CRISIS ENVELOPS URUGUAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000800260001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 13, 1972
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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Approved For Release 200111013104 :193IA-RDP80-01
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By AUrecio ilOpT-drts
Special to the Guardian
Montevideo, Uruguay
? A major political crisis is developing in
Uruguay over the' army's growing power.
President Juan Bordaberry brought in a
new cabinet Nov. 1 after a furor developed
over the arrest of Jorge Bathe, leader of a
leading but rival faction of Bordaberry's
Colorado party.
Baffle was arrested at the demand of the
army for criticizing, the military in a radio
broadcast in which he lashed out at officers
for trying to reopen a case in which he was
acquitted of financial impropriety four years
? ago.
Last week, Bordaberry announced that
the military courts would also take action
? streets by trigger-happy troops?and tho
deaths don't figure on the fatality list. Nor
do the cases of a Christian Democratic.
worker and a doctor, who were tcirtured to
death. Nor the cases of "suicides" in prisons.
Everyday an average of eight
71-upamaros" are captured, bringing the
total. to 2550 officially. The Committee for
the Families. of Political Prisoners claims
that up to 10,000 have been detained, many
of them not Tuparnaros but union leaders,
.students and "suspicious" persons.
- Nearly everyone suspected of Tupamaro
connections is tortured, although the more
efficient methods are reserved for known
revolutionaires. The methods are
refinements of those used in Vietnam and
Brazil: electricity, beatings, ice water baths,
partial suffocation, prolonged periods of
standing without food or water, fake
executions, limb stretchings, and
psychological harassment.
A number of the most important
organizers of the guerrilla movement have
been killed or captured: Jorge Alberto
Candon Grajales, Horacio Carios Novina
Greco and Armando Hugo. Ele,neo are dead.
Luis Efrain 'Martinez Plater? and Raul
Sendie have been captured. The most sought
Tupamaro now is Raul Biclegain .Greissing.
Sendie was wounded anti captured last
.Sept. 10 along with several others in a shoot-
out at an abandoned. store front on Sarandi
street in the old city of Montevideo. The
"founder" of the Tupamaros had led a rural
guerrilla column near Rio Negro, which was
against Sen. Wilson Ferreira, a leader of the irtualiy wiped out by the Joint Forces.
opposition liberal Blanco party who ran
against Bordaberry in last year's election. Move to countryside?
Ferreira was charged with "divulging a The fact that Sandie had been living in the
secret document" revealing a navy
agreement with the foreign ministry on
countryside, coming to the city only oc-
casionally to make contacts, indicated that
he apparently supported the idea of
diminishing Uruguayan sovereignly over
territorial waters,
developing a rural-based guerrilla war.
?
That the military has managed to force Some "legal" organizations are treated by
charges against two of the country's leading ? the regime as if they were clandestine. The
politicians has provoked discussions of the most important of these is the Broad Front
which contested last November's elections.
army's greater power and some talk of a
possible coup. -It consists' of Communists, Christian
The army has not, however, been all that Democrats, Socialists, independents and
successful in destroying the Tuparoaros ? splinter groups from traditional parties.
guerrillas (MLN?National Ll'oeration . For its part, the state realizes that its battle
Movement), is not just against the "subversives," but is
Although the Bordaberry regime has for self-preservation. Uruguay is in hock and
claimed a great .deal of success in its cam- . the auction is selling it to the bankers and
paign against the Tupamaros, in private foreign debtors of this former "Switzerland
o
government officials are not so optimistic. of Latin America." This debt is about $700
'rite fascist bands, secretly operating with million and somehow $270 million in in-
government support, are even less so. terests, payments and, mortgages must be
?.! In a recent editorial in "Azul y Blanco," scraped together?mostly from the same
newspaper of the ultra-right, they moaned, financiers?by May 1973.
. .
'Inflation is becoming a -way of life." It is
"We are losing the war precisely when we
think we are winning it."
running at 70 percent already this year and
? Since the Tupamaro assassination of
will likely hit 90 percent by -Christmas. The
International Monetary Fund tried to ime
Several members of the government's Death
pose a limit of 20 percent for wage increases,
Squad last April 14, and the regime's sub-
sequent declaration of "war," 43 Tuparnaros but militant strikes have forced Bordaberry
aid 39 members of the government Joint to grant 40 percent hikes. Nearly a million
Uru.guayans, more than one-third of, the
Forces have been kilied. Every now and
then, however, soApproveddForoReleas??turyhmf ykinimhiwaft tlo
,?ofotvim?mrfric-..-6,r9xte..006e
mp oyed and thousands of retired peoplc
who don't receive pensions arc literally
starving to death.
