut 'of counter-insurgency zealots should have
? , even higher level?orally. This is not a small the right to define our national interests for
? '. matter because it places the President's word us in this fashion, and then involve us in a
?
? , and prestige on the line. Clearly, if he puts dangerous and entangling mission without
. - . ? the full power of his office behind a national, ) the public knowing anything about it. This
' ' state and local drive, the promise can be Is the critical moral issue raised by the Laos
'kept. ? hearings and toward the end of the censored
DISCLOSURE OF KEY FOREIGN from visits to Laos as much as any Senator
POLICY ACTIVITIESdid about the U.S. role there, raises the mat-
ter in blunt terms: ,
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, frank "We incur hundreds of thousands of U.S.
disclosure by the executive branch to casualties because we are opposed to a closed
' Congress of key foreign policy activities? society. We say we are an open society, and
In executive session if necessary?is one ? the enemy is a closed society.
basic necessity for the continued film:. "Accepting that premise, it would appear
? . tioning of our form of democratic gov- logical for them not to tell their people
(what they are doing); but it is sort of a
, - ernment, twist on our basic philosophy about the im-
Among the several important issues portance of containing communism.
raised in the recently released Laois tran- "Here we are telling Americans they must
.
script of the Symington subcommittee of . tight and die to maintain an open. moiety.
. ,
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 CIA-RDP80-01t01.R00076003,0001-4
answer to the national moral questions
raised by such clandestine military opera-
tions, therefore, to counter that "everyone"
knew about them anyhow, so there was an
real deception.
Nor is it any moral "out." as Sen. Syming-
ton noted, to shift blame to the Central In-
telligence Agency for operational activities
it was directed to perform by the nation's
leadership. The moral responsibility is gov-
? ernmont-wide. '
Those who express bafflement about why
? a younger generation loses faith in the words
of He leaders will and some ansvrers in the
, lases transcript.' '
? ;."-2'1.'
a -es e
Approved For Release 2001/03/00 CIA-IRDP80201601R0
STATI NTL
? INDOCINA SENZA P
?
STATiNTL
eTh
O Sotto il controllo diretto di Lawrence Devlin, capo della CIA a Vien-
tiane, mut fitta rete di informatori e di u consiglieri militari? - Ma it
Pathet Lao ha praticamente nelle mani ii Paese
Dal noslro invialo
VIENTIANE, aprile --
L'onesto inviato che sbarca
In questi gloml mita cap!-
? tale del Laos it ph) dello
volte non perde nemmeno
tempo per lavarsi to man'
nella sua camera del ?Lan
Xang ? o dcl ? Constella-
tion a, I due alberghl della
colonla giornalistica di
Vientiane, ridiventeta fol.
tiselma. Sublto sl mate in
? giro a caccla di notizie o
? at primo college the incon-
tra domande: ? e Dov'e
Pathet 'Lao? ?. Le notizie
? sull'avanzata delle forze
partiglane at di qua della
mitica Piana delle Glare,
guile direttrice di sud-ovest
ossia verso Vientiane,
? capitale amministrativa ?
o sulla dlrettrice di nord-
ovest ? ossia verso Luang
Prabang, capital? reale ?
sono considerate infatti ge-
neri dl prima nedessita e
? sembrano consent1re, . di
.questi tempi, la costruzio-
ne di ogni ipotesi strategi-
ca e di ogni prevision? pre
Mica non solo per 11 Laos
ma per tutta l'Asia del sod.
est. Ma slecome tall inlay-
mazionl o sono false o esi-
Stono soItanto per Were
essere subito contraddetto '
da altre informazioni dia.- '
? metraimente opposte, le
sorti di quest? paese sten-
-vagante che 6 11 Laos. con
Un re, due capitalt a tre
raggruppamenti polit 1-
cl, clascuno dotato di un
proprio esercito, mutano 4
nelle prevision' degli osser- ,
vatorl, da un glorno all'al-
rale qati agattt Peifc
care ell sapere dove Si tro-
v1 11 Pathet Lao, ossla II
breccia armato del Neo
Lao flak Xat (traduclamo,
per brevitit e chlarezza:
Front? della sinistra leo
-
Liana). rappresenti una ctv
rlosita perfettamente glu-
StIficata.
L'ineffe5ile
ufficio feico?
, Ma In sorprcsa dell'inter-
rogante non 6 poca quando
si sente rlspondere dal pro-
prio interlocutore che
Pathet Lao si trove dietro
l'angolo, subito clop? l'Ar-
, co di trionfo (squallida re-
rniniseenza della death-le-
mon? francese) a trecento
marl dall'ambasciata ame-
ricana. Basta seguire le in-
dicazioni per renders! con-
to che non si tratta di uno
scherzo. Dietro l'angolo, su-
bito dopo l'Arco di Trion-
lo, a trecento metri della
ambasciata americana in-
lett!, circondata da uno
steccato e ?lire un polvero-
so giardino, pieno di alba-
ri ma trasformato in una
area di parcheggio per
jeeps, sta una bossa e
ga costruzione In muratu-
ra in cul ha sede la
rappresentanza ?permanen-
te del Pathet Lao a Vien-
tiane, guidata dal col. Seth
Pethres1 e presicliata In ar-
nil da un distaccamento di.
120 uomlni dell'esercIto
partigiano. Due dl essi, Im-
peccabilmente sull'attenti,
TOntlno la guardia driven-
4111641/4001n2g:
time carabine semiautoma-
tiche AK 47 di fabbricazio-
ne clnese. Per la strada
passano, ridenti e chiasso-
? si, del ragazzoni blond! in
borghese con vistosi giub-
bottl in pelle, da aelatore.
Sono pilotl e navigator! di
Air America e del Conti-
nental Air Service, le. due
coinpagnie aeree create di
sena plant(' della CM e de-
stinate a ogni traffic? gni-
dicato necessario della
centrale 'americana di spice
naggio e sovversione. Dl-
dame subito che questi
traffic! sono Infiniti e im.
' prevedibill: dal trasporto
dell'oppio . coltivato dal.
montanar1 ,Meo suite ajte-
terre del nord-ovest e ven-
duto poi at mereato di
Vientiane, assieme a frutta
e verdure, lino alio sposta-
? mento, a mezzo di elicot-
ter il piu delle volte, del
commandos di ? berretti
verdi ?.
I ?berretti verdi a che
vino, per chi non lo sapes-
se, gli uomini delle a for-
ze special!? dell'esercIto
,? statunitense, non hanno di-
. ritto di avere 11 loro co- .
mend? e la loro sede qui
? a, Vientiane, cosi si sono
plazzati a Udorn, at di la
. del Mekong, flume di con-
fine. Uclorn 6 una delle ba- ,
1 si thallandesi che gli Sta.
Iti Uniti hanno costruito,
soma badare a spese, per
la 1oro avlazIone. Quando
I vengona . a Vientiane re ?
IA-RDP80-01 601R00
ci vengono spessissimo ?
non portano distintivi no
divise ma una semplIce
tu-
ta di fatica e fanno capo
a uno strano luogo, un po'
In perlferia, dove ha sede
un anodino servizio detto
? Ufficio forniture ? che
non 6 se non un'altra dello
trasfigurazioni della CIA.
Sotto II controllo diretto
di Mr. Lawrence Devlin',
capo della CIA a Vientia-
ne con la innocent? coper-
tura di ? consiglicre politi-
co? ?all'ambasciata USA,
questo uffielo tiene lode as-
sal bene al suo name po-
tendo a fornire? in effetti
qualsiasi cosa, da uno
stock di armi modernissi-
me per ogni uso, a un
gruppo di uomini per una
azione di commando fino
a una Incursion? di B.52.
Pare che una delle maniere
migliori per sapere se qua"-
cosa di importante belle
nella pentola del ? servizi
sped all ?, Ma di non perde-
re di vista le ragazze del-
la ?Rosa Bianca ?, 11 pie'
prestigioso bordello ? di
Vientiane, di cul i ? berret-
ti verdi ? sono accaniti ire-
quentatorl e dove si puo ac-
quistare di tutto, da un
panetto di oppio a on lin-
gotto d'oro, oltre, com'e ov-
vio, at servizi natural' in
tale tipo di Istituto.
Laotianl di destra, laotia-
ni neutrallsti, laotiani
,sinIstra, vletnamiti del
nerd e del sud, sovieticl e
driest, americani e trance-
si, uomlni della CIA e del
servizi speciall statuniten-
? si, vlvono insomma a View
mogopeciAD.airauro,
*v4.0446:4
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
ASHVILLE, N.C.
CITIZEN
M - 4 7 , 15 1
CITI7,FN-TILIES
- 67,7 (1E3
- 2-4910
he U S. is Directing ?.(1
A Secret War In Laos'
A few weeks ago, to 'discount re- But the U. S. bonibing raids in Laos
. ports that the United States is active-? ?cost, on the.basis of simple arithmetic,
.ly engaged in the war in Laos, Prost- 'mote than $1,3.90,000 daily.
1. dent Nixon said that no combat treops-: Why have ? these operations been
are involved and that "fewer than 50", shrouded in secrecy? Because they
? Americans ,? civilian and military --.
; assigned to the U. S. mission in Laos
hive lost their lives as a result of
enemy action.
This week it was disclosed that
about 200 have been killed and 200
others are missing or prisoners as the
;!result of a secret U. S. military 'opera-
.:tion in Laos known as Project 404.
' 'Why did the President lie?
The existence of the operation was
? disclosed in testimony taken last fall
i by. the Senate subcommittee on se-
curity agreements and commitments
abroad and just now released, in cen-
sored form, by committee officials.
, This: clandestine maneuver has
: been directed, for the last four years,
t:by the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane; un-
known to the Congress and to the
American people. It is administered
:by the U. S. ambassador and involves
some 'of the 2,000-member U. S. mis-
sion in Laos. It includes more than
100 military attaches who fly with the
Royal Laotian Air Force and direct
Laotian pilots to their, targets. More-
over, the ambassador personally re-
views all proposed U. S. air. strikes
, (from Vietnam and Thailand) against
'.Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese po-
,sitions, 'passing .,reports along to the
. S. Air Force commanders..
are a direct violation of the treaty
that declares Laotian neutrality. The
Administration didn't even want any
of the Senate subcommittee testimony
disclosed because of the fear of a Rus-
sian protest.
But Senator Stuart Symington in-
sisted., "H we can get the facts out to
the people," he said, "I believe there
:is a chance of avoiding another Viet-4
nam war. If we don't get the facts
out, I don't believe there is a chance."
Well, the facts are out-- 90 per
cent of them anyhow. But the opera-
tion is apparently continuing.
