U.S. SABOTAGED GENEVA ACCORDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R001200610001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 11, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

1IAT tOIcALGUAI'>J7_AN
7 STATINTL
Approved For Release 200I/64 1lA-RDP80-01601 R
By Prichard E. Ward
Third of a series of articles
;instructions from President Eisenhower and Seer
State John Foster Dulles opposed any international
recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
which had existed for nearly nine years and led the
resistance against the French.
Blind pollicies
Prior to the Geneva conference itself, Washington
policy papers of 1954 underscored U.S. aims in Indo-
china as "a military victory" for the French, whose
armies were on their last legs-indicating the lack of
realism in Washington. Thus it is not surprising drat the
U.S. worked to destroy the new peace. This was evident
at the time to anyone who wanted to see what was
happening in Vietnam.
Clearer than before, the newly available documents
show that the U.S. never intended to respect-the Geneva
settlement. On August 3, 1954, just two weeks after the
Geneva conference concluded, the National Security
Council discussed Vietnam. About the meeting, Fox
Butterfield in the Times wrote: "The objectives set by
the [National Security] Council were `to maintain a
friendly non-Communist South Vietnam' and `to prevent
a Communist victory through all-Vietnam elections.' "
Although the Pentagon analyst denied that the U.S.
"connived" with Diem to prevent national elections,
Butterfield noted that Washington had made its desires
known to Diem and when Diem later blocked the
elections, the U.S. indicated its full "support." The
Pentagon papers could hardly conceal the fact that Dieni
remained in power by virtue of U.S.-backing, although
the dependence on the U.S. is sometimes obscured,
particularly in ascribing to l)icm the repression. for
which U.S. was ultimately responsible.
Washington's cynical attitude toward the Geneva
settlement was stated by John Foster Dulles-in a cable to.
the U.S. embassy in Saigon on Dec. 11, 1955: "While we
should' certainly take no step to speed un the present
process of decay of the Geneva accords, neither should
Official U.S. policy statements on Indochina issued_to
the public characteristically have charged the Viet-
nanrese With the crimes actually being conrinitted by the
U.S. From 1954 to the present, day, among the U.S.
ideological keystones have been the spurious claims of
North Vietnamese aggression and violations of the 1954
Geneva settlement.
Althou h U.S. responsibility for sabotaging the
Geneva agreements has been recognized widely for well
bver a decade, the first time it was seriously suggested in
the New York Times was last month in its final
installment of documents and reports from the Penta-
gon's history of U.S. intervention in Vietnam.
Following the disastrous French defeat at Dien-
bienphu in May 1954 as well as serious military reverses
elsewhere in Indochina, France finally faced the neces-
sity of negotiations to avoid complete destruction of its
forces. The ensuing settlement at Geneva contained
provisions for a durable peace in Indochina. But as
quickly as French troops left Indochina the U.S. began
its direct intervention, preventing essential provisions of
the Geneva agreement from being carried out.
Art-nod res=sianca u ;ins
As is well known, the U.S. caused its puppet Ngo
Dinh Diem to be installed in Saigon, even before the
set tlr-ment had been reached in Geneva. Under programs
J financed and largely conceived by his CIA tutors, Diem
instituted a neo-fascist regime. Thousands of patriots
who - had served in the anti-French resistance were
assassinated or jailed and tortured. Armed strugglq
became the only road to survival; this developed
spontaneously in some regions or under the direction of
local 'cadres in others. Full-scale, coordinated resistance
began with the formation of the National Liberation
Front of South Vietnam in December 1960, which was
-headed by a representative cross-section of the leader-
ship of democratic.and progressive organizations in the
South.
In the U.S. version, which the American press rarely
challenged (except to give a partially true picture as
Diem neared his end in 1963), the Saigon puppets were
treated as the legitimate rulers, threatened by subversive
agents acting on behalf of Hanoi. In essence, according
to WaSiiington, in the late 1950s the U.S. was not
intervening in Vietnam while "foreign aggression" was
we make the slightest effort to infuse life into them."
Perhaps the most 'revealing new document from the
post-Geneva period is a ten.-thy report on the activities
of the so-called Saigon Military Mission, headed by Col.
Lansdale of the CIA. Ostensibly written by anonymous
members of the group, there is no doubt that the report
which eulogizes Lansdale was largely his doing. Lans-
dale's" activities were described in fiction by Graham
Greene, in "Tire Quiet American." Lansdale's chauvin-
ism and callousness might also be compared to the comic
strip character, Steve Canyon, like Lansdale an Air Force
carried out by Vietnamese. - -colonel.
Unfortunately the press has only published a small
amount of material fro.rn the Pentagon study _oil the
period following the Geneva settlement. However, there
:is sufficient information from the Pentagon report to
tdemonstrate that Washington consciously and deliberate-
ly was trying to crush the revolution in Vietnam and
that virtually every public statement was-nothing but a
tissue of lies designed to conceal U.S. activities from the
American people.
At various stages the U.S. and its apologists have
blown hot and cold about the Geneva agreements. At
the conference itself the chief U.S. delegate,. Walter
Bedell Smith, pledged that the U.S. would not upset
them by force. Officials back in Nast ' nr~ on were o e
0.ont iriued
STATINTL
annbi;uous, hardApp we 1t;.ord s(t eas11n2O01/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001200610001-4
satisfied _ they well might be, for Bedell Smith's initial