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December 13, 1972
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NATIONAL G1.14F,D I ki+r -01 ATINTL Approved For Release 200111013104 :193IA-RDP80-01 1N j LI 1:17.';-) ?,.4.: By AUrecio ilOpT-drts Special to the Guardian Montevideo, Uruguay ? A major political crisis is developing in Uruguay over the' army's growing power. President Juan Bordaberry brought in a new cabinet Nov. 1 after a furor developed over the arrest of Jorge Bathe, leader of a leading but rival faction of Bordaberry's Colorado party. Baffle was arrested at the demand of the army for criticizing, the military in a radio broadcast in which he lashed out at officers for trying to reopen a case in which he was acquitted of financial impropriety four years ? ago. Last week, Bordaberry announced that the military courts would also take action ? streets by trigger-happy troops?and tho deaths don't figure on the fatality list. Nor do the cases of a Christian Democratic. worker and a doctor, who were tcirtured to death. Nor the cases of "suicides" in prisons. Everyday an average of eight 71-upamaros" are captured, bringing the total. to 2550 officially. The Committee for the Families. of Political Prisoners claims that up to 10,000 have been detained, many of them not Tuparnaros but union leaders, .students and "suspicious" persons. - Nearly everyone suspected of Tupamaro connections is tortured, although the more efficient methods are reserved for known revolutionaires. The methods are refinements of those used in Vietnam and Brazil: electricity, beatings, ice water baths, partial suffocation, prolonged periods of standing without food or water, fake executions, limb stretchings, and psychological harassment. A number of the most important organizers of the guerrilla movement have been killed or captured: Jorge Alberto Candon Grajales, Horacio Carios Novina Greco and Armando Hugo. Ele,neo are dead. Luis Efrain 'Martinez Plater? and Raul Sendie have been captured. The most sought Tupamaro now is Raul Biclegain .Greissing. Sendie was wounded anti captured last .Sept. 10 along with several others in a shoot- out at an abandoned. store front on Sarandi street in the old city of Montevideo. The "founder" of the Tupamaros had led a rural guerrilla column near Rio Negro, which was against Sen. Wilson Ferreira, a leader of the irtualiy wiped out by the Joint Forces. opposition liberal Blanco party who ran against Bordaberry in last year's election. Move to countryside? Ferreira was charged with "divulging a The fact that Sandie had been living in the secret document" revealing a navy agreement with the foreign ministry on countryside, coming to the city only oc- casionally to make contacts, indicated that he apparently supported the idea of diminishing Uruguayan sovereignly over territorial waters, developing a rural-based guerrilla war. ? That the military has managed to force Some "legal" organizations are treated by charges against two of the country's leading ? the regime as if they were clandestine. The politicians has provoked discussions of the most important of these is the Broad Front which contested last November's elections. army's greater power and some talk of a possible coup. -It consists' of Communists, Christian The army has not, however, been all that Democrats, Socialists, independents and successful in destroying the Tuparoaros ? splinter groups from traditional parties. guerrillas (MLN?National Ll'oeration . For its part, the state realizes that its battle Movement), is not just against the "subversives," but is Although the Bordaberry regime has for self-preservation. Uruguay is in hock and claimed a great .deal of success in its cam- . the auction is selling it to the bankers and paign against the Tupamaros, in private foreign debtors of this former "Switzerland o government officials are not so optimistic. of Latin America." This debt is about $700 'rite fascist bands, secretly operating with million and somehow $270 million in in- government support, are even less so. terests, payments and, mortgages must be ?.! In a recent editorial in "Azul y Blanco," scraped together?mostly from the same newspaper of the ultra-right, they moaned, financiers?by May 1973. . . 'Inflation is becoming a -way of life." It is "We are losing the war precisely when we think we are winning it." running at 70 percent already this year and ? Since the Tupamaro assassination of will likely hit 90 percent by -Christmas. The International Monetary Fund tried to ime Several members of the government's Death pose a limit of 20 percent for wage increases, Squad last April 14, and the regime's sub- sequent declaration of "war," 43 Tuparnaros but militant strikes have forced Bordaberry aid 39 members of the government Joint to grant 40 percent hikes. Nearly a million Uru.guayans, more than one-third of, the Forces have been kilied. Every now and then, however, soApproveddForoReleas??turyhmf ykinimhiwaft tlo ,?ofotvim?mrfric-..