"It is not a question whether it is
right or, it is wrong;" added Syming-
ton. "The point we ate trying to bring
out is that this is true. And neither
does the Congress ? and neither does
the committee nor the Senate Armed
Services Committee know all the
facts." '
The U. S. has involved itself in a
lot of trouble in Southeast Asia; no-
body is yet aware how deep it is, how
extensive the commitments. The wars
there, the fighting, the intrigue are
being run by the Pentagon, by the
? White House, by commanders in the
field, by the Central jklitga_ice
Agency, _and now -- it develops ?by
the-emlbissies; Small wonder the out
t No 4:It e4timates were released:. come has 'been so frustrating.
?
4
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :sCilif1980-01601
ST. PAUL, VINN.
DISPATCH
E - 130 29_2.
APR 2 19i0
ore Light on Laos
' It took a Senate subcommittee six'
months of battling with the Defense and-
State Departments to blast loose facts
about clandestine American war activi-
ties in Laos during the past several'
years. These operations, kept secret un-
til now from the American people, have
cost the taxpayers billions of dollars
,
and American lives have been lost.
The whole Laos story has not yet been
revealed, but at least the subcommittee
headed by Senator Stuart Symmgtoe of
Missouri has managed to rip away most
of the curtain of censorship behind
which the Executive Department has
hidden its operations.
Although, the State?Department Is,
supposed to devote itself to nonmilitary
activities, it was revealed that the
American ambassador in Laos supervis-
es and directs Army personnel and pas-
ses on bombing targets. In addition the
Central Intelligence Agency finances an
-ftoOf
"irregular" Laotian army force. The
- U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID) has a group of retired army
of fleet's headquartered in Thailand
which has trained and equipped other
military groups active in Laos. An ex-
tensive network of undercover projects
has been in existence sinc,e 1962.
,
A strange excuse is given by Adminis-
tration officials to justify their stubborn
devotion to secrecy. It is that the gov-
ernment should not indicate to the Soviet
Union that the United States may have
violated the 1962 Geneva agreements on ?,
Laotian neutrality. But Russia has
,known all along just what the U.S. has
been doing. It is only the American pub-
lic which was kept in the dark.
, American military interventionism in .
Asia is too important a matter to be con-
cealed from its citizens. Senator Sym-
ington's committee has done we.1,..to",
in the light.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
weet-
r 4 I, -,:??
?
Approved For Release 20iMOVENFUN-Ft0580-01
22 APR 1970
e
ON .1t11,Y 23, 1962, the ?
THE REST of 'Mc 111,11.
*.
Communist and non-Coen-
munist powers in Asia -- in.
chiding the United States ?
( signed the Geneva Accords
? to create, neutral Laos.
The foreigners agreed to
i withdraw their military
forces from the little Conn-
try and promised never to ,
send any more troops ? not ; end agreed to put into the
, even military advisers. country 1,100 tons of mill-
The Russians milled out
i I 'tory equipment each month.
their 500 troops. The Ameri-
That was a marginal viola.
cans pulled out the 750 they
. tion of the Geneva Accords,
had, including 450 Green Be-
but it set in motion other ac-
rets who had been operating
tivities that were a clear vio-
in the boondocks as White lation of our promises..
Star Teams. The North Viet- Somebody had to find out
, namese, who were always I. what kind of equipment the
known as the bad guys, Laotians really needed. So
pulled out 16 men and left I the United States recruited
6,000 others behind in their , retired military men, put
lair in the northern prov- ; them in civilian clothes and
"inces. ," sent them into Laos as em-
The agreement was hailed ployees of a new branch of
as a triumph of reason over , .our AID mission ? the Re-
quirements Office.
passion and as a great diplo-
?
Richard Hartrood
U. S. Role in Laos Is Story
Of Intrigue, Broken Promises
can glivernmit M
eearled gel,
ting involved in September,
1962 when the new Prime
Minister, Souvanna Phou-
ma, asked both the Russians
and the Americans for mili-
tary equipment.
1 'the ilussinns. turned him
,?, dnwn. Americans didn't
The next development i
should have been pi- 1
I
He. The Laos needed more
direct forms of American .
help?active combat atip- I
port. So in 1964, months he- I
fore ground troops were
sent to Vietnam, the Air
Force began providing air !
reconnalstince, t h e n air
cover, then air strikes, then
close support. To get this
job done, it WRS necessary to
send in American ground
controllers and airborne
spotters to manage the '
strikes. .
By 1966, the Special ,
Forces wanted a piece of the
action and proposed a
Golden Eagle operation that ,
.? involved, presumably, the
insertion of Green Beret
teams into the countryside. i
That was turned down. i
But the air support, the ,
'
CIA operations with the
Meos the use of Army and
t Somebody had to stock-
matte coup for Air Force , "coordinators,"
, Kennedy. irpile, maintain, process and the various missions of DEP-
' We are now learning from
il, transport this equipment. So CHIEF and other American '
'
'the Senate Foreign Rein- . the United States created activities have mushroomed
' tions Committee that there i another new agency. It was ; into a"?billion" annual en.
was less to that agreement ,
i called Deputy Chief, U.S. ' f . terprise. The figure is classi-
than met the eye and that i . Military Assistance Group, fled.
? within 60 days after it was i Thailand, or DEPCHIEF, as I' All the while and right up
signed, the United States I it was known in the trade. ?' to today, Article 4 of the Ge- ,
was embarked upon a series I , Its missioit was classified , neva Accords remains in ef- i
, of secret activities designed i and Its headquarters was *" feet:
to violate every promise this 1 across the border in Thai- : "The introduction of for-'
country had made. I land, eign regular and irregular '
formations and loreign mai.;
It is a delicious story of Somebody had to check on * troops, foreign paramilitarY
Intrigue, black tricks, cover
operations, secret agents,
phony agencies and code
names like Golden Eagle,
Operation Triangle, Sea-
cord, DEPCHIEF, and Proj-
ect 404.
The first fact that
emerges from the commit-
.
I tee's hearings is that the
Americans never left Laos
as they had promised to do.
CIA operatives remained in
? the hills to provide "suste-
nance" to their allies among
the Meo tribesmen led by
General Veng P30, whose
'virtue always had beenVat
were using their new wrap- 1 tkry personnel Into Laos is,
the Lnot inns to see ,
ons properly and to give ': prohibited*" ', , ! I' . -..? ;
them advice. So the United ' I , iii.it, 'V* eic1,' lin
States set up another cover
operation?Project 404. This
was the code name for the
Army and Air Force advis-
ers sent into the country to
staff at the American em-
bassy in Vientiane.
1T WAS SOON obvious
that the Laotians could use
additional training. DEP-
CHIEF took on part of that
!lob, to supplement what the
(CIA already was doing with,
- he likes to fight . ?? ,,! ' Nrg path trolpersed..14
STATI NTL
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BAL7IM:)R, MD.
Approved For 4Iease 2001/03/04: as--Romacrtmoi
2, NEWS AMERICAN
E - 216,949
S
An 21 1970
?Prijiminummillinuomminninmonummoomounimmonuming
,
g ,
g Special Report
1
I Private. Airline E
a
1 E
I I Pilots Fly Deep
, In Laotian Bush
?
By. FRANCOIS SULLY
News Anierican-Newsweek Correspondent
VIENTIANE, Laos ? Early every morning, 701
small, highly powered planes roar off from the
Vientiane airport and head for "Old Sam Soak"
Strip" or "Pop's Field" or certain other tiny
clearings deep in the Laotian bush.
14 "Sometimes no one can tell whether a site is
closed or open," says one of the pilots. "You get
there and circle the place, looking for any sus-
picious sign. It no one shoots, you take your!
1;
chance and land and keep the engine running
a friendly face shows up."
The planes bear the discreet markings of Airl
1. America ? better known in some circles as "CIAt
?' Airlines." ,........-.0*
- Nominally, Air America is a privately ownedi
'company which does all its flying in Southeast ,
,...-i t Asia and all of it under contract to the U.S. gov- I
; ernment.. .
It; ACTUALLY, ITS MAIN assignment is to assist
In the half-acknowledged U.S. war commitment in:
' Laos. As a civilian organization, it can circum-
vent the 1962 Geneva accords which bar foreign'
' military aircraft from Laos but permit air activity.'
L,
r by civilian planes. 1.
And Air America is about as active as an air-.
line can be. Indeed, it is one of the largest of i
..11.S. lines, . ranking just behind National and !
: ahead of Northeast in the number of its planes.:
. i
e and personnel.
I. ' Last year Air America carried 11,000 passen-1
\ gers, 16,000 refugeps and 6,000 tons of cargo. It,
i also dropped $4 million worth of rice to 150,0001
refugees in Laos, and flew in several hundred I
,? Thai troops to help defend the Long Cheng out-,
f, post. against Communist attack.
't: ?
MORE TO TilK clatulestine point, the airline.
I :11 'available to drop individual agents behind the
t'
1. North Vietnamese lines in Laos ? and pick them
,.. up when their mission is completed. '
,
It has also been used by the CIA In Vietnam
to fly out high-level Viet Cong prisoners, and by
: . the Green Berets to supply. Montagnard mer-,
cenaries.
L Well-informed observers believe that Air Amer-I
..., lea has gone even further: that it regularly picksi
r up agents in North Vietnam, that it puts' U,S.1
!.Special Forces teams, into Laos, that it para-!
4 chutes infiltrators into Cambodia and that Itilies1
intelligence missions along the Chinese coast.
, All , this, and private enterprise, too. For Aitq
' America is part of a complex corporate organize- .
+ ??-
"WHAT WE DO," he says, "is best described
as utility flying. We caiTy people and things ?
whatever the customer has for us. A lot of ro-
mance gets around about our activities, but
they're much more routine than you would think."
'Air America is an offspring of Civil Air Trans.
port (CAT), the company formed
by Gen. Claire Chennault and
some of his Flying Tigers after
I World War II. .
In its early days, during the
Chinese revolution, CAT did a brisk
business flying relief supplies into
China?and fallen war lords and
their loot but to safety. Later
Chennault sold out, and since then
the line has been involved in most
of the wars In Southeast Asia. It
ferried supplies into the French in
Vietnam in the '50s and has been
supplying anti-Communist? forces
In Laos at least since 1962..
NOWADAYS, Air America uses
I twin-engine Volpar Beecherafts
I.. and Swiss-built Pilatus Porters. It
has about 150 of them and some
600 pilots to do the flying.
.. Some of the executives like to
say the pilots are recruited mostly
among civilian cropdusters,
Alaskan bush pilots and similar
? figures from the seat-of-the-pants
flying era. Actually, most are
service veterans, and In some
, cases even their "veteran" status
Is in doubt'.
,
Pilots have moved directly from
the Air Force into Air America
and .then back into the 'service,
again. Some have even been given
i
U.S. decorations?albeit in private
ceremonies?for their heroic per-
formances while serving in the
private organization.
IThe heroism is often very real.
Pilots have been killed on
missions, have been captured, ex-
ecuted or have simply disap-
peared. They earn their relatively
high pay?up to- $25,000 a ; year,
!untaxed.