The GNP shrunk by more than 1 percen
last year, but the 500 oligarchical familie:
who rule .the country didn't do so badly
They control nearly half of all anriculturg
land and, helped out by foreign investors, 7z
percent, of industrial capital. With Bor
daberry, a cattle rancher, as.' president, e
four-month restriction of Meat sales ha:
been imposed. Meanwhile, 1000 cattle a day
are marched across the border and sold lot
three times the price in Brazil.
To sustain its positions and work out its
new role in imperialism's new international
division of work, the regime has had to
resort to fascism. In a prelude to a proposed
'education law that would break up
university autonomy, student participation
in polities and put education under the
direct control of the chief executive, faecist
bands invaded schools, beat up storierits and
professors, .robbed or destroyed school
property- and shot and killed a leftist
militant. Similar incidents are being trumped
up in unions to give excuse for intervention
in. the Communist-dominated worker's
movement. ? -
These fascist bands obey the interests of
diverse factions of the ruling class. Sonic are
associated. with ex-president Jorge Pacheco
Areco, others operate out of the Ministry of
Interior, others in the pay of the CIA, t12.5
Spanish Falange or even Braziiie.n
Paraguayan agents. When the Tuotimaros
kidnapped. CIA agent Nelson Barclesio in
February he gave them information about
the Death Squad with which he was -con-
nected. Some of the exposed Squad
members were later given refuge in the
Paraguayan embassy.
The ultra-right is also calling for a counter
insurgency type of coup to create something
like the regime in Brazil. Hence, in co article
caning for creation of a "Chief of Staff for
Psycho-political War," an editorial in "Ace!
y Blanco" asserted that "it would be absurd
to pretend that political, religious, cultural
or union counterinsurgency actions can be
carried out by the state's civil organisms."
Some military officers were said to be
"negotiating" with the Tuparnaros, with an
end to the war in exchange for a Peruvian
type social transformation. While both
official and revolutionary sources men-
tioned this, it wasn't clear whether it was just
a gimmick or if real talks had taken place.
Senator Zelmar Michelini and many
revolutionaries say that the Army is divided
between "nationalist" and pro-imperialist
factions.
In view of this complicated but critical
social picture, all of the left agrees that
fascism is the immediate enemy arid that
unity must be obtained to defeat it. MOSE
also agree that peace is also necessary. Bet
the meaning of peace and unity and how to
obtain it is subject to a vigorous polemic.
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By Karen Wald
When unsuccessful right-wing attacks on
the. Cuban revolution began to be sup-
planted by so-called "left-critiques," a
prevalent accusation against Cuba was that
.?Soviet domination" had caused the
'revolutionaries to abandon armed struggle
and their previous open support for
liberation movements.
K.S. Karol repeated the popular myth in
his hook Guerrillas in Power." "Castro was
forced to turn his back on what 'had been his
paramount objective until then: a con-
tinental reNolution," Karol told his readers.
No fresh 'proclamations .on the Latin
American revolutioo have been issued since -
che death.
-Sell out?
The cause of this "sell-out" position, to
Karol and to a number .of' other outside
critics, was the Soviet Union. "The man in
? the street . . . and also the devout party
member ... could not help but wonder ...
whether Fidel's support of the Peruvian
?'revolution.-did not fly in t-he face of the
OLAS (Organization of Latin American
Solidarity) resolutions. and whether it was
. not time for Fidel to make it clear precisely
? Mow this new alliance with Russia. was in-
fluencing his views on the Latin American
revolution."
When visited Cuba last year, everyone
_insisted that Cuba had not changed her
policy. They suggested one look at Cuban
policy statements, at Cuban actions, instead
-of the analyses offeted by foreign observers.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, member of the
central committee, stated flatly: "The
? thought of the Cuban revolution about these
questions has not changed.. Our position is
the same we have defended throughout the
entire development of the revolution."
Over a .yer later, commenting on the
recent OAS (Organization of American
States l meeting, the .editorial in Cuba's
official daily newspap. Granma, used
almost the same words. Peru had tried to
introduce a resolution ending the h!ockade
of Cuba. Although it was defeated, seven of
the member countries had voted for the
measure, a sharp rebuke to U.S. domination
of the organization. Expressing satisfaction
that the measure had not passed, the U.S
'representative added that the U.S. was
"willing to lift the blockade of Cuba as soon
as there are clear indications that Cuba is
changing its policy (of 'intervention' in-Latin
America.)"
The Granma editorial called the U.S.,
statement hypocritical and diversiOnis'tic,
trying to Create confusion "when it in- .
