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December 21, 1972
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STATINTL A '~;., !t- i r,.I Approved For Release 20011/~30 bP80-016 JAMES SCHMSINGER Late in 1971 James R. Schlesinger, his wife, Rachel, and two of their children made headlines by roaming around a barren, uninhabited island-Amchitka, in the Aleu- tian chain off Alaska's coast. They were trot there to pur- sue Schlesinger's h o b b y: bird-watching. Their mission was to prove to skeptics that it was safe to inhabit an area where the U.S. government had just exploded the largest underground nuclear blast, known as "Project Cannikin." ?A determined man who acts out his convictions, the 43-year-old native of New York City now moves into another controversial area, b Lit one that produces few headlines: intelligence network. -Chosen by President Nixon today to succeed Richard M. / Helms as director of the Cen- tral Intelligence A g e n c y, Schlesinger will be giving up the post of chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. In taking the intelligence po- .sition, Schlesinger will have an opportunity to act out some of his ouvji conclusions about the ' way that job should be run. His first job in the Nixon administration - assistant director of the Budget Bureau (later during his tenure re- named the Office of Manage- merit and Budget)-lcd to pri- mary responsioility for reor- ganization of the intelligence .;apparatus cf the federal gov- ernrtient. - ~l 4 F'7P.11 t JAMES R. SCHLESINGER Accomplished In 1971 the changes streamlined budget- ing procedures and, more im- portantly concentrated the process of coordinating and assessing intelligence data in the hands of presidential ad- viser Henry A. I issirger and his aides in the While H(Ase. The reorganization gave the director of Central Intelligence full budeetin responsii)ility for all of the intelligence serv- ices-enhanced authority which Schlesinger himself pre- sumably now inherits. Created Post Perhaps by coincidence, a former colleague Of Schlesin- ger's at the Hand Corp. "think tank" in California-Andrew \I. Marshall-is the member of Kissinger's National Securi- ty Council staff most con- cerned with coorclinatitng intel- ligence matters. Marshall's post, as head of the "Net As essment Group,'' within the NSC staff, was cre- ated by Schlesin ger's reorgani- zation plan. Schlesinger had joined the Nixon administration in Fcb- rltary 116t), pr inlarily as a budget-watcher. His main as- signment was to oversee the Petlta'ion's blld etlug proce- dures, during a period military spending was easing; is reputed to have showirti e Pentagon in one year how to trim $6 billion out of its budg- et. Although much of his profes- sional and governmental life seems to have involved nation- al security in one way or an- other, he also has a reputation for being sensitive about envi- ronmental issues. Ecology Stand Tested His friends recall that, among his other activities within the government, he per- suaded the administration to reverse itself and to allow the Taos Indians to keep their sacred Blue Lake lands in New Mexico. The chairmanship of AEC tested his devotion to ecology. Although environmental orga- nizations strongly criticized his full support for the Am- chitka atomic blast, they have praised his stand on the so- called Calvert Cliffs case. Pressed by the atomic ener- gv industry to a )peal a federal court decision ordering the AEC to act much more ab t re.:sively to protect the envi- ronment, Schlesinger refused, choosing to obey the court. file chairman also has taken the position that it is not ap- propriate for the AEC to pro- mote atomic energy, or to esti- mate how much nuclear power the nation ~,cill need. Instead, it has been his policy to have the agency develop energy op- tions that the public may de- cide to use as it wishes. Trained as an economist, Schlesinger was graduated summa cum laude from Par- v2rd in 1P5n. After a year's travel in Europe on a fellow- ship, he returned to Harvard to take a doctorate in econoni- ics. Taught at Vii-inia After, that, lie taught eco- nomics at the University of Virginia, and hey*an concen- trati;n,g oil the budgetary side of rational security and dC- fense policy. Ile wrote a book titled "Tile Political Economy of National Security." In part as a result of the book's favorable notice among experts is the national s:acuri- ty field, Schlesinger was of- fereci the job at Rand in Santa Monica which carried out much of the defense estiblish- ment's computer-based analy- sis of defense systems. While at Rand, Schlesinger headed a study of nuclear Ft r in S proliferation, and worked on a study of the role of "systems analysis" in polit- ical decision?makir.,. That work brought h;rn to the atten- tion of the Nixon r,dnli:listr::- tion's new budget staff in the early days after the Prc~!i- (lent's inauguration. Durin=g then time in \'; ash- ington, the Schlcsingers have avoided much of the city's so- cial life. Schlesinger is said to dislike cocktail parties. He is a Republican and a Lutheran. Mrs. Schlesinger, the former Rachel Mellinger, is a gradui ate of Radcliffe. 'llicy have eight children-four daughters and four sons. Approved For &ml `9,a#: CIA-RDP80-016018001300390001-8 NEW YORK TIMES Approved For Release 2001/03/041:r1CIAeR9080-016 CAI sJ,. kr h HE.::~~Lr, How purely-military judgment can miscarry even from a stratveje, standpoint is all too sharply illustrrtc.d by the bo)-ilbing of I:doith Vietnam that was authotired. ?I)uring his first week in office in January 3.959, presi- dent Nixon asked the eight key military -And civilian a.f;envies of the Government concerned with the Indo- china. yyar what could be achieved by mining hlaipbong and other ports and resuming the bombing of North Vi(llrlam, which had been halted three months earlier. The Joint Chiefs of Staff mid the American military command, in Saigon replied that: the effect on the war would be decisive if previous restrictions ware removed oil the bombing of overland transport from China. But giro C.I.A. and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (O.S.I).) challenged the military estimates, As summarized by the Kissinger staff in the then-secret: National Security Study 7,4ernor.: ndun, No. 3. (N S.S.Iri.-]) in .February 1.959, the C.I.A. and O.51). s ,,id that "the overland routes from China alone, could provide North i(:-,tnaann with enough material to carry on, even with .an unlimited bombing campaign.." other kinds moving from China' . lough supplies have got through for new Connaur Offensives in the ,next six weeks---including one in the Mekong J)elta south of Sai~,on-if Hanoi decides to launch t:heni. Ple nnystc;~y is why a.rnything other than tl:is should have been expected. As the N.S.S.Ivi. I ,tardy pointed out, ll-nost four years of air war in Not IL Vietnam have hown---as did the IS:orean vvar--that, although Jr astrikes will destroy transport facilities, eq!u pment and supplies, they ca;nnot successfully interdict tine [mtcrlandj flow of supplies because much of the damage can frequently be repaired within hours." That these facts, known since. 1h99, were disregarded is bad enough. What Would be even worse;. would bw con- tinuing illusions that the minin and. bcnii;ins' night force Ilanoi to accept negotiated defeat. A compromise political settlement, which involves a sharing or division of power in South Vietnam, is the one way to cod a war that neither side can win on the battlefield. J 'three years ltiter, on May e, 1972, President Nixon disregarded the C.I.A.-O.S.U. judgment, which was sup- ported by an impressive array of facts, and took the ad- vice of the military, who evidently argued that "smart bombs" and other new techniques would make even more certain the success they predicted in 1969. For four months now, the ports have been closed by mines and a massive bombing campaign has been tinder way. Indications that the Communists' war effort was not being impeded have been countered with the asser- i ;ion that several months would be required before the interdiction campaign began to pinch. Petroleum sup- plies, which came by Soviet tanker overseas and had to .be pumped ashore, were said to be particularly vulnerable. These predictions now have been exploded by two separate intelligence studies. The C.I.A. and the I'enta- g all's Defense Intclligence Agency have both concluded that the blockade and bombing, after four months, have had relatively feeble results. The Communists have built three four-inch petroleum pipelines-which are hard to hit and can be rapidly re- paired--south from the Chinese border to the Hanoi area and another from Hanoi to the southern tip of North Vietnam and beyond, into the Ashau Valley of, South Vi- etnam. Ant-like tactics of rapid repair of damaged rail- ways. and bridges have,also ki;pt. adequate supplies of STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 0I/AIIIVIL ' / L: CIA-RDP80_-Q41,6-0 t, , "I 'V t' t. ..? .f.i.._1i. ary u 1 0 v Under Nixon Auiu is sit down to hammer, out decisions in p secrecy . . 1 ; 1 here wa a story sc v oral years manded the Marine Corps comman.. E'l?f-, danf, for j0i9ug; a di?l.lssiou on \VASI-1I N GTON They are warriors transformed into technocrats. The Joint. Chiefs of Staff, tluasi- board l of directors of the American military n1~ichine-?-influencing the use of billions of dollars each year, .moving in circles where foreign pol- icy is nladc; preparing for military threats a generation into the future, linking the.President with men un- ? ? der arras. The institutio) has been under fire ever fince it was created 25 years .,ago. Dean Acheson, the late secreta-' Times staff tin her Abramson coy. Said one JCS staff officer: "So111e- times the weight of a discussion is carried by people who didn% even.' have a seat at the table in past years." For such reasons, military iilen are persuaded they are at least being heard. The JCS institution and the men who manage it have changed ]ouch more slowly than the limes. The chiefs themselves are still of- ficers from a generation that served with the Lisenbowers, ?Bradleys, and NacArthurs, survivors of a pre nuclear age when the men who com- manded armies were bigger than life. 'an the 1'entngon, They stayed in uniform when ,the United States- mothballed its fleets, r}'' of state, compared it to "my fa- put its bombers in boneyards, and sell t its conscripts h0111e. voriie oi$ lady who could net say _ But mastery of the military system what she thought until she heard what she said.' and years in prized command posts I f ? 11, 1C`' l a e Ti:) its critics, the JCS is a pondc- xous, ineffective anachronism de- scribed this . way, "The courts meditate, Congress deliberates, and the Joint Chiefs bicker." Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs are increasing their influence, playing a stronger role in U.S. policy than they have for years. And paradoxically this is happen- ing in an atmosphere of tarnished military image, disaffection over de- fense spending, and continued rec- .otlllnellclations for reorganization of the JCS machinery. For one thing, the Nixon Admin- istration has greatly strengthened the role of the National Security c 0011 e an of no more p . ..' than: a. life in politics trains him for the Presidency. At the top, they are asked to he master diplomats, politicians, and advisers to the President at the same time they are burdened with more narrow, responsibilities as leaders of their individual services. Bicker, they have. In the '30's the admirals. and generals feuded over aircraft carriers versus bombers. The Army and Air Force fought over control of ballistic missiles, the Army contending the new weapons were a new generation of artillery, the Air Force' viewing them as un- manned planes. ? In the '60's, it was a conflict. with Council and the crisis-managing Defense Secretary Robert S. McNa- Washington Special Action -Group mara and his civilian aides poaching where military advice is fed into the in the preserve of military preroga- 1Vhite House decision-making pro- five. cess. The chairman of the Joint Not much leaks out of the gold- Chiefs of Staff is a member of both, carpeted Pentagon conference room Furthermore, the Nixon :~dminis- called "the tank" where the chief- trati'on feels more strongly than re- cool. nast artmifistrafinn'l 11-a1 lip- with the Marines," he yeas quoted. NVhy are you getting into this?" To which the Narllle snorted, "l?ecause I am an American citizen, god- danlit." Such bickering is said to be a thing of the past, On paper, the harmony is indeed astoundiiln. Of 1,0(10 to 1,200 official recommendations alld po itions per- sonally endorsed by the chiefs each year, fewer than l fail to get una- nimous support. Even during the 'GOB, when Yictnam was escalating', and :tic\ an ara was conducting. a management rcvoluti".?-, at the Pen- taggon, the split dechio.1 never rose 'above: 5 in a year. . Therein lies the hasis for charges that rather than basing; decisions on what's best for the nation, JCS 11oli~ cy emerges from a logrolling exer- cise that rounds off the sharp cor- ners of policy, enabling; the chiefs to march shoulder-to-shoulder. Said an officer .who recently com- pleted a tour of duty on the JCS staff: "They can he very good when they're dealing; with single service issues, emergency situations. "But ask them how the services should divide up an extra billion dol- lars in the defense budget, and they are completely incapable of dealing with that. They are just not able to address questions of resource alloca- tion." 't'his is the so-called "two-hatted problem" that has hovered around the JCS organization since- it was created 2.5 years ago. The same men called upon to ad- vise the President on how the mili- tary should be structured, how to provide the armed forces to meet the country's national security objec Lives are at the same time leaders of their individual services. "A chief of staff does not lead his service by being noble," said Rear Adm. Gene A. I.,a Rocque, who has become an outspoken defense critia since retiring fronl',ihc Navy. "Ileha3 .r ,.- ~.y ..-r ...~.-~-- --- -- - ? --? -- ]18S to 11j, -C dca distinct conlli nltion from the mili- Lary. . doesn't care.' 1runkokka STATINTL AND) rpvedrEor Release 2001/03/04 : 'CIA-RDP80-01601 RO HERALD AUG 2 0 197C M - 19,818 S - 21,768 Edito~al Opineon ole naISe rity Iic~ ' Recent disclosures that an under- cover agent of the U.S. security establi.shi-nent, posing as an out- ?sidi'r and using. obviously faked credentials, wandered unmolested ~ - for several hours in some of the security agency's.. most sensitive areas where he had almost unhin- dered access. to some of the na- tion's top military secrets, has led many people to wonder just how .the national security establishment works' and what it is for. The National Security.Act, which became law 25 years ago, has been described' as "perhaps the most far-reaching measure in its effect upon the role of the mili- tary in American life since. the for- mation of the Navy Department in .1798." 1.y bringing the three branches of the armed services together in a single department, the act, signed ' into law July 26, 1947, by former President Harry S, 'Tru- man, aimed to eliminate inter- service duplication and rivalry. But it also had the unintended side- effect of profoundly altering the process of formulating U.S. for- eign policy. la addition to creating a na- Jtional military establishment, later to become the Defense Depart- ment, the National Security Act set up three bodies that have grown in importance over the years. The Joint 'Chiefs of Staff was an outgrowth of the Combined Chiefs of Staff set up by the { United States and Great Britain early in World War II. It was.giv- en the responsibility of preparing military plans, reviewing over-all military requirements,, and direct- ing unified and specified. combat commands. Over and above the National Military Establishment, the act provided for a National security Council "to advise the President with respect to the integration. of domestic, foreign, and military pol- icies relating to the national secur- ity," with the specified duty to "assess and appraise the objec- iives, commitments and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and p,o t e n. t i a l military, power." It is this same National Security Council from which presidential advisor Henry Kissinger operates. Kissinger's influence in arrapiging and guiding President Nixon' through a complex round of inter- national conversations on both sides of the Iron Curtain, all ap- parently being strongly related to the security of the United States, has provoked a measure of domes- tic debate, but most recent polls show that the president has a comfprtable majority of citizens who approve policy changes stem- ming from the world wide, jour- ney's. Kissinger, who is now in South ' Vietriarn on a mission for Presi~ dent Nixon after several secret sessions' with North Vietnamese negotiators in P?aris, has become the target of some crii;~ici'sm in. liberal n'iedia circle and in some discreet rumbling within the State Department, where some feel he has usurped traditional State De- partment power. Finally, 'the act established a. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA was to "correlate and evaluate in- telligence relating to the national security," , but was to "have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement ? . or internal security functions.'.' It remained for Robert S. Me- .Namara, Secretary of Defense un- der President's John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson from '1961 to 1968, to utilize to. the full the powers inherent in the National Defense Act. While McNamara. found the basic structure of the Defense Department to he "entire- ly sound," he nevertheless insti- tuted a number of changes. In 1961 the Tactical Air Command. and the .Strategic Army Corps were placed under the direction of the U.S. Strike Command. The communica- tions and intelligence branches of the three military services were merged, and plans for streamlin- ing of procurement of arms and equipment were instituted. "Despite its awesome power and the worldwide sweep of its activi. ties, the basic, mission of the De- partment of Defense is s i in p l y stated," McNamara wrote in 1968. "The mission is military security;' or more broadly, to maintain a constant readiness the military forces necessary to protect the na- tion'from attack, keep its commit- ments land support the foreign policy. . In the light of present political controversy over the relative posi- tion of President Nixon and his Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 continued Approved ?For Release 2001/03/04 : -CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 Democratic c h a l l e n g eden. George McGovern, McNamara's statement is of interest to many, because McGovern, in attacking the president's position, has prom- ised sweeping Defense Department appropriation reductions which many critics contend will make the military unable to defend the country from attack, let alone. back up commitments abroad in support of foreign policy. Some' critics argue that the De- fense Department has a hand in shaping foreign policy, too. Discus- sion of contingency plans by Penta- gon. and military planners of for- eign countries, C. Merton Tyrrell wrote in 1970, "have tended to di- minish the role of the State De- partment, and place the Depart- of Defense in the quasi-official po- sition of `suggesting' foreign policy action." The CIA and the National. Security Coi' f? likewise have chipped away at State Department policy-making powers. For better or worse, the National Security Act has had consequences that Con gress could not foresee 25 years ago. With the concentration of U.S. and foreign. military data that must have been. stored up during the past 25 years in an agency that reaches deep into both military, and foreign policy decision making, and with both foreign and domestic interests trying through both legal and illegal means, to open. up this mass of sensitive data, it is little wonder that the ssecurfiy agency, has ordered. a :detailed overhaul- ing of,iits own security. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 . WASHINGTON POST PARADE Approved For Release 2001 /pp / Q4? CIA-RDI J"9eR0 z AUG 1972 SAN CLEMENTE, CALIF. ith the exception of the President, no one in the Nixon Administra- tion has been more publicized than Henry Kissinger, Nixon's National Security Affairs adviser. Yet Kissinger does not work alone. He heads a `staff of 110 including mes- sengers, secretaries, researchers, and brairitrusters, all self-effacing, hard- working men and women, nerve of them 'known to the public. Of late, however, one of Dr. Kissin- ger's loyal' arid intrebid band of devoted slaves has begun to surface. Mark his name carefully: Maj. Gen. Alexander Meigs I laig Jr. At 47, Al Haig is tall, blue-eyed, and more handsome and sex-appealing than secret agent Kissinger whose deputy he is. Soft-speaking and tactful, subtly am- bitious with just the right amount of ruthlessness, Al Haig is second in com- mand at National Security Affairs. He is. Henry's "gute rechte hand" (good right hand). Checks on Vietnam It is he who holds together the dedi- cated "low profiles" who work for Kis- singer while. Henry cavorts in strange and foreign lands. It is through him that the, mountain of position papers on Vietnam, the Middle East, the Soviet. L i_..ta ti_:1i L..s t. ,In ? :` t `. 