-6,r9xte..006e mp oyed and thousands of retired peoplc who don't receive pensions arc literally starving to death. The GNP shrunk by more than 1 percen last year, but the 500 oligarchical familie: who rule .the country didn't do so badly They control nearly half of all anriculturg land and, helped out by foreign investors, 7z percent, of industrial capital. With Bor daberry, a cattle rancher, as.' president, e four-month restriction of Meat sales ha: been imposed. Meanwhile, 1000 cattle a day are marched across the border and sold lot three times the price in Brazil. To sustain its positions and work out its new role in imperialism's new international division of work, the regime has had to resort to fascism. In a prelude to a proposed 'education law that would break up university autonomy, student participation in polities and put education under the direct control of the chief executive, faecist bands invaded schools, beat up storierits and professors, .robbed or destroyed school property- and shot and killed a leftist militant. Similar incidents are being trumped up in unions to give excuse for intervention in. the Communist-dominated worker's movement. ? - These fascist bands obey the interests of diverse factions of the ruling class. Sonic are associated. with ex-president Jorge Pacheco Areco, others operate out of the Ministry of Interior, others in the pay of the CIA, t12.5 Spanish Falange or even Braziiie.n Paraguayan agents. When the Tuotimaros kidnapped. CIA agent Nelson Barclesio in February he gave them information about the Death Squad with which he was -con- nected. Some of the exposed Squad members were later given refuge in the Paraguayan embassy. The ultra-right is also calling for a counter insurgency type of coup to create something like the regime in Brazil. Hence, in co article caning for creation of a "Chief of Staff for Psycho-political War," an editorial in "Ace! y Blanco" asserted that "it would be absurd to pretend that political, religious, cultural or union counterinsurgency actions can be carried out by the state's civil organisms." Some military officers were said to be "negotiating" with the Tuparnaros, with an end to the war in exchange for a Peruvian type social transformation. While both official and revolutionary sources men- tioned this, it wasn't clear whether it was just a gimmick or if real talks had taken place. Senator Zelmar Michelini and many revolutionaries say that the Army is divided between "nationalist" and pro-imperialist factions. In view of this complicated but critical social picture, all of the left agrees that fascism is the immediate enemy arid that unity must be obtained to defeat it. MOSE also agree that peace is also necessary. Bet the meaning of peace and unity and how to obtain it is subject to a vigorous polemic. 01 R000800260001 -8 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000800260001-8 BEST COPY Available THROUGHOUT FOLDER 6/24/98 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000800260001-8 Approved For Releas*2404108WdiA-RDP80-0160 171-.)ii n n r itiHy ? ! I 12.4 ?.,4ALJ ? " ji (i k.,1???U;.1r9 1.G PUG 1972 n, n ? Trl r:7)vI,Pit7.\.!!71 r-f; 2 p (7,?. r.,.1 ,,.,-4.1 n 1 ' '''? ,1"111'1H1',11,pi ii \ '1. \J aid j By Karen Wald When unsuccessful right-wing attacks on the. Cuban revolution began to be sup- planted by so-called "left-critiques," a prevalent accusation against Cuba was that .?Soviet domination" had caused the 'revolutionaries to abandon armed struggle and their previous open support for liberation movements. K.S. Karol repeated the popular myth in his hook Guerrillas in Power." "Castro was forced to turn his back on what 'had been his paramount objective until then: a con- tinental reNolution," Karol told his readers. No fresh 'proclamations .on the Latin American revolutioo have been issued since - che death. -Sell out? The cause of this "sell-out" position, to Karol and to a number .of' other outside critics, was the Soviet Union. "The man in ? the street . . . and also the devout party member ... could not help but wonder ... whether Fidel's support of the Peruvian ?'revolution.-did not fly in t-he face of the OLAS (Organization of Latin American Solidarity) resolutions. and whether it was . not time for Fidel to make it clear precisely ? Mow this new alliance with Russia. was in- fluencing his views on the Latin American revolution." When visited Cuba last year, everyone _insisted that Cuba had not changed her policy. They suggested one look at Cuban policy statements, at Cuban actions, instead -of the analyses offeted by foreign observers. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, member of the central committee, stated flatly: "The ? thought of the Cuban revolution about these questions has not changed.. Our position is the same we have defended throughout the entire development of the revolution." Over a .yer later, commenting on the recent OAS (Organization of American States l meeting, the .editorial in Cuba's official daily newspap. Granma, used almost the same words. Peru had tried to introduce a resolution ending the h!ockade of Cuba. Although it was defeated, seven of the member countries had voted for the measure, a sharp rebuke to U.S. domination of the organization. Expressing satisfaction that the measure had not passed, the U.S 'representative added that the U.S. was "willing to lift the blockade of Cuba as soon as there are clear indications that Cuba is changing its policy (of 'intervention' in-Latin America.)" The Granma editorial called the U.S., statement hypocritical and diversiOnis'tic, trying to Create confusion "when it in- . " sinuates that the Cnban government inie.h: - change its policy, thuS attempting to Inc false rumors that- the Cuban government'. derstood that Cuba's Commitment was not may be stuc,.ng a change of policy or ? just theoretical. Rodriguez concluded: "You contemplating talks involving compromises can be certain, comrades, that just as we and transactions with. imperialism. greet with joy the bloodless victories of out "Even though Cuba's staunch position has Peoples and support all possibilities of suck been clearly stated a thousand times," the victories, so, wherever in? Latin America 01 Granma editorial continued, "we will never anywhere ? else in the world firm?firm!