" sinuates that the Cnban government inie.h:
- change its policy, thuS attempting to Inc
false rumors that- the Cuban government'. derstood that Cuba's Commitment was not
may be stuc,.ng a change of policy or ? just theoretical. Rodriguez concluded: "You
contemplating talks involving compromises can be certain, comrades, that just as we
and transactions with. imperialism. greet with joy the bloodless victories of out
"Even though Cuba's staunch position has Peoples and support all possibilities of suck
been clearly stated a thousand times," the victories, so, wherever in? Latin America 01
Granma editorial continued, "we will never anywhere ? else in the world firm?firm!---
tire of reiterating it as .,many times as hands take up-the weapons left by the heroic
"necessary. The policy ?of the Cuban guerrilla, there will be the support, thc
government has not changed and will never ' solidarity, and if need be, the presence of tin:
change. It is the imperialist government of Cuban people."
the U.S. that must change its policy. Until it The Second Declaration of Havana, oi
does so ... Cuba have.nothing to discuss I support for armed liberation 'struggles, ha:
with the government of the U.S." .; been the cornerstone of Cuban foreigt
What is that unchanging policy of the policy since the victory of the revolution
Cuban revolution? Rodriguez summed it up But lessons have been learned through th,
in a speech to the International Organization 'years. and the outward expression of chi
of Journalists in January 1971: "It is true that policy does not always appear the same.
when a people has a revolutionary con- "Wchaven't by any means given up antic(
sciousness and weapons . . . it has a ' struggle," exploded one worker in at
guarantee of independence, but we als'o . organization with direct ties to the liberatio:
know that that -guarantee will not be ab- I struggles abroad. 'We've just gotten a hell c
more. serious. We've been too
the assembled journalists, lie underlined the generous with our blood and our lives
'
solute until imperialism is defeated," he told a- lot _
need for continental revolution, stating "..
we understand that for us, the most Ira- lbefore," he vent on?an idea I was to heat
.
repeated many times before I left. "The
portant factor in that defeat is
the Cuban people have paid a very high price fol
? development of the struggles of the peoples'
our too hasty support of every group that
of Latin America for their independence and..
picks up a gun. We can't afford to 13(
Commenting on events in Chile and Peru, ! t
progress." romantic revolutionaries anymore, and w
can't afford to support this type o
Rodriguez observed: "It is understandable,
revolutionary, either?all those people winthen, why we are overjoyed with the triumph _
don't lead anyone, don't represent anyone
of Salvador Allende and Unidad Popular,
achieved at this stage without the peoples
having to take up arms. .
Armed struggle necessary
"We are pleased- to see that the Govern-
ment of Peru holds firmly to its nationalist .
positions; rejecting .the - intervention of Continued
imperialism and searching for its own roads
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to the solutions of its problems... " he went
on, but quickly cautioned: "We would .be
Nvry happy to know that the independence
of Latin America could be achieved by roads
such as those taken by Chile and Peru,
without a need for armed confrontations,
but a glance at the panorama of our America
does not Make that satisfaction possible. The
military gorilla tyrannies continue to subsist
and are maintained. We know full well that
the roads to dernoeratY are closed and that,
as was stated in the Second Declaration of
Havana, 'Wherever the roads to the exercise
of democracy are.. closed to the people,
there is n'o other.- way but thrit of armed
strugg.ie."
:Then,' to make certain that ? people -tin-
but declare themselves a militant vanguari
organization and demand our help. An,
' we've always given it, all too freely.
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By Lewis 11..Dinguid
SANTIAGO?"There is a
lot of liberty in Chile,' said
Costa Gavras, the director
of politically provocative
movies. There was enough
for him to film "State of
Siege" here, but just barely.
Costa Gavras previously
had infuriated the world's
dictators, and particularly
those .of .his native Greece,
with "Z." Likewise, he in-
sulted Stalinists and. agi-
tated other Communists
with the showing of "The
Confession."
Now 'State of Siege" has
convulsed all sectors of
Chile's broad political spec-
trum.
quite
does
Costa Gavras
And the film is not
finished as yet. And it
not have to do with
Chile, anyway.
Gavras, at 39 the leader of
the political film movement,
offered an interview in
ITT's Sheraton Carrera
Hotel, a sanctuary from the
slings of the ?Chilean right
and the arrows of the left.
? "State of Siege," he ex-?
plained, is a story of neoco-
lonialism, of advisers from
rich countries who seek to
impose their own systems
and values on the cou:lities
they "aid." The events of ?
the film derive roughly
from the execution by Uru-
guay's .Tupamaros of U.S:
police adviser Dan Mitrione
. in 1970. Yves Montand, lead-
ing man in Gavras' previous
,movies, plays the approxi-
of Mitrione," Gavras in-
sisted. "We do not really
know that case, although we
know some of it. Montand is
a high functionary who is
kidnaped. But we .use no
names."
The locale is not defined,
either, beyond its being in
Latin. America. But the
movie had to be made some-
where. Chile, as the freest
.country with at least a rudi-
mentary firm industry nec-
essary to support the pro-
duction, was the only choice.