1(7) by Lloyd Shearer Union, South Africa, and ad infinitum is funneled. And it is he, without fanfare or publicity, who wings off to Vietnam every six months or so, to assess first- hand for the President how things are really going. Last month Haig returned directly to San Clemente frain his eighth "trip to Southeast Asia and briefed the Pres- ident on conditions in Vietnam and Cambodia. He was then trotted out on a non-attribution basis to the press, which described him as "an uniden- tified, high-ranking source." Although Al f-laig has spent the past 27 years in the Army, "my entire adult life," he neither looks nor behaves like a military prototype. He is not obdu- rate or parochial. There is no rigidity to .his mind, which is open and inquiring, or to his speech, which is academic and articulate. Haig could very well be faken for a college professor or a diplomat, which in a sense he is. For diplomacy is cer- tainly a requisite in getting on. with taskmaster Kissinger whose tolerance quotient is low and personnel turnover high. Last month when Henry invited Haig, to the swank Bistro restaurant, one of Kissinger's favorite restaurants in Bev- erly Hills, along with actress Sally"Kel- lerman, Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin,.and a flock of screen colony Probable inheritor Should anything happen to -Henry; like being appointed Secretary of State, or being incapacitated by one of his scorned. girlfriends, Haig most probably would inherit Kissinger's job. Although philosophically Kissinger and Haig see eye to eye--both are con- .servatives~-Haig as foreign affairs ad- viser. to the President, would certainly avoid the spotlight Kissinger, by his na- ture, attracts. To begin with, Haig is a happily-rnar- ried,-chu'rch oing Roman Catholic. Son of a lawyer, he was born in Phila- delphia, attended parochial grade school in Cynwyd on the Main Line, moved up to St. Joseph's Prep and studied two years at Notre Dame before his appointment to West Point came through in 1944. His brother, a priest, is president of Wheeling College in West Virginia, and his sister,- Regina Meredith, an attorney in Pennington, N.J. Like many young men, Al. Haig set- his eye on a service academy appoint- m--nt because it was a financial neces- sity. "My father died when I was 10," he explains, "and I had pretty much to fend for myself in terms of economics. I had newspaper routes, worked for the Post Office, the Atlantic Refining Com- pany. I even worked as a floorwalker in the ladies' department of Jahn Wang, Republican fat-cats, several wailers mis- took Haig-heaven help litm, for an maker's (a well-known department store in Philadelphia) to support myself. actor. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 eons{:; _%d VMSIX7.IGTO14 OBSERVER NEt7SLE 2 Approved For Release 2001/03/04 `'&VA-I?P80-01601 R ;, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger is officially t'hl f rtl ~ designated as Assistant to the President for National Security 3LJAffairs. And in this capacity lie presides over the National Security Council staffs which are -divided into 13 divisional staffs, such as NSC planning Group, Program. Analysis Staff, Scientific Affairs, International Economic Affairs, African and U.N. Affairs, etc. In addition he is Chairman of the \Vashington Special Action Group, which directs the activities of all intelli- . genre agencies, including the CIA and the FBI. The White House Military Situation Room also operates under the aegis of Dr. Kissinger. It is here the military evaluations and strategies are formulated for the President's decision. The super- strategist Kissinger frequently. overrides the re- commendations of the four-star generals and ad- mirals of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Where did Kissinger acquire all of his military expertise? Certainly his Army career in World War II was somewhat mediocre as a staff scrgealit, and his brief career as a very junior reserve officer after the war. Since he never even comniancled a squad; how could. he acquire matured military judgment? 1-1 1, he resigned his reserve commission as a-captain in the Military Intelligence. In his resig- nation letter, Reserve Captain Kissinger had the audacity to say that he was quitting because of "pressure of other obligations and the conviction that I can be of greater service in a high rank in case an emergency necessitates this step." The U.S. Ariny was happy to get rid of hint. The following is an official n lemoranclum, dated April 3, 1.959 shortly before his discharge: MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF' OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMEN'T' as a Department of the Army civilian instructor at STATINTL the European Theater Intelligence School, Oberanl- mcrgau, Germany. lie served ?in'this capacity for one year. Upon return to the United States in 1947 .Dr. KIS- SINGER applied for a commission in the Officers' Reserve Corps. He was appointed a 2nd Lieutenant, 1\MI (ORC) on 19 April 1948. He was promoted to the following grades on the dates shown: 1st Lt. MI (USAF), 11 May 1.951; 1st Lt. MI (AUS), 5 Nov. 1952; Capt. MI (USAR), 15 Nov. 1955. Since 1948 he has completed annual tours of active duty of from fifteen to ninety days duration in his Department of the Army -Mobilization Designation assignment in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, U.S. Army Intelligence Center, 'Fort Holabird, Md. and has regularly attended meetings of reserve units to which he has been assigned. in a letter dated 6 Mar. 1959, addressed to The Adjutant General, Dr. KISSINGER has indicated a desire to resign his commission becaue of ". . . pressure of other obli- gations and the conviction that I can be of greater service in a high rank in case an emergency neces- sitates this step. . .." 'T'his action, which has been referred to The Commanding General, First United States Army, is still pending. Upon his return to the United States in 1947, Dr. ICISSINGER entered Harvard University as an un- dergraduate. lie graduated in 1950 with the degree Bachelor of the Arts in Government. From 1950 to 1954. he was. a teaching Fellow in the Depart- ment of Government at I-Iarvard University. Ile has been a nicniber of the Harvard faculty since he received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from that University in 1951. The Directory of Officers in the Official Register of Ilarvard University, Vol. I,V, No. 24, General Catalog Issue, 1.958-1959, con- tains the following entry concerning Dr. KIS- SINGER: 'Kissinger, Henry Alfred, PhD., Lecturer on Gov- . ernment, Associate Director of the Center for International Affairs, Executive Director of the Summer School International Seminar, Editor of CONFLUENCE and Member of the Faculty of Public Administration....' Dr. KISSINGER was subject of an intensive investi- gation in 1955 because of allegations that the pub- lication CONFLUENCE might contain items writ- ten from a Communist or pro-Communist point of view. SUBJECT: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger (U). Dr. KISSINGER was born in Fuerth, Germany on 27 May 1923. Ile arrived in the United States on 5 September 1938 and was subsequently naturalized while in the military service by the U.S. District Court, Spartanburg. South Carolina on 25 June 1943. After attending high school in New York City for one year he worked as a shipping clerk until inducted into the Army on 26 February 1943. Dr. KISSLNGF_R received basic training at Camp Croft, S.C., and was enrolled in the Army Specialist Training Program at the University of North C~a?o- ]ina and Lafayette University. He served in the Rhineland, Ardennes and Central Europe campaigns as a rifleman in Company C, 335th Infantry Regi- ment, 84th Infantry Division and as an investigator in the Counter Intelligence Corps. Ile was discharg- ed as a Staff Sergeant in 19.16 to accept employment FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE (signed) 1tICHARD COL LINS Brigadier General, GS Director of Plans, Programs and Security Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 Noam. Chomsky whether !Commie much nationalist as (May 20, 1949). Reviewing the record of American intervention in Indochina in the Penta- gon Papers, one cannot fail to be struck by the continuity of basic assumptions from one administration to the next.. Never has there been the slightest-, deviation from the principle that a noncommunist regime must be imposed and defended, regardless of popular sentiment. The scope of the principle was narrowed when it was conceded, by about., 1960, that North Vietnam was irretrievably "lost." Otherwise, the principle .has been main- tained without equivocation. Given this principle, as well as the strength of the Vietnamese resistance, the military power available-to. the United States, and the lack of .effective constraints, one can deduce with precision the strategy of annihilation that was gradu- ally undertaken. On May 10,. 1949, Dean Acheson cabled US officials in Saigon and Paris that "no effort [should] be spared" to assure the success of the Bao Dai government, since there appeared to be "no other alternative to. estab [lishmcnt] Coinmie pattern Vietnam." Ile further urged that this government should be "truly representative even to extent including outstanding non- Commie leaders now supporting Ilo." A State Department policy statement of the preceding September had noted that the Communists under Ilo Chi Minh had "captur[ed] control of the nationalist movement," thus impeding the "long-term objective" of the United States: "to eliminate so far as possible Communist influence in Indo- china."We are unable to suggest any practicable solution to the French, the report continued, "as we are all too well aware of the unpleasant fact that Communist Ho Chi Minh is the strong est and perhaps the ablest figure in Indochina and that any suggested solu- tion which excludes him is an expedi- ent of uncertain outcome." But to in May, 1967, - Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton presented a memorandum which the Pentagon his- torian takes to imply a significant modification of policy toward a more limited and conciliatory position. The Saigon government, McNaughton urged,. should be moved "to reach an accommodation with the non- Communist South Vietnamese who are under the VC banner; to accept them as members of an opposition political party, and, if necessary, to accept their individual participation in the national government . . ."- (Gravel Edition, Pen- tagon Papers; vol. IV, p. 489).'.,Exact- ly Acheson's proposal of eighteen years earlier, restricted now to. South Viet- nam. In a summary of the situation after the T?t offensive of 1968, Leslie Gelb, director of the Pentagon 'study, asked whether the US 'can "overcome the apparent fact that the Viet Cong have `captured' the Vietnamese nationalist movement while the GVN has become the . refuge of :-Vietnamese who were allied with the French in the battle. against the independence of their na- tion" (II, p. 414). His. question ex- pressed the dilemma of the State Department twenty years before, and properly so. The biographies of Thieu, Ky, and Khiem indicate the continuity of policy; all served with the. French forces, as did most of the top ARVN officers. "Studies of peasant attitudes conducted in recent years," the Penta- gon historian informs us, ".`have demon- strated that for many, the struggle which began 'in 1945 against colonial- ism continued uninterrupted through- out Diem's regime: ? in 1954, the foes of nationalists were transformed from France and Bao Dai, to Dien and the US ... but the issues ? at stake never changed" (1, p. 295). - Correspondingly, the Pentagon con- like Diem's,2 and substantial segments of the urban intelligentsia-"the people who count," as Ambassador Lodge once put it (II, p. 738)=-now speak out against US intervention. A National, Intelligence Estimate of June, 1953, discussed the gloomy pros- pects for. the "'Vietnamese govern- ment" given "the failure of Vietnamese to, rally to [it]," the fact that the population ? assists the Viet Minh more than the French, the inability of "the Vietnam leadership" to mobilize popu- lar energy and resources, and so on (l. p. 391f.). With hardly more than a 'change of names, this analysis.nnight be interchanged With the despairing report from. US pacification advisers (MAC- CaRDS) on December 31, 1967, de- ploring the corruption. and growing weakness of the GVN, the "ever widening gap of distrust, distaste and disillusionment between the people and the GVN. With. these words, the record 'of US-GVN relations . in the Pentagon Papers ends (II; pp. 406-7). One may, perhaps, argue that the mood of the South Vietnamese counts for less in the war than it did in earlier years, now that the US has succeeded, partially at least, in "grinding. the enemy down by sheer weight and mass" (Robert Komer, II, p. 575), and now that North Vietnamese forces have increasingly been drawn into the war, as a direct and always anticipated consequence of American escalation. In November, 1964, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor argued that even if we could establish an effective regime in Saigon, to attain US objectives it would not suffice to "drive the DRV out of its reinforcing role.". Rather, we will not succeed unless we also "obtain its cooperation in bringing an end to the Viet Cong insurgency." We must "persuade or force the DRV to stop its aid to the Viet Cong and to use its directive powers to make . the Viet Cong - desist from their efforts to ere s pro m s liva Acheson, Hoi4t l;Jf~i f$ra Yease 20 A, ,I 03id}4e~iEIAeRDP8l~t;0~t6:b~0 819Q39UA01-8 IU? XGa;x: 0dIE;i OF BOOK Approved For Release 2001/1 0JUNaIRDP80-0 to be to "deter the overthrow the government of South ble id d it nationalist credentials: . "Question `11' -`..-` .1- today has a power base remarkably THE WAS?1IIGTCJis OB:>ERVr2 U EWSLRPTER x June 1972 Approved For Release 200103/04 : CIA-RDP9--6T98 k00 Several present and former FBI ;,rants are savinw privately that they suspect that J. Edgar Hoover died from an overdose of sleeping tablets. But they add that the exact cause of his death can't be determined without an autopsy. And Dr. James Lulke, D.C. Coroner, has adamantly refused to conduct an autopsy. The FBI men say: "Regardless of whether Mr. Hoover committed suicide or died from a stroke induced by hypertension: there is one thing for sure: Jack Anderson drove Mr. Hoover to his death --the same as Drew Pearson drove Jim Forrestal to his death." Jack Anderson, a legman for Pearson for 23 years became his successor as the Nation's fore- most muckraker. For the past two years Anderson has conducted a continuous, unrelenting campaign of harassment and vilification against T. Edgar Hoover. Anderson's gumshoe operatives shadowed Hoover, snooped in the trash can at his home, checked on the food he ate and the medicines he was taking; Anderson also purloined investigative reports from the confidential files of the-FBI and publicized them with critical commentary. Hoover fumed and raged, but he seemed im- potent to do anything about it. Anderson carried on his savage personal attack against Hoover with official impunity. Even when Anderson filched the C--super-secret reports on the brief Pakistani-Indian War from the files of White House's National Security Council and the FBI was ordered to in- vestigate this flagrant breach of national security the culprits were not apprehended. Under a re- organization Executive order all Federal intelli- gence agencies-including the CIA and the FBI- must work directly under Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, White House Chief National Security Adviser. Since then, the flow of classified documents to Anderson have increased in volume. He seems to enjoy complete immunity from prosecutive action.. Hoover was terribly frustrated with this brazen security breach but there was apparently nothing that he could. do. Did hoover become a prisoner in his own Bureau? Did the F131 that he had. created in a 45-year strenuous effort turn into a Frankenstein? Some conservative-oriented former FBI men believe that this is true. The FBI men's analogy between Drew Pear- son's vicious personal campaign against Forrestal and Jack Anderson's virulent personal campaign against Hoover is significant. In 19-IS ):lines V. Forrestal, the first Secretary of the Department the Jewish occupation of Pale up of the Arab world against the U.S. Ironically, Forrestal had been the Vice Presi- dent of the Jewish international banking firm, Dillon, Read & Co. And Forrestal was planning. to soon return to the firm, but he put duty to his country above self-aggrandizement. Forrestal exerted every effort to persuade President Truman not to recognize Israel, but in vain-Truman suc- cumbed to the temptation of political campaign gifts from American Zionists. In their vengeance, the Zionists selected Drew Pearson to lead the vicious campaign to destroy Forrestal. The Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith assigned David Katz (alias Karr), former by-line writer for the Communist Daily Worker, and Andrew Older, member of the Wash- ington, D.C. Communist newspaper cell, to the Pearson staff to assist in the vilification campaign, against Forrestal. The Zionists furnished Pearson cash funds to hire Gentile undercover gumshoe operatives to shadow Forrestal clay and night, check on his personal life and the lives of his wife and son. F,orrestal's personal correspondence and office files were stolen and published by Pearson in his syndicated column and in his hews broadcasts. Pearson published not only half-truths but pure unadulterated falsehoods about Forrestal. When a Pearson aide remonstrated that an article that Pearson wrote about Forrestal was not true, Pear- son replied: "The end justifies the means." Colum- nist Westbrook Pegler accused Pearson of writing "unequivocal lies" about Forrestal and when For- restal committed suicide he castigated hint for driving Forrestal to his death. Shortly before his own death, Pearson wrote in his diary: "After Forrestal's death I suffered from insomnia. I was haunted with the thought that maybe Pegler was right-maybe I did drive For- restal to his death. I felt an almost compulsive urge to join Forrestal in death." At the time of Forrestal's death in 1949, some Washington insiders did not believe that Forrestal actually committed suicide. Forrestal was incar- cerated as a patient under guard high in the tower of the Bethesda Naval Hospital. A Chief Naval Petty Officer was stationed outside the door of his room. Forrestal tied several sheets together, fastened them to his bed and climbed out the window holding to the rope of sheets-Ile may have been trying to escape to a room below. Anyhow, he fell. sixteen floors and died instantly. It was call- ed "suicide." 01 J.~c tense nc i reel t \ rat i 'e e #1OOjJjd$jOj A?-F~[ ` ~opposern i s c come an anti enntie crackpot, was en( angering STATINTL Approved For Release 20 I PZ4X'RDP8OO601 RO 1 JUN 172 STATINTL X.:: Stone Reports: 16 ~!d The Washington dispatch which fol- lows had to be written and put into type before Nixon's speech the night of May'8, announcing his decision to mine North Vietnam's harbors and to. smash its rail' and road 'connections with China. But the disclosures to which the article calls attention pro vide'the explanation of Nixon's long- range strategy, its weakness and its risks. It is characteristic of Nixon's secretiveness that National Security Study Memorandum No. 1-which is discussed and partly reprinted be-, low-though intended in 1969 to lay the groundwork for his policies on Vietnam, nowhere asked the advice of intelligence agencies and the bureaucracy, military and civilian, on the very policy of ' "Vietnamization" he adopted.. But at two points in their responses, there were warnings against US- troop withdrawal 'and doubts expressed about ARVN's ability to stand alone. Four military agencies .