--- tire of reiterating it as .,many times as hands take up-the weapons left by the heroic "necessary. The policy ?of the Cuban guerrilla, there will be the support, thc government has not changed and will never ' solidarity, and if need be, the presence of tin: change. It is the imperialist government of Cuban people." the U.S. that must change its policy. Until it The Second Declaration of Havana, oi does so ... Cuba have.nothing to discuss I support for armed liberation 'struggles, ha: with the government of the U.S." .; been the cornerstone of Cuban foreigt What is that unchanging policy of the policy since the victory of the revolution Cuban revolution? Rodriguez summed it up But lessons have been learned through th, in a speech to the International Organization 'years. and the outward expression of chi of Journalists in January 1971: "It is true that policy does not always appear the same. when a people has a revolutionary con- "Wchaven't by any means given up antic( sciousness and weapons . . . it has a ' struggle," exploded one worker in at guarantee of independence, but we als'o . organization with direct ties to the liberatio: know that that -guarantee will not be ab- I struggles abroad. 'We've just gotten a hell c more. serious. We've been too the assembled journalists, lie underlined the generous with our blood and our lives ' solute until imperialism is defeated," he told a- lot _ need for continental revolution, stating ".. we understand that for us, the most Ira- lbefore," he vent on?an idea I was to heat . repeated many times before I left. "The portant factor in that defeat is the Cuban people have paid a very high price fol ? development of the struggles of the peoples' our too hasty support of every group that of Latin America for their independence and.. picks up a gun. We can't afford to 13( Commenting on events in Chile and Peru, ! t progress." romantic revolutionaries anymore, and w can't afford to support this type o Rodriguez observed: "It is understandable, revolutionary, either?all those people winthen, why we are overjoyed with the triumph _ don't lead anyone, don't represent anyone of Salvador Allende and Unidad Popular, achieved at this stage without the peoples having to take up arms. . Armed struggle necessary "We are pleased- to see that the Govern- ment of Peru holds firmly to its nationalist . positions; rejecting .the - intervention of Continued imperialism and searching for its own roads STATINTL to the solutions of its problems... " he went on, but quickly cautioned: "We would .be Nvry happy to know that the independence of Latin America could be achieved by roads such as those taken by Chile and Peru, without a need for armed confrontations, but a glance at the panorama of our America does not Make that satisfaction possible. The military gorilla tyrannies continue to subsist and are maintained. We know full well that the roads to dernoeratY are closed and that, as was stated in the Second Declaration of Havana, 'Wherever the roads to the exercise of democracy are.. closed to the people, there is n'o other.- way but thrit of armed" :Then,' to make certain that ? people -tin- but declare themselves a militant vanguari organization and demand our help. An, ' we've always given it, all too freely. Approved' For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R060800260001-8 Approvdfor R ins e? IUDA. . 1 3 AUG 1972 easeaavr /03/04 : C OP80701 ig. L.dabe1. ls ond By Lewis 11..Dinguid SANTIAGO?"There is a lot of liberty in Chile,' said Costa Gavras, the director of politically provocative movies. There was enough for him to film "State of Siege" here, but just barely. Costa Gavras previously had infuriated the world's dictators, and particularly those .of .his native Greece, with "Z." Likewise, he in- sulted Stalinists and. agi- tated other Communists with the showing of "The Confession." Now 'State of Siege" has convulsed all sectors of Chile's broad political spec- trum. quite does Costa Gavras And the film is not finished as yet. And it not have to do with Chile, anyway. Gavras, at 39 the leader of the political film movement, offered an interview in ITT's Sheraton Carrera Hotel, a sanctuary from the slings of the ?Chilean right and the arrows of the left. ? "State of Siege," he ex-? plained, is a story of neoco- lonialism, of advisers from rich countries who seek to impose their own systems and values on the cou:lities they "aid." The events of ? the film derive roughly from the execution by Uru- guay's .Tupamaros