MARASCO IS NO ABRAMS BOOSTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R001100100001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

THE ELIZABETH, N.J. DAILY JOURNAL
1 _Dec 1_9 L2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0
He Gave Up On Army Career
STATI NTL
?
(Former Green Beret
Capt. Robert F. Marasco
and seven other Special
Forces Members were in.
volved in one of the major
controversies of the Viet-
nam War in 1969 when ac-
cused of murdering a triple
agent. Now a civilian in
Bloomfield, he spent many
hours being interviewed by
Daily Journal reporter
Thomas Michalski, ? recall-
ing events surrounding the
assassination that he says
never were made public).
By THOMAS MICHALSKI
Journal Staff Writer
The decision to drop murder
charges against eight Geen
0 Berets
accused of
"eliminating"
Vietnamese
triple-agent Thai Khac Chuyen
in June 1969 was "approved"
by President Nixon after the
/ Central Intelligence Agency
refused to provide witnesses
for the court-martial.
The official word came from
Secretary of the Army Stanley
R. Resor in September who
said, "in the interest of
national security it is my
judgment that under the cirs
cumstances, the defendants
. cannot receive a fair trial."
Last of 5 articles
to do with the dismissal of the
charges. He later
acknowledged, however, that
the President was "somewhat
involved," although Ziegler
-insisted that the Army acted
flas
0Th -24 1(4.
L.iiJ-
a good commander and was
even thinking of making the
Army a career ? until he
received orders to. report to
Ft. Riley, Kansas.
"When I saw those orders I
was furious," he said. '71 guess
I was more sore than anything
because the Army was putting
me in a shelf job. They were
its own. hiding mc."
The press secretary said / Marasco went to Washing-
CIA Chief Richard Helms ton. lo his original assignment
decided that the agency's branch, and put in his papers
employes would not be allowed
to testify for reasons of
national security.
'77- "The President," Ziegler
said, "approved the decision."
"We were released on Sept.
30, 1969," former Capt. Robert
F. Marasco said. "And we
received VIP treatment all the
, way home."
"They were all crying,"
; Marasco recalled. "My wife,
I my first wife, wasn't there.
She was afraid of the news
media. She was afraid they
would ask her what she
thought and that she would
have to tell the truth."
Mt rasco's first wife -- -- he
has since remarried --- was
deeply involved in the anti-war
movement, he said.
"She would not lie to the
press," Marasco said. "She.
would have told them what-
she thought of the war, the
military . . ."
The couple later discussed
their problems and it was
agreed that they would file for-
a Mexican divorce.
Friends and neighbors, how-
ever, treated the Green Bei et
with all the honors due to a
homecoming hero.
Maraaeo said the Chuyen
Resor, after rioting that the
Berets would be assigned to
dirties "outside of Vietnam',"
went on record as
approving "the act which the
Green Berets were accused o f
carrying out.
, ''l want to make it clear."
he said, "that the acts which
tt ere charged, but not proven,
ta present a fundatitental
?iolation of Army regulations,
orders and principles. The
Army will not and cannot
0 rondone the unlawful acts of
the kind alleged."
feariw, hile, kVhite I louse
happy
matter "was very hard on my
pa 'cots'. They were
w?hch it was all over."
Preys Secretary Ronald
to leave active duty.
"They told me I had to wait
seven months," he recalled.
Meanwhile, Marasco
received word that Rep. L.
Mendel Rivers, chairman of
the House Armed Services
Committee, wanted to meet
, with h.m.
"He asked me if there was
anythieg be could do,"
1\iarasco said. "I told him I
wanted out of the .artny."
Rivers. Marasco said, called
Gen. William \l'estmoreland,
who was then Army chief of
staff, and on Oct. 14, 1069 he
was honorably discharged.
M
Mit arasco's problems
were not over.
St-I:cant weeks later he flew
to Mexico City and filed for
divorce. Three days later, after
17 months in Vietnam. going
through the hell of a possible
court martial. t hrough a
divorce and just getting out of
the Army turd picking up
where he left off --- :Marasco
was nearly killed in a ear
accident.
Marasco was driving north
on Route 33 in South A?mboy
when a second cr a operated by
a 22-year-old Cliffwood man
crossed the median harrier
Ziegler first contended that
e s abtit
President NixApproVedFcii,iRwtoko?Lc /011/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601ROOI 100100001-1
?
n--11 t Cl
71(06-1) T/Tra
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and crashed heati-on into
Alarasco's car.
The driver of the second car
was killed. Marasco suffered
extensive injuries and was in a
coma for three drys at Perth
Amboy General Hospital. A
passenger in his car also
suffered extensive injuries.
There were unofficial
reports that the accident
"could have been arranged."
Marasco discounts those
reports.
"I guess there were always
possibilities," he said. "There
were anti-war people, and I'm
not talking about student
groups. There are some very
big international organizations
who oppose the ? war for
political reasons."
Marasco said he has no
evidence that the accident was
planned.
"I had a private investigator
look into it," he said. "He
found nothing unusual. The
mishap was sheer
coincidence."
An insurance settlement of
$10,000 just about paid for
hospital and other medical
bills. Marasco was out of work
for more than a year.
"I sold a little insurance,"
he said. "I am` now vice
president of my father's
agency in Bloomfield. but I
don't know what the future
holds for me."
Insurance is what he knows
best, "outside of espionage,
and there is not a very
good market in that field for
me because my picture. has
been on the front pages all .
over the world."
Marasco says today he has
no ill feelings about the Army.
"I talked with a great many
military men and they all feel
that I got a raw deal," he
said. "I do have some very
strong feelings about Gen..
(Creighton) Abrams (now
Army chief of staff) and a few
d ,c
--
THE ELIZABETH, N.J. DAILY JOUliN
3K 19/2_
Approved For Release 2001/03D704No : ulA-KuP80-01601
,
;-ir
.11..4 ? 1
? - :U
. (Forturr Green Beret
Capt. Ilobert F. 'Marasco
and seven other Special
Pores members were in
in one of the in.,:jor
controversies of the Viet-
nam War hi 1969 when ac-
eused of muttering a triple
agent. Now a civilian in
THoomfield, he spent many
hours being interviewed by
Daily Journal reporter
Thomas Michalski, recall-
ing events surrounding the
assassination that he says
never were made public). ?
By THOMAS MICHALSKI
Journal Staff Writer
The Central Intelligence_
Agency Frd--tf,-S, Special
Tarne n an "unsanctioned
feeiticre'TCere to _free eigirt.
0 ti:rcerizBeret-s-iim :o mditarY
e-ustody in September199aby
iiieTE,' tier e-di tale escape
jinn-that involved a parachute
aror-1 :3(10 nte-ti ora_Leng
triir a-T.l_a t1i,21it to Burma.,
' a e co rding to former Cant.
Marasco, one of the eight.
rharged with the murder of
Vietn a rne.se tel plc-a genj Thai
Khae Chuyen, said "the highly
secret, unorthodox and uncoil-
-ventional" escape plan has
never' before been made
public.
? In telling the story to The
Daily Journal, Marasco said
the parachutists would have
distracted base personnel
enough to allow the landing of
a twin-engine C-7A Caribou on
a roadway at Long Birth, pick
up the Berets and fly off to
Burma. ?
Once in Burma, :laraseo
sjI.17717i7 neretsr- .-C- ill? CIT:
:fi=laiawould have es-Rigited
guerrilla forces for counter-
intelliecnce void; in Red China
0 and other parts of Asia.
"We were in the stockade
three weeks," Marasco said.
I
0 11 ii
71-1
\LI a._
"Officers arc never put in
jail. They are usually held in
house arrest."
Such was the case of Col.
Robert B. Rheault. Green
Beret commander. who also
was involved in the Chuyen
incident.
Marasco's cell was four by
seven, It had no teilet facili-
ties. A 200-watt bulb burned
continuously, and the average
temperature, he said, was 120
degrees.
''We lay in these cells in
undershorts," Marasco
recalled. "When you had to go
to the latrine you had ta
scream, `Guard, prisoner in
Cell Two has to go to the bath-
room
Marasco said, "We were. in
fact, prisoners of war. POWs
of the American miltary.-
'The jail's 'commander, a
lieutenant colonel, made our
lives as bearable as possible
with books', cigarettes, things
like that."
While in. the Long Binh
stockade, the Berets were
"still convinced that
eventually somebody would.
find out what was going on
and that we would be let out."
In early August an Ameri-
can newspaperman was in an
enlisted man's club when he
heard two military policemen
talking about the case.
"He went to MACV ? Mili-
tary Assistance Command,
Vietnam ? and started askine.
questions," Marasco said.
On Aug. 15 the Army, after
having- held the Berets for
over three weeks without
officially charging them with
an' crime, issued a news
release that said "eight Green
Berets are being held for
nuirder and conspiracy to
commit trial-dm-
;murder carries A Illillift1111t1
of lift Un!);jracy
a maximum of life imprison-
"We were in IllaNiflit1111 merit.
security where they lucid "No\\ that it was all out it,
rapists and 1Am:trolled-For Release 2001/03/
..roL 'Leo
(1-1\ (11N
"V
.the open we said to the CIA
'You'd better get the word
lback to Washington that if you
continue this, foolishness you
have to assume the potential
of us compromising every high
OWN;
Fourth of 5 articles
level intelligence operation in
Southeast Asia," Marasco
said.
didn't do anything that
wasn't done regularly,"
Marasco said.. "The only
difference is that it was
usually given to t h e
Vietnamese to-do .for us.