(US MACV, CINCPAC, JCS, and the vi office' of the Secretary of Defense) warned against "a too hasty with- draw4l of US forces." The CIA went further and said progress "has been slow, ' fragile and evolutionary," adding quietly, "It is difficultto-see how. the US can largely disengage over the next few years without jeopardizing this." prepared to gamble America's and the world's. This is the behind Nixon's proclaimed for "a generation of peace." It is. now clear that Nixon took, the gamble on Vietnamization in the hope that if this failed, a bigger gamble would succeed. The bigger gamble, as the reader will see, was either to buy off Moscow and Peking or, if that- didn't work, to use the threat of a nuclear confrontation to make them stand by while we de- stroyed North Vietnam from the air. In other words, if. his gamble on' South Vietnam's future failed, he was and is future reality search Th { 9t ...,,~- that could ignite. World War III. A Kremlin to make up its collective gamble of such magnitude, taken by mind or would we see an opera one man without any real consulta- bouffe cave-in instead of an apoca- tion with other branches of govern- lypse? If brinkmanship paid off, what ment, can only be described as an act new hair-raisers lie ahead? Just lafte r orning at the Caprto vigil hi of dictatorship and war. Nixon--one must assume-is as ready for the domestic . ? as for, the world conse- quences. The martial law imposed in Saigon may be a foretaste of the repression to be 'expected at home if the situation deteriorates. In the literally terrible calculus -of events, as I write a few hours after the deadline passed in Haiphong harbor, the question is whether Mos- cow 'and Peking will act with the same primitive irrationality that Nixon has, putting prestige, face, and machismo ahead of civilization's sur- vival, or whether their leadership will take the blow at whatever cost. to their own political future, hoping that Hahoi's armies will shortly have achieved their aim, which clearly is not territory "but the destruction of Saigon's will to resist and an end of the Thieu regime. But even if the crisis is thereby resolved "peacefully" at the expense of the Vietnamese people North and South, it is dif- ficult to see a successful summit, a SALT, agreement as a sequel. It is easier to see a new era of heightened suspicion, tension, cold war, and escalating arms race. Was this cheerful idiocy merely . marking time while waiting for the s m dawn t under a cloudless blue sky as theSTATINTL mines were activated 9,000 miles away, one listened to the cliches with which men comfort themselves in crisis and could only hope that by some might miracle the American people themselves and force a. change of course. Catch the Falling Flag by Richard J. Whalen. Houghton Mifflin, 308 pp., $6.95 National Security. Study Memorandum No, 1: The Situation in Vietnam - Anonymous Xerox Pubrication,' I. F. Stone Four years ago Richard Nixon was just* where he is now on Vietnam, i.e., on the brink of a-wider conflict. He didn't think the war could be won, but didn't want to lose "leverage" by saying so in public. His one hope., his "secret plan" for "an honorable peace,". i.e., for snatching political victory from mili- tary defeat, was to shut off Haiphong and bring about a confrontation with the Soviet Union. This is exactly where he-and we-are today. After all the years of costly losses, all he offers is a In the tense moments at the White House just before press time Nixon was doing his best to pantomime a victory, calling in the pTnotographers and giving them sixty feet of film instead of the usual forty to record a visit with Soviet Ambassador Dobryn- in and Soviet Trade Minister Patoli- chev. "The atmosphere of the ses- sion," said the pool report in the press room, "was extremely amiable, cordial, and pleasant. There were lots of smiles all around and the President seemed particularly buoyant." Do- brynin looked a bit uneasy, but mining of North Vietnam's Patolichev, when asked later whether pqrts ancAdOPfOiWd FoQ11 l*a1SO1QOO1M3(t04til1 #eP~' 8 ab doubt . by sea and air is potentially the gravest there ever any decision ever taken, by an American bigger gamble. Catch the Falling Flag, Richard J. Whalen's memoir of his service as a speech writer for Nixon in the 1968 campaign, could not have appeared at a better moment. It provides the full text of the speech Nixon was about to give ' on his own plan to end the war when Johnson announced on March 31., that he would not run again. Two days before, conferring with his speech writers, Nixon startled them by an extraordinarily-and uncharacteristi- cally-candid remark. "I've come to the conclusion," Whalen quotes him as saying, "that there's no way to win the war. But we can't say that, of course. 1I601cR0013003900 1 L say the opposite, just tb keep some degree of bargaining leverage." 1m w Yom: PEV.+' Or, EoOK:) Approved For Release 2001/031D4UR 2RDP80-01601 R A 1P 0 conmen -3 from TM-Lori's ~`~?3-- ecret Study of the :'Jar; STATINTL North Vietnam has repaired . all major supporting targets. road and railway bridges, constructed QUESTION 28d A. - ?. - camp "^n as described o s om an . rmp r . . A strong' effort to interdict road and buffer restrictions were removed near the the same period. Thus, the act of scaling rail transport from Communist China Chinese border. off the enemy's Cambodian supply lines There is not sufficient data available at through North Vietnam would require a at. must be considered as an integral part of concerted and coordinated air interdiction this time on either the cost or any plan to prevent supplies from reach- campaign against all transportation: mili- effectiveness of an air campaign against the ing enemy forces in the Republic of these land lines to reach a firm conclu- tart' support; petroleum oil, and lubri- Vietnam. cants power; industrial; air defense; and Sion as to the chances of isolating NVN ' communications target systems. The inter- from her neighbors. Past attempts to tut ?'I30 tat@ relationship of the effects of destruction rail, road, and water networks in NVN Depwr{'3 ?; El's .nswCT of targets in one ~ category to the effec- have met with considerable difficulties. It tiveness of others is such that a cumula- has been estimated ? that a minimum of The crux of this question is the defini- tive impact is achieved. The air campaign 6,000 attack sorties per month would be lion of "war-essential imports." There is war-essential of imports that could come with denial of sea imports, would, in 'Into North Vietnam over the rail or road large part, isolate Hanoi and Haiphong lines from China, even if all imports by from each other and from the rest of the sea were denied trnd a strong effort ? even country. Isolation of lianoi, the focal made to interdict ground transport? What point of the road and rail system, would Is the evidence?? be highly effective in reducing North Vietnam's capability to reinforce aggres- ,e Defense ' sion in South Vietnam. Importation of war-supporting material would be seri- yjear;s~.?.$ ~'''"~~w?1e~ ously reduced. Road capacities would be Land Import Capacity reduced by a factor well in excess of the estimated 50 percent believed to have In 1968, NVN imported an average of been accomplished during the summer 6,800 STPI) (short tons per day); 6,000 months of 1966 and 1967. Over time, STPD by sea, and 800 STPD by land. North Vietnam's capability to cope with imports by land were higher in' 1967, the cumulative effects of such an air amounting to about 1,100 STPD. How- campaign would be significantly curtailed. ever, the land lines of communication from China were not used to capacity. It ~-+ is estimated that the two rail lines from. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that China have ' a theoretical uninterdictcd resumption of an interdiction campaign capacity of. about 8,600 STPD and the similar. to that carried. out in Route road network could provide an additional package I between July and 1 November 7,000 STPD during the dry season 1968 would assure almost total fnterdic- (normally June-September) and about. Lion of truck and waterborne movement 2,000 STPD during the poor weather of supplies . into the demilitarized zone months. The combined capacity of the and Laos. Naval blockade offshore and land, routes (9,000-?15,000 STPD) is more interdiction of Regional Package II to than enough to transport North Vietnam's Thant I-lao would further enhance this total import requirements of about 7,000 effort. STPD. If all seaborne imports were to Commitment of B-52 forces following- come through China, considerable logistic heavy and -unrestricted suppression of problems would have to be solved by the defenses by fighters, could reduce the Chinese regime. amount of time to accomplish the above. Interdiction of Imports from China Although the North Vietnamese have If seaborne imports can be denied to established a significant by-pass capability, NVN, her ability to successfully pursue the transportation nets remain vulnerable the war in SVN would be dependent on at many key points. The locomotive China population could be attrited quickly if all rt f 1 d ' 'be free of the militarily confining China. Even at this level of effort, the this subject; but in our judgement, the constraints which have characterized the North Vietnamese could continue to -use' category of war-essential imports should tl ii lines to shuttle supplies if they ; 1 d t f th o 'd ie ra u me e ntos o e e onomc ar pro- conduct of the war in the north in the past. The concept would preclude attacks were willing to devote sufficient man:. vided by the Soviets and Chinese, as well on population as a target but would power to repair and trann hippment[ opera- as nearly all of their purely military aid. aid accept high > t~nFe@11ra lieA"be s il r`~m~ more dif clulfo tfee ~l v~equ_a~ly~if ~o tmore`~ important ~ an ordet ' to achieve destruction of war- bombing halt. north of 190 in April 1968, military aid in keeping North Viet-Nam a C=.^;i ; and expanded the railroad capacity by converting large segments from meter to dual gauge truck. These improvements would make even more -difficult pro- longed interdiction of the overland lines of communication. We currently fly approximately 7,000 sorties per month against two primary roads in Laos without preventing through- put truck traffic; the road network from China. has 7,10 principal arteries and numerous bypasses. Finally, the mon- soonal weather in NVN wodld make it difficult to sustain interdiction on the land lines of communication. Poor visi- bility would prevent air strikes during 25-30% of the time during good weather months and 50-65%n of- the time during poor weather months. Thus, -it is not possible to give ?a definitive amount to the question of how much war-essential imports could come into. NVN if sea imports are denied and a strong air campaign is initiated. Attention would also have to be given to interdiction of supplies coming into SVN from' Cambodia. Over ' the past 2' years, the enemy's use of Cambodia as a supply base and a place of refuge has become more pronounced. During the period October 1967 to September 1,968, 10,000 tons of munitions transited Sihanoukville and are suspected of having been delivered to enemy 'forces in the Cambodia-Republic of Vietnam border ? more regions. This . amount represents than enough ordnance to satisfy the arms and ammunition requirements for all enemy forces in South Vietnam during CIA tat 0 :T's:, sf3 Ea'Q 1'o t Approved For Release ,j atA4scQ"DJ? NV3'8a June 1972 The Penrngoii Pajels- A Discussion STATINTL The publication of "confidential" materials has inevitably given rise to a debate concerning a number of different but related problems: To what extent do the revelations contained in the documents throw light on events or policy decisions with which they deal? To what ex- tent, if at all, does the publication of the information contained in the documents jeopardize the processes of ,-executive decisionmaking? Ilow can the conflict between the public's right to know and the ex- ecutive's need for confidentiality be reconciled? The editors of the Po- litical Science Quarterly have in tu: past published a number of arti- cles dealing with the issue of access to governmental information and the terms on which that access is made available, notably, Adolf A. Berle',; and Malcolm Moos's reviews of Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power (PSQ, LXXIX, June' x964) and Theodore Draper's review of Jerome Slater, Irttcn'ention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican l:evohttion (PSQ, LXXXVI, March -1971). The recent publication of the Pentagon Papers has given the contro- versy new urgency. U.S. Senator George McGovern of South Dakota, candidate for the Democratic party nomination foi president, and Professor John P. Roche, from 1966-6S special consultant to President Lyndon Johnson, were asked by the editors of the Political Science Quarterly to',review the Pentagon Papers and to debate in print the political and legal issues to which their publication has given rise. Publication of the Pentagon Papers has raised a storm concerning the right of the press to publish classified government documents. But the contents of the papers are so sweeping in their disclosures of official suppression of the realities in Vietnam, so revealing of the disastrous, secretly conceived policies and practices which led us into this tragic war, that it is impossible---in fact it misses their true significance--to discuss them in such abstract terms. The integrity of our democracy is profoundly involved, not only in the constitutio::-1 sense with respect to the warmal:i ng power, but in the basic sense of the reality of government by pop- ular rule. It is axiomatic with us that a free people can remain free only if it is enlightened and informed. It is axiomatic with us, as well, that a free press is essential to the creation and main- tenance of an enlightened and informed people. A press which Approved FoEbIR-1epp s2~0a/tQ~tQ4re`tI~QI~0e1 COt;~t@0tI,3DO390001-8 what our executive leadership knew and what it led the nation Iii r'1'Tluv RIC,!irj 17 MAY 1972 STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001 Those Intelligence Failed? . NOTHING beats hindsight when choosing where to kick for making a mistake-the mistake in this in- stance being wrong about where, when and with how much the North Vietnamese would attack. The military intelligence community says that Washington's strategists-meaning the National Se- curity Council led by Henry Kissinger-took the in- telligence reports and decided an attack would come, if it came at all, west from Cambodia to cut South Vietnam in half. U.S. intelligence flights were curtailed. The elec- tronic surveillance devices employed on the ground couldn't tell a truck from a Soviet-built tank. But our intelligence: knew that something was moving on the supply trails and that the North Vietnamese had strengthened their forces north of the demilitarized zo:M Intelligence reports predicted an attack in Feb- ruary or March. When'it didn't come; some credibil- ? ity was lost. When it did come--in April-from an unexpected direction with unexpected force, Wash- ington was stunned. It's difficult to run a war from the banks of the Potomac, 9,000 miles from the battlefield. But if in- telligence- reports are weighed in Washington and the decisions are made in Washington, the blame be- longs i,n Washington. As the long-distance strategist, the NSC took responsibility for the conduct of the war. If intelligence. officials are correct in claiming that we were caught off guard because of NSC mis- interpretation of their reports, it doesn't take much hindsight to know exactly where to kick. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 THE OKL,AHOI4A JOURNAL STATINTL - ADDroved For Release 2?01*$/6$72CIA-RDP80 _0160'LR001 Candidate 9"I ICCt By STEVE DI14IICK Of The Journal staff, YI; S. senatorial hopeful Jed Johnson spent more than two years as an undercover agent for .the Central Intelligence Agency during the early ?1960s, he said Friday. Johnson said he carried on CIA activities in more than a dozen Asian, African and Latin American countries while working for one of the front organizations exposed in the "CIA on campus" scandals in 1967. The former Sixth District congressman Fri- day released a copy of a speech he will de- liver to the Oklahoma Jaycees convention Satur- .. . . _---i_ MA i vnivement his n "I know that the CIA is very, very meticu- Communist officials," he said. lous and careful in its evaluations and is ac- "I also did get information on what the curate and precise," he said. of up-and-coming oli "The point is, if the CIA has given such an political ideology was p evaluation (of the Vietnam blockade), I know tical leaders," he said. they've done a thorough assessment of the sit- Johnson- balked.at the word "propaganda" uation. They're very capable people and are when asked whether his. job entailed more not political; they're very apolitical. - ; gathering of information or disseminating "While I was never involved in CIA ;propaganda. operat?ons in Southeast Asia, I know per- "It involved a lot of both," he said. "But we sonally that they literally can tell you the were never told what to say by the CIA. We minutest details about minor African political were never giver any orders about what to say figures and I'm sure they have done the same. in a speech. type of investigation in Vietnam,". Johnson "I was simply a youth. leader telling them what said. we believe, why our economic system is the Johnson' said he was not at liberty to dis-st productive, why our political system is while a student at Oklahoma University which Youth and Student Affairs, the dummy foun- was still in colleg with a 1959 trip to Cuba i hi 4 b - us dation for which he worked, was still in was inter thrown back at him during his 19 . congressional race, also was actually a gov- ness. ernment-sponsored "intelligence-gathering' "For me to say anything would have literal- trip.-. by endangered the lives of some of our people In his speech to the Jaycees, Johnson will overseas," he said. attack President Nixon's new interdiction poi- He came back to the U.S. early in 1964, on d icy against North Vietnamese supply routes. leave from the Foundation, and then resigne He bases his criticism largely on his knowledge from the organization before he made his suc- of 'the CIA, which reportedly has claimed that cessful race for Congress. the blockade will not work. ' Johnson served in Congress from 196466. He said the "whistle was blown" on the cover Johnson quotes from the "Kissinger Papers," - of the dummy foundation In 1967. a secret government study conducted by the "I'm still not sure how much I'm at liberty " he said. athering groups to tell you tion f r i , g ma o n CIA and other .and mane public by columnist Jack Ander- The former student.leader at the University He said another of his missions was to son two weeks ago. The study reported the of Oklahoma said he was approached by the CIA -debate young Communist-leahers in Cuba. CIA's belief that no amount of . interdiction (referred to among agents as ".the firm") in However, he was not able to reveal in 1964 ,will be successful in stopping the flow of war 1962, a year after his graduation from col- that he had known in 1939 that the Cuban trip materiel to North Vietnam. lege? was a government-sponsored one. "I am personally acquainted in some depth "They contacted you to see if you were i y "It was a very interesting ex erietice, but h a y ruouwer taken it was frustrating that I couldn't rebut some of - terest ad very 1with the degree of precision that the CIA open . clearanc a nd heesad. 'Later t me, ates within its intelligence activities, because against or 1he afires made secrets oath of that trip and so e tother ac- e J worked under contract as a covert agent for to a hotel divulge sign an .the CIA prior to my election to the Congress," saying Y Johnson said. critical information. I was involved in, I was later asked to- " . At that time, the CIA had extremely de- "After that, I was what they call `under become an agent for the CIA." tailed information on such things as which contract' to the CIA until I resigned," he During his years as an agent, under the. code name "Mr. Page" ("I chose that name hand an obscure African provincial chief said. because I had been a page in the Senate and would eat with and the vintage of his favorite "It was fascinating work," he said...If I thou ht it would be easy to remember,".), Twines," he said. hadn't run for Congress, I might have made g a career out of the CIA." he was at liberty to tell only his wife of his "I am convinced after reading the Kissinger activities. Papers that the CIA estimates of-our capacity Johnson said he actually worked for the U.S. le of agents before me -to interdict supplies was done with similar at- Youth Council, which was. funded by the Foun- "There w wtere a disc coupuped a sni tention to precision and gave absolutely no dation for Youth and Student Affairs, which in who pp :reason for encouragement that this military turn was funded by the CIA. Johnson says he still has faith in the per- action will successfully bring the war to a con- His duties, about which he was never too suasive and example type of diplomacy, the ;elusion." specific, involved basically being a sort of good, former the kind he said is practiced by the dor cum s CIA b ll py. . assa am In an interview with The Oklahoma Jour- wi nal before his announcement Saturday, John- "I led delegations of young Americans to de- son said he'worked for the CIA from 1962 to veloping nations and spoke before various.le h islative assemblies." he. said. -We met with t g s which later returned to haunt him during congressional race in 1964. - "There were chat ges made during the cam- paigning that I, had, taken this trip with other student leaders in defiance of the State De-. partment," he said. "This was untrue. The trip was sponsored by the U.S. government. '?'I was asked by people in the State Depart- ment to make the trip to get information about. what was going on," he said. At the time the group of young student lead-, ers made the trip, shortly after the Cuban re- volution, we didn't know that things in Cuba would go the way they. went," Johnson said. as 1964. He said his experience as an agen ids r si deuLs i e minis- caused himAppVOVedpFOtf lea ~ g i/blld' : Clw- P'80--01601 P'80-8 CIA'i assessments of various situations an Once at an Indian Youth Congress in Ti- in the ?aeencv's non-partisan, position. rupathi, India, I debated_ a_ couule of older 'I ASHIUGTOU POST Approved For Release 2001/ /qjy. QV4-RDP80-01601 RO .Makin Hanoi Dependent on Pelr.in.g ' Interdiction: The Last Big Bluff? By Allen S. Having gone to the Chinese Wall, Presi- dent Nixon is going to the brink. At least he so declared in his May 8 address ordering that "rail and all other communications [to North Vietnam] will be cut off to the maxi- mum extent possible." If seriously imple- mented this threatens war with China. If not implemented the mining of North Vietnam- ese ports and interdiction of shipping will accomplish little except to make Hanoi wholly dependent upon Peking. As the Pentagon Papers revealed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander