SALE OF U.S. AIRCRAFT TO PORTUGAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000800030001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 24, 1971
• Content Type: OPEN

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE Fbnfi,9 71
a rational fashion there are certain things
that we should do, and a number of things
which we assuredly shonld .not do:
1. In the existing climate of the United
States efforts to reeiment, conscript, or apply
economic saiIctiCflC to the medical profession
are destined to make matters worse rather
than better. They have the effect of driving
even more physicians from active practice
Into research, teething, administrative medi-
cine, more narrow specializ-ation or prema-
ture retirement.
2. Promises on the part of government
that practicing physicians will deliver even
more health service to beneficiaries than they
are Maw able to produce under stress condi-
tions force still more physicians to seek re-
fuge from the pressuree.
? 3. The practicing physician is confronted
With increasing costs of living and of doing
business. In a generally uncontrolled econ-
omy- measures which would freeze the income
levels of physicians, eliminating their ability
to. adjust to the economic environment are
discriminatory and lead to still further de-
. partures from active practice.
4. The individual physician has limited
'opportunity or capacity to respond to overall
societal demands. These responses are best
-made by physicians collectively, acting in
concert through their professional associa-
tions. It is in the- best Interests of the nation
that Professional organizations be aided and
abetted in their cooperative efforts. To deni-
grate. them and to give them adverse tax
treatment reduces their capacities and their
?resoinces for constructive input..
? 5. It has bean 'proposed in several legis-
lative bills that bonus dollars will motivate
physicians to establish practices In rural and
"urban shortage areas. The fact Is that large
numbers of physicians who, have been pro-
viding service in those areas leave lucrative
practices for lc-as rewarding circumstances in
which the offsets are such things as personal
and family security, improved educational
facilities,. or a lessened pressure of patient
demand. .
6. Prepaid comprehensive group practice
has been "discovered" as a potential answer
to most of the delivery problems. Rechris-
tened "Health Main tenance Organizations,"
these arrangements for practice are offered
as a paniCea without recoaultion of the fact
that such groups hhve been encountering
serious problems of their own, that ninny
patients do not wish to enroll in such plans,
and that many physicians have no interest
in practicing ,in them. The many variations
of this approach deserve support as competi-
tive mechanisms with a chance to prove such
superiorities as they may develop in respect
to quality, eiliciency and economy, but no
attempt to force all physicians into a rigid
pattern of salaried group practice could be
the most destructive move made by govern-
ment.
7. Plans which would base the entire de-
livery system of medical service upon "pri-
mary physicians" with responsibility for
Channelling patients and regulating pay-
ments to consultants, specialists and the like
betray a lack of understanding as to how
medicine is practiced. ?
E. The willingness of physicians to partici-
pate In and to be Subject to peer review in
respect to the quality and quantity of their
services and the, changes made therefor are
encouraging. This should .be supported, not
discounted. The prospect of evaluation by
non-medical reviewers, or medical reviewers
hired by non-medical agencies is a strong,
deterrent to cooperation.
Iii .summa ry, to keep physicians in active
practice, rather than to dispense them, gov-
ernment should abandon emphasis on pee-
paid comprehensive group- practice although
it may still support it. It should Uphold the
principle that a phyeicinn should be?cx
pected to charge his usual fees to all patients
and should depend on a strengthened system
of peer review to guarantee that such usual
fees will conform with cust&na.ry fees and.
be kept within the ranges of what can be
defined as "reasonable.". Mathematical for--
mulae for freezes and- arbitrary percentiles
should be abandoned, it should probably be
accepted that highly trained physicians can-
not be attracted into practice in rural areas
or in many slum areas, and alternative
mechanisms for the provision of adequate
medical service shcfuld be developed.