"But, beeause Project
Gamma . WO!, a unilateral
operation. ,we couldn't. . do
that." .Marasco e?aid. "The
Vietnaritese Naeren't seepeeed
to know Project Gamma
existed."
Military attorneys for .the
Berets were joined by a host
of well - known stateside
lawyers. One of the civilian
attorneys said. "1
evidence to prove that ihell
,
enemaieo tHE'
people in South Vietnam,
during the past year.
regory,
attorney for Major Thomas C.
Middleton Jr.. cabled Defense
Secretary Melvin R. Laird to
charge that the Berets were
being held under "inhuman
conditions."
Shortly afterward, the men
acre released from Long Binh
hull and allmved to stay in
reaular billet.
The handling of the case
also stirred reaction among
sonic congressinen. Sen.
Ernest F. Hollings of South
Carolina said, '''1' use men are
soldiers who were doing a job
that had to be done."
Rep. L. Mendel Rivers,
charman of the House Armed
,-'11:11AIRE)Ft60-1111601R001100100001 -1
case is going from bad to
worse."
Attorneys for some of the
men, meanwhile, 'contended
that their clients could not get
a fair trial in Vietnam because
Gen. Creighten Abrams.
commander of U.S. Forces in
Vietnam, and Maj. Gen. G .L.
Mabry, commander of support
troops in. Vietnam, were
"prejudiced hecause they have.
prejudged the defendants."
"Abrams caused this whole
thing simply because of
service rivalry between the
regular Army and elite Green
Berets," one attorney told. the.
Associated Press.
...Yearns-1de, the threat by the
Berets to expose other_CIL
.saecret operations got-back...le
CIA . 6hief Ilieltard_Helms
saLd_o_wa with_President
ihxctn.Marasco said..
Marasco said a few days
later Abrams met with
President Nixon at the
Western White House to
discuss troop withdrawals.
"The next day Nixon's
military aide called us and
said. 'Forget it. you're not
coming -home," Marasco said.
"Abrams. the aide said. told
President Nixon that if he
wanted the troop withdrawals
to go smoothly, without
problems, he wanted the
Green Berets."
Abrams, Marasco said,
pointed out to the President
that. as military commander in
Vietnam he should be allowed
to handle the case.
The exchange, Marasco
said, occurred iii September,
1909, when troop withdrawals
were in their early stages.
President Nixon, he said,
agreed to allow Abrams to
handle the Green Beret case.
STAT.I NTL
STAT I NTL
THE ELIZABETH, N.J . DAILY JOURNAL
2 9. Pa.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 . t.,1A-M3k0-01601R0
Ferlitsr)crqC"S .1VeXt
Tr-Tr
.sv
67-, -Tyr -if-
(Former Green Heret
Capt. Robert F. 3Iarasco
and seven other Special
Forces members were in-
volved in one of the major
controversies of the Viet-
nam War in 1969 when ac-
cused of murdering a triple
agent. Now a civilian in
Bloomfield, be spent many
hours being, interviewed by
Daily Journal reporter
Thomas Michalski. recall-
ing events surroundimi: the
assassination that he says
never were made public).
By THOMAS MICHALSKI
Journal Staff Writer
The murder of a South Viet-
namese triple-agent in June
1969 came to liht when one of
the eight Green Berets
involved "blew the whistle"
because he thought "he was
next on the list."
Former Capt. Robert F.
Maras.co said a sergeant,
Alvin L. Smith Jr., started a
chain of events that caused
the commander of the U.S.
-Forces in Vietnam "to lose his
cool."
Marasco earl:er losed,
the order to murder Thai
Khac Chm en con-ie directly _
? station cnief rano.
frem a l-nnl entaal Intelli-
Hut 1-77. went to a differcnt
agent,. not the no who was
involved in the thing from the
outset," :Marasco said. "This
agent did not knew anything
about the Chti on thing."
?Marasco pointed out
'everything is celled
0 11
71 JLiLiI
L'
STATI NTL
%.1 I Fl I 11'I I I-
Lft
''He was always going to
Saicron with Chuyen for one
thing or another," Marasco
said. ''But it didn't seem
wrong until iriterwards."
All to the negotiations
ceocerning Chuyen's fate.
Marasco said. Smith "was not
agreeing that he (Chuyen)
should he eliminated. He was
not disagreeing, either. He had
no alternative, hut he had a
special feeling for Chuyen."
Marasco said Smith
"became very nervous of
number of reasons. He had
recently buried his mother in
Florida and had become quite
neurotic in Vtetnam.
"He had decided that
because he was the only
enlisted main a non-com-
missioned officer, involved in
tile Chuyen thing, that. we did
not trust him and that we
would kill biro. ?
?That was absolutely ridicu-
lous," Marasco said. "The
thought never entered our
minds."
Jo Anaust latig
said, Smith went to theS11
gei-ice ..?,2-eric....,,c,fri,--i,i.
Chuyen was "eliminated" ?
thrown into the South China
Sea -- after being shot twice
in the head, on or about June
15. 1969.
"IN had Awn two more
wetlis to servtt in lielnam,"
Marasco recalled. "Smith,
who was in on toe negotiations
and decisions all the time, was
ve:'Y frientil. wiCtl Citl,Veni '
"They were buddies,',,vhiah
was his ,first mistake. Tou
never comes.: buddy with
0 yi?? r.0-1:!c r1 7.c,srit. n's j1.1s.
b.--.1 intellige,nc,, rn-acucc."
Maras ?.. said Smith rlo
WAF: Ii ierdly `.4 IIii ChlitOn'S
Nviff.!, Pilpm Nun Lien, and her
&isle:.
that
a ncl
compprimentaiied in the
intelligence community. Some-
times the right hand dot rot,
know \A hat the left is dling."
The aCha Trang ,CIA rniAn
dicer rd tiraiill
!smith. hiarci on i-us belief that
_1!1:
t,)
ahollt
to
Approved Foi-r:Relea se'0200110)3/041.:?',(01AROF1,,,00(710101R001100100001-1
'
must understand that the
Army had no real knowledge
of Project Gamma. Although
we were military, we, in fact,
worked for SOG ? Special
Operations Group."
The (jhuyen incident, how-
ever. went up Marasco's chain
of command to Col. Robert B.
Rheault, Green Beret com-
mander at the time.
"He made the final decision
on the assassination, based on
our information and that
provided by the CIA,"
Marasco said. "We assumed
that Rheault went up his chain
of command as we went up
ours. He did not."
Smith, Marasco said, told
his story to an unidentified
Army officer in Saigon who
r,:daer.1 it. through channels.
to Gen. Creighton Alwarils.
commander of tile U.S. forces
at the time and now Army
chief of staff.
"Abrams called in an aide, a
brigadier general, who was
.supposed to know all about
intelligence operations in
k'iptnam." Marasco said. "He
was _asked about the Chuyen
matter. ?
"The aide, having been in
Vietnam only a month. said
'we don't have am- cross-
hot-der operations.' fl.
there were no CIA a_gents con'
trolling military ni-.ople and
that. til-e--tipe-t...-iai.Forcrs -are-
itTvolved - -advisory
trairoet!
.1hr?tms. Marasco said, then
Rileatilt to Saigon "to
sa.piore !lungs away.
"1,'(- had come up with a
l'Itird of 5 'articles
(-I'
\\ 'it
had
ha opened
1 I,. told 'ii, story to the
standard procedure."
? The story was that "we had
found out that Chuycn might.
have been a had guy, but that
we didn't know for sure and
that he was sent to Cambodia
on a mission. We had a heli-
center log and it showed that a
guy went: from Nita Trang at
the specified time to the Cam-
bodian border where he was
dropped off.
"Chuyen was chubby and we
happened to have a heavy-set
Oriental in Project Gamma
who looked like him.
"In the cover report,"
_Marasco explained, "we said.
Chuyen went to Cambodia,
had one-way radio trans-
mission. and that he was sup-
posed to contact us arid never
ci id
Marasco. who could not
identify Chuyen's double, said
"he wasn't really that
involved in the operation."
"We said in the cover story
that Chuyen was a had guy
and that he just never came
back from Cambodia,"
Marasco said.
One of the military's
unwritten rules. Marasco said,
is "In always cover your com-
mander, no matter what."
?-l'his is why Rheault gave
the general the cover story
but, according to a CIA 'after
action' report, Abrams
"became very upset because
one of his senior eommanders
apparently had lied to him,"
Marasco said.
Abrams, Marasco said was
further angercd hhi'the__Sact.
that civilians, in this_casc the_
T7I-A-77iTt le in ch_agr e j.he_
Berets.
STATI NTL
_
y14 GUARD IAN
? A--
2 2 tiov eTATINTL
Approved For Release 200110J/u4 : C 19I -RDP80-016
By Richard E. Ward
Second. of a series
Clandestine sabotage, combat and
espionage missions have been conducted in
Laos and Cambodia by U.S. military per- -
sonnel, despite White House denials and
contrary to congressional prohibition.