In The writer, a former State Depart- nrr.ent official and expert on China, now teaches at the University of Mich- igan. This article first appeared in The New Republic magazine, with whose .permission it is published here. Chief of the' Pacific Forces (CINCPAC) urged the mining of Haiphong as early as 1965, However, its futility was revealed in the recent "leak", of national security study memorandum number one; provided Janu- ary 21, 1969, at the request of Henry Kissin- ger for the new administration. The Central ? Intelligence Agency stressed Hanoi's ability to receive what it needed from China; were Soviet bloc forces to be cut off.by sea: "all of the more essential imports could be brought into North Vietnam over rail lines or roads from China in the event that im- -ports by sea were successfully denied . the uninterrupted capacities of the railroad, highway and river connections with China are about 16,000 tons per day." At this point, the Joint Chiefs finally con- ceded the difficulty of interrupting the routes from China, noting "a minimum of 6,000 sorties" per month would be required against the two rail lines from China. Even at this level of effort, the North Vietnamese could continue to" use the rail, lines to shut- tle supplies if they were willing to devote sufficient manpower to repair and trans- shipment operations." The Joint Chiefs failed to add that China had supplied such manpower, beginning in 1965, when it sent 50,000 People's Liberation Army troops, primarily engineer and con- struction divisions,, to keep supplies moving across the border. Defended against U.S. air attacks by Chinese antiaircraft units, these forces not only repaired rail and road facili- ties as soon as they were damaged, but built a huge storage area in the northwest, near the Chinese border. Additional access to this vicinity is provided by a newly built road across northern Laos from southern China, currently defended by up to 20,000 Chinese Troops and antiaircraft. , ApprovediforpRebea9q,20 4/03104 ClAL 1 t~ ,j 4PA ~1, 1-8 transit iroinls at th' border without overfly- mains: c oes rNixon n e ing Chinese air`pa''c. Whatever else I'resi- he about to be called in his last big bluff? dent Nixon may have hoped to gain by he Copyright 1972 Harrison-J3laine of'New Jersey, Inc. Whiting trip to Peking, he cannot expect Mao Tsp- tung to duck this challenge now, when it was met forcibly in 1965-68. Whenever U,S. aircraft strayed, Chinese radar tracked their movement, usually accompanied by MIG ef- forts at interdiction. Peking did not always announce the intrusions and even kept one of the shootdowns secret, but Washington knew that actions spoke louder than words. Neither side wanted a public confrontation. Fortunately President Johnson was deter- mined to avoid the final escalation: Few persons within government and none outside knew. how close questions of "hot . pursuit" and attacks on Chinese bases made war with China an issue in 1965 and again in 1967. Today similar secrecy insulates Presi- dent Nixon and Henry Kissinger from the probing of Congress and the press If the White House is to he believed, the risk of war with China is high. How else can we "keep the weapons of war out of the hands of the international outlaws of North Viet- nam"? Since 1966; China has supplied most of the hand-held weapons to North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front (NLF). Eighty per cent of the ammunition and 60 per cent of.the weapons seized in Cambodian caches during the 1970 invasion came from Chinese arsenals. All have since been re- placed by Peking. Nothing Hanoi needs in the next six months is beyond China's capac- ity to supply. Does the President think that by making Hanoi dependent on Peking he has better leverage on the battlefield or at the peace table? This runs counter to all evidence and. logic, There is no known instance when the North Vietnamese deferred to Chinese ad- vice contrary to their own judgment. If any- thing, Hanoi has defied Pekilig in its con- duct of the war as welt as in its willingness to talk in Paris. Nor is there the slightest in- centive for Peking to play Washington's game, while the disincentives are vital to Chinese perceptions of their own role in Asia as well as to the credibility of commit- ments elsewhere, from North Korea to Al- bania. Regardless of Peking's public pronounce- ments or its rumored reactions to the new escalation, its private support for Hanoi can- not be questioned. The U.S. mining and in- terdiction by sea of supplies to North Viet- nam provides China with a virtual monopoly of influehee in the induchina war. Its influ- ence will prolong the fighting toward the ultimate, perhaps imminent, defeat of the U.S. allies in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. This Chinese policy is dictated by ideology, by national interest, and by power politics. This policy risked war with the U.S. in ' 1965-58 when America had more than 500,000 troops on the Asian mainland, but Peking persisted. It will certainly ac- cept that risk with only 60,000 troops re- maining and the President seemly backed % against the peace wall by a hostile public STATINTL }? 'ail"; ~ aigofi -'\, 5oc.Trang MICRAR t REG! 3N W. 0 50 100mi. with his family, rushed back to Saigon. So did U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bun- ker, who had been in Katmandu with his wife Carol Laise, the U.S. Ambas- sador to Nepal. In Washington, Nixon met with his military advisers: Admiral Thomas Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of State William Rog- ers, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and his recently named deputy Kenneth Rush. Meanwhile Henry Kissinger con- vened what would turn out to he the first of almost daily sessions of the WSAG (Washington Special Action Group), which consists of ranking officials of the State and Defense departments and the- CIA, who form a sort of foreign policy crisis management team. Administration spokesmen insisted that the President was "keeping his op- tions open." In fact, the options were limited. Nixon ruled out any pause in troop withdrawals; he will announce the next phase sometime before May I, when the U.S. troop level in Viet Nam dips below 69,000. The President also directed that the 6,000 U.S. combat troops currently stationed in Viet Nam should not be shifted from their defen- sive positions around U.S. installations 604ROQ1130()8900()4a8 area to. aid ARVNApptnd medtfiamil)Rase 2001 /03104 CIA-RDP8 war," it was decided that reporters' in- quiries about the South Vietnamese sit- uation would be bucked to the State De- partment. The President demonstrated his confidence that the situation was un- der control by leaving for Key Biscayne in midweek. An Umbrella. The one option that was available was air power, and Nix- on made the most of it (see page 39). For the first time since 1968, four air- craft carriers were on station in theTon- kin Gulf; a fifth, the Midway, was on its way. Also sent to the area were a squadron of F-105 Thunderchicf fight- er-bombers and. about 20 B-52s, which joined the 80 already operating from bases in Thailand and Guam. Later, two squadrons of F-4 Phantoms flew to Da- nang from bases in Okinawa, Japan and Korea. The additions meant a jump in U.S. air strength in Indochina within a week from 450 to 700 planes. Meanwhile Nixon, in effect, ordered a resumption of the unconditional bombing of the North. The invasion across the DMZ, he charged, had shat- tered the so-called "understanding" under which Lyndon Johnson had or- dered the bombing halt in 1968. (The North has never admitted acceding to it.) f=or a "limited duration," which seemed to mean until the end of the of- fensive, U.S. Pilots would be allowed to attack any military targets; before, they could only stage "protection reaction" ARYN TROOPS NEAR QUANG TRI CITY DRAG BODY OF NORTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIER Looking for signs that the lines would bend but not break. strikes on antiaircraft sites. The new franchise did not extend to "punitive raids" on targets such as Hanoi and Hai- phong. The main objective seemed to be the missile sites massed in a narrow belt above and below the DMZ, where they could extend an air-defense "umbrella" over the invasion force in Quang Tri. The step-up in the air war would in- evitably renew the ugly worldwide image of the U.S. once again clobbering the North from the skies. To counter possible reaction at home and abroad, How Good ~s Saigon's Army? rOR better or worse, the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN for short) holds the key to the success of Pres- ident Nixon's Vietnamization policy. Expert opinions are strongly divided on whether ARVN can sustain that policy. Re- flecting the cynical view of more than a few American G.Ls who have returned from combat'in Southeast Asia, one U.S. military adviser last week complained: "The colors in the South Vietnamese flag are certainly appropriate--most of the people are yellow, and the rest are red." By and large, though, American advisers believe that ARVN is a competent and rapidly improving fighting force. Since shortly after the 1968 Ter offensive the South Viet- namese armed forces have been expanded from 730,000 men to 1,100,000. ARVN has become the second-largest military machine in Asia, second in size only to China's 2,700,000- man People's Liberation Army. Counting the People's Self- Defense Force, the volunteer militia, South Viet Nam has nearly 2,000,000 men under arnis. The main fighting force consists of 587,000 men, including 492,000 in ARVN (in elev- en combat divisions), 13,000 marines, 40.000 sailors and 42,000 airmen. It also includes 513,000 Regional and Pop- ular Force troops, who are assigned to guard the country's towns and villages and reinforce pacification efforts. The South Vietnamese armed forces are among the best equipped in the world-at least for conventional warfare. The U.S. has provided ARVN with 640.000 N1-16 rifles, 34.000 M-79 grenade launchers, 40,000 radios, 20,000 quarter-ton trucks and 56 M-48 tanks. The air force has 200 A-1, A-37 and F-5 fighters, 30 AC-47 gunships and 600 transport, train- ing and reconnaissance aircraft. Despite supch impressive fig- tires, rep] acxp QE WV[i. 0 f 8~t7 cEr ~~1'id 4 the White House ordered up a kind of pre-emptive public relations strike that emphasized Communist villainy. Ad- ministration officials pressed the view that South Viet Nam had been the vic- tinm of a flagrant `:`invasion" from the North; they also emphasized the ene- my's ample Soviet hardware. At a tough-talking Washington press conference, Laird branded Mos- cow as a "major contributor" to the war, and blasted the North Vietnamese for "marauding throughout Southeast stance, the U.S. fighting force had more than 3,000 in 1969. Three years ago, ARVN was primarily engaged in rural pacification programs, while U.S. troops handled most of the "search-and-destroy" missions. Since then a, number of ARVN divisions-notably the Hue-based Ist-have acquired a good deal of combat experience and acquitted themselves with honor. Nonetheless, the army still has several large un- solved problems. The educational level of the troops is low -most ARYN privates are barely literate. Leadership, par- ticularly at regimental and battalion levels, is erratic. ^ U.S. advisers make two general criticisms of ARVN: it is not flexible enough to defend the country properly, and it tends to get bogged down in bureaucracy. When ARVN took over the U.S. firebases south of the DMZ, the locations and even the names remained the same, which meant that the North Vietnamese did not even have to worry about chang- ing their artillery coordinates. Furthermore, a call for artillery support from a belea- guered ARVN field commander must pass through a tortuous chain of command extending from the district commander through the civilian province chief to the divisional com- mander and finally to the appropriate artillery battalion. Be- yond this, ARVN's divisions are of sharply uneven quality, and its best units are apt to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Last week the crack 1st was resting in Hue while the bungling 3rd bore the brunt of the early fighting. In a purely military sense, most U.S. strategists believe that Vietnamization will succeed. "It is inconceivable that the South can't hold out against the North Vietnamese," a se- nior Rand Corp. analyst observed last week. "They are just too good and well-equipped an army for that-unless the North Vietnamese are all Prussians and the South Vietnam- thor: t Vit'~e e(I'1eOh11`FNV04 00011's that Asia.' BeftfrPrl9'. FOid Releafo eo?P01IQ3/04iri 1'LI tn ~u ~reQ160i'ROO1ce3 39 the Paris negotiations, "the enemy only defeat. The big loser was the 3rd would have to draw back across the Division, whose troops abandoned l4 Driz." Privately, Administration offi- firebases below the DMZ in five days. vials were pleased that neither the So- The 3rd was a newly formed ~.mnit, raised viets nor the Chinese had reacted sharp- largely by conscription, of local men, in- ly to the bombing and the rhetoric; cluding a good many draft dodgers and Moscow, like Washington, seemed un- delinquents. Considering the ferocity of willing to let the fighting get in the way the initial North Vietnamese barrage, of May's Nixon-Brezhnev summit. retreat made sense. But it was not sen- The Proof. The White House saw sibly executed. Some units quit the field another possible plus in Hanoi's switch so quickly that they failed to spike their from guerrilla tactics to conventional guns. Many 3rd Division soldiers joined warfare. By coming out in the open with the 50,000 refugees who fled south for their heavy armor and artillery, the sanctuary in Quang Tri and Hue. Communists have made themselves vul- At Camp Carroll, a former U.S. M a nerable to fearsome losses from air at- rive outpost ten miles south of the DMZ. tacks. Said one senior U.S. military ad- 3rd Division troopers mutinied. After viser: "They are going to be hurt badly." three days of brutal shelling, their con- R Conceivably-but that prophecy points mander ordered a gradual retreat; they iii to a crucial element in the war: the con- wanted to surrender. Luckily for the tinued dependency of the South Viet- U.S. adviser, Lieut. Colonel William namese troops upon massive U.S. air Camper, it passing helicopter heard his support. Without it, ARVN might well radio call: "They're running up a white NORTH VIETNAMESE SAM MISSILE have had to surrender even more ter- flag! I'm leaving!" Camper was picked Moscow gave generously. ritory than it did last week, which would up, along with a couple of the soldiers have further reduced its credibility with who wanted to retreat too. But the un- viser. "Those outfits are heroes," said the civilian populace that has counted lucky base commander was reportedly one American who observed the battle. upon it for defense. tied up by the remaining mutineers and "There hasn't been anyone in the Viet But can ARVN lose? U.S. military ex- turned over to the NVA. Nam War who fought better." perts are reasonably confident that un- Single Shot. Inept as the 3rd Di- Hue, the ancient Vietnamese impe- less overwhelmed by vastly superior vision appeared to be, it was a model rial capital, is presumed to be a prime numbers, ARVN can handle North Viet- of discipline by comparison with some target of the Communist invasion. So namese regulars. Nixon's criteria for of the Regional and Popular Force ir- far, the North Vietnamese have been success should not be beyond ARVN's regulars in the area, who were little bet- unable to slip past Bastogne and Bir- reach. The President told a press con- ter than gun-happy mobs. South of mingham, the ARVN 1st Division bases ference last month that he was confi- QuangTri city, one such mob fired away that guard the approaches to the city. dent that "the South Vietnamese lines with giddy abandon for two hours at Last week, Hue had a besieged look, may bend, [but] not break. If this proves Communists holding a bridge on High- nonetheless. No effort had been made to be the case, it will be the final proof way 1. When the Communists finally to repair the walls and shrines that had that Viet namization has succeeded." broke and ran, reported "fi\tt Corre- been reduced to ruins four years earlier Last week,. though, ARVN did not spondent Rudolph Rauch. "the South -the traditional period of mourning in quite live up to Defense Secretary Vietnamese ran off after them, hooting Viet Nam-in the Tet offensive of 1968. Laird's measure of success: winning in jubilation-until the Communists At the university, faded signs on walls '75% of its battles. In the very first hours turned to fire a few sobering rounds at urged: sst.ASir s i n . A ] 1 1 ; NI 'r IQ VII I- ry of mutual see-congratutauons. r ncrc ugees wno ssvarmeu 111LO we city 110111 was a wounded prisoner lying on the the north, ground, his face covered with dust and Few Clues. "They came by bus, by NI b 1 . l h IZ h h their pursuers. The troops stopped, then N .A nt IZI; r ttr W &it. The students were out tied back to the bridge, where they all in the streets, canvassing for contribu- ernu+rirrl tnoether andl indlntoerl in a flnr- tines in relieve the nlieht of 50.000 ref- OEOU ers, a oatc army put-putting blood oozing from his mout . A t oug it medic was present, the prisoner was trucks borrowed for an afternoon from given no attention. A private raised his ARVN," wrote TtsIE:'s Rauch. "Those M-16. 'Don't!' warned a Vietnamese- who had time to pack chose peculiar speaking journalist. 'Too many Amer- things to salvage: one family had a re- icans.' The soldier put his gun down and frigerator' in a wheelbarrow, nothing the journalist moved off. A few min- else. A lieutenant carried an enormous utes later there was a single shot; the Sanyo sound system, still in its carton prisoner had a hole between his eyes." and minus the speakers, strapped to the But when ARVN was good, it was back of his motorbike. Nearly every- very, very good. At Dong Ha. it town one seems to have a pig. Pigs are of rude wooden shacks and prosperous strapped onto Honda seats, pigs are tied brick houses ten miles south of the DMZ onto front bumpers, pigs hang in wire on the banks of the Cua Viet River, one cages from tail gates and are slung from vital North Vietnamese objective was poles that peasants and their wives heft spiked by the tanks of the tough 20th onto their shoulders. On the highway, a Armored Squadron. As the Communist Jeep carrying six prosperous refugees spearhead rolled south on Highway I. had tried to pass it slower vehicle, the 34-ton M-48s of the 20th sped north. strayed off the tarmac and hit a mine They met-and stopped-the Commu- buried in the unpaved shoulder. The ex- nist armor a scant 300 yards north of plosion blew the Jeep and its passen- the Cua Viet bridge. The tankers and gers clear across the road and into a two companies of South Vietnamese field. No one even bothered to look at marines held the bridge long enough for the bodies; like pedestrians avoiding a ., _AppLW@,CI. a if200 /m3104rf KCfl!4-R?il 0a016fl9 ROO1 39Oj04.l8irted the Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 hole dug by the blast and continued on toward safety." What were the North Vietnamese really up to? There were few clues from the Communists: Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, the chief Viet Cong negotiator in Paris, spoke conventionally of over- throwing "the repressive regime of Sai- gon" and establishing a "government of national concord." All that intelligence officers know for sure is that Hanoi has planned a five-phase offensive for 1972. The first two phases, described in cap- tured documents as terror in the coun- tryside and attacks on militia outposts, began after the Tel holidays last Feb- ruary. Evidently, last week's offensive began Phase 3: an effort to pin clown South Vietnamese forces where they are weakest, inflict casualties, and discredit Vietnamization. The final phases are at- tacks on major cities (quite possible) and a general uprising leading to the fall of the Thieu regime (farfetched). In opening a multi-front offensive, as they seemed to be doing last week, the Communists could whiplash the ARVN command by reducing the pres- sure in one region, only to step it up sud- denly in another. The idea would be to force reserve units to move and thus to weaken vital areas. Saigon last week was all but stripped of its reserves; even the presidential palace guard was sent north to the action. At week's end, Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams were said to have told Washington that they be- lieve the enemy drive will is inevitable. Still most U.S. intelli- gence sources If ARVN comes out of the current of- fensive in good shape, Hanoi might be willing-or so Washington believes-to negotiate a settlement along the lines of Richard Nixon's eight-point peace proposal. With its provisions for an In- dochina-wide cease-fire and ' return of all troops to their national boundaries, Nixon's eight points add up to some- thing close to unacceptable surrender for Hanoi. Most likely, the Washington speculation goes, a way would be found to allow the North Vietnamese to save face, and thus not feel obliged to re- turn to the battlefield later on. That is a highly wishful scenario, and it would be extraordinary if the North should follow it. Washington tra- ditionally has inclined toward optimism in its thinking about the war. In Sai- gon, however, the prevalent opinion is that the current offensive is not the de- cisive thrust, but is aimed mainly at pun- ishing ARVN and pushing it back from the border sanctuaries that the Com- munists have carved out over the past two years in Laos and Cambodia. With the reconstruction of the sanctuary net- work completed, and with the war- weary regimes. in Phnom-Penh and Vientiane all but on the ropes, the North Vietnamese are turning their attention to South Viet Nam again. The imme- diate goal is not to topple Thieu in 1972, but to begin to rebuild the weak- ened Viet Cong and otherwise prepare to act on the day when the Americans and their airpower are really gone. Only then would Hanoi enter what it might consider, after 26 years of struggle, a "decisive" battle for Saigon. For as Ambassador Bunker frequently reminds dinner guests, the North Viet- namese have never given up hope of achieving a military victory. ouflaged trucks on jungle trails seldom afforded high-fly- ing iff ear: To ~CG Is to Destroy ing supersonic pilots a visible target. Last week, when- ever the cloud cover lifted, the flyers could sight the enemy on the ground. "You had the feeling," said Wad- For U.S. Air Force pilots iii Viet Nam, it was one of ??