of U.S: police adviser Dan Mitrione . in 1970. Yves Montand, lead- ing man in Gavras' previous ,movies, plays the approxi- of Mitrione," Gavras in- sisted. "We do not really know that case, although we know some of it. Montand is a high functionary who is kidnaped. But we .use no names." The locale is not defined, either, beyond its being in Latin. America. But the movie had to be made some- where. Chile, as the freest .country with at least a rudi- mentary firm industry nec- essary to support the pro- duction, was the only choice. But as the most highly poli- ticized nation, it. hardly turned out to be ideal. ? Critics ? on the right main- tained "State of Siege" was financed by the Tupamaros (most of the money iS Amer- ican). Uruguay's ambassador protested diplomatically. The left accused Gavras of unrevolutionary commercial- ism. ? Part of the problem was that Gavras' politics do not fit under any of the ideolog- ical labels that define poli- tics here. Gavras said he has never associated with any move- ment, that his character' would not permit it. ."My friends accuse me of being an aggressive inde- pendent. I don't know if a society can organize itself around people such as me, but. . . ." He punctuated the phrase with a take-it-or- leave-it shrug that Santia- go's half-dozen brands of so- cialists find so disconcert- ing. . "The trouble with political parties is that they deal in simplifications. None is as perfect as its advocates say." What, then, is the basis of his own philosophy? "The dignity of man, fun- damentally. Justice. I cannot accept that some men go hungry. I cannot accept that some live very well while others live very poorly am not a Christian but 1 ac- cept the ideal, 'to love thy neighbor as thyself.' All the enormous quantity of words today makes this ideal seem old-fashioned, but it is my philosophy." laxed and intense. He grew UI) in postwar Greece. where the air was thick with the themes that would later dominate ills films: Stalin- ism, anticommunism, U.S. aid, military rule; civil strife. In 1953, Gavras left Greece for the Sorbonne in Paris. "But literature and philosophy did not get to the issues," he said. So after three years he turned to studies for television and the movies, and be then worked in those fields. After 14 years in France, Gavras returned briefly to Greece in 1967?as it hap- pened, just before the mili- tary coup. He had picked tin the "Z" book describing the death of Greek rebel leader Lambrakis at the hands of the military, and the coup that soon followed gave it an instant relevance. Argentina, whose military regime usually imposes a ? rigid movie censorship, was allowed to see "Z." Gavras explained that the film had just received a big reception at the Mar del Plata film festival and the distributor seized that moment to 'ask approval in Buenos Aires. It worked. Several Argentines who saw the picture said they felt it was describing their own dictatorship, the only incongruity being the fact that they were there seeing it. - According to Gavras, Don- ald Rug,gof of ? Cinema Five in New York paid about $600,000 on the gamble that the show would succeed there. It did, bringing in $10 million. With that, American fin- anciers were interested in political movies, It was 1968, and the throttling of the Prague spring was on the public mind. Gavras and INIuntand turned to "The eontInued Approvtd FdfitRtrrease 2001/013104 PGIA-ROP8-01601R000800260001-8 "But this is not we case Constantine Gavras, is a ._? . STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/031/04WCIAARD 28 JUNE 1972 - r ?) f7,7s? " (1,1.7.1 11 t; I c I iLL2 ra .1 aa m 'am) aama te'; :a Z3 Lehr By Marry Rubin Second of two artic.'es A number of Latin American revolutionary groups, particularly in the urban and industrial southern part of the continent, have been able to synthesize armed strm:nia h w.te mass organizimn. The Chilean Nvi: (which engened in armed struagle eulinr, the Eduardo Frei administration, 1%9-1970), the Uruguayan -Tupamaros and several Argentinian groups?particularly the ERP-PRT (People's Revolutionary Army and its political leaderhip, the Revolutionary Workers party)?have managed to put down deep roots in the working class. . Thus while they engage in kidnappings, bank robberies and attacks on repressive police and military forces, they are not terrorist or Debrayist groans, with a political line guaranteeing their isolation from the masses, as they have been portrayed by the mass media in this country and by the revisionist Communist parties and Trotskyist grouns. - ? They have consistently used both armed and unarmed actions not to attempt to launch an immediate assault on the state at this stage or to defeat the government in purely military terms, but to develop the political consciousness and level of -.revolutionary organization of the masses, especially of the working class. Food trucks have been hijacked and the contents distributed to poor families, radio stations have been seized for revolutionary broadcasts and reactionary figures have .been imprisoned in "people's jails" to show both the political illegitimacy and military vulnerability of the rulers. Both Uruguay's Tupamaros and ,Argentina's PRT have origins in the workers' movement?among rice and