ACCURATE WARNING

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80-01601R001200770001-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 16, 2001
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 17, 1971
Content Type: 
NSPR
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80-01601R001200770001-7.pdf91.6 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80- I I'lloVIDfiN1CE, R.I. JOURIMI-, Ii- 66,67 S - 209,501 'dUN.17 19 `~1 Iii'tiyinf to assess the, McNamara Report hastily ,=-aside from suffering a bad case of intellectual execs---one is impressed not the least by the general. ly high quality of the'advice given by the intelligence Community. The voluminous report-----just the part that has been published in newspapers-provides a fascin- ating, and sometimes shocking, insight into the process by which the United States became enmeshed in the jungle of an unwinnable Indochina war. But of all the branches of the kovernment that had a share in the decisions on Vietnam, the intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA, come out looking tho best. The intelligence people warned-and accurately --that neither the South Vietnamese government nor. the American forces could overcome the appeal of the Viet Cong to the South Vietnamese people. They wwarned-and accurately--of the ineffectiveness of aerial bombing. They suggested the inconclusive- ness of introducing large numbers. of American ground troops into the fighting in South Vietnam. After more bomb tonnage had been dropped on North Vietnam than had been dropped in World War II and after half a million ,American troops had been deployed in South Vietnam, the enemy remained un- defeated and victory remained as elusive as it had been for 15 years. STATINTL To be sure, the CIA cannot claim 100 per cent commendation. In maid-1965 John A. McCone, head of the CIA, warned that the use of U.S. combat troops would be.ineffective unless the aerial bomb- ing campaign, already under way, was subject t: rninimurn restraint." That sounds ; usp1C1011:;1y Lil the. later e%hort ation of Gen. 'Curtis LeMay to bomb the North VkkinaniCSo "back to the stone age." But in general, the estimates of the CIA and other -intelligence agencies seem to have gauged :accurately the. snood of the Vietnamese people, the staying power of the Viet Cong and North Vietnanl- ?ese, and the limitations of American military might when separated from the democratic ideals that had in the past inotivated American intervention abroad. If Ainericail power^and idleals became separated, a large 'hart of the reason teas the failure of the highest officials in our government to inform the people or even Congress fully about both the condi- tions that existed in Vietnam and the real purposes for expanding the war. The McNamara Report is not a complete record of the entanglement process, but it, is record enough to show the folly of presi- dential decision:; that ignored the best intelli'v.ante and the arrogance of presidential war-malting with. out the full participation of Congress. Many Americans probably a majority. failed to get aroused about Vietnam when the Johnson ad- ministration teas making the fateful commitment of American combat troops because, like the officials at the top, they believed the tiny enemy could not stand: for long against the overwhelming inight of American troops and planes. The argument has fre- quently been used that these officials had little more information than the general public for the crucial decisions. But the McNamara Report indicates that they did have considerably snore--and quite specific -information, much of it_ negative in its implica- ? tions. Those who trusted the highest officials to .know what they were doing were sadly mistaken. A full-dress congressional debate might have avoided the pitfall into which the country stumbled, particu- larly if the intelligence estimates had been more widely available. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R00120-0-7-7-0a0-1--7