LETTERS TO THE EDITOR A SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIER WRITES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R001300290001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 6, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

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Approved For Release 20=03= ClA7RDP80-01601
-6 APR 1972
Lett'e'rs
he Editor
A South V ietnarn ese Soldier Writes
I have just received a letter from a South
Vietnamese soldier in Vietnam (a former
constituent) who retreated from the DMZ.
His language is very straightforward, but I
will not change anything because it will help
the American people who are saturated with
cliches and hypocritical euphemisms to
know the other side of the story. Here are a
few excerpts (when my correspondent says
"we" he refers to himself and his South Vi-
etnamese comrades in arms):
"Enemy fire was not so terrible really, I
.have known much worse; we were not afraid
at all, we could have stayed, but we did not
want to fight the Reds . .. What for ? Why
should we fight them? They have never
harmed us. But the corrupted Vietnamese
'leaders in Saigon and the Americans who
.live in luxury and debauchery in Saigon
have harmed us. These Americans and these
Vietnamese traffic in heroin and opium;
they share the proceeds with one another;
the Vietnamese are the high officials; the
Americans are U.S. officials which include
military, civilian and CIA personnel; they
live lavishly with villas, cars, mistresses;
each of them spend in one night what we
soldiers, with one wife and three or four
children take one year to earn. That is why
we all agree: (1) it is too stupid to die for
nothing; (2) it is even criminal to kill the
guys in front because they do not deserve to
die, they are unfortunate fellows like us; we
should kill instead the corrupted leaders in
Saigon and their dirty Saigon-American
friends ... [note: he makes a distinction be-
tween the Americans who live in the U.S.
and who are not involved and the despised
Saigon-Americans }vho are war profiteers]
... who have made shambles of our country.
Since the Americans killed [sic] President
Ngo Dinh Diem and installed a new regime
of yes-yes men, corruption stinks to the sky.
We want to tear down the corrupted. Since
the Communists want to do the same job, we,
leave it to them. What we want before all is
independence, then we shall freely choose
the leaders we respect. With the Americans
sitting right on our head we are anything
but free. That is why we are more and more
mad at President Nixon. His withdrawal is
interminable, hence we have no independ-
ence. His Vietnamization shall never work.
because he is fighting not only the Commu-
nists but also the whole Vietnamese popula-
tion which are mad at the corrupted Ameri-
cans and Vietnamese who rule them,
"There is a brave U.S. major. who acted as
adviser and who probably meant well, who
saw us packing and leaving and who asked
me-probably because I have many ribbons
for gallantry on my chest-why we did not
make the slightest effort to resist and save
our country from communism, etc., etc.... I
looked at him silently for a long moment,
shrugged my shoulders, and went away with-
out answering, because I cannot tell him
what I tell you in this letter. Some of us, in
other units, fight by sheer reflex, like ro-
bots, but they will quit too, because they
also feel the same way as we do. For the
time being we just quit. the battlefield. but
in our next step we shall join the Commu-
nist forces.
"We hate the corrupted. Why don't you
come back to lead us?"
I concur, but I also advocate reunification
and neutrality for the entire Vietnam.
TRAN VAN KIIIEM,
Former Deputy. Vietnam National Assembly.
Chevy Chase. -
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One Who Was There Assesses the CIA's Job in Laos
... I.-!" _F.1 5 "1 YWI . rn 'h
etters, - -to i - P., L arior
A brief article in The Washington Post of
December 27 quoted Congressman G. V.
Montgomery as saying "What I know about
Laos is that the CIA has done a pretty lousy
job and has been ineffective."
One could answer such an assertion by
simply saying that as the chairman of the
House Select Committee on U. S. Involve-
ment in Southeast Asia, he should know
more about Laos than that, particularly
,when what little he knows is manifestly
wrong.
I spent. 17 years as a -CIA employee and
left in early 1968 because of my basic opposi-
tion to United States involvement in South-
east Asia. My last four years in the agency
were totally involved with Asian affairs. My
knowledge of what CIA has done and has
not done are obviously more detailed than
Mr. Montgomery's, but it seems to me that if
he is going to make public statements, he
should at least take into consideration facts
which-have been well publicized.
It is clear (at least to me) from the Saigon
dateline on the piece in question, that the
congressman arrived at his remarkable con-
clusion after discussion with military
sources in Vietnam who have been itching
for at least six years to expand their own op-
erations into Laos. Their desires in this
direction must increase daily as the Ameri-
can role in Vietnam winds down. If they
don't find something new, the time may
come when they have no war at all to fight.
In order to assess CIA performance in
Laos it is necessary to know what it was
asked to do.
CIA involvement in Laos stems from the
agreement by the U.S.A., and other powers
involved, to withdraw all foreign troops
from Laos. The agreement was signed in
1962, It became apparent immediately there-
after that the North Vietnamese, in violation
of the, agreement, were continuing to send
irregular forces and supplies to the Commu-
nist Pathet Lao. Their purpose was clear-to
establish a Communist government in Vien-
tiane which would allow the North Viet-
namese free access to the uortion of the Ho
Chi Minh trail in Laos and the road across
central Laos to Thailand. The government of
the United States decided to mount an oper-
ation to thwart the North Vietnamese pur-
pose. ,Because the Geneva agreement pre-
cluded the use of U.S. military forces or ad-
visers, CIA was designated as the executive
agent to handle the training and support of
the non-Communist ATeo tribes who lived in
and around the Plain of Jars. The Meo force
was the only army in Laos capable of stop-
ping the Pathet Lao (supported by the North
Vietnamese) from quickly over-running the
Plain of Jars, which was essential to the
Communist purpose.