I MANY 010 THEM fly for the
k money, but perhaps more do It for
the adventure?or simply for the
joy of flying without having to
obey the bureaucratic rules im-
posed on military pilots. And some
look upon it as simply another Job.
I. Lanky, 49-year-old Clyde
Morehouse, a retired Air Force
lieutenant colonel, spends a good
portion of his time ferrying Lao-
'Han officers to remote outposts in
i
.the hills?and manages 'to seen
bored by it all.
1 "Once you've seen 'a couple' Of
i
these ,mountain valleys, you've
soon the* all '' he ikays4 v. , ..j.,, `-
.....? ? ,? . ,.. L ? . , . 4 4 . I, r? l'i, ..'
Frequently, the aircraft have
been mobbed by panicky Meo!
tribesmen, anxious to escape from
a village before the arrival of
Communist troops. When this
happens, the pilot pulls up the
ladder and battens down the air-
craft until things quiet' down on
thc( landing strip.
"THESE MEN are highly ex.
perienced professidnals," says Onc
executive. "They fly eight to ten
hours a day over mostly uncharted
mountains with almost no naviga-
tional aids. They face slick landing
strips, treacherous approach
winds, rough terrain, bad weather
In the rainy' seasons and blinding
fog,in the dry seasons."
MtrAtly, however, the men who izz
run Air America play down the.
drama, along with the CIA con4
nections.
"We* operate on a you-call-we-
haul basis," says the line's general
manager in. Vientiane, James A.
'Cunningham Jr. "We don't go into
details. We don't ask for creden-
tials."
, M.,.:1,.t wordlessly he gestures
toward a placard emblazoned With
Air ,America's motto:. "Anything,
Anytime, ' ,Anywhere.Profession.'
ally.!' , ii 1 , , i ' ? --,' ,
.11 isssestspett ',satyrs ServIcs '
''")-",)'.. , ??? ?
k;
,- ieorns, ag#2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80,01,60,1R000700030001-4
A. Doole Jr., 60, a large, amiable ex-Pan Ameri!
can pilot who has a special sort of used-car sales-
' -ret,n
?
Approved For Release 201110MILID: CIA-RDP80-01601
2 1 APR 1970
S.TATINTL
Laos; Cambodia--and now Cub;
I.' Having been caught in one lie after another about
the U.S. secret intervention in Laos, the Administra-
tion is now clamming up about the latest attack on
Cuba with its usual disclaimer of "Who, me?"
The fiction which Administration myth-makers' want.
us to believe is that the Central Intelligence Agency .
and the Pentagon brass are independent agencies oper-
ating on their own, with no direction or control from -1
' the 'executive, legislative and judicial departments of .1
the government. ,
?
But self-exposure of this deliberate Administrationl
policy of trying to gull the U.S. population is increas-.1
ing. It is patently evident that no "invasion" of Cuba.'
could have occurred without funds, arms, protection and
? instigation by agencies under direction and control of
the Nixon Administration.
The aim of all this humbug is to divert attention
; from the sinister meaning of the so-called "Nixon Doc-.
trine" which the President; set forth at Guam. .
. The doctrine is operating this moment' in Vietnam, ,l
Cambodia and Laos. Now it has been applied to the ;
first socialist state in the Western Hemisphere, and as i
I applied to Cuba, it means paying and directing Cubans:.
to kill Cubans, Latins to kill Latins to fatten the swin-
ish U.S. monopolies that feed off the misery of the La-
tin American peoples.
Soon or late, unless the monopolies are curbed, un-
less the Nixon gang in the executive, legislative and
judicial branches of government are thrown out by the 1
electorate, unless the military brass are brought under
civilian control?unless the people mobilize and organize
to bring about these results, the Nixon, Doctrine could !
come to mean increasing numbers of Americans paid
.and directed to kill other Americans: .
A first step toward preventing such a culmination is
an increase of the popular movement to end the ag-
gression against the peoples of Indo-China, and to de-
mand hands off Cuba now!
_
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STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001=174 VIGINAI-RDP80-01601R00
2 1 APR 1970
0
CoT
7 r En ILic
oncoio[rs
: Daily World Foreign Department
Senate testimony released yesterday on the eve of President Nixon's report to the. -
nation on Southeast Asia revealed that the U.S. ambassador to Laos has been directing a ? -
secret military operation and that a clandestine U.S. group in Thailand has been training
and equipping Laotian troops.
This testimony had been given
at hearings held last fall by the
Senate subcommittee on security
agreements and commitments
abroad. The Nixon administration
had up to now forbade any of it
to be made public. '
Walter Pincus, a member of
the Senate subcommittee staff,
declared that some of the testi-
mony which the people "have a
right to know" is still undisclos-
ed. Pincus made his statement
in a letter to subcommittee,
chairman, Senator Stuart Sym-
ington (D-Mo).
The "secret military operation"
referred to in the testimony
made public was called "Project
404," and began on October, 1966,
with 117 military and five civil-
ian personnel being assigned to
the U.S. Embassy in the Lao cap-
ital, Vientiane, The project per-.
sonnel fly missions with the,
"Royal Lao" air force and they
spot targets for air strikes.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State William H. Sullivan, ? U.S.
ambassador in Laos, 1964-69, said:
"The ambassador approves or
disapproves whether a strike can
be made." If it is approved, then ?
the request is, passed on to the
U.S. Air Force in Thailand or
Vietnam. Sen. Symington said
' this means the ambassador has
,become a "military proconsul,"
In Laos instead of a diplomat.
Sen. J. William Fulbright, (D-
Ark) chairman of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, ' said:
"I have never seen a country en-
gage in so many devious under-
takings as this."
Administration officials testi-.
lied they did not want to be ac-
cused of violating the 1962 Ge-
,
.? neva Agreements on Laos.
, The 1962 agreements prohibit
foreign military forces of any
kind from operating in Laos.
The testimeny also showed that
"Royal Lao" forces are trained
and equipped by a secret "Spe-
cial Requirements Organization"
based in Thailand and run by
.' "retired" U.S. military person-
, nel. Much of the testimony con-
firmed aspects of U.S. involve-
ment in Laos long ago uncovered
by U.5, and other newsmen,.
Still secret
Pincus, in his letter to Sym-
ington, said the still-secret, ma-
terial in the testimony covers:
government support for
:
the clandestine army of General fl
Vang Pao, a force of some 15,000
?Meo tribesmen and opium smug- ,
'.glers run by the CIA in northern
,Laos.
? ?Adequate information about
increased U.S. combat sorties ?;:.
? over northern Laos,
?Cumulative U.S. military aid
since 1962 to Lao regular and ir-
. regular forces.
?"The millions of dollars it
has and is costing for U.S. air '
combat operations ?over northern
Laos."
? ?U.S. air bases in Thailand
used to bomb Laos.
?"The financing by the U.S. of
third-country nationals in the war
f in North Laos." ("Third-country
- nationals" probably refers to the
Filipinos, Thais, Vietnamese, Aus,
tralians and Chinese Nationalists
the U.S. is using in its operations 1
inLaos.)
? ,
The Senate testimony also in- 1
. ;eluded the disclosure that "some- ?'
? thing under 200" U.S. military
personnel had been killed in
, Laos, about a quarter of them in'
? northern Laos. President Nixon
.had claimed earlier that no U.S.
ground combat forcgs had been
killed in combat in Laos. ?
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?
Apprcpteihicikr,r IlfiiI8ppe 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601 RPM!
STATI NTL
NUS
Ia E 592,616
ApR 21 1970
S - 827,036
?
War in Laos hardly a secret
Unknown to Congress- and the
; American people, ? a secret anti-
Communist military operation has
been directed by the American em-
bassy in Laos for the last four years,
it is charged. But how substantial
is that accusation?
We don't know who named the
!operation "Project 404," which is
rather James Bondish, but if it was
supposed to be secret it has, been
the . worst kept'. military Secret of
the:century. ? . .
1. A vast amount'. of material
,facts, figurea and some intelligent.
i.guesswork?has been printed. from
!correspondents whose beat has been
Laos even when th,e guerilla war
there was fairly quiescent. And
'since the indigenous Pathet Lao
(Communist) P ar ty and 67,000
'North Vietnamese regulars turned
on the heat in. Laos ..a. few months
; ago, there has been. a spate of re-
porting.
The President himself 'on March
6 made a statement 'on the history
,and current motive of our involve-
ment in which he said we were
! supporting the independence and
i neutrality of Laos as set forth in
1 the Geneva accords of 1962.
He added: "In addition to our air
operations on the Ho Chi Minh
1% trail, we have continued to carry
; out reconnaissance .flights in north.
Laos and fly combat-support mis-
sions for 'Laotian forces- when re-
quested. by the Royal Laotian gov-
ernment.' . ? ? ? ? .?
? That's an astonishing admission
fran a President, who .is trying; to
. ?t
keep this Laotian sideshow a secret
war, which is what the Senate Sub-
committee on Security and Agree-
ments Abroad is' suggesting. Short
of announcing weekly war commu-
niques, what 'does the committee
want?
As the press has faithfully re-
ported, Americans have been in-
volved with air controllers to pin- ,
point targets for the fledgling
Laotian air force, ground combat:
instructors, the CIA and two Amen-
"can airliterfOrlo-glitfes and sup- "
port.
But even in an openly declared
war you don't announce the tonnage
of every bomb you've dropped, how
many air missions were aborted,
what the state of your logistics ,
backup is. We do reveal air casual-
ties, on Mr. Nixon's order, and we
don't have any GI's committed in
combat.
Because the Reds are making war'
clandestinely despite their signature
on the 1962 accords, we have to
counter to keep faith with our sig-
nature pledging Laotian independ-
ence., This administration, as its
predecessor, wants to avoid making
headlines out of every military
move because one day everyone
probably will have to return to the
1962 pact terms. It's the best for-
mula for peace and peace there
would be if the Reds acquiesced.
Instead, Hanoi has never ad-
mitted a 'single one of its soldiers
is aggressing in Laos. Perhaps the
senators could better direct their
charges about secrecy to Hanoi?
for all the good that would do the
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STATINTL
.1.Approxed Foil Release 200t/03044sCOURDP80-01601R
CieAadonale.
a Symington ? a n
2 1 197n bright, however, question
for Invoiivement ? and oversees the work toingence money. That la whether the actual
partid-
aC,0 million additionally a pation of more than 200
estimated to cost $50 to.