Considerations in.reepect to the and pri-
ority (increased productivity) :
1. There is, In ?general, little opportunity
to increase the productivity of the average
practicing physician by simple extensions of
his working hours. Actually current en-
thusiasm for group practice formulae seem
to be retrogressive Inasmuch as it is repre-
sented 'to the physician who is currently
working 00-270 hours per week that under
group practice arrangements he may reduce
this to 50 or less hours per week. Scattered
figures may be cited to support the idea
that 100 physicians in solo practicd actually
provide service to more patients per week
than do 100 physicans in group practice of
any type.
2.? The multiple experimental programs of
Medex, Duke University, the American Uro-
logical Association, and scores of others to
develop support to the practicing physician
deserve subsidy and assistance. At the seine
time serious attention must be paid to the
medical practice acts of the several states,
to factors of professional liability, Insurance
coverage, and the like.- -
3. Restrictive provisions in such programs
as Medicare and Medicaid which make it
economically unfeasible for physicians. to
delegate to others--especially to interns, res-
idents and office assistants?the provision of
appropriate services should be eliminated or
read lusted.
4. Government has taken an unproductive
and adverse position in respect to those
physicians who have appeared to earn "tbo
much" money from federal and state pro-
grams. Instead of the antagonistic approach
of questioning the financial "take" by. such
persons, focus should be on rdquesth.a- "peer
review" of the quality of care offered by these
mass producers. It may be good.
5. Many physicians are dissuaded from, or
become disenchanted with, efforts to provide
medical service for feeleral and state pro-
gram beneficiaries because of relatively low
compensation, excessive paper work, and an
exposure to adverse publicity because of pay-
ments received. This should be corrected.
. Physicians willing to devote themselves to
this type of work In volume should. be
-praised rather than denigrated for their
efforts.
Consideration in respect to the 3rd priority
(augmentation of physician numbers):
1. Support to the educational roles of med-
ical schools should be clearly separated
Irons support to medical research so that the
latter is not used as a subterfuge for the
building of a medical school faculty, or the
underwriting of medical school operations.
2. As much attention should be devoted to
keeping in clinical practice of medicine thote
physicians who we have as to the training
of more physicians.
S. A positive program of public relations
dedicated to making the clinical. practice of
medicine attractive to oncoming generations
of young Americans would be more produc-
tive than a campaign to picture physicians as
entrepreneurs requiring regimentation and
control.
4. Serious attention should be gives; to the
problem of professional liability insuyance
and the jeopardy in which the practicing
physician finds himself today. It is no small
matter that the new physician finds ..that
he Must pay from two to ten thonsand dol-
lars per year in malpractice insurance pre-
miums before he feels safe to treat his first
patient. It is equally important to recognise
?that many active practitioners are being
forced front practice by the inability to pur-
chase, at any reasonable figure, adequate Nan
bility insurance. The answer does not, lie in
finding. new "carriers" for the insurance.
'It lies in legal reforms' governing liability.
Considerations in respect to the 4th prior-
Ity (conservator of public expenditures) :
I. "Peer Review" is the governing concept
Which requires support. To dilute it with lip
service to consumer representation is not
helpful. The medical profession needs to be
supported in the outstanding progress which
It has made in the past decade in the per-
fection of peer review techniques.
2. Indoctrination in peer review should be
looked upon as a proper role of national,
state and county medical societies for in-
corporation into medical school curriCula and
hospital intern and residency training pro-
- grams, grams. ?
3. Techniques of education for the practic-
ing physician In the relationship between
hospitalization, physician orders and pre--
scribing practices and the expenditures man-
dated for patients or those who pay their
bills should be advanced.
4. Considerable attention should be given
to the thought that when a physician is sal-
aried, or otherwise divorced from the fee-for-
service .method of compensation, he is Inane
lated from a specific interest in how his serv-
ices or his authorizations for service have
impact upon the economics of medical care.
SALE OF U.S. AIRCRAFT TO
PORTUGAL
Mr. CASE, Mr. President, for many
years now, I have observed with more
than.routine interest events in southern
Africa. I regret to say that self-determi-
nation has been systematically 'denied by
the South African ancl Portuguese Gov-
ernments .to the majority of the popula-
tion in-that part of the world. .
