ACCURATE WARNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R001200770001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 16, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 17, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-
I I'lloVIDfiN1CE, R.I.
JOURIMI-,
Ii- 66,67
S - 209,501
'dUN.17 19 `~1
Iii'tiyinf to assess the, McNamara Report hastily
,=-aside from suffering a bad case of intellectual
execs---one is impressed not the least by the general.
ly high quality of the'advice given by the intelligence
Community.
The voluminous report-----just the part that has
been published in newspapers-provides a fascin-
ating, and sometimes shocking, insight into the
process by which the United States became enmeshed
in the jungle of an unwinnable Indochina war. But
of all the branches of the kovernment that had a
share in the decisions on Vietnam, the intelligence
agencies, particularly the CIA, come out looking tho
best.
The intelligence people warned-and accurately
--that neither the South Vietnamese government nor.
the American forces could overcome the appeal of
the Viet Cong to the South Vietnamese people.
They wwarned-and accurately--of the ineffectiveness
of aerial bombing. They suggested the inconclusive-
ness of introducing large numbers. of American
ground troops into the fighting in South Vietnam.
After more bomb tonnage had been dropped on North
Vietnam than had been dropped in World War II
and after half a million ,American troops had been
deployed in South Vietnam, the enemy remained un-
defeated and victory remained as elusive as it had
been for 15 years.
STATINTL
To be sure, the CIA cannot claim 100 per cent
commendation. In maid-1965 John A. McCone, head
of the CIA, warned that the use of U.S. combat
troops would be.ineffective unless the aerial bomb-
ing campaign, already under way, was subject t:
rninimurn restraint." That sounds ; usp1C1011:;1y Lil
the. later e%hort ation of Gen. 'Curtis LeMay to bomb
the North VkkinaniCSo "back to the stone age."
But in general, the estimates of the CIA and
other -intelligence agencies seem to have gauged
:accurately the. snood of the Vietnamese people, the
staying power of the Viet Cong and North Vietnanl-
?ese, and the limitations of American military might
when separated from the democratic ideals that had
in the past inotivated American intervention abroad.
If Ainericail power^and idleals became separated,
a large 'hart of the reason teas the failure of the
highest officials in our government to inform the
people or even Congress fully about both the condi-
tions that existed in Vietnam and the real purposes
for expanding the war. The McNamara Report is
not a complete record of the entanglement process,
but it, is record enough to show the folly of presi-
dential decision:; that ignored the best intelli'v.ante
and the arrogance of presidential war-malting with.
out the full participation of Congress.
Many Americans probably a majority. failed to
get aroused about Vietnam when the
Johnson ad-
ministration teas making the fateful commitment of
American combat troops because, like the officials
at the top, they believed the tiny enemy could not
stand: for long against the overwhelming inight of
American troops and planes. The argument has fre-
quently been used that these officials had little more
information than the general public for the crucial
decisions. But the McNamara Report indicates that
they did have considerably snore--and quite specific
-information, much of it_ negative in its implica- ?
tions. Those who trusted the highest officials to
.know what they were doing were sadly mistaken.
A full-dress congressional debate might have avoided
the pitfall into which the country stumbled, particu-
larly if the intelligence estimates had been more
widely available.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R00120-0-7-7-0a0-1--7