American military men in'
!more then 100 military at-
and Secrecy
taches,
'rho lAvo f gures the Laotian war ? even
--"Something u iid e alue ana,,,,i??a, though not In ground corn-
. IY?eq tad t:r; bat?does not conatitute
BY TED SELL both an implied commit-
; III CPI(111
? IlliiliOn -e-y ea r Laotian t
. years of maicomi product. : :tient and the posAbility of
? Times 31art Writer m
volveera in ."'"'? NI"A 4't,A 5,0a:0+100.1c which ' the United Stas being
NVASHINGTON?A special Senate et these were airmen, but rues aro.eall a70 to SSO ? drawn into a major new
?c o m m i t m e n t s abroad Sunday ::11nvicitan and military" pei- , Vietnam-type war. There
nearly 50 were listed as '
subcommittee investigating U.S.,. ceaDleal $591 million.
ne assigned to the U.S.b ? eaagaa .Nr.ntvilly, ia on tOp ' was no resolution of the
brought out?after a five-month ?mission there. from ? 1944 through MS:
argument. . ,
rhc combination of mi SymInguan and commit- '.
, of this. Total economic aid '.
?battle with State Department cen- ... sen, Stuart s ? '
litary and ceeeomic assis--? tee sources said that even
ymington ?
involvement in Laos, :Senate Foreign Relations with the argtiment unre-
aors?a long-awaited study on U.S. ' (D-o.), chairman of the ?
The 236-page report said little that ' Committee's special mai-, . taeee aaataim, aiernands s o 1 v e d, t h e s u b c o m-
ifera :S'amington and from ? Mittee'S aim had been '
has not previously been published '
ty. agreements :lad ttlItl. ,i 0-Ark,), chairman of the: light in an official paper '
':served?to bring to public ,
committee on U.S. securi- Sen. .1. William Fulbright
about the U.S. role in Laos. About
Amen-
,security reasons. - group's purpose was to try.,. full committee, for ? an the extent of the Ameri-
accountin, of What pur-
- 10% of the text remained deleted for . initments abroad, said his
.P . pose had accounting
served by; can commitment. .
What was new, however, was the ? . The actual combat corn-
1.0 make public- facts re- .
, fled
shrouded as eiassia,
. .rationale of the State Department, ,: this expenditure of whati. mitment, however. was ,
' first, for the initial U.S. commit- l'iled* ? ? ? Symington called "billiona not made public. Almost
p e o p 1 c," Symington ' of U.S. dollars." , ? all statistical references to -,
commit-
ments in Laos after th'e 1062 Geneva . - "If we get these facts out
.agreements forbade outside inter- ; to Sullivan repeatedly rc4 the huge American air
.vention and, second, the reason the 'said, "maybe we can avoid, plied that the U.S. aim in i- effort were deleted ba.
- ,executive branch has steadfastly. 1116re yietnams." . .? Laos was to support the l censors. One that did re-
kept secret the extent of involve- : Symington has eepea- independence of the coun- I. main was that each aerial
- a ment and its reasons for official ? to,clly said that the nation's ,try, led by the neutralist sortie cost an average of
secrecy. . . military budget is keyed S 0 tv a n n a '; P h o u m al s3,ino in ordnance alone ??-.
U.S. Aim Served by Secrecy , ? .--not cotmting costs of ?
? l
directly to the forces con- goacenment. ?
, ? siclered necessary to meet Sullivan, who wat am- . approximately 400 planes ! ,
Secrecy imposed on the U,S, role , expressed and I m pli e ri ' litiasadoe to Laos from I which have been lost over
? ? ....even though American notions are continitmente, 14
?once, any ? November, ino,i, to Aplii, - Lnniq since 1064, ,
'highly visible in the landlocked move ? to reduce the de- leela Insisted the tjaited ' But the sortie nurnLer .,
was deleted. A rough fi-
gure for numbers of sor-
ties over northern Laos? '
? ";
little country?serves the U.S. aim tense budget should start, States-had no formal.com-
?because it means that the Soviet with an exploration of initment to defend Laos.
. 'Union', a cochairman with Britain of, precisely what U.S. obliga- That, he said, was elimin-
- the 1962 conference, does not have ? tions are to allies, he said.. ated by the 1062 agree- Symington specifically ex- .
-to acknowledge formally that the WitneaaeS before - Sy- wients in which ?Souvanna j. cepts those over the Ho
United States is in violation of the mington's g r o u p were, elloama expressly agreed Chi Minh Trail in southern
Geneva agreement, Walter Sullivan,' from the State Depart-'. . ? : - - Laos as being part of the
'deputy assistant secretary of state! merit, ? Air Force, Aymy, 'not to call-on. the South-
. .for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,: U.S. Information' Service,' cast Asia tames oraartlaaa
?said. . ' the Agency ' for Interne- . lion for mailers assis-
. ' This permits Russia to continue to tional Development and: lance.
:
'he available as a prospective peace-' Central Intelligence, Agen7. . Under the' 1%4 agree-
-maker a The entire testimony of 've .a war and creating an
l
%rents ending the Incrochi-
State Department.
in Laos, according to the: eY. ?
Another reason for secrecy was' Richard B. Helms, CIA', independent Laos, . t h a t
' the wish of Prince S'ouvanna Phnue. director, was deleted : ?country r
was designated
'ma, the Laotian neutralist leaderj even to his name .as the one .? of ihrce southeast
that 'the extent of U.S. air activity in
.Laos not be publicized.
Sullivan said the U.S. action was
prompted by massive North Vietna-
mese intervention and was aimed
partly at protecting Laos as a buffer
state:
The transcript also contained
these points:
witness on the final day of l Asia sp r.o o?c o states"
the closed hearings. which SEATO .n a a i net s
CIA Financing bound t h e in s e II e? ea: to
lb was understood, assist. ? .,
however, that - much of ?
inter-
helms' testimony related ' ? The United States vened in Laos, Sullivan
to support of the mercena- .'? said, in response to mas-
ry Meo tribesmen army a sive North Vietnamese in-
led by Maj. Gen. Vang Pao. . tervention. And the U.S.
The omission indicated a?tion. Sullivan said, was
?U.S. air action in Laos began in that whereas normal U.S.' aimed partly at protecting
:June, 1961, even before that 'U.S. 'Military Assistance Pro- * Laos ue a buffer between
bombing of North Vietnam. ' gram funds?which -run T China and North Vietnam
?The American amlee,onder di- about 14
t $04 notolb theil,ltioia year? Royal ,., on
ne othne o
e ster.
ifieand Thatland
reek the t!.S. ?lima Itill'
A eallt,i1 ?
o
, ?Project 4n I,. in I g:i11!1. Iii 1 his 140 regular ? army,. the .. .... , .. ,.
Vietnam war?has been ?
;500 a week.
' For bombs, bullets and
:napalm alone that would
add about $00 million a.
, year.
".
Not Counted ?
' Because all but forward ?
.anir controller missions arc
flown front bases oaaaec
. Laos?in Thailand, South
? V ii:L;la111 and from 7th
.,? Fleet aircraft carriers?
. the men assigned to strike
?Laotian targets are not
'counted in the U.S. man-
power commitment.
? T h e report pointedly
'(notes that the air war in
?? northern Laos began in
,'the middle-Of 1064 ? well
before the U.S. (aulf of
Tonkin retaliatory raids
against North Vietnam or
the commitment of Amen-
can ground t re o p s i
capacity the aintalar.ador .plipeietraa n
Meos are financed by in- . ? South Vietnam and even.
the 2,000ApprO4ed ecritoRti4tese'2001/03/04 CIAADP804t601R0007000
414. raids agaima '
'CM Minh Trail in
,.the southern Laos pan- I
handle. a
Approved For Release24ft00AMehtfRaDP80-01601R0
21 APR 1970
"r?"D",..a
Deception
STATI NTL
iii , "Because," he answered, havl it wai directed to perform by the 'nation's
aos 7 7 / - . .
, resented the holier-than-thou American atti leadership. 'inc moral responsibility ls gov?
A. Deltberate One about yottieciaim to a 'higher morality.' Now
t, Those who express bafflement about why
you are n in the gutter with us. The U-1 a ounger generation loses faith In the words
1. (spy-plane flights over the Soviet Union) at
If its leaders will find some answers in the
fair was the first blow to American'virgin; Laoilranscript. ,
ity mo t* t t'; this is the second. Now we are all
tude about iniervention, about ernment-wide.
?
By Murrey MardcT ?
. ?
Washington Post Staff Writer .
FOR MORE than six years, the Symington, .
. ?" NI
.. Subcommittee's report on Laos shows, the4, Later that year came the major American t
.? United States practiced a policy of official
slide into Vietnam, then afterward, increas74 ?
.? deception about its extremely extensive mill-d. Ing unofficial disclosure of the clandestine4
tary operations in Laos. .
i? American involvement in Laos.
I,' It did not do so idly or haphazardly. Thers Senate Foreign Relations subcommitteeP
Si 'policy of official deception was carried out.
?.' deliberately and systematically, for what ot ? toarings on Laos showed how Congress its! '
elf is misled by artful or deliberately techni-
7, ficials at the highest levels Of government . cal official replies to questions.
' ,. were convinced were sound reasons of na-i;
Ilona' security. Many of those officials are ? . .. , .
In 1968, the Laos transcript reveals the ' ',' ? '
!,
' ..
still' in the government today. They are still' ' parent committee was informed that. ' ?1
1,e .., , - just as convinced that the reasons for decep:'i ?W do not have a military training and ad-
F'
' lion were and are fully justified, and that quiry confirmed that there are hundreds of' in Laos." The Laos in-
!.;'.visol'Y
,
U.S. operations in Laos are a "model" of an 1
D el- ,I. U.S. "advisers" in Laos and at training bases
I. efficient, successful, relatively low-cost, 1
c
'for Laotian forces in Thailand. The Syming-, '.?. fectively clandestine, counter-guerrilla oper-li,
. ton Subcommittee demanded an explanation.'
? ation. i
? There is no inconsistency, government wit- '
On the last count, the officials may be
; '
. right?the Laos operations, may be a model nesses responded; in military parlance, "an
of a successful, secret operation against advisory group's" sole mission is "to provide!
tough odds. But that by no means answers advice ... down to lower unit levels," came,:,
the real question which is whether a handful
the explanation. U.S. military personnel inv
of counter-insurgency zealots should have the
provide "advice," -but officially do not
' constitute "an advisor group."
' * the right to define our national interests for-1 ? y - --. ?
us in this fashion, and then involve us in a. His committee, Sen. Fulbright protested,
dangerous and entangling mission without, ? :was victimized by "semantics."
', the public knowing anything about it. Thia ,. , ?: ??
6+3
is the critical moral issue raised by the Laos' ? . .. ,.
hearings and toward the end of the censored IT IS argued by many officials, members
transcript Sen. Stuart Symington, who is-I of Congress?and even newsmen as well?
:. anything but anti-military, and who knew. that nothing vitally new has been disclosed
:from visits to Laos as much as any Senator ; about U.S. operations in Laos that was not,
did about the U.S. role there, raises the mat-'i, or should not have been, known to any care-
ter in blunt terms: ? ? .., ful reader of his daily newspaper. , ?