-Thus, I was concerned by press re-
-ports that appeared in January 1971, de-
.scribing the sale of two Boeing 707 air-
craft directly to the Portuguese ?Gorcrn-
ment, for there was some question
whether this transaction violated the
terms of the 1961 U.S. embargo on the
sale of arms to Portugal for use in Africa.
At that time, I wrote to the. Secretary of
State for more information, and I re-
ceived a prompt reply from his Depart-
ment. ? -
I ask unanimous. conSent to have
printed in the RECORD the original Wash-
ington Post article by Marilyn t erger
which prompted my inquiry, my letter to
the Secretary of State, the answer I re-
ceived from the State Departnient, and
an earlier letter I received from State
which has been described to me. as prob-
ably the most complete public disclosure
ever -made of U.S. policy toward Portugal
in Africa. - ?
-
There being 'no objection, the items
were ordered to be printed in the RI.coao,
as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Jan. 5, 1071]
PORTUGAL To GET Two Poarem 707's
"(By .Marilyn 'Berger)
In what Is believed to be the first trans-
action of its kind since the imposition of a
partial arms embargo to Portugal, theaUnited
States has apptoved the sale of two',13ocing
707s to the Lisbon government. t ? -
? Although there has been an embargo
against the shipment of arms for use in the
Portuguese overseas territories, State Depart-
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STATI NTL
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10n6 SENiYfi
:Iota tine% rectioull is an end in itself; it
has to 1.0 en integral peat of an entire cc1-
1,--tie hi-v.-tram," no -..clieves,
"We all know good blocking, tackling are
responsible for winning, but preparation,
dedicaticei, desire, mental toughness and In-
telligence end a lot of other basic things
ere responsible. for helping players block
tackle well.
-When they understand this they also
-understand that it Comes to be steIcassiul
in all their endeavors," the three time South-
land Conference oeach of the year sold.
Ellender, who quarterbacked at Thiene
University in the mid 1940s, must compete
for his players in a state rabid for Arkansas
Razorback 'tootball. But he believes he lias
just :Is much Or more to offer than the big
?time college fora:ben provers.
We offer a boy an opportunity to play
quicker than he can at the larger schools
and we offer nearly as much here in academ-
ics as coy eel:coal. The spectator interest isn't
as great but there Is more opportunity." And
he believes the players know it.
"We have a tremendous amount of to-.
gethernesa and this is good. We strive to
Make them feel they are part of the orga-
nization. We feel like we have good rapport
with all our people, that the door is open
to them at all times."
?
U.S. POLICY TOWARD PORTUGUESE
? AFRICA --
M-1": CASE. Mr. President, in light of
the present 'continuing debate in the
1.1.1:T. Security Council about alleged Por-
tuguese involvement in the invasion of
Guinea, I ant today releasing the text of
correspondence I have had with th e State
Department on U.S. policy toward Por-
tuguese activities iii Africa.
My original inquiry of the State De-
partment ?.,:as prompted by a letter. I re-
ceived in November from a Maplewood,
N.J., high school student, Laurence E.
Tobey. At that time I wrote Mr. Tobey
that his letter to me "raised some points
with which I was not familiar," and I
thanked hint for what I consider to be "a
well thought out and informative letter."
While the State Department reply is
?ot responsive to all the details men-
tioned by r. Tobev, my understanding
is that it. is probably the most complete
Public disclosure to date of U.S. policy
toward Portugal in Africa.
ask unanimous consent that the texts
of the lett...cis Le printed in the Rncor.a.
There being no object-ton, the texts
were ordered to be printed in the Rucoart,
as follows:
? NovEmazit I, 1970.
Hon. CLITFOnli P. CASE,
U.S. Senate,
Washinvion, D.C.