sugar workers?and both have many members who are workers, shop stewards, and trade union officials. ? The Tupamaros, founded in 1963, is the better known of these two groups in the U.S. It has taken a number of spectacular actions,. such as the kidnapping of U.S. CIA agent Dan . Mitrione and of British ambassador Geoffrey Jackson, the escape of 106 Tupamaros from the national penitentiary last September and the exposure of corruption ? within the country through . the seizure of government .and corporate documents. ? J I bk I uN I L fl r 1:1 ' ? '"1 r'l , , H 1 P71.1 .Li and ? left sections of the bourgeois parties formed a "Broad Front," patterned after? but to the right of?the Chilean UP (Popular Unity) of Salvador Allende. The Tupamaros, although not supporting the Broad Front, ?declared a truce during the campaign so that the government could not use their activities as an excuse for suppressing the opposition. Nevertheless, the reactionary Juan Bor- daberry was elected after a campaign full of fraud and harassment of the left. ? In an attempt to smash the Tupamaroi and the workers, who have waged several general strikes, Bordaberry declared a "state of internal war" April 15 giving the government military powers and eliminating democratic rights. A fierce struggle between the. military and the Tupamaros has. raged since then. . Lrataxatkan struggle In ArgentiPa The decisive political event in modern Argentinian history was the taking of power by Juan Peron in the elections of February -1946, following a military coup in 1944. Peron, an army officer who became Minister of Labor and Social Security in the military administration, was a brilliant political tactician. He built a massive power base among the workers and the poor and created a nationalist-populist movement, the Justicialists or as they are usually called Peronists. The first years of Peron's administration brought Argentina a considerable, though temporary, degree of national independence from British imperialism, which had been severely weakened by World War 2. Real gains were made by both workers and Women, led by. Eva 'Peron. But in its later years the Peron regime ran into both economic problems and imperialist sub- version and was overthrown by a military coup in 1955. Peron went to Spain from which he today directs much of the Peronist movement, which still leads the powerful union federation, the CGT. After a period of civilian rule, the military again seized power in Argentina in June 1966. The economic situation continued to stagnate and took a qualitative turn for the worse in 1955 when foreign domination, this time U.S. imperialism, again gained the upper hand. During 1967-68, mass marches of hungry, unemployed sugar workers at- During the carnmiNi.iico*.HNFt610?10 AZrWm7.9gOlVtli4" flAs ts: 04. e ? Ai' re-F?) Altig) 1971 elections in 1.11117,ny, tnr'Cornmunilr party, Socialist party, Christian Democrats bureaucrats were replaced by revolutionary workers. STATI NTL The Revolutionary Workers party (PRT) was founded in 1964 by several diverse political groupings. Atthe time of the sugar workers marches, -.the PRT decided to embark on armed struggle; in July 1970 it founded the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). "With the foundation of the ERP," PRT leaders told Prensa Latina last January, "a military plan was drawn up whose main purpose was to make the organization, its program and objectives known to the masses. It was principally a period of armed propaganda." The PRT, although associated with the Fourth (Trotskyist) International, has at- tempted to assimilate the thinking of the most advanced Marxist-Leninists around the world: "The PRT, which leads the ERP, defines itself ideologically as Marxist- Leninist and it assimiliates the teachings of. revolutionaries from other countries among them those of Major Che Guevara, Trotsky, Kim II Sung, Mao Tsetung, Ho Chi Minh, Gen. Giap, etc." They also maintain relations with Peronist groups engaged in armed struggle in Argentina including the Peronist FAR, Moateneros (right-wing Peronists) and the FAP, largest of the three.. At the si;rne time, the PRT aces itself as a socialist "alternative to Peronism." In an interview in the January- February New Left Review; PRT leaders called Peronism, "an alliance of three classes: . the bourgeoisie, the petty- bourgeoisie and the working class. Ideologically, its policies are national- capitalist. The Peronist guerrillas ... are the popular sector of the movement. .. . As the class struggle intensifies, Peronism will divide.... . The revolution in Argentina will be made with Peronist workers, but the leadership will not be Peronist but socialist." ."Argentina," they said, "is capitalist and semi-colonial. The bourgeoisie is a junior partner of U.S. imperialism?there is no 'national' bourgeoisie to promote in- dependent capitalist development, the fight is for socialism: The bourgeoisie cannot lead the revolution, only the working class can make the revolution." !loots in workers' allover:vent Under the leadership of the ERP-PRT and other left forces the highly organized and class-conscious Argenti.aian workers have staaed massive strikes and demonstrations. ainst represst ispmtsbovye2oodoiq Cordoba too.:. place agon