.t "We incur hundreds of thousands 'of U.S',1 This is basically correct But there Is a:(?? .
casualties because we are opposed to A , fundamental difference in a nation that ?
closed society. We say we are an open so???1,. claims a standard of "higher morality" be./
ciety, and the enemy is a closed society. .. tween? admitting its actions officially, and'
. ...'.1
"Accepting that premise, it would appear,!. having knowledge of them seep out.
logical for them not to tell their people I:, In fact, this is precisely the case that the'l
(what they are doing); but It is sort of.a twist United States government argued for main-11
on our basic philosophy about the import- ' taming officially secrecy for six years, as the' .
, 1
ance of containing communism. 1 testimony shows: to take "official cogniz?
.' "Here we are telling Americans they must . ance" of what it was doing in Laos carried ki?
light and die to maintain an open society, . whole range of possible international reper-.,
Ift
but not telling our people what we are do-2 cussions.
;
; ing. That would seem the characteristic of a ; Newspaper accounts can be disavowed:. a
' closed society." . , report that Is inaccurate even fractionally-1
? fr, ' ? i as accounts of secret operations are very4
ci4
I likely to be?can be officially dismissed as.; ?
, THE SITUATION recalls a comment made.' containing "Innumerable inaccuracies." Thisi;;
In private, by a Western European friend, often has been the official response to enter-,2 ..0
(who is extremely pro-American and who was' prising news reports about Laos?or Viet'7 .
troubled by the international moralistic con- nam, or Cambodia. It is hardly a satisfactorY11,
sequences of the American military inter, answer to the national moral questions'
in the Dominican Republic in April,' raised by such clandestine military opera.,
! l
,.. 1965. When the Johnson administration was; tions, therefore, to counter that "everyone% ? ?
- caught lying about its original rationale foil knew about them anyhow, so there was no
the intervention ("to save American lives"),, real deception. ? . ' '
this man remarked in dismay: ? .1.,. Nor is it any moral "out," as Sen. Symine
"Thi! Wi41315,61?19601RDP Ptel*Oose-Rtrit0014q143 04311$111k
'.,' ?. .,aL,..... ocnce,, ftenc.v. enielfteonal, actlyAtte.st
ANCiinAGE, ALASKA
NEWS Approved Flo/Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
APR 20 1970 STATINTL
? 11,056
S 12,970
'
1:? doing what it might be expected to do ,If that policy.
' ? ?
ei.
ing from sight? A modest fancy can ?
! conjure up a picture of the origins of ,
; this episode. A select handful of count-
' The planet Uranus was discovered es-intelligence specialists on the west ?i ,
?by the astronomers because, 'observing' bank of the Potomac hunched over. 1..
the conduct of other planetray phe- ' Contingency Plan 3, code name, "Op-,,' under the control of the McNamera
nomena, it had to be there. By much i eration Eagle's Eggs." ' defense department. ..
the same type of logic, the ordinary : But the persuasive evidence of the , Within the Pentagon, as publicly,
citizen may detect the presence of ! C.I.A. presence does not depend on !, the question of hand-tieing came down ..
America's department of subversive flight of fancy. Much more convincing 1 to whether you viewed the Viet Nam :
1
services, ' the Central Intelligence i , is the fruit of policy analysis. Policy ', war as a hot center surrounded by '
6.0,1Ley. ----------- ' determines action. If events evolve
. , . 1 diplomatic policical and territorial grey
Restating the planetary logic as 1 Which promote the ends of a particular , zones of decreasing. temperature or .,
it might apply to international intrigue: I , policy, it is pilobable that the events i?Whether the grey zones were viewed as
An invisible organization is likely to be ware Predetermined by the advocate i4sanctuaries for the enemy.
', The extreme positions of each view
.1.
r,were equally untenable. Every, war
Policy Profiles :
. its sanctuaries, a borderline of con- '
;s.hort of nuclear holocaust will have
??. . ',: duct that is not passed for fear of
By John Havelock .d provoking conflict in a broader arena. -,
,In the 60's, neither the North Vietna."
vrnese nor ourselves waged all out war.!
Popularly denounced among the un- ,
leash4he-military school were the.
North and South Korea under a north- bomb moratorium on Haiphong Har-.
1. today engage so much passion, the de-
even while- spreading denials that it is ' 7
!,- doing it. A corollary: Coincidence is ..
0 !. the last explanation of fourtuitous I
v events.
IT IS T.,EFT to some remote arch-
i, ivist to describe the development of the !
i C.I.A. role in the Cambodian coup d'
- 'etat. Years from now, when the repu-, In 1953 the announced policy ?of '
I
North Korea was reunification of
. tations and policies have passed which
classification of official documents ern style regime. At the opening of ihor in North Vietnam and restrictions.
'
(those not destroyed) will reveal the , that war, each side accused the other.on operations against North Vietnam'
only remaining identifiable traces of ? of invading. its territory. The South:!Army supply lines in Laos and the
Korean Army caved in almost im-
'staging areas for Viet Cong guerrilla
mediately. The North Koreans swept '
operations in Cambodia. Less puble?
swiftly down most of the length of the cized in this country were sanctuaries
Korean peninsula. recognized by the North Vietnamese.
The safe conclusion: The war was ,Our aircraft carriers, which were (and
.
initiated by the North Koreans. Jstill arc) targets vulnerable to short
The policy context of the coup d, range missiles, were left alone. Saigon -
'etat in Cambodia is a little more
could, in practice, be made all but un-':
plex because neither side has been' -li com-
vable by Viet Cong rocket attacks. A
, quite so clear in its policy pronounce- :Viet Cong initiative to do just that;
was quickly cooled when our Presi-
ments, In the last months of the .iohn-
dent indicated he was considering trad-
: son administration, policy was in flux.
In the first year of the Nixon adminis-
ing off of their sanctuaries for this un- welcome innovation..4.
,tration we must search for policy in-
, dications preceding the Nixon inaugu- On the other hand, the advocates of ;
ral. ,the grey zone approach frequently
The selection of Melvin Laird in overestimate American capabilities to
1968 as Secretary of Defense designate wage the new style of warfare. Wars
, was Widely considered as a triumph for of attrition, wars without territorial
policy positions with which he had ex- boundaries, wars with more than one )
'
pressed sympathy as a member of Con-
set of rules, wars fought with political
'
In his role as leader of the wars fought with politiacl means
gess. op.
are alien to tho American Imminent.
position for military affairs in tho ?
, House of Representatives, Laird, an 'We understand the nineteenth century
? ? y
this violent passage, while the conse-
quences of intervention merge into the
' stream of history.
But it is rather surprising that there
ha.s been so little speculation on the
visible course of events. Has the us-
ually cynical press caught napping? It
is true that several Senators quickly dc.
Med that the C.I.A. was envolved. But
the Senators who might complain arc
t not informed of Guatemala's in ad-
! ? vance and those that might be are
1. quite capable of mendacity in the na-
tional interest.
1- The observations upon which an
; assertion of clandestine involvement
depends, do not include the strange
piracy of the Columbia Eagle. But that
1( episode was surely eccentric enough
to arouse at least the suspicious of the
: Most credulous reperter. How strained
is the co-incidence that two treasonous
! defectors wculd 6uccessfully seize a
handy munitions ship and flea to
Cambodappeowail,Fedi Relbase 210'64KP3te4ciPC4AIRIEt$R60401
on the eve of revolution from the itarY leardership, had developed per-
Right, thence conveniently disappear- allianccs with those military
(leers who had arciwn mott
lnctotm6ovis,\ioanroisf
jv 0er means." But we are
,1 contest in yotiCh war
oar. -
STATINTL
)
' TRIBUNE
Approved For kelease 2001103/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000
? 805,924
S ? 1,131,752
APR 20 270
ecret e or
eve is Costs
' BY JAMES-YUENGER
? (Chicago Tribune Prtsti Service)
Washington, April 19 ? A carefully-censored transcript of
secret Senate testimony, released today, discloses that the
United States 'has sunk billions of dollars into the war in Laos
without a formal commitment to help that country.
Testimony about American military involvement in Laos was
given by administration -officials behind 'closed doors last
October to the Senate subcommittee on commitments abroad,
Fourteen state and defense department censors went over the .
transcript before agreeing to its publication. ?
?
The material that was deleted made it impossible to learn
the precise amount of money
America has spent helping the
Laotian government battle
Pathet Lao guerrillas and
North Vietnamese troops on its
'own territory.
Indications of Expenditures
But there were smallIndira-
tions of what has been spent,
for example: -
"The total cost of all United
States activities in Laos, in-
cluding air operations against ,
the Ho Chi Minh. trail is about
(deleted) billion a, year. Of t Sem Symington
J.. ...tt ,
"PrmArifitAffittfObi--Release 2001103/04 :
billion is related directly to out
efforts in South Viet Nam."
The major missing ingredient
in the cost was the amount
spent on bombing raids against
both the Hi CM Minh trail in the
south and troop concentrations
In the north by jet fighters.
based in Thailand, South Viet
Warn, and carriers off the Vieki
namese coast.
The cost of one air strike was
given? as slightly more than I
$3,000. News ac counts from ;
Laos. have said that up to 500
singles are being flown daily..;
This would add up to 1.5 million ?
dollars a day for that item.
.'200 Killed in Laos I
It was revealed that some 200
Americans were killed in Laos 1
from 1962 to 1969. and another
200 were either missing or
known captured.
? Altho this information was.'
provided last October, the White,
House at one point last' month
said the 'casualty figure was
less than 50. Subsequently it is-
sued a new figure in conformity
with. the one given to the sub-
o mm it t e e,? but the lag
prompted Sen. Stuart Syming-
ton JD., Mo.), subcommittee
chairman, to remark:
"In this ..."case, the Whaei
House did not have the best
Still f t e c t
.information."
aos. The record showed, how-1
ver, that the United States hadi
ven Thailand new planes to
r place some which Thailand
had given to Laos.
CIA Activities Deleted
Ele` leted. completely from the
report was an account of ac-
tivity in Laos by the Central
Intelligence, agency. Richard
Helms, CIA director, appeared
before the 'committee. but is not
even identified by name in the
transcript as a witness.
. One previously unknown ele-
'meat that emerged was a so-
called "Project 404" arrange=
meat in which the. American
mbassador in Laos maintained
tight control over American
military activity.
This includes supervision of
pilots in small spotter planes
who sight targets for Laotian
bombers. The ambassador also
has a say?for "political rea.
sons"?over all proposed Amer.
lean air strikes. His judgment
Is passed to air force command-
'
era in Thailand and South Viet
Nam.
Likely to Prolong Criticism
The administration's insist-
ence on secrecy over basic
facts and figures seems likely
to, prolong the criticism of con-
gressional doves who maintain
that the American public shodid
9)7090440011344 what the
,, (win about Tho .1.??11n in ;Veiled Stela Is dobvi in,Laos.