Such missions are top-secret actions
directed by the Studies and , Observations
Group of the U.S. Army Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam, located in Saigon and
'generally known by its initials, MAC-V
SOG. The most comprehensive picture of
these activities available, based on testimony
of former participants in these missions,
known as Cornmand and Control operations,
is contained in a series of three articles by
Gerald Meyer, published in the Nov. 5, 10
and 12 issues of the St. Louis Post Dispatch.
Unless otherwise indicated all material in
this.artiele is based on the articles by Meyer,
a regular staff member of the Post Dispatch,
who interviewed former Special Forces
members, helicopter pilots and others who.
took part in the Command and Control
operations during the 1960s and into 1972.
The Post Dispatch's informants, whose
names were not revealed to protect them
from possible prosecution, stated that the
clandestine commando raids were still in
progress as of August. One informant said
? that in August when he left Bien Hoa, one of
? the Command and Control bases, more than
teo Army Special Forces were stationed
there and reinforcements were being sent
from Okinawa.
? The commando raids in recent years,
utilizing Army personnel who generally
command teams composed of mercenaries
? from Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam,
were also sent into North Vietnam and
liberated areas of South Vietnam. There is
evidence that the Air Force has operational
'jurisdiction over a similar program based at
Nakon Phajon, Thailand,_iust .a.c TOSS the
Laotian bat
Rproved For Release
Commando raids were ordered by
Washington against the Democratic
'Republic of Vietnam in the early 1960's, as
documented in the Pentagon Papers,. but
which provided few details. The present
program, apparently undergoing a partial
"Vietnamization," is an outgrowth of the.
original escalation of CIA-Special Forces
missions in Indochina ordered by the
Kennedy administration.
Although the Post Dispatch does not
mention the CIA, it is clear that Studies and
Observations Group is a CIA operation. The
informant most knowledgeable about SOG,
a Special Forces officer, was described by
correspondent Meyer as fearful of being
jailed or fined, saying: "If I talked to you and
got 'caught, I could get 10 years in prison and
a $10,000 fine."
The Special Forces officer said that the
connections between Command and Control
and the 'MAC-V SOG' organization in
Saigon were so highly classified that we
would not risk commenting on them," wrote
Meyer.
Despite his reluctance to talk the officer
explained that the Command and Control
operations were "formally" under the
direction of the Fifth Special Forces Group
until January 1971, when the Fifth Special
Forces officially was described as having
been withdrawn from Vietnam. Actually,
according to Meyer, "numerous Fifth
Special Forces were left behind at Command
and Control bases throughout South
Vietnam" and various efforts were employed
to conceal their continued presence. They
were forbidden to wear the green beret and
.Special Forces insignia while they remained
in Indochina. .. ?
Symbolic of the Command and Control
operations, was a gestapo-like insignia, used
ty one of the units, a green-bereted .skull
with blood dripping from its teeth. This was
the emblem of Command and Control
Central. There were at least two other main
units, Command and Control North and
Command and Control South. The North,
Central and South referred to the base areas
of the commando teams.
Apparently most of the operations under
the Command and Control program, at least
in recent years, took place in southern Laos.
However, after the U.S.-Saigon invasion of
Cambodia and subsequent Congressional
prohibition against use of ? U.S. ground
troops in Cambodia, it is safe to assume that
the secret U.S. missions were increased in
the latter country.
Airborne bandits ?
Typically, Command and Control missions
comprised several U.S. officers or NCO's
commanding a mercenary team ? which
would land in Laos or Cambodia, and
"aimed at taking prisoners, gathering in-
formation and disrupting communist ac-
tivities." The commandos would be tran-
sported in four helicopters, while four
helicopter gunships would. provide air cover,
191krapaklk.. .ki4a4t5Atai
Vft11141 St!
the forward air controller, were also jn-
volved in missions.
neSpeci'al'orces teran, who par-
ticipated in Command and Control raids
from Danang, said he had taken part in
missions in North Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia. "He said they were for the
p rpose of gathering intelligence, rescuing
ther American missions threatened by
North Vietnamese forces, destroying
supplies and disrupting enemy com-
munications facilities."
Command and Control Central, operating
put of Dakto and Kontum, near the tri-
Vborder area of South Vietnam and Laos and
Cambodia was used for raids deep within
the two latter countries.
"A Special Forces soldier formerly
assigned to Command and Control Central
said that the group's missions were handled
by about 150 Americans and from 30Q to 400
Montagnard tribesmen. Men participating in
missions first were transported to Dakto and
then sent by helicopter across the borders,
he said.
"The missions were rotated among the
men and casualties were severe, the man
said.... Such teams usually included two or
three American leaders and about half a
dozen Montagnards.
"Dakto was the starting point also for
large 'hatchet forces,' with larger numbers of
Americans and Montagnards. . ? .
"Less frequently?apparently only about
once every six months?very large groups of
Americans were sent across the borders on
so-called Slam (Search, locate and an-
nihilate) missions. More than 100 men
sometimes participated in such missions....
"Some penetrations into Laos apparently
were quite deep. Both the Special Forces '
(two of Meyer's informants) said the U.S:
operated a radio relay station on a mountain
top about 30 miles inside Laos.
'This station, called the 'Eagle's Nest,' was
used to transmit messages between South
Vietnam and Command and Control teams
operating beyond the mountain top in the
Laotian countryside."
The radio station, whose _exact location
was not specified, could have been located
near the Bolovens plateau, in Southern Laos, .
where the Pathet Lao told this correspon-
dent in 1970 there was a secret U.S. base.
The Pathet Lao liberation forces captured
.14?
STATI NTL
1R001100100001-1
0 0
THE ELIZABETH, N. J.
27 Nov 1972
Arrovelil-Ror Release,2001/03/04 : CIA-1311)
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i
DAILY JOURNAL
0 Al
-,?1,714 -i.t-
9
(Former Green Feret
Capt. Ember( F. Ihia5r,)
and seven ether 5prcial
Forces members were in.
Vfllf'dbi one of the maior
controversies of dm Viet,
Ilan) Wtir in 1%9 st hen ar.
rtiserl of mitrrlerinrt a fririln
azent. Now a civilian ill
Bloomfield, he t.pept niuny
hours bed pr, c tet lett cid by
Daily 3nurilai reporter
Thomas Mit balski. recall.
lug eveht5
assps?,jiiatien that he sayl
never were niade public),
By TBOMAS MICHALSKI
Journal Staff Writer
Former Green Beret Cant.
'Bobert F. Marasen said he
arid other Special Forces
peranimel were involved in
clandestine cross border in-
te,14enci,i operations n
Cambodia as far back as
That fact is actually ir
relevant. hon ever, in that
Email, units of 115. military
and the Central Intelligence
Agency have been operating
"unwritten about" i,cirtici;?
both Cambodia aori Lans for
several years previous to 12,
But, Marase? and seven
other Green Berets were
.accused by the Army with flin
June lno "elimmatinn' of
Thai Khac Chuyen, a triple
agent who jointly 7-erved the,
S. North Vietnam and South
Vietnam governments a: a
spy. This came directly as a
? residt. of "out..n1 country"
operations.
Chuven.Nlarasco told The
Daily sit-initial was not.
"properly checked out" hy
American Intelligence nfficials
?
rii-Ft of 5 articles
''''''''
before his asirignment. a; a
principal p;_iriit. for the Fifth
Special
Cambodia and L'.ins diving lie Fats "whirl -did
in Vietnam was a job . .
the 1,e:t intercits of my
country."
'Marasco's, first wife 'was a
collerie professor, a staiineh
anti ii.ar, hut. not necessarily
anti-Vietnam war type. She
a leader or
rcie anti war ronvornont M. her
tIrliver5Ity at the time. To be
married tn a Green Beret, it
just didn't g.e.i together.
"Of crini-Fe," he said, "just,
havin^ been in the sprvire
alone 13cinga Green
Beret eininnnunded it and then,
of course, the 'incident' corn-
poundcd it, more."
The an lalos-mmed infn an
emotion-laden controversy
that touched Congress, the
secretaries of the Ar cry and
Dii.fense. the Central In-
telligence Agency a nd
ItIaraisco was charged with
pumping two bullets into
litiniien"s head before his bodY
." dumped into the shark-
infested South China Sea. It
was an act. which Marasco has
since freely admitted,
'U' case, however , wait_
ari5ripe.d after a_ntilalic. outcry
at7
for a pl...2po:r1rj
Army 0110 roar::,11,1 o[ the_
That announcement came in
seritember 1255 from then-
aiy of tlie Ai ins, Staiiiikiy
P. Resor and, according to
White House Press Secretary
Ronald I,, Ziegler, the derision
was "approved" by President
Maraseri, aaid he "no longer
feels constrained from making
disclosures which will clear
the facts and show that, all of
us involved acted with honor
anti in the best interests of our
country."
With the war in Southeast
Asia now apparently corning
to an end, Marasco disclosed
in detail several incidents
leading up to Chuven's as-
sassination.
He spoke of the highly
secret "Project Gamma," how
and why the Berets ,rere
charged with murder . and
c.enspiracy, the reasons' why
they were eventually set free,
and of an incredible escano
plan.
To begin this story one must.
understand Marasco 11;m7r1f.,
Nrm? rimri .7411r] R
pa utiv7r in 1,1.7.'1'1i-her's. Bloom_
field insurance Ma-
u'.izeo is ouirl inlollit:ont., rn01
and calculating,
After his graduation from
Blnein-ifield High School,
Marasco went on to Fairleiel?,
pickirreiri University where. in
1962, he earned a hustness
adminisfratinn degree.