DcAr. Set: I ran a student .at Columbia
High School and have recently completed a
course in African history. one of the major
? .ohleme under discussion was European
colonialism. European oppression has been
overthrown throughout Africa, with the ma-
jor exception of the Portuguese colonies of
Mozamnique, and Portuguese Guinea.
The cactano regime which is presently In
power in Portmerd has maintained repressive
colonist wars in each of these colonies since
1961, which the United States and NATO
allies; have supportcd with military aid and
training. I woulct like to question this sup-
port.
"The UM sti States had supplied the Po:tit-
goose Air Inietie with .50 Thundeelet tightens
since 1(15?, some 20 Cessno training and
see.nrity plenes, (of which Portugal has paid
for 12), a !erne number of Harvard trainers,
18 Lockheed bombers (PV-2. Harpoons) and
12 other Loelheid liombioa". (Afrieaa
May, 1970). In addition, West Germany has
supplied CO Flat C--90 fighter-bombers. Ger-
many has also supplied three naval frigates,
In addition to two front Britain and four front
France. All of this material hers been provided
ostensibly for NATO nee. None of it has been
used for that intrpose. Portugal has further
failed in its NATO commitment by main-
taining only one catty division for NA.To
duty, and that . at 50% combat strength,
while by contrast, the Portuguese maintain
120,000 soldiers in Africa for colonial duty.
Finally, clandestine aid has been given by
the United States, in particular the Central
Intelligence Age-nay, In the form of 20 Ba2o
loombela, and the United States has also
trained several thousand Portuguese soldiers
in counter-insurgency, and at present the
Army maintains a Military Assistance and
Advisory (1,ZAACI) Group in Portugal. The
fact renetins that these forms of military aid
have been provided ender the auspices of
NATO and the Military Mutual Defense
Assistance agreement. ft. has not been used
for that purpose, but in fact, the Portuguese
have continued their colonial wars at the
expense Of their NATO commitments.
The ihitlire of the tears conducted In
Africa by the Caetano regime has often been
described as Immoral, indiscriminate, and
blood-thirsty. Their purpose Is none but
ittOV.'ed, adtaitted inuiperiaiisnn. There can be
no metal justification for anah territodal
aggrandizemen t.
In concloston, I would like to suggest the
following:
.(1) Immediate cessation -of all American
military aid to Portugal, and diplomatic
pressure pat on the NATO allies to do the
same.
(2) The American Embassy to the United
Nations be instructed to introduce action
In the UN condemning the Caetano regime
for its WCti'S, and demanding that steps
he taken to prepare Angoia. Mozambique,
and Portuguese Guinea for independence.
(The United States voted against such a
reeolution in 1966.)
The American policy towards Africa as a
Whole has been described as one of benign
neglect. American attitude toward Portu-
guese Imperielism Is at midrst, acenziescence.
The continuation of bloonahed serves no pura
Pose for any one except the narrow-minded
men of the Caetano regime; not the people
of Africa, who are kept in crushing poverty,
no: the people of Portugal, who must light
and pay the bills. The present American pol-
icy aids only the Caste no regime. I ask that
the United States stop underwriting their
policy of imperialism and repression.
Sincerely,
?
Latramena 13. TODEY.
DCPARTMENT OF STATE,
WC3hinifteit, D.C., November 1,3, 1970.
Hon. Crotroan P. CASE, s
U.S. Senate,
Ii'asflirigfoct, D.C. ?
DEAR Sti:ATOil Casa: Thank you for your
letter of November 4 and the opportunity
to comment on Mr. Tobeyes letter of Novem-
ber 1 to you regarding U.S. policy towards
Portugal and Portuguese Africa.