--- del, "that you were really doing something significant." the busiest weeks of the war, as TIME Correspondent Last week's bad weather compelled the flyers to take David DeVoss discovered when he visited the big Amer- even more risks than usual. Fighter-bombers had to slice icon airbcrse at Danang. His report: hrlrnv thn rniarroct to " ? ?1.,...7 ,t.,.._..__i______.. . , . , vi vny )vv it. or so. At that low altitude even a rifle bul- 'HE flying weather was poor, air traffic heavy and haz- let can bring down a jet if it strikes a vulnerable point. ardous, and there were rumors about the infiltration ^ of CAU antinir-1ff l so ivrc;en w uy va Captain sty lower.~During one ...... -w" ? a fighter-bomber. "It was unbelievable," he said. "I've nev- four hour n ANis FAC Capptain the Con area rad 1 between en 32 e Cr seen anything like it-columns of tanks, columns of dodged ;5 "~nMS as lie e circled he trucks, even men marching along the road." Sanh a':ci the DMZ. "A lot of 23nim. and 37i m. anti - 0 acro sitth ~~ r c '01 /04~ lAa-R0P8O1QMM1d~fl&Mv3O?c8~ft10i~ the of- avy pi ts in the fc_nsive began," said Pekkola. "Usually they aim at any war -rarely saw their prey. Elusive guerrillas and cam- break in the clouds because they know that's where last for several months, until either victory is achieved or defeat seem to think that the offensive, how- ever intense, will be of limited duration. Within a month or so, monsoon rains will make movement and resupply dif- ficult in most of the country. But in Mil- itary Region I, where logistical support via the DMZ and Laos is relatively easy, the Communists could make trouble for a much longer time. President Thieu be- lieves that the Communists may try to seize South Viet Nam's two northern provinces and use them as bargaining chips to force a negotiated settlement of the war. Shock Waves. If Huc falls, the NVA might conceivably set up a "provisional government" of the long dormant Na- tional Liberation Front and the Viet Cong in the old capital. Washington be- lieves that Hanoi will settle for a few "spectaculars"-perhaps the temporary occupation of a city or two-to embar- rass Nixon and Thieu and perhaps force the U.S. to begin talking seriously about the Communist seven-point peace plan, which includes dumping the Thieu regime. But what if ARVN and its air sup- port hold fast and thwart the spectac- ulars? What if the Communists move back to their horder sanctuaries with- out having inflicted a massive defeat? If that happens-and Washington is be- ginning to think optimistically of the prospect-North Viet Nam would have lost more than it did in Tet 1968. That furious onslaught created psychological shock waves in the U.S. and led to the beginning of American disengagement. From a military viewpoint, the post-Tel counterattack by U.S. and ARVN troops was a considerable success: it virtually shattered the Viet Cong infrastructure and pushed main-force NVA units be- yond South Vici Nam's borders. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 eventually be." In the first six days of the offensive. the North Vietnamese shot down five U.S. aircraft and two South Viet- namese aircraft. One American-manned HH-53 helicopter crashed while on a rescue mission. The stepped-up tempo of the air war was reflected last week in the frenzied activity on the ground. "We're working double shifts to keep the planes ready to roll," said Staff Ser- geant John Macy, a crew chief at Danang. When a flight of four Phantoms lands on the twin I0.000- f I. runways, the planes quickly.taxi to rows of protective con- crete revetments. Once a plane is safely parked. the pilot climbs out and is handed a cold can of Budweiser. While he sips the brew, a yellow forklift truck trundles tip with ar- maments, and the ground crew hurriedly rearms the Phan- tom with an awesome array of weaponry-iron bombs, rock- ets and napalm canisters. Normally, the entire operation takes only 20 minutes. The beer never gets warm before the pilot climbs back into his Phantom to take off on another sortie. The Sea War: Barrages and Boredom During the first stages of the North Vietnamese offen- sive, gunfire front the U.S. destroyers that patrol the Tonkin Gulf succeeded in turning back 300 Communist troops from an atempled crossing of the song Ha River. Shortly before the Navy became engaged in the battle for Quang Fri prov- ince. TIME's Saigon Bureau Chief, Stanley Cloud, was a guest aboard one of those destroyers. There lie ivas able to ob- serve a vital but underreported U.S. contribution to the war: HE U.S.S. Buchanan, a guided missile destroyer, rolls gent- ly in the waters of the Tonkin Gulf, 5.000 yards offshore of the Demilitarize(] Zone. Overhead, a full moon slips in and out of wispy tangles of cloud. Crew members who are not needed to tire the guns or run the ship are down in the mess deck watching Jane Fonda in Barbarella. One of the Buchanan's two automatic five-inch guns, with a maximum range of twelve miles, is trained to starboard. A voice rasps over the ship's loudspeaker: "Stand by. Mount 52. Two salvos." Five seconds later, the gun shreds the night. A pale orange flame shoots from the muzzle, and a 70-lb. shell whistles through the air en route to a target more than three miles inland from the Vietnamese coastline. In the pilot house, the officer of the deck watches the flight of the projectile on radar. Then a second round is fired. "Bore's clear," comes the voice on the loudspeaker. "Next tar- get is Number 17." So it goes until 5,30 the next morning, when 200 rounds of the Buchanan's "H and 1" (harassment and interdiction) fire will have been spent on 25 targets in- side the DMZ. Another night in the U.S. Navy's long war off the coast of Viet Nam has ended. U.S. Navy destroyers first began patrolling the Tonkin Gulf in 1961, and providing gunfire support for troops on the ground in 1965. Largely because the small North Viet- namese Navy has steered clear of combat, ine naval war has been consistently overshadowed by American fighting on the ground and in the air. The major exception occurred in Au- gust 1964. when two American destroyers, the Maddox and the Turner Joy. reported that they had been attacked in the gulf by North.Vietnamese torpedo boats. The incident, whose authenticity is still in doubt, led directly to passage by Con- gress of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Which Lyndon John- son used as authority for massive U.S. intervention in the Viet Nam War. ^ Last week, for the first time in two years, the ships that have been daily pounding the coast drew return lire from shore-based Communist artillery. One round hit the U.S.S. Lloyd 771o11zc1s. inflicting minor damage and injuring three crewmen. Normally, though, war ahoard the Buchanan and other destroyers is an impersonal war. The chief ingredients are ra- darscopes, computers, control panels, microswitches and ra- dios-plus movies in wide-screen color. The only time the ammunition is touched by human hands is when it is loaded into the automatic hoist. Deep in the bowels of the ship, Fire Controlman Second Class Jim Fagan of Miami holds the por- table trigger in his hand, nonchalantly squeezing the lever when he gets the signal over his headphones. "I don't feet like I'm part of this war," says one sailor. "I never see what we're shooting at. or whether it does any good." In the style of Admiral Zumwalt's "New Navy," officers and enlisted men alike sport beards, waxed mustaches and hair long enough to have put them on report three years ago. The chief disciplinary problems are drug abuse and ra- cial tension. though in scope they barely match similar prob- lems suffered in the Army. Boredom is pervasive. As one Buchanan sailor puts it: "1 sometimes go topside and stand at the rail. watching the moon on the water. I just stand there for hours like some damn U.S.O. ad." It bothers many of the sailors that they are fighting a pas- sive, unseen enemy. "We've been shooting at the same place for seven years," says one radarman. "By now, the Viet Cong must have the area roped off and posted with signs that say, 'Keep out, the ship is firing.' Still, unlike the ground units in South Viet Nam, the Navy is not setting an immediate course for home. "When they talk about the U.S. withdraw- ing from Viet Nam," says a chief petty officer, "they don't count the Navy, because we're not in the country. I figure we'll be staying around a while." IA-RDP8V,-0 601R001.30039000t' ---- ' pRY,For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDR& 1 R00 SA1 DI UNION .- 139,739 S .- 246,007 APR 1.51972 "Some events In the world ?,POSSIBLY ATTENDED over which we have little con- trol may produce crises that we Secretary of Defense Melvin cannot prevent. But we can Laird was -in the White House i at the same ti m e to confer be the masters of events when; _ crises occur, to the extent than with the President on Vietnam and h may ave partiitd i cpaen we are able to prepare our was never I A `1 e L ~ v I r n selves in advance. 1 ;- the session, but this announced. Crisis Unif SPECIAL PANEL 1,;' Dr. Henry Kissinger, Mr. "For this purpose we created Nixon's national security ad- within the National Security " viser, chairs all WASAG ses- Council a special senior panel sions. known as the Washington Spe- The official descriptions of cial Actions Group. This group WASAG activities indicate they possible crises, integrating the making contingency plans to political and military require- meet anticipated crises of the I r meats of crisis action. future. NUO''s Vlar " In 1971, the White House de- " j group also has been in- Copley News Service so important it raised the mem ?""ling together and examining WASHINGTON - Hanoi's in bership from the assistant see information on a breaking retary level to the under-secre-, crisis in order to provide op-; vasian of South.. Vietnam with; bons, if needed, from which massed infantry, tanks and! tary level. decision& can be made. heavy artillery set off a rapid-1- It was also disclosed: fire series of meetings here fori "In 1970 the WASAG had to one of the least known but most! deal with Cambodia, the Middle important crisis management -East and Jordan. In each case, teams in the government. I it laid the groundwork for rea- ' Called the Washington Spe cial Actions Group (WASAG), it, has met regularly at the White; House since the North Vietnam-i ese struck across the Demilita-1 rized Zone April 2. ! Members always include representatives of the State and soned decisions to prevent crises from expanding and threatening our interests and the peace." Cambodia, the Middle East and Jordan were the major crises of that year. - Defense departments, the Cell- Again early this year, in Mr. tral Intelligence Agency and' the White House. Other depart- ments are added if the subject matter requires it. Ronald Ziegler, White House 'press secretary, has provided! no information, from the ses- sions other than to announce they had been held, name the participants, and say they were assessing and coordinating in- formation from Vietnam. NO CRISIS He also attempted to down- play suggestions that decisions had been or would soon be made to counter the invasion, that WASAG would play a role in determining what those dcci- sions would be and to maintain that there was no crisis atmos- t~''phere at the White House. Previous administration de- scriptions of the duties of the special action group, however, suggest that major decisions were being pondered and that -'action would follow. President Nixon's first for- eign policy report in 1970 stated in part. Nixon's third annual foreign policy report, he said: "The Washington Special Ac- tions Group is charged with meeting the special need for. coordination' in crisis situations. .. WASAG serves as a manage- ment team assuring flexible and timely actions by the re- sponsible departments. It is also responsible for. . . devel- oping options for NSC (National Security Council) consid- erations." Adding impact to the impor- tance of the WASAG sessions launched in the wake of the North Vietnamese offensive was the fact that Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, attended on Monday, April 3, the day af- ter the attacks began. Also participating were Depu- ty Secretary of Defense Ken- neth Rush, Central Intel ace Agee Director Richard Helms, to ers"? :ecre'Iary of State Jo~Fin Irwin, and Deputy Asst. Secretary of State William Sul- livan. Approved For Fkelease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 WASHINGTON STAR Approved For Release 2001/93i0A$ R9RDP80-01601 RO Key U.S. Aides `ffietnam Hulead for V Maj. Gen. Alexander N. Haig is going to Vietnam to assess the war situation for President Nixon. Haig, deputy presidential as- sistant for national security affairs, two members of the National Security Council staff and one representative each from the State and Defense departments will spend about a week in Vietnam. Ilaig, who last visited Viet- nam in September, will con- sult with Ambassador Ells- worth Bunker and Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, U.S. commander in Vietnam. White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler made a spe- cial effort to tell newsmen yes- terday that the purpose of Haig's trip is not to help Nixon decide whether U.S. ground troops should be recommitted to the war. Edmund S. Muskie and Hubert H. Humphrey, candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination. Eleven senators reserved three hours of time for Wednesday to open the first full floor debate on the war since the Red offensive began. Eight critics and three de- fenders of Nixon's policies were set for a general discus- sion of recent events. Six other senators, three on each side of the issue, were said to be con- sidering joining in. r Sen. Alan Cranston, D-Calif., said in a statement that he has invited all 100 senators by let- ter to join the debate on the Senate floor. He said it will be open to all senators wishing to reserve time. On the campaign trail, Hum- phrey, Muskie, George S. McGovern and Rep. Shirley Chisholm all hit out at the Nix- on war policies. Humphrey Hits Involvement Humphrey, for example, said "The United States is very much deeply involved again" in the fighting. "It is my judment we should pro- ceed to end, this conflict and withdraw our forces," he said. Mrs. Chisholm said that Nix- on should "just for once .. . listen to the American peo- ple." Nixon has dispatched addi- tional air and naval forces to Indochina, including aircraft carriers, destroyers, fighter- bombers and B52 bombers. The pentagon has revealed few details of the buildup. But four aircraft carriers on duty in Indochina have 17,000 men on hoard, and the B52 force is being built up from, about 50 at the start of the North Viet- namese offensive to about 130 - a record number to be as- signed to the war zone. At the same time, the ad- ministration has reported a continued drop in U. S. ground force stationed in South Viet- nam, and officials have said plans to cut the troop level in South Vietnam to 69,000 by May 1 will go abed as sched- uled. Naval forces based off the Vietnam coast and air forces based in Thailand and Guam used in the fighting are not included in the strength figure. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 Ziegler said Nixon is consid- ering neither recommitment nor slowing the pace of U.S. withdrawals because of the Communist offensive. ' Critics of the administra- tion's 'Vietnam, policies, mean- while, were increasing their attacks against the current buildup. On Capitol Hill, 62 members of Congress sent Nixon a letter asking that he inform them and the public "as soon as possible of the size, purpose and anticipated costs of the U.S. military. actions now con- templated in and over Indochina." "If news reports are accu- rate," the letter said, "our country is now assembling in Southeast Asia one of the larg- est air armadas in military history. The use of such a force would certainly add not only to the destruction our bombing has already brought to the people and land of Indo- china, but also to the number of American casualties and prisoners of war." The signers included 58 Democrats and four Republi- cans, of whom there were 17 senators and 45 House mem- bers. The senators included NEV YORK I i;,:2n Approved For Release 200110/OIR:13Th -RDP80-01601 U. S. CaUtiOUSly Op mix I ic. But Sends Further B- 52's By TERENCE SMITH i Special to TIleNCW York TIMES WASHINGTON, April 11-The Nixon Administration provided a cautiously upbeat,assessment of the fighting in Vietnam today, but Pentagon sources disclosed that two ,more scuadrons of 13-52 bomb --- 1 d b 1 1 performance. Stressing that ors la OUR fiNell ore CIS tol Saigon still faces "several more leave for Indochina shortly. .weeks of major engagements" The additional planes, some! with the North Vietnamese, 30 in all, will increase the fleet! Jerry W. Friedheim, the Pen- of the giant jets in the combat zone to approximately 130, the largest ever assembled during the war. At the same time, White House sources reported that Henry A. Kissinger, the Presi- dent's adviser on national se- curity, had decided to postpone his scheduled trip to Japan un- 'tiI early May, to keep a close watch on the situation in Viet- nam. nor. Kissinger had been .scheduled to leave this week- end for three days of talks with Japanese leaders. The sources said that lie still planned to accompany Presi- dent: Nixon to Canada on Thursday for two days of con- versations in Ottawa. White House sources said that Mr. Kissinger bclieve& briefing that the South Viet- namese Army had performed "very well" in the latest fight- ing. The State Department spokesman, Robert J. Mc- Closkey, asserted today that the South Vietnamese had seized the initiative in the last 48 hours and that "the majority of the attacks" had been begun! s i o ' f S b . a g n orce y s Bodi he and Mr. Friedheim were careful, however, to, stress the tentative nature of their remarks and to emphasize that it was too early to reach any conclusion about the out- come of the offensive. A less guarded - and more. optimistic - appraisal of the) cf B-52's deployed in the com- b-at zone'was 103, in July, 1969. The sources said this was the deployment of the giant third, and probably the last, bombers to be ordered to coun- tcr t he enemy offensive. Thirty if the planes were dispatched Isle in February in anticipation of the fighting and 20 were or- d,-red to air bases in Guam and Tl ailand last week. - While Administration of- ficals have clearly have been, reI edeFo offered their firs tentative ap- praisals of the South Vietnamese g er c . stressed the effectiveness of the After the Saratoga headed strengthened American air out into the Atlantic, Naval power in turning back the Air Station. They presumably North Vietnamese attacks. landed on the carrier at sea. A few hours after his re- The Saratoga was expected marks, Pentagon sources said to pick up other fighter that the latest deployment ofl ,squadrons on the way to snake B-52 's would increase the slra- I a full battle complement of 70 tegic bombing force in lndo- aircraft. Sources said that the c.na nearly 3 r cent, to a t~lea$~at~(P,6`0~I~Z~01300390001-8 Approved For Release 2001/OY4di,,~- T.8~~160'IR 9 APR 1 The Challenge: C ucial Test. 101 rue Nixon oil. y WASIIINGTON _ In the basement of the White House there is an area full of reassuringly modern communi- cations equipment that its known to its inhabitants as the Situation Room. In the middle of the complex there is a small conference room insulated from the surrounding commotion by paneled walls. It was to this room that Henry A. Kissinger summoned Presidentt. Nixon's senior advisers ast week, and their mood was as and serious as the news clattering over the teleprinters outside. he Nn,it.h Vietnamese had moved across the demilitarized zone (DVIZ) to launch massive, coordinated attacks on South Vietnamese strongholds, thereby putting the Vietnam war precisely where Mr. Nixon did not want it- back on page one-and raising an ominous challenge to the President's -election-year hopes, By the end of the week the South Vietnamese seemed to have softened their resistance. Nonetheless, there was little question that the enemy al.tacks had severely shaken tine Ad- ministration, confronted Mr, Nixon's military advisers with hard choices and caused his political strategists to w,iestioO nis three-year effort to en- f;:ir.er an American withdrawal from Vietnam by Election Day without si- multaneously sacrificing; Vietnam