7\laramcn went intn the insur-
ance field In liiackgr^'Ird in
underwriting, claims adjusting
and sales.
.."1 ultimately wanted to
work for fly\ fathpr," be
"Riit wapfrd to be able to
otter something to his agency,
not. ;lust being the boss' son."
In ll16t3 I?larascit. at 24,
received his Army draft
notice.
-1 wont to the recruiter and
had him convince me why it
would be worth my while to
enlist. and give him an extra
year." he explained. "We
eame to an agreement. that, I
would gin into the counter-
intelligence ryirps. as afl.
enlii.ted man."
Itlarascn fr.w!,4\ that
he enlisted "beicante .,,anipd
ti stay out, of the infart
He went. in in
Nlarch 1P7P was
Officer's Candidate School an
went to Fort Benning, Ga.
"After six months at OCS
didn't want to go back I-
intelligence." he said. "I fel
the Army was taking the hes
officer candidates and putting
them in the 1.1ff branches 111,:r2
'intelligence, transportation
and the quartermaster corps.
"The best men were going to
all other fields, and it, seemed
like they were putting the
worst. officers in the infantry,"
ha said. "This should not. have
been because 'the infantry is
the most important branch in
the Army,"
Despite his feelings voiced
only moments earlier about
serving in the infantry.
Marasco said at this point, "I
thought could be a Znewl
infantry officer , , I just,.
wanted to stay in the infantry
let rip because of my central
. they (the Army) wouldn't,
intelligence training."
In April DO Marasco Was
commissioned a seerind lieu-
tenant and went back to Fort.
BrilRbird for a dd.itionat
trainine, He then war. assig.ned
tn intellic'ence unit in
Washington.
"T met the aF,signment7,
captain there." 'Marasco
recalled, prevailed upon
him to r.enri roe In Vietnam
beicane that was the only way
you could get out of any unit
at the time "
Before gning tin Southeast
Asia. Marasco went, to para-
chute school and other schools
required by the Special
a:signmellt 1-4 to
Birth Special Forces' Group
ElPret,..1 Soullii
Vietnam," Nlarasocin
c to the
aar.lel,ed,.4; \a?7*n1r;;.t 11:1/3' 41.0811:-..lit. AI irli.?in.?r7'nedlZvrilsricirin
where
drill ser:caqt," 1 !..IR vrd for ,O.X. or seven
The ne-, t sio it a; I- nut ninnar,,"
Trollhirrj for
Forces in Matason then ?oluniec,?ci fir
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c,;-%
roup
STATI NTL
1)0.5
Approved For Release 2001/0i/IR4dItIDP80-01
Viet Prisoner-Rescue
Unit to Be Disbanded
Fate of Secret Squad Parallels That of
Other Clandestine Operation's in S.E. Asia
BY GEOUGE McARTIWIL
? ? 'times stet writer
SAIGON?A secret corn- cuing a single .Arriericari
mand of American sol- prisoner held by the Viet'
C
' diers specially trained for Cong. though it has helped
prisoner rescue raids in Ic1 "'"'ll "umber of.
S .c. u t h Vietnamese cap-
hostile ,territory is sched- ? lives from jungle camps.
uled to be disbanded some The tAt-had a parallel
. lithe this month. mission of saving downed
According to an officer pilots in cases where
long involved in clandes-
ground commandos might
tine operations, the move
be required in addition to
will take from the U.S. the crews of Air Force
command in South Viet- rescue helicopters known.
nam its last cloak-and-da- as Jolly Green Giants. If:
? g e r outfit specifically any such operation was
honed to fight its way in ever mounted it has not
and-oht of prisoner camps.
been revealed. Some of fi-
(The secret unit being cers hint, however, that
'disbanded was trained for
use in the jungles of South
Vietnam, Laos and Cam-
bodia and not for such
spectaculars as the' unsuc-
cessful raid on Son Tay in
North Vietnam in Novem-
ber, 1970.)
Scattered Around
Though there are plenty'
of toughly skilled . Ameri-
cans in Sbuth Vietnam to
mount such raids if the
chance arises, they are
'scattered among many
Units. There are also small
outfits ? like Navy seal
.teams?available for such
things, but they are not
specifically trained and
kept in readiness for pris-
oner rescue grabs..
Consequently the stand-
down of the secret prison-
er rescue group has stirred
heated words within the
headquarters of U.S. Gen.
Creighton W. Abrams.
Abrams, who has an ill-
concealed suspicion Of the
value of elite units super-
imposed on the Army's reg-
ular structure, has repor-
tedly resisted arguments
to go lightly on the with-
drawal of such outfits.
some operations of this
type took place.
Not Many Captives
One reason the unit has
few successes ,to its credit
is that it was used sparing-
ly and under the strictest
limitations. To avoid en-
dangering the lives of any
captives with "fishing ex-
peditions." special raids
were ordered only when
intelligence turned up
hard and immediate infor-
mation on the location of
Viet Cong POW camps.
Thus, while the unit had
few successes it could
equally boast few failures
in the sense of botched or
sloppy efforts. -
The number of Ameri-
can captives in Viet Cong
camps is also very small.
Casualty figures list.. 463
Americans missing in
South Vietnam. The Unit-
ed States claims 78 of
these were known from
various sources to have
been alive at the time of
their capture and were
consequently listed as
war prisoners. Of these,
however, only 20, have
S p e cial prisoner -res
commando of a relative
handful of men is there-
fore small in the face of
the overall troop with-
drawal demands?the U.S.
force level is now 127,000
men and the current goal
is 69,000 by May 1.
? The withdrawal,
however, underscores the
unpublicized decline in all
eland estine operations
which has paralleled the
pullout of regular troops.
eseasagownen a su
sidiary unit known as the
B-57 Detachment precipi-
tated what became known
as the Green Beret case.
That case ? which in-
volved the execution of a
suspected double agent?
blew the cover on how ex-
tensive clandestine opera-
tions had grown in South
Vietnam. It also caused a
number of heads to roll
within the U.S. establish-
ment and resulted in a
general hunkering down
,CIA Cutback ? of cloak-and-dagger types.
This actually hega
Military spokesmen say
about 1969 when the Cen-
n/
that a number of SOG per-
tral Intelligence Agency sonnel have been drib-
began to sharply trim
bling out for several
its involvement in
many programs. Part of
this was caused by
Abrams, who disliked hav-
ing Army types under CIA
command as was the case
in several areas. At any
rate, the CIA began to
withdraw, provincial
agents from the Phoenix
program?aimed at root-
ing out and killing Viet
Cong "Phantom govern-
ment" officials?and quit
funding (and controlling)
such programs as the
training school at Vung
Tau which turned out
government Revolutiona-
ry Development cadre.
Though the CIA's tenta-
cles still reach all the sen-
sitive areas of control in
South Vietnam, the em-
phasis now is less on
"operational" areas and
more on pure intelligence
gathering.
Paralleling the CIA's ap-
preciably lower silhouette,
the Green Beret troopers
of the 5th Special Forces
Group were pulled out a
year ago?their clandes-
tine operations being ab-
sorbed by an outfit known
Luontns. its future will
probably be sharply di-'
minished within the next
several months when the
troop withdrawal program
enters its final phase.
Paralleling t h e s e de-
clines in the "secret war'
is the increased use of sen-
sors and computers re-
quiring fewer men in the
field and more brainpower
at headquarters.
Long-range patrols into
Cambodia, Laos and even
North Vietnam have been .
virtually eliminated by
the seeding of the Ho oil
'Minh Trail with electronic
sensors.. Much of the am-
cputerized analysis on the
readouts from these sen-
sors is now done from a se-
cret Air Force establish-
ment in Thailand and not
in South Vietnam (though
the results are still chan-
neled into 7th Air Force
headquarters at Tan Son
N1-alt where the air. war
-c-,:r:tinues to be run).
While clandestine oper-
as SOG?the Studies and ations on the ground have
Observations Group. SOG lessened, the Air Force
is a cloak - and - dagger has also cut the number of
grabbag at Abrams' head- planes that were part of
quarters, incorporating a the "secret war." These
dozen or so outfits which planes were in conglomer-
do everything from super-. ate outfits .known as spe-
secret long-range patrols cial operations squadrons.
to analyzing documents They included everything
an d interrogating top- from helicopters for drop-
rank prisoners. ping penetration agents to
b e e nacknowledged by r a dio -.pac_ked executive
Since the prisoner Less Visible
rescue unitAwA for d .at_. V ie t C o n g _prosaganda , jets equipped to pick up
NRO011e r 0 [M. tcalgsA Wfif04a
? "t4s-t. 4pssiMpRoolitip014)000/4n
te c
ter the bigtt agents eep in enemy
lean -troops in 1965-66 it The justification for the today than they-. were a land. The
quad
has not succeeded in res-
rons also
STATINTL
tfrir+ - 4
STATINTL THE FNJX)11 DAILY =GRAPH MAGAZINE
Approved For Release 2091/0/641:330!?-RDP80-01
When Britain pulled but of Rhodesia after the 1965 Unila
the CIA worked. t5 ferret out details of the sanction-busi
In the popular. traditions of spying, secret documents disa
were used to convey messages in invisible ink. It was a shock
one of the informers was a prominent lawyer. But it was noi
,Iihe CIA had expandedinto an a'real where the British were una
'active in Egypt, Iran and Syria. E. H. COOKRIDGE ends his (
-and looks at the Director, Richard Helms
ANY of the bright young /
men Allen Dulles had v
recruited to CIA from
law offices and univer-
sities had gained their
spurs in London, where they were sent
to glean some of the methods of the
British Secret Intelligence Service.