But as the most highly poli-
ticized nation, it. hardly
turned out to be ideal.
?
Critics ? on the right main-
tained "State of Siege" was
financed by the Tupamaros
(most of the money iS Amer-
ican). Uruguay's ambassador
protested diplomatically.
The left accused Gavras of
unrevolutionary commercial-
ism. ?
Part of the problem was
that Gavras' politics do not
fit under any of the ideolog-
ical labels that define poli-
tics here.
Gavras said he has never
associated with any move-
ment, that his character'
would not permit it.
."My friends accuse me of
being an aggressive inde-
pendent. I don't know if a
society can organize itself
around people such as me,
but. . . ." He punctuated the
phrase with a take-it-or-
leave-it shrug that Santia-
go's half-dozen brands of so-
cialists find so disconcert-
ing. .
"The trouble with political
parties is that they deal in
simplifications. None is as
perfect as its advocates say."
What, then, is the basis of
his own philosophy?
"The dignity of man, fun-
damentally. Justice. I cannot
accept that some men go
hungry. I cannot accept that
some live very well while
others live very poorly
am not a Christian but 1 ac-
cept the ideal, 'to love thy
neighbor as thyself.' All the
enormous quantity of words
today makes this ideal seem
old-fashioned, but it is my
philosophy."
laxed and intense. He grew
UI) in postwar Greece. where
the air was thick with the
themes that would later
dominate ills films: Stalin-
ism, anticommunism, U.S.
aid, military rule; civil
strife.
In 1953, Gavras left
Greece for the Sorbonne in
Paris. "But literature and
philosophy did not get to
the issues," he said. So after
three years he turned to
studies for television and
the movies, and be then
worked in those fields.
After 14 years in France,
Gavras returned briefly to
Greece in 1967?as it hap-
pened, just before the mili-
tary coup. He had picked tin
the "Z" book describing the
death of Greek rebel leader
Lambrakis at the hands of
the military, and the coup
that soon followed gave it
an instant relevance.
Argentina, whose military
regime usually imposes a ?
rigid movie censorship, was
allowed to see "Z." Gavras
explained that the film had
just received a big reception
at the Mar del Plata film
festival and the distributor
seized that moment to 'ask
approval in Buenos Aires. It
worked. Several Argentines
who saw the picture said
they felt it was describing
their own dictatorship, the
only incongruity being the
fact that they were there
seeing it. -
According to Gavras, Don-
ald Rug,gof of ? Cinema Five
in New York paid about
$600,000 on the gamble that
the show would succeed
there. It did, bringing in $10
million.
With that, American fin-
anciers were interested in
political movies, It was 1968,
and the throttling of the
Prague spring was on the
public mind. Gavras and
INIuntand turned to "The
eontInued
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"But this is not we case Constantine Gavras, is a
._? .
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/031/04WCIAARD
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By Marry Rubin
Second of two artic.'es
A number of Latin American
revolutionary groups, particularly in the
urban and industrial southern part of the
continent, have been able to synthesize
armed strm:nia h
w.te mass organizimn.
The Chilean Nvi: (which engened in
armed struagle eulinr, the Eduardo Frei
administration, 1%9-1970), the Uruguayan
-Tupamaros and several Argentinian
groups?particularly the ERP-PRT (People's
Revolutionary Army and its political
leaderhip, the Revolutionary Workers
party)?have managed to put down deep
roots in the working class.
. Thus while they engage in kidnappings,
bank robberies and attacks on repressive
police and military forces, they are not
terrorist or Debrayist groans, with a political
line guaranteeing their isolation from the
masses, as they have been portrayed by the
mass media in this country and by the
revisionist Communist parties and Trotskyist
grouns.
- ?
They have consistently used both armed
and unarmed actions not to attempt to
launch an immediate assault on the state at
this stage or to defeat the government in
purely military terms, but to develop the
political consciousness and level of
-.revolutionary organization of the masses,
especially of the working class.
Food trucks have been hijacked and the
contents distributed to poor families, radio
stations have been seized for revolutionary
broadcasts and reactionary figures have
.been imprisoned in "people's jails" to show
both the political illegitimacy and military
vulnerability of the rulers.
Both Uruguay's Tupamaros and
,Argentina's PRT have origins in the workers'
movement?among rice and sugar
workers?and both have many members
who are workers, shop stewards, and trade
union officials. ?
The Tupamaros, founded in 1963, is the
better known of these two groups in the U.S.
It has taken a number of spectacular actions,.
such as the kidnapping of U.S. CIA agent
Dan . Mitrione and of British ambassador
Geoffrey Jackson, the escape of 106
Tupamaros from the national penitentiary
last September and the exposure of
corruption ? within the country through . the
seizure of government .and corporate
documents. ?
