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December 29, 1972
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?0 4./ V;:,.SH11:G101,1 POST ChahneApptoffKlbspysRelease 2001/034649:ECIXRDP80-01 STATINTL Helms, the Shah and the CIA THERE IS A CERTAIN irony in the fact that Richard Helms will go to Iran -as the American ambassador 20 years after the agency he now heads organ- ized and directed the overthrow of the regime then in power in Teheran. The tale is worth recounting if only be- cause of the changes in two decades which have affected the Central Intel- ligence Agency as well as American foreign policy. Helms first went to work at the CIA in. 1947 and he came up to his present post as director through what is gener- ally called the "department of dirty tricks." However, there is nothing on the public record to show that he per- sonally had a hand in the overthrow of the Communist backed and/or mi- ented regime of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in 1933, an action that re. turned the Shah to his throne. 'ne can only guess at the wry smile that must have come to the Shah's face \ Men he first heard that President Ni:-on was proposing to send the CIA's top man to be the American envoy, The Iranian affair, and a similar CIA action in Guatemala the following year, are looked upon by old hands at ? aea.ae:, 1953: Teheran rioting that over- threw the government left the Unit- ed States Point Four office with gaping holes for windows and doors. the agency as high points of a sort in the Cold War years. David Wise and Thomas 13. Ross have told the Iranian ilstory in their hook, "The Invisible Gov- v ernment," and the CIA boss at the time, Allen Dulles, conceded in public ? after he left the government that the ODAY Till: IRAN to which Helms United States had had a hand in -what will ;;a-) after he leaves the CIA is a sta- occurred. ble, \Veil armed and \cell oil-fill:1/1(TO re?jrni, under the Shah's command and the country was thrown into crisis. Mossadegh "connived," as Wise and Ross put it, with Turich, Iran's Com- munist party, to holster his hand. The British and Americans decided he had to go and picked Gen. Fazollah Zahedi to renlace him. The man who stage- managed the job on the spot was Ker- mit "Kim" Roosevelt (who also had a hand in some fancy goings-on in Egypt), grandson of T.R. and seventh cousin of P.D.R., and now a Washing- tonian in private business. Roosevelt managed to get to Teheran and set up underground headquarters. A chief aide was Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who, as head of the New Jersey state police, had become famous during the Lindbergh baby kidnaping case. Schwarzkopf had reorganized the Shah's police force and he and Roose- velt joined in the 1953 operation. The Shah dismissed Mossadegh and named Zaheldi as Premier but Mossadegh ar- rested the officer who braught the had news. The Teheran streets filled with rioters and a scared Shah fled first to Baghdad and then to Rome. Dulles flew to Rome to confer with him. Roo. sevelt ordered the Shah's backers- into the streets, the leftists were arrested by the army and the Shah returned in triumph. Mossadech went to jail. In time a new international oil consor- tium took over Anglo-Iranian which operates to this day,though the Shah has squeezed more and more revenue from the Westerners. - ? In his 1993 book, ''The Craft of Intel- ligence," published after he left CIA, Dulles wrote that, when in both Iran and Guatemala it -became clear" that a. Communist state was in the making, "support from outside was given to loyal anti-Communist elements." In a 1965 NBC television documentary on "The Science of Spying" Dulles said: "The government of Mossadegh, if you recall history, was overthrown by the action of the Shah. Now, that we en- couraged the Shah to take that action I will not deny." Miles Copeland, an ex-CIA operative in the Middle East. wrote in his hook, '"The Caine of Nations." that the Iranian derring-do was called "Operation Ajax.'' Ile cred- ited Roosevelt with 'almost single- 'fixity, there were plenty of ot ter suc- cessful enterprises that fell short of changing government regimes. Today the CIA. humiliated by the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco it planned and ran, has wi:hdrawn front such large scale af- fairs as Iran, save for its continuing major role in the no longer ''secret \car in Laos." The climate of today -would not permit the United States to 'repeat the Iranian operation, or so one a slimes with the reservation that IdresidentNixon -(who was Vice Presi- clent at the time of Iran) loves sur- prises. The climate of 1953, however, was very different and must he taken into account in any judgment. Moscow then was fishing in a great many troubled waters and among them was Iran. It was probably true, as Allen Dulles said on that 1965 TV show, that "at no time has the CIA engaged in any political activity or any intelli- gence that was not approved at the highest level." It was all part of a deadly "game of nations." Richard Bis- sell, who ran the U-2 program and the " Bay of Pigs, was asked on that TV show about the morality of CIA activi- ties. "I think," he replied, that "the morality of . . . shall we call it for short, cold war .. . is So infinitely eas- ier than the morality of almost any kind of hot war that I never encoun- tered this as a serious problem." PERHAPS the philosophy of the Cald War years and the CIA role were best put by Dulles in a letter that he wrote me in 1961. Excerpts from his then -forthcoming book had appeared ?i/ri Harper's and I had suggested to him some further revelations he might in- clude in the book. He wrote about ad- ditions he was making: -This includes more on Iran and Guatemala and the problems of policy in action when there begins to be evidence that a country is slipping and Communist take-over is threatened. We can't wait for an engraved invitation to come and give aid." There is a story, too, that Winston Churchill was so pleased by the opera- tion in Iran that he proferred the George Cross to Kim Roosevelt. But the CIA wouldn't let him accept the decoration. So Churchill commented to Roosevelt: "I would he proud to have served under you" in such an opera- tion. That remark, Roosevelt is said to vi STATI NTL handedly" calling the "pro-Shah fom ces! have replied was better than the deco - on to the streets of Teheran" and su- ration. pervisine "their riots so as to oust" Ifelms doubtless would be the last to Mossadegle say so out loud but I can imagine Ins STATINTL reflecting that. if it hadn't been for what Dulles, Him Roosevelt and the others did in 1953, he \could not have the chance to present his credentials to in IRAN IS NEXT DOOR to the Soviet Union. In - 1951 Mossadeeh, who con-. fused Westerners with his habits of %%Telling in public and running govern- ment business from his bed, national- East-West relations from the Cold War ized the BritiAl Aprolvedforileleasea2001103/04q.CIA-RDP80- Oil Co, and schcipthe Abadan refill- While Iran and Guatemala were the era'. The West boycotted Iranian oil high pointa of covert GIA Cold War ac- which has mended its fences Wit Ii AN)F, Cow With011i hurting its close relation- ship with Washington. The Shah has taken full advantaee of the changes in LAS:it:Kr:ON ?OST Approved For Release 2S081r431101F:2CIA-RDP80-01601 1 LFTTEFtS TO LL,Pi EDITOR. Rasters of the U-2 In The Post of Nov. 30 there is an ar- ticle by your Bernard Nossiter, under an Oslo dateline, about the Russian submarine excursion into the Norwe- gian fjord. On page A10, column 7, there is this paragraph: "If an exercise had been scheduled for November in the Sognefjord, the explanation runs, the Soviet military would have been insensitive to the po- litical authorities, In this view, the s(s.. vict military was not trying to sabo- tage Ifelsinid, any more than the Pen- tagon masters of the U-2 were out to undermine the summit 12 years ago. The Soviet military machine, it is sug- gested, may have simply been pursu- ing business as usual." Mr. Nossiter has his facts wrong. 'Perhaps he should consult your re- cently retired Chalmers M. Roberts, who could tell him the Pentagon held 110 "masters of the U-2." In his book, "The Nuclear Years" (Praeger, 1970) Mr. Roberts discusses the matter, starting on page 43. lie makes it clear the U-2 flights were ordered by Presi- dent Eisenhower and were directed by the Central Intelligence Agency. They also were carried out by a contract? (Lockheed) who was paid by CIA. Another authority who might per. suade Mr. Nossiter is Arthur M. Schle singer Jr. In "A Thousand Days" (Houghton Mifflin, 1965). Mr. Schlet singer writes on page 241 of how Rich. ard Bissell, CIA's deputy director for operations, "conceived and fought through the plan of U-2 flights over the Soviet Union." Clearly, Mr. Nossiter's commentls - not based on fact. The Defense Deport.;:. ment used some of the information ob. STATINTL toined by the U-2 and Defense Seem. Uzi's, Thomas Gates said so. But to de clam, as Mr. Nossiter did, that "Pentagon masters of the U-2" insti. gated or carried out the flights is in. correct. Washington. CLAUDE WITZE. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 Approved For Release 2M/cptQfysq,I,MDP80-0160 23 OCT 1972 SECRET FLIGHTS ON THE FRINGE OF SPACE c r P STAT] NTL Approved For Release 200lip04,:,:0910ADP80-01601R0 1 9 OCT 1972 :menace by putting it to shame. Although Eisenhower is 'justly famous for having said that we must hold onto Indochina because of its raw materials, he should be equally famous for the much more sophisticated no- tion, emphatically ascribed to him in this hook, of want- ing to assure the freedon of American corporations to export capital abroad, to buy as much of the world as possible, as a basic exten- sion of U.S. foreign policy and cold-war strategy. Frus- trated by the failure to 'elect Wendell Wilkie to head the expansion of Amer- ican corporate enterprise into the ownership of One World, the great financiers and industrialists who sup- ported Eisenhower (while middling entrpreneurs and old-time conservatives de- nounced him) may have thought him quite necessary to safeguard the expansion- ism which has now flowered, under three other presi- dents, into the age of the multi-national corporation. This brings up that most - perplexing of all Eisen- hower riddles: Eisenhower's farewell speech in which he warned against the CXCeSP?CS of a military-industrial com- plex which he saw as threat- ening to become the domi- nant force in American poli- ey-making. Why was the man who ? was prepared to oust gov- ernments, dispatch Marines, talk of massive retaliation, overfly the U.S.S.R., and an- ? grily rebut anyone tried to ? tell him, how to run an Army?why was such a man so concerned at the end about the military he had faithfully served and the in- dustry he had painstakingly supported? Parmet isn't even curious.. Again the clues, if not the conclusions, are scattered throughout this storehouse collection of facts. One is the context of the speech. Ei- senhower spelled out the menace to be that of a "sci- entific-technological elite" and not just the MTC ab- stractly. To him, real busi- ness meant the big banks, the big owners, the vastly rich folks whom he enjoyed so much as personal friends. e s ? Book World The Ike Years 11 Over Again EISENHOIVER: Aud the .1awrican Crusades. By Ifei?bert S. Panne:. 6b0 pp. 512.:151 Reviewed by Llcss ? The reviewer, 15t0 served briefly on spcclal cisignincnt at the IVInte House daring the Eisenhower administra- tion, is a visiting fellow at the Institute for Policy Stud- ! If you -ant to relive the ?. Eisenhower years, this is the book for you. It has what seems to be 40 million use- ful references to Eisenhower sources, piled up as the e foundation .for what is al- ? most a daily log of the Gen- eral-President's years in the White House, and the sev- eral immediately before, as ? he backed-and-filled about ;. heeding what eventually he came to see as his bounden duty to lead the nation. __It cites dozens of inter- views. It obviously is writ- ten by a man whc, has read - himself bleary in his subject ?_ .but who, at the end of it all, -simplY says that to call Ei- senhower "a great or good .er even a weak President --misses the point. He was . Merely necessary." Necessary, for what? By contenting himself with oh- 'serving Eisenhower rather .Than with trying to under- stand . him, Ins friends, Ins : "particular role in the so- ciety, .Herbert Parmet does not .provide - even a hint of answer. But because lie is a spella veracious reader and ...studious observer, the clues ? .are all there. First, there is Eisenhower the anti-Communist. Like Kennedy-Johnson-Nixon, Ei- senhower saw the isonfronla- lion with communism both ? apoplectically and apoca- lyptically. Eisenhower's New Look defense policy, diplo- matical ly extended throueli ? John PoApprovedrFor manship, n ei in to deter the Soviets and the Chinese, at ; least, from hie moves in the of nuclear retaliation. As Parmet meticulously re- counts?without seeming to be impressed?Eisenhower's rhetoric! about the New Look was seriously compro- mised by the old look of some of his. crucial actions: when he landed Marines in Lebanon, for instance. Also, when Eisenhower supported the covert U.S. operation that overthrew the Guatemalan govern- ment, he was well into a world of old-fashioned, even if newly-equipped, coup and counter - coup, terror and covert warfare. That, as a matter of fact, is just the . way Eisenhower wanted to fight the war in Indochina --secretly and discreetly. But he did want to fight it. On that he was as dedicated a hawk as Kennedy, John- son or Nixon. (If there was a difference in style it would probably be mostly in con- trast to Johnson. Eisen- hower was dead set against a big land involvement. The Nixon . policy of -ordering bombing while talking peace probably would have ap- pealed to him more, and the early Kennedy policy of se- cret raids most o; all?ex- cept that Eisenhower always seemed skeptical of how well such secrets could he kept. Iris explicit skepticism about the U-2 overflights was, of course, brilliantly justified.) Beyond his fervent anti- communism. there is an- other aspect to Eisen- bower that might mark a very special (and necessary) place for him in our coun- try's development: his total visceral and intellectual commitment to the recti- tude of American corporate enterprise?as he under- stood it from his closest Raielea nds, siciaitemai rt. uSe14 tive that the expansion of capi- talist enterprise around the aim, ea-aim on iiastao, frOubled bythe fantastic support given, say, the bank- ing system by federal policy. But he was troubled by the thought that the new, scientifically-based weapons companies would muscle their way into policy-influ- encing positions. Also, he seems to have been disturbed by the possibilities of a garri- son state, totally dominated by a defense budget. He was never disturbed by the com- pany-store domination of the lives of most ordinary Amer- icans by the financial elite which already does own con- trol of most the capital and industry, as well as control of those who make policy. Maybe that just seemed tra- ditional to the General-Pres- ident. At any rate, deep concern along these lines may he merely academic after all.. Thanks to Eisenhower's foremost bequest to a grate- ful nation, Richard Nixon, it looks like we are going to have both a garrison state and a company store any- way. The eunsliner cbugDpatiscati401100170001-4 under Kennedy, apparently appalled him. He was an old- fashioned remit Mist. Ile STATIP . Approved For Release 200/19611:f4cMtiP80-01601R 10 * a A (1 :I r-2,) .ii r g sj tlia) it 4 \' 4,,,`? r) Soviet Weapons in Cuba, U.S. Blockade might kick up a mighty crisis elsewhere--say in divided Berlin. B ii t meanwhile t h e United States began a buildup of air power in the southeast. About T).0n0 ma- rines put out to sea. About 40 'U.S. warships con- Brought Globe to Brink of Nuclear War verged on the Caribbean area, The of.:Icial cover was that this was part of a training exercise. Outwardly, a look of calm prevailed at upper levels of the 'White House, Pentagon and State De- partment. Routine went on as usual. Behind scenes, the tension mount- ed swiftly. President Kennuly met Oct. 18 for two and a half hours with Andrei A. Oro- myk o. Th'e Russian foreign minister assured \V-II,LIA:tI L. P.YAN Associaled Press Writer For seven (lays in Octo- tekivision appearance that ".\londay night. Oct. 22. For her a frightened world the President and Ii is ad vi- contemplated a specter of sers it had been a much nuclear cataclysm. The week of high ten- sion began Monday, Oct. 22, just 10 Years ago, when the youthful President of the United States an- ?nounced to a startled na- tion a direct challenge to the Soviet Union in a blockage of Soviet vessels. ? That was the Cuban 'missile crisis. It is likely to be credited by future his- torians with having ap- plied , the severe shock treatment that jolted the two superpowers into a .new era and eventually produced radically differ- cot relations between Mos- tow and .Washington. Source of Shock Ten years ago the two glared at one another through nuclear gu n- sights. Today, in the wake of a visit to Moscow by the President of the 'United States, the Russians are buying huge quantities of . Amerian grain and eager- ly inviting U.S. technolog- ical know-how to help ex- ploit their resources. The , Americans seek return benefits from. these con- tacts. And what about the - source of the shock treat- ment.? Kiel Castro's Culla no loner is producing cri- sis headlines, In fact, it seems to some students of Soviet affairs that the Paissians would be grati- fied if they could find a. convenient way of shear- .g away Fidel's power. It was a close thing, 10' blockade t'ears ago. As President Cuba and chal- John F. Kennedy himaeif lenge Soviet shires bring- longer siege. Calls For Photos Actually, it bad begun for the White llou:ze and official Washington early h September with U.S. in- telligence reports of sesni- clous- looking emplace- ments in Communist-ruled Cuba, The President or- dered photographs of the entire island and high- flying U-2 planes carried out the mission. What they brought back was evidence that some sort of military buildup was going on. Put not un- til early October was there hard evidence of interme- diate-range missile bases on a hostile island so Close to U.S. shores. By Oct. 15, analysis confirmed Wash- ington's worst suspicions, and in an atmosphere of crisis the President met with his chief defense, se- curity and intelligence ad- visers to discuss what to do about it. Should the United States it back and wait? That would suggest U.S. weak- ness and irresolution in the face of a threat. It. would strengthen Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's position. Should the United States bomb the bases? That could be bad. too, because of the world outcry it could cause on moral grounds. A. n d Russians might be killed. Retaliation Feared Should the United States him the only Soviet milita- ry aid to Cuba was of a de- fensive nature. The Pres- ident now knew better. Two days later, having agreed with his advisers that a blockade should be the response, he ordered preparations to go for- ward. He prepared to make the announcement at 7 p.m. Monday, Oct. 22. America's allies around the world were filled in. The Organization of Amer- ican States would be call- ed into session. A letter WOlilti be drafted for Khrushchey. One hour before Mr. Kennedy was to go on tele- vision, Secretary of State Dean Rusk summoned the Soviet ambassador, Anato- ly F. Dobrynin. The am- bassador was his usual ex- pansive, smiling self on ar- rival. When he left the secretary 25 minutes later he was pale and shaken. The President went on the air. He told Americans of a "secret, swift and extraordinary buildup? of Soviet missiles in Cuba, called it a deliberate and unacceptable provocation and revealed his orders for a quarantine of all offen- sive weapons for Castro.? Soviet ships carrying such eq ui pm ent would be Itot it zit one point in the ing in the offensive equip- turned back. He used the :\?,,,i3lopingApproveddForRefe. ? ? biocharle, and in inter- World Stunned The United St ate.3----and the woild--were stunned. So was Moscow. For 13 hours there was no re- sponse. Then a Kremlin statement, fuming about an nniicaed-of violation of international law, indig- nantly denied that offen- sive weilpons had been in- stalled in Cuba. it wasneiwous-ound- sizy..rneht, howe\ er, betraying shock at having been caught red-banded, Thc. blockade took effect oficially at 10 a.m. Wed- nesday, Oct. 2.1 At that. time 25 Soviet merchant ships were heading to- le;ird Cuba and that night they were still on course. yneeow said Mr. Kenne- dy's demands were unac- ceptatile, but larushchey c:!gerly agreed to a propo- sal by 1.; Thant, then w- ing U.N. secretary gener- al. that. both sides halt all these activities for two or three NITC1;3 to permit a I ii s. Washington was cold to the propo.ed, it woold not hack doi,vn from" its basic demand that nothing could ha accom- plished by negotiations until the Russians agreed to dismantle and remove the missiles. On Thursday came the Dews that 12 of the 25 So- viet merchantmen h a d turned around. It was a welcome indication that they would not risk con- fronting the blockade. Far From Over Still, the crisis was far from ended. In the U.N. Security Coo ncil, Ambas- sador Adlai E. Stevenson challenged the Soviet dele- gate to answer ''yes or no' whether Russian missiles were being placed in Cuba. Ile would, he said, "wait 'till hell freezes over" if necessary, for the answer. Then he produced huge blown-up photos of the damning evidence. U.S. intelligence report- ed work on the Cuban bases 11.0W was proceeding at top speed, suggesting the Russians were trying to make them operational. The tellSi011 rose. The STATI NTL 20M/p3104 elk FOR gone "either way." risks. o cook say 804)1)604 R00110017 S 0c1M124 d Up pre :;sure t me a o- 'For the nation as a whole, what the Soviet reply Dational law blockade is yiet to board- 1..?) ?.;.1., mm chit he. or whether, in ?,, ?r ?,,?! ing and searching it and. HOUSTON POST Approved For Release 2o011034:04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0011 pies in sky keep two :big powers in balance By DONALD R. MORRIS Post News Analyst , All that has 'kept the world from sell- destructing this last quarter. of a century has been the precarious nuclear balance between the United Stales and the Soviet ?Union. ? For a few short years America had an overwhelming preponderance of power. We were certain we would never resort to it, but our mere possession of such night- marish power drove the Russians to dis- traction. Then they in their turn achieved -an edge--and regained a measure of sta.- bility?and it was our turn to ? taste the ?fear in the phrase "missile gap." A decade ago the balance was regained and has since been maintained. The num- ber of missiles, their megatonnage and their guidance systems are largely irrele- vant; what counts is that neither power can launch a preemptive strike with any hope of survival, and on this balance hangs the peace of the world. 'Tiger by the tail ; The balance, however, is far from stat- ic. Both powers hold a fearsome tiger by the tail. Research and development must continue lest one side or the other achieve a breakthrough in delivery or de- fense, which might destroy the balance. The expense of such a break- through?indeed the expense of maintain- ing the current balance?is so hideous that both powers would like to avoid it. , They are committed to a continuing arms race not by the need to achieve a breakthrough but only by the imperative of not permitting the other to da so. Both sides recognize the need for a mu- tual effort to scale down their arsenals. In the past, negotiations over dis- armament foundered on a single ele- ment?trust. The issues at stake were so overriding that neither the U.S. nor the -Soviet -Union could afford to accept the other's word that an agreement would be adhered to. ? The recent SALT talks, however, have achieved initial and encouraging suc- cesses, and the key to the progress can ? be found in an innocuous euphemism the treaties employ: "National technical .means of verification". The phrase refers to a program which supplies an accept- able substitute for the missing ingredient of trust, and on that program rests all STATI NTL referred to as SAMOS (for "satellit: organization won't:get-apt! past -the fronF and missile-observation system"); the Soviet satellites are referred to as COSMOS, and while neither country will discuss their .details, they do, as the re- . sult of a 1962 agreement, report each launch and its ot?bital characteristic to the UN. The programs give both countries a positive check on the nuclear activities of the other. Neither nation can test or deploy a major new weapons system without timely?and highly detailed? warning accruing to the other. The United States launches four or five "search-and-find" SAMOS missiles an- nually from Vandenburg Air Force Base in California. They remain in orbit about a month, covering the entire surface of the globe twice a day, once at night (when infi?a-red photography, sensitive to heat emissions, gives almost as much in- formation as daytime passes) and once during the day. The photographic results are radioed back, and despite the loss in resolution, construction work of any description is at once apparent when photos taken a few days apart are superimposed. Each search-and-find satellite is follow- ed a month or two later by a "close-look" satellite, which photographs the specific areas of interest its predecessor has spotted. These photographs are not transmitted electronically. Instead the satellite ejects the film capsule itself, which is recovered in mid-air by special- ly equipped planes based in Hawaii. - ? door) a; The first generation of satellite cam- eras a decade ago were lucky to pick up objects six feet across. The third gener- ation in current use will pick up objects less than two feet across, and the resolua, tion may ?some day be measured in inches. In terms of analysis, this means that not only can new missile Sites, or changes in old ones, be recorded, but the precise technical construction of the mis- sile can be reconstructed in fair detail as well. . . The Soviets launch perhaps four times as many satellites as America does, par- tially because theirs do not last as long, and also because the Soviets are given to "tactical" missions ? sending a satellite for a special "look-see" when something of interest is going on. The U.S. prefers to wait for its regu- larly scheduled shots, and has sent only one tactical satellite aloft ? to check Is- raeli claims that the Soviets were violat- ing the truce by installing missile sites on the banks of the Sues Canal. Soviet photography is good enough to allay their fears that the U.S. is installing new weapons systems, although the resolu- tion of their cameras is not nearly as good as ours. . . High-altitude coverage of the Soviet Union started in the early 1950s when bal- loon - mounted cameras were launched. in Europe to drift across Eurasia before beim, recovered in the Pacific. .? ? . From such crude beginnings we ad- vanced to the U-2 aircraft, which worked like a charm until the Soviets finally de- veloped a missile that could bring it down ? with disastrous results for American idiplomacy. President Eisenhower had ap- proved the U-2 program only after Pre- mier Nikita Khrushchcv had rejected his . suggestion of "open skies" inspections. The gap between the U-2 flights and the inception of the SAMOS program was for- tunately a short one. What photos show The pictures are analyzed at the Na- tional Photographic Interpretation Center (known as "En-pick" to the intelligence community), a little-known joint project located in Washington under the aegis of. the Central Intelligence Agency. The sophisticated interpretation of these photographs provides the vast bulk of what America knows about the Soviet Union, the Eastern bloc countries and the People's Republic of China. The photos reveal not only major con- struction ? from transportation nets through shipyard activity to all manner of missile facilities ? but an astonishing wealth of technical detail as well. While the U.S. will not talk about the SAMOS program any more than the So- viet Union will discuss the details of COSMOS.. the general details of both programs are more or less open secrets. contilwA. hope of reversirk.....,the aat,i America's most closely guarded secret The "nation^HREWW4,179trApleaseN2001i03104rosetiARRDR80-01601R001100170001-4 - fication" are the photo reconnaissance photographic systems employed by satellites employed by both America and SAMOS. aN.P.I.C? in fact, maintains its nwn tv cv,:irrn and a ? Approved For Release 2001003/04RKCINIRDP80-01 7 AUG 1972 9 r4k I ?SCOW S mii By HARRY SCITWARTZ ? ties for baking its own matzos. to pump into Siberia ana. stirs its oil, MOSCOW--"We don't have to like f r course. The Soviet press hammers 0 gas and metals flowing whenever Mr. There is 'another side to the picture, each away on Vietnam day in and day out. One an only conclude that iglu- ?other to do business and cooper- Nixon rives the signal. ate. I am for improved Soviet-Amen- and Soviet sources say proudly they c can relations because I am a Soviet intend to continue helping the North ential Muscovites believe the Vietnam war will be over in the not-too-distant 'patriot and I know improved relations Vietnamese. The message about es- would be good for my countr national atmosphere resulting there- y. T - chewing barbaric tactics has not yet future and that in the improved niter- 'think the same thing applies to you caused any softening toward s' from both Washington and Moscow tar Americans.' Yuri. Arbatov, the Krem- lin's chief Arnericanologist, was speak- ing for himself when he made these remarks,. but there is mounting evi- dence that similar ideas form the back- bone of Leonid I. Brezhnev's policy ,toward the -United States. ' Certainly Mr. Brezhnev has made- settle impressive moves recently to demonstrate his commitment to better relations with the United States. He. reaived President Nixon here last May despite the political difficulties ? caused him, by the President's earlier decision to mine North Vietnamese ports. He accepted. the setback repre- sented by Egypt's decision to oust Soviet military ? personnel rather than 'give the Egyptians, the offensive weapons. they demanded, Diplomats here believe he faced significant oppo- sition from a "hard line" Politburo faction on both issues, a faction that could become a majority and oust Mr. ? Brezhnev if his policy There are other,' less cosmic, signs pointing in the same direction. The Peterson trade delegation here waa received with outstanding hospitality 'and friendship even while very hard 'bargaining went on behind the scenes. A mbjor and prestigious Soviet re- search institute here is now engaged In a high-priority. effort to figure out ways of improving Moscow's image in the United .States. The ,goal of the effort was expressed the other ? day by a Soviet editor, who said, "We don't 'want you Americans to think of ?us as barbarians." That some lessons have been learned was evident recently when a Soviet court gave Gavriel Shapiro, who married an American girl in a Jewish religious ceremony, an astonishingly lenient sentence on a 'charge of draft dodging. Evert that old bugaboo, the unavail- ability of matzos to religious Soviet Jews for Passover, has been taken care of to some extent. On a recent Satur- day morning a group of Americans from the Peterson mission visiting Kiev asked to see the synagogue in :that city. They were taken there promptly and found a congregation of over 200 elderly Soviet Jews engaged 'in the traditional. Orthodox Sabbath, service. Before the Americans left they were shown an album of pictures de- Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 STATI NTL picting the *e: iea ..coneregation's f tcilinew tIclorado with limitless resources ballet dancer Valery Panov or toward various Soviet scientists who fell into disfavor after, they asked permission! to emigrate to Israel. ? There is no mystery about the two chief reasons for the main thrust of the: Brezhnev line. which is so reminiscent' of the drive Nikita S. Khrushchey mounted for a similar rapprochement during the?Lisenhower Administration at the end of the nineteen-fifties. So- viet sources here freely admit that Mr. Khruslachey made a major blunder by blowing 'up over .the 1.172 incident in May, 1990, and they seem rather praud that Mr. Brezhnev made no similar error Over the mining of. North Viet- nam's ports. "We are trying to repair the thread that was snapped by Gary Powers," one Soviet editor said. Very little is said here about the Chinese, but the fear and worry over future relations -with , Peking is un- mistakable. Soviet officials know from their own life experiences that a large country can go from weakness to power in one or, two generations. But it is economies- that is the main motive. Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev are now far richer than they were 'when this correspondent first visited' them in 1935. Food of all kinds seems abundant, with the strange exception of lemons. Most people seem well- dressed, and mini-skirts and pants suits are all the rage among the more elegant women here this summer. , There are now traffic jams in Moscow, a phenomenon that was unthinkable three ot four years ago. But Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev are the main tourist cities. -Except for them and a few others, living condi- tions?though better than earlier?are still hard. One need only look at the - bedraggled dress of the peasant women in the street to sense the gulf between ? the urban living standards and the conditions in the countryside. It is for massive American economic ' and technical aid, above all; that Mos- cow now wants to improve relations with Washington. Despite the emphasis in the Soviet press on U.S. unem- ployment and the poverty of Negroes and,Mexican Americans, even sophisti- ? cated and well-infortried Soviet sources - ? speak of -America as though it were a will be able to reduce their arms budget and end the, futile and ex- tremely expensive strategic weapons race. Only on that hypothesis does the Soviet hope for major American in- vestment make sense, since the Russians are realists accustomed to calculate. Secretary of Commerce Peterson has said Vietnam was never mentioned in his economic negotia- tions here, but it must have been very much in his own mind and in the mind of Mr.. Brezhnev when the two men met. It would seem a reasonable bet that when' Henry Kissinger flies to Paris these days to negotiate with North Vietnam's i.e Due Tho, he has Mr. Brezhnev's best wishes and per- haps?but only perhaps?more tan- gible Kremlin help, behind the scenes. Harry Schwartz is Cr member of the editorial board of The Times. - Approved For Release AUG 1972 and Damascus. President Johnson brought tremendous pressure on Israel to halt further troop movements -and also got On the hot line to warn Premier Kosygin against S what appeared to be an imminent Soviet airborne'opera- s-jion against Israel from Bulgarian bases. C Did this not, in effect, not only prevent further Viet- nams, but stop the outbreak of World War III? Isn't , the tight surveillance that Fellwock insists the NSA Y is keeping over the Soviet bomber fleet and Soviet nu- - clear subs designed to avert war rather than to touch it off? Isn't the NSA, whose mission is to gather informa- :tion, but never to act on it, a.weapon for peace rather ; than a weapon of war? The answer is,. of course, that Fellwock and Ellsberg and the others are first and fore- 'most anti-13.',Stablishment and very possibly anti-Ameri- can. And they have managed to talk themselves around . to saying that when they decide unilaterally to abrogate an oath, steal a Top Secret document, traffic with the :enenly, which this amounts to, that they are doing it b.2- cause they are right. Theirs is the higher morality. ? It was a simpler world when the betrayers of national trust?,. the Phil bys, the Burgesses and MacLeans, the Martinscs and Mitchells (two earlier NSA defectors), did their dirty work and, cut and ran. And a better: ,world. ? None Care If It Is Treason Ramparts published the article. The New York Time reported it in full, page one, carry-o'er of four column :on page three. It was a revelation by a former U.S. cod analyst that the United States has broken all super secret Soviet communications codes, (This, incidentally 'say the experts, is not so.) The article tells how man planes, ships and satellites the United States has moni loring foreign air waves. Where many of them are; how they operate; what they have discovered, things calcu- lated to win friends and influence enemies all over the world, .and also at home. - It was written by 'Perry Fellwock, 26, of San Diego, .California, a war protester. At twenty, he enlisted in the ?;Air Force. While serving,. he was recruited by a United 'States security agent into the National Security Agency, :which is charged with the collection of security infor- mation, most of it through advanced technological means U-2s, spy satellites etc. When Fellwock left the :Agency three and a half years later, he?like all other ;Intelhgence people?swore an oath never to reveal what he had done while in .the employ of NSA. But now Fell- 'wock feels that oath no longer "is binding to me." He :feels that by telling. all Ile will "make sure that there are no .more Vietnams." He feels that "the American miii- tary [is) the most dangerous threat to me, my family and to world peace itself." He has taken this step "rid.' .ther for money nor glory, but to bring to the American people knowledge which they have a 'need to know.' " . And also, and not so. incidentally, to the enemies of - the American people knowledge which they have a para- mount need ?to know. ? And yet, if Fellwock is so dead set on preserving the. peace by this attack on NSA, how does he explain away. one incident he describes in detail in his article. It was during the Six Day War. According to Felhvock, the U.S. electronic intelligence ship Liberty (a Pueblo) was sent along the .Israeli coast to intercept Israeli-baffle orders. It was attacked by the Israeli air force and 34 Ameri- cans were killed. But, still according to Fellwock, the Liberty already had transmitted the fact that General Dayan intended to order his forces to attack both Cairo Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 STATINTL STATINTL NATION'S BUSINESS HOWpproved For Release 2001M3/04 411 usmer.3, s ers OUr Intellllgenc Deenees From building eyes in the sky to advising Presidents, businessmen ,are deeply involved in an essential but hush-hush 'national activity . .The revo6iution began one ecein- Laboratories, Bell rl e ep -lone her afternoon. in 1954 when TrevoVtories, RCA and Philco-Ford, Tick Gardner, a former ? California busi- Corp., Eastman Kodak Co., Perkin- nessman who was the Air Force's re- Elmer Co., AerojetGeneral search and development Chief, picked TRW Inc.?as well as thousands of ? up his'Pentagon telephone to make a /smaller suppliers. ?I call at the CIA's'request. The 'man he/ Only when first cousins of clandes- I called was Clarence (Kelly) -John- tine devices developed for intern- ! son, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.'s chief gence work show up in civilian life-- designer, in Burbank, Calif. Nineteen' in the camera system of the Lunar? onths later Mr: 'Johnson's ubiqui-v ? Orbiter, for example--can companies a ora- - High over the Eurasian land mass, ? i two Project 647 .satellites (Made in 'U.S.A.)" patrol unusual "dwelling" orbits, their delicate "sensors watching for a missile launching in the Soviet Union or a nuclear explosion in Chi- na. - ? ? :A propulsion engineer in a secure, windowless California office calcu- lates the range of an Egyptian anti- shipping missile from data gathered V ? by the Central Intelligence Agency. A_ computer analyst in, Boston, his . advice needed by the code-breaking , National Security Agency, ' hops a plane to Washington. And a corpo- rate . executive answers the Presi- dent's" personal plea for some annub- licized counsel on How to reorganize , ? the Defense Intelligence Agency. ? American industry, a world leader in advanced technology, is deep into the Complexities of modem intelli- gence work?and much quieter about it than a swinging dames Bond. . The U.S. intelligence establish- ment, once comparatively simple, is now, huge as well as highly sophisti- cated, costing the government some $6 billion a year and directly employ- ing 200,000 men and women. . One expOt has estimated that 70 . per cent of this money and manpow- er .is inextricably involved with the science- and technology that, in less ' than two decades,. have revolution- ized an essential national activity? essential despite the thaw in the Cold War STATINTL Approved For Release tous 13-2---designed, built and teste.d take oblique credit for remarkable in an atmosphere of extreme secrecy .7--made its first spy flight for the CIA ? over the Soviet Union. Today, the U-2 still flies recon- naissance missions over Cuba, poten- tial Latin American trouble spots and the troubled deserts Of the, Middle East. Its intelligence "cover" was blown in 1960 when a Soviet missile I knocked Francis Gary Powers from the sky over Sverdlovsk. But its cam- eras still rank among the world's best, it can slip over a target, more easily than a satellite?and. it remains an undispided symbol of modern, tech- nological espionage. . Ironically, Lockheed did almost as much to push the U-2 into the open? by creating superior spycraft, and. therefore reducing the"nced for secre- cy about it?as the SVerdlovsk.marks- ? men did. By. 1960, work was well along on a supersonic successor air- craft, the Lockheed SR-71, and on in- creasingly sophisticated spacecraft that keep an entire planet under ob- servation. Under the peculiar rules of the in- telligence game, Lockheed can admit. what everyone already knows?that the U-2 was and is a spy plane. HOw- ever, it can only concede that the Air Force SR-71 has "strategic reconnais- sance" as its mission. And the com- pany cannot even discuss the fact that its Agena rockets have carried almost every American spy satellite launched in the past dozen years. technical achievements. Industrialist John A. McCone, who ucceeded aging spymaster Allen W. Dulles as Central Intelligence Agen- cy director in 1961, and is now back in industry, is given much of the credit for harnessing industry and technology to ? the intelligence com- munity's needs. "Dulles had no background for this kind of thing," a top intelligence ex- j ecutive recalls. "McCone had headerN the Atomic Energy. Commission and been Under Secretary of the Air Force, and he: fancied himself some- thing of an engineer. . "He wasn't afraid of the tech- nological game." The simple communication link: that Mr. Gardner used to order the. U-? from Mr. Johnson still operates. "We can pick up the phone to a West Coast. contractor and say, 'Go ahead,'" an intelligence .official re- ports. "Research and development is different in this field than in the mili- tary services. We are jtist plain less .bureaupratic. "Contractors say it is a pleasure to deal with us because they can get de- cisions quickly. The security rules ? are hard to live with, but they are', more than counterbalanced by the lack of complications." . The leading consumer of new in telligence technology, the CIA, ini- s- tiates more than 50 per cent of the . R&D projects it sponsors but de- pends - on industry for many new The rocket's role ideas. Surprisingly, it and the other While the U-2 clearly marked the intelligence agencies also depend beginning or the new espionage, the heavily on. companies for analytical rocket quickly proved a far more dra- help. "We don't contract out 'current matic instrument of change. business' [the hottest new intelli- Sputnik I, launched on Oct. 4, gence data] but we might ask some- . 1957, left no doubt that.rocketry had - one to do a six-month exhaustive attered man's destiny. . study, say, on the accuracy of an , ? And the prying eye of the intel- ICBM," one government intelligence : ligence camera soon peereddown official explains. from 100 miles in space, rather than 2001) II 'Mt. bfk_RDI:i861p14, techno ogy i -Kills-tr.-les were qiirtr cruited?General Electric Co., CBS 1 magtermno??????? MEATUS STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01 AUG 1972 STATINTL 0* Ctre--1 J . C A lk I II Ill BOUT THIRTY., MHES NORTHEAST Of CIA head- ' '''N, quarters in Langley, Virginia, right off the ----v, Baltimore-Washington expressway overlooking ?-?11,- the flat Maryland countryside, stands a large three story building known informally as the "cookie fac- tory." It's officially known. as Ft. George G. Meade, head- quarters of the National Security Agency. Three fences ? surround the headquarters. The inner .and outer barriers are topped with barbed wire, the middle one is a five-strand electrified wire. Four gatehouses span- ning. the complex at regular intervals house specially- trained marine guards. Those allowed access all wear irri- deScent 1. D. badges ? green for "top secret crypto," red for ."secret cry/1)(o." Even the janitors are cleared for secret codeword material. Once inside, you enter the world's longest "corridor"-980 feet long by 560 feet wide. 'And all along the corridor are more marine guards, protecting the doors of key NSA offices. At 1400,000 square feet, it is larger than CIA headquarters, 1,135,000 square feet. Only the State Department and the Pentagon and the new headquarters planned for the FBI are more spacious. But the D1RNSA. building (Director, National Security Agency) can be further distinguished from the headquarters buildings of these other giant bureaucracies ?it has no windows. Another palace of paranoia? No. For D1RNSA is the command center for the largest, most sensitive and far-flung intelligence gathering apparatus in the world's history. flere, and in the nine-story Opera- tions Building Annex, upwards of 15,000 employees work to break the military, diplomatic and commercial. codes of every nation in the world, analyze the de-aypted mes- sages, and send on the results to the rest of the U.S. in- telligence community. Far less widely known than the CIA, whose Director STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 .1.1ib HOUSTON PO3T /7) Approved For Release 2001/0gW611aDP80-01 warmal -Ai ET& olc ? t, 71 03,-0 ? Post News Analyst ? By Donald R. Morris The August issue of Ramparts i?-naga- zinc ? a periodical much. given to at- tacks on the intelligence community ? features an article entitled "U.S. Espion- age: A Memoir," attributed to "Winslow Peck," i? The article claims that the N.!ationaI Security Agency (NSA) has broken ev- ery Soviet cede, and can pinpoint; the lo- cation and type of each Soviet jet and Missile submarine. It also claims the United States is still making routine U-2-type surveillance flights over: the So- viet Union and China. For lagniappe, the author describes how in 1957 the NSA monitorqd a live TV contact between Soviet - Premier Alexei Kosygin and Cosmonaut Viadi- mir ?Komarov, who had just ,been in- formed his braking chutes were mal- functioning and who was facing certain death. "Peck" also claims that the .electronic surveillance ship Liberty, on: which 74 ? crewmen died in an Israeli altack dur- ing the Six-Day War in 1057, overheard Gen, Moshe Dayan order his troops on to Cairo and Damascus, as a result of which then President Lyndon B. Johnson brought intense pressure on. Isi'ael to halt further troop movements, and on Premier Kosygin to call off a :threatened Soviet airborne operation .agaiust Israel. "Peck" turns out to be one Perry Fel- lwock, who enlisted in the Ail. Force in 1966 at the age of 20, was assigned to NSA for duty, served in NSA. stations in Turkey and Indochina, an& was dis- charged in November, 1969 ? age 23, Ramparts claims ?? he was a "senior analyst" with NSA. Fellwock claims he then turned down a $10,000-a-year job with the. CIA, be- cause he wanted to "work to end the Vietnam war." In April, 1.9'12, he was arrested and fined $50 for disturbing the peace in San Diego before the can party headquarters and the nth Naval District headquarters._ , In an interview with the New York Times, Feliwock said, "1 know the FBI knows who I am. I'd like to avoid pub- licity but I'm willing to go through and if I haye to, to jail." Fellwock and the Ramparts editorial board can sleep quietly. Neither the FBI nor anyone 'else is. liable tot bother him. Approved For Release 2001/03/04 NSA's "no comment" to the story does not conceal official agitation but only ? yawning boredom. To begin with, while 1\15;k does employ multitudes of Air Force enlisted men in a variety of clerical and technical ca- pacities, it does not use such youthful detailees ?Vith high school -educations 'as "analysts," senior or. othemise. Ramparts could have acquired a far more detailed, and accurate account of the structure and activities of NSA from an overtly published book, David Kahn's superb "The Codebreakets," than they got from their ego-tripping source. His corridor gossip is flattet,'ing, but ludi- crously inaccurate. Items: NSA is the seat of the major cryptanalytic effort of the. U.S. govern- ment. It regularly reads ti-tat portions of the traffic Of foreign nations NV11 tC11 is sent in a wide variety of low-level crypto systems, designed only to .provide pro- tection for a short period of time. It does not, alas, read the key internal traffic of major powers, which these days is sent in crypto systems using computer-generated keys, ?which are im- pervious to attack. There have been- no U-2-type *over- ' flights since the early 90s, when the sat ellite reconnaissance programs were de- veloped. The unmanned SAMOS capsule houses equipment so sophisticated that ? the photographic and electronic take -is infinitely superior to that which a con- ventional overflight could produce. (The United States does send planes and ships along Soviet and Chinese borders to sniff out electronic- developments and defen- sive techniques and reaction times, but these do not deliberately violate foreign air or sea space. When it happens by accident, the results can be disastrous.). And youthful military enlisted men on detail to NSA simply do not have access to intelligence slated for the executive. level ? and they . certainly aren't con- versant with presidential actions based on such intelligence.. In. short, Ramparts ? .which has scored palpable hits in the past is attacking with .an empty ?waterpistol. And Fellwock, having ? secured ample amounts of the publicity he is so ar- dently avoiding, can sink back into the obscurity from which he emerged. : CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0 BRI.C.i:O2T, CONN. TELEG M L 2 4 13721 - 12,425 STATINTL ode Breakiiig . A former Air Forte sergeant, who was discharged from the service in 1969, ? claims that the United States has re- ? fined its electronic intelligence tech- niques to the point where it can break `Soviet _codes, listen to and understand Soviet communications and coding systems and keep track of virtually '? ever); Soviet jet or plane or missile- carrying submarine around the world. The press quickly discovered the identity of the analyst, who signed .his / article. with .the pseudonym of Winslow Peck. Peck corroberated many of .his ? revelations, but found .some experts strongly denying that the United States -, had broken the sophisticated codes of the ? Soviet Union or of other foreign powers, This whole matter strikes at the fundamental ? security of the United States as well as of the Soviet Union. In the sixties, the U-2 intelligence flights were known to the Soviet but Premier Khrushchev used it as an excuse to call off his summit talks with President Eisenhower. Government intelligence experts now say there has been no auth- orized violation of ,Soviet or Chinese air space since. Peck was employed by the little . known National Security Agency. Head- quartered at Fort Mead, near Baltimore, it has about 90,000 employees, mostly military. Its -annual budget is about. z1. billion. Primarily, it collects World in--- formation, mostly through advanced technology, for distribution- through the ' Government, including the Central 1t1, telligence Agency. Peck claims?Mr.-it .has elicrEl-e-d'tlie Communist world with some 2,000 electronic listening posts on,. land or on naval vessels or aircraft. It is reassuring to know how wide- spread our intelligence apparatus is But, no matter how comforting, it is not information to broadcast to our fes. Its value is in its secrecy. Its original revelation can only be distressing to American relations..with the Communst powers with whom we are trying. to up new relations of co-existence leading to peace. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 Approved For Release NiNA:f2:61A-R, DP80-01911M11-19 Spy in the Sky? It was just 'announced that the gov- erriment is going to send a U-2 plane up bver Chesapeake Bay in the next few 'days to map the damage caused by trop- ical storm Agnes. Without wishing to seem unnecessar- ily suspicious, we should just like to point out that, by the freakiest of coinci- dences, the Soviet Embassy has recently :purchased a summer residence for its ambassador and the embassy staff at ,Pioneer Point on the Chesapeake's East- ern Shore. The embassy, according to latest reports, is in th.e process of reno- vating the tennis courts and building a basketball court on the grounds of the waterfront estate. If .you remember, President Eisen-, hower was first impressed by the poten- tial of the original U-2 over a decade ago when the spy masters showed him de- tailed photographs of his favorite green at Burning Tree, snapped from 60,000 feet up. If you also remember, Premier Khrushchev used the shooting down of an operational U-2 as the pretext for scuttling summit talks with Ike in 1960. We just hope every precaution will be taken with the flood-mapping spy plane, so that the new era of sweetness and light between the United States and the Soviet Union will not come crashing down in flames just because somebody at the CIA wants an aerial eloseup of the Russians' new basketball court.. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 WASETI;C7T0:: POST Approved For Release 20017Q3/Q4I:g[A-RDP80-01601 .13 .._ . 21(61.1) e e '1' r" ,1,11A. :,..i... r u.. 'LI., 61,1 -1.!-- .U... , ri(0.11 ily ')-1 tl- t; :iYT--N,',, ly-o 1:1 cpPIPee 11 11.c,i.;.L.L. J ? .u..u. ,... :. ? , ..i I , ,'.1.,1_ - .. ; , By George C. Wilson . Union over the last few years i inspector effort has been heav-i Washinfflon rust Straf Writcr has conducted several sets of illy classified by the Pentagon . The U.S. Air Force is taking; exercises which many Western !through the years. But the a. new le?1; at satellites that. space specialists we as (I(-, 'basic idea has not changed could rocket into, space and in- , signed to perfect satellites , . S.ince former Defense. i .sPect foreign spacecraft look. that could in IMI M spect, and possi- ing down on the United bly destroy, U.S. satellites. , F.7e.cretary Robert S. Mc- States. - The United States is behind Namara told Congress in se- The arms control agreement Russia M this field. The A in 1 eret testimony in 1968 that with the Soviet Union ? r orce has sponsored a nm uber "we are exploring the develoP-, given imPetus i? Pr?P?sals has of studios but. has vet to fly Intent. of a non-nuelear surveil- such inspector satellites. Presi-Ithe first. inspector satellite, lance or destruction capability dent Nixon has assured c on. One argument against doing it ;against hostile satellites . . ." . gross that the United States has bec--n the fear of looking! - any .will keep track of the Soviet , i .t , i? ? the i McNamara said one of a a promise provocative.iii.3?i.;cetonoltliit- e(1'7\s",1( "1" 'Inumber of rockets could carry .pace. .missile buildup, hinged on the ability to keep the satellite inspector into , counting missiles with observ- In the environment? of the; space- Spartan, Polaris, ' ation satellites, recent Strategic Arms Limita- ,rhor or minuteman, one way Right now, both the United tion Treaty (SAL Ii, aerospace for the satellite to home in on States and the Soviet Union Fompaides see their chances 'another would -hi' by the beat spy on each other from space improved for .gettim._ beyond :it would give off in space?so- by satellite.. Neither side has Pr--s studies and individual called infra-red sensors. ,i . interfered with the other, in pieces of hardware' LTV Aerospace worked with contrast to Russia's desperate Several of the companies :the Air Force on a sensor for / effort to knock down U-2 spy are PrePari.nr_! Proposals for :a satellite inspector under a planes which used to fly over submission this week to the secret project called 922. The her territory?an effort that Pentagon in hopes of obtain-!sensor was launched into was ultimately successful in ing one of two Air Force study space successfully from Cape downing Francis Gary Pow- contracts for the satellite Kennedy but the doors on the ers. inspector. sensing unit failed to open, Nevertheless, the Soviet . ?The off-and-on satellite dooming the test. 4.. ? yt. '1 r(r6E-1-1 STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 5 Approved For Release 2001/03Ts .?? ARE BUREAUCRACIES (, IMPORTANT? (OR ALLISON WONDERLAND) by Stephen D. Krasner ? kW-180-01601 STATI NTL article on this subject. With the publication of his book this approach to foreign ? policy now receives its definitive statement. The bureaucratic interpretation of foreign policy has become the conventional wisdom. My argument here is that this vision is misleading, dangerous, and compelling: mis leading. because it obscures the power of the 'President; dangerous because it undermines the assumptions of democratic politics by Who and what shapes foreign policy? In relieving high officials of responsibility; and recent years, analyses have increasingly em- compelling because it offers leaders an ? phasized not rational calculations of the excuse for theif failures and scholars an ?national interest or the political goals of opportunity for innumerable reinterpreta- national leaders but rather bureaucratic pro- tions and publications. ? cedures and bureaucratic politics. Starting The contention that the Chief Executive a is trammelled by the permanent government. with Richard Neustadt's Presidential Power, judicious study of leadership published in has disturbing implications for any effort to ? 1960, this approach has .come to portray the impute responsibility to public officials. A ? American' President as trapped by a perma- democratic pOlitical philosophy assumes that nent 'government more enemy than ally, resPonsibility for the acts of governments can Bureaucratic theorists imply tha,t it is exceed- be attributed to elected officials. The charges ingly difficult if, not impossible for political of these men are embodied in legal statutes. leaders 'to control the organizational web The electorate punishes an erring official by which surrounds them. Important decisions rejecting him at the polls. Punishment is result from numerous smaller actions taken senseless unless high officials are responsible r by individuals at different levels in the for the acts of government.. Elections have bureaucracy who- have partially incompatible some impact- only if government, that most national, bureaucratic, political, and personal complex of. modern organizations, can be . objectives. They, ate not necessarily a reflec- controlled. If the bureauctatic machine tion?of the aims and values' of high officials. escapes manipulation and direction even by ? Presidential Power?was well received?by'John the highest officials, then punishment is ? Kennedy, who read it .with interest, recom- illogical. Elections are a farce not because the mended it to his associates, and commis- people suffer from false consciousness, but ? sioned Neustadt. to do a private study of the because public officials are impotent, en-? 