The point to remember here is that the de-
cision to act was a U.S. government decision;
not one arrived at by CIA. I think the deci-
sion was wrong, just as I think almost every
other decision with regard to our involve-
ment in Indochina has been and continues
to be wrong. That is not the point under dis-
cussion.
The question is: what kind of job did CIA
do with the task assigned it in Laos?
The answer, based on any comparison
with the U.S. military effort in Vietnam,
would have to be. A spectacular success.
My personal knowledge of the operation
ended in mid-1967, the last time I visited
Long Tieng, the seat of the headquarters of
Gen. Vang Pao, the Meo leader. At that time
there were roughly 35,000 ATeo tribesmen
under arms fighting daily with the Pathet
Lao and North Vietnamese irregulars. This
force had been fighting successfully for five
years and, inasmuch as they held Long Tieng
until a few days ago, continued for another
four years to beat off a vastly superior Com-
munist army. The CIA contingent support-
ing them in Laos and in Thailand did not
exceed 40 Americans, plus a small air con-
tingent which air-delivered supplies and
personnel. Imagine 40 Americans in support
of 35,000 friendly tribesmen. Compare this
with the situation in Vietnam in 1967 when
we had about 400,000 U.S. troops fighting
for, and supporting, an army of roughly 1
million Vietnamese, and they were losing at
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every turn. Had the U.S. Army had. the re-
sponsibility for the support of the Meo, we
probably would have, had a minimum of
15,000 U.S. troops in Laos. Naturally that fig-
ure would have included cooks, bakers, pas-
try. chefs, many chauffeurs for the many
generals, PX managers, laundry officers,
radio and television station personnel, mo-
tion picture projectionists, historians, social
scientists, chaplains and a variety of simi-
lar types essential to the conduct of a war
by the U.S. military, but which the CIA op-
eration with the AMeo seemed to be able to
forgo.
For eight years this ragtag force defended
its area of responsibility, protecting the
backside of the South Vietnamese-with no
U.S. troops fighting' at their side, not to say
in front of them as in Vietnam. They accom-
plished this with the support of a handful of
Americans and with the loss of perhaps
three or four Anierican lives.
Can anyone seriously suggest that this
was a lousy job?
In fairness to Congressman Montgomery,
it Is not entirely his fault that he is not fully
informed. The role of the CIA with the Meo
has been an open secret for years; known to
Lao of high and low degree, foreign journal-
ists, diplomats in Vientiane and almost any-
one else with the interest to find out. Given
this situation it would be comic if it were
not tragic that the Executive branch of the
U.S. government was willing to share this se-
cret with Lao generals known to be traffick-
ing in opium, but not with the Congress of
the United States.
Perhaps someday 'Mr. Montgomery and his
colleagues in the Congress will establish a
real CIA watchdog committee, long overdue,
which will give the agency the scrutiny re-
quired. When that is done I am sure a sub-
stantial number of lousy operations will be
uncovered. I am confident, however, that
when they take a long hard look at the CIA
operation with the Meo in the general con-
text of the war in Southeast Asia, there will
be general approval.
THOMAS F,'McCOY.
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The CIA's Co:ltributio;l mucn 1nLe111ac,1~-c; ,a ----
answer is that there can never be too much
I am moved to respond to your editorial knowledge. The policy planners and decision
"Taking the CIA on Faith" (April 18). The makers who are charged with the_responsi-
editorial contained some interpretations of bility for charting the course of the United
statements made by CIA Director Richaid States in the sensitive area of international
Helms with which I must take exception. affairs aunbroad t be provided
and detailed with, a s "Mr fHe ms
The editorial repeated Mr. IIelms state-
intelligence." The need for objectivity in the
ment that the public cannot judge the value
or the efficiency of the operations of the production of intelligence paramount, as obj ec-
agency because of the secrecy requirements llr. Helms stated in his speech. tivity is required in order to preclude the
which surround it. This fact is unassailable agency from becoming ambitious, and either
and was stressed by Mr. Helms; however, making its own policy or inducing "policy
the editorial ignored the common sense of makers to posit an American interest..
this statement and continued to bemoan the The CIA continuously makes a great con-
lack of public scrutiny. While secrecy is an tribution to the security of this nation and
important component of the operations of to the well-being of its citizens. Mr. Helms'
speech has served to inform the American
an intelligence organization, a dearth of in.
ormation does exist concerning the general public just a bit more as to the extent of
formation'
theory and practice of intelligence opera- that contribution.
tions; this information is available-without PAUL D. WARREN SR.
the need for a security clearance--to the in- Glen Burnie.
terested individual. Furthermore, public in-
i
n
formation is available, often to the chagr
of CIA officials, concerning more specific
details of certain agency operations, witness
the operations of the Meo tribesmen in Laos
and the U-2 operations over the U.S.S.R.
(which was highly successful by all accounts
until May 1960): Therefore, while much of
its daily operations are necessarily veiled in
secrecy, the agency is not the ultra-secret
"invisible government" as some would have
us believe.
Mr. IIelms' statement that the CIA is not
involved in drug traffic seem to me to be as
.definitive as he could make it. The nature of
intelligence operations, however, often ne-
cessitates the conduct of business with cer-
tain individuals who may have connections
with the traffic of drugs. Sq long as the op-
erations of the agency do not promote the
worldwide traffic of drugs, it must be ac-
cepted that we will occasionally have to deal
with these individuals so long as they can be
of value to these operations.
Finally, the editorial questions, "how
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