Dulles enjoyed making wisecracks
? about the Victorian and Indian Army
traditions still surviving in the British
secret service, but he had a healthy
respect for its unrivalled experience
and great professionalism. He knew
that CIA could learn a lot from the
British about operations in the Middle
'East and Africa, where its stations
were rapidly expanding.
.7 After Archibald Roosevelt, one of
4. CIA's foremost "Arabists", had re-
stored cordial relations with SIS when
station head in London, a plan of co-
pperation was devised for Africa, where
most of the former British colonies had
gained independence, and were be-
coming subject to strong Soviet and
Chinese pressure. Roosevelt was still
in London when, in 1965, Rhodesia
made her momentous "Unilateral
. Declaration of Independence" (UDI),
which led to the conflict with the
British Government.
?
There is no better instance of the
strengthening of CIA-SIS collabora-
tion than the hitherto undisclosed
story of the services CIA rendered
the British authorities in Rhodesia,
particularly since about 1968.
Indeed, in assisting the British SIS
" in its thankless task of implementing
the policy of economic sanctions
against the Smith regime, CIA put its
relations with the Portuguese in
jeopardy. It has an enduring under-
Standing with the Portuguese Govern-
ment and its PIM secret service on
many aspects: NATO security, anti-
communist operations, the use of radio
stations in Portugal and her colonies,
official, who had joined it in 1952 from
and of bases
? fAsma:mo il 134AcuRpP80-01601R001100100001
and Special Forces
biqup and Macao. However thin
'the to Africa in the guise of an official o
the U.S. Development Aid Agency.
British sanction policy became, British
consular offices and SIS men were
supposed to watch the steady flow of
Rhodesian pig-irm, tobacco, and other
products through the Portuguese ports
of Lorenco Marques and Beira in East
Africa to Europe and the Far East.
Merchants and shippers there ?had
made fortunes out of the traffic which
the Portuguese were bound, by United
Nations resolutions and agreements
with Britain, to regard as illegal.
After the closure of British missions
in Salisbury all information about
Rhodesian exports dried up at source.
At this juncture CIA stepped in to
assist the British. It was not merely a
labour of love. American tobacco
syndicates in Virginia, Georgia,
North and South Carolina, Ten-
nessee and Kentucky greatly in-
creased their production and sales to
Europe when Rhodesian tobacco .journeying between Salisbury and the
Other CL
were Cal
former A
Francis IN
who had
cloak-anc
Cuba and
Wigant,
Congo ch
and sevez
the most
Edward'
Salisbury.-
1957 from the State Department
from 1959 he headed the East an
South African section and, at the tim
of his new appointment, was Statio
gead in Pretoria. Among his variou
exploits he was reputed to hay
initiated the first contacts between th
South African government and D
Banda of Malawi.
The CIA agent's were perpetually
growers lost most of their trade
through sanctions. Traditionally,
Rhodesian tobacco was used for cigar
and cigarette manufacture in Belgium,
Holland, Germany and Switzerland.
When these supplies dried 'up, Euro-
pean manufacturers turned to Ameri-
can growers. But by and by Rhodesian
exports began to flow again, by the
use of false certificates of origin and
smuggling through the Portuguese
ports and through Durban in South
Africa, much' tothe displeasure of the
Americans.
Thus, obliging the British and help-
ing American business, CIA ordered
its agents to ferret out the secrets of the
sanction-busting schemes devised by
Mr Ian Smith's regime. Soon the CIA
station in Salisbury was bustling with
activity. Since 1962 it had been headed
by Richard La Macchia, a senior CIA
Mozambique ports, and Murray was
temporarily posted to Lusaka to main- STAT I NTL
tam n personal contact with British
officials resident in Zambia. Mr Ian
Smith and his cabinet colleague, Mr
J. H. Howman, who looks after foreign
affairs as well as security and the
secret service of the Rhodesian regime,
were not unaware of the unwelcome
operations of the Americans. They
suffered them for the sake of avoiding
an open clash with Washington. Their
patience, however, became frayed
when it was discovered that secret
documents had disappeared from the
headquarters of the ruling Rhodesian
National Front__Party. Subsequently,
-1
continued
U. NEVIS t.; WORLD REPORT
STATINTL 1 006 1S7I
Approved For Release 2001/0i/u4 : 1A-RDPAT-glY1TFiD
_
,21)i.1\ )
NV/ h
L:,51
[LIZ/ L
r,
IF I'ki-"-?\0.?
STATINTL'?
ii if
I
.1,1 i/ [
V.. 1[..,,,,, N.::,?! ,,.., i i
\ 14" .
?11 P if/ I F it .)) I
.1?.h.Vir-A h
STATINTL
Just how valid are ,the charges against the Central intelligence Agency? What
guarantees do Americans have that it is under tighLcontrol? A pint-by-point de-
fense of the:organization comes from a man v,rho served in top posts for 13 years.
V.E7
Following is an analysis of intelligence operations
.? by Lyman Ii. Kirkpatrick, Jr., former executive direc-
tor-comptroller of. ihe Central Intelligence Agency:
The Central Intelligence Agency was created by. the Na-
tional Security Act of 3.017 as an independent agency in the
executive branch of the United .States Government, report-
ing to the President. Ever since that date it has been sub-
jected to criticism both at home and abroad,: for what it has
allegedly done as well as for what it 'has faded to do.
Our most cherished freedoms are those of speech and the
press and the right to protest. It is not only a right, but an
? obligation of citizenship to be critical of our institutions, and
no organization .can be immtine from scrutiny. It is necessary
that criticism be responsible, objective a?d constructive.
It should be recognized that as' Americans we have an
inherent mistrust of anything secret: The unknown is always
a worry. We distrust the powerful. A secret organization de-
sexibed as powerful must appear as most dangerous of all.
It was my responsibility for my last 12 years with the CIA
?fh?st as inspector general, then as executive director-
comptroller?to insure that all responsible criticisms of the
CIA were properly and thoroughly examined. and, when
-required., remedial action taken. I am confident this practice
has been followed by my .suceessors, not because of any -
direct knowledge, but bccatise the present Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence was my respected friend and colleague for
more than two decades, and this is how he operates, :
It is with this aS background that I comment on die cur-
Tent allegations, none of which are original with this critic: but,
'any of which should be of concern to any American citizen.
CIA and The Intelligence System Is Too Big.
This raises the questions of how much we are willing to
pay for national security, and how much is enough.
First, .what arc the responsibilities of the CIA and the
other intelligence organizations of our Government?
Very briefly, the intelligence system is charged with in-
suring that the United States learns as far in advance as pos-
sible of any potential threats to our national interests. A
moment's contemplation will put in perspective what this ac-
tually ncans. It can range all the way from Bussian missiles
STATINTL
pointed at North America to threats to U. S. ships or bases,
to expropriation of American properties, to dangers to any
one of OM allies whom we are pledged by treaty to protect.
It is the interface of world competition between superior
powers. IktN, are those who have served in the intelligence
system who have not wished that there could be some
two of responsibilities' or some lessening of encyclopedic re-
quiremeiils about the world. It is also safe to suggest that our
senior policy makers undoubtedly wish that their span of
required information could be Jess and triat not every dis-
turbance in every part of the world came into their purview...
- (Note: This should hot be interpreted as meaning that the
U. S. means to intervene. It does. mean that when there is a
Mr. Kirkpatrick
Lyman - B. Kirkpatrick; Jr.,
now prbfessoi- of political
science at Brown University,
joined the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in 1947 and
advanced to assistant direc-
tor, inspector general and ex-
ecutive director-comptroller
before leaving in 1965. He
has written extensively on
? intelligence and espionage.
Among other honors, he holds
the President's Award for
'Distinguished Federal Civil-
ian Service and the Distin?
guishod Intelligence Medal.
boundary dispute or major disagreement between other na-
tions, the U.S. is expeeLed to exert its leadership to help
solve the dispute. It does mean that we will resist subversion
against small, new nations. Thus the demand by U. S. policy ?
makers that they be kept informed.)
What this means for our intelligence system is world-
wide coverage.
-To my personal knowledge, there has not been an Admin-
istration in Washington that has not been actively concerned
with the size and cost of the intelligence system. All Admin-
istrations have kept the intelligence agencies under tight eon-
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1:1(510 .1 no e
TM DOSTCY'T GLOBE
Approved For Release 2001103RM .1-stIA-RDP80-01601R0
?
,Joe Pilati proce.sd ,The drug's are
'.Globe Staff.
, ?
? , .11 flown into South Vietnam
-
A foriner Green Beret aboard both military and .
-a warded- nine Purple
"7".
\ un
%.
? asserted yesterday that he civilian aircraft.
.egularly purchased large I, ? Hearts, the Distinguished
c./ ? quantities of opium in Laos The coitgressmen's Service Cross and Silver
with funds provided by the '1port also alleged that both and Bronze Stars...