1962 Skybolt incident. The approach has meshed in a' bureaucracy so large that the been developed and used by a number of actions of government are not responsive to ? their will. What sense to vote a man out of scholars?Roger Hilsman, Morton Halperin, Arthur Schlesinger, Richard Barnet; aU office when his successor, regardless of his Graham Allison?some of whom heldsub- values, will be trapped in the same, web of Cabinet positions during the 1960's. It wa - only incrementally mutable standard operat- 's .the subject of a special conference at the RAND log procedures? Corporation, a main theme of a course at the The Rational Actor Model Woodrow Wilson School at- Princeton and ? . the subject of'a faculty seminar at Harvard. Conventional analyses that focus on the It is the intellectual paradigm which guides values and objectives of foreign policy, what the new public policy program in the John F. Allison calls the Rational Actor Model, are Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. perfectly coincident with the ethical sas- Analyses of bureaucratic politics have beenumptions of democratic politics. The state is used to explain alliance behaviour during the viewed as a rational unified actor. The 1956 Suez crisis and the Skybolt incident, behaviour of states is the outcome of a c?, Truman's relations with MacArthur,- Amer- rational decision-making?process. This proc- ican policy in. Vietham, and now most ess has three steps. The options for a given situation are spelled out. The consequences thoroughly the Cuban missile crisis in ? Graham Allisi&VdfAmistMjii 26eftworavot es eT eiPsion- e1 ing the Cuban WITsgler risis, Published in 1 OP t (Little Brown & Company). Allison's Volume makers. The. analyst knows what the state -1 _ IL - _ ? ? ? n ? I Aid 14iC "1,1.1.,t;? L__ STATI NTL 00170001-4 1-&-S &WORLD. REPORT Approved For Release 2001/0311f49: bY\-WIliP80-01601R001 HOW NT . Thanks to aerial surveillance and space-borne cameras, the world. is now virtually an open book to U. S. They've become vital tools of American policy. ? President Nixon, directing war moves in Southeast Asia and peace moves with .Russia, has at his fingertips a major weapon brought to a peak of reliability ? during his Administration. The weapon is this: a constant flow of .aerial photographs providing, in minute. .detail, the kind of intelligence informa- tion that no previous President was able to 'donut ? ? Over. North Vietnam, reconnaissance .pilots flying at altitudes of 10 miles. or more are able to take pictures that can clistinguish between tank models, . show the types of trucks. and artillery pieces, expose troops in camouflaged bunkers? and even count rifles. Over Russia, reconnaissance satellites orbiting at 1.09 miles up?or more than 'SOO miles--can detect the construction of rocket sites and the firing of missiles. 'From their pictures, aircraft at- landing Strips . can be identified. The most ef- fective cameras, from 100 miles, can .depicf objects two feel in diameter and show the writing on billboards. "Silent army." Such surveillance intelligence?when- properly interpreted seen as a major key both to the fight- ing in Vietnam and the possibility of an arms-control pact with Russia. Behind the information fed to the President is a silent army of intelligence specialists using. new- advances in photography, aeronautics and space technology. . In Southeast Asia, these technicians depend heavily on reconnaissance plahes and pilotless drones for the pictures they need. Space satellites are used for back- up material. Worldwide, however, the important business of keeping tabs on the Russian and Communist Chinese nuclear-missile build-up rests primarily with the space satellites. Aircraft give better pictures at lower cost. But, since the incident in which a U-2 spy plane was shot down over Russia, aircraft ? reconnaissance of- . the Soviet Union has been ruled out. I1os. they work. Reconnaissance -planes and drones have been flown rou- tinely overridesfaithia Place iFise S Es- EK7 A HE RED WORLD ed States first began bombing North Vietnam in 1965. The drones have their cameras turned on to take wide-angle pictures .contin- uously while in flight. Reconnaissance pilots, after studying earlier drone pho- tography, can pinpoint their cameras on suspected military activity for closer, more detailed pictures. The photos are analyzed within min- utes at U. S. bases in Southeast Asia. In some cases, the photos are also sent to Washington?either by air or by radio beam, depending on whether the priority is secrecy or speed. Over the' past decade,' the U. S. has kept- watch on the Soviet Union and Red China with a series of "search 'and find" satellites whose. very names are classi- fied. They are equipped to pho- tograph and radio back to "Sky spy" model is readied for testing. Satellite cameras can photograph most of the world. ground stations prints that can be put together to depict the entire country. Cround stations for receiving these pictures are located at Another series of "close look" satel- lites is used to focus on known or sus- peeled subjects of military significance. These photos, of a much higher quality, are dropped by parachute to be re- trieved and sent on to the National Photographic Interpretation Center in Washington, D. C. What's ahead. New and improved reconnaissance satellites, officials say, are in the offing. One, clubbed the "Big Bird," is expected to have an orbital life of several- months and to carry a quantity ? of film packs that can be re- turned at frequent intervals. Success of the sky spies has been credited with removing an important hurdle to a U. S.-Russian agreement on limiting arms. Without the satellites, it 'r'"',"'"Tlrrr':,'',"?.'':'r,'T,7'r"-? ? Gemini V photo shows African airfield from 100 miles up. Sky spies give much more detail. New Boston, N. II.; Vandenberg ?Air is argued, no significant agreement could Force Base in California; Oahu:, Ilawall; be possible because of the Kremlin's Kodiak Island, Alaska; on Guam; on the steadfast opposition to on-site inspection Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean, teams to enforce a treaty. and in Ethiopia. In addition, six ship- Even before arms-control talks started, board stations, each with a 30-foot an- U. S. officials say the satellites have tenna, can be deployed around the helped to stabilize relations between the world to fill blank spoCs in the network. U. S. and Russia?through increased The photos are radioed from the satel- knowledge?and at the same time have. lites and wind up at 'Sunnyvale, Calif., significantly reduced U. S. defense spend- /60\11/01i7an.:ftlAe-kb0810-01601R0011001/006Ven?"' ("DI ? 28 MAY 1972. STATINTL ? fi.pproy.cd..ForRelease 2001/03/04.:.CIA-RDP.80-01601R0 act Unveiled I ader . ? . ? ireumstances ? Nightclub Act -- ? ? . i . ? raised dance floor, against By Murrey Marder a baeIground of champagne I- Washington Post Staff Writer . buckets. President' Nixon's r - ? MOSCOW, May .27?It is a press inexhaustible security ad. tradition that journalists brace them- viser, Henry A. Kissinger, ' selves doubly against the winds of gave the American version 1 political hyperbole 'at summit confer- of what Mr. Nixon described ences, where there is abnormal temp- as the "enormously impor- tation to create. a public impression tam" strategic arms agree- of extraordinary,' happenings. But even ment signed two hours ear- 'the most imaginative news manager her in the Kremlin. ? . would have been taxed to preplan the On Tuesday, Kissinger bizarre staging that unveiled the said. the President and world's first nuclear arms limitation Brezhnev spent the after- here. . . , noon and evening on four Nothing approaching the manner in unresolved SALT disagree- '. :7 which this major international news meitts, resolving all but two .reached the press has occurred since of them. One group of re- "rthe aborted 1960 summit conference mining problems con- tin' Paris, Th9re, former Soviet Pre- ? cerned the terms for inter- g . '-mier Nikita S. Khrushchev blew clown changing land missiles with ?the pillars of the temple with .a temper submarines and another oh- tantrum using unPrintable language.: stacle was how to deal.with /because the United States had sent ' older Soviet submarines. a U-2 spy plane across his country. Kissinger and other Amer- That.was stagecraft fCir disaster. What lean and Soviet experts rr happened here last night and in the worked most of the night on early morning -hours of Saturday was these issues; they were ? Improvised stagecraft to display briefly discussed again, by suecess. the President and lirezhnev ? ? - ? Nene who experienced it will the next day followed by an- ' "quiekly forget the: climatic act of an 'other prolonged session by ? improbable ? 'diplomatic presentation experts, who worked into that had. leaped between the Kremlin the morning hours of Fri- ?.Palace of the czars; ? a well-worn dip- day. ? lomatic 'bargaining room in Helsinki,. Airborne Negotiations Airb Finland; the U.S. embassy here, and ? :ultimately the night club of Moscow's By noon Friday, the stale- , Intourist Hotel. No one fully orche- mates were broken, and the Strated, this production. Russians. were anxious ? to ?In the seductively dim lighted "Sky- announce the result Friday ;light Sky Room," which happens to night to avoid disrupting the :be on the 'hotel's ground. floor, be- summit schedule. Joint in- ,t1m0 A bandstand and a circular structions were flashed to ? ?- . ? ? ? . the U.S. and Soviet negotia- tors in Helsinki, and the final agreement was. liter- ally pieced . together by American Ambassador Ger- .:a/4 C. Smith and chief So- viet negotiator V. S. Semy- enov on an American plane that brought them to Mos- cow at 9 p.m. yesterday. The task of publishing the agreement and explaining it to the world was barely be- ginning at that point, with a signing ceremony set for 11 .p.m. in the Kremlin. . At 10:02 p.m. American newsmen traveling with the President were assembled in . the U.S. embassy for an on, -the-record briefing by Am- : ger, both operating under heavy strain. ? ,Smith called it "the fresh- est treaty that I have ever talked about." In fact it was so fresh that no one in the room had a copy to show to newsmen. That produced tu- mult. The "landmark" treaty that the President and his associates hailed was not available to quote from be- cause a frantic operation was under way to produce a formal version for the Kremlin signing ceremony. ? Criticism already was being raised in Congress about the still-unseen treaty, especially charges that it gave lopsided submarine ad- vantages to the ? Soviet Union. Smith and Kissinger firmly denied that, and then ? ?in an unusual sequence? began revealing, in Moscow, intelligence information to sustain the American assur- ances. ?This session, and the one afterward in the Intour- ist Hotel, 'produced on-the- record. exchanges between American newsmen and of fi-- dials never before heard in Moscow. ? - Ambassador Smith, who has been negotiating with the Russians under mutually agreed stringent security precautions, in addition to usual sensitivities on weap- ons data, reached an iim. pass(1 with newsmen in the brief time allotted for ques- tioning. ? Then Kissinger stepped - in. ? 'Not Constrained' Basic Story Reporter: "The baSie story (about the treaty) is going to go out of this session. I think . we have to get figures on submarines and other es- timates, otherwise the story will go out in a garbled way . . . is this figure of 42 Y. class submarines an accur- ate one that they will be al- lowed to complete, and we with 41?" Smith: "I don't know about this figure of 42 sub- marines. I have seen all sorts of speculations about Soviet submarines, but it is perfectly clear that under this agreement if the Sovi- ets want to pay the price of scrapping a substantial num- ber of other Important stra- tegic weapons systems they can build additional submar. Ines. Reporter: ". . I think you are evading the point Stith: "I am purposely evading the ? point because that is an intelligence esti- mate that I am not in a posi- t, Ut horized version Approved For RelehtWIRIC:P0376144itirA-FtYlitiM1101R0011001060b11-4 Kissinger: "Since I am not quite as constrained or don't feel as constrained as Am- bassador. Smith, lest we build Up a profound atmos- phere of mystery about the submarine issue, I will straighten it out as best I can. .. "The base number of So: via submarines is in dis- pute. It has been in-dispute . in ow- intelligence estimate exactly how much it is, though our intelligence esti- . mates are in the range that was suggested. Kissinger: "I am not going to go beyond what I have said. It is in that general range. The Soviet estimate of their program is slightly ' more exhaustive. They, of course, have the advantage . that they know what it is , precisely. (Laughter)" ? This discussion then pro- - eeeded into complex detail but with little time for addi- tional questioning because of the impending 11 p.m. signing ceremony. At 10:55 p.m., the briefing was cut off with a pledge to resume it across town at the Intour- ist Hotel that serves as press: headquarters for the summit meeting. There, 'an attempt was made to hold a joint Ameri- can-Soviet press briefing, but that was frustrated be- cause no one had a copy of any of the three official doc- uments that newsmen had seen being signed on televi- sion. At 1 a.m. today, secretar- les were still, rushing to copy ? and mimeograph the texts of the antiballistic mis- sile treaty, the interim agreement limiting offen- sive nuclear weapons and an accompanying protocol from ed ? v:AsH:1;;Noli sn?. Approved For Release 2001/03/042:AVRICala80-01601 MOSCOW MUSINGS Despite Soviet Rigidity, Life Relaxing STATINTL ? By a Star Staff Writer MOSCOW ? All the poetry of modern Russia seemed to be summed up in that little dining room across from the Kremlin. There we sat, connoisseurs of past Nixon travels to Rus- . sial reminiscing about the 1959 visit of the then vicc president ? which produced so much ver- bal fireworks with Nikita S. Khrushchev. Superficially not much has changed in the heart of this metropolis. There in that Vie- ,torian-like dining room were the same tatty lace curtains, the same struggle for service, the same blaring music from a ?combo still living in the 19305. Outside, despite Ulu intru- sion of several new glass sky- scraper hotels, the splendor of the flood-lighted .spires of the Kremlin remains supreme'. But as the evening wore on, the real changes in Moscow Shone through. It is 'uasically a change in mood. It is relaxa- tion. It is an unashamed ? search for the "good life," as dfigrmined in best Ameri- can style ? by more cars, better, clothes, larger apart- ments. This poetry of change pene- trated the dining room. Sud- denly, in an interval between blaring jazz tunes, came the haunting strains of the Lara theme from the movie Dr. Zhi- vago. The movie ?and the aook by Boris Pasternak ? have not been allowed here. This great among modern Soviet poet- novelists was ignored to his death by the guardians of So- cialist orthodoxy. Yet 'in came the Zhivago music, and the fofeign and Russian patrons around the room, many of them affluent Russians still dressed in clothes of harder times, ate on with noisy nonchalance. Later, in the doorway of the hotel, a group of Swedish lads ?on a school graduating trip to a Russia which they confid- ed they didn't like?also per- sonified the changing Moscow. They ?. 41n r;rilnk" little raucous, dressed in the David" were a time of new hairstyles and ragged clothes hope. Today the same opti- mis.m is abroad in this capital. of the young West. Guitar in "Everyone here is expecting hand, they strolled through the co much, yearning for so balmy night to the Lenin tomb much," said an intelligent In- on Red Square, mingling with tourist guide of the President's ; Russian passersby who visit. "Last evening on the seemed not the least bit sur- metro home, everyone was prised by this youthful parade. reading about his arrival and It all seemed so normal ? talking about what can hap- therein lay the difference from pen." 1959. Time end relaxation Nixon has said that he does have worked their way. Thu- not want a new "spirit which teen years ago, for instance, will later die in disillusion- the rage of Soviet puritanism meat. The "spirit of Camp Da- would have been visited on a vie Crashed with the U2 young Russian couple who ' plane incident over Russia in walked over .the cobble stones May 1960 and Khrushchev's of Red Square hand-in-hand, later sabotage of the Big Four sneaking an occasional kiss. summit conference in Paris. These are only little things. For President Nixon today, They form the first impres- his summit with Communist skins of a returning traveler to party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev Russia. is painted as a' summit of sub- The bitter Nixon visit here stance. But already a "spirit in 1959 produced the first real of Moscow" is building in pop- but brief thaw in Soviet- ular expectations of dramatic American relations. Those lat- achievement. er months when Khrushchev Whether the substance the visited the United States and President wants matches this lie and President Eisenhower expectation is still an unan- distilled the "sp -it of ? Camp ? swered question. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 yORIC TX Approved For Release 2001/03{%;/pRlitsilpP80-01601199111i9lL70001-4 Tass Criticizes4P;esia ;it/ ,2 Ships Hit, China Says, American U-2 spy plane was ? ?-.- -T No Mention Made of Trig brought down. By HEDRICK SMITH They noted that the Kremlin Special to The New York Times . MOSCOW, May 9?Tass, the Soviet press agency, today crit- icized President Nixon's: deci- sion to mine North Vietnamese ports as a violation of inter national law, but gave no indi- cation whether the move would force the cancellation of Mr. Nixon's scheduled trip to Mos- cow in two weeks. ? The initial Soviet. reaction tame in the form of a dispatch from Washington summarizing Mr. Nixon's speech last night on new measures against North Vietnam. Pravda, the authoritative Communist party newspaper, carried the Tass dispatch with- out-.any other commentary to signal Moscow's intentions. American embassy officials ,said late tonight that a 20-man ?White House team, which ar- rived Sunday evening to begin final preparations for the Nix- on visit, was still planning to hold its first meeting with So- viet officials .tomorrow morn- ting?probably the first real test .of the Kremlin's attitude since the new measures were an- nounced. The Tass report branded thel port-mining and other measures! announced by Mr. Nixon as,: "overt acts- of aggression" inl violation of "norms of inter-1 national law." it was taken as preliminary response while; the Kremlin weighed alterna- tives. The President's announce- ment came as the Soviet Union and its leadership marked a two-day holiday celebrating the 27th Anniversary of the Arne% victory over Nazi Germany. The holiday perhaps added to the traditional Soviet reluctance to respond quickly in public to major new foreign policy de- velopments. . Diplomatic circles were mind- ful that the first Soviet reac- tion might not necessarily in- dicate hOw the Kremlin would finally deal with Washington's challenge. They recalled that in May, 1960, Premier Nikita Krushchev delayed for nearly two weekspixtatoiNlile the might want to confer with Hanoi before taking any major course of action and also might want to wait until the vote in Bonn on ratification of non- aggression treaties with Mos- cow and Poland. The Tass dispatch from Washington, 'presumed to have been carefully screened at a high level before its release, re- ported' Mr. Nixon's speech mat- ter-of-factly, citing not only the military measures but also his statement that "these actionsi, are not directed against any other nation?' It related his offer for a complete halt to "all 'acts of iforce throughout Indochina" :and American withdrawarfrom Vietnam within four months of an internationally supervised ?cease-fire and release of Ameri- can war prisoners. It cited his. assurances that he wanted to end the war but said his latest. actions "point to the contrary," an unusually mild .Soviet con-17 ? President Ei e ir Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 visit to Moscow. after Approved For Release,2001*SibLPSalA-RDP80-01 10 MAY 1972, Victim- ?Aorta Viet ar Puts rez Tiff on Spot ? STATINTL THE SOVIET LEADERS . that Mr. Nixon might be ?The Soviet- Union cannot - have made a great effort in genuinely anxious to secure afford to make trouble on recent days to help .Presi- a "generation of peace." But the routes to Berlin because.. Marshql Grechko the de- this would damage its dent Nixon settle the war op c. , , tense minister, countered by search for an understanding terms acceptable to him, but publicly drawing attention with West Germany. But it Indoing so .they have be- to the "growing aggressive- can send minesv.'eepers to come vulnerable to the hard- ness of imperialism, and pri- Vietnamese waters, thus liners in the ? Kremlin. ?2 Madly American imperial- putting the onus of challeng- . ing them on the U.S. Navy. ? ? Just how far the So vi ism." . Soon after Kissinger left leaders went is evident from SOVIET M I L I T A R Y Moscow, where he had cer- IVEr Nixon's statement that leaders ob v io u sly were not mollified by what ,Brezh- tainly warned his hosts of Mr. Nixon's determination a . inC they had lately shown an in- pev to14 them u 'an end on a basis that would meeting held midway through Henry Kissinger's terest in bringing the war to ? 'be "just to both sides." For visit to Moscow last month. him ' to say this is to ac- The army paper Red Star,- ?knowledge that the Soviet commenting on the meeting, leaders were working for a pointedly stressed again the settlement which, in Mr. threat of an American at- Nixon's own judgment, was . . tack on ,the Soviet Union. "just" and 'therefore favora- to be tough, a Soviet missile submarine arrived in Cuba ? in apparent violation of the Soviet-American unde r- standing. . t At any other time, there . would have been bawls of , -protest from Washington. So' far, the administration. has ? chosen to play it down. But the' arrival of the submarine The military leaders have al. shows that those Soviet . 'ole to the United States. lies in the Soviet security, 'play it tough are not leaders who also. want to In spite .of his continuing with- anger at the Kremlin for ,police . apparatus, w h o s e out resources. supplying arms to Hanoi, hec...e,. 1,4 f, -11T s7 i A ?11drOp0V, is the , ..._ 0 1972. ilictOr Zona , was admitting, in effect, only Soviet leader: to have, that Moscow and Washing- ward a settlement on Viet- about the "illusions" im- nam. His failure even to plicit in trusting Mr. Nixon ? "complain about China sug- too far. . . .gests that Peking was even ,Brezhnev was able ? to - The Soviet leaders who fa- overcome the objections 'more cooperative. ?vored the summit had 'from both these .quarters staked their political ca- while the preparations for reers, as Khruschev once the summit were going well, did, on the - expectation that ,with the United States was viously been weakened. by , were arguing that such an The parallel with the Paris.: - expectation was an illusion. suinmit of 1960, which They are ,bound to claim Khrushchev was forced to 'proved them right. . from his own hardliners in abandon under pressure . now that Mr. Nixon has --- The Kremlin hardliners, response to the U-2 over- ' especially the military, were flight is an obvious one. concerned about the conces- - ' ? sions that Mr. Nixon might EVEN IF Brezhnev had. ? :exact froin their politicians, been tempted by Mr, Nix - much as some of the mili- on's renewed offer of tary and conservatives in "major agreements" on the United States were con- trade and nuclear arms, he cerned about' the conces- must' now be in a much sions that Mr. Nixon might weaker position to persuade make to the Russians. his opponents in the Krem- L eo aid Brezhnev, the lin that' the summit ought to Communist Party secretary, go on. Indeed, he may lvell as 011sce? # e SAiii be unibr ressure to re-. pr , uttered a public warning Ion had gone a Ion ?;:', ?.vay to- but his position has ob- ,a mutually acceptable deal possible. The, hardliners Mr. 'Nixon's latest actions. at eAStei 0 /013/0441 CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 summit with the argument Nixon himself has acted. ? WASHINGTONIAN Approved For Release 2001/01161-RDP80-01 STATI NTL- STATINTL ? STATI NTL ? - The Voice *of ? Joe Alsop Power Glory By Twin Kelly n Joe Alsop's pleasant garden room I four plump .caged doves are cooing. Joe says when asked that he does not like doves?that out of their cages they are dirty, mean, and hard to man- age. ?Joe sits under the skylight sipping a tisane from a huge blue and white china cup and the doves in two large, elaborate cages pay him no mind. ? They're in and Joe's out but nobody's free. Joe i a blue blooded falcon, a rare and endangered species. He is a falcon by inheritance, a member of the estab- lishment, a natural-born leader, a cousin of leaders, a classmate of leaders, a for- mer roommate of leaders, and the chosen voice of the pedigreed "first-rate men" for .thirty years. For generations we've all been run by the East Coast cousins. The first cousins went to Grown and the second cousins to St. Paul's. The Irish Catholic fifth cousins. were named Kennedy?but that was later. First they were coachmen and named Pat and Mike. They went to Choate. ? It is difficult to tell the cousins without an alumni bulletin. Cousins are not mea- sured by blood alone, but establishment cousins do tend to marry establishment cousins and produce geneological cousins. . There are several (de 'facto) Jewish cousins named Lehmann, Ochs, and Mor- genthau, but there are no Italian or Polish or Bulgarian cousins. Black people .are not ready to be cousins though some can be classmates. It is customary to speak well of the late Frederick Doug- lass. Some cousins chuckle a lot and Joe's blood cousin Teddy' Roosevelt grinned and shouted "Bully" but most were serious faced and did not laugh out loud. This was partly because many were from New ? England but also because they were born to assume the awful responsi- ? bility of running the world. ? Running the world. is not easy. Joe took up the burden in 1932. He was a Go loom oom ing Connecticut reactionary father and a mother who was as well connected -:.; as the Connecticut Light & Power Co. He was cousined to everyone important south of Portland and north of Phila- --"??.?.?I delphia. He was literally a cousin to all 1 t? - ----- the Roosevelts?Teddy, Franklin, Elea- t, ? ? ? nor, and Alice Blue down. ""-N When Joe was ready for the profes- sional world his grandmother (a cousin of God's) decided that he was not to be a businessman, diplomat, banker, Episco- pal bishop, or president of Harvard. It was suggested that he get a job on a newspaper, a startling idea. Cousins and ? , . ' . ? -, 1 I 11 i ? :- ! classmates owned newspapers, of course, but they didn't work on them. Joe had :4-4?6;,,,, 'a few precedents. Alexander Woollcott, ---?itrF; who if not a cousin. was at least invited' I ..:*t to cousins' homes, was cutting a choleric swath through New York culture, and Bob Benchlev, a blithe spirit but a Har- vard, boy, was working for magazines. Ogden Reid hired Joe at Joe's grand- mother's suggestion and sent him to re- port to the Herald Tribune's city editor, a disenchanted man. named Stanley Walker. City editors are all low-born. Stanley had difficulty believing his own ? eyes since Joe, though only twenty-two, was 245 pounds, dressed in well-cut vest and watch chain, and possessed of an ? extraordinarily arch accent that sug- gested simultaneously the Queen Mother, Cardinal Newman, and the fatigue of a gentleman who'd just swum the English Channel backwards. He also couldn't type. Still, no one is perfect. Joe was broadly read and he could write a clear, ominous sentence. Alex Woollcott decided that Joe was the only educated youth he'd met since his own college days. Alex was given to extraordinary judgments?he was against sex and he believed Louisa May Alcott was a great writer. ? N+Actrie. , - ? t. , - ? F z1/4 ?? ? , - ?.?.? ??? '014. vagiMs.. Joe was soon a featured byline writer at the Herald Tribune and in less time than it takes to add up the Vietnam elec- tion. returns he was the co-proprietor 'Of a Washington column?his partner being a gentleman named Robert Kint- ,? I t % ?.4', -4 ? , - 1 - 2.117 ? :?.. - strange youth?fat, an honor graduate ner, a non-cousin, who would in time 3 - ? of Groton ,and Harvard, .s.on of_a .roar- b.Sg.rgq.ka.ti g NBT C and an advisor to Approved ror Keiease zeumiuziu4f.x.:1A-RDP80-01601K001f6b170001-4 continuea Approved For Releattr 2CINTO31541Z-CIARROP80-01601 25 April 1972 'lough Sf Covert Action While the Administration has obtained a tern. porary order against publication of a bpok on the CIA by a former officer of it, Victor L. Marchetti, the public has reason to be thankful to the author. He has already provided outside of book covers some valuable insights and corn- Inents on an agency that deliberately hides from the public and Congress. Without revealing any really hidden secrets, the author uses published reporls to note that the nation's intelligence budget is 6 billion dol- lars a year, that the Central Intelligence Agency has 18,000 employes, and that 6000 of these 'are working in clandestine services, as opposed to intelligence collection. As it is, .however, the CIA is the President's baby. ,Congress has proposed various control measures, such as a limit on the CIA budget, or requirements for clearer information about It, or Senator Cooper's present legislation for the CIA to give intelligence briefings to Con- gress as well as the White House. Congress, after all, foots the bill, but it does not know for what. ? CIA officials occasionally surface frdm se- crecy', to complain that critics concentrate on CIA failures. If so, that is because the public only hears about the failures, and they have to be, big ones at that. They always seem to involve those covert or "paramilitary" opera- tions, which range from a most qualified suc- cess in Guatemala to an unmitigated disaster at Cuba's Bay of Pigs. Mr. Marchetti says, "I don't think we've had a successful paramilitary operation yet." The clandestine operations are worth review-. There was the U-2 spy plane incident that tor- pedoed President Eisenhower's efforts to im- prove relations with the Soviet Union. There was the CIA's proud armed intervention to "save" Guatemala from. leftists, leaving the country to, oppression and terrorism. There was the financing of Radio Free Europe which, when disclosed, stripped that station of every vestige of freedom or credibility. And there was the Bay of Pigs. Then there was the CIA militafy operation to save ?the Dominican Republic from a :rebellion to return a democratically-elected president. There was armed support for the overturn of a government in The Congo. Of course, there was the CIA's hand in the overthrow of the Diem dictatorship in South Vietnam, opening the way for another dictatorship more satisfac- tory to Washington. And there is presently war in Laos, which the CIA actively engendered without any visible success for the American position in Southeast Asia, much less for peace and order. ' Aside from the fact that so many of these clandestine activities were inefficient and in- effective, even aside from the fact that they were bound to' be failures for America's long- ? range pi?ospects and 'reputation even if they did succeed, the ability of the CIA to engage in paramilitary functions represents a continuing ability to start hostilities without the knowledge of the people or Congress, and certainly with- out any declaration of war. Author Marchetti is fair enough to say .that,' so far various presidents have kept a measure of control over such activities. That is no guar- antee for the future, however, and it is Con- gress, not the President, that is supposed to make decisions on war. Consequently, Mr. Mar- chetti recommends confining intelligence ac- tivities to a small and highly professional group, and eliminating the covert actions entirely. Intelligence simply cannot work well when governed by an agency equally interested in activities ranging from propaganda to military action; that is a conflict of interest. The nation does need successful intelligence. It does not need a publicly-uncontrolled and unanswerable power tct make War Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 STATI NTL =NINO TON S Approved For Release 20%ittig01497:2CIA?lioifiT RICHARD WILSON. ?SCOW Trip L?s ond Present Tens.fons It's a fair question why and how plans for President Nix- on's visit to Moscow can go forward in the present state of tension and confrontation be- tween the United States and the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower's pro- jected trip to Russia was called off in May, 1960 under essentially less . provocation than the direct risk to Soviet shipping in Haiphong harbor at the present time. Although the Russians knew of reconnaissance overflights of Soviet territory, its leader- ship exploded in fury when Red gunners. succeeded in shooting down a U2 spy plane and accused Ike of treachery. Premier Nikita Krushchev -withdrew his invitation to Ei- senhower to visit Russia in June 1960 and U.S.