STATINTL STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 ? CJA-R1Q9,807,0,1 601
S 5988 CONGRESSIONAL RECOKu? naNn
REFUGEES AND CIVILIAN WAR bombing sorties by United States Air Voice 'My wife and three children seer e',
CASUALTIES IN LAOS and Navy jets rose to as many as 300 a day. said a man in his thirties. "There were no
This bombing campaign, code-named Bar- troops iPathet Lao or North Vietnameael
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, one of rel Ron, Is separate from the other, more- anywhere near our village."
the more distressing aspects of the war in publicized campaign. The latter, code-named All this raises some basic questions about
Laos is the plight of the Laotian people? Steel Tiger, is directed against the Ho Chl the bombing in northeastern Laos. What
who, like their neighbors elsewhere in Minh Trail in southern Laos. has been its purpose?
aid about 0 out of 10 of the It is impossible to get the United States
Indochina, are paying a heavy toll not Tho refugees s
bombing strikes flown over the past two Government side of the picture in any de-
STATINTL
only from insurgent attack, but also from years in the Plain or Jars area were carried tail because American oMcials refuse to die-
the nature of our own military activi- out by American jets and the rest by pro- cuss except in the vaguest generalities the ac-
?
ties. As chairman of the Judiciary Sub- peller-driven Royal Is() Air Force T-283. tivity in Laos.
committee on Refugees, there is little In most areas of the plain, the bombing PILOTS PLEDGED TO SECRECY
doubt in my mind that the escalation of forced the people to move out of their homes ?
these military activities is following the and into trenches, caves, and bunkers where The pilots who fly the raids from air bases
. -
familiar pattern of Vietnam in the de- they lived for the most part for two years. In Thailand nd South Vietnam and from
a
carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin are under in-
struction of the countryside; the genera- ?MODEN DY DAY - structions not to discuss the details of their
tion of refugees, and the occurrence Of They threw corrugated Iron over the missions,
civilian war casualties. The sUbconimit-
trenches and covered it with dirt, topped For years, the United States maintained
tee is pursuing this significant aspect of .
with branches for camouflage. Many said they the fiction that it was only flying "armed
ventured out to farm only at night because reconnaissance" missions over northern
our involvement in Laos, and, as I sUg- of the bombing. Laos.
geSted last week, will, it is hoped, hold By all accounts, the situation has been The most candid official acknowledgment
hearings within the very near future. somewhat similar for the estimated 192,000 that something other than "reconnaissance" .
Some recent press articles detail the peopio living in Hotta Han, or Sam Neua was going on came in President Nixon's ?
current situation among the people in Province to the northeast of the Plain of march 8 statement when he said for the first . -..
Laos. Because Of the broad congressional Jars, although Information is more difficult time that the United States had been flying
and public interest in this matter, I ask to come by on that area. "combat support missions" In northern Laos
Ono Western diplomat reported, however, when requested to do so by the Royal Lao
Unanimous consent that articles from that in some areas of that province "whole Government.
the March 14 issues of the Christian Sci- communities are living underground." "The level of our air operations has in-
ence Monitor and the Manchester It has been a similar, story, also for v11- creased only as the number of North Viet-
Guardian weekly, from the New York lagers living In the vicinity of the Ho Chl namese In Laos and the level of their ag-
Times of March 15, from the Washing- ? Minh Trail in southeastern Laos, where gression has been increased," the President
ton Post Of March 26, from the Washing- refugees and North Vietnamese prisoners and said,
ton Evening Star of March 27, from Life defectors say may villages have been de- BUILDUP ADMITTED
magazine Of April 3, and from the strayed. On this point, there is no question that
Washington Sunday Star of April 19, be In all of these places, the bombing stepped there has been a continuing North Vietnam-
printed in the RECORD, up greatly after the cessation of the attacks ese buildup in northeastern Laos. This build-
.. There being no objection, the items In tho Plain of Jars area, the bombing up has been in direct violation of the 1962
against North Vietnam.
Geneva accords and has allowed the Pathet
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, destroyed the main towns of Men Khouang,
Lao, heavily supported by the North Viet-
as follows: ang Khay, and Pmongsavan. The refugees
Kh namese, to solidify their control there.
'From the Christian Science Monitor, Mar. said the bombs flattened many villages in But has the bombing been a justifiable or
14, 19701 and around the plain and heavily damaged effective response? A number of well-quall-
WHAT U.S. BONDING FEELS LIKE TO LAOTIANS others. They said no villages they knew of fled military sources feel the bombing's ef-
(By Daniel Southerland) The refugees said they were sometimes fectiveness in cutting enemy supply lines and ??
d the bombing
slowing down the North Vietnamese harbeen
BAM Nom XAY, Lsos.?The old woman said forced to leave their villages and bunkers in general greatly exaggerated, just as It so
she had been through several wars but that to do porterage?carrying rice and ammu-
often had been in both North nd South
this was the most destructive and terrify- nition?for the Pathet Lao and North Viet- a
Ing?because of the bombing. . namese. But they added that in many bomb- Vietnam.
BOOMERANG EFFECT?
"In the other wars, I didn't have to leave Ing raids there were no Pathet Lao or North
my home," she said. Vietnamese troops near their villages.
"When the soldiers came on the ground to RAIDS DAILY OR OFTENER
fight, I wasn't so afraid," she said. "But when
they came in airplanes, it was terrible." As the bombing increased, they said, the
, The 70-year-old Lao woman was one of troops moved farther away from the poptl-
some 14,000 refugees evacuated from the lated areas.
Plain of Jars prior to the Feb. 21 recovery of In 1969, they said they saw the bombers
( ? that area by North Vietnamese forces and the (every clay when the weather was clear, some-
Lao rebels, the Pathet Lao.
Few civilian Inhabitants, Lr any, were left
- in the Plain of Jars following the evacuation
of the refugees.
In 1960, the plateau itself and its sur-
rounding ridges and valleys had supported
an estimated 150,000 people. But a decade of
. war has taken its toll.
The old woman and some 750 other persons
from her native village were moved by Mune
and then by truck last months to this refugee
camp with its barnboo-nnthatraw huts, about
40 miles east of Vientiane.
. AIR rowrit REDIRECTED
4.,campe and talked with refugees from six Some refugees said they moved four or five North Vietnam, the civilians are tied to their
different locations In and around the Plain times, each time farther away from their , rice fields, their livestock, and the rest of
of Jars. ? villages, to escape the bombing. But the their belongings and are thus exposed more
After questioning a large number of them,' bombs always followed them. Even at night constantly to the bombing than the soldiers.
It was possible to get a picture of the deva- the bombers came, and finally, even the rice A refugee from Phongsavan said the
station unleashed by American fighter- . fields were bombed. bombing put a halt to all civilian motorized
bombers in northeastern Laos over the past "There wasn't a night when we went to transportation in his district and caused
two years, and it is not a pretty one, sleep that we thought we'd live, to see the markets to open only In the predawn dark-
After the United States halted its bomb- morning," said one refugee. "And there nee' and to close before sunrise. Schools
? Mg of North Vietnam on Nov. 1, 1968, It wasn't a morning when we got up and were destroyed, and there was a general
' . stepped up a. much as 10-fold it. bombing thought we'd live to see the night" shortage of everything from clothing to Me ? '
raids--support which started on a minor "It was terrible living In those holei ht the oyele parts.
scale in mid-1964?against Pathet Lao-oecue ground," said another. "We never eke thw Sometimes It took Kens prodding and a
pied northeastern Laos. The aumbw di VIM Our hair was felling nut." , lot of pstlenee ,to pt the refugees to talk ?
.
According to the refugees from the Plain
of Jars, the bombing may even have had a
boomerang effect in some areas. ,
One refugee said that as the bombing in-
creased, the Pathet Lao forces in his dis-
trict '
started getting more volunteers, whose,
attitude was "better to die a soldier than
to stay at home waiting for the the airplanes ,
times so often they could not count the to kin you."
number of raids. The planes tended to Are He also said the bombing tended to ? I .
at anything that moved, they said, heighten the fighting spirit of the Pathet ? For the most part, however, the attackers Lao?no mean achievement given the Lao
apparently spared their buffaloes and cows, propensity for avoiding battle.
although some refugees felt that even these whatever the effects of the bombing on
.were sometimes targets. ?' . enemy military forces In Laos?still a sun-
One man said he narrowly escaped being jest for much debate?there is no doubt as
blasted to pieces on six separate occasions to its effectiveness in completely disrupting
when bombs fell near his hole, several times civilian life.
knocking him unconscious. But while he es- TRANSPORTATION HALTED
?aped death, there was one thing he could
Whereas the North Vietnamese and the
not escape?fear. It stalked Mtn day in and
. Pathet Lao soldiers are capable of moving
day out. into the protection of the forests and living
The correspondent visited four refugee CIVILIAN TERRORS DE.SCRIDED off supplies shipped in from neighboring
Approved F6r Abiease';'200110.3'/O
000,t:0003o0017
Approved For Release 2001/0VWCIA-RDP80,01601
20 APR 1970
I Clandestine Militarism
The United States today is largely run by the mill-
tary services and the Central Intelligence Agency. ,v1
The ordinary citizen doesn't see this, but just two
? items appearing in The New York Times on April 5
? should have opened his eyes: Richard Halloran's "i
story, "Air America's Civilian Fa?e Gives It Lati- ?'"
hide in East Asia" and Peter Grose's 'Pentagon
'Slips Its 'Goodies' to Its Friends."
. Reporters must watch their wording when they,
write stories of this type. Thus Halloran, noting that .
Air America and subsidiaries, with 167 aircraft and
9,300 employees, performs diverse missions, ranging '
from Korea to Indonesia, says cautiously that it "is
? believed to be a major link for the CIA's extensive
activities throughout Asia." His long story leaves
? no doubt that Air America is a major airline in per- ,
sonnel, aircraft and ground facilities, and if the..
reader questions that it is a CIA .operation he must ;
, also question that the moon is a satellite of the earth. !'
? Who but the CIA would be parachuting Moo tribes- t
Nmen and assorted secret agents behind North Viet-
'?,narnese lines in Laos, or training mechanics for the
aviation division of the national police in Thailand,
7' ferrying U.S. Air Force men from Okinawa to Japan
? and South Korea, and dispatching intelligence flights .
from Taiwan toward or over Communist China?
One of the excuses for keeping these operations
under a flimsy civilian cover is that it enables the
U.S. Government to disclaim responsibility when
certain "dirty tricks" miscarry. But the cover is it. ?
self a dirty trick on the American people and, to
some extent, the Congress. In the March 9 Nation;
?*, Michael Klare described "The Great South Asian
War." Air America is a key organization enabling ,
,the military (including the CIA) to carry on that war-
t' with a minimum of publicity. Of course, this is done
with the approval of the Nixon Administration, as of .,
!, the Johnson administration before it, but a large de-
gree of initiative and operational freedom remains
with the military, who can get credit in Washington
; for their successes and play down their failures.