arie.dertpf clines wages. Worker's took over their nein'M Approved For Release 200.1103/04: CIA-RDP80-01601Rik8dbal-0001-8 HOUSTON, TEXAS POST - 294,677 sA-prieer2 ? , , inflation could trigger ?? i'revolution, soil expert says ' ?? Claude Fly, An agronomist t ? ? who was held captive seven :months by Tupamaro rebels ?in Uruguay, warned downtown :Kiwanians Wednesday that in- :ilation could cause revolution ',in this country as surely as :poverty can cause it in Latin :America. He said the ruling oligarchy ;in many Latin American 'bountries made off with as ?Tnuch as a billion and a half dollars a year, while 90 per cent of the population lives on from $70 to 8800 a year. In the U.S., Fly said, pri- vate, public and corporate -debts total some $3 -trillion while the country's net worth Is only $2 trillion. Latin American resentment of the U.S., he said, stems from U.S. investment there where companies reap profits ranging from 100 to 270 per cent. triggered his release after all Fly has been "lent" by the ". other efforts failed, and Fly U.S. to 21 different countries gives credit to prayer by him- self and others. He was flown home March 28. Touching on American firms in trouble in Chile, he said that any foreign corn- pany must be ready to leave Latin America within 15 to 20 years. He said there was still , room for firms that give as of well as take. mental and physical exercise ' impressed his rebel guards, who "thought they had a agent but found they had a common old Aggie." A heart attack Feb. 22, 1971 to tell them how to use their soil. He was on such a mission when kidnaped from his office outside Montevideo Aug. 7, 1970. Fly was kept in a steel wire cage with 15 inches of stand-up space where he was "suspendedintime and space" for 208 days. He said his regimen Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000800260001-8 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R00 TOPEKA, KAN. CAPITAL M ? 66,164 CAPITAL?JOURNAL S ? 70 851 B 2 5 In_ f Fly Recalls Kidno Story In Manhattan The Capttal-Journal State Staff MANHATTAN?Dr. Claude Fly felt a lot better when the Uruguayan rebels who kidnaped and held him 208 days last yeear relazide he was nothing like a CIA agent, "just a plain old Ageltgra`r' When rebels ceased harassing him, he had a lot of time to think in the close confines of his basement cage. Thursday, Fly, a soil conservationist, shared some of his thoughts with Kan- sas State University students at a convocation. Wednesday night was his time for reunion as he told old Ma- nhattan friends from 20 years ago how it was to survive the kidnaping and a heart attack while captive. Similarities Seen ? After reiterating statements from Wednesday on how religious faith preserved his sanity and on the role U.S. bu- siness had played in degrading. life for the common Latin American, Fly told students of similarities here and in South America. ? Fly claimed the saddest result In Uruguay has ' been the destruction of one of the more viable middle classes in South America by an expensive, idealistic welfare program. - * Receives Plaque Fly predicted more dangers for the United States in the cur- rent turn of society against changes wrought by science and technology in areas like agricultural chemicals and space exploration. Fly warned that scientists must assume some social responsibility to present their side of the story instead of being consumed in projects. Thursday night in Manhattan, Fly was presented a plaque for his contribution to good land practices in Kansas by the Soil Conservation Society of America.ii ? Approved For elease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000800260001-8 STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0 paif, FLA ? liERALD?,- r6 1974 ut-u itt ? 380,828 ? 479,025 ? / **AO Jack Kofeed Says Ingersoll Successor To J. Edgar Hoover? RUMOR has it that J. Edgar Hoover will end his long and distinguished ca- reer as head of the FBI soon and be succeeded by John In- gersoll, head of the Bureau of Narcotics . . . THE gA has a bad press anywWe, and it's getting worse in South America. Its --man Dan Mitrione, who was murdered in Uruguay, was generally regarded there as a torture specialist for the in- telligence agency. True or not, that's the reputation of the CIA . . . 4 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000800260001-8 . .?STATINTL Approved For Releasq9A-y9/04 : CIA-RD SEP '1971 11 " ----1/CtyLLL 0 \, yrri),,rz-v-ve0071 0 1_ it it 1A?zi0. , 1 a-e-f.- ? -1,,m, Pic fiLn 7in Lac, \hiv, loy In1,-)-ri tr; ,?,r risi 0 1 .0....i,t ii i ,.._.0 k...,? 64,,..