'Phe United States Government's attitude
towards this question was eat forth In the
Secretary of State's. March 26 policy stae-
ment on Africa. He said: "As for the Portu-
guese territories, we shall continue to believe
that their peoples should have the right of
self-determination. We will encourage peace-
ful progress toward that goal. The declared
Portuguese policy of rachli toharation, is an
Important factor in this equation. We think
this holds genuine hooe, for the futairo. Be-
lieving ths.t resort to fotee and violence is
In no one's interet, we imposed an embar-
t9 in HGl agai:sst nlhe slr:ipment or areas for
&amber 8, 1920
use 121 the rertilgite2e telritOrieS. We have
maintained this embargo foul will continue
to do ao.',
It is true that vie do ma:Antain a -/noaat
Military Assistance program (MAP) in 'For;
tugal, designed to help it filled Its NATO
missions primer: 11y in anti-suinnarine war-
fare and air defense. Materiel and training
In. these areas are generally Inapplicable to
the African wars. (Counterintarreeney train-
ing courses have not been offered to the
Portuguese militaty since 1264.) Moreover,?
since the Imposition of our arms embargo in
1961, we have required assurances from the
ortuguese Government that any materiel
supplied to Portugal from public or private
U.S. sources will be restricted to the NATO
area, which does not include the African
territories. To the heat of our knowledge,
these assurances; have always been kept.
We, therefore, believe that any U.S.-man-
ufactured arms required In the U.S. and
tesed by the Portoguese in Africa were ac-
quired prior to the 1961 embargo. I might
point out that such items; being often of
World War II or Noreen War vintage, are
also available commercially in many pirts of
the world outside U.S. Governmental con-
t
r
o
l
.
. With regard specifically to 13-26 aircraft,
Portugal did obtain seven 11-26's through a
SVI:E.3 thin in 1263. The aircraft crone front
private U.S. sources. Thoce direetly 131VOIVed
in delivering the planes to Portuga.I includ-
ed three Ameeicans, a Briton and a French-
man. All were -indicted by a U.S. -Federal
Grand Jury for illegal export of the aircraft.
Charges were dropped against two of the
Americans; the - two non-Americana were
brought to trial but acquitted; and the fifth
suspect evaded arrest and remains at large
(presumably abroad).. The case attracted
widespread public notice at the time, and
;included unfounded allegations that the
transaction had been a CIA-sponsored yen-
ture. .
Repeated high-level efforts by U.S. officials
to obtain the return of the aircraft from
Portugal met with no success. The Portu-
guese inave maintained thrlenghout that they
bought the aircraft ik good faith and under
valid contract from a Swiss firm and cannot-
_ be held responsible for the illegal acts of
those with whom the Swiss firm In turn may
have had dealings. At our insistence, how-
ever; the aircraft hare not been moved front
the metropole, and have not, therefore, been
of any use to Poettigal in Africa.
Concerning Mr. Tobey's policy ree-ommen-
dations, I might make a few observations.
First, our MAP program in Portugal has av-
eraged about $1 million annually in recent
years?an amount which mprezients less than
one-fourth of one per cent of Portuguese
military spending. Any tetOlti:eeS freed. for
Portugal by ofie MAP are thus of relatively
negligible value. In the absence of our MAP,
Portugal would doubtless continue its min- .
tary effort In Africa, an effort which the Poi:-
tugnese view as essential to their vital na-
tional interests. Without our MAP, Portu-
gal's NATO proficiency would likely suffer,
. while there would -be virtually no effect on
Its capability in Africa.
In the United Nations, we have supported
resolutions which we believed offered a. con-
structive approach to the question of rortu--
guese Africa. An example of this was our vote
for a Cath General Assembly resolution wel-
coming the Manifesto on Southern Africa; a.
copy of the statcinent of the U.S. represen-
tative is enclosed for your information. We
have been uneble to support certain resolu-
tions M. the General Assembly or the Security
Council which, in our view, have contained
objectionable provis'ons, 'unsubstantiated al-
legations, and un,7,,arranted
I believe that the foregoing points illus-
trate that. the United Stake; has not ac-
quiereed in Portuguese colonialism In Africa,
as Mr. Tobey alleges. We have, over the peat
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