The other story was largely covered in a Nation
? editorial, "The Phantom Phantom Jets" (February
2) and is further amplified by Rep. Silvio 0. Conte
(R., Mass.) who discovered by accident that nearly ?
.4160 million worth of military equipment had been
" slipped to Chiang Kai-shek's government on Taiwan..
.The thinese Nationalists are not the only benefi-
ciaries of this Pentagon gimmick. The technique is
' to declare items as surplus, whereupon they may be
disposed of on an accounting basis of one-third their
, value, or less. Congress has been cutting down on
the Military Assistance Program (MAP). By dis-.
counting its equipment, the Pentagon can triple the ,
i',??:amount of hardware it distributes to anti-Communist
governments without exceeding the dollar ceiling;
?'Thus Greece, Turkey, South Korea and Nationalist
China receive large stocks, of military equipment ,
,practically free. . ? ? ? . ,
'Approved For Release 200.1/03/0'4.: CIA-RDPg0.-01601R000700030001-4
(Th
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R0007
v ear ago, said the U.S.
FRANCISCO, CAL.
EXAMINER
E - 208 , 023
EXAMINER & CHRONICLE
S 018;231
A 14 R 2 0 1970/
i Envoy
birected
Laos War
1
Examiner News News Services
i WASHINGTON ? Newly, mit the following statement:
released congressional test1-1 "The total cost Of all U.S.
mony today revealed new as-i activities in Laos including
pects of U.S. involvemeM in :' air operations against the Ho
Laos: The American ambas-, Chi Minh trail is about (de-
sador ,there has been direct-, ;
1 teted) billion a year. Of this,
ing a secret military opera-
tion, and a clandestine U.S.
group in Thailand has been
training and equipping Lao-
tian troops.
Symington (D-Mo.) releasedi
the heavily censored tran-
script of Senate' foreign rela-
tions subcommittee hearings
into AmeriCan involvernent,
in Laos. The hearings were
conducted last October.
About 150 of the approxi-
mately 200 Americans killed
in Laos were airmen based
in Thailand or aboard U.S.
Navy carriers, testimony re-
vealed. The remainder were
described as U.S.' civilians;
and servicemen based iti
Laos.
No clear estimate was
Made of the cost of the U.S.
4. involvement in Laos. But the
iDefense Department did
The Nixon Administration
is r e port e d escalating the
clandestine war in Laos
w hile attempting to scale
down the conflict in Vietnam,
the Senate testimony has re-
vealed.
Last October
About 200 Americans were
killed in the Laotian conflict,
from 1962 to 1969, the testimo-
ny disclosed, and approxi-
mately 200 more Americans
are listed as missing or pris-
oners.of war.
The figures contrast sharp-
ly with a recent White House
announcement that Amer i?
can m i lit a r y and civilian
deaths in Laos due to enemy
action totaled fewer than 50.
The extent of the U.S.. in
volvement in the Southeas.
approximately (deleted) bil-
lion is related directly to our
,efforts in South Vietnam."
The Embassy-headquarter-
ed op e r ation in Vietiane,
called "Project 404," involves'
part of the 2000-man U.S. Mis-1
sion in Laos.
The ambassador supervis-
es more than 100 military at-
taches, some of whom fly
with the Royal Laotian Air
Force and direct its pilots to
targets. In addition, the am-
bassaclOr Personally reviews
air strikes :in Lads by U.S.
planes sent in frond Thailand
and Vietnam.
The project has been going
on for the past fonr yprs.
The transcript Ori5c1Osed
that Laotian forces are
trained and equipped through
a secret Ame ic an group
called "Requirements Organ-
ization" o p e r a tin g out of
Thailand, nominally under
the U.S. Agency for Interna-
esterday when .5,eLqtyar, 4by retired U.S. officers. ,
tional Development, It is run
Asian nation came to light
, Sen. J. William Fulbright
(D-Ark.) said, "I have never
seen a country engage in so
many devious undertakings
as this."
Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State William H. Sullivan,
.who was the ambassador in
Vientiane:tom 1984 Until Oil*
. ,
advised Laotian forces sug-
gest. possible bombing tar-
gets to the Embassy and
the ambassador approves.
or disapproves whether a
strike Can be made." If ap-
proved.: the request is passed
on with the ambassador's
recominendation to the 7th
Air Force.
Symington said the ambas-
sador has become virtually a
"military proconsul."
.Col. Robert L. F. Tyrell,
chief U.S. air a tt ac he in
Laos, testified the U.S. air
strikes in Laos were in-
creased "roughly 100 per-
cent" as a result of a request
for a heavy stepup in air sup-
port from L a o ti an forces
headed by Gen. yang Pao.
Symington said the "fig-
ures which Col. Tyrell shows
emphasize there has been a
heavy escalation of our mili-
tary effort in Laos."
Escalation of the, Laotian
war came after the U.S. halt-
ed the bombing of North
Vietnam in the fall of 1968,
the testimony says.
Saying. the Nixon Adminis-
tration has emphasized the
de-escalation of the Vietnam
conflict at the same time it
has heavily 'escalated U.S.'
military effort in Laos,,Sym-
ington said:
"It is not, a question of
whether it is right or Wrong.
The point We are trying to
bring out is not only that the
Piin er ic an people have no
knowledge at all that this is
true and neither does C o n-
gress ? and neither does this
committee nor the Senate
Armed. Services Committee.
It could run us into new prob-
lems for this new Adminis-
tration."
All testimony before the
committee by Richard
Helms, director of the Fen-
tral,Intelligence Agency, an'd
his staff was censored::?"-:
Questions ? about Thai
troops in, Laos also were de-
leted. 1341 the rec or d re-
vealed Ault the United States
had ,giiren? the Thai govern-
ment new plaz:es to replace
those turned over earlier to
the Royal Lao Air Force.
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700030001-4
Approved For Release 2DelYNIRF.Takii6P80-01601R0
20 APR 1970
STATINTL
CIA's Testimony
n Laos: (Deleted)
The Central Intelligence
Agency, the most clandestine
operating group in the , secret
war in Laos, virtually escaped
mention in the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee in-
quiry on U.S. involvement in
Laos.
Subcommittee Chairman
Stuart Symington CD-Mo.), in
defense of bowing to the Exec-
utive Branch's demands in the
battle over clearing the hear.
Ing transcript, said:
"Well, the CIA is an agency
that operates on the instruc-
tion of other people ... My ex-
perience is that if anything
goes well, someone else takes
the 'credit for it; if it goes
badly, they try to put? the
blame on the CIA"
Although' ,the transcript
doesn't show it, it is known
that CIA Director Richard
113,e1mi was the witness on Oct.
28, 1969. Here is the full pub-
lished text of that morning's
transcript:
The subcommittee met, pur- .
suant to notice,-at 10 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Sena-
tor Stuart Symington (chair-
man of the subcommittee)
prosidirte.
Present: Senators Siithina.
ton, Fulbright, Mansfield, Ai.
ken, Cooper and Case.
Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. .
Pincus, and Mr. Paul of the
committee staff.
Senator Symington. The?
hearing will come to order,,
(Deleted.)
(Whereupon, at 12:25
the subcommittee adjourned,
to reconvene subject to the
call of the Chair.) .
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :? CIA-RDF'80-01601R000700030001-4
3 THE WASHINGTON POST
Approved For Release 2001/931i9A-R12_1M.I-Tr6L01
..-- 1.
ft 0 111:1Seatate5, .
.. .? . .. k reasons unrelated to nationali !
, !
.. . . security. 1!
0' Censorship took out of the .
air, 111 Laos . 1 transcript all summary figures
9 . 1 on costs; every refernece to
.
' ' the Central Intelligence Agen
:.1
., .. 1,ey's operations, which include
0
, training, equipping, supplying:
., and directing Gen. yang Pao's
. "clandestine" army of up to
iii. Disci ses.
' 36,000 Men tribesmen in Laos: , ,
' all references to the use of !
Thailand's forces in Laos; de-
By Murrey Mutter -
tails on U.S. air opreations
*Washington Post Staff Writer , from Laos; figures showing
"The United States is engaged in "heavy escalation" of the escalation of American air
its air war in Laos while trying to de-escalate the war in strikes sin Laos during bomb.
Vietnam, a Senate inquiry disclosed yesterday. Ing "pauses" or the halt in the
?air war. against North Viet- tee was focused primarily on
The Symington subcommit-
When the American bombing of North Vietnam ended nam, apd other critical facts. the war in the north. But both
?;.
SEN. STUART SYMINGTON
. . . releases testimony
on Nov. 1, 1968, U.S. air power. shifted to hit the predom- PortiOns of the story can be portions of the Laotian con-
owever, despite the de et ons. Vietnam militarily and diplo-
Laos, testified William H. Sul-
A typical deletion in the ' ?
livan, former ambassador in
transcript reads:
Lads and now assistant secre-
"The total cost of call U.S.
tary of state for East Asian
activities in Laos, including
and Pacific affairs. air operations against the Ho
After more than 100 meet-
Chi Minh Trail, is about (de-
ings with administration offi-
leted) billion? a year. Of this,
cials, Synlington's subcommit-
approximately (deleted) billion
tee on U.S. commitments is related directly to our ef-
?? -es f forts in South Vietnam."
abroad salvaged 237 nag o
censored transcript. U.S. air strikes in Laos have
President Nixon pierced the, been reported to run up to 600
censorship deadlock when he or, more sorties a day,
disclosed, on March 6, ,a few The transcript shows that in
selected portions of U.S. activ- northern Laos the average sor-
ities in Laos, emphasizing that, tic costs $3,190 and delivers 2.2
they began under "two pre- 'tons of bombs. This would add
vious administrations." , up to a cost of $1,914,000,for a
But the new record shows 'day of 600 air sorties.
that the war in Laos involves1 President Nixon on March 6
far more ?than "1,040 Amen- I originally said that "No Amer
-
cans . . . stationed in Laos" lean stationed in Laos had
as the President's guarded ever been killed In ground
combat operations." But the
statement listed.
inantly North Vietnamese troops in Laos, the record however,
or estimated,i flict interact with the war in
matically.
shows. The. U.S. bombing of
Laos, secretly begun in 1964 by
President Johnson, was report-
ed to have doubled in May,
1969, and nearly tripled last
August.
A Senate Foreign Relations
subcommittee headed by Sen.
Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) yes-
terday made public the e.en-
sored results of a six-month
struggle with t h e Executive
'Branch over releasing testi-
mony taken last October about
the secret U.S. role in Laos.
It shows that by agreement
;with Laotian Premier Sou-
1.vanna Phouma, the United
.States responded in 1964 to Vi-
etnamese Communist viola-
tions of the 1962 Geneva ac-
'cords on Laotian neutrality by
'violating them too. The U.S.
share of this decision has cost
"billions of dollars," and about The hearings disclose, as inquiry, confirming figures
he said, by attacking neutral-
200 American lives, the record subcommittee sources put it disclosed in the dispute over ist forces and "in 1964 North
that "tens of thousands" of that statement, shows there
indicates.?