I Central Intelligence Agen- the Laotian aimy corn-
Cy. mander,
lie said he spoke. about
- . , ?
?
? His testimony came dur-
ing the final clay of ."Win-
?,ier Soldier investigation
sponsored: by Vietnam
? Veterans Against the War
(VVAW) at Boston's Fan-
euil
1 miner Sgt. Paul With-
ers, 24, a Springfield native
now living in Cambridge,
told 306 persons: "When I
'was in Laos in 1966, one of
; any Main functions. was to
buy opium from Moo
r e s 11.1 n, using CIA
funds."
?
?
'He said his orders to buy
-opium "came down fi-om
T contact man' the CIA
:-and were "only Verbal,
never on paper," Payment
to the Meo tribesmen was
made in "gold and silver,
'which .carne in on an agenL
ey plane," he added.
?Withers said i-?pium pick--
'ups at a small base camp in
northern Labs, which he
- and two other Green Be--
'rets built, were made by
-"Air America" planes. "It
;was. Americans 'who picked
up the opium' in its raw,
unprocessed form, he said.
Gen. Ouan
'
?his involvement in opluni
koun, and Soutn Vianain-
trafficking to Sens. Mike.
\._ cse Premier Tran Thien
Gravel (D-Alaska) and s
, Khicm are involved h the
i p t i .c. o r r u. on of customs .McGoveyn
G.eorge
(ll-S.D.) and th aides of
agents . and drug, traffick--
: Sess. John ,S t e n n i s
; in. _ . .._ .
- - - ' - (D-Miss.) and William. ?
Withers said that,. after Fulbright (D-Ark.) in.
coMpleting basic training June "but was not aware. of .
at Fort Dix in the fall of any subsequent action
3 1965, he W a S sent to Nha -taken by the legislators.
? ; Trang, Souh Vietnam. Al-
though he was "ostensibly" ? He said FBI and Army
stationed there, .he said he Criminal Investigation Di-
was placed "on loan" to the vision (CID) agents had
CIA in January 1966 with visited him "three or four
? orders to help "train and times, most recently about ,-
- qui Mo t
p eribesmen in'.
_ .. .?.. ., a rnonth and a half ago in ,
? counterinsurgency" against Camr:dge," to question him
.
Pathet Leo guerrillas. about his allegAions. e said -
. ij.
, A report in july by-two
j'House Foreign Affairs
'Committee members, Reps.
Robert Steele (D-Conn.)
'and Morgan MUrphy
(D-Ill.), alleged that "Air
. -.America" aircraft, .. con-
'traded by the CIA, have
been used "to transport
'opium from northern Laos
into the capital city of
:Vientiane, and that, once
_,. . .
. ..fact, hsi mother in Springfile
The traiinng was ".in
, and his wife,now living in
the main part of my job" in.
1 Laos, Withers , arid,but South Hadley, had also
- been questioned.
"there were never fewer . __
Another participant in
than two opium pickups a
week" during the year he yesterday's VVAW panels, ,
served there. Charles Knight of the- /
Withers said that, after
receiving language training
in various Southeast sian
dialects while at Nita
Trang, he was "stripped of
my uniform and all Ameri-
can credentials." , before,'
going to Laos. ' .?
He s a i ci the CIA
"wouldn't ? even let me
write my own letters. Th-..-T
gave me blank sheets of'
paper and told. me to sign
at the bottom. Then the'
? agency typed out letters
sent to my parents and my
girlfriend."
Discharged last- Dedem-
. her after post-Laos service
in Cambodia and South.
? Vietnam Withers-. _was-
Committee of Concerned
Asian Scholar s, called
opium 'the largest export'
commodity in the Laotian'
economy" and commented:.
."In this -sense, it is not at.
all strange that the CIA.,
should aid and protect its'
transport." ,
Other testimony
ed statements by Indochina:
veterans who said the)'
were former or current'
heroin addicts. .
STATI NTL
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SOUTH
GULF ',I=
'OP _ VIETNAM
- ?
C AMBODIA is ? a comparatively ?
? recent victim of American Imperial-
ist. aggression in Indo-China?U.S. forc-
es invaded it only last year. The polit-
ical prologue, it may be said, was the.
? Guam doctrine?the new Course in Asia
proclaimed by President Nixon. two
? :years 'ago at the U.S. air loice base in
? Guam. As put by Nixon 'himself, the
point of lids doctrine Is that the United
States 'must play a substantial role in
.:Asia. but would like the problem of war
tincl the responsibility for it to be as,
lumed In ever greater degree by the
Asian countries themselves. In the
epinion of, many Asian public le.adas
publications the veiled meaning of
this is that Washington wants to "pit
Asians against Asians," that is, to have
its war in Asia fought .by others In the
selfish Interests of the U.S. ? 'ruling
'element. The tempestuous?eVents of the.
?
last eighteen months ? In the once
tranquil: coin-lily of .Cambodia offer a
classic 'example of how this is worked
In practice.
YANKrns 114 PHOIYI?Plaiff
- .. ?
. taken by the Defence Ministry: tilt,
? ??
P,P4P
In the city there are colts of barbed
wire everywhere. The barbed wire IS
strung on poles right on the sidewalk;
In front of all government buildings?
whether a post office or a ministry. The
more Important the office, the mor.
? wire there Is In front of it. First place
Witshington makes no secret, now of -
Its massi.ve.? bomb Strikes against vast ?
street it stands on Is covered with rows
of it, and at its walls are Piles of 5and-STAT I N-11
areas of Cambodia, but "ailrifs other -
Military operations against Cambodia's .
??ready to man machine-guns. There are
?- ? bags behind which soldiers stand, by
? patriotic forces are painstakingly :
camouflaged by its :official representa-
tives .in the. Cambodian- capital, This
summer, for Instance, quite a few groups.
of American serviceracm were flown ?
Into Pnonr Penh from Saigon, but In' . press centre a representative of the
. . military command cautions journalists
-each case they viere dressed as civilians. ..? '
Thus "camouflaged," the visitors ? were ..-.. that It is risky to take photographs In
then. deposited in various- parts of the , -- the streets?a nervous soldier may
country by U.S. Embassy- helicoPters, . Open fire without warning. A state of
This. operation, directed, by the? Penta- al. emergency has been declared In the
he CIA 'rounded It and by night approach its
, Is kept secret from . capital, for guerilla units have stir-
gon and tire
and world . public opinion.
-'What IS more, it Is conducted in - suburbs. No one may enter the city ,
defiance of the ban Imposed by the U.S. after sunset; all roads are bloaked by
Congress on American land operations . government soldiers vino huddle fear-
In Cambodia-. But In Nom Penh itself, fuIly around ? the American M-11-3
armoured cars placed at their disPosal.
It Is widely known that the Pentagon's -
"special forces" units?the notorious /Winery batteries have been mount-,
'Green Berets?systematically make-ed even in the centre of the city, on the
raids deep into the interior of guerilla Mekong embankment, their guns train-
areas, Very often they ? disguise . them- ed on the opposite bank from .- which
selveS as insurgents. The Green Berets guerillas sometimes open up fire with
carry out sabotage and terrorist mis- : mortars and Mobile rocket launchers,
sions in the guerilla areas and pick From tine to time they even blow. up
'targets for U.S. bombers. ? . a munitions dump right in the city or
, American army planes can be seen shower hand grenades on picked tar-
daily in the Nom- Penh' airport though gets, such as the Saigon mission, After.
their presence Is partly 'concealed: the ? one such attack the South Vietnam
. A.
Identification marks on some of the ambassador landed In hospital. i4.
.planes have been ' painted over. Last guerilla attack on the arsenal In June
January guerillas blew up a few Amer- caused an explosion of such force that
- lean planes- in the airport and since the flames rose 120 metres and the sur-
then the building has remained half in rounding streets were showered with
ruins. The surviving part Is footless and shell and mine fragments mixed with
Its .windows are gaping holes. The wind . stone and rubble, ;Y?
blows through It freely and the floor is From a white four-storey building on.
..
strewn with rubble and plaster. But out the corner of one of the Pnorn Penh
on the airfield American military trans- boulevards and Avenue Mao Tse-tung,
. ports and sharp-nosed fighters again near the Mekong embankment, hangs
come and go, - ? the American flag. This is the American
The road from the ahport to. the Embassy building and the Americans
capital Is blocked off every three occupying R?are jestingly called -"the
Yankees from Mao Street." Recently,
though, the street was. renamed?either
at the 'request of the American ? dip-
lomats or because of the change in .the
political climate or the Cambodian
capital.,
-'?The .-American Embassy In . Paom
also machine-gun nests at the gates of
nearly all government offices. Prom
time to time people calling at thorn FIN'
carefully searched at gun?point. At the
hundred .metres by empty petrol bar-
rels, so that no car can speed past.
Near these roadblocks are stationed
. groups of soldiers equipped with
American. quick-firing -rifles and field
'telephones, end wearing American
green's tropical uniforms': and helmets.
'1 nu e cf.
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_
By Trudy I:Zubin
.. Stag co7yea,00nde at of
The Christian science Monitor
?