to the enemy. Most analysts here saw the offen- sive as an all-out effort to discredit the Viet.namization program, shatter South Vietnamese morale, weaken Mr. Nixon's hold on public opinion at home and force him, to offer more gener- ous terns if and when the suspended peace negotiations resume in Paris. Asked on Monday what the Presi- d ould do to Help South Viet- t w oraeref tnem to oegin-was well away from the scene making a speech and shaking hands in Philadelphia. As devised by the Special Action Group in conjunction with the United States commanders in Vietnam, the massive air strikes Thursday and Friday went well beyond the concept of "protective reaction" used by the Administration to justify earlier retal- iatory raids. Mr. Laird, speaking for the Adminis- tration while the President rested and conferred with Mr. Kissinger in Key Biscayne, said the bombing would con- tinue until * Hanoi withdrew its tanks and troops. Admiral Moorer said the planes were bombing targets up to 40 to 50 miles north of the DMZ. Other sources said the "upper limit" would probably be the 20th Parallel, about 200 miles above the DMZ and about 70 miles south of Hanoi. In domestic political terms, the pres- ent round of fighting may yet prove to be acceptable, Much depends on how long it lasts. If the South Viet- namese show themselves capable of mastering what Is clearly their sternest test in a year, it would strengthen the credibility of Mr. Nixon's withdrawal strategy. But if the South Vietnamese fail to stem the tide, even with American air power to help them, or if the attack appear. If this idea were to take root, Mr. Nixon's speeches about a "generation of peace" might begin to sound hol- low. And his inability to shed an old commitment could make him yet an- other political casualty of the Vietnam war.. . -ROBERT B. SEMPLE en nam in its moment of trial, White to the enemy's reliance on Soviet* House spokesmen said ivir. Nixon was supplied equipment -- not the White keeping his "options" open. But he House, whose occupant still wishes to did not seem to have many options go to Moscow and has no interest in left.. engaging in personal name-calling To withdraw completely from the with the Soviets. And when the first conflict at this critical moment would massive retaliatory raids began Thurs- l' App vela or Release 2OO 1/0$104n: CIA--RDP80101601 R001300390001-8 ization. It would seem to many to be an abandonment not only of Mr. Nix- on's pledge to find an "honorable" so- lution in Vietnam but his outit! oft-stat- ed concerns about the "credibility" of America's pledges overseas. The President's withdrawal program has reduced American forces in South Vietnam to 95,000 men-including only 6,000 or so ground combat troops- and , indications have been that the number would drop to 35,000 by Elec- tion Day. Reintroduction of ground troops at this point would have enor- mous political impact. It would amount to a public vote of no confidence in the South Vietnamese and an invita- tion to a renewal of sharp domestic dissension over Vietnam. The President spent most of Mon- day on the phone-with Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with Melvin Laird, his Secretary of I)efense, and with William P. Rogers, his Secretary of State - receiving estimates of the fighting and debating the alterna- tives. In the end he won support for his own tentative decision that if the fighting worsened the United States should seek to 'stem the enemy of- fensive by the only means available .-air power. The President assigned the task of devising detailed options to the Wash- ington Special Action Group, a team of proves to he only one of a series of in- planners headed by Mr. Kissinger and termittcnt enemy offensives, each re- including representatives of the State /quiring new doses of American help, it and Defense Departments , the Central may occur to the American public that Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs the war, after all, is not going to dis- of Staff that meets at moments of emergency. The group met daily in the Situation Room until Mr, Nixon left for Florida late Thursday. And to his press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, Mr. Nixon entrusted the propaganda war, instructing him to devise some way of portraying con- cern and preparing the public for re- taliatory action without conveying or creating a sense of panic and failure in the White House itself. The solution, devised in morning huddles among Mr. Ziegler and his counterparts at Defense and State, Dan Henkin and Robert McCloskey, was to impose on State and Defense the bur- den of enunciating Government pol- icy and articulating official fears and hopes without directly committi,ig the authority of the President to any par- ticular argument or line of reasoning. It was Mr. McCloskey, for example, who first pointedly called attention 5APR1972 Approved For Release 2001/03/04':.CIA-RDP80-01601 R001 30 rushea z 0 more i Washington Bureau of The Sun' Washington-The United States has rushed an additional force of about 20 B-52 bombers across the Pacific to bolster units already there in prepara- tion for the heavy blows . in said the enemy has put more, titsky, described as a Commu- than 30,000 troops from ele-' nist party Central Committee ments of three divisions and member and head of Soviet air three separate regiments into defense forces. the battle-entering South Viet- While he raised the issue of foam from both the buffer zone and the Laotian border area. He said the "invasion in retaliation for North Vietnam'sI force" is continuing across attack into South Vietnam I "what used to be the Demilitar- across the demarcation zone between the two countries. This was disclosed by author- itative sources yesterday as one ized Zone." At the State Department, Robert J. McCloskey, the offi- cial spokesman, sought to focus of the major immediate actions; a spotlight on the Soviet Un- taken by the administration Jon's contribution to the offen- which continued to say official- ! sive, ,ly that it is keeping "all options) The Communist forces "are open" to deal with what is supported in a very large way shaping up as a large set-piece, by heavy military equipment" battle in South Vietnam's north-i from Russia, he said. This re- ern province. Defensive line.. ferred to the tanks, artillery and antiaircraft missiles (some STATINTL Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), the majority leader, raised his voice here yesterday against the use of either air power or American ground Soviet backing of the new offen- troops against the enemy offen- sive, Mr. McCloskey said there !save. was no reconsideration in any l "Its time for vietnamization way of President Nixon's visit [turning the war over to the to Moscow, scheduled to startiSouth Vie'namesel to fish or May 22., cut bait, to produce or else," The Washington Special Ac-1Mr. Mansfield said. "My point Lion Group-a sub-Cabinet level is, and has been for years, we committee which prepares ana- Iought to get out lock, stock and lyses and proposals for presi- barrel." He was asked the po- dential action-met again yes- litical implications for Mr. Nix- terday on the Vietnam situa-, on of the present attack and Lion, but no official word shot back: "I'm not interested emerged on specific actions to in political implications." be taken. But Senator Barry M. Gold- The options realistically open water (R., Ariz.) urged the to Washington are air strikes in President to end the "Dilly-dal- support of the South Vietnam- ly bombing of North Vietnam" ' The South Vietnamese ap-lof the last-named reportedlylese in the battle area and; and cut loose a major cam- ;pear, informants said, to have now in the buffer zone) which against North Vietnamese tar- paign against enemy supply fallen back to a defensive line Russia has supplied for years ! gets, along with naval gunfire lines and marshalling yards, ranging along the Dong Ha Riv-i and, according to Mr. Mc-! performing the same functions. That would include Haiphong or and then southward before, Closkey, has lately increased. Both are under way, but are Harbor, if necessary. Quang Tri city and Hue. These) Soviet and North Vietnamese expected to be escalated sharp-' Mr. Nixon faces a "major ,.informants expected the ene-! news media have reported the f ly with clearing weather. ! decision" on how far to extend .my's next moves to become I visit to Hanoi-just before the! With the'B-52 reinforcements the bombing now. Mr. Goldwa- :apparent in the next day or so. Jerry W. Friedheim, a De- lense, Department spokesman, offensive started-of a Russian ! sent to the war zone from U.S. to said in the Senate. He had a military delegation headed by bases, American commanders "hunch" a large campaign was Marshal Pavel Fedorovich Ba- ;now have about the same nun-. under consideration. He said lie .her of the bombers as they had had no inside information, how-, at peak strength in 1968, when ever. there were 102 based in Thai- The tenor of official indica- land and Guam. tions thus far has been that air In mid-February, two squad- power will be used, at least rons, 30 planes in all, were sent initially, to try to influence the to Guam to bolster the air battle in northern South Viet- power than being brought to nam and against the supply bear on an expected enemy lines and facilities across the offensive in the Central High-! buffer zone that are supporting lands and the northern prov-the offensive. The adminisira- inces, There were 50 at U Ta- tion has left Hanoi to wonder Pao Air Base in Thailand. [what more may come. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 By Courtney R. Sheldon Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor ~q' ~~~~ 2d1~ }~i ~IIIl~II ~Ill~lla Washington seeks to gauge extent, 'duration of 'new assault CFz'~:ISaIAtT SCIENCE }~C? SI~Tq Approved For Release 2001/03/04. CIA-RQF 80-0'6p 1300 5 APR 1972 Washington Washington may soon know if it has critically underestimated the military strength and political punch of the North Vietnamese.. If it has, a shift in President Nixon's three-year-old Vietnam war strategy could well follow. Administration officials have consistently predicted harassing attacks by the Com- munists in 1972, but not debilitating or even seriously embarrassing ones. Administration spokesmen indicate a be- lief that the North Vietnamese "invaders" are apparently intending to hold onto the land they have seized. The North Vietnamese force, according to the Pentagon, is comprised of conven- tional ingredients such as "tanks, heavy artillery, antiaircraft fire, engineers, and fresh supplies." Bornbing jab discounted? At the White House, the Washington Spe- cial Action Group was summoned for the second day in a row to advise the President. The administration continues to discount the possibility that U.S. ground forces will be used, but White House officials .will not say so publicly and explicitly. Instead, the official position is that, "all options" are open to the United States. One extreme one that could be under considera- tion is bombing of North Vietnam as far north as Hanoi. However, such action has generally been felt as unnecessary and likely to jeopardize the U.S. goals at the Moscow summit meeting in May. The panic button has not been pushed at the, White House. But there is admitted un- certainty and concern that North Vietnam will, at the very least, hold on to much of the territory it now has overrun south of the demilitarized zone. Massive U.S. air support for reinforced South Vietnamese can prevent a rout of Saigon's forces, administration officials maintain. Whether U.S. air power can lead the South Vietnamese soldiers and refugees back into lost territory is a larger question. Too busy for theorizing Administration officials are too busy try- ing.to bail out of the present military situa- tion in northern South Vietnam to engage in such theoretical speculation. They may soon be faced with .further frontal-attacks by the North Vietnamese in the central highlands, and farther south. Henry A. Kissinger, the President's ad- viser for national security affairs, said as recently as Feb. 9 that North Vietnam "ap- pears to be concentrating, especially in the area of the central highlands, but perhaps also for high-point activities, as far south as the delta." A year ago, after North Vietnam's in- cursions into Laos, the White House ac- cepted intelligence estimates that the North Vietnamese were no longer in a position to interfere with the Vietnamization pro- gram-the strengthening of the South Viet- namese to go it alone eventually. At that time, it is understood, the White advised that Hanoi had been shaken to-the House was core. It was felt that the North Vietnamese could mount momentary spectaculars, but could not continue a pro- tracted war if they did. Administration officials warn against jumping to conclusions while the battle situation remains so murky in South Vietnam. Until the North Vietnamese came swarming across the border last weekend, the Vietnam issue in domes- tic politics was subdued. California Congressman Paul N. McCloskey Jr. (R) had abandoned a futile race against Mr. Nixon in the GOP primaries. The continued insistence by administration officials that withdrawals from Vietnam will continue on sched- ule has given war critics less room for new criticism. But this may not hold for long. While the North Vietnam offensive was in its fourth day, Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield op- posed "countering the North Vietnamese attack with huge bombing attacks which will only mean more planes shot down and more Americans falling into Communist captivity." He added that "we must get out, lock, stock, and barrel." McGovern : `two choices'. Sen. George McGovern's first reaction to the new Hanoi initiative was that he had "predicted two years ago that if we continued on Mr. Nixon's Vietnamization STATINTL If this cannot be accomplished, would the course, }which is an effort to sustain General Thieyu in _,1 ra U.S. public/~PPtl}C9VW cFb t6y2a /4~'4e rtloic F fdS rr is e'I i cM,e Q bO001-8 the North Vietnamese ability to a o t eir attack and try to force us out, especially at a time when ti real estate after eight years of decima ng we're bombing them very heavily." C&?nf i )'1.' ~; ~';y y0iti. T~.taFu Approved For Release 200T/0 jI9l4 -RDP80-0 XON DISPATCHING ~ ION~i~BHO2'~ 10 to 20 Craft Are Ordered to Reinforce Air Armada to Counter Enemy Offensive STATINTL At the White House; fTie;ddpf,'ventional coiniined-arms battle Gerald L. with the enemy employing ress secretar t u y p y, Warren, said that Mr. Nixon tanks, heavy artillery, heavy was keeping do close touch with I antiaircraft fire, engineers and the Vietnam fighting through fresh supplies for its troops.". his advisers. 1: Mr. McCloskey character- For the second consecutive I ized it as a "naked attack by day, Henry A. Kissinger, the. the North Vietnamese military, President's adviser on nationals into South Vietnam." security, presided at a meeting' of the Washington Special Ac- tion Group to discuss the- re- taliatory options available to the United States. The group, which is com- posed of senior officials from the State and Defense Depart- Troop Freeze Is Implied - Although the spokesmen said the new assaults would not in-: terfere with the President's program for troop withdraw-` als, other officials implied that: Mr. Nixon might freeze Amer" Vican troop strength in Vietnam; at 69,000 after may 1. That decision, and the ques-, tion of resumed bombing of the, special to The New York Times genCe Agency, meets durin WASHINGTON, April 4-The emergencies. The officials con- Unit?d States tonight ordered ferred for an hour and 15 min the deployment of 10 to .20 utes today and are expected to more B-52 bombers to Indo- meet again tomorrow. china to strengthen the Ameri Meanwhile, the President was receiving conflicting advice can ability to respond to the from Congress on what the new North Vietnamese of fen- American response to the ene-; away from suggestions that the stye, my attacks should be. attacks might effect a major The new planes will bolster The Senate Democratic lead- change in United States rela- er, Mike Mansfield of Montana, thb existing fleet of strato-I opposed the use t;!nns with the Soviet Union. fortresses by up to 25 per cent.i said that lie specifically said that there of American air power or corn no reconsideration of the Eighty more of the giant bomb I bat troops. was President's intention to visit I ers -already are stationed at "Bombing the north will not th Soviet Union beginning airfields in Thailand and Guam.l bring about a settlement," he May 22. The Pentagon spokesman, said. "I mean, we would just I`he spokesman said he did lose more planes, increase the ant know whether the Adminis- Jerry W. Friedheim, declined) number of prisoners of war and tration would approach the So- comment on the B 52 deploy decrease the chances for a ne- vict Union to persuade Hanoi jrnent, except to observe than gotiated settlement." to limit its offensive. But other President Nixon had expressed) He repeated his call for a '.,Ifi, ials said there was no rea- liis readiness "to take what-I complete American withdrawal rat to believe Moscow would ever steps are necessary toi from Vietnam, adding: "This is be responsive to such a request. ern- 1protect the remaining United! a time for Vietnamization to , Rather, the deliberate em- fish or cut bait." phasis on the role of the Soviet States forces in South Viet On the Republican side, Sen- equipment in the spokesmen's nam." ator Barry Goldwater argued statements today seemed to be Meanwhile, the State Depart- the opposite view. designed. to underscore the Iment asserted that what it said The President will have to magnitude of the foreign sup- was North Vietnam's extensive make a decision, he said, port the North Vietnamese are use of Soviet supplied tanks' whether "we continue the receiving. and heavy artillery in its five- dilly-dally bombing" of enemy So far as the American re- da offensive had added "a supplies as they are shipped sponse is concerned, officials Y south, or "go in earnest at the at the State Department noted new factor to the battlefield source of supplies in the north, that increased air strikes were f or e situation in South Vietnam." including the harbor at Hai- the only viable option The department spokesman, Iphong." United States to pursue, since Robert J. 