-Soviet rela- tions fell back into a deep freeze. The difference between then and now, if Nixon's analysis is ? correct, is profound. We have done more than fly over Soviet territory (in fact, American spy satellites now do so every day.) We have damaged Russian shipping by aerial bombard- ment. It is surmised we may have killed Russians at sur- face-to-air missile sites in North Vietnam. It is commonly recognized that the war in Vietnam, par- ticularly in its present stage, is a proxy conflict between So- viet and American arms, with the prestige of both countries at stake. How, then, can we continue to talk to the Russians with great expectations of new trade arrangements, cultural exchanges and nuclear arms agreements? On Nixon's side, the answer is to be found in his underlying concept of his discussions with the Chinese and Russian lead- erships. He sees those discussions as transcending present conflicts. He deems them to be of an historic nature meaning more to the next generation than this one.. Small token advances may be made with both Russia and China as a result of his visits to Peking and Moscow. Cer- tainly the most will be made of any partial agreement on nuclear arms. But this is only the begin- ning of what must be a con- tinuing process extending over many years so that the very strong China of the future, and the very strong Russia and America of now and the fu- ture, will not plunge the world into a horrendous conflict from which it might never re- cover. Something of the same atti- tude must be shared in Peking and Moscow, it is reasoned, or Nixon never would have been invited to Peking, nor have been received there as he was, and his projected trip to Rus- sia would most certainly be " called off. Compared to what might happen in the future involving Russia, China and the United States in nuclear ware the present conflicts between these powers seem minor and, in any case, can eventually be overcome. One would like to think that this largeness of mind is as universal as Nixon evidently hopes it is. He adverted to this theme indirectly in China, par- ticularly at the Great Wall, and it now appears to be a per- thanent part of his political psychology which he likes to believe originates in the ideal- ism of Woodrow Wilson. Therefore, the President, knowing that only Soviet arms make the present offensive in Vietnam possible, is willing to go ahead with the Moscow part of his general scheme re- gardless. And the leaders in the Kremlin, with who knows what on their minds, are will- ing to set to one side the threats to their shipping? and confrontation in the Mediter- ranean, and the conflict over Israel. They are willing to suppress" their suspicions of Nixon's going to Peking and quit harp- ing on some unknown secret deal between Chou En-lai and a perfidious American Presi- dent. , Their receiving American advance delegations and going :ahead with Nixon's planned visit displays a mood quite dif- ferent from their bristling an- ger over Eisenhower's rela- tively innocent venture in 1960. The United States desires an Improvement in relationships in certain areas and so does the Soviet Union. Those areas are limited. The outstanding big differences remain. In the- ory, at least, those differences might prove less menacing in the future if some preliminary agreements can be reached Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 WASIIINCiTOI4 POST Approved For Release 200,1/0?/84A:P6Ii-V-kDP80-01601 Stanley Karutow Nwutuino- tne ]Kremlin ; The details of their con- leverage to restrain the'4 1. versation are of course un- North Vietnamese?if not AMERICAN OFFICIALS .known. Yet it is fair specula- .through advice then by cut- :.are entreaty stressing that tion that Dobrynin made it ting back their militer the administration's "contin- gency plan" to mine Hai- phong harbor is Only an "op- tion" that may never be ex- -.erased. But 'the possibility' of such a 'move is nettling plain to Kissinger that min-: shipments to Hanoi. ing or -blockading- the Hai- Administration spokesmen phong harbor might lead to ' further hold that the conten; something like a combine- tion of the Russians that'tion of . the 1960 15-2 incident their aid to Hanoi is the'. and the 1962 Cuba confron- equivalent of U.S. aid to Sai- ? tation in reverse. .gon is specious since, they' say, the, -South Vietnamese Besides prompting the are defending their territory the .Kremlin, and the risks , Kremlin to cancel the esi- .against a North Vietnamese ? are real that some miscalcu- dent's invitation to visit.' invasion. Aation could jeopardize not , . . Moscow next month, Dobry- But underlying these ad--? only Pr?dent Nixon's Mos- nin 1 ministration arguments 0,N,,, presumably said, ' cow trip but also endanger other considerations that:, threat to Soviet ships might are rightly or wrongly spur- - U.S.-Soviet relations in also torpedo the Strategic ring the President's decision ' other ways. ? ? - ? ' Arms Limitation Talks and to challenge the Russians. ? -- Proposals to mine or One of these, consistent blockade the .Iiaiplion-g' har- the prospects of increased. with his strategy since 1969, bor in order to discourage U.S. trade with the Rus- is that he must intensify his Russian' weapons shipments sians. ? ; employment of air power to to North Vietnam were re- At worst, the Soviet diplo- cover the reduction of U.S.' peatedly rejected by former - troop strength in Vietnam. mat' may havewarned, the _ President Johnson on the the other, particularly im- pounds that the tactic might destruction or damage of portant at this time, is that -wreck Soviet-American ties. Russian. ships in the Hai- he must escalate even more i But on Tuesday, in re- phong area might, even forcefully to placate the :sponse to questions fromhawks at home if he intends ':Senate Foreign Relations touch off a? more serious to keep withdrawing Amen- Committee Chairman J. W. clash between : the United,.. can boys. In addition, he ' Fulbright, DeferiSe Secre- tary Melvin IL - Laird de- States and the Kremlin. simply refuses to be "bul- But the Russians have lit-- lied" by Moscow. 1 dined to "rule out" .a deci- sion to drop high-explosive :devices into the sea near the North Vietnamese port. LAIRD'S REMARK was / ? 'more than mere talk A mas- sive U.S. naval buildup has Neon underway in the Ton- ,k inn Gulf to provide the yes- their present offensive in Osels for the prospect of a South Vietnam, partly be- 'blockade. Moreover, as 'cause their influence, in Washington Post reporter Hanoi is limited and partly ;Michael Getler disclosed, a because they fear being over- U.S. Navy ammunition ship taken by 'the Chinese. Nor ? laden with aerial mines has can they, for the same rea- 1 left its Philippines base to sons, curb their military - ' join the American armada supplies to North Vietnam. off the Vietnam coast. In addition, they elver- ' If the ; administration's statements and deployments ently believe, they have were designed to worry the every right to provide North long as the United States Russians, they had their ef- Nrietnam with weapons as feet. Soviet Ambassador to l Washington Anatoliy Dobry- tl continues to arm the Saigon ; regime and fortify it with in delayed his scheduled ' 4 departure for Moscow this air support. ? : .1 week, reportedly to discuss JUDGING by both its ' the deteriorating Vietnam rhetoric' and conduct, how-' situation with Henry Kis.; ever, the administration is singer, the President's for- plainly persuaded that the eign policy adviser. ? ? ? . ? ? '. Russians do indeed have the. tie to offer in exchange for their demands that the Pres- ident refrain from escalat- ing his actions in North Vietnam. They cannot or Will not 'at- tempt to dissuade the North Vietnamese ; from pursuing Whatever the -validity of this approach, it is carrying the United , States danger- ,ously close to a collision ',with the Soviet Union. Such a. collision;' Hit nappenS, would be one- of Vietnam's, most costly !..casualties.. - STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 11 STATI NTL NATION Approved For Release 2(9=04 ..i..CIA-RDP80-0160 Pint ig'L ? CEPA,: ?E.1,72.47 (ZEME vxmon mAnorETTI Mr. Marchetti was on the director's stall of the CIA when he resigned from the agency two years ago. Since then, his novel The Rope-Dancer has been published by Grosset & Dunlap; he is now working on a book-length critical analysis of the CIA. The Central Intelligence Agency's role in U.S. foreign af- fairs is, like the organization itself, clouded by secrecy and confused by misconceptions, many of them deliberately promoted by the CIA with the cooperation of the news media. Thus to understand the covert mission of this agency and to estimate its value to the political leadership, one must brush myths aside and penetrate to the sources and circumstances from which the agency draws its au- thority and support. The CIA is no accidental, romantic aberration; it is exactly what those who govern the country intend it to be?the clandestine mechanism whereby the executive branch influences the internal affairs of other nations. In conducting such operations, particularly those that are inherently risky, the CIA acts at the direction and with the approval of the President or his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Before initiating action in the field, the agency almost invariably establishes that its oper- ational plans accord with the aims of the 'administration and, when possible, the sympathies of Congressional lead- ers. (Sometimes the endorsement or assistance of influen- tial individuals and institutions outside government is also sought.) CIA directors have been remarkably well aware of the dangers they court, both personally and for the agency, by not gaining specific official sanction for their covert operations. They are, accordingly, often more care- ful than are administrators in other areas of the bureau- cracy to inform the White House of their activities and to : seek Presidential blessing. To take the blame publicly for an occasional operational blunder is a small price to pay in return for the protection of the Chief Executive and the men who control the Congress. The U-2 incident of 1960 was viewed by many as an outrageous blunder by the CIA, wrecking the Eisenhower- Khrushchev summit conference in Paris and setting U.S.- Soviet relations back several years. Within the inner circles of the administration, however, the shoot-down was shrugged off as just one of those things that happen in the chancy business of intelligence. After attempts to deny responsibility for the action had failed, the President openly defended and even praised the work of the CIA, although for obvious political reasons he avoided noting that he had authorized the disastrous flight. The U-2 program against the USSR was canceled, but work on its follow-on system, the A-11 (now the SR-71,) was speeded up. Only the launching of the reconnaissance satellites put an end to espionage against the Soviet Union by manned aircraft. The A-11 development program was completed, neverthe- less, on the premise that it, as well as the U-2, might be useful elsewhere. Approved For Release 2001/03/04 After the Bay of feel the sting of Pre: the agency had its because it failed in overthrow Castro. the top of the agenc committee, which tii tration, the agency . tices. Throughout th tine operations again the same time, and agency deeply invoh ing regimes in Laos When the Natiorn the CIA in 1967, s exposed the agency' labor and cultural ( funding conduits, ne tried to restrict the Senator Fulbright's a trol over the CIA In was simply told by P and get on with its 131 formed to look into Secretary of State, th of the CIA. Some ( because they had be -longer thought worth continued under improvect cover. A ICW Oi the larger operations went .on under almost open CIA sponsorship, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Air America being examples. And all the while, the CIA was conducting a $500 million-a-year private war in Laos and pacification/ assassination programs in Vietnam. The reorganization of the U.S. intelligence commu- nity late last year in no way altered the CIA's mission as the clandestine action arm of American foreign policy. Most of the few changes are intended to improve the finan- cial management of the community, especially in the mili- tary intelligence services where growth and the technical costs of collecting information are almost out of control. Other alterations are designed to improve the meshing of the community's product with national security planning and to provide the White House with greater control over operations policy. However, none of that implies a reduction of the CIA's role in covert foreign policy action. In fact, the extensive review conducted by the White House staff in preparation for the reorganization drew heavily on advice provided by the CIA and that given by former agency officials through such go-betweens as the influential Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier in the Nixon Admin- istration, the Council had responded to a similar request by recommending that in the future the CIA should con- centrate its covert pressure tactics on Latin American, African and Asian targets, using more foreign nationals as agents and relying more on private U.S. corporations and other institutions as covers. Nothing was said about reduc- ': CIA-RDP80-01601 R001100170001 -4 z r sz 3 0 MAR 1972 Approved For Release 2001/03/Q4 : CIA-RDP80-0160 !From Bratsk to NovosibIrsk, U.S. Roc Is Big, President Isn't ? By HEDRICK SMITH Special to The New York Times BRATSK, ,U.S.S.R., March 23 ?Across the vast ex- panses of Siberia, the pros- pect of President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union this spring stirs little excitement. People are more interested in knowing- about American cars, books, rock groups and fashions. "I'd like to see New York ?what are they wearing there?" asked a 23-year-old factory worker and amateur guitarist, decked out in a loose - sleeved yellow and green paisley sportshirt and a purple vest for a jam session of the Padun, a local group. When a visitor suggested that the young combo from Bratsk would be pretty much in vogue in New York and inquired where they had found costumes so far from the usual Soviet garb, a teen- age flutist with long red hair replied with a laugh, "From you ? Americans." He ex- plained that while the style was American, the clothes were home-made or ,custom- made here. Questions About Cars In Irkutsk, a taxi driver wanted to know whether it was true that "Americans all have cars and they are bigger and better than our." He was immediately hushed up by two technicians who in- sisted, "As you can see, we have everything here. At a Russian Orthodox Church, a grandmotherly yior- *strollea up to two American visitors and, amid . recollections of the suffering of World War H, suddenly ' asked: "How is life with ; you?" Then looking the visi- tor 'up and down, she an- It? swered herself: "I ' can. sec thatit's good." In far off Yakutsk, south ' of the Arctic Circle, an ac- cordionist in a hotel dance band stopped at an Ameri- can's table to ask whether American accordions had five rows of buttons or just four. (Generally, there are six.) In Novoisibirsk, a college senior wanted to know about ,the lateskrecv&ved iSi miap tha Franklin and the rock , group Blood, Sweat and Tears. ! The questions and com- ments of Siberians in random conversations reveal aston- ishing pockets of specialized knowledge about aspects of American life in the midst of ignorance about American so- ciety in general. Capitalist Social Security Two industrial workers' riding the Trans-Siberian Railroad were at first skepti- cal then sincerely surprised to learn that unemployed or disabled American workers receive social security bene- fits and that many Ameri- can college students receive scholarships. A 26-year-old welder was incredulous that a husband alone could sup- port a middle-class family of four. In most Soviet families the wife must work, too. A young professional wom- an in Novosibirsk, said that some Soviet women were so, stirred by the Angela Davis , case that they were naming babies after her, then asked why Miss Davis was being so persecuted. The woman later acknowledged that she had been unaware that Miss Davis had been charged with complicity in a murder. Many Soviet youths listen to the Voice of America reg- ularly and are up-to-date on the lives of movie stars and rock musicians in America. In Siberia one encounters four university graduates whose favorite tune is the depression-era tune, "Brother, Can You Spare a Dime," and SOVIET "4'4" ? UNION Yakutsk Navisibirsk e) MONGOLIA ?cuiN/A17/ o ' 1,111-E3 SOO ' The New York Times/March 30, 1972 in Yakutak a university lec- turer who knows not only such Soviet-translated staples as Dreiser, Jack London and Hemingway, but also Faulkner, J. D. Salinger, and Saul Bellow. Release 2001/03104: In Siberia, much , as in middle America, the tendency seems to he to regard inter- national politics as the dis- tant affair of officials in the capital. Publications in Mos- cow may be gradually mel- lowing in preparation for the Nixon visit, but thousands of miles away the people were either uninterested or wary about having Mr. Nixon visit. Some, remembering how President Eisenhower's planned trip to the Soviet Union in 1960 was canceled at the last minute because of the downing of the American U-2 plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers, are skeptical that Mr. Nixon will actually make the trip. "We built a special guest house for President Eisen- hower," a Bratsk executive .recalled over dinner. "Then he sent Powers and that fin- ished it. We still have the house. Maybe Nixon will use it. But we'll have to see if he actually gets here." A teacher in Novosibirsk voiced a thought echoed by many others: "It would have been better if Kennedy could have come instead of Nixon." Memories of Old Days - Some of the wariness is attributable to Soviet mem- ories of Mr. Nixon's vigor- ously anti-Communist politi- cal past and some to the tremor of uneasiness sent through the Soviet Union by his recent trip to Peking. STATI NTL trouble in the Middle East and the Vietnam war con- tinued. But both, reflecting the obvious desire of Russians to be friendly with Americans and to avoid war at all cost, . were ready to join in a toast to "peace with honor." Again and again, Amer- ican travelers are urged to explain why Washington has suddenly decided to be close to Peking after two decades of estrangement. More than one Soviet cit- izen suggested that a secret deal had been struck in Peking to Moscow's disad- vantage. "In a year or so it will come out," said a politi- cal lecturer in Bratsk, Two Soviet journalists in Yakutsk disagreed on wheth- er the time was ripe for an American-Soviet agreement on arms limitations or space cooperation. One, reflecting the present approach in Moscow, fore- cast a "useful" visit. The other, more in line with the old position, suggested that important agreements were unlikely so long as there was CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 Approved For Release 20eTtiD2P34in-CIXRDP80-01 1 5 MAR 1972 .Mnfst Snit By Sidney I. Ploss Mr. Ploss, a research fellow at Harv- ard University's Russian Research Cen- ter, wrote this article for Perspective. The manual used in a special new course in Soviet universities regrets that under the late Nikita Khrushchev Joseph Stalin's version of politics-as- warlfell into disfavor. Devoted to the ruling Communist Party's "strategy and tactics," the new course brings back the military defini- tion of politics for which Stalin was notorious. Prof. V. S. Aleksandrov, author of the course manual, examines the history of the 1.1. S. S. R. in terms of "strategic stages." At each stage, he writes, party 'leaders confronted "the main enemy" ? and targeted it for "the main blow." ' Invariably this meant a fight to the finish with "class-hostile forces" inside the country and abroad. Main Enemy: U. S. Business Now, U. S. big business is seen as the Soviet's "main enemy." American cor- porate interests are pictured as dispos- ing of huge power which they use to Subvert the Eastern bloc of nations and ? to launch armed attacks on it. Aleksan- STATINTL S ezza.a ev top level is shared and policy disputes 'Soviet propaganda is likely to sharpen exist there, all of the regime's propa- as a result of Nixon's trip to China. gardists do not say the same thing. Kremlin hardliners may be expected to Instead, they tend to voice the diverse stress Peking's anti-Soviet behavior and opinions of mighty patrons at the seat to offer the Nixon voyage as proof that of power. . it is America's unchanging policy to The case of Aleksandrov and his encourage a weakening of Russian in- friends at the Ministry of Education fluence wherever possible. . looks like a classic example of Soviet factionalism. Wields Less Power . A Basic Clue ?Others . will argue that foreign entan- glements have cost Washington too A basic clue for solving the riddle .of much in recent years 'and compelled (sleke.androv's eccentric manual is its Nixon to assess more soberly the situa- oe moion of policy compromises. Un- tion in the world. One is thus reminded *of Khrushchev's like Brezhnev's spokesmen, 'who have advance to the summit meeting with gone to great lengths to justify such President . Eisenhower in 1960. At that East-West deals as the Berlin accords, time it was Mao Tse-tung who most the manual warns that some compro? prominently raged against the Soviet mises may express "opportunism and chief's search for recognition of the Eu- betrayal of the workers' interests." ropean status quo. The Paris surnmit good Communists are urged to "pite conference, abruptly collapsed in the j lesSly expose" and wage "irreconcilable wake Of the I.1-2 incident and amidst struggle" against "top leaders" of signs that Khrushchev was not corn- Communism who strike that kind of Plete master in his own house. bargain with outsiders. .? In ,1,974.Brezlipev wields less personal drov instructs that in turn Soviet ener- The super orthodox textbook also re- ? power than Khrushchev. The Ihternal gies mus e t .b applied toward, isolating stricts the differences between Western critics of his policy of cooperation with and eliminating this mortal foe. , politicians to starkly economic ones. In the West are more conspicuous. Clearly 'The rivalries between America and contrast, those Soviet writers defending worried about the prestige of the Corn- its unist philosophy, 'these neo-Stalinists democratic partners in the world Brezhnev's policy of resolving Soviet- In community are to be exploited as a American differences insist that "a con- are strong enough to preach their mill- "strategic reserve" of Communism. siderable number of capitalist figures" tant gospel in Moscow lecture halls. And allowance is made for "trials of now oppose a line of military pressure They, may yet cause a major surprise strength" to promote the cause of glob- and advocate "mutually advantageous in the 'uncertain field of U. S.-Soviet relations. - ' al revolution. cooperation with Socialist countries." All this seems inconsistent with the Brezhnev's group includes President foreign policy stand of today's Politburo Nixon among the Western moderates, headed by Leonid Brezhnev. His actions to judge from the hopes for improving would make it appear that Communist U. S.-Soviet relations during his upcom- China is the Kremlin's "main enemy" ing visit to Moscow that are raised in on the international scene. Over 30 So- the quoted source; an editorial in the viet divisions, after all, are massed on party magazine, Kommunist. It takes The R u s s o -Chinese frontier, where issue with diehards like Aleksandrov, bloody clashes occured in 1969. Brezh- who are told that long-term trends in nev soon afterward: gave his belated world politics must never be treated approval to President Nixon's call for a as "a rigid scheme." Each international new era of negotiations between Wash- situation is said to be "unique and unre- ington and Moscow. peatable," requiring "a creative ap- Why then is an effort being made to proach and solution on every occasion." induce cold-war moods at Soviet This dynamic attitude is a far cry from institutes? . the party educator's static teaching While secret police operatioris are abcut need for ironbound continuity of more limited, the U. S. S. R. is still a conflict with class enemies, foreign or totalitarian state. Unusual effort is d made to coApprovett FortRebeasV litcp/p4fi;thchkaphoio1601R001100170001-4 it iervice a narrow group of supreme poli ' i . .. cy that sindicated by disarray in Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDF'80-016 AUS1 IN, TEX. STATESMAN r 2 - 31R8 i3Z-ertiVie CrirAinco. t 11. One of the most unique ? developments in the history of ? aerial reconnaissance was the Lockheed II-2 reconnaissance' airplane. Design work on the U-2 was initiated in the summer of 1953 at the request and with the funding of the CentEaLatsligeege..,,,Ageewm By the summer of 1954 construction of the prototype ? airplane had begun and by 1955 this first airplane had made its first flight. The ? airplane was given a "U" ? category designation to ? maintain its veil of secrecy ? relative to its real purpose (U being a designation given to Utility class airplanes). The C.I.A. had requested the U-2 for the express purpose of espionage ,reconnaissance. They wanted an airplane capable of flying over forbidden territory at an ? altitude so high it would be Immune to conventional anti-aircraft defenses. This airplane would, of necessity, also be capable of carrying a highly sophisticated lightweight reconnaissance package over very long ranges. ? Lockheed Aircraft Corporation was chosen as main contractor in the U-2 program for several reasons. In the main, they had Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson (one of the true greats in the world of aeronautical engineering) and his design team, as head of their experimental and advanced projects division, and they had a super secret facility known as the "skunk works" ? In which a ? airplane stcig s the I3-2 ? kg VR ar without fear of discovery. AVIArrolt . by JAY MILLER Johnson hhd done some outstanding work during his years with Lockheed. Some of his more famous products included the P-38, the P-80, and 'ate-F-104. After the U-2, came the world's fastest jet-propelled aircraft, the YF42A and the SR-71. The U-2 began its design development program at the same time as the F-104. As a result, the two aircraft mutually influenced each other, as a comparison of the two airplanes will bear out. Several crucial factors dictated the U-2's many unique features. First and foremost in importance was the airplane's weight which needed to be kept at a bare minimum. With very ? few exceptions every conceivable short cut was taken to keep the U-2 within certain weight restrictions. The landing gear was compromised down to a bicycle arrangement of a single main bogie with a smaller bogie in the rear. Outrigger wheels under the wings, used during taxiing and take-off, were jettisoned as ? soon as the airplane became airborne. The wing structure consisted of a single main spar with turned-down tips serving mainly as skids during landing and secondarily as "end plates which cut down on tip drag. Over-all, the wings had the amazing aspect ratio (chord to span) of 14.3 to 1 (compered to a more conventional 6 to 1). Full span flaps filled up some 6 percent of the trailing edge span and? wing loading was 25 pounds Rt htitigdp20 0 1 /03/04 : ? The U-2 was virtually a powered sailplane. And like a STATI NTL , sailplane' it "ims a highly sophisticated, very efficient, and aesthetically appealing flying machine. ? The U-2, in its initial production U-2A variant, .entered service with the U.S.A.F. during the summer of 1956. All U-2's were ? hand-made and as a result, production lots were relatively small, only 10 airplanes per lot being built. During its first two years of service a total of some 20 airplanes became operational. About 10 of these entered service with the C.I.A. under .the cover of N.A.S.A. Initial releases concerning the 3irplane ? and its duties ieclared it to be for weather 'ecennaissance only. Observers in Britain, 6armany, and Japan noted etherwise. or two years U-2 ! reconnaissance missions were ? flown over Soviet Russia beginning in the fall, of 1958. The missions did not go unnoticed inside .the Soviet Union but acknowledgement ? by U.S. authorities that the flights were being made was nonexistent. The Soviet government demanded a halt to the overflights (this being kept from the U.S. press) but the demands were ignored. It was of utmost importance for the U.S. security system to know of Russia's internal workings. With very few exceptions, the 13-2 overflights remained/ one of the best kept secrets of the U.S. intelligence system. The U-2 was a seemingly impregnable reconnaissance machine and as long as it remained so; it would be used. A total of 55 U-2's were built. in at least three different models. Five of these were two-place U-2D's "(for missile monitoring), approximately 30 etAcRopeovo1601R0 approximately 20 were U-2B's. The JJ-2A was the intial production variant powered by a Pratt and Whiney J-57-P-37A jet-engine developing 11,200 pounds thrust. This version was capable of maximum altitudes in the vicinity of 70,000 feet. When the overflights began in ,the fall of 1958, a newer, more powerful version of the U-2, the U-2B, was introduced. This version was powered by a Pratt and Whitney J-75-213 jet-engine of 17,000 pounds thrust. This engine gave the 11-2 a maximum operational ceiling of 90,000 feet. ? The engines used in the various 13-2 mOdels were special modifications of standard production engines. The main difference was in the compressor section. The U-2's engines had special broad chord blades in this section to make better use of the low air density at high altitudes. These engines also burned special low-volatility fuel (MIL-F-25524A). This prevented evaporation losses at high altitude and added an additional 5 per cent to the airplane's maximum range over standard JP-4. With the phenomenal 90,000 foot altitude capability of the U-2B, it was well known that nothing the Soviet Union could put into the air could possibly come close to knocking the airplane down during an overflight. This was of course, barring the possibility of an engine failure or other malfunction. The original U-2A at 70,000 feet was in its own right, within this realm of immunity. The 13-23 was, for all practical purposes, an impregnable fortress. On May 1, 1960, Francis Gary Powers and his U-23 were shot down near Sverdlovsk well inside the Soviet Union. Exact details as to how the airplane was destroyed remain covered to 01110 017 01301 ?ormation available indicates that for some reason the airplane was -tZ Yknog Approved For Release 2001/03/04FEeliVRD$W644/61 A iningcr Eanirv..132Me ? RISE TO GLOBALISM: American For- eign Policy Since 1938. By Stephen E. Ambrose. Penguin Books. 