Americans are involved in the have been "something under, Vietnam began markedly to
Increase its support to the
i Under the covert U.S. opera-
Laot Ian war in air combat, in , 200 U. S. military personnel
lion, the American A rilbaSSII-
training, advisory, supply and . killed in Laos," Most of these (pro-Communist) Pathet Lao
dor in Vientiane virtually has
intelligence work ? operating were airmen, but nearly 50 arethe Ho Chi
operated as co-commander of
from Thailand, from South listed as "civilian and 'Minhan d its trail11.7 .4) f
the war in northern Laos: he
Vietnam and from U.S. air- "In the same spirit of pro-
portionate response to North
Vietnamese violations of the
agreements," Sullivan testi-
fied, "and as part of our effort
to assist South Vietnam in its
defense," the United States1
began "air operations" and.
considerably expanded its
ground support. . .
Sullivan insisted the United
States is free to "terminate".
Its operations in Laos at any-
time.:
The "first U.S. reconnals-1
ons over r
1964 after consultation with
rtnniAntiOd
Sullivan, who worked on the
1962 Geneva accords, became
ambassador to Laos in Novem-
ber, .1964, replacing Leonard
Unger.
North Vietnam failed to
comply with the 1962 Geneva
neutrality agreements "from
their inception," Sullivan testi-
fied, withdrawing only a token
number and retaining about
6,000 troops, while the United.
States pulled out all its 666
men.. ?
The United States, in No-
vember, 1962, agreed to provide
supplies and repair parts for
U.S.-supplied equipment and
other material "as permitted"
under the Geneva accords,
said Sullivan. Then in 1963
North Vietnamese and Pathet
Lao troops broke the accords,
controls a U.S. mission of air,
ground and intelligence advis- craft carriers at sea.
ers that coordinates American Symington expressed the
and Laotian air and ground hope, in making the transcript
operations in northern Laos;
public, that it. will help pre-
vent "another Vietnam."
arranges for the training (pri- .
madly at American bases in No conclusions or findings
Thailand) of Lao troops, and accompany the report, partly
supplies American mil it a r y because it is incomplete. The
,,---. and economic funds to Laos subcommittee staff noted that
that are larger than the Lao- it had gained release of 90 per
. tions' own contribution to cent of the transcript, but
their nation's economy. chief consultant Walter II.
The Laotian Premier "made Pincus stated in a covering
,it clear thane wanted?up. to
say as little*/ FirsilMechlf6Q
, I
American,, military . action., in
letter that the public's "right
Relele 12b004 d MO-ROP-0411
to avoid"em arrasYsT4Micteiast;Mig' -souin t? oi rough Laos from
administrations or officials for .,North to. South,3t!gnom.!..L.1.::
tary" personnel assigned to
the U.S. mission in Laos..
There are "two wars" in
Laos. One is what began as a
"civil war" in the north, in
which the main Communist
forces consist of constantly in-
creasing numbers of North Vi-
etnamese troops; this is the
air and ground war that the
American Embassy mission in
Vientiane is deeply engaged in
running. The other war in
Laos is the American air war
against the so-called Ho Chi
' .
Approved For Release MOSAD3/04 $0511A-Rprift9010
2 0 APR 1970
S !?
ATI NTL
ombing Began in '64;
The number of Army officers
/ inil
bid "Talki)ion: 'Set Tonight
operating in the office of Col.
military regions under Project
Edgar W. Duskin and in the five
.....se 404 was censored. But Duskin
. ,
.emieemisar
LAOS
By GEORGE SHERMAN
Star Stall Writer
Hitherto secret testimony to-
day revealed that the American
Embassy in Vientiane has quiet-
ly directed a still-escalating war..
in Laos for almost six years.
According to American field,
officials, testifying at closed
Senate hearings in October, U.S.
Air Force planes began "armed
reconnaissance" over Northern.
Laos in June 1964. By the follow-
ing Dec. 14, several months be-
fore American bombing of North
Vietnam began in February
1965, the planes were making
"strike missions" of their own in :
Northern Laos. ?
William H. Sullivan, ambassa-
dor to Laos from November 1964
to April 1969, told the subcom-
mittee chaired by Sen. Stuart.
Symington, fl-Mo., that this first
escalation of the American ef-
fort in Laos was personally de-
cided by then President Lyndon.
B. Johnson.'
Oral
Oral Request Granted
Johnson was granting an "oral.
request" by Laotian Premier
Prince Souvanna Phouma to.
bring increased pressure on the
lines of communications of
North Vietnamese forces which
had refused to leave Laos as'.
agreed in the 1962 Geneva ac-
cords. This request ? and all
others since ? was kept secret:
partly because Souvanna Phou.
ma feared his official "neutral-
ity" would be compromised, Sul-
livan said. ?
The 235 pages of testimony by
Sullivan and leading military .
and civilian officals in Laos was
made public by the Senate sub-
committee today. Although
heavily censored, the transcript
Is the first authoritative account ,
of the extent and nature of the
secret war waged by the U.S. in
northern Laos.
Sullivan made the point that '
this war is separate from the
war being waged farther south
along the Ho Chi Minh supply.
trail where It passes through ,
Laos from North to South Viet. ,
nam. The testimony shows that
as the Ai Om xled fled Ne
Vietnam It has steadily ens.
lated in northern Laos ? the
main f
? billion. said they do take part in the
Economic aid the same year daily Joint Operations Center
came to $52 million, from which meetings with Laotian corn-
the United States ? according to manders and U.S. Air Force off i-
the top official of the Agency for cers, and that they give both
'International Development there "advice" to Laotian officers and
--finances 75 percent of the "inforrnation" to the U.S. Em-
shortfall between revenues and bassy on planning.
expenditures in the total Laotian The whole operation comes to-
budget.
gether under the American am-
Exceeds Laos GNP bassador?first under Sullivan,
who created it, and now under
..'. Under questioning from Ful- G. McMurthrie Godley. Sullivan
? bright, the administration offi-
ricials admitted this total input of itsarynowof deputy
foras assistant
eEasst7e-
ni
More Planes Available
At one point, Col. Robert L. F.
Tyrrell, U.S. air attache in the
American embassy in Vien-
tiane ? chief manager of the
air targeting operation ? agreed
with Symington that with the
halt of bombing of North Viet-
nam, More planes became avail-
able for attacks in Laos.
'Tyrrell said that U.S. air
strikes in northern Laos in-,
creased "by roughly 100 perA
cent" in April-May 1969 to sup-
port efforts by ground Laotian
forces under Men tribes leader
General Vang Pao to turn back
a North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao
offensive. The following August,
Tyrrell said, another increase in
air attacks occurred. The per-
centage was deleted.
Throughout the testimony the
censors ? working mainly from
the State Department, according
to subcommittee staff?took ',Out
all references to the number of
these raids. But they did not
delete one statement by Syming-
ton that his "apprehensions"
about Laos began to increase in
late 1965, when, at Udorn base
in Thailand, he discovered that
"378 strikes" had been flown
, against Laos in one day.
The censors' also permitted
publication of the estimated cost
for each raid against Laos ?
$3,190. But they refused publica-
tion of the figure given the com-
mittee for the total cost of the
war in Laos.
"The total cost of all U.S. ac-
tivities in Laos, including air op-
erations against the Ho Chi Minh
trail, is about (deleted) billion a
year," rends the transcript. "Of
this, approximately (deleted)
billion is related dirdcUy to our
efforts in South Vietnam."
Sen. J. William Fulbright,
I/Ark., chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, noted re-
peatedly ? without contradic-
tion ? that the total of formal
American military and econom-
ic aid from 1062 to 1969 to Laos
was over $1 billion.
Col. Peter T. Russell, who
heads the secret military aid
group for Laos from the U.S.
Embassy in neighboring Thai-
gt 1*
lion?more than five times the
Laotian military budget of $17
ocus of the hearinm. ????
4
all formal economic and military
aid each year exceeds the total
$150 million annual gross nation-
al product of all Laos.
For the first time, the tran-
script gives details of the ma-
chinery built up through the
American Embassy in Vientiane
to run this mushrooming opera-
tion. .1t is summed up in the
code-word "Project.404," under
which the Army and Air At-
taches brought in extra opera-
tional and administrative /per-
sonnel.
According to Tyrrell, 117
tary and 5 civilian personnel
were brotight into Laos in the
? Initial "404 package" in 1966. In
? October, he said 106 people were
, there in the project, most of
them on six-month temporary
duty from Vietnam or Thai-
land.
Tyrrell said that, oVer-all, 125
U.S. Air Force officers and air-
men are assigned to his office.
That means, according to an of-
ficial chart given the committee,
that well over half of the total
218 military personnel in all ca-
pacities in Laos belong to the
Air Force.
Of the 125, Tyrrell said, 60
work at Air Operations Centers
: in the five military regions of
Laos?coordinating. targets and
plans' with the Laotian com-
mands. Another 21 are "forward
air controllers" ? so-called
"Ravens," or American Air
Force pilots who fly T-28 jet
trainers and other less sophisti-
cated aircraft spotting targets
for the U.S., aside from other
aircraft and the Royal Laotian
Air Force.
In 1966 and 1967, Tyrrell said,
40 T-28s were available inside
FitAlitgladd
affairs, dealing almost exclu-
sively with Vietnam. ,
Sullivan said he held daily
meetings with his staff. Every
proposed bombing target had to
be approved by him. Once ap-
proved, the request goes to the
7th Air. Force Command in Sai-
gon, which decides when and
how the raid is to be carried out.
Sullivan explained how the
international neutrality of Laos
?set up in the 1962 Geneva ac-
cords and never carried out by
North Vietnam ? had imposed
this special procedure on the
U.E. Embassy in Laos. Ordin-
arily, he said, the military func-
tions would be carried out di-
rectly by a miltiary mission
under the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
but the Geneva agreement made
such a mission impossible.
? He also said the special Mili-
tary Aid Program of the Penta-
gon to equip and train Laotian
forces had to be set up surrepti-
tiously. It became the Require-..;
inents Office of the Agency for '
International. Development
(RO-AIS), run by Col. Russell, :
the deputy chief of AID in Bang, ,
kok.
All reference to the training .
and equipping of Lao forces in
Thailand is deleted from the
transcript. So is all reference to
American air strikes from Thai-
land, or the use of disguised
Thal forces on the ground.
At one point, when Russell tes-
titled about transit of goods
from Thailand to Laos, the tran-
script allows that the cost of Lao
training in (deleted) since 1965
has been $1,188,800.
The extent of the operations In .
and around Laos caused Ful-
gionthat htryeenhgaad ge "ninev,er
so
many devious undertakinp as
thiLOtrarnstiva
ed, as were the figures on hours
and missions flown daily., ..1!