-0,1. Fl I le ri Left . ? OCTOBER 1967, WASHINGTON counter-insurgency ex- 1 perts were understandably jubilant. With the death i of Che Guevara and the failure of the Bolivian revo- --eel lutionary loco, they thought serious left-wing. agita- tion in Latin America would end?at least for the forsce- able future. In fact it did the very. opposite. In Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia apc1-.Peru, while Che's death did indeed lead to the abandonment of his continental theory of revolution, it also stimulated new revolutionary thought and groups, and brought the struggle in less than four years to dramatic and unexpected results. In all five of these countries today, the left is either on the road to power or in the process of consolidating actual victories. It is no longer trying self-consciously to mimic the Cuban ex- perience, do longer courageously (but inopportunely) launching rural guerrilla adventures, no longer volunter- ? istically declaiming that the objective conditions for revo- lution need only the development of subjective leadership. Rather the left is now soundly grounding its strategy and tactics in local reality; and that reality, although it varies in all five countries, seems to exclude precisely the Che (Regis Debray) model of guerrilla /ow. 47r7r-WCAUSE OF THE TUPAMAROS' spectacular. exploits, .1.2) it is Uruguay which has received most publicity. Indeed the Tupas have repeatedly robbed suppos- edly impregnable banks and gambling casinos, assaulted -police headquarters, kidnapped high government officials, captured official radio stations long enough to broadcast 12-minute manifestoes, and, in general,. Con- vinced the country's 2.9 million people that they are in- vincible?despite massive US counter-insurgency aid to the government. But most importantly, the Tupas have helped radicalize that population, so much so that today .all liberal and left-wing forces are united in one formidable front, and that has been Tupamaros' strategy from the be- ginning. .? 'Organized by socialist party cadrernen as early as 1961, the Tupamaros, which are armed forces of the clandes- tine Movement of National Liberation (MLN), never intended to seize power simply through violence. Their goal was, and is, to help build a mass political conscious- ness. Until 1963 their activity was limited to helping the non-unionized and exploite0 sugar workers of interior 'Uru- guay to win bread-and-butter demands. Only when the government veered sharply to the right, broke . relations with Cuba, installed press censorship and launched wide- spread repression did the Tupas begin their "retaliatiOn." Althouah some of the money they stole went to hemp finaom By making public the official documents they seized in banks or ministries, the Tupas exposed government cor- ruption and showed up the collusion existing between the rich, the USAID programs, and the elected officials. In exchange for the release of kidnapped officials, the Tupas forced the government to distribute food to the needy and, in one dramatic case, to build a free workers clinic, win- ning the population's admiration and a great deal of co- operation as well. ? `Tem 1967 on," one Tztpa told me in Montevideo last June, "we were strong enough to seize power. Bit what good would that have done? The gorillas [right-wing gen- erals] in Argentina and ,Brazil would have descended on tiny Uruguay .and crushed us. Besides, :the people) might have cheered us, but would not have fought for us. Our people have to learn that it is for themselves that they arc fighting. They have to want power. That takes years of politicization. We have to. wait." Waiting, of course, has been costly not only to the government but to the Types themselves. The police also are learning from the slruggle, and, as it has been intensified, the Tupas have begun to suffer serious losses. Scores have been killed, and there are currently over 100'in jail, including Raid Sendie, once a socialist party official and one of the original leaders of the ,MLN. Also, as US counter-insurgency experts have taken over command of the hunt, torture has become a standard part of the government's retaliation. That was why -th&-.7'upas executed Dan Mitrione, the CIA's super-sleuth, whose office was in Montevideo's police headquarters. With general elections scheduled for this November, it is campaign time in Uruguay now. In the past, only two parties have jockeyed for power: the Mancos (Whites), by and large representing the landed population and the Coto- rados (Reds), strong especially in Montevideo, where. half of Uruguay's people live. But now a third party will be on the 'ballot, a united front which is so vast that it has. official support from Moscow to Rome, joining together under a single banner the Communist and Christian Demo- cratic parties, as well as Trotskyists, anarchists, pim -o-Tztpa- maro militants, left liberals and dissidents from the two major parties. The Frente Amplio offers none of the usual "advantages" (pork barrel posts, concessions, contracts, etc.) in exchange for votes; presidential candidate, General Liber Seregni, who once ruled Montevideo's arm), but re- signed when ordered to use his troops for repression, promises only hard times ahead. Yet in a few short months, and starting from scratch with neither the press nor the airwaves in its favor, the Frente has become the front- runner, so much io that there is a great deal 'of talk that their own ctiviqipbaadistR ld to teei4achc taeeeto"lhiti why we not pdeieaeObi63/0:aIAIDWO- l6iioio06W000l-8?ont? . READERS' DIGEST Approved For. Release 200W/clith: CIA-RDP8 Only disciplined faith and an unfeigned love for his fellow man enabled the kidnaped American to survive his captivity in the hands of these determined Uruguayan guerrillas laude Seven- Month ? ? - 5 I Lill are ? Abruptly at 9:40, five men in street clothes burst into the tiny office, drew guns and hustled Fly out 6. , back door. The