352 pp. Paper $2.45. .COLD WAR AND COUNTERREVO- LUTION: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy. By Richard J. Walton. The Vik- ring Press. 250 pp. $7.95. norzALD rulrooSEE Mr. Radosh is author of American Labor and United States Foreign Policy (Random House) anti editor, with Murray N. Roth- bard, of the forthcoming A New History of Leviathan (Dutton). lie teaches history at Queensborough 'Community College of the City University of New York. undertook to arm Europe. The program had to surmount an initial obstacle: the American populace was not yet ready for a new holy crusade, and Truman needed large economic and military lar- gesse from Congress to meet the sup- posed threat. The issue Truman found to get this funding was Greece, as the United States prepared to move into the areas from which Britain was forced to withdraw. But to mask their real purpose, Truman had to present his intervention as a step on behalf of worldwide freedom. Hence the Truman Doctrine Was devised, and it "defined American policy for the next twenty years. Whenever and wherever an anti-communist government was --threatened, by indigenous insurgents, for- eign invasion, or even diplomatic pres- sure .??. . the United States would supply political, economic, and most of all mili- tary aid." For Truman the terms " 'free peoples' and 'anti-communise were as- sumed to be :synonymous." , Once the premise was accepted, the enormous inter- ventions of future administrations were, but a step away. It was Korea, however, that allowed the Truman administration to finally achieve the enormous defense budget called for in the secret and influential National Security Council resolution 68j The drafters .of NSC 68 asked for a $35 billion budget. This task Truman consid- ered hopeless, calculating.that a reluctant Congress would grant at most $17 billion. At least, until Korea. The crisis allowed Truman to put the recommendations oi NSC 68 into effect. Ambrose is emphatic on one point: the Korean War, which- ever side started it, was a boon?political- fly, economically and socially?to Amer. ican imperialism. During the past ten years, it has become much more widely accepted that the cold war Was not a Russian invention. Cold- war "revisionism" has made its impact. The shock of the Pentagon Papers has , been eased for many by acquaintance with the historical analysis of such schol- ars as William Appleman Williams, Gabriel. Kolko, David Horowitz and Walter LaFeber. Yet until now, there has been no overall synthetic account that tells what each postwar administration did and also provides a critical analysis of its policies. ? This task has been realized by Stephen E. Ambrose's Rise to Globalism. As the title suggests, Ambrose is concerned with the :developing globalist conception of America's role abroad. He realizes that this posture developed from the need to avoid a postwar depression by achieving new foreign marketsa problem, since "much of the proposed?market place was closed." Ambrose sees postwar foreign policy as formulated particularly to pre- vent nationalization of American-owned property abroad, which meant an effort to create "an open door everywhere." The globalist shift was not mindless. "Pol- iticians looked for areas in which Amen- can influence could dominate; the busi- nessmen looked for profitable markets and new sources of raw materials; the military looked for overseas 'bases," and /America began a "program of expansion that had no inherent limits." This basic stance was developed by the administra- tion of Harry S. Truman; it is in its account of these years that Mr. Ambrose's book makes its most significant contribu- tion. By 1947; Truman and his advisers "saw communist involvement in every at- tack on the 'status quo anywhere and convinced- themselves that Kremlin ilk:Olt/Mgr As for the war itself, Ambrose corrects major errors in our understand- ing of it. First, he points out that the U.S. authorities knew that North Korea was planning 10 invade across the 38th Parallel. In fact, the State Department had prepared a resolution condemning North Korean aggression days before the attack. But unlike I. F. Stone, who argued in his book that Syngman Rhee started the war with covert American support, Ambrose writes that the North Korean action was "too strong, too well coordi- nated, and too successful to be a counter- attack." He believes that the North Ko- reans simply calculated that they could overrun the peninsula before the United States could reinforce South Korea. More- over, American officials had already de- was at the ppfOlve sQF etleas conquer the world." To deal with what was regarded as a worldwide threat, they may very we ave iou.ted.that America . would move in. Second, Ambrose presents a major revi sion of standard accounts of the Mac Arthur-Truman dispute. Truman's as- sumption that American bombers alone would force the North Koreans back was quickly shattered. American troops were then brought in, supposedly only to re- store the border at the 38th Parallel. But by August, the policy was to reunify Korea under the aegis of the South. Now. the' policy of-crossing the 38th Parallel and unifying Korea was not Mac- Arthur's. Rather, it was the new policy of the Truman administration. The Presi- dent's advisers argued that China would not intervene on Korea's behalf. Quoting from instructions issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur, Ambrose writes that stepping beyond containment "came after full discussion and considera- tion in the highest levels of, the American government. Truman later implied, .and millions believed, that MacArthur had gone ahead on his own, that it was the general in the field, not the government at home, that had changed the political .objective of the war in the middle of the conflict. Such was never the case. Tru- man, with the full concurrence of the State and Defense Departments and' the Joint Chiefs, made the decision to liber- ate North Korea." Much later, after. Mac- Arthur's February 1951 offensive, Tru- pan moved away from the objecti-e'of a military victory. But that policy :had it- self arisen from the decision ? to favor containment, which actually meant war mobilization, a high defense budget, and a permanent cold-war footing for the na- tion. That is the significance of Truman's flat rejection of Clement Attlee's plea for peace in Asia. In contrast to Truman ' and the policy of permanent intervention, Dwight D. Eisenhower appears in Ambrose's book as a President struggling nobly to mini- mize the effects of the cold war. While his administration engaged in the rhetorit of liberation, the reality was more often a restrained Version of Truman's contain- ment; Despite John Foster Dulles, Eisen- hower was more flexible than hi:; prede- cessor. The Republicans may have rattled the saber, but "they also shut down the. Korean War, cut corporate taxes, and reduced the size of the armed forces. ? Despite intense- pressure and great temp- tation,. they entered no wars. They were willing to supply material, on a limited ? scale, to others . . . but they would not commit American boys to the struggle." By 1955, the decision to go to the summit had undercut the failure of Re- 4 .4i4 ut,..1._Lhe us. -4RnopEg1601R001100170001-4 6c-in finu 4a: 41) TIE DENVER POST EMPIRE MAGAZINE Approved For Release 2001/03/04 WALAIDP80-01601R00 The amazing true story of the CIA's secret war - against Red China By L. FLETCHER PROUTY [, IGHT HAD obscured the : mountains when the Air Force cargo plane finally 11?1 approached the Pikes Peak country from the west. Wearily, it seemed, the aircraft crossed the south shoulder of the peak, turned left, dropped flaps and began the long, gradual descent to .Peterson Field which serves both as an Air Force base and ' the municipal airport of Colora- do Springs. The landing was uneventful. But from that point some strange things happened. The aircraft, a heavy-bodied .C130 powered by four turbo- prop engines, taxied to a remote end of the field rather than to the regular ramp. A military bus quickly pulled up alongside. If any outsider had been there to witness some 20 men disem- bark, he would have been told they, were soldiers from? India scheduled for training at nearby Ft. Carson under a military aid program. But the troops weren't Indians and they never got to Ft. Carson. The loaded bus headed west- ward out of Colorado Springs, .up the Ute Pass highway, and disappeared into the night. During the months that fol- lowed, other men like those in the first ApiiiroztrediRoteRelvits odically in Colorado Springs in ? The author, L. Fletcher Prouty, is a retired Air Force colonel who is now with the Center of Political Re- search in Washington, D.C. STATINTL who connected, vaguely wi the same mysterious manner Ronald Coleman movie about and vanished into the mountains. Shangri-la. The identity of these men and There is nothing mythical; the nature of their mission about Tibet. It is an ancient makes a fascinating story ? and, country with an area four times in some respects, a frightening that of Colorado, separated from one ? with vast international implications. Recent develop- ments in relations between the United States and Communist China, which portend so much for an era of peace, give that story a special timeliness. The details of this operation are reported here for the first time. To understand what this hush- hush operation was all about, it is necessary to set the time, which was August 1959, and to recall the ominous twilight zone ? neither peace-nor war ? into which relations between East and West had drifted in that period. With an eye toward the successful culmination of his two-term administration, Pres- ident Eisenhower announced a series of international events leading to a super-Summit Con- ference in Paris during May 1960. The Korean War had settled into an uneasy truce six years earlier, in 1953. The Berlin Wall was still two years in the future, India to the. south by the Hima- layan Range, many of whose peaks are twice as tall as Colora- do's highest mountains. The country's average elevation is about 15,000 feet. Soon after the Communist ? government took over control of China in 1949, Peking announced its intentions of "liberating" Tibet. In October 1950 Chinese Communist troops invaded it. Tibet's spiritual and temporal leader, the Dalai Lama, then only 15 years old, urged his people not to resist. The Chinese in turn left the Dalai Lama alone. But by February of 1959 it became evi- dent the Chinese intended to seize him to gain undisputed control over that country. Forewarned, the Dalai Lama and about 80 of his followers fled Lhasa, the capital city on March 17, 1959, heading for the safety of India. The Chinese were not aware of the Dalai Lama's departure for several days. They had been lulled by the fact that ? 1961. At the moment the point of there were only two good routeg- eudot orittu4sal of Lhasa, both unrdatevr aCnhilleeasv! mythical land to most Americans ing for India would have had to THE LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH MAGAZINE Approved For Release 24010311m P-CITA-RDP80-01?RIRA01-00170001-4 When Britain pulled out of Rhodesia after the 1965 Unila --Ile CIA worked , tO ferret out details of the sanction-busi ".-In the popular. traditions of spying, secret documents disa were used to convey messages in invisible ink. It was a shock one of the informers was a prominent lawyer.. But it was noi , the CIA had xpanded.into an a'reti where the British were una .-actiVe in Egypt, Iran and Syria. E. H. COOKRIDGE ends his arid looks at the Director, Richard Helms ANY of the bright young / men Allen Dulles had -V recruited to CIA from I Li law offices and univer- British sanction policy became, British sities had gained their consular offices and SIS men were ? spurs in London, where they were sent supposed to watch the steady flow of to glean some of the methods of the ? British Secret Intelligence Service. Dulles enjoyed making wisecracks about the Victorian and Indian Army traditions still surviving in the British secret service, but he had a healthy respect for its unrivalled experience and great professionalism. He knew that CIA could learn a lot from the ? British about operations in the Middle 'East and Africa, where its stations were rapidly expanding. After Archibald Roosevelt, one of CIA's foremost "Arabists", had re- stored cordial relations with SIS when station head in London, a plan of co- pperation was devised for Africa, where most of the former British colonies had gained independence, anti were be- coming subject to strong Soviet and Chinese pressure. Roosevelt was still in London when, in 1965, Rhodesia made her momentous "Unilateral . Declaration of Independence" (UDI), which led to the conflict with the Britigh Government. There is no better instance of the strengthening of CIA-SIS collabora- tion than the hitherto undisclosed story of the services CIA rendered the British authorities in Rhodesia, particularly since about.1968. Indeed, in assisting the British SIS Rhodesian pig-ir.ma, tobacco, and other products through the Portuguese ports of Lorenco Marques and Beira in East Africa to Europe and the Far East Merchants and shippers there .had made fortunes out of the traffic which the Portuguese were bound, by United Nations resolutions and agreements with Britain, to regard as illegal. After the closure of British missions in Salisbury all ? information about Rhodesian exports dried up at source. At this juncture CIA stepped in to assist the British. It was not merely a labour of love. American tobacco syndicates in Virginia, Georgia, North and South Carolina, Ten- nessee and Kentucky greatly in- creased their production and sales to Europe when Rhodesian tobacco growers lost most of their trade through sanctions. Traditionally, Rhodesian tobacco was used for cigar and cigarette manufacture in Belgium, Holland, Germany and Switzerland. When these supplies dried up, Euro- pean manufacturers turned to Ameri- can growers. But by and by Rhodesian exports began to flow again, by the use of false certificates of origin and smuggling through the Portuguese ports and through Durban in South Africa, much' to the displeasure of the in its thankless task of implementing the policy of economic sanctions Americans. Thus, obliging the British and help- against the Smith regime,'CIA put its relations with the Portuguese in ing American business, CIA ordered jeopardy. It has an enduring under- its agents to ferret out the secrets of the 1. standing with the Portuguese Govern- sanction-busting schemes devised by ment and its PIDE secret service Mr Ian Smith's regime. Soon the CIA on many aspects: NATO security, anti- station in Salisbury was bustling with communist operations, the use of radio activity. Since 1962 it had been headed by Richard La Macchia, a senior CIA stations in Portugal and her colonies, jitnehtdireapceitnft official, who had joined it in 1952 from and of bases - and Special ForcEslinArigoK.Klozam-eleiaSev2MMWO4n0 GP P80-01601 R001100170001 -4 to Africa in the guise of an o ID t bique and Macao. However thin the the U.S. Development Aid Agency. Other CI' were Cal former A Francis who had cloak-anc Cuba anc Wigant, Congo dt and sevet the most Edward ' Salisbury- 1957 from the State Department; from 1959 he headed the East and South African section and, at the tim of his nev appointment, was Statio 1-lead in Pretoria. Among his variou exploits he was reputed to hay initiated the first contacts between th South African government and D Banda of Malawi. The CIA agent's were perpetually ? journeying between Salisbury and the Mozambique ports, and Murray was temporarily posted to Lusaka to main- tain personal contact with British officials resident in Zambia. Mr Ian Smith and his cabinet colleague, Mr J. H. Howman, who looks after foreign affairs as well as security and the secret service of the Rhodesian regime, were not unaware of the unwelcome operations of the Americans. They suffered them for the sake of avoiding an open clash With Washington. Their patience, however, became frayed when it was discovered that secret documents had disappeared from the headquarters of the ruling Rhodesian National Front_Party. Subsequently, STATI NTL continued LOS ANGELES TIMES Approved For Release 2001/6404111:NCIPARDP80-01601R ? we ? : HARRY TRIMBORN ? , ? ? moSdow ? ? What constitutes proper behavior ? for an Official representative of the United States government in visit- Ing the Soviet Union? . Does he have the right to engage In any activity not specifically pro- hibited by Soviet law, even if he knows?or should know?that cer-. tain of such activities are sure to an- ger his hosts? Or must he follow the ground rules?explicit or implied? laid down by his hosts, whether he likes them or not? Is it acceptable for him to come to the Soviet Union ostensibly for one purpose at? the invitation of the So- viet. government, then? engage in side activitieS that the government 'considers "subversive" and "anti-So- viet"? . And what would the answers to these questions be if they were ap- plied to an official Soviet visitor to the United States? ? These and similar questions, are at the root of the controversial activ- ities of three U.S. Congressmen who visited the Soviet Union recently as part of a seven-man House subcom- mittee .delegation ostensibly for a two-week look at Soviet educational facilities The three congressmen were Reps. James H. Scheuer (D-N.Y.), Earl F. Landgrebe (R-Ind.) and Alphonzo Bell (R-Calif.). Among them they contacted Jews seeking to emigrate to Israel as well as a Soviet civil rights leader, and distributed reli- gious material to Soviet citizens. Their activities, however laudable and well-meaning they might have been, placed the U.S. Embassy here In an impossible situation. The em- bassy, according to reliable sources, was deeply angered over the behavi- or of the three visitors. The State Department even complained to the congressmen's Washington offices about it, according to the sources. While maintaining .an official stance of "no comment," one top dip- lomat called the distribution of reli- gious material here "stupid." ? Yet at the same time the embassy was trying desperately to hush up the activities, ven to the gx,tent misleading .erapprovea ror K est of Soviet Sensitivities STATI NTL And it didn't help much when the congressmen later insisted that they had done nothing wrong, had not meant to anger the Soviet govern- ment or break any laws. , Their remarks showed a lack of knowledge of the Soviet Union and extreme naivete over what would or would not be permissible for a vis- Scheuer sought ,out newsmen to relate with relish his encounters with Soviet authorities and also to tell of his meetings with a number of other Jews seeking to leave, and with dissident civil rights leader Valery Chalidze. Bell allegedly accompanied itor, official or otherwise, to the Scheuer to some of the meetings and country. supposedly was collecting material The embassy felt the visitors for the World Zionist Congress in Je- should have done nothing to anger rusalem. Bell went to Israel after their hosts, whether or not there leaving the Soviet Union. were any specific regulations cover- ? While readily admitting his con- ing their actions. tacts with the Russians, Scheuer de- The embassy's sensitivity to diplo- nied a Soviet allegation that he had matic disruptions is at a peak now in iistributed anti-Soviet material. The anticipation of President Nixon's ;:eference apparently was to doe- scheduled visit to the Soviet Union nnents Scheuer displayed disclos- in May. U.S. diplomats reportedly ing the formation of a group in the are concerned over supplying the Jnited States to press for greater Russians with ammunition for what :migration of Soviet Jews. one source called the "U-2 gambit." Scheuer was detained on the pre- This is a reference to the planned text that police were searching for a 1960 summit meeting between Pre- "foreign-looking" criminal in the mier Khrushchev and President neighborhood and, since the con- Eisenhower which the Russians an- gressman was a fdeigner, he might grily called off following the down- just be their man. ing of the U-2 spy plane over Russia. To some observers, the Scheuer In the view of some sources, the detention represented a Soviet blun- Russians appear to be attempting to der. The resultant worldwide publi- stockpile "anti-Soviet" incidents in- city cbuld only help Scheuer politi- volving Americans in the event they cally and embarrass the Kremlin. need an excuse to call off the Nixon Thanks to his own efforts and the visit. And visiting congressmen and apparent Soviet mistake Scheuer other Americans should do nothing found himself in a dream position to help the Russians build their in- for any politician. He had struck a ventory. blow on behalf of a serious and . The "U-2 gambit" may have been deeply felt cause that gave him behind the beating of U.S. Air Force worldwide publicity and went over attache, Captain Elmer L. Alderfer big with the voters back home. at the Riga airport Jan. 5, ostensibly Here was a JewiSh congressman from the heavily Jewish constituen- cy of the Bronx tangling with the. Soviet police over the status of So- viet Jews. As ScheUer himself re- portedly put it to a U.S. diplomat , ? The author heads The Times bit- following his detention: reau in Moscow. I've just insured my reelection. It's too bad there wasn't a little blood on my face and an American photographer around." The incident, and Scheuer's sub-, sequent expulsion, along with the embassy's futile efforts to minimize the three lawmakers' activities makes sense if the Russians are in- deed stockpiling material for possi- ble future use against the planned presidential visit for taking pictures there. The embassy's efforts to keep a lid on the three congressmen's activi- ties were doomed because Scheuer? taking advantage of a seeming So- viet blunder?wanted anything but silence. Scheuer was detained briefly by Soviet police Jan. 12 after he had gone to the. home of a Jew who is seeking to emigrate to Israel. Two ,days later Scheuer was ordered ex- pelled from Russia for engaging in elesene2fre1)e3ib4 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R001100170901-4 ? 4071t Ltir.4 WASHINGTON POST, Approved For Release 2003/08/e4: CIA-RDP80-01601R0011 STATINTL he Al-P eimin JACK ANDERSON achiev- ed a Journalistic coup in pub- lishing the minutes of the se- cret White House meetings on the India-Pakistan crisis. But liow much of a hero is the man Who leaked the informa- tion? My strong Impression is that he accomplished very lit- tle public good, if anY. On the contrary, his actions are al- most certain to drive the Nix- on administration deeper than ever into secret dealings on a restricted basis. On the good side of the ledger, the leak has now pro- vided unmistakable informs-, tion that the President delib- erately tilted American pol- icy in favor of Pakistan and against India. But that much was known to everybody in touch with the State Depart- ment and White House at the time of the crisis. Sens. Edmund Muskie, Ed- ward Kennedy and Frank Church, among others, said so. Hundreds of us wrote it. Indeed, one reason Henry Kis- singer held his background briefing of Dec. 'I was to take the edge off the charges the White House was biased in favor of Pakistan. A second and more Impor- tant gain from the revelation has to do with information about -the way the govern- ment works. The secret min- utes provide detailed, irrefu- table evidence that daY-to-day foreign policy is made in the White House as never before. . They equally show that top officials allowed themselves to be treated as mere lackeys by the White House. Some of them?including such sup- posed heavyweights as the chief of naval operations ? said, and apparently regularly say, things silly enough to issue from the mouth of Bertie Wooster. ? Then there is the matter of truth-telling. According to the minutes in cpk.ty. odcryt son, Hen gs c f7 WIMR. meeting of officials on Dec. 3 that. "he (the President) wants to tilt in favor of Paki- stan." On Dec. 7, in a background session with reporters subse- quently released by Sen. Bar- ry Goldwater, Dr. Kissinger said: "There have been some comments that the adminis- tration is anti-Indian. This is totally inaccurate." Seen thus starkly, Dr. Kis- singer told a flat lie. My im- pression is that, taken in the larger context, his remarks at the secret conference were not in such flagrant contra- diction with his remarks at the background briefing. Still, he was plainly trying to ma- nipulate public opinion. BUT SO WHAT? Does the new evidence do more than suspicion that the depart.' ments and agencies are full of crypto-Democrats out to get the administration?is only going to be intensified. And that deep suspicion is going to yield two sets of adverse reactions. ? For one thing, security will ? be tightened. There is apt to be an end to th,,- kind of min- utes that were taken at Dr. Kissinger's meetings. They will certainly not be spread through the bureaucracy any- more. Seco:1ply, the limited access which experienced officials now have to White House de- cision-making is going to be even further curbed. The President and Dr. Kissinger are going to keep things to themselves more than ever., Important decisions which are confirm a universal Judg- even now made with too little ment? After the U-2 and the /consultation. and with Bay of Pigs and the credibil- small an input from the ity gap, is there anybody not Impossibly naive or ill-inform- ed who doesn't know that the government lies? Is one more bit of evidence a noble act? Or is it just a pebble added to the Alps? Set against these gains, there is the way the adminis- tration is apt to react. Maybe the President and Dr. Kissin- ger are going to say to them- selves: "Golly, we sure erred in not telling the truth and nothing but the truth. Jack Anderson has taught us that honesty is the best policy." But much more likely, they are going to feel that the min- utes of- the meeting were le- gitimately classified internal working papers, of the govern- ment. Probably they are going to feel that the stuff was leak- ed not for any large purpose, but out of opposition to the policy. And almost certainly? and I say this as an opponent of the policy?they will be right in this surmise. In these circumstances, the they have in the world is going to be even more sharply limited. Re4easei2001M3404gClA-RDP80 have, of the bureaucracy-7-ft4 limited trust outside too out- side are going to be made by an even more narrowly cir- cumscribed group of men. No doubt And?rson gets high marks for his acumen and industry and courage as a journalist. But his source, the man who leaked the stuff, is something else. Whatever his motives, he has done this" country a disservice. -01601R001100170001-4 :WS ANGELES MALI) EXAKENER Approved For Release 20at/0310.41931A-RDP80-0160 I t tato?tc ? could fly five miles high at a ? sileed of 50 m.p.h. and had a range of at least .250 Bares gins, "Both Powers and I were spies with ?a lot of cloak-and-dagger stuff, but there the similarity ends. He :was probably taking pictures ,..of Red gaided missile bases hundreds of miles inside Rus- sia, while we were parachut- ing secret agents, supplies - and leaflets ...into satellite , c('lwi nicrica4 1.1-2 pilot,. Frauds GUry Powers toes ,shot dc on 1390 miles inside Russia ; 7; May I, 1060, .it cau-. sed a c Isis between the U.S. and Pusia? and Premier Khrushellev?caneellM. a surri -mit mc ;ting with President Eisenh; wen But CIA-sponsor- ed orer flights of Iron Curtain cauntrie: ' had been taking Vac& fir at least 10 years, cc- cordinoVo a Southern Califor- nia rjs'Ident who began his Career as au airman with the Polish lir Force in, 1932),. By DM. SCITRADER Hormt".-ai?en'inti- ri Wrilcr ? Ten year.. 