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and ? left sections of the bourgeois parties
formed a "Broad Front," patterned after?
but to the right of?the Chilean UP (Popular
Unity) of Salvador Allende. The Tupamaros,
although not supporting the Broad Front,
?declared a truce during the campaign so that
the government could not use their activities
as an excuse for suppressing the opposition.
Nevertheless, the reactionary Juan Bor-
daberry was elected after a campaign full of
fraud and harassment of the left. ?
In an attempt to smash the Tupamaroi
and the workers, who have waged several
general strikes, Bordaberry declared a "state
of internal war" April 15 giving the
government military powers and eliminating
democratic rights. A fierce struggle between
the. military and the Tupamaros has. raged
since then. .
Lrataxatkan struggle In ArgentiPa
The decisive political event in modern
Argentinian history was the taking of power
by Juan Peron in the elections of February
-1946, following a military coup in 1944.
Peron, an army officer who became Minister
of Labor and Social Security in the military
administration, was a brilliant political
tactician. He built a massive power base
among the workers and the poor and created
a nationalist-populist movement, the
Justicialists or as they are usually called
Peronists.
The first years of Peron's administration
brought Argentina a considerable, though
temporary, degree of national independence
from British imperialism, which had been
severely weakened by World War 2. Real
gains were made by both workers and
Women, led by. Eva 'Peron. But in its later
years the Peron regime ran into both
economic problems and imperialist sub-
version and was overthrown by a military
coup in 1955. Peron went to Spain from
which he today directs much of the Peronist
movement, which still leads the powerful
union federation, the CGT.
After a period of civilian rule, the military
again seized power in Argentina in June
1966. The economic situation continued to
stagnate and took a qualitative turn for the
worse in 1955 when foreign domination, this
time U.S. imperialism, again gained the
upper hand. During 1967-68, mass marches
of hungry, unemployed sugar workers at-
During the carnmiNi.iico*.HNFt610?10
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1971 elections in 1.11117,ny, tnr'Cornmunilr
party, Socialist party, Christian Democrats bureaucrats were replaced by revolutionary
workers.
STATI NTL
The Revolutionary Workers party (PRT)
was founded in 1964 by several diverse
political groupings. Atthe time of the sugar
workers marches, -.the PRT decided to
embark on armed struggle; in July 1970 it
founded the People's Revolutionary Army
(ERP). "With the foundation of the ERP,"
PRT leaders told Prensa Latina last January,
"a military plan was drawn up whose main
purpose was to make the organization, its
program and objectives known to the
masses. It was principally a period of armed
propaganda."
The PRT, although associated with the
Fourth (Trotskyist) International, has at-
tempted to assimilate the thinking of the
most advanced Marxist-Leninists around the
world: "The PRT, which leads the ERP,
defines itself ideologically as Marxist-
Leninist and it assimiliates the teachings of.
revolutionaries from other countries among
them those of Major Che Guevara, Trotsky,
Kim II Sung, Mao Tsetung, Ho Chi Minh,
Gen. Giap, etc."
They also maintain relations with Peronist
groups engaged in armed struggle in
Argentina including the Peronist FAR,
Moateneros (right-wing Peronists) and the
FAP, largest of the three.. At the si;rne time,
the PRT aces itself as a socialist "alternative
to Peronism." In an interview in the January-
February New Left Review; PRT leaders
called Peronism, "an alliance of three
classes: . the bourgeoisie, the petty-
bourgeoisie and the working class.
Ideologically, its policies are national-
capitalist. The Peronist guerrillas ... are the
popular sector of the movement. .. . As the
class struggle intensifies, Peronism will
divide.... . The revolution in Argentina will
be made with Peronist workers, but the
leadership will not be Peronist but socialist."
."Argentina," they said, "is capitalist and
semi-colonial. The bourgeoisie is a junior
partner of U.S. imperialism?there is no
'national' bourgeoisie to promote in-
dependent capitalist development, the fight
is for socialism: The bourgeoisie cannot lead
the revolution, only the working class can
make the revolution."
!loots in workers' allover:vent
Under the leadership of the ERP-PRT and
other left forces the highly organized and
class-conscious Argenti.aian workers have
staaed massive strikes and demonstrations.
ainst represst
ispmtsbovye2oodoiq Cordoba
too.:. place agon arie.dertpf clines
wages. Worker's took over their nein'M
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HOUSTON, TEXAS
POST
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sA-prieer2
? , ,
inflation could trigger
??
i'revolution, soil expert says
'
?? Claude Fly, An agronomist
t ?
?
who was held captive seven
:months by Tupamaro rebels
?in Uruguay, warned downtown
:Kiwanians Wednesday that in-
:ilation could cause revolution
',in this country as surely as
:poverty can cause it in Latin
:America.