American struggled; , but De Leon shouted: "Don't fight! They'll shoot to kill." Outside, the guerrillas quickly blindfolded Fly, then bound him hand and foot. He was shoved into a large burlap sack and dumped into the back of a battered pickup truck. The kidnapers climbed into the fr?cab of the truck and sped away. ? Thus began for Claude Fly an in- credible 208-day ordeal, and for Uruguayans another chapter in the Tupamaros' seven-year struggle to overthrow the elected government of their country. Just a week before the , Tupamaros (the name comes from an r8th-century Inca chieftain re- nowned as a leader of oppressecipeo- ple against Spanish rule) had demanded that some 150 political prisoners be freed in exchange for Mitrione and Gomide. Immediately after Fly was hauled away, they telephoned a local radio station and warned: unless their demands were met the scientist faced the same fate ?death--as did the other two. "Malice Toward None." After a long, jolting ride over winding,. cobbled streets, the bruised and ex- hausted Fly was half-carried, half- dragged, into an old, apparently abandoned building. There his cap- tors stripped off the sack, removed blindfold and bindings, and shoved him through a hole into a dungeon- like hideout beneath the floor. "The space was only ab.out three and a half feet deep," Fly recalls, "and I had to bend over to .crawl to a blanket-covered cot in one cdrncr. Then my kidnapers clamped a lid over the hole and left me to medi- tate on my fate in darkness and. terror." Fly had only recently recovered from viral pneumonia, and was soon shivering and coughing badly in the damp, chill hideout. The next morn- ingt his guards pulled him from the hole and gave him a cot in the empty room above, plus his first meal?chunks of beef, potatoes and tea,. heated over .a blowtorch. Sometithe during his third night _ BY - PAUL FRIGGENS ? N THE morning of August 7, 1970, kindly, soft-spoken Claude L. Fly kissed his wife, Miriam, good-by and set out as usual for his laboratory office in the Ministry of Agriculture on the out- skirts of Montevideo, Uruguay. Th.e distinguished, 65-year-old U.S. soils expert had come to Uruguay at that government's urgent request. His mission: to help?as he had helped xi other countries?that economi- cally troubled nation of three million to improve its agriculture. As hc rode to work, Fly was mind-.- 11.11 of the U.S.. embassy's warning that three U.S. citizens had been as- saulted in the preceding week by a band of urban guerrillas known as the Tupamaros. Two of the.Ameri- cans escaped, but one, Daniel A. Mitrione, an Indiana police expert who, like Fly, was advising the gov- ernment, had been kidnaped. Also abducted was Brazilian consul Aloy- sio Dias Gomidc. But Fly was not unduly alarmed. "After all," he had said in casual conversation with a Uruguayan colleague, 'what would the Tupamaros possibly want with an .old soils man like me?" At his laboratory, Fly plunged into a conference with his Uruguayan counterpart Prof. Luisi De Leo]; Approvea*For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000800260001-8 0 I P. I I IN I L in captivity, again un an folded, Fly was removed to a second hideout, where he found himself padlocked inside a 4-by-61/2-foot cage built of two-by-fours covered with strong steel-wire mesh. The sole furnishings were a lumpy cot and, a bucket for sanitary facilities. There was barely room to walk, but . he could stand. Fly stretched and flexed hisJaut muscles with relief. Meanwhile, Uruguayan President i Jorge Pacheco Areco had steadfristly refused to .negotiate with what he called common criminals. Fly's family and friends found momen- tary relief in a handwitten note the kidnapers had delivered from the scientist to his fearful wife: "Please don't worry. I am well. Pray for me and wait. They give me enough to eat." But the good news proved short-livedr for at about the same time it was announced that the Tu- pamaros had executed Mitrione. He was found blindfolded and shot in the head'and back, i n'a bloodstained car parked in one-Of the city's mid- dle-class residential sections. Unaware of the murder, Fly paced his wire cage and began to size up his captors. Until, his knowledge of the Tuptimaros had been scant, but he soon . discovered that the guerrillas (perhaps 3000 all told) operated through cells or ae- tion groups. "Only one or two mem- bers in each cell knew anyone in another cell, so that if captured they could not reveal the hideouts of others," he says. "They never ad- dressed each other by name, only by _ . 'Comrade' or sonic similar term." Apparently they ran the gamut of Uruguayan life, from? laborers to 'university faculty members to col- lege-age young men and women to professional men. His guards were mostly middle-class yoUng men and ? women of college age, with a few older, gangster-type leaders mixed in. Fly was immediately accused of being a CIA agent, and grilled in- tensely. The terrorists produced as evidence the technical soils manual that Fly had, just authored. They pored over its contents, seeking proof of espionage, but in the end it , proved harmless, - as did Fly's per- ?att-iti titled STATINT Approver14,8/04 : CIA-RDP80-016 POST LAPR 71.7177 7 E 25-2 , 19.8 r.77.7\ S ,773 t 7.71 ) J0 n\ j'