'McCloskey, said that ; Mr. Goldwater left no doubt the American combat forces Soviet equipment had permitted that he favored the second had dwindled to the point the North Vietnamese to wage course. where they could no longer be "conventional warfare rather The Administration took effective. than their traditional guerrilla- steps today to insure that it, The officials said they doubt- style attacks." would speak with one voices ed that Mr. Nixon would seek Mr. McCloskey's stress on + to re-introduce additional. Amer-. Its three principal spokesmen,: Soviet equipment appeared to lean forces. be an effort to provide addi- Mr. McCloskey; Ronald L. Zieg-` "This has got to be a. test tional public ju"stifidation in ler, the White House press sec for the Vietnamese," one offi case of a decision to renew the rotary, and Daniel Z. Henkin? cial said, "and they have ta bombing of North Vietnam. the Assistant Secretary of De-i pass it on their own." He specifically said the fense for Public Affairs, met in' United States was still holding Mr. Ziegler's office this morn-; STATINTL open all its retaliatory options, ling ing to coordinate their state7', including resumed air strikes ments. deep into North Vietnam while In subsequent briefings; they`; it continued to review the mili or their deputies all made a; tary situation. point of stressing that full, Privately, Administration of- scale conventional fighting was ficials said that while Presi- now going on. dent Nixon might order heavy Mr. Friedheim, Mr. I I enkin's had bn5t` v,41 i it f", t ti A-RDP80-01601 R001 300390001-8 nor,, will depend on the evef is of the next few days, the officials said. Despite his stress on the role of the Soviet-supplied equip: L HT[Ii~ TON POST Approved For Release 2001/08/'?Fi dI1A-RDP80-01601 K001 300390001 -B quences. To all these goes TO ~' Y'~Il1~i91 War l"adiiC By Murrey Marder Washington Post Staff Writer United States officials said yesterday that Communist forces are shifting from guer- i?illa tactics to frontal warfare in South Vietnam by introduc- big "massive" quantities of heavy battle equipment, in- eluding tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft guns. "These units are supported in a very large way by heavy military equipment from the situation is still too "fluid" to make any durable assess- ments. Sy labeling what has. oc- curred as an "invasion," "a blatant invasion," or a "naked attack" by North Vietnam, the administration already has laid out a justification for greatly intensified U.S. air at- tacks on North Vietnam. The continuing expansion of the official denunciations of the Communist assault suggests, in addition, that the Nixon ad- ministration is bracing Ameri- can public opinion for more adverse news about the mili- tary capacity of the Commu- nist forces. In claiming that the nature of the warfare is shifting fun- damentally, the administra- tion, in effect, was throwing a question mark over its own re- Soviet Union," said State .De-1 peatedly expressed confidence said the unusually heavy flow Soviet partniclit press spokesman I that the Communists cannot of this equipment through t i l d f a n a pro onge major o -;I the Di11Z continues. Robert J. McCloskey. sus fensive in South Vietnam. ,! Despite the heavy Commu. When newsmen asked if the If the Communist offensive ! nist attacks just below the raising of that issue carried should succeed in seizing the.! supposed buffer zone between the implication that the input northern provinces of South North and South Vietnam, of Soviet weaponry might Vietnam, which some officials many officials believe that an- ,jeopardize President Nixon's privately fear, that would not I other and -possibly larger as- A1ay 22 sumillrt trip to Mos- nniv hnitar flip Nivnn nriminic. -?11 ,~ < 41,.. cr; ,.. t._ claimed any such intention. Vietnamization. A Communist "No, no," he replied. Until yes- advance of that scope would t.erday however, U.S. officials also impose a heavy burden of had avoided statements chat the administration to carry would raise such questions. through the current presiden- For the second straight day, tial election campaign. spokesmen for the White For the second day in a row, House, the State Department the Washington Special Action and the Pentagon engaged in Group of the National Secu- a coordinated escalation of the rity Council, the administra- ff" ; 1 1 1 r U Q nccrn o o continue dilly-dally bombing conventional warfare is tnat i or go into the northern part of this is the kind of warfare the North Vietnam to the source American troops, which are of supply," he said. This is a 'now largely withdrawn, were long-standing G o l d w a t e r best equipped to fight. The theme, and he said he has South Vietnamese First. Dlvi- been advising the President sion is rated as a prime exam- privately to take that course, pie of this American training. Defense Secretary Melvin R. I U.S. officials say it will signify Laird met with Mr. Nixon for !"serious trouble" for the Viet- an hour yesterday and spokes- man Ziegler said the Presi- narnization program if this di- vision fails to meet expecta- dent continues to' follow war tions. developments closely, which t Pentagon spokesman Fried- Ziegler emphasized are still in 1 heim said North Vietnam'! their "early stages." l battle force in the northern State Department spokes- provinces of South Vietnam is man McCloskey said North now above 30,000, with the in- Vietnam has moved into the flow continuing. The United South far more Soviet-sup- States now has four aircraft plied tanks and other weapons carriers in the Tonkin Gulf, than ever before. In addition, Plus the U.S.S. Tripoli, a heli- he said, Soviet-supplied sur- copter carrier used in amphib- face-to-air missile sited in the ;ions assaults. Demilitarized Zone "add an important factor." Defense and state officials 1 Central Highlands areal around Kontum. This is where the heaviest thrust initially was expected. North Vietnamese strategists openly boasted last week that since South Vietnamese forces "have lost their shield" through the withdrawal of about 400,000 U.S. troops, Sai- gon's forces are too weak to . . t o rcia eve tion s top task force for inter-.1 meet challenges from multiple about the North Vietnamese national emergencies, met at directions. This is the critical about the offensive. the White House under presi-!' test that is now under way. "The North Vietnamese are dential adviser Henry A. Kis- U.S. officials said South in a sophisticated way through the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) into the south," said White House press, secretary Ronald L. Ziegler. 'What appears to be shaping hii;h officials of State, De- ! roved 10.000 to_ 15 000 air- , fense, the Central Intelligence jjoorne troops, marines, and Agency and the NSC. Another some portions of their highly meeting is scheduled for 1 rated First Division further today. " I north, to reinforce South Viet- Senate Democratic Leader ? nam's Third Division at the up, said Defense Department Mike Mansfield of Montana main point of contact, just press officer Jerry W. Fried- told newsmen it is "time to north and west of the city of heim, is "a more convention- fish or cut bait" in the Viet. Quangtri. al-type battle effort on the namization program for turn- , However, the bulk of the part of the enemy than we ing the war over to South First Division, which is rated have known for years." Vietnam. "We ought to get out one of the best in South Viet- Said lwn or ey, "What we sack, stock and barrel," he nam, reportedly. remains de- see on the ground ... is a di Another round of ? U.S. ployed around the coastal city, bombing of Hue about 35 miles south vcrgenee from the more trad g North Vietnam, said of Quangtri. Some military an- tional pattern of guerrilla war- Mansfield, will mean that "we alysts believe that the Corn fare," Missing from all these char- acterizations, however, was any comprehensive report on the actual atlkte? prospects ,wdrbe dat~ projection, of the - conse- will lose more planes, the munists, probably after an as- and the possibility of negotia- tions will evaporate." Sen. Barry Goldwater (R. Ariz.), however, advocated ex- "01 /03/04 resr ent Nixon "must make up his mind whether to at Hue, depending upon how much of the First Division is drawn off by the battle fur- ther north. One of the paradoxes In the veIA iRDR8O-@1AQ4R forces are now reverting to 01300390001-8 3111 !Toll STAR Approved For Release 2003/d810k: IA-R~ff*N f 01 RO '(a001u, 0(1311 S JllSS l Ofl By GEORGE SHERMAN to .open talks on addition sale Star Staff Writer i:,1'-of American,,grain and feed The Nixon administratioij the Russians.) has carefully escalated verbal A fear among on Hanoi's invasion of g some in- South Vietnam while insisting formed sources is that what- there is no crisis here over ever retaliation Nixon decides what to do on the ground. upon in North Vietnam may State Department spokes- cause the Russians -to cancel man Robert J. McCloskey, the President's own Moscow chief vehicle for transmitting visit. For that reason, Mc- Nix:on concern, for the first Closkey's official mention of time yesterday injected a Soviet involvement was kept mention of the Russians into purposely low-keyed and his discussion of the "naked sketchy. He referred only to attack" on South Vietnam. the added SAM missiles and "I want to call attention to heavy tanks supplied by Mos- the fact," he told a news brief- cow to Hanoi. ing, "that these (North Viet- Ziegler said afterwards that narnese) units are supported he had "nothing to add.11 Fur- in a very large way by heavy military equipment from the Soviet Union." Both he and Pentagon press spokesman Jerry W. Fried- heirn emphasl7?cd that the full- scale attack by. North Viet- namese across. the demilitar- ized 'zone shows a massive shift to sophisticated couven-, tional warfare, and a turn away from the more tradi-' tional guerrilla pattern. Russians Equip SA.'1Is Later, intelligence sources said that $45 million of the estimated $100 million military aid sent by the Russians last year ,to Hanoi went into equip- ping 10 of the SAM 2 surface- to-air missile battalions now set up in and around the de- militarized zone. The $100 million aid for 1971 said that $45 million of the lion sent in 1970. But at the White House press secretary Ronald L. Zie- gler., who is meeting daily with McCloskey, insisted that presi- dential concern over the inva- sion has not reached crisis proportions. Nixon yesterday was still "assessing" the situa- tion, spending "some" but not "most" of his time on it, and there was no "crisis atmos- phere" at the White House, he said. Both the White House and State D e p a r t in e n t denied quickly - McCloskey an- swered "No, no" - that Soviet support for the invasion was supply depots, including Hai- scorned the proposal. ? Mc- phong harbor if necessary. Closkey said that chances are "The President is faced. with "dim" for public or private a decision," said Goldwater in -negotiations so long as the mil- a Senate speech." ... He must itary invasion continues. make up his mind whether to continue dilly-dally bombing or go into the northern part of North Vietnam to the source of supply." I Although it was his first pub- lic expression of differences with Nixon over handling of the war, the senator added that he still supports Nixon's overall policy in Indochina. His words contrasted with those earlier of Senate Majori- ty Leader Mike Mansfield, thermore, he maintained that who said he would oppose re- the daily meetings at the sumption of the bombing "un- White House of the Washing-. der any circumstances." ton Special Action Groups "It's time for Vietnamiza- chaired by presidential advis- tion to fish or cut bait - to er Henry A. Kissinger and in- produce or else," said the eluding top lieutenants from Montana Democrat. "We must the Slate and Defense Depart- get out, lock, stock and bar- ments and the Central Intelli- 'rel." genre Agency, have been J Sen. George McGovern, who "routine, to a degree." Ile re- won a victory yesterday in the " cri- fused to call the group a sis-management" body. The universal suspicion in official circles is that the President will order heavy bombing of the, North Viet- namese staging and other sup- ply sites just above the DMZ once the weather clears in the Wisconsin Democratic presi- dential primary, made the same point. He repeated his position that it is time for the President to set a definite data for total U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. North. Officials point to a Sen. Hubert H. Htunphrey, warning Nixon made in a who finished third in the pri- press conference Dec. 10, 1970. mary, was more cautious. He said that if he concludes While predicting failure of the that the North Vietnamese, North Vietnamese drive, he "by their infiltration, threaten said that continued American our remaining forces, if they \, air power in support of the thereby develop a capacity South Vietnamese is necessary and proceed possibly to use to keep the situation stable as that capacity to increase the American troop withdrawal level of fighting in South Viet- continues. nam, then I will order the U.S. officials here admit bombing of the military sites in North Vietnam, the passes that lead from North Vietnam into South Vietnam, the mili- tary complexes, the military supply lines." Officials note that this course of aciion, at least ini- tially, would not mean re- sumption of bombing of the highly populated areas of North Vietnam above the 20th Paralled. causing Nixon to reconsider But yesterday Sen. Barry his planned trip to Moscow Goldwater, R-Ariz., made his starting May 22. first attack on the Nixon han- (The White House an- dling of the Vietnam war and nniuiced yesterday that Agri- . called upon the President to CHI' Ire Secretary Earl L. Butz order an all-out bombing as- great puzzlement over the ulti- mate intentions of Hanoi in this conventional-type inva- sion. Perhaps the best- informed guess is that made public today by South Viet- namese President Nguyen Van Thieu - that the North Viet- namese are trying to take a limited amount of South Viet- namese territory for bargain- ing purposes. Yesterday both the Viet Cong and Hanoi representatives in Paris made a formal proposal that the peace talks normal Thursday session be held this week. But both Washington STATINTL would visit Moscow next week Sault on . North Vietnamese the talks two weeks ago - Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-[001300390001-8 L r .T? .sii:: SUN Approved For Release 2001 047ZCIA-RDP80-01601 RO Hundreds o I.S. air strikes flown k ? invaders in South -VIetnam Amer- Saigon-A warplanes fleet has of lean begun :flying to aid South Vietnamese troops hurled into retreat by the North Vietnamese offensive in this country's northermost province. American military sources said that "several hundred" air 1strikes were flown in South 1Vietnam this morning by U.S. planes despite bad weather, but there was no official command announcement of what ap- peared to he the start of an intensive bombing campaign. i f , a t thrted level o r Bue repo . ~ ton Spe- strikes was still only a fraction' 000 to 17,000 North Vietnamese mecting of the Washing troops who have pushed Saigon cial Action Group, whose func forces out of 1.5 iron would be to prepare aria- government rein- forced capability as morning fog along with broken and low bases in northern and western lyses and proposals for presi- clouds.} ept many planes on thei Quang Tri province, which lies dential action. ground. ' . just south of the demarcation This group, made up of State The raids this morning, ani zone separating North and and Defense Department offi- ncrease from yesterdays 123i South Vietnam. , cials, Central Intelligence Agee- in Quang Tri province, were' American 13-52s bombed a' cy representatives and others flown by planes based on three series of suspected Communist as required, and chaired by onccntrations pn-hing on Henry A. Kissinger, the Presi- c o l STATINTL op U.S. aircraft carriers off the t Vietnamese coast and from Quang Tri city from the south, dent's national security affairs American bases in Thailand de- southwest and west yesterday assistant, is the action subeom spite the low cloud ceilings, areas across the buffer zone) mittee of the National Security military sources said. that are supporting the tanks, Council. It proposes, but does The American command is and infantry driving into the. not, decide, actions to be taken. also believed preparing to re- South. The foe has wiped out: Gerald L. Warren, a White sume the bombing of North the buffer zone, one official; House spokesman, said in dis- said. closing the high-level meeting Vietnam, at least on a limited While the first use of air that Mr. Nixon stands by his north demarcation zone, in an effort. to blunt the flower, as weather clears, ~cili earlier expressions of confidence ifive-day-old Communist offen- be aimed at influencing thej in South Vietnams ability to sive. . immediate course of battle, all; cope with enemy offensives. [A Reuter dispatch today official indications were that Dr. Kissinger and Adm. quoted military sources who re- strikes farther north must bel. 'Ihoheas H. Chiefs Moorer, Staff chairman Joint of , met q considered likely. I of ported that 3,000 South y ietna mere marines waded ashore on Robert J. McCloskey, a Stateffe ive Nixon to discuss the con. the banks of the Cua Viet River Department spokesman. recall i ;offensive andhothe ne President William below the demarcation zone to ed Mr. Nixon's freouer,t as-Ilferred by p sertions that he would '-take 'P..Rogers, Secretary of State, with be g ,in counterattack. whatever action he considered and Melvin R. Laird, Secretary [The marines moved ashore necessary to protect i .S. forces of Defense. 'five hours before dawn after and their continuing r;iritdr:+~- (being landed by U.S. and South al" during the Viet nam i za tion Vi,Anamese landing craft, the process. dispatch added. McCloskey issued the [Reuter quoted the military Mr. denunciation Mr. Ms Ianoi for "f tae sources across l arithe grant violation" of the 1754 Ge- neva agreements on Indochina beach and surrounding area to and of the 1963 "uuderstand- ?dut off any Communist thrust ings" which brought an end to know that of the coast America's continuous bombing ;known as as "the Street without [joy."] of North Vietnam and a move, The U.S. command said yes- to the Paris talks. terday that it was taking what , Those "understandings," now it called "~c~ ~, a~t ion- t~ caned by IIanoi were that arv meast?~5o ~t~i 9e ~elmog2001l'( 04111sCIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 sea power t protect-remaining would get under way, and IIa American fo orces, which were not would respect the buffer reduced by 6,200 men last week zone and avoid shelling major to 95,500. South Vietnamese cities. The An official Voice of America U.S. says it was to continue un- commentary broadcast latrr from Washington ' blunl.'.'r molested reconnaissance flights noi that it would 1~^, over the North. The U.S. al- d II a warne "a serious miscalculation" to so says that most of its bomb- conclude that President Nixon ing of the North since 1968 was in retaliation for North Viet will not resume bombing of; namese attacks on the photo North Vietnam if it presses its planes. attack in the South. President Nixon demonstrat- The first targets of the Amer-i eJ his concern about the North ican bombing campaign, how-i Vietnamese offensive by having will be the estimated 15,-; his spokesmen announce a ever Approved For Release 26 /631/ 4 : CIA' AWO 1601 R NIXON SEES AIDES Renewed Bombing of North Among Steps Being Weighed By BERNARD GWERTZMAN Speriai to Tkr New York T!mes WASHINGTON, April 3 - The United States accused Hanoi today of 'launching an "invasion" of South Vietnam and said Washington was leav- ing open all retaliatory- options ,--including renewed American bombing of North Vietnam. The justification for such strikes - if they are ordered was provided by the State Department, which charged North Vietnam with "flagrant ';violations" both-of the 1954 treaty ending the French Indo- china war and of the 1968 understanding that led to the end of systematic American bombing of North Vietnam and the start of what were to be substantive talks in Paris. Spokesmen for the White House, the State Department and the Defense Department refused, however, to predict what course of action might .be taken in coming days. Some Bombing Foreseen low. That panel, which includes Both the 1954 and 1968 ac- I representatives from the State `cords have been sources of and Defense Departments, the emantic contention between supporters and critics of Amer- Central Intelligence Agency and can involvement in Vietnam. other concerned agencies, meets In essence, the United .during periods of emergency. States has charged North Viet- Mr. Kissinger met privately nam'with violating the 1954 with Mr. Nixon after the ses- treaty by infiltrating men and Sion, Ronald. L. Ziegler, the, supplies into South Vietnam. Critics, however, have charged White House press secretary,' that South Vietnam broke the said. Attack Expected, Ziegler Says It was evident that despite the crisis in South Vietnam, the Administration was seeking to avoid giving an impression of undue concern. Mr. Ziegler referred several times to the current fighting as "the South" Vietnamese operation" and said that the attack by North Viet- nam had been expected. "Now i that it is beginning, our posi- tion is to evaluate it day by day," he said. He cautioned newsmen again matting any "assumptions at this time" on what would be done, because, he said, the President wants "all options open." Mr. Ziegler and the Defense Department spokesman, ' Jerry W. Friedheim, said that the American withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam was con- tinuing on schedule despite the increased fighting. Mr. Nixon has said that troop strength would be reduced to 69,000 by May 1 and has promised a new troop reduction announcement before then. Mr. Ziegler said that this plan was unchanged. The spokesman also said it was highly unlikely that any of thb six United States combat battalions remaining in Viet- nam would be engaged in the ground operations. They are committed. to guarding United States installations. In answer to questions, Mr. Ziegler also said that American air power would be used as necessary to aid South Viet- namese forces in combating enemy forces within South Vietnam. Robert J. McCloskey, the State Department spokesman- who had attended the meeting of the Special Action Group- was the Administration's sharp- est voice during the day, `Flagrant Violation' Charged treaty in the middle nineteen- Fifties by refusing to hold elec- tions that might have led to Communist control of all Viet- nam. The 1968 "understanding,' as made known by the Johnson 1060 31 Vietnam-on to destroy their ability to fight. The Paris talks on Vietnam have. been indefinitely sus- pencdel, and the chief American negotiator, William J. Porter, has returned to the United States. Mr. McCloskey said there were no plans for Mr. Porter to return soon to Paris. He will confer with Mr. Nixon later this week. Mr. McCloskey also said that one factor in the United States decision to suspend the talks had been the build-up of enemy forces for the expected attack against South Vietnamese forces. He said that the United Admmtstration on Oct. , Slates would not negotiate un provided for an end of Ameri- current cart bombing of North Vietnam S the gun of the n- Id Pensive. in return for the start of sub- When he was asked what led talks on Vietnam, with 1him to call the latest offensive Saigon S Saigon and the Vietcong rep- an "invasion," Mr. Mc'loskey resented at the table in Paris said that this was the most along with Hanoi and Wash- ington. The United States also asserted that it had an "under- jstanding" from Hanoi that the North Vietnamese would not violate the demilitarized zone and would not shell cities in South Vietnam. The United States also claimed the right to fly recon- naissance missions over North Vietnam. Hanoi hasnever ac- knowledged that it agreed to any restraint., and began in 1970 to shoot at these planes. This in turn led to American air strikes against antiaircraft em- placements and other military targets in orth Vietnam. Theoretically, under the Ame icans' interpretation, the abrog- ation of the 1968 understanding culd justify a resumption by the United States of systematic bombinb of North Vietnam. Time Limit Suggested Such a course would lead to increased tensions with Hanio's allies, such as the. Soviet Union and China, and might even endanger the chances for suc- cess of Mr. Nixon's trip to Moscow set for May 22. It could also lead to unfore- .seen political problems in