'bigore Francis ? Gary Pi?wers' VI was blasted from the skies orer Russia in /1960, Polish airman Janucz S. V Baru was making the first of Ids 00 spy -flights over Com- munist-held-Albania, Romania 2.td Bulgaria for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Bares, '52, now a patriotic American citizen living in San Pedro, recalls his four-years ? of 1 r antic hedge-hopping through the Balkans from a base in Athens, Greece, with at shudder. "We flew 0.0 low around and Up over :those. mountains' and bills that my heart still But- lers when I think. of those ex- citing, but danger-filled mis- sions. We ?started out An the old C-47 which had a top speed of, 140 m.p.h. and later switched to C-54s with a tap cruising; Speed of 185," he Powers,fiew a sophisticated high.winnd . specially-built Lockheed Aircraft jet . which -countles. He made $::0,000 year and I made '?521;0. Oh, there was one more s'arniarity ?we both carried 'poison kits' to be used if we were about to be ? captured. Powers 'ob- viously never used his end I was never forced to seriously consider using mine." But this Is not to say Bares Communists openea up with all the artillery and machine .t.:us they could muster.. We tnok scores of hits., and one of our two engines was knocked out. It 'was a miracle we got out alive. My radiri was dead so I? ,threw . the radio code books into the Adriatic along with the stuff we had to drop. Two Russian Migs circled above Us as we hugged the water and made for -Brindisi, Italy. ? ' "I did a foolish thing which no spy 'should ever do. I found the radio was working again so I se.lt an nncoded message describing our circumstances. The iklfr,s crave up the chase at Briztais'i, but the Italians put us in jail. Two ham's later a U.S. IAir Force plane ar- and his tour-man crew didn't rived and we were released. have some close calls. He re- Three ci,a'Yz later we had re- calls, "An Albania turned [to Athens ? via Rome n agent wa .c.11eti 'The Old Man' almost and we never saw the old man succeeded in doing again, thank God." - ? us-in. It was in 19;33 and we had para-,, The reason Bares and his. chute d this old man four crow Made ' only 90 over- times into the wilds of Alban- flights in four years is be- la and his companions were cause they .flew only when always picked 'Up and execut- there was a full moon- "You ed but ul,t,, leiltwtralers Cgot IAbmaa71. -a ?nd- . ?irlei rg"ent? thsty,;:ri IL.1,..1. aglulipntd "werfigI lt. said, "there's something fun.j .yto'sli 11::seo.zreallsift4hhet-flinyohcigoagnhdt. i ily about this. The old man al- v. ays comes back, doesn't he? you easy .get to be able to Another thing, he's the. tam& distinguTh 1. h e mountains est dressed spy I ever saw. He from lb ir shadows." - - ? wears expensive Italian silk ? Today ? American satellites suits, silk shirts, diamond whirl nh above Russia and rings and - parachute boots. the irrl Curtain 'countries in nnd we'reahmeorenz id)lreo.priiilnr)ganTamn dtaaiycisngfolioi,c4t.itygesibrlueit Ii;n7a'rthue peasants. I think the old man the spyI planes did the job. is a counter-spy.'; Bares sa.,Ys he never flew over .:1::it thc. ciA, successor to Russia, rut he did know or'-. ?rdz,, warimo. oss, was smart. mer Pollee Air Force airmen 11.-aL knewzics 1ery, 3.cn,tlatnalihi jashinneersarinpgera. .Bw1h41,:e casti overa and Hungary n dtile t Baltic a lite iic iti.:t.F17:,sob-10 s asafil)1:er Sates. it.c.s:m,, s0 In of 11czte;as:edlInhennefovrisia. "During my four-year tour the old man said his right left band. I 'guess they. be- shot clovvii over Bulgaria with Za.:31 h7;15 1.1'2:1 111:'1;Ted ailii 11.6 : td1(1:41-..:,)lenis:ti.se:roilka ittil?hlienrecarzirwiir'nae.s- lieved him because we flew wtx. hitting the key with' his ear's, ' The Communists into almost a fatal trap set biaPPorentlY 'him. We were scheduled /to e-r fOr one of our sPY P:arie3- drop our stuff in a. boxed-in _T.,h??' so-called Bucharest 1 TbI) -6 valley ? and the only way in 1--iicir"3 possibly could was -ar., a river, , . , - taced to our activities, but - '",'Illen we were a half mite nobodl, in the CIA confided in from drop-down, the Albanian 'us aside frora assigning our ? ? missions. ? STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 aoutinusa THE ECOIICCIST Approved For Release ic10317064Th. CIA-RDP80701 A traffic of spies SPY TI1ADI-.7 By E. H. Cookridoe. .1-todder end Stoughton. 288 pages. ? ? CENLEN : SPY OF THE CENTW1Y By E. H. Cookridgo. Hodder and Stoughton. 424 pages. The beauty of spies is in the eye of the beholder. Mine are fine, Until they get caught. Yours are black- guards ; or so, at least, governments and spy trial judges conventionally pretend. In the eyes of most of us spies are ?remote outsiders' though worth a second glance should you ever surely recognise one. And Mr Cook- ridge. observes in the opening chapter aof " Spy Trade " that it is not only the richly ornamental spy of'' fiction who excites pleasurable , curiosity. How it happens that many a " real life " spy has been able to turn profit- -able publicist instead of having to ? languish in jail ? for as long as his .captors had originally intended he -should, is amply explained in " Spy Trade." - The author discusses over a .score of postwar cases of governments bartering captive foreign agents against their own incarcerated men. For in the end, it seems, no govern- ment is quite so beastly as to disown altogether a man who has supplied it with valuable intelligence; however dis- reputable he may have been made to look subsequently. ? A ?delicate matter in'these exchanges is the comparative worth of the hostages. available. When equally big fish are' not at. hand several small fry have the good luck to be thrown in to balance the scales. Mr Cookridge devotes seven of his i chapters to the intricate circumstances in which /..Moscow exploited the windfall of Mr .Gary Powers. and' the U-2 shot down Over Siberia to effect the ? release in February, 196; of Colonel Rudolf. Ivanbvich Abel, the highly competent. Soviet spy in the United States, who had been sent to prison for. 30 years. Among other comparable cases con- . sidered by til"111411- Messrs Grevilregifjrifilnand or on Getelen (left) in Nazi days Lonsdale, the Krogers and Mr Gerald Brooke, and Mr Alfred Frenzel, (a l'inealtime-minded Bundestag deputy who had sold defence secrets to the 'Warsaw Pact coUntries) and the com- paratively insignificant west German archaeologist, h-au Martina KiSchke. The book is aptly illustrated with 4o photographs. ??e? ? Like the rest Of us, spies tare mostly weird birds, variously impelled by 'the exigencies not only of mating, feed- ing 'and drinking (preferably the hard stuff) but also by patriotism, religious or political '? belief, some personal grievance 'against society, or, above all; by the desire to be somebody different and . important. Even- the fabulously competent and studiedly aloof General Gehlen displays in his recently pub- lished autobiography an undignified itch to play to the gallery, not merely for the lolly. ?that a knowledgeable agent (literary) can rake from the international market but also for personal vindication in the face of latter-day disparagement. Mr Cookridge, perhaps in deference.. to his publishers, calls his other book Gehlen Spy of the Century.". But in fact Reinhard Gehlen himself never crossed a frontier to .spy Out' the nakedness, of the land' of military apparel. General Gehlen controlled a far-reaching network. of agents' and shrewdly fitted their bits and pieces of information in to a coherent picture. co-or c mator o inte igence or tae; Wehrmacht on the eastern front. (It? Was not his fault that Hitler dis- regarded unpleasant news.) In.L'avaria, after the war, Gchlen put :his exper- ience and knoWledge at the disposal of the west, first the United States, . and then the Federal German Republic. As head of the Federal .Intelligence Service he tapped sources , invaluable information from- Ple rival east German Democratic Republic, especially in the days when it was expanding much of its " People's Police " into- a " People's Army tutored by Soviet officers. In March, 1968, Gehlen was the first to .predict, on the strength of contacts in the Soviet Union, that Moscow would dis- place the Dubcek regithe in Prague by force. Eventually he came hi for heavy public esiticism for high-handed ways and undiscriminating choice of staff, including some former SS officers and such costly double agents as Heinz ? It s in all a fascinating story and Mr dookridge tells it well. The text is adequately documented. But there are a. few mildly irritating mistakes. Herr Bran*, for instance, spells his first name Willy not Willi. And there cannot have. been a rendezvous at Milestone toy on the autobahn ; there are only kilometre posts. STATI NTL aJP2otilial3logt ?itIAQRDP8011601R001100170001-4 Near he orgamsei an .1311.L T Ufa E'L AiICA1T Approved For Release 204/01491.:1911A-RDP80-01601R0 ? _ . . tr'dI . kki_r. 67,p0-,s2A-.7,43 D.. 11 T 9 ( STATINTL What did "master spy" Rudolf Abel, who c last week in Moscow, spy upon during his years in America? He dretv a whopping y3O- sentence, twice the penalty imposed, on pa Greenglasa for betraying (for ',300) the inform secret of the A-Bomb, the lens-trigger. r. a ? SBut Abel's harvest was never detailed dur his trial, except that it had to do with Snopp around "military secrets." When the FBI mud n on him he was living in a cheap New York 2 Street hotel with a lot of radio receiving e u \I meat. It did not seem quite elaborate enough for a "master s,py." Yet the CIA dhector, Allen Dulles, said at the time of Abel's conviction, "I wish we . had three or four like him in Moscow." . ? . The FBI was pretty certain that he was a full colonel in the KGB, the Soviet Union's secret police, and that during World War 111th might have infiltrated circles clOse.to Hitler. Abel was a , . superior linguist. -- He could even speak ' Brooklyne.se by the time he wascenailed. . , . . AT THE TIME of his apprehension and. trial. the Russians announced that they had never heard 1 ' of the man, But three years after Abel returned to Moscow ?:--- having been swapped for our airborne spy, Francis Gary Powers ? he was lauded in ' Pravda by none other than the KGB director. And . in 1036 the popular Soviet magazine "Young Cora- munist" had, a big- spread on him. It praised his ''courage, valor and boundless devotion," and even quoted him on his perilous profession: - "Intelligence work is not a series of rip roaring adventures, a string of? tricks or an en tertaining .trip abroad. It is, above' all, arcittous painstaking work that calls for an intense effort . perseverance, stamina, fortitude, will power . serious knowledge, and great mastery." - - He may have been building himself up. Spying against the U. S. is something like spying el -Times Square. As the last citadel of the free press .we relieve a spy of most of traditional chores. We . print or televise or expose in scientific journals , just about everything any foreign power wants to know about us. We give it away before a spy can - teal it, generally. '' ????.. ? ? - - .i - ? - WIIETIIER ABEL was all that he was cracked . up to be will never be known nor \vitt he have the ? lied satisfaction now that he is dead, of reading his nine -memoirs-and learning ti?bra him just what it was -ear that he spied on. He personally couldn't have seen vid mach from -that. frowsy, hotel room, 'though, of ost course, it might have been the KGB's. hotline- ter- Inn lal in this county. : ing, When we gave him up in 106?2 to get .baek Gary ing Powers it was said in WaShington that it t,'as a led bad deal as trading a 20-game winner for. a bat. 8th by. Abel, by, that time, was labeled "master i - spy, credentials not quite clear. PoWers?waS, a plane.jockey, albeit an unusual one. ife worked:far the CIA. and his job was to get into a U-2 in a friendly country, fly it very high over the restricted airspace of the Soviet Union and, work- ing from a pie-set plan, take pictures, record military messages, and sniff out radioactive par- ticles and positions of heat-producing installation, ? such as steel plants. One camera alone cost $.1. million. He was shot .down C3,000 feet over Sverdlovsk by what must have been one of the earlier versions of the SAM, the air-te-ground missile that was launched extensively from North Vietnam bases during the U.S. bombing of the North. ABEL WAS GIVEN a: medal for whatever it was he did for his bosses. Powers was given the boot out of the CIA flying job, returneci to test-fly for Lockheed, which bailt the high-flying plane, in a restricted plant known to the employes as the "Skunk Works," and finally drifted off to write a . Isola He wouldn't urge that you think of it as your - life's work. ? . The actual swap of the "master spy"ei and the , pathetic pilot ? who had served two years of his , 10-year sentence by a military tribunal ? was something right out of ."The Spy Who Came In From The Colds" Under guard, they walked to the middle of a bridge linking East Berlin with West Berlin. It was a fog-shrouded day. Dialogue was Unnecessary. Curiously, the mechanics of the deal had been arranged by Abel's' trial lawyer, Jim Donovan, and he?was present at the exchange. ? Now Abel is gone, without telling us what he stole. It must have bemuSed hint, as he died, to ?relize that despite all that talk, you CAN take it with ? ? . . you. , 7 , . . .? STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-pDP80-01601R001100170001-4 STATI NTL SHLNTQU P..c.) 3 - Approved For Release 2001iyiK: R D P8 0 -01 ? ? .? , ? ' .? ? ? :":" By Jean R. Halley -:?.i,icrashingeon Post Staff Writer - ?, COL. Rudolf Ivanoviel Abel, at one time the Soviet Union's master spy in this 'country, reportedly has died - of lung cancer in Russia. He was 6'8. Col. Abel, who posed as a :struggling artist in a small ? studio in Brooklyn in the j1950s, was exchanged in 1962 for American U-2 pilot Fran- Gary Powers, " The Soviet -spy, who headed his country's 'espio- :nage network in the United ..States for nine years before his arrest in a New York hotel room in 1957, had been sentenced to 30 years in prison. .Sentencing of the nondes- cript, bald and slightly built Russian followed a dramatic ,trial in the Brooklyn Fed- eral District court house jUst "across the street from his cluttered $35-a-month , photographic and art studio. ? "While he turned out a few paintings, his time was 'spent mostly in finding out national defense data of this country and inicrolihning it. , The microfilm was then hid- den in hollowed, out coins; bolts, pencils and blocks of Wood. His studio also con-: tamed short-wave receivers -capable of picking up radio messages from Moscow. , ? 'Col. :Abel, who slipped . into the United States ille- , gally from Canada in 1948, ? Used the name of Emil R. Goldfus during his years in :this country. He was ex- posed when an assistant, Reino Hayhanen, defected and told. American authori- ties about hirn after being ordered back to Moscow. The principal charges against Col. Abel included ? conspiracy to transmit at- comic and military informa- tion to his country, which he - gathered through a system of codes; secret drops and ..couriers. . But even during his trial, ? few specifies were given on :the information he was alleged to have transmitted. listened without emotion ,to ,the proceedings, some- -times with akraatiupii1A. life admittedftpRmvem ?;charge?that he had entered ?this country illegally. _ ? ' Associated Press . . COL. RUDOLF IVANOVICII ABEL ? - - - . ? ' ' ? He was finally convieted. on the testimony" of Hayha-; nen and the evidence of the equipment. found in his stu- dio. ? Col. Abel had served four years and eight months of his 30-year sentence, when- he was exchanged for Pow- ers, who had been shot down in ,the American U-2 spy plane over. the Soviet Union in 1950. . ." The secret and heavily' guarded exchange took place at " the Glienicke Bridge between East Ger- many and West Berlin. Pow- ers had served 18 months of the 10-year sentence - ha- posed on him by the Rus-? sians. He reportedly now. is -a traffic, reporter observing freeway congestion from a plane in Los Angeles. . For many years after Col. :Abel's arrest, the Soviet t - to Russia, he 'was awarded the Order of Lenin, that country's highest civilian award, for his "outstanding service" as an intelligence agent for 30 years. And in 1969, he appeared In East Berlin for a cere- mony renaming a street for Richard Sorge, considered Russia's most valuable war- time spy,- who was executed by the Japanese in 1943 Born in St. Petersburg -(now Leningrad), Col. Abel was the son of a factory worker. His father eventu- ally was arrested for his rev- olutionary :activities and ex- iled to the Far North. After, serving in the Army, Col. Abel was dis- charged in 1925,...When he was given job offers from a Union denied any knowl_ radiO research institute and ForAefleasRi,n0111q3704a1VyR040-00 R0011001700014 four years ,a er is re urn gen T.,, Of foreign languages and ? had a knowledge of radio ? communications. "My comrades argued that I should employ icy knowl- , "edge of foreign languages to serve the country," he once said. "Finally, I made up ray mind and started working for the Soviet intelligence service on May 2, 1927." "Clean hands, a cool head, and a- warm heart," was his description of a good intelli- gence agent. . , Approved Fpr Release 2001/%3M :1g14-RDP8CW.6% GEN. PHILIP !-) .t.noNp- . P. G. Strcnig, 709 c Gener-df In Marines Retired Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Philip G. Str,ong; 70, a ca- reer intelligence:Officer, died of cancer yesterday at Metro- politan Hospital after an ill- ness of several months. . Gen. Strong served in naval intelligence during World War II, and after the war in senior positions with the Central In- telligence Agency for almost 15 years. ?? During World War II, he served for more' than two .years as chief intelligence offi- cer to the admiral who com- manded the battleships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Following the war, he held an executive post in intelli- gence with the State Depart- ment where he developed an interest in scientific intel- ligence, which he later ex- panded on during his career in the CIA. ? ? According to information provided by his family Gen. Strong was early involved in. work that led to development of the - U-2 reconnaissance. air- 'craft. On retirement, he was awarded CIA's intelligence medal of merit. He afterwards served as a consultant for the General Electric Corp. In 1946, he married the for- mer Margot Berglind of Goth- enburg, Sweden. They moved to Hartland, Vt., following his retirement in 1957 but her long illness made it necessary for them to return here. She died in 1970. Gen. Strong is survived by two daughters, Margot Sem ler, of Washington, and Har- riet Barlow, of Chevy Chase; a brother, Benjamin, former head of the United States Trust. Co. in New York; two sisters, . Katherine Osborne and Elizabeth Watters, and five grandchildren.. V !in! UN IL V Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-.RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 1/ ? STATINTL WASHINGTON St.i1AR Approved For Release 2001/0)3?041VCIWRDP80-01601R 'I' erirL, 1 h St?.._)in h ? -- h F.-511 -.---, [-----, I TI ,--,,,, 0 ,,,,, il e.,-, . . I. :-_-0,4,1,:.%,. ..2.: - - n .._.) p t:;;I `1, l..)!?'?;:4 l ) b y ti V . - Brig. Gen. Philp G. Strong, 71, U.S. Marine Corps?Reserve, retired, a career intelligence of- ficer who Was involved in the development of U2 reconnais- sance aircraft, died of cancer yesterday at Metropolitan Hospi- tal. He lived at 2500 Q St. NW. ? Gen. Strong was an intelli- gence specialist for the State ? Department and the Central In- telligence Agency. During World War II, he? was chief intelligence officer for the 'commander of U.S. battleships in the Pacific for two years. . Gen. Strong was commis- sioned. in 1926, after attending Princeton University and spent a year on active duty as a cap- tainU During the wi,)r, he returned to ? active duty, serving in the office of naval. intelligence. His duties included supplying intelligence for the battleships in 10 major campaigns in the Pacific, 2,7 air-sea actions and two major fleet battles. ? . Headed Unit . Later he was assistant chief of staff in the intelligence section at the 'San Diego Marine base. In 1946, Gen. Strong went on inac- tive duty and became head of the intelligence acquisition and distribution division in the office of _special assistant for intelli- gence to the Secretary of State. At the State Department in 1350, Gen. Strong helped to write a report, "Science and Foreign Relations,'! which recommended creation of posts for scientists as overseas attaches to spur inter- national scientific inquiry and exchange of scientific data. . In 1950, Gen. Strong was trans- ferred to the CIA, where he held senior positions until he retired in 1064. ? While at the CIA, be was in- volved in . the innovative con- cepts of revolutionary ciao - recon- BRIG. GEN., PHILIP STRONG naissance \vehicles, Which led to the development of the U2 spy planes. Gen. -Strong was married to the former Margot Berglind of Sweden, who died a year ago.. In his career Gen-. Strong col- lected books . and articles on in- telligence, which he ? gave . to Princeton University'. Another collection went to George Wash- ington University. Gen. Strong received many' decorations and awards, includ- ing the Legion of Merit and the CIA 'S Intelligence Medal of Mei- He leaves two daughters, Mrs.. Margot Semler of Washington and Mrs. Harriet Barlow of Chevy Chase; a brother, Benja- min, of New York; two sisters, Mrs. Katherine Osborne of Sara- sota, Fla., and Mrs.Elizabeth Watters of Scottsdale, Atiz., and five grandchildren. Services will be held Tuesday at 1 p.m. at the Ft: Myer Chap- el, with burial in Arlington Cem- etery. -? .:?. ? ? . Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 CM CAC 0 Tit BWI)11 7 N OV 1971 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160 - (----,1 0 tj P r!!'-'k::^, ---\ 11 V --5.-;\ .11 rf P. (--.4 4.9 ;.!.. s:,../1,...) .. .. .-....!:, ... . - Ji. WASHING-TON, Nov. C?Some of my be-St fri.ends are spies. ? I was talking to on the other day who was complaining that moot Ameri- cans seem to -fitinl: t,hat we don't 11?..;;CI any undercover agents, altho it is all :fight for the other side [sides) to have plenty el them. . . . . There is a' little bit of truth in what itile spy says. Everybody knows that'we have the Central Intelligence Agency .becaus.e_ it gots blamed for everything " that goes wrong in the spy business. The spy-in-the-shy case in which Gary . POWCTS got shot down in his high-flying ?. / 1J-2 airplane is perhaps the best known ' case, but the CIA also tool: the rap for the ill-fated invasion of Cuba which was to unseat Fidel Castro. -But the CIA is not really all that big and RS jab gets compounded heel-also many, if not most, of the ether govern- ment. bureaus which do business over- seas - like to .tahe individual his at - spying. This includes _the Federal Elu- rep or Investigation with agents plant- ed everywhere?from among revolution- any groups to Barth Day rallies. At the last demonstration .against the ;--iif'-2) - ? White ITorie policies On Viet Nara, it rather small affair as .demonstrations go, it WaS noticed by this reporter that an awful let of the people mingling with . the demonstrators didn't really look the part. Investigation disclosed they were from the CL1FA)P.:13 Office., Secret Service, Internal Revenue Service, United States Marshal's Ofilce, or the Bureau of Far.- - cotics, to name a few., ' Not too many years ago, we learned of .t?t diplomatic trip to Russia by an American [who shall not be named] who took along a group loaded with more gadgets to detect radiation than .they could carry at one time? One of the gadgets was shaped like a slightly oversim fountain pen. , After we gave up the 11-2 flights over Russia put not China] the Military de- veloped cameras for space satellites that today are launched in secrecy ' from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Cal., . to circle far above foreign nations. The , detail from these pictures is amazing- - and helpful. ? . - - - But this sort of thing is never talked about in more' conventional places of American government, especially not at the State Department. There is a cer- tath disdain shown toward spies and spying at state, a trait shared by diplo- rests of many Western nations. So it was with interest that I listened when another spy-told me how Villiam Rogers, secretary of state, had played a key role .in helping Egypt purge ,its nation of CommuniF.4 spies. The story the spy told us ,was that Rogers had been equipped with a wrist watch that could detect electronic eavesdropping equipment. This makes sense because there are any member of . minute .electronic devices that could be detected by a watch of this kind.? E. is also on public rbcord that East Europeans had indeed been e.:pellod front Egypt for planting listening de- vices in a variety of official meeting places. In any event, Rogers' watch was sup- posed to have sounded a signal during a private meeting with President Amvar Sadat that they were under electronic surveillance. Sadat, of course, heard the buzzing. I asked Rogers the other - night if the story was true. ? .The secretary grinned and said he had heard the same story. "But," 'he insisted, "it.: just isn't true." it's getting so you can't _even trust spies any more. STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001,4 'BIB BATMAD 0a.:31.-MTER Approved For Release 20310)3/04 : CIA-RDIRWIIVIZI1 -/-7.1 ? , ,--ln i',Iir- _..A ...-)1:::::)Uf...?1. --- --7.-,--::::7:-_--.--. -L-1:::;::--;:,-;:::--:--.7--.,..-:-.?::::?.-_,:::,--7------1:,-'- 1 u i. !?] 4%-1 s..%; cUlates the length of the re- rileinihg life-span Of foreign personalities who interest the , United States. Its doctors saY. (PIEltitF,-*NOIM,- an internationally known exert on espionage, (escri-? . they do not bother with lead- beS subversive w:d.- --:-- the ultimate Weai)on ? in his book `IlintoxicatiOn" ing American fiLrures.: that is (Editions l''ayarcl). It is il do'cUment, a first-hand mo.moire., .. In, it, he, ti ices l'alse on the 'face of it because . the development of the. great cOntempbrary affiiirs Ana eVokes. little-kr:Orli it is. the latter who determine ' ? facets of tile 1939-1945 world conflict and the subversive, revolutioii.ai..y, .eVnybo'dy's future. . ? , kleolog,leal cold. war that his changed the. face of the 'world Since 1945 ... -As for the private lives and . , Here are passages 1i-in his chapter on the Unita}, State's Central Intellige- financial affairs :of these per- nee Agency ? C.I.A.). . . . sonalitie.,:., the C.I,A.'s leadim.4 ' evaluated. in terms of nurn.bers:; -,- ' IPzal exnerts accaunt.i,lits and - The .C.I.A.'.s. hcadquar.ters is The results Of these v)aee onicers often know ino- . . ?sl-Ap,/,. . . -.....N.V..?R.1.-(116 it 1;e(Lilt.':'lelan their - colleaDies hi Sheltered horn the curious in a .eYes:. into film and the translated i . C.I.A.'s 125-acre uark at Langley, ' Vii - tree. recordinr,s, graphs and . . . -. I the subject's homeland. ' I i,l'ill'arP,4 allr'v- the dirc-'orq Th2. C.I.A. decla.res ?soire) ginia, twehty 'Minutes by car..s.--- -. --? ''' " ? ? ' -". '.- 2 , . . , ' A very sel&ct company of so- ,./;.., 0.000 permanent employees . to ci?unt Soviet missiles sto, , ? froin the White House.. /fifer; ,I.,.?r and sonic Writers have out tli;e, .ciptogists, econo.mists, historia- ed a_t Sireiallcsk,- or to dc .. - zintion .has assumed that the anti SUNIC ?NILLCLJ IliPilf IlL.H. LH,' fl, ,geographers, . financiers.' President of the United .StateS,:n1ir.e' t'lle advanca state of t:19 total at 60,000 -- divided mor'ri political experts and enii;re's ...funs the secret Services. him- next Chinese nuclear; experi- .or less equally between the intcr?Pret ar enoiiricitils. mass Of 'Sel.`, (!) and is is close to the ment, or to hear Moscow's or ?'biocks" \vho oPerate under ?information collected on each oier user . of it.,... serviz.'es, the.- tlers:to it. sub'Inarines crui.,:ing cover. and the -white's" `?chb- aritag,bnistie, neutral 'or allied agon hadqUarers Pent, joint et ' i along Florida's coast, or to cliek in at Lanciley and its state. Of ;the. American General Staff follow the countdown of- Soyuz.- branelizs CVery day and cannot' ? and the US, Department of rocket "Nurilber' X" at Baiko- conceal themselves, beience, ? . tour in the farthest re ---? ., , . aches of : -"BLACE."" agents get data The C,I,A ? directer, head . the. Soviet Union .as easily as it its 'source ..overSeaS under i )f.. American secret war:are, they can cheek the pro,_fress of .cove.r as tourist, journalists, espionage -activity. and sui3ver, t:-.-.,ii- u.v..1 Apjlo -fityn,?i.-?, v., bus.Inessnien or diplomats. Ion' in ?foreign . Countries, is at Cape -Kennedy.. All inst:intlA . These are the real 'secret ,ss,ist.N.1 by t W O. other men: the - agents. The "WIfIT1'.lS" I:loin'. ' biers of. the Intellfg,ene Divi- I - ' . i .. ? A SliCROT . "AR-MIT" de a tcelinulo$,.1,m3 'clike ,-,.:: I,On .-and .Plans Divigicn, and t s openly reoorted that researchers, scientist's, , el-ie- .:cid ? knoWs what .Combinatiop . - ,. -the American secret service is ; mists, roctallurg?ists, T ma the- .4. . f 1 -nd ?ec.s orthot,- - ?)1 '1 ? ,? ' ?en an-I.*, o iti i 1. . maticians, biologists, 'electri- ,. . ,all and robots! ' - SPYING I'.. Lux-uhY ' scinds of me.n. That is plainly . Ci I' el Cie LT 0 niCS experts, OF. ? ELEcTrz.,0N.,,Q.. ., : an exageration: but it WOUld . i graphers, doctors, fores- Th no directors --I sur- be less so if the venal foreigh .11hoto - ? . 7oundod by luxury and calm, hi agents on the manthly payroll ters, dieteticians and even lieir Langley office, dressed and freelance spies were coml.. ? :.And this is no joke... Going' h.irt-SICCV es .and 'slippers if led' ? ?? I ike their ea..e ? can eX 'WHO CAN. say how many . even fart'ner: The A f: rican8: , -alone?; and the Sc.viets morecver hav'e-':;? they..like their ease can ex- ate Work in Indoe'nina Ploit the labours of the -Natio- It:Would he well blow . the been .eS:perlincliting in thouglii.::. ?nal .Aeronautics and .Space mark if scientific and indust.-? transn-!issicn, and what has Ill- Administration and its -satelli- rial workers who conceive ancV hi-cc; through of the first re r,ults could shake the most ra- tes carrying out .patrols'. for build the esoienage machinery':Richard Halmes tonal. mind..., Ahem. in the. str'atos'pherer.,' at. were cOuntcd. the new C.I.A. boss. ? / 40,00.0 nines an hetit:, the Mi.:" Spying and commterrspionage. , . . . t . . . ' _ das II . detecting missiles, 7 the. have become vital industries . HOW ?CI-OS.13 ici DEATH? Being, the most . eXoensivelv . . Samos se.ries. and othi-r .sys- and electronic values. are the : But it is c.C.rtainly the Medi- paid .r:- t' ? odd 11' -n - - I i tie N , .ley 'tip,a ..,- . t,ms la'kincr photographs.' To 'workhorss of Wail Street, thel cal servic'e which is the Agen- ' - ? - qualified enough to Coh_hich. mar roW, the orhitting :spae6 New. York Stock EXchange.. 