He said the ruling oligarchy
;in many Latin American
'bountries made off with as
?Tnuch as a billion and a half
dollars a year, while 90 per
cent of the population lives on
from $70 to 8800 a year.
In the U.S., Fly said, pri-
vate, public and corporate
-debts total some $3 -trillion
while the country's net worth
Is only $2 trillion.
Latin American resentment
of the U.S., he said, stems
from U.S. investment there
where companies reap profits
ranging from 100 to 270 per
cent. triggered his release after all
Fly has been "lent" by the ". other efforts failed, and Fly
U.S. to 21 different countries gives credit to prayer by him-
self and others. He was flown
home March 28.
Touching on American
firms in trouble in Chile, he
said that any foreign corn-
pany must be ready to leave
Latin America within 15 to 20
years.
He said there was still ,
room for firms that give as
of well as take.
mental and physical exercise '
impressed his rebel guards,
who "thought they had a
agent but found they had a
common old Aggie."
A heart attack Feb. 22, 1971
to tell them how to use their
soil.
He was on such a mission
when kidnaped from his office
outside Montevideo Aug. 7,
1970. Fly was kept in a steel
wire cage with 15 inches of
stand-up space where he was
"suspendedintime and
space" for 208 days.
He said his regimen
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TOPEKA, KAN.
CAPITAL
M ? 66,164
CAPITAL?JOURNAL
S ? 70 851
B 2 5 In_
f
Fly Recalls
Kidno Story
In Manhattan
The Capttal-Journal State Staff
MANHATTAN?Dr. Claude
Fly felt a lot better when the
Uruguayan rebels who kidnaped
and held him 208 days last
yeear relazide he was nothing
like a CIA agent, "just a plain
old Ageltgra`r'
When rebels ceased harassing
him, he had a lot of time to
think in the close confines of his
basement cage. Thursday, Fly,
a soil conservationist, shared
some of his thoughts with Kan-
sas State University students at
a convocation.
Wednesday night was his time
for reunion as he told old Ma-
nhattan friends from 20 years
ago how it was to survive the
kidnaping and a heart attack
while captive.
Similarities Seen ?
After reiterating statements
from Wednesday on how
religious faith preserved his
sanity and on the role U.S. bu-
siness had played in degrading.
life for the common Latin
American, Fly told students of
similarities here and in South
America. ?
Fly claimed the saddest result
In Uruguay has ' been the
destruction of one of the more
viable middle classes in South
America by an expensive,
idealistic welfare program.
-
* Receives Plaque
Fly predicted more dangers
for the United States in the cur-
rent turn of society against
changes wrought by science and
technology in areas like
agricultural chemicals and
space exploration.
Fly warned that scientists
must assume some social
responsibility to present their
side of the story instead of being
consumed in projects.
Thursday night in Manhattan,
Fly was presented a plaque for
his contribution to good land
practices in Kansas by the
Soil Conservation Society of
America.ii
?
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STATI NTL
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paif, FLA ?
liERALD?,- r6 1974
ut-u
itt ? 380,828
? 479,025
?
/ **AO
Jack Kofeed Says
Ingersoll Successor
To J. Edgar Hoover?
RUMOR has it that J.
Edgar Hoover will end his
long and distinguished ca-
reer as head of the FBI soon
and be succeeded by John In-
gersoll, head of the Bureau of
Narcotics . . .
THE gA has a bad press
anywWe, and it's getting
worse in South America. Its
--man Dan Mitrione, who was
murdered in Uruguay, was
generally regarded there as a
torture specialist for the in-
telligence agency. True or
not, that's the reputation of
the CIA . . .
4
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. .?STATINTL
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SEP '1971
11
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Fl I le ri Left
.
?
OCTOBER 1967, WASHINGTON counter-insurgency ex-
1 perts were understandably jubilant. With the death
i of Che Guevara and the failure of the Bolivian revo-
--eel lutionary loco, they thought serious left-wing. agita-
tion in Latin America would end?at least for the forsce-
able future. In fact it did the very. opposite. In Uruguay,
Argentina, Chile, Bolivia apc1-.Peru, while Che's death did
indeed lead to the abandonment of his continental theory
of revolution, it also stimulated new revolutionary thought
and groups, and brought the struggle in less than four years
to dramatic and unexpected results. In all five of these
countries today, the left is either on the road to power
or in the process of consolidating actual victories. It is no
longer trying self-consciously to mimic the Cuban ex-
perience, do longer courageously (but inopportunely)
launching rural guerrilla adventures, no longer volunter-
? istically declaiming that the objective conditions for revo-
lution need only the development of subjective leadership.