He said the incursions were made at Lai
Chau in the northern tip of Laos and :?,a10n2;
Sing, also in northern Laos, and that the
? 'units moved about 50 to75 kilometers north
-Fort Collins, Colo, and northwest into a large open area touch-
ing on the town of Lant Sang in Yunam
Province in the People's .Republic of China.
Mr. and said his information was based
on studies he had read while serving as a
plans .ociicc-r in Thailand on the U.S. Army
general staff and in conversations with mil-.
itary. personnel. ?
The United States Central Intelligence
? Agency "equipped and directed" incursions
by mercenaries into Chinese territory from
northern Laos, according to a former Green
.Beret captain..
Lee ln.end, now a student at Newark, N.J.,
State College and a delegate to the National
; Student Association Congress hero- say;;
j "no Americans have crossed the C3-1ese
border." However, the CIA recruited ethnic
Lao's and Chinese for the crossings. In ad-
dition, .he maintains. the CIA "dir'ected re-
connaissance missions and monitored oper-
ations along. the Chinese border."
Enaotional speeelt
?
' Mr. Mond repeated in an interview with
thf.. Monitor charges he first aired at a
forum on war .crimes sponsored by the
Vietnam Veterans Against the War- as. part
of the congress last Saturday.
The tall, black veteran of seven years,
Seven months service who left the Army in
June., 1970, after being wounded three times
?winner of the Silver Star and three Bronze
Stars ? struggled with his emotions as he
told the cheering NSA delegates on Monday
that he had "made up my mind after a year
of deliberations to disclose this information
because these things were part of an on-
going philosophy of ... the executive branch
of this country."
. Mr. Mond said that about 3,000 Chinese
were in northern Laos when he was in
Thailand. from June, 1069 to June, 1970, and
that they then controlled the quarter of the
country north of the royal capital Luang
Prabang. ?
The majority were engineers, building a
north-south road from.China to Luang Pra-
bang. He said "studies indicate" that they
hoped to push down to Vientiane, the pres-
ent provisional capital.
Chinese infantry units were in Laos to
protect the road builders, he added, and
antiaircraft installations were built in Lacs
to protect them.
? ?
Incursions cscyibnd?
?
The incursions were aimed at watching-
Chinese moverrApprovedfotReleas
?
He also served with the 101st Airborne in
Vietnam.
The former captain cited as one main
reason for his disaffection with American
policies the massive flood of drugs pouring
out of Lacs into Thailand and then into the
?
hands of American troops.
added "it is inconceivable that this much
opium could be transported on American
aircraft without their superiors knowing it."
Mr. P.Iond said he had never personally
witnessed such shipments. However, he
said, that while he was in Bangkok doing
research for his study on Thailand "I talked
with several young Air America pilots. They
had been helicopter or fixed-wing pilots in
Vietnam?and they told me that the drug
trade from Vientiane to Bangkok was vast.
They indicated that it was being flown in.
I took it for granted that since they were
relating this, they had firsthand knowledge."
While in Thailand Mr: Mend's unhappi-
ness with the drug problem led him to
write a letter in April, 1970, to the com-
mander of U.S. Army Support Forces in
Thailand in which he indicated that be-
tween 10 and 15 percent of the junior enlist-
drugs daily.
rehabilitation
0 men on his base used hard
He .nIso initialed a drug-
He charged that the CIA "actively cncour- program on his base.
aged the growing of poppies, the flower frcirn'l
which opium is made, by Montag,nard tribes-
men (on-the opium rich Plain of Jars) whom.
the agency recruits as mercenaries.
Hc later qualified this statement by add-
ing, "perhaps they (CIA) don't always -need ?
to encourage them (the Montagnards) to
grow poppies because it is so lucrative." He
added, "But I am sure they don't discourage
them. If they cut .off this source .of income,
they would have to -support the tribesmen
far beyond what they are paying them now."
Mr. Mond also charged that the opium is
often flown illicitly to major populations in
Laos by Air America, a private airline said
to be controlled by the CIA. "Opium comes
out of the Plain of Jars catch as catch can,"
he said in an interview with the Monitor,
"hut from Moung Suoi, a major CIA bane
which has an airstrip, . . . I am aware that
pilots would fly it down to Vientiane for
their own profit."
Planes .carry drugs
He said he "knew" that Air America was
flying opium from Vientiane to Udon Thant
on the southern Lao border from where it
would be. transported to Bangkok and per-
haps on. to the United States. He said that
the base at UdOn had one of the biggest drug
problems of any?U.S. base.
Mr. Mond said he could not say v:hethei-
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MANCiF;STr.R, ENGLAND
GUARDIAN
? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
WEEKLY - cinc.N-A
AU CH, 4 1)71,
THE C-113/t.-tDiAhl August 14 1 071
Arnerr.:an Intolligenc:e faked abroadcast in Prince
Sihanoui,:s 'nice in its latest attempt to regain
influence in (.1:ambodi.-: 1. D. Allman reports
from Ph.n,_?m.Panh on the dangerous rivalry
hymieen the CIA and the American State and
Defence r.);.?partrneras.
...-
F1 Y
C 4-1 1 ki ;
While the armies of Phnom Perth
am! Saigon fight the forces of
? Hanoi for control of Cambodia,
another war is being fought for
the same territory by another set
of allies against another ;Hint /tutor
from the north. The. other (--t)-bel-
ligerents are the American Depart-
ments or State and Defence like
Cambodia and South N'ietnam,
hardly natural allies. Tit,: invader
Ohl. has brought them together,
to use Bresidettt Nison's phrase,
is the Ce rural intelitgonce .\g-tiney.
The CiA; 1: vi the Nor,-;:
or. .7u riposted to hilYtt
been deprived ?,,f th0tr Cambodian
enclaves last year, auout the time
of the US-South ;Vietnamese in-
vasion, when the White House
ordered that the poShinvasion US
role in Cambodia be as above-
board as possible. Both criteria
seemed to rule out the CIA, but
?both the 'North Vietnamese- and
the CIA keep trying to encroacli
on Cambodia from their secret
bodian 1-Ceiirts and -minds from tilt,
State and Defence departments,
Unfortunately for the C1 A,
Baczynithy,i. a Eh iner-sPitta i ng ex-
Peace Corps Volunteer. noticed it
coasiderable difference in the
words of Sihnor?k as beantod over
vitacito Peking, and the statements
attributed to him by the Phnom
Pon!, liovernment. After months
of checking, he verified the eXkl-
enfra of the clandestine Pattse
Radio. and established tile idint ity
of its operators.
Baczynsliyj's discovery, how-?
ever, was more than a journal's:tic
coup. It revealed the latest in a
series of failed CIA attentpts to,
maintain cover for its Cant'odian
operatiOnS, 1111011 are bitterly re-
sented by the foreb.tm .and.
initilary officers who predominate
here. 'She agency, in fact, has been
Irving rather unsuccessfully to re-
gal,n ii pioce of the Cambodian-.
action ever since Ifi,Stit?
Prince Sihanouk sent the US aid
outposts In southern Laos. ,ntission packing, \vincli had served
Whereas Ihmoi's South Laotian Os the agency's main Ca at
base is known as the Ho Chi Minh cover.
the CIA's is called the The Green Leret .scandal in Viet-
'Annex.' 11 is a white, multi- nam, for example, grew' out of a
St oreyed building in the I-totian CI crder LUIIIr0i1)::d'2i n "-
vi,a,kong rive, town of pa h,? 'he titerne prejutdice one. Of its Ca m-
building looks no every ,11.,...bod131?1 Oflerativc,s. ? The al,:i,-ency
.thirilt:ing11 1 supporte.d anti-Sihanouk in-
has no Nvint?lows, is co% (11 1 Ii surgentst, even when the Sttite De-
ani,unna-e iiistead of tropical ? test, partment was trying for a Cam-
and can he entered only by bochan rapprochement in the late
the right combination .0.11 wi 0 c- 1960s,.
tronic board lock. . Stvertil times burned, the State
11)0 CIA's latest Cambodiie,t Departitilint, Witten :it resumecklip-
CUrSion recently was limited hy a toniatic relations. with Cambodia
enterprising, Phnom Penh-b.:1:J i in 1959, tried to make sure there
American correspondent rained would be no CIA agents in the ern-
Boris Baczynskyt. \\ ho ttiscevercd ' bass y woodpile. Even now, osten-
nothing less titan a CIA i?lot sibly, there is no ct
component
S\ nthesise Prince Noroder,? at all ill the 100-man Li1, mission
nouit's inimitably squeak:\ vttice, in Phnom Eut01-1.
and broadcast it ever the border Never daunted, the CIA lis kept
into Cambodia. The venture. was up its 'cfltris to develop its own
not .ottlt.: Ck ?
Ilk . trincezinb:?YlytAiiiPtiallied:i7onlulocnomeaspowt0-41Qrilt4 L.,,IA-RDP80-01601R001100100001-1
ung Sill i_ts into his mouth. hut also . ft:Ong to ?stay out of the Cain-
an effort 10 win a,?ay a 1(?\,.. Cain-
hoditin political erisiS, the Agency
unheltnx,vn to the diplomats, re
layect promises of support to lb
anti-Sihanouk faction. And as som
as the Cambechan war broke out
Agettiey-run teams of Laotian mer-
cenaries began ranging down into
Cambodia on "intelligence
patrols," which the Pakse station
hoped would be the landing parties
rot a whole CIA-run Clandestine
Army in Cambodia.