1 cys 'tint garde . Amon o- its - '_ 'Here is What this counti.v ?,vi."0. . ..._ ?? . stations will 1)Alarkrit.ved For Rel'eatie2061t01/02th'f'..ear-Ruvuu--01buTROD1100110001b4circiirosta;ices". ' 'only catecmry wnicn can . be! , 1 ? Approved For Release This is f1 manwho EJE? 1 ? 1. leaked the Pentagon 5ers that tell The 2001/0 -/85-i ? Top ;Secret history of deei- ? 171 r sion-Making in -the Vietnam \ 1 war Di7 Daniel Ellsberg ? ? - - veteran .of Vietnain and Pentagon combat, is. 'lean, intense, athletic, attractiveto woMen 'and brilliant. Why did this 4O-year-old?nar- tvard:-Cambridge-MIT intellectual, thusias- tic Marine. Corps _officer, Rand Corp. an?_ly st an.d Defense Department planner expose these When you turned yourself in, you said you had inade the ,Pentagon papers public di' a responsible American cititien. 'Really, the'essential question we wa,nt .abola rl.at is the moral responsibility of the citi;:xn who thias he sees his government doing evil? ? '1 was in a dual position. Eike every American, I had a feeling of obligation to the Constitution and ' to my fellow citizens. At the same time, 1 was a re- k'archor through most of this periq,. doing consult- . . Ing for the Government, and someone whose reflexes in terms of loyalcy.had been set by 12 to 15 years of service to the Executive branch-15 yeats would - include the three years with the Marine Corps. : ? I question the identification of the state or the Government with the.Executive Branch or with the President. All the members of the Executive Branch ? ? are the creatures of one elected representative of the - ' people, the President: When you look at the entire Executive- Bianch, you confront this enormous structure of somewhat conflicting institutions in which .only one man has been elected by the peo- ple. The effects of this are very-great. In the early sixties, before I ever got on the . subject ofYietnarn, I was granted interagency access at a very high level to study the decision.-making process in crises like the Cuban missile crisis, Suez, Skybolt; U-2 and so forth. In fact, the arrangements for,. that study were sec up by Walt Rostow, who was than head of the Policy Planning- C9uncil of the State Department, I was at Rand and Was brought to Washington ? as the sole researcher for .what was to be a year's study. That 'study exposed to me the importance of time Ptesident in every one of these crises, the pecu- liar, Very 'powerful influence of the President's per- sonal judgment and personal preconceptions. - This Conflicts with another view of the decision process in Government ,which says that the president, although he may look powerful, is given surprising)), little leeway by the bureaucratic agencies under him, in which to influence policy, that he has to fight for influence, to connive, to maneuver, in order to have any impact whatever.. ' . . ? STATINTL -RDP80-01601 c assi.aec ciocuments. ? .!1 -??? /' to the world? Since he did, their pUblica- ? tion has becoine the most sea-. ? sational story of the year. The Nixon Administration tried to ,halt publication, starting a battle in which the Supi:einc Court refused to stop the nation's press from making the papers public. In this so] f-revcalin t interview with LOOK'S l'oreip 'Editor J. Robert Moskin, Dr. 1.7,11sberg. explains ) . why he risked prison to try to end the war. ? - Its a position that's very plausible from within the system. The bureaucrat gets a sense that presi- dential policy reflects the success of one or 'another agency in tying his hands. He doesn't have a sense of presidential initiative and power. The most startling thing to me Was to discover ,how critical timePresident's role had been, that if his hands were tied at all, it. was because he chose to cooperate in having his position forced by one pses- Sure or another. ? Was this the expiTienee of just one President, say, Kennedy? Oh., no. This related very. Much to Eisenhower and others. Remember the clear-cut lies by the Executive relating to the shooting down of the U-2 Eight over Russia in 1969? Remember that first they described the pine as haying been a weather plane off course. Then Khrushchev revealed that thy not only had parts of the plane but they had the pilot alive. After which the President himself took respon- sibility for the U-2 plane and admitted that It had been a spy reconnaissance flight. Ile was very much criticized for having, admitted this, which demolished the. summit conference scheduled right afterward. ? Most Americans assumed! that Eisenhower had .not known of the flight, certainly in detail. I think most people believed this on two grounds: that there's, a lot that goes on that no President knows about In detail and that Eisenhower knew even less .than most President:s because he was always on the golf course. ? ? In the Course of doing this.study, I looked into the U-2 crisis. quite closely and finally went to the .man who was. in charge of the U-2 progm.m. from. beginning to end, who had left the CIA at that point. He said that President Eisenhower went over the flight plan. of every U-2 flight over Russia in the greatest detail, which usually occupied no less than four or five hours. lie said that for every. flighi of the . ? 11-2 over Russia, he brought the detailed flight plans . ? wite the full schedule to the White House for Prcsi-. .clent Eisenhower, and in no.ciise did Eisenhower .fail to make some modifications in the flight plan. ? He said the questions that President Eisenhower. Approved For Release 2001/0 014ft)CIALFTP8fp&ItW1R9011b0V0001-4 jective assignee to tne It an to weigh it co,.:71-t '1'iiOErCi ?. STATINTL 'KM rA,9,Y.i..r.(rOr-f.- 1.-L11;\:..1;.3 11.11ICK1 Approved For .Release 2001/03/04 PCIA-RDP80-01601 9. 110 0 6 " %ch ? i i :1-F ri[1rTO... .1 t (U UL ONE OF TILE 01,1MST 'PRACTICES world is the exchange of rich gifts when one head of state visits another. Right now, somebody in the State Department's p'otocol .division -- probably Bus Mosbacher himself -- is shopping for just .the right baubles for President Nixon to press upon Chou ri\lao Tse-tung and Lin Pine when' he visits.them in Peking. The Foreign (devil) Office of the Peoples Republic of. China is engaged in the same pursuit. ? _ ? ? ? There has been an understanding sincq about the time Cleopatra called on Julius Caesar and presented him with, among other gifts, a son, that the loot belongs to the individuals concerned, not their respective states. In our times, tins has enabled oup former . presidents ? to fill -,their museums and libraries with treasures of. ? great value. The gifts President Nixon receives in Peking vil( be viewed -- perhaps with wonder -- - by future gene:,ations of sightseers -trudging through his museum. sometimes wonder whatever became .of .the fibre-glass lake -boat which thc., State Department bought for President Eisenhowsr. to present to Nikita Nimuschev in the spring of 1.'?30. It was. to; be Used in the pl.casanl stretch of water near Nikita argeyevich's dacha about f.?) miles out of. Moscow. But something happened on May .1, . . something called a 13-2 spy plane piloted by CIA pliot Francis Gary Powers. A Soviet ground- to-air missile winged it at c3,CCO feet over Sverdlovsk_ laruselte).? canceled his invitation to Ike to visit him, The Slate Department- was left., holding the bag. Or, rather, the boat.. . In view of. subsequent events, maybe -it's a - ferry on the Styx. When Vice President Nixon visited Klauschev in 7959 he presented filmt with an expensive inter- continental radio. Khruschev gave Nixon a -shotgun, for Unexplained reasons. 11o r- I :11 ra ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 STATI NTL ? STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04;: CIAIRDP80-01601 _2 1 SEP 1971 If '47'4 P r!,. d . . . ? %I:20A . fi r! ? v r if ZO-') lb] i! ? '"1.1 Hti p ? ivwcd Plans of Mizsirirr,,, and Sanclio,:led S?-qt '-? NEW YORK (UPI).? . ? President Dwight D. Eisenhower personally re- viewed the flight plan of all U-2 spy missions over . the Soviet Union and it was -he. v.ho decided ;-the ill-fated flight of Francis Gary Powers was "worth the risk," Daniel Elkberg said Monday. ? Elkberg, the former De- fense Department analyst :who leaked the Pentagon papers ? on he -Vietnam war to 1.7?-le press, said in an interview in Look maga- zine that he learned of Gen. Eisenho?,,,?er'-s person- al involvement in the U-2 ? flights when preparing an early study. of the deci- sion --making process in crises, ? The shooting down of - .Powers' U -2 reconnais- sance plane by the Pus- sinus in ION shortly he. fore a planned. summit conference. between Can. 'Eisenhower and then So- viet Premier Nikita S. Xhrushchev strained. U.S.- Soviet, relations apd. prompted Mr. -.Khrushchcv to cancel the conference. ? "M o t Americans is- ? that Eisenhower had not known of the flight, certainly in detail," ? Ellsberg said. But, Ellsberg said, in the course of hiz--; study )10 learned differently from "the man \r,dio Was in charge of the II-2 program ? from. beginning to end, who had left the CIA at that point." "Ile said that President Eisenhower went over the flight :plan of every U-2 flight over Pussia in the greatest detail, which usually _occupied_ no 1cs3 than four or five hours. "He said the question? that President. J...isenhow- cc asked forced 'him to jus- tify every reconnaissancc objectie assigned to the flight and to weigh it against: the precise mar-. ginal risks on each leg of the flight.? ? "In fact, he said that on the specific flight where Powers was shot down, ? they were weld, aware that there were. SAMs (surface- to-air missiles). in that area that were becoming. opera.tional. "There was already a risk, and. they had to ba- lance hat leg of the flight against, the desirability of covet?ing those objectives," Ellsbei:g said. "President Eisenhower made. the de- cision that it was worth the Approved For Release-2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001100176001-4 Approved For Release 2uu-TRAI114 C1AL-RDP8 - 9 SEP 1971 ? STATIN L 11'11 Y1,-03 kicb 0 .a.. . o . . A . fi-75-il fi , -.,,r, 71, yq . 0,..3 1, \ f I.] t I .- --,04,-.----A ? -IA U)4-PJ. Jj..A11. \..?]..0., .;, CU LI.L.....1).,i.J, Lt. ? . NEW YORK, Sept. 8 [Rene tersl-a-The remarkable per- formance of spy'-in-the-sky sat- ellites and a "tacit understand- ing" by the governments of the -United States . and the Soviet Union not to interfere with them could be a major factor in preserving- the peace, an ex- pert on the subject has report- ed. There even were two occa- sions in a one-year. span when the information from recon- naissance satellites saved the peace, according to Philip J. Klass, an avionics editor of the magazine Aviation Week and Space Technology. Product of Think Tank Klass gives the first detailed study of the .history and ability of reconnaissance satellites in the book,. "Secret Sentries in Space" [Random House, ? p.0.33.? According to Klas the first concept of .spy-in-the-sky satel- lites stems from a report by the Rand Corp., ?the Air Force's think-tank?in 1046. The technology to actually build the satellites was created when Bell Labs invented the transis- tor in 1048. All that was needed were rockets big enough to launch the satellites and the will to do so. During , the Eisenhower years many government offi- cials . believed Space was' a "frivolous" diversion and gave little- credence to the possibili- ty it could have military im- portance.'' ? _ ? : Foreign Minister Andrei Gro- p delicate balance the satellite .13alloons Landed in Russia myko during a .- Washington have given ave given the two big powers. The first attempt at aerial meeting. This, he believes, ie may have .contriuted to' the Ones He fact the Russians surveillance during the post- Russian backdown on Berlin. probably have killer satellites war period came in the late the that can knock dos American '40s when the 'LT. 8. launched Later that - year dining satellites. That NVOUld end tue. h i g h -altitude bEtE0011S Nvith Cuban crisis the Russians may "understanding." : have again backed down, be- - Klass also thinks it's possible cameras attached to them cause of satellites, in this case near the s soviet border. The their own. They may have had to someday make laser beams cameras did not ?work verypowerful they could. be pictures :that showed the U. S. iso well and balloons lav,r,,i `111,'n1Ths'siYc,,, " n 1" ",'mg 2 04103/1A 61 R0b1100170001-4 ? i could create "death rays"--a prompting complaints from the Cuba and was capable of using ' t' i Buck Rogers concept he. be- Russians. . .it. . 1 iir,vps -ig lin lonlrfo.r romnIolp . ? In the late '50s, NV11-011 the. Klass writes there are proba- Soviets appeared to have taken, lay two kinds of satellites. the lead in intercontinental They are those that drop pack- [ICBM] and intermediate ages of film Irons orbit for .air- range ballistics missiles craft pickup, and that use tele- [IRBM] [the so-called "missile vision to scan the pictures and gap"), tI-2 high altitude air- transmit them' to earth later. craft .gave the U. S. the first Newer satellites are hooked "hard" look at what the Rus- into communications satellite beamS to speed up delivery of sians were up to. So diq R13-47 the television pictures. jets flying around the' Russian borders.. New One Launched' Klass says tlie U. S. is now But when the Russians shot' reducing .the fourth genera- down U-2 and an RB-47 the U. S. was left with no way to find out exactly what the Rus- sians had developed; Klass writes. By this time work on spy .satellites waS beginning to bear fruit. Then, in 1061., .during the height of the Berlin crisis, the t i on satellite, called- "Big Bird." It weights 12 tons- and will remain in orbit several months. One was launched re- cently. . ? Ho says cameras aboard the. newer satellites may.be able to - !pick out objects several inches wide, use infrared for taking pictures at night, use zoom ? first hint the U. S. was using the satellites came in a column 'rises' and have special radar c a in eras for shooting thru by. Joseph ? Alsop?probably Pentagon "leak," Klass writes lclouds. --that stated that the U. S. A fifth generation satellite I now thought the number of now planned could give "real (CiT,Is the Russians had were time" information, meaning. only a quarter of previous esti- television pictures of exactly what the satellite sees as the .? mates. satellite sees it. I Learned They Had 11 Elder Satellites,?Feared. , Klass says the U. S. found There are also early warning out some time later exactly satellites parked in ? orbit-- how many the Russians ? bad probably over the Indian [141. . Ocean?watching for missile He speculates Prsident'John launches from the two Russian launch sites at Plesetsle or F. Kennedy may have let the Russians know about the satel- TYuratam. lite by actually showing pie- Klass sees two clouds on the tures taken by the satellites to horizon that could- change the ? Approved For Release 20111,1113104rt 01AIRDP80-01 ? no. 19 1971 ? tTATI NT "...AIth31.I;It IhIs elttire f.erin or eis- rivalries .,to be: stire, 61 once. the deci- . .. ._ . . .. .._ ... cnsslom vins "C the. the, r.eco?.1", c2c sio.hs arc.rcaehed at the top they are slthject of Si -for thIs pnrik..)-- carried out with the monolithic tone or lar meeting. %vas especiany 'senst1ye 'rid tubject to the preriotls!y zn- - state power. ? . rotms-ed resty;ctieTs." The..intellitence cbmmunity-now ?C. Do.egIe.s D:lIon ''. plays an expended and critical role in By The ilf'Zi.n GYelvi.) creating and administering the real; . ? stuff of American foreign policy. CIA , The Central. Intelligence Agency is . Director Richard Helms presides over a, *one .of the few governmental agencies U.S. Intelligence Board which links the %whose public image has actually im- secret services of all government agen-: /proved as a result of the publication of cies, including the FBI. In the White j the Pentagon japers. Despite diselo- House, Henry Kissinger presides over sums. of "The Agency's" role in assassi- an expanded National Security Council 'nations, sabotage, and coup d'etat's structUre which "further centralizes consciously intended to subvert i'Mehta- covert foreign policy planning. It is here tional law, A meric.a's secret agentry that the contingency plans are cooked. has actually emerged in some quarters up and the "options" 'so carefully :with the veneration due prophets, or at 'worked out. It is in these closed chant- leas.t the:respect. du'e its s?o.agcsted effi- .bers, and strangelovian "situation ciency and accuracy. . ? rooms" that plans affecting the lives of Virtually every newspaper editor, not millions are formulated for subsequent to mention Daniel Ellsberg, himself,. h,as execution by a myt;iad of U.S. con- heaped praise on the CIA for the aceu- trolled agencies and agents. 'racy. of its estimates detailing the U.S. . Jncreasinnly, these schemes rely' on defeat in Vietnarn..Time and agltin, the covert tactics whose full raianii'ig is se- Agency's "level headed professional- .dom perceived by the people affected -:--- ism" has been contrasted 'with the esca-? be they Americans or people of foreign lation-ovei-kill orientation of the Penta- countries. The old empires, with, their t, 'ocin or the President's advisors. The colonial. administrators- and civilizing _ . -. . 4 ?editor of the Christian Science Monitor mission have given way to the more ' CIA manip- ulations. ? / - even called upon policy makers to.con- subtle craftsman Ol intervention. Their Richard Bissell, the man who led the ?s/ :suit the CIA more, calling it a "re- manipulations take place- in' the front Council discussion that night, Was well markably accurate source or informa- rooms of neo-colonial institutions and egelpped to talk no the CIA. A or 'tion." But such backhanded praise for the parlors of dependent third world. time Yale professor and currently an Conspirator's confuses public under- elites. In this world of r6alpolitik,--ap- executive of the United Aircraf Corpo- ,Standing of the important and closely Dearances are Often purposely deceptive t . . ' ration, Bissell served as the CIA's Dep- integrated role which Inc CIA plays in ancl politIcal stances inc-en Director un tionally mis- ladvancing the Pax Americana on a leading. The U.S. agnT,ression in Viet- uty- til he ?"resigned in the '' ;global scale.. - nam, lest'anyone forget, began as-a wake 1961 invasion of ' of the abortive .. Cuba. The blue-ribbon group to For atiy, tie Pentagon Papers -covert invOlvement largely engineered. .which m provided a- first peek into the inner by the CIA. Similar covert interven- enee exoerts including Robert Amory,. he- spoke included-a number of inte'llig- 'sanctum of foreirm policy making. As - tions now underwayelscwh Jr another forme Deputy Director ere in the the government's attempt to suppress world may be fueling' tomorrow's Viet-, arid-the ,,, .,:. r , the study illustrttes, the people are not n ioams. . collr,:tidte erC:;dI A ehiet hc,,rf:t, ,niesc?srblock.in It c, n )latInl is) r . , .. _ .suppos,-d. to have access .to the 'real . It is for: this reason that the Africa'Arae lcn. plans of their novernment. On close nese :Arch Group, an indepe ndent rad i--? ---wans.irnei-paor.tte:sriP i0t?e1:01Zh i a TheI ol c. Zsrl c:n osf cocr inspection, what emerges is not an "inv- cal research collective, is now tnaking international banker Douglas Dillon to -isible government" but an indivisible 'public Major excerpts from a document system in which each agency offers its which offers an informed insider's view own specialized input, and is delegated of the 'secretworkings of the American . _ its own slice of responsibility. Coordi- intelligance apparatus abroad. Never *1 he complete text of the document will nated inter-departmental agencies work .. intended for publication, it was made be available fOr SI in late- October from out the division of imperial labor. There ? available to the Group which will pub_ Africa 3 ca Research Group, P.O. Box. 21, are disagrApproved ForaR4leilsei20.01/93/04>:tOIAADR80-4116ocilkbbitcifiThkdi.4 -sym,L6,17.00 !cm Approved For Release 2001/Oa/Vs. p167-RDP8VM0A r of U.S. aircraft in Florida and the Amer- ican task . force assembled in the Ca- ribbean.- "What role, if any, Russian sat- ellite pictures played in , convincing Kremlin leaders that the U.S. was pre- pared to go the limit," Klass writes, "probably is known only to a few Rus- sian leaders." The ..author concludes that "the au- tomatonS-in-orbit, adolescent as their performance was at that stage, had kept the to . giant thermonuclear powers from bombing into World War III at least once, perhaps twice." , Another round of reconnaissance dueling came last year over the Middle East, when U.S. satellite pictures confirmed that U.S. MR FORCE SATELLITE LAUNCHING ESPIONAGE The Spies Above / If a U-2 overflight could once pro- yoke crisis, as the Francis Gary Powers incident did in 1960, the elaborately pre- cise spy satellite systems of the U.S. and Soviet 'Union a decade later have created and enforced a de facto "open skies" policy between the two super- powers. Today such satellites slide through space like disembodied eyes re- cording an astonishing variety of in- formation. Just over a month ago, for example, the Pentagon revealed that the latest Soviet SS-9 ICI3M ground tubes -are exactly 20 ft. in diameter. Neither country, naturally, is very talkative about its espionage system. But in a new book, Secret Sentries in Space r (Random House; $7.95), Philip J. Klass, senior avionics editor of Aviation Week & Space Technology, offers a first, fas- cinating look at the space hardware that has, so far, contributed to global stabil- ity. By allowing the two major nuclear powers to examine one another's military installations in exact detail, the satellites have considerably diminished the danger of war throughmiscalculation. Florida Force. During the 1961 Ber- lin crisis, the "first generation" of Dis- coverer satellites was aloft, and John Kennedy was able to show Soviet For- eign Minister Andrei Gromyko pho- tographs indicating exactly how few ICBMs the Soviets really had. "I be- lieve," says Klass, "that after Gromyko saw those pictures he persuaded Khru- shchev to back down." , Similarly, Klass writes, "the President entered the Cuban missile crisis with a very precise inventory of Soviet stra- tegic missile ail o 111 to U.S. satelli, xrogovkibikiMe s. r sc time, the Soviets undoubtedly used their Cosmos satellites to watch the buildup RECOVERING CAPSULE Also for poppy fields. the Soviets and Egyptians had moved missiles into the cease-fire zone, in vi- olation of the cease-fire agreement, Klass submitted proofs of his book to the CIA and the Pentagon; they ob- jected tO its publication but made no ILOVC to stop it. No one else has writ-i ten in comparable detail about spy sat- ellites. Klass describes; for example, the nation's latest SAM05,(satellite and mis- sile. observation system); "the Big Bird," launched just two months ago. A giant, twelve-ton spacecraft capable of working aloft for at least several months, the Big Bird combines the capabilities of sev- eral earlier satellites, It can transmit high-quality pictures by radio, and eject capsules of exposed film which then drop by parachute. The Big Bird also in- . _ tration Klass reports, is behind the Urals in Cen- tral Asia and in Siberia. Narcotics Film. Besides sniffing out weaponry, spy satellites provide a va- riety of data for civilian use?in geo- logical studies, for example, or even narcotics control. Color firm pictures of the poppy fields of Southeast Asia and elsewhere, taken from satellites, have been projected at the White House. When President Nixon referred recently to international control of narcotics, he had in mind the U.S. capability to point out the exact locations of the world's poppy fields. In the past 18 months, the Soviets have moved one step ahead of the U.S. They have devised a killer satellite that can track, inspect and blow up another satellite aloft. The situation is not un- like that in the James Bond epic You Only Live Twice. The U.S. is still de- veloping such a destroyer, and the pos- sibilities are ominous. Should one side decide to knock out the other's spies, Klass concludes, "it will turn space into a battleground, precipitate a still more costly arms race and return the world to the perilous days of the .late 1950s." STATI NTL i0eAritO ?0, tigg4.7emp, -o 601R001100170001-4 an ice and snow to locate Soviet under- ground weapons, The heaviest concen- Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0 BOSTON, MASS. GI405E M - 237,967 S 566,377 liMci; 2 5 131_ .,.?o REPORT FROM 'CUBA 3 . By JAMES HIGGINS ? '. -- HAVANA-- "From April 19, ?! 1961,, up to the present," said the ,. .young man from Cuba's Ministry of e Foreign Relations, "we have publicly i? announced 87 separate aggressions against our cottntry by the CIA." He emphasized the "publicly." He said that Cubans had been ,I very . interested in .the information , which the Pentagon Papers had pro- vided to the people of the US. .' "Partly," he added, -'because we e are sure that the people in your coun- try do not yet know that for 10 years, . ever since the Day of Pigs invasion, Whicb We defeated, there has been :.consistent espionage, sabotage, infil,- ' tration. and -raids conducted by the ' CIA against Cuba!! . . I .asked if he were certain that all Were the work of the CIA. .I reminded ;him that there were Several thousand , Cuban exiles in the US and that a . number of them, especially those of the Alpha 66 organization insisted .t.h.ey were operating on their own in ) their efforts to penetrate Cuba. ....."Well," he said, "if there were several hundred thousand North Americans in Cuba,- and if some of : these were not only openly declaring their intent to invade but also, from tittle. -to time, sneaking ashore with : guns, . aminunition and explosive i 'equipment, you would assume that all this.could not happen without the .cooperation?of agencies of the Cuban government," ? e ? And, he went on, if, in addition, official' Cuban government planes, . : such as US ?U-2s .and SR.71s were , flying along tire US coast and photo- graphing US territory, it would be - hard not to conclude that the nation " which did this had had intentiOns STAT I NTL - . lritevan [C@ g lin grd: upon your territory and sovereignty. "Leto me give," he said, "a few specifics from a document we pub- lished about a year ago." HQ quoted:- "1?On June 13, 1961, a CIA craft based in the US attacked and sank a Cuban ship to the north of Isabela de Saglia" "2?In May of 1965 members of a network of CIA agents who: were sending secret information to the US through the Guantanamo Naval Base were captured in Camaguey "3?On Dec. 29, 1967, a light plane proceeding from Homestead, Fla., was. shot .down here. The pilot, US ditizen Everett D. Jackson, was' captured. He had air-dropped arms and espionage equipment in the northern part of. Las Villas Prov- ince:" "4--On Sept.. 12, 1969, counter- revolutionary agent Jose Antonio Quesada Fernandez landed in Oriente Province.' He was, captured with War material and espionage equipment found on him. He was tried by a rev- olutionary court, convicted and exe- cuted:" ?-"5--On April 17, 1970, a group of mercenaries proceeding from the US and armed with the latest weapons used by the US Army landed near Baracoa in Oriente Province: The group was .put out of action. Some were captured, others killed." He said that two years ago a CIA spy had been detected- here in the Mexican Embassy where, in the guise of a diplomatic officer, he attempted. to cover his efforts to gain informa- tion from highly placed Cubans and to comMunicate reports by radio to' the CIA as well as sendingwritten Messages and photographs. "Every- thing the spy Humberto Carillo?Colon ' did. was intercepted by our counter- intelligence authorities," he said, "and most of the documentation was published, including the instructions he had received to pretend he was writing a book about `The Men Around Castro," one of the stated ob- jectives being to try and find out Who'. might lead a faction against Fidel." Perhaps in time ;to come, he said, from CIA or other US government files, it will become clear that a long; caniyaign of secret aggression ? se- .ret from the US people but not from us ? has been waged against Cuba. He said. that he thought it was even , possible the US p'eciple did not know of their ?government's interference with Cuban trade, using such meth- -ods as Pressure upon other govern- , ments and private companies to pre- : vent Cuba from selling nickel, for ex- , ample, or from haying machinery, tools and spare parts. ? ? A "We regard the haven and sup- Tort the US government gives to Cu-'] bans with have left their cOuntry," he added, "as, similar. to the. policy the uS govefnment has followed up to lately ? toward the-Chiang Kai-shek elements. on Taiwan, a US ? Protector- : ate for more than 20 years. These ele- ments have, it is now admitted, been iaiding and penetrating the Chinese mainland, just as, Cuban -e)dle ele- ments have been doing- here. The only difference is that now the US- sponsored activities against the 'Pee- ples Republic of China are becoming public knowledge. Presumably this , means they will stop, Of. course that is a guess. We don't know?" - NEXT: If .a student is bad, he goes to the head of the line.. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 r Approved For Release 200iii0,1:61AgRbP80-01 1971 Pao Into Chhuz. Said Halted , By Michael Getler washing;top. Post Staff Writer The Nixon administrati on. has -ordered a -halt to the cis- patching of special CIA-sup-.1 Etiorted teams of .Laotian:' tribesmen into China on re-. eonnaissance patrols' from. bases in northern Laos, ac- cording to well informed dip- lomatic sources. These patrols-L-which some.: times range 200 'miles inside China's Yunnan Province on. road-watching, telephone-tap- ping missions----have been going on for a number of? years, and their existence wasi known to the Peking regime. I Nevertheless, in a recent ac- tion designed to avoid any pos- sible incident which could! sour U.S. relations with Pe- king before President Nixon's: forthcoming trip to the Chinese mainland. the forays have been halted, according to . official sources here. . ,Some sources also suggest: that the intelligence value of these- operations may also have decreased somewhat. Although no Americans go on these patrols, the Laotian bill tribesmen who carry them out are recruited, trained and equipped by the CIA, and the staging area for the patrols is a CIA outpost in northern Laos. The Laotians are native to the border region, and the in- telligence-gathering operation .took advantage of the -normal movements back and forth of those bill people. ? While the White House, CIA and the U.S. embassy in Vien-i Cane have never commented: on or confirmed these activi-I 'tics?which reportedly (late back to the Johnson adminis-i tliation?the patrols have been: ? mentioned in numerous press reports by C.S. correspondents. In Laos.. i STATI NTL Inlate 1970 'and early this.: year, articles by Michael Mor- ? row of Dispatch News Service} InIernational described the re-1 connaissance operations in considerable detail. ? As recently as June 27, Ar- nold Abrams of The Philadel- phia Bulletin reported that the raids were still being car- ried out despite the onset Of Ping Pong Diplomacy. The order to 'stop these pa- trols, according to informed sources, came 1,?ery recently. Presidential aide Henry Kis- nger's secret trip to Peking was made July 9 to II. In another move relating to the forthcoming Nixon visit, a press report last week, citing administrative sources, said the United States had sus- pended- flights over Commu- nist China by high-flying SR- 71 spy planes and unmanned reconnaissance drones. This. concession was also depicted as a move designed to avoid any incident which could in- terfere with the President's journey, . However, well placed de- fense and intelligence, , offi- cials, asked about the reported suspension, said privately that to the best of their knowledge there had never been any SR- 71 flights Over the Chinese mainland. Officials say there was a suspension of the unmanned drone flights some months ago, partly for diplomatic rea- sons and partly because of technical problems and the vulnerability of these drones 4to Communist gunners. At least two of the drones were shot down since late in 1969, one over the mainland and one over Hainan Island. There have been flights of the older-vintage 13-2 spy plane over mainland China carried out by the Nationalist Chinese, but officials hint that these flights, too, have not been scheduled for about a year. The United States for some time has relied On satellites for photographic coverage of goings-on inside China. The SR-71s based in Asia, sources say, are' used primarily for flights over North E.orea. . Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 Approved For Release 206410'' A . ? .651616 For the time being, we're going to stop sending 3pi'-in-the-sky planes OVerPlC Peoples Republic of china, formerly Red China. We don't want to risk The chance of having one of our latter-day Fra?eis Cary Powers shot down over Peking while Presi- lent Nixon is on his any to tea with Chou Eu-lot. Whether we'll request or 9 demand that fhb Nationalist Chinese follow suit has not yet been leaked, Rut the chances are that we'll lake care of that, too. We gave Chiang Nai-Shek's forces their U-2 spy planes, taught his pilots how to use them, and asked only that they keep a peeled- eye on Mainland China. ? It would be relatively simple to knock that off until further notice, just as --- in massive mor- tification ?.President Eisenhower cancelled out U-2 flights over the Soviet Union in lice wake of thq shoot:do,,vn of POWCF.,7, Ehruslichev's angry pro- teSs, and the State Department's clumsy at- tempt 'to fob oft a hoax to the . effect that ? Powers' U-2 Miff, a wnther plane that had been blown off course. "4/13! ji SI'VING ON CliN13, will not be suspended completely during the period of' the new rapport. Our inquisitive satellites will continue to criss- cross the .tvorld's 31,10A 1 ,,Dpill01.1S a, lion night and day, taking pictures, sniffing out nuclear tests and producflen, keeping tabs on steel production, counling missile installations and bombers parked ; on rautva:;s, and watching for unusual Dloveinents of huge armed forces. ' , Russia's :pony satellites will be attending to the ;same flabbergasting chores at the same time. In :addition, they will also ? be checking over every part of the U.S., and ours vill be zipping over the groat land mass of rli:! Soviet Union. But the adirAlstration has decided wisely that It wouldn't be cricket to continue our spying from within the Eat th's atmosphere. Spying from space is different, as. any UN diplomat can explain at -great length. It is silfreuent principally because ribbody yet has coma up with a- sure-fire way to knock down the other fellow's orbiting robot spies. The Russians amply proved when they knocked down Powers front U.Ci(l0 feet over Sverdlovsk, even the best of spy planes operating in the at- mosPhere with a guy at the wheel can be knocked out. 11..E1,:3:: LEEN 1,11iC.i.V with our spying on ? China from manned planes. II-2 pilots who. have been shot down have been Nationalist Chinese. So have the .unmanned .planes the mainland gun bat- teries have claimed --- remote. control drones that zip across the Straits of Formosa, cross over into China, take a few pictures, and try to zip home, We've been using a super version of the old UAWN the SRAUQN which has a top speed. three times that of -sound. This is the plane that will now be grounded voluntarily to avoid a foul-up in the Peking talks. We'll probably put it to work elsewhere, but not over the Soviet Union. We still give Cuba a regular 'Iookasee from on high, just. to make certain Castro isn't stashing any missiles or moving his guns too close to the wire fence at Guantanamo. 7111: 1/AVOC RAISF,D Py the shecting down of Francis Gary Powers is still unnerving, even after a Japanese of It years. The incident gave. Nikita Ehrushchev the sledgehammer he necded to break up a summit conference in Paris attended by himself, President Eisenhower, ChEtrles De Gaulle and Harold Mac:million. Khrushchev's dressing down of Eisenhower at the Elysee Palace was the most humiliating mo- ment ill the President's life. The Soviet Premier's news cenference. the following-. day in Paris sounded for a time like a declaration of war. The scheduled Eisenhower trip to the Soviet - -Union -- returning Khrushchev's U.S. visit to the: year before -- was 3:evoked. It had promised to be the high point of his life as Chief Executive. It was planned for him to make half a dozen major speeches to the Soviet people. They had been written for him and, in the opinion of one of the. " writers, Dr. Kevin McCann, could have brought about:a fine relationship between the world's two great powers. Dr. McCann is also sure that the speeches, which had to be junked, would have eliminated all chance of the subsequent eyeball-to- eyeball confrontation and threat of thermonuclear war during the Cuban missilie crisis of 1992. So, this time well play it cozier. President Nixon does not want a fly (or a flier) in his oolong. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 CORPUS CHRISTI TEX. CALLER m 68 ipproved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R CALLER?TIMES S 82,638 41.1 6 2 l971 4. ,Aellis:Wr-toTP,"2.23.,IV 1,5?4/004 Frucient insu_ranee President Nixon has much better liaison with the ? military and the Central Intelligence Agency, or more alert advisers than-his-pi'edecessor President Dwight ? D. Eisenhower. As a. result, he has ordered a suspen- sion . of SR71 and drone reconnaissance flights over mainland China. - ? This is prudent insurance against' an incident which ? E might disrupt' the President's plan to visit Peking sornelime before next May. The Chinese resent the ;? intrusion of reconnaissance planes into their air space, just as we would if we were in their place. Most impor- tant intelligence information can be gained from recon- naissance satellites anyway. Perhaps we can never know the true impact on Russian-U.S. relations of the U2. flight over .Soviet Russia on May 1, 1960. This reconnaissance plane pilot- eel by Francis Cary Powers was shot down approxi- mately 1,200 miles within the Soviet Union. Premier Nikita. S. Khruslichev refused to participate in the Paris sumrnit conference scheduled for May 16 unless Presi- dent Eisenhower apologized for the U2 flight. Eisenhow- er refused and the summit conference failed; We assume that the 112 incident contributed to The downfall of Khrushchev two years later, although Ins . ? STATI NTL performance in the Cuban missile crisis in21962 proba- bly played a dominant role. We cannot know what will come from the visit of Nixon to Peking. But we do know that we should not invite any incidents that might abort that mission. ? ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 STATI NTL ? ? M. MI N.11.1ES Approved For Release 20(0A/6p/fi41: CIA-RDP80-01601R00 STATINTL GElOROl. W,' PAL It has been evident forseme. time that our Government was seeking tci detach itself from a China policy con- gealed in aspic for. the last twenty years. What no one expected was the: spectacular means chosen to bring it about. Presumably the President might have explored, and with luck devel- oped; an improved understanding with Peking by traditional diplomatic 'means. But, hi announcing arrange?, inents for a personal 'Visit, he quite' deliberately adopted: what Might be called ,symbolic diplomacy-Ha form of international maneuver in which the chosen method .of diplomatic inter- change is itself a political act produc- ing .major consequences regardless of any .substantive agreement that may emerge. .? Though I accept the President's se- lection of .diplomatic tools as a shrewd and useful ploy, it may still be profit- able to speculate as to its far-reaching Implications. The classical objection to summit' meetings e is that they raise expectations which, if: unfulfilled, can lead to disillusion and even greater tensions, but, in the Present special circumstances, the mere announcement of the projected meeting has already produced irreversible effects. At the heart of the President's- calculations is the hope that those effects.will, on balance, be- more useful than other- . ? ' ? ' Wise. ? ? ,By?.his. unexpected actioh he has set in motion forces that can 'free us from the, fictions and rigidities' of the past. On. the 'home front, the irrevocable effect of the .arinOuncement---ethe fact that;. ncoinatter what: happens, it has already 'eroded. our. Unrealistic China policy?!S instinctively Understood. It has compelled Americans to' adjust ovelmight to a new -set -.of. ideas they Might sttibbornly have resisted if pre- sea-ted Progressively and - inuiramatical- ly; To -a publid ;cliseburaE,red by our ? manifest impotence. ?iii - Indochina, a demonstration of colorful and incisive action is a long-;overdne stimulant. aTTfl ?1 ( Yet if the clement of fatt accompli Is tonic to the home front, its effect for, given the fact that Japan's Gross National Product is two and a half In operationalterms is to limit both sides' freedom of action. Since Wash- times mainland China's, it would be no bargain to trade a functioning and Peking have each acquired their own peculiar vested interests in friendship with a functioning super- the making of the visit as well as in Power for the chance of a fragile ar- ena rangement with a potential one. at least its outward ' success,. ........ _ . capital roust?in shaping its policies between now and the meeting--,-factor in the forces of cOnstraint on the other side. During this' Period President Nixon, will be under pressure. -to Pursue courses Of action, at the United Na- tions and elSewhere, calculated not to provoke Chou En-lai to renounce his China visit as ,Ign-ushchev used the U-2 incident in ,1960 to torpedo the conference with President Eisenhower. 'And,- on its side, Peking, oblivious to domestic opinion yet sensitive to reac- tions throughout the world Communist party structure, long as .it finds it useful- to keep Moscow off balanc:e-----tendatp. avoid outrages that might force Washington to cancel the visit. ? - ? -For Our Western friend's and- allies the announcement has come at a good time. it is a welcome reassurance of America's resilience and good sense. For the Soviet Union it is a blow and, a worry---which may not be a bad thing. In India there is anger that Mr. Kissinger's visit was connived with Pakistan, while ae shell-shocked Talpei is apparently scrambling toward great- er flexibility _and. jmaneuver in an ef- fort to face up to its alarming pre- dicament. Since five out of six Japa- 4iese shipping lines have abruptly can- celed their service to Taiwan, and American and other foreign companies are sharply curtailing their direct in- vestment plans, it requires no special Oriental insight to read the message in the entrails and tea leaves. Ohly in one major capital is therd. urgent need for diplomatic repair work' and .that is Tokvo,_ Unable, because' of the requirements of secrecy, to' in-' form him in. advance, President Nixon's announcement left Premier Sato and his colleagues in a had spot,. Having pressed Japanese governments for two decades not to get too close to Peking but give political and -economic sup- port to Taiwan, we have suddenly cut the ground from under .our most loyal friends. in Japan, just at a time when our commercial differences are prov- ing dangerously abrasive. Unless we act quickly this could well produce a crisis we cannot afford; (1'..-ST1 e., / undo, g et Approved For Release 2001/03/04,e,V011,44600:-61601.k001100170001-4 STATINTL STATINTL Approved .For Release iNifirgigitfil e-C1ik-RDP80-cl 2 AUG 1971 STATINTL Tn.)'71T ? -0 ? ? - - ? ' ,) .L...J' .C) ? by Milan Mikovsky, one of the *Justice Department aides of Attorney General Robert, F. Kennedy. They were under orders to get the Cuban invaders back to the United States by Christmas Eve. Donovan negotiated an agreement under which the United States would give Castro food and medicine worth $53 million in ex- change for the prisoners. In addition, Castro insisted on getting $2.9 million in cash which had previously been offered by Cuban refugee organizations as payment for sick and wounded brig- ade members already re- leased. It was during a conversa- tion that lasted until 1 a.in. in early April, 1953, that Castro announced he womd take Nolan and Donovan to the Day of Pigs. They left from Castro's beach home at Verdadera, on the north side ot--the island nation, at 5 the same morning and drove to the bay on the south shore. - - . . . By Murray Seeger . ,... . Los Antelcr, Timn - '1 'WALT:MAX, Mass., Aug. 1. . - ---Two 'years after the Amer- , - lean-sponsored inVasion_ of Cuba, Fidel Castro took .two- . -.A:inc,?rican lawyers to the ' Day ,of Pigs site and ,dem- onstrated why it had failed So disas-tronsly. . . .. ? . It was April 1963, just days short of the second an- -niverstary of the- invasion which John .F. Kennedy yinEr, , cASTP.0 later acknowledged was one ,- ... explained debacle of the great mistakes of his ? . . presidency, and 'Castro was. dinal Cushing, the interview laying host to -James B. supplies details not pre- ! jonovan and John F. Nolan-- viously known of the-. ne- Jr., as, he had several tillICS gotiations with Castro. in the previous five months. Wouldn't Square ' "He'd get out of the car . Speaking of the mercurial and ,describe diferent as- . Cuban leader, Nolan said, peels Of the battle; where "M he was when he got such any of the impressions and such a message from that we had, and I think that my impresaions were the troops-and what he did, and so on," Nolan recalled about the same as Jim's a recorded interview (Donovan), would not square made for the John F. Ken- with the commonly accept- nedy- Library located in ed image of Castro in the Sampled Swamp . temporary qu arters in this United States.. ?"At one point, there's an. Boston suburb. "During the tune that we area there which is marshy This interviee,,, recorded were with him, Castro was land, swamps and - there's . .. -- pril by never irrational, n ever only one road that runs. ' in A 1937 Nolan in- drunk, never dirty," Nolan across it to solid ground," Washington, is just one r e cal 1 ed. In his personal Nohm recalled. Castro "got of the many. revealing new relationships with u-1--; and out, walked off the road and in connection with the ne- into the marsh to see how . . -pieces of history now avail? . able to researchersat the gotiations, he was always swampy it was. . -- -: . ? ,., ? reasonable, always easy to "You really ? had a sense library.' ; ...,... :- deal with. He was a talker of history listening to some- Effective Monday, .a eiy r the of v ?'' significant prc)por- one like Castro -describe ..... . Kennedy Library is-Making; tions. I mean, - he would 'something like the Day of ,c_f {.11( come over at midnight or 1 available 95 -per cent Pigs. And then the feeling o'clock. in the morning and "3.3 million documents it has- that in walking out into the stay all night talking. but: 'relating to the Ke.nnedy ad,. marsh, which was consider- ministration. A small, ini- , he wasn't a conversationall ed impassable by him and -tial portion of the docun hog. He;'d ask questions, Es-. the brigade, if he ?merits ?was opened to.- thei,, ten for viewpoints. He was also by. easy to talk to, good con- or something . stepped in the wrong spot __. . .. , versationalist, hardsell guy; , that he might :public in October, 1969. The . Milan intervew is constantly plugging bis pro.- just disappear beneath the especially interesting for its gs, his: government. " ooze and that would be the ram idescriptim4 of Castro with end of the whole problem. whom he and Donovan ne- - Donovan, a New York at "And he sank down and gotiated for the release of torney NV110 had previously it was up to his boots, but - the 1,100 survivors of the negotiated the exchange of he got back." disastrous invasion and 23Castro and Donovan de- Soviet spy Col. Rudolf Abel tl. ? American prisoners. for the American U-2 pilot veloped a warm. relationship Added to 'other recorded held by Russia,?Francis Gary that enabled the hard-drink- mpaenmtsd ri.nie stheA pi Pst vnr ck, -'_0 c?,t 10sQ W?. ielcf i'n 1, 20111/ -'- 1, 0- .? 11th 01 'retired Gen. Lucius D. Clay view at the library, that his associates could .and the late, Richard CRY: Nolan was enlisted to help not, Nolan related. . . Just - before Christmas, 1962, when Castro came to Havana airport where the prisoners were waiting for the ransom goods to arrive, a flight .of Cuban Mig fight- ers swooped so low over the field that the men on the field had to crouch down. "Donovan was standing next to Castro, elbowed him and said, in his loud voice that was clearly audible to me and .other peo ple around, 'It's the invasion,' "It seemed to me to be a very jocular remark to make. Castro laughed at. it. And then it seemed to me that the other people around, who initially didn't think it was funny at all, looked at Castro and saw his reaction, and they laughed, too.? in the April meetings, held to clean up details of freeing the 2$ Americans, including three CIA agents, Donovan and Castro talked about improving ?relations between the United States anti Cuba.? "I think Jim (Donovan) always had his Cyc on this as a possibility," Nolan said. "He felt that his maximum usefulness lay in the direc- tion of providing that kind of alternative to American policy. And I think that Castro had a similar inter- est in Donovan _... ." Nolan gave another ex- ample of Donovan's manner with the Cubans, describing a tense scene when the. Americans were desperately trying to get $2.9 million into a Havana bank before 3 p.m. Christmas eve, 1962. "Look, Mr. Minister, if you want to be helpful in this regard, there's one thing you can do," Donovan told the cabinet official who was driving Nolan to the airport. "When you get- out there and that big plane is waiting to take off for Miami, don't defect." In his intervi ew,.-Gen. Clay recalled ,that he was summoned to Robert Icon- most before I knew, I signed a _note for the $2.9 inMon STATINTL VORLD Approved For Release 20000340412c1A-RDP80-01601R0 STATI NTL \iril r(Til ? 0 A.L.,i..t.1.,tgJr ? One week after the announcement of President Nixon's trip to the People's Republic of China, the PeMng: government issued a "serious warning" about the 41,\lth' military aerial intrusion. . Now the White IIonse has announced that there will be. no rrwe flights over China by the SR-71 spy plans. It seeks to avoid an unpleasant incident. ? However, U.S. reeionnaisance satellites will continue to conduct military operations over China, as will "pri- vate'' SR-71s on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency, and American U-2s flown by Chiang 12:al-Shell airmen. ? The ceremonial pause. in U.S. SR-71 spy flights over China do not prove Nil.,:bn's peaceful intentions. - The flights prove that China is an "enemy" target, that U.S. imperialiS.in is an enemy of People's China, event. as it is an enemy of the entire socialist world and the national liberation ? movements. The Chinese leaders' hostility to the Soviet Union is not enmity to "revision- ism,". as they assert, but enmity to-the wofld's first social? ist state. Security of be People's 1-Z6public of China lies in. the unity of the socialist world in the first place. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4 Approved For Release 2001 , . . . . - , -.-- r ? - i) IV,- ?.I. ' iiki(i', c 4 il N. V .,... il 1 k P., '4' '''.., LA A \,,i 1 P . fIrl U, T Ti In 1 \ 1V? riliN 0 : h t 1 !1,1,?.!'. H '1''i a q ri ..i : 1 jAkti. ,J,.P.:11ii 1...a'o,Witi :?,..r1,1. p, uff:0), KiripTom. 1 ? , ' r jr.il fl Nil k. 11 0 l'..P.I ..i. i '0 .1.11-.46. ). .:: : . ... ...._?,.._......._..._. Missions Suspended to Bar Interference With Nixon .. 'nip, Officials Assert . . U-2 1.) OWN IN (i? .R E V, LLED II (I QTY.?. 111)34:( Reconnaissance Satellites, Termed Not Provocative, Ito Continue Surveillance --.^, By WILLIAM BEECHER Sp.edal n Thes.v York VLIes WASHINGTON, July Administration officials said to- day that the United States had suspended flights over Commu- nist China by manned SR-7l. spy 'planes and unmanned le- connaissance drones to avoid any incident that might inter- fere with President Nixon's :forthcoming visit to Peking. But,' it was reported, Ameri- can reconnaissance satellites :will continue missions over Chi- na. Such missions are consid- ered relatively unprovocalive since they are well above the .airspace of China, In 1930, it was recalled, a planned conference between .presicint Dwight D. Eisen- hower and Premier Nikita S. Kruschev was called, off by the Soviet Union after an Ameri- can U-2 spy plane had been. shot down over Soviet: ter- ritory. U-2 planes are flown oyer the Chinese mainland by Chi- nese Nationalists from Taiwan, an official informant said "the mainland Chinese have good enough radar to distinguish be- tween art overflight by the kind of aircraft we possess and. the kind flown by the Chinese Na- tionalists" t 416 tat: ta-RDP80-01601R ,as much more compelling than continued intelligence from an occasional SR-71 or drone mis- sion. Some sources also noted that the, suspension conceivably might be lifted after President Nixon's visit to China, although a similar suspension of flights -over the Soviet 111111011, tUted after the 1960 U-2 .in- Cident, remains in effect. ..,,White House officials, in re- porting July, 16 on Henry 'A. Kissinger's- conversations in Peking with Premier Chou En- lai the Nixon visit, ex- pressed confidence that neither nation, "will knowingly do something that would under- mine the prospects of something that it took so long to prepare and that it took such painful decisions to reach," Satellites Play Key R013 ?Although officials were. re- luctant 'to discuss the specifics of American intelligence-gather- ing activities in relation to China, the following details have been pieced together from well-infprmed .sourees: The bulk of photographic re- connaissance is done by spy satellites operating at altitudes of about 100 miles. Photos taken from that altitude would ;allow aaalysts to determine, (say, the type of aircraft sitting on a- field- but not to read its wing markings or discern de- tails or armament. If a new type of aircraft was? spotted by a satellite, intel- ligence- officials could call an SR-71 mission to get clearer,: more detailed pictures, Cameras carried by the Sit-71, which, flies at an altitude, of about 50,000 feet, reportedly can cap- ture small details. - According to time imformants, a handful of SR-71, operated by the Air Force, normally fly from Okinawa. There are additional SR-7)'s in the Far East, they say, flown by civilian' pilots under contract to the Central -Intelligence Agency. Because of its 'high altitude and 'great speed?more than 2,000 miles an hour?the SR-71 is ? not believed vulnerable either to Chinese surface-to-air missiles or interceptor aircraft. ,It can provide photographic coverage of about 611,000 square miles in an hour. The U-2, by contrast, has a . Political Reasons override .maximum altitude of roughly '/0,000 feet and a top speed of :Informants said the political about 000 .miles an hour, . -reasons for the decision to halt American flights were regarded Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP30-01601R001100170001-4' The drone, the Ryan Firebee, is also used for some recon- naissance missions. Typically a C-I 30 "mother -ship" carries two drones to a point outside the defenses of mainland China, where It launches -them. They fly a predetermined course and return to a safe point over water where they are parachut- ed down and recovered.. Peking has publicly protested nearly 500 incursions of its air space by United States aircraft. The United States also uses SR-71's and drones over North Vietnam and North Korea. Be- sides cameras, the SR-71's also carry equipment to monitor and record radar and% radio transmissions. ?' ? ? ? 1 STATINTI_ 2.- u STATINT Approved For Release 2001/03104 : C1A-RDP80-016 MIDDLE: EAST Flybys and Superspies Israel celebrated the 23rd birthday of its potent air force last ..yveek with flow- ery words and impressive flybys. The words came from the ?air force com- mander, General Mordechai Hod: "We breathe the air of the summit of Mt. Her- moo, our wings trace the tranquil waters of Mirfatz Worn? [Sharm el Sheikh] and the reaches of Sinai, and our jets em- brace the skies of Jerusalem, which has become a united whole." Then at Hod's order came phalanxes of Phantoms, Sky- hawks, Mirages, Mysteres and Ouragans, of Sikorsky helicopters and Noratlas, Dakota and Stratoeruiser transports, and even of gnatlike Cessnas. The only disappointing aspect of the display for Israelis was that it did not in- clude more of the swift, dangerous U.S.- die East power balance differently. from the Israelis, partly. because it considers the Phantoms a useful lever for mov- ing Israel into 'a Suez Canal agreement. The Phantom decision is still, so to speak, up in the air, but Jerusalem hopes for some progress when Assistant Secretary of State Joseph J Sisco makes a scheduled visit this week. "We don't ex- pect Sisco to come flying over in a flo- tilla of Phantoms," says a government official. "But we do hope that he will come ?vith words. of encouragement." Arab Buildup. On the eve of Sisco's trip, pro-israel politicians in the U.S. have been spreading alarmist reports about a significant buildup Of Arab air- powe,r. The Egyptians, according to Washington estimates, have received 100 lvtlGs since last September, in addition to 80 MI-8 troop-carrying helicopters. Syria has got 30 HiGs, five Sukhoi-7 fighter-bombers and 22 helicopters. All built Phantoms, the backbone of the together, there are no ,N nearly 600 So- . air force. Israel has so far received ap- proximately 85 Phantoms and lost nine ?in sorties over Sinai or in accidents. Last year it requested another 4.0 or so to keep its military power on a par with that of the Arabs. The Administration has postponed a decision, partly because it secs the Mid- poin s discussed when Helms conferred with officials of Ha'Mossad, or "the In- stitution," the Israeli equivalent of the CIA: Is Soviet-flown MIC-23s, which can fly at 80,000 ft., an altitude that Phantoms cannot reach, are conducting intelligence missions out of Egyptian bases. Tv,,o electronics-crammed Russian "listening ships" have been stationed about 80 miles off the Israeli coast. I- Soviet radar installed on the ground in Egypt can monitor air routes over Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Jordan. I. Hundreds of Soviet intelligence ex- perts are at work in Middle East eval- uation centers in Cairo and Alexandria. Soviet agents are visiting Israel in in- creased numbers in the guise of tour- ists, journalists, European businessmen and even immigrating Jews. The Russians are gathering informa- tion more openly than they once did; they are ready to risk more in order to GRAYSMITH-SAli FRANCISCO CHRONICLE "A fine job of camouflage, comrade ..." viet-built planes in .the area, some flown learn more. Helms and his hosts ap- by Soviet pilots.parently came to no firm conclusions The Administration argues that So- about the objectives of the current So- viet plane figures look more formidable viet operation. But they did reach some ? than they are. U.S. officials point out decisions, including an Israeli agreement that while the Arabs have about a 6-to-1 to provide facilities for U-2s and advantage over Israel in planes, the Is- SR-71_ U.S. spy planes. raclis have the edge in qualified pilots It will be no surprise if Sisco, fresh and able ground crews. Egypt lost so from conferences with the National Se- many pilots in the war of attrition that . curity Council, makes less headway on after Russian resupply it had four times the diplomatic front. His object is to as many jets as men to fly them. The Is- probe for possible areas in which U.S.- raclis fret nonetheless about the grow- sponsored discussions on reopening the ing, number of aircraft in Arab coun- Suez Canal can be continued. tries, and there are signs that they will In Cairo last week, State Department not discuss a Suez agreement until there Middle East Specialists Donald C. Ber- is some redressing of thebalance. gus and Michael Sterner received assur- '' Sovief Activity. If the weapons build- ances from President Anwar Sadat that up is worrisome to Israel, the U.S. has Egypt still wants the canal reopened Approved Fpr Rele 2001403/04 \re shown concern over a marked buildup of -14iut on its t own teiindts. Sisco ise it iill