Rather the left is now soundly grounding its strategy and
tactics in local reality; and that reality, although it varies
in all five countries, seems to exclude precisely the Che
(Regis Debray) model of guerrilla /ow.
47r7r-WCAUSE OF THE TUPAMAROS' spectacular. exploits,
.1.2) it is Uruguay which has received most publicity.
Indeed the Tupas have repeatedly robbed suppos-
edly impregnable banks and gambling casinos,
assaulted -police headquarters, kidnapped high government
officials, captured official radio stations long enough to
broadcast 12-minute manifestoes, and, in general,. Con-
vinced the country's 2.9 million people that they are in-
vincible?despite massive US counter-insurgency aid to
the government. But most importantly, the Tupas have
helped radicalize that population, so much so that today
.all liberal and left-wing forces are united in one formidable
front, and that has been Tupamaros' strategy from the be-
ginning. .?
'Organized by socialist party cadrernen as early as 1961,
the Tupamaros, which are armed forces of the clandes-
tine Movement of National Liberation (MLN), never
intended to seize power simply through violence. Their
goal was, and is, to help build a mass political conscious-
ness. Until 1963 their activity was limited to helping the
non-unionized and exploite0 sugar workers of interior 'Uru-
guay to win bread-and-butter demands. Only when the
government veered sharply to the right, broke . relations
with Cuba, installed press censorship and launched wide-
spread repression did the Tupas begin their "retaliatiOn."
Althouah some of the money they stole went to hemp finaom
By making public the official documents they seized in
banks or ministries, the Tupas exposed government cor-
ruption and showed up the collusion existing between the
rich, the USAID programs, and the elected officials. In
exchange for the release of kidnapped officials, the Tupas
forced the government to distribute food to the needy and,
in one dramatic case, to build a free workers clinic, win-
ning the population's admiration and a great deal of co-
operation as well.
? `Tem 1967 on," one Tztpa told me in Montevideo last
June, "we were strong enough to seize power. Bit what
good would that have done? The gorillas [right-wing gen-
erals] in Argentina and ,Brazil would have descended on
tiny Uruguay .and crushed us. Besides, :the people) might
have cheered us, but would not have fought for us. Our
people have to learn that it is for themselves that they arc
fighting. They have to want power. That takes years of
politicization. We have to. wait." Waiting, of course, has
been costly not only to the government but to the Types
themselves. The police also are learning from the slruggle,
and, as it has been intensified, the Tupas have begun to
suffer serious losses. Scores have been killed, and there are
currently over 100'in jail, including Raid Sendie, once a
socialist party official and one of the original leaders of
the ,MLN. Also, as US counter-insurgency experts have
taken over command of the hunt, torture has become a
standard part of the government's retaliation. That was why
-th&-.7'upas executed Dan Mitrione, the CIA's super-sleuth,
whose office was in Montevideo's police headquarters.
With general elections scheduled for this November, it
is campaign time in Uruguay now. In the past, only two
parties have jockeyed for power: the Mancos (Whites), by
and large representing the landed population and the Coto-
rados (Reds), strong especially in Montevideo, where. half
of Uruguay's people live. But now a third party will be on
the 'ballot, a united front which is so vast that it has.
official support from Moscow to Rome, joining together
under a single banner the Communist and Christian Demo-
cratic parties, as well as Trotskyists, anarchists, pim -o-Tztpa-
maro militants, left liberals and dissidents from the two
major parties. The Frente Amplio offers none of the usual
"advantages" (pork barrel posts, concessions, contracts,
etc.) in exchange for votes; presidential candidate, General
Liber Seregni, who once ruled Montevideo's arm), but re-
signed when ordered to use his troops for repression,
promises only hard times ahead. Yet in a few short months,
and starting from scratch with neither the press nor the
airwaves in its favor, the Frente has become the front-
runner, so much io that there is a great deal 'of talk that
their own ctiviqipbaadistR
ld to teei4achc taeeeto"lhiti why we not
pdeieaeObi63/0:aIAIDWO-
l6iioio06W000l-8?ont?
. READERS' DIGEST
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Only disciplined faith and
an unfeigned love for his
fellow man enabled the
kidnaped American to
survive his captivity in the
hands of these determined
Uruguayan guerrillas
laude
Seven-
Month
?
? - 5 I
Lill are
?
Abruptly at 9:40, five men in street
clothes burst into the tiny office,
drew guns and hustled Fly out 6.
, back door. The American struggled;
, but De Leon shouted: "Don't fight!
They'll shoot to kill."
Outside, the guerrillas quickly
blindfolded Fly, then bound him
hand and foot. He was shoved into
a large burlap sack and dumped into
the back of a battered pickup truck.
The kidnapers climbed into the
fr?cab of the truck and sped away.