-
he Afnencan --tibbling rivalry,
might otherwise It0 us amus-
ing as a nineteenth-century brou-
lrilia between Whitehall and Simia
0,:er of some Indian
Itt,c,:arLtitoll,. already is producing
i;tunnte unedifying complications. .
The C.[..1,'s Pakse ofwvations------
whi6h to:- all their ingenuity so far
lhtve failed lo keep the Com-
munists from taking oVel' II10:4 of
flagrant \dotal ions
of Laotian neutrality. And neither
-acts's premier, Prince Souvanna
Plittuma, who is a northerner, nor
the CS Embassy in faraway Vital-
thine, scorns able to curb the
Pakse opera', ion,
Here in Cambodia, where the CS
entbassy has become. 1!?,e nexus
of Cambodian itolitical power, the
American infighting has airoady
produced some domes'iic
cot I ical ions --- notably affecting
the much p,iblicised rivalry tie-
1.'. eon Premier-delegate Siscrwath
Strait Malah and lt.ilarshal Don Nol's
yonng. and antbitious brother, Lon
Non. The embassy. likes Sin!!
Ttdittak, and hardly bothers to ytiil
its distaste far Lon Nan.
t,Vith Sirik who has
shitimed Cr:i contacts, emerging
tts the embassy's Irian, said Lon
Non emerging as the CIA protege,
the Ame.rican squabble sritems to
contain Leeds potentially as. dis-
astrous Os those that i.iisrupted
Laos a dcciartt-2, At tkit.
the CIA. so di.sliked the State De-
.i,rtment's candidate for premier
f Laos that it sent its own Laotian
army marching north to drive him
out of Vientiane.
Several times routed in its efforts
to infiltrate Cambodia, the CIA,
like Ilanoi, may decide on a
strategy of letting ? dissension
Fpring up arnong its adversaries.
The State Department wants to
keep the Cambodian operation-
loon, clean, and honest. The
Department keeps pushing
for a big in-country US military
e.'ct .,1-dishrittent. ?
"t?Zoit Might say we're caught ii?
11:0 middle,- said one foreign ser-
vice officer recently, empathising"
with the Cambodians who are simi-
larly caught betwenn North and
Sstch Vietnam.
STATI NTL
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WINNING IMARTS AND MINDS
LLI J 5
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11,-.41,nAY4
From the beginning, the core of the tragedy in Southeast Asia
has been the inability of Western political leaders; and par-
ticularly American political leaders, to grasp the nature . of
insurgency in areas formerly under colonial rule, or the limita-
tions of counterinsurgency to qUell it. Accordingly, The
Nation is devoting almost this entire isSue 'to Eqbal Ahmacrs
essay on the subject. In somewhat different form it will be a
chapter in his forthcoming Reaction 'and Revolution in the
Third World (Pantheon). Mr. Ahmad is a Fellow of the Adlai
'Stevenson Institute in Chicago.
To write on counterinsurgency one must first explain
what the so-called "insurgencies" really are. In the United
States that may be difficult because for the most part the
social scientists who write on revolutionary warfare have
been proponents of counterinsurgency. As a result, the
biases of incumbents are, built into the structure, images
and language of contemporary Western, especially Amer-
ican, literature on the subject. We have come to accept
ideologically contrived concepts and words as objective
descriptions.
One could, take innumerable examples?terrorism, sub-
versicni, pacification, urbanization, protective 'reaction,
defensive interdiction, etc.--and expose the realities be-
hind these words and phrases. The term counterinsurgency
. is itself an excellent -example. Like all coinages in this
area, it is value-laden and misleading. In fact, counterin-
surgency is not at all directed against insurgency, which
Webster defines as "a revolt against a government, not
reaching the proportions of an organized revolution; and
not recognized as belligerency." The truth is, the Congress
and the country would be in uproarif the government were
to claim that U.S. counterinsurgency capabilities could
conceivably be available to its clients for putting down
"revolts not reaching the proportions of an organized
. revolution." The truth is the opposite: counterinsurgency
is a multifaceted assault against organized revolutions.
, The euphemism is not used by accident, nor from igno-
rance. It serves to conceal the reality of a foreign policy
dedicated to combating revolutions abroad; it helps to
:relegate ? revolutionaries to the status of outlaws. The
reduction of a revolution to mere insurgency is also an im-
plicit denial of its legitimacy. In this article, counterin-
surgency and counterrevolution are used interchangeably.
Analytically, counterinsurgency may be discussed in
terms of two primary models--the conventional-estab-
lishment and the liberal-reformist; and two ancillary
'models?the punitive-militarist and the technological-at-
tritive. I term these latter ancillary because they develop
after the fact?from actual involvement in counterre,volu-
.tion, and from interplay between the conventional and
liberal institutions and individuals so involved. The .
models, though identifiable .in to =s- of the iziesasit:u2U
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L L.; '
STATI NTL
scope of their applicatio ,
of the agencies and individuals favoring them, are oper-
ationally integrated in the field. 1 outline them here:
.Although monolithic in its goal of suppressing revolu-
tions; the theory and practice of counterinsurgency reflects
the pluralism of the Western societies to which most of its
practitioners and all of its theoreticians belong. A pluralis-
tic, bargaining political culture induces an institutionalized
.compulsion to compromise. Within a defined boundary,
there ,can be something for everyone.. Hence, the actual
strategy and tactics of counterinsurgency reflect compro- ?
mise, no one blueprint being applied in. its original, un.
adulterated form. This give-and-take contributes to a most
fateful phenomenon of counterrevolutionary involvement:
groups and individuals continue to feel that their particu-
lar prescriptions were, never administered in full dosage
and at the right .intervals. They show a tendency toward
self-justification, a craving to continue with and improve
their formulas for success. Severe critics of specific "blun-
ders" and "miscalculations," they still persist in seeing
"light at the end of the tunnel." I shall return to this in
discussing the Doctrine of Permanent Counterinsurgency.
Set I:7,2nRc!m
We might view the conventional establishment approach
as constituting the common denominator of the assump-
tions and objectives shared by- all incumbents; viz., an
a priori hostility toward revolution, the view that its ori-
gins are conspiratorial, a managerial attitude toward. it as..
?
a problem, and a ?technocratic-military, approach to its
solution.. In strategy and tactics, this approach prefers con-
ventional ground and air operations, requiring large de-
ployments of troops, search-and-destroy missions (also
called "in op-up operations"), the tactics of "encirclement"
and "attrition"?which involve, on the one hand, large-
military fortifications (bases, enclaves) connected by "mo-
bile" battalions (in Vietnam, helicopter-borne troops and
air cavalry); and; on the other hand, massive, displacement
of civilian population and the creation of free-fire zones.
The conventionalists also evince deep longings. for set
battles, and would multiply the occasions by forcing, sur-
prising or luring the guerrillas into conventional show-
downs. The results of these pressures are bombings .(e.g.,
North Vietnam) or invasion of enemy "sanctuaries" across
the, frontiers of 'conflict (e.g., Cambodia) and the tactio
of offering an occasional bait in the hope of luring the
enemy to a concentrated attack (e.g,., Dienbienphu, Kite
Sanh).
If the conventional-establishment attitudes constitute
the lowest common denominator of counterreVolution, the
liberal-reformists are the chief exponents of its doctrine,.
and the most sophisticated programmers of its practice.
tas.sszferea
iated
STATE!
?
Ral
Tlie article' tha-t foll-ows is part of The
Planning of the Vietnam ?War, a study
by members of the Institute of Policy
Studies in Washington, including
Richard J. Barnet, M'arcus Raskin, and
Ralph Stavins.* In: their introduction
to the study, the authors write:
"In .early 1970, Marcus Raskin con-
ceived the. idea of a study that would
. explain how the Vietnam disaster hap-
pened by analyzi!!g.the planning of the
.War. A group of investigators directed
? by Ralph Stavins concentrated on
'finding out who did the actual plan-
.ning that led to the decisions to bomb
:North Vietnam, to introduce over a .
half-million troops into South Viet-
'nam, to defoliate and destroy vast
areas of Indochina, and to create
.,millions of refugees in: the area.
? ?"Ralph Stavins, assisted .by Canta
Plan. John Berkowitz, George Pipkin,
and Brian Eden, conducted more than
300 interviews in the course of this
.studj. Among those interviewed
.were many ?Presidential advisers to
.Kennedy and Johnson, generals and,
'admirals, middle level bureaucrats who
. occupied strategic positions in the
? .national security bureaucracy, and offi-
cial's, military and civilian, who carried.
out the policy in the field in Vietnam.
?' "A number of informants backed up
their oral statements with documents
. their possession, _including informal
fiminutes of meetings, 'as well as por-
tions of the official documentary rec-
ord ? now known as the "Pentagon ,
Papers." Our information is drawn not.
only from the Department of Defense,.
but also from the White House, the
Department of State, .and the Central'
? Intelligence Agency."
The study is being?published in two
. volumes. The first, .which includes the,
article below, will be published early in
August. The second will appear in
May, 1972. . .? ?
*The study is the responsibility of its
:authors and does not necessarily reflect
the views of the Institute, its trustees,
_
STATI NTL
Approved For ReleaseldRibidiTCcrijklE080-01601
22 JUL 1971 STATINTL
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