? Thus began for Claude Fly an in-
credible 208-day ordeal, and for
Uruguayans another chapter in the
Tupamaros' seven-year struggle to
overthrow the elected government of
their country. Just a week before the
,
Tupamaros (the name comes from
an r8th-century Inca chieftain re-
nowned as a leader of oppressecipeo-
ple against Spanish rule) had
demanded that some 150 political
prisoners be freed in exchange for
Mitrione and Gomide. Immediately
after Fly was hauled away, they
telephoned a local radio station and
warned: unless their demands were
met the scientist faced the same fate
?death--as did the other two.
"Malice Toward None." After a
long, jolting ride over winding,.
cobbled streets, the bruised and ex-
hausted Fly was half-carried, half-
dragged, into an old, apparently
abandoned building. There his cap-
tors stripped off the sack, removed
blindfold and bindings, and shoved
him through a hole into a dungeon-
like hideout beneath the floor. "The
space was only ab.out three and a
half feet deep," Fly recalls, "and I
had to bend over to .crawl to a
blanket-covered cot in one cdrncr.
Then my kidnapers clamped a lid
over the hole and left me to medi-
tate on my fate in darkness and.
terror."
Fly had only recently recovered
from viral pneumonia, and was soon
shivering and coughing badly in the
damp, chill hideout. The next morn-
ingt his guards pulled him from the
hole and gave him a cot in the
empty room above, plus his first
meal?chunks of beef, potatoes and
tea,. heated over .a blowtorch.
Sometithe during his third night
_
BY
- PAUL FRIGGENS
? N THE morning of August 7,
1970, kindly, soft-spoken
Claude L. Fly kissed his
wife, Miriam, good-by and set out as
usual for his laboratory office in the
Ministry of Agriculture on the out-
skirts of Montevideo, Uruguay. Th.e
distinguished, 65-year-old U.S. soils
expert had come to Uruguay at that
government's urgent request. His
mission: to help?as he had helped
xi other countries?that economi-
cally troubled nation of three million
to improve its agriculture.
As hc rode to work, Fly was mind-.-
11.11 of the U.S.. embassy's warning
that three U.S. citizens had been as-
saulted in the preceding week by a
band of urban guerrillas known as
the Tupamaros. Two of the.Ameri-
cans escaped, but one, Daniel A.
Mitrione, an Indiana police expert
who, like Fly, was advising the gov-
ernment, had been kidnaped. Also
abducted was Brazilian consul Aloy-
sio Dias Gomidc. But Fly was not
unduly alarmed. "After all," he had
said in casual conversation with a
Uruguayan colleague, 'what would
the Tupamaros possibly want with
an .old soils man like me?"
At his laboratory, Fly plunged into
a conference with his Uruguayan
counterpart Prof. Luisi De Leo];
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0 I P. I I IN I L
in captivity, again un an
folded, Fly was removed to a second
hideout, where he found himself
padlocked inside a 4-by-61/2-foot cage
built of two-by-fours covered with
strong steel-wire mesh. The sole
furnishings were a lumpy cot and, a
bucket for sanitary facilities. There
was barely room to walk, but . he
could stand. Fly stretched and flexed
hisJaut muscles with relief.
Meanwhile, Uruguayan President
i Jorge Pacheco Areco had steadfristly
refused to .negotiate with what he
called common criminals. Fly's
family and friends found momen-
tary relief in a handwitten note the
kidnapers had delivered from the
scientist to his fearful wife: "Please
don't worry. I am well. Pray for me
and wait. They give me enough to
eat." But the good news proved
short-livedr for at about the same
time it was announced that the Tu-
pamaros had executed Mitrione. He
was found blindfolded and shot in
the head'and back, i n'a bloodstained
car parked in one-Of the city's mid-
dle-class residential sections.
Unaware of the murder, Fly
paced his wire cage and began to
size up his captors. Until ..now, his
knowledge of the Tuptimaros had
been scant, but he soon . discovered
that the guerrillas (perhaps 3000 all
told) operated through cells or ae-
tion groups. "Only one or two mem-
bers in each cell knew anyone in
another cell, so that if captured they
could not reveal the hideouts of
others," he says. "They never ad-
dressed each other by name, only by
_ .
'Comrade' or sonic similar term."
Apparently they ran the gamut of
Uruguayan life, from? laborers to
'university faculty members to col-
lege-age young men and women to
professional men. His guards were
mostly middle-class yoUng men and
?
women of college age, with a few
older, gangster-type leaders mixed
in.
Fly was immediately accused of
being a CIA agent, and grilled in-
tensely. The terrorists produced as
evidence the technical soils manual
that Fly had, just authored. They
pored over its contents, seeking
proof of espionage, but in the end it
, proved harmless, - as did Fly's per-
?att-iti titled
STATINT
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