this country, with Vietnam again becoming a major divisive is- sue. For these reasons, it seemed likely tha, barring very large North Vietnamese incursions, American bombing of territory: north of the border would be, directly linked to. the invasion A senior Pentagon official said privately that he thought Pres- ident Nixon would order Amer- iean aircraft to bomb the sup- ply lines and base camps in North Vietnam of those enemy units that have crossed the demilitarized ? zone in recent 'days into Quangtri, South Viet- nam's northernmost province. President Nixon spent most of the morning discussing the Vietnamese developments with his top aides. He met with Kenneth Rush, Deputy Secre- tary of Defense, and 'Adm. Tjjromas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs . of Staff. He. spoke by telephone with Secretary of State William P. Rogers and -Secretary of De- fense Melvin A. Laird. Later in the morning, Henry A. Kissinger, the President's ad- viser on national security, pres- ided at a session of the Wash- ington SpApproveC >FoI ,to discuss what tactics to fol- He said that what had hap- of South Vietnam by the 308th pened in South Vietnam was and other North. Vietnamese "a flagrant violation by North divisions. Vietnam" of the 1954 Geneva A Pentagon official said he agreement on Indochina and expected that, if the decision the 1968 understanding between was made to bomb north of the United States and North the DMZ, the raids would be Vietnam. . limited in time to as long as "And by any definition, what necessary to get the North serious violation of the 1968 understanding. He said there was a "qualitative" difference as well, because of the heavy: artillery, tanks and antiaircraft weapons used by the attacking! forces. It is also the first time that an attacking force has come directly across the de- militarized zone, he noted. , 9Qe?i i04'~l koll AnR P80LO4601800`1300390001-8 WASHINGTON POST Approved For Release 2001 /03/g4Apg1.6 DI Q11QgIJR a U.S. Snot' esmen ,'x a?ess iuloinaev: asrri Co.raeerra Thi-list By Murrey Harder gravity, officials indicated. ff water t S ta Washington Pos Administration spokesmen This is a considerable markedly raised the level of shift of emhhasi from the official U.S. concern yester- position the Nixon adrninis- day over the North Vietnam- tration has taken since the ffensive began last Friday. ese thrust into South Viet- o Initially, the public U.S. re- nam by labeling it an "inva- sponse to the offensive was story" and a "flagrant viola- low-key, in conformity with Lion" of the Demilitarized forecasts by officials during Zone. the past three months that a After a meeting of mili- Communist offensive was in tary and diplomatic strata prospect. to demonstrate a egists at the White House "show of strength' by "spec- yesterday morning, spokes- tacular" but limited and men sounded the theme that containable thrusts of Corn- the United States is "leaving munist power. By publicly all options open" for its re- forecasting that pattern of spouse to the offensive that military action, administra- is unfolding, tion officials hoped to fore- "The administration ' is stall the 'political and psy- watching the situation very chological shock produced, carefully," said White House especially in the United press secretary Ronald L. - States, by the countrywide Ziegler. "Our position," said Communist Tet offensive of Ziegler, is to evaluate the new military threat in upper South Vietnam on a "day-to- day" basis. During the day, the ad- ministration backed away' from the confidence ex- pressed at the White House over the weekend that the South Vietnamese them- selves "can cope with the enemy threat." While that was repeated at the White House in response to ques- tions early yesterday, a no- ticeably more guarded re- sponse was given later at the State Department by press officer Robert J. McCloskey, in what the White House subsequently dciicribecl as the basic ad- ministration aiVraisal. . "I would have to say pres- ently that it is too early to judge the ability of the South Vietnamese to meet this," said McCloskey, fol- lowing the White House meeting( presided over by national security adviser Henry y A. Kissinger. "The total situation," said Mc- Closkey, "is under review. I ain in no position to antici- pate what course of action the United States might take." By declining to rule out any "optiqq,~~t " the a~dnlii~'s- tra.tiou ev~t] ~~l0thor What yesterday's height- ened expressions of official concern indicated, however, was that U.S. planners nev- e r t h e l e s s understirnated the military-political risks that North Vietnam was pre- pared to take in attacking directly through the politi- cally sensitive Demilitarized Zone dividing North and South Vietnam. This is what appeared to surprise at least some U.S. planners, and which the official reaction yesterday registered. The international implica- tions of this thrust through the DMZ were still unclear yesterday, in part because the full scope of the Com- munist offensive is not yet discernible. If U.S. planners have greatly miscalculated the power that North Vietnam and the Vietcong can bring to bear in the weeks ahead, some U.S. officials privately conceded, that could have major repercussions on the current American presiden- tial election campaign and also on President Nixon's planned l y, 22 visit to the At the White House yes. tinue to fly as part of the terday morning, the Wash- "understandings." ington Special Action Group. This -is not the first time (WSAG) was convened to as- )hat the United States has sess the situation. In addi- charged North Vietnam with ion to Kissinger, partici- violating the "understand- pants included Under Secre- ings." McCloskey, however, tart' of State John Irwin; said "this is unquestionably Deputy Secretary of De- a more severe violation than Tense Kenneth Rush; Adm. h. s occurred heretofore." Thomas H. Moorcr, chair- When newsmen ask. d man of the Joint Chiefs of McCloskey if the present Staff, and other officials. Communist military offen- President Nixon also con- live exceeds U.S. forecasts ferred by telephone with about it, he replied; "I Defense Secretary ?Melvin R.. would he hard put to shy it Laird and Secretary of is exactly what was antici- State William P. Rogers, pated in terms of numbers, and met with Kissinger and targets." While the numbers poorer, spokesmen said. of Communist forces ero State Department spokes- in range of the pre'lictioJIs, man MMcCloskey said after- McCloskey said, the ecrec The Washington Post recently published news of a National Security Council rccom- mendation that the existing secrecy policy in Executive Order 10501 for safe-guarding national defense information he reissued in a new order. Measures currently imposed to keep Congress and the people from know what the Executive branch is doing Wound be continued. We can all be thankful for the opportunity to-explore this subject with the President and express our own views. Excessive se- cibcy has developed into one of the most critical problems of our time The court cases and other events of 1971 show that the more secret the Executive branch becomes, the more repressive it becomes. It has al- ready adopted the practice of honoring its own secrets more than the right of a free press or the right of a citizen to free s lt:ech. The NSC "final draft" revision, as o1T)- twined by The Washington Post. claims that an Executive Order is required to resolve a conflict between (a) the right or citizens to be informed concerning the activities of the government and (b) the need of the govern- ment to safeguard certain information from unauthorized disclosure. Of course, that sine ply is not true. The Constitution J id not cre- atg and does not now contain a basis for any such conflict. The interests and the power of the people are paramount in this country. The only conflict about this matter is the President's failure to recogilize the citizens' rights and ask Congress for legislation, in ,addition to existing law, tltlt would provide the protection he wants for information bearing on the active defense of this nation. The information could be called National Defense Data. A specific definition for the data could be similar to the one already rec- bmmended in the report submitted to the President and Congress last year by the Na- tional Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Code. The President should take guidance from the fact that the Atomic En- ergy Act has been quite effective in con- trolling Atomic Energy Restricted Data with- out objectionable impact on the citizens' right of access to government activities. if the President still insists on having an Executive order on the subject of safe. card- ing information, here are some comments that.could be helpful: 1. Updating. The procedures in Executive Order 10501 for classifying defense informa- tion as TOP SECRET, SECRET or CONFI- DENTIAL are substantially the same as the Army and Navy used before WorJa War 11 to classify military information as SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL. The policy was suitable for small self-contained military forces. All of the SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL mate- rial held by some of the large Army posts could fit in a single drawer of a storage cabi- net. Circumstances are completely different today. The strength of our national defense is not limited to military effort. It stems 'front the vast politico-social-industrial-mili- tary complex of this. country. A cornmensu- ? rate interchange of information is essential. Therefore, such Lxecutive order as the Pres- ident considers to be required should be rad- ically updated.. 2. Definition. A fatal defect of Executive lion on a great volume. of information under Order 10501 was the absence of a definition the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense of "national defense information." That com- that had originated throu;.'h the year 1945. partitively narrow term was an improvement As for the smaller number of items that over the broader terms "national security" should be produced in the future, deelassifi- and "security information" which were dis- cation by the originating authority would be carded in 1953. However, it is imperative practicable and enforceable. Exceptional that the designation used be limited se- classified items, if any, sent to records repos- verely hich by specific definition to information i w which tories could be declassified au*omatically the President really believes would after the passage of a period of time such as damage the national defense and which leads 10 years. itself to effective control measures. G. Privately Owned Information. It is esti- 3. Categories. Consistent with the urgent need to narrow the scope of protection, there should be only one category of de- fense information. Internal distribution des- ignators could be used to limit distribution of a given item, but there need by only one classification marking. Experience proves that three classifications invite serious con- fusion, promote uncontrollable . overclassifi- cation, and reduce the effectiveness of the Security system. 4. Authority to Classify. The President's as- sumed authority to impose a defense classi- sification authority since they are not classi- cation ought to be exercised by only a tiny fraction of the hundreds of thousands of people who are now classifying. The new definition and great importance of the infor- mation involved would permit limiting clas- sification authority to persons designated by the President and to such others as they might designate. (Individuals who put mark- ings on documents containing information classified by someone else do not need clas- fiers.) As a new procedure, anyone who as- signs a 'defense 'classification to material which does not qualify for protection should be made subject to disciplinary action as a counterfeiter. 5. Declassification. The millions of classi- fied papers currently gushing forth cannot possibly be kept under review for declassifi- cation on a document-by-document basis. But that is no reason for perpetuating as- signed classifications as the NSC proposed. The President should take the insignificant risk and cancel the classification on histori- cal material by appropriate order. As guid- ance, this writer authorea DoD Directive 5200.9 in 1958 which canceled the classifica- mated that at least 25`0 of the material in this country which bears unjustifiable classi- fications was privately generated and is pri- vately owned. The Executive order should specifically exclude privately owned infor- mation from the defense classification sys- tem . 7. Misrepresentation of Law. The NSC draft revision would continue the existing misrepresentation of the espionage laws by warning that disclosure of information in a classified document to an unauthorized per- son is a crime. The law applies only if there is intent to injure the United States, with no reference to classification markings. Falsifi- cation of the law should be eliminated. The President could do the country' a great service if he would seek advice from Congress and others outside the Executive branch regarding Executive Order 10501. It is hoped that many concerned citizens will help influence the adoption of that course of Washington. Thos writer retired from. the Air Force it May, 1971, after 43 years of gov-ern.nient ser vice, including 26 years as a security policl specialist. (See -editorial,. "Official Secrets.") Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0.1601 R001300390001-8 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R MONTGOM;rRY, ALA. ~Anvlal3s 11972 M - 61,769 8 - 80,831 STATINTL A Light Checkrein On The CIA THE CENTRAL Intelligence ency gets a large chunk of its unds through hidden channels. . A favorite method is for another agency's budget to be kited by a certain amount, then that amount is dec1 ted surplus and transferred to the CIA. In this manner, only a handful of people know what has occurred, most. of them in the Executive branch. There is an oversight committee of the Senate made up of senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, plus four members of the Foreign Relations Committee. As chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Sen. John Stennis of Miss. presides over the group, which is supposed to monitor all CIA activities. Last year the oversight committee didn't meet a single time. The Foreign Relations Committee members on the oversight panel are angry. They contend CIA activities around the world have a decisive effect on the conduct of U.S. diplomatic policy. They have taken action to by- .pass Stennis and to gain some measure of control over CIA funds, personnel and activities by writing new curbs into the foreign aid authorization bill. The bill, signed by President Nixon the other day, requires for the first time a reduction in military personnel working for the CIA in activities similar to the assistance and advisory groups now operating in Cambodia and Laos. It includes t h e`ZIA in t $341,000,000 ceiling on aid o Cambodia and requires CIA ar s transfers to be counted against the military aid appropriation. The CIA is reported to have warehouses filled with arms at various points in Southeast Asia for distribution-to anti-communist guerrillas. The CIA will be forbidden to pay foreign troops - such as the 4,800 "volunteers" in Laos -more than their' counterparts in the U.S. armed forces. The bill specifical- ly..places the CIA under existing restrictions on giving arms to forces in Asia. It will require quarterly reports to Congress on Cambodia and ,annual reports on foreign aid. CIA assistance will. be included in the totals, althpughit will probably not be pinpointed. These regulations will increase congressional supervision over shadow wars, but the language is not so tight as to prevent some circumvention, if the CIA_ is supported by the White House. The National Security Council, the President's consultative committee to which the CIA reports, has the final decision on: the agency's activities. However, the new controls should require the CIA to think twice before committing the U.S. to clandestine wars, as it has done all too often in the last several years. Approved For Release 2001/03/04.-: CIA-RDP80-01.601 R001 300390001-8 !TT'T ~rt(T R' mi C 7F' C "I ~'JNITOR Approved For Release 2001/03f(94 FEMI DP80-01601 RO View from tie fudge factory By David K. Willis Washington It looks the same, outwardly - endless antiseptic corridors; subdued lighting; anon. ymous doors opening into hushed offices; the flags and the globe and the slippery floor of the diplomatic entrance on C Street... . This is home to that body of men and women whom Franklin D. Roosevelt called "cookie pushers," and whom John F. Ken- nedy characterized as "those people over there who smile a lot"-the professional diplomatic corps of the United States. But the "fudge factory" (as the State Department has ingloriously been dubbed) Is not the same at all, really. To a v -i -u . returning after several years, it is even more subdued than it was in the late 'GO's. It feels even less in the mainstream of U.S. policymaking than it felt in Lyndon John- son's day; morale is low, and the talk of the building is often about what might be done to redress the balance. The thoughts come thick and fast as Presi- dent Nixon's party heads to Peking. Dip- lomats at the State Department welcome Mr. Nixon's initiative toward the People's Republic. They want to see it succeed. Some of them helped in preliminary staff work, writing papers for Dr. Henry Kissinger and his national security staff. And yet, even those officials who would normally expect to know the ins and outs of evolving U.S. strat- egy toward Peking were frank to admit in private conversation a few days ago that they did not know the exact state of play. It hardly.needs restating: Major Ameri- can foreign policy is formed and executed largely in the White House these days. The Kissinger staff, according to a late report, numbers 46 assistants, with 105 adminis- trative personnel. Both Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger like to plan quietly-and to move quickly. Neither demonstrates much regard for the diplomatic bureaucracy. They ask it questions, but not for crucial policy recom- mendations-or so one is led to understand. They do not ignore it entirely, but-neither do they keep it informed of just who is say- ing what to whom when Dr. Kissinger makes his dramatic, secret journeys: to Pe- king, to Paris. Some diplomats, unsurprisingly, don't like it at all. No one man, or two men, no matter how brilliant, can cover every nu- ance in dealings with nations such as China or North Vietnam, they say. Others are seriously concerned with the quality of recent appointments to the rank of ambas- sador: former Treasury Secretary David Kennedy to NATO, for instance (consid. ered? by some too old, by others too inex- perienced); Borg-Warner's Robert Inger- soll to Tokyo (recognized, as a gracious businessman, an expert in business, but largely inexperienced in Japanese affairs b ? ess and a co o Asian s, Granted, it is said, that Mr. Nixon has dis- liked the Foreign Service since 1954 when the Republicans came to power with a fistful of new slogans such as "massive retalia- tion." And Mr. Nixon was right: The pro- fessionals didn't like him, or President Eisenhower, or John Foster Dulles.. But those days have gone. The world has changed. Issues are increasingly complex. The bu- reaucracy of State and the Central Intelli- gence Agency does possess expertise, built up over the years. True, bureaucracy grinds slowly-and true, it needs shaking up from time to time: prodding, cajoling, pushing. Yet, by cutting State out from the crucial decisions, the view maintains, the White House runs clear and definite risks, both now and for the future. How, then, to marry professional exper- tise to the need of the White House to move fast and flexibly? One answer: the White House could cut in six or seven top profes- sional diplomats on China and Vietnam strategy. This could serve several purposes, it is said: ensure that all' policy bases are covered; prevent further atrophy of State, which is becoming more and more cautious about making firm recommendations to Dr. Kissinger's people ("Where is Henry right now, while we're talking?" asked one source with a grin; "in Pyongyang? Could be ..."), thereby lowering its standing in the White House still more. It could even help prevent "leaks" from the bureaucracy of the kind that Mr. Nixon detests. Where no one knows anything, the argument runs, disgruntlement can lead to erroneous specu- lating to friendly journalistic ears; it is safer, paradoxically, if a few people know a lot. Professional diplomats have deep respect for Dr. Kissinger, and, they say, for Mr. Nixon's approaches; privately, however, many feel that the quality of the national security staff does not equal the best men in State. The professionals acknowledge that State needs to find ways to keep se- crets better-to show Mr.. Nixon that it can indeed be trusted. It asks for the chance. David Willis, Monitor American news editor, was this newspaper's State De- partment correspondent for four years from 1965. - f STATINTL y~ outside u diplomacy i~Al f"cQve FQ 1a e 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 rim play what the professionals consider an enormously significant part). NEW YORK TI :E9 Approved For Release 2001/Q IQ1j RDP80-01601 RO White Housekeeping By RUSSELL BAKER WASHINGTON, Feb. 14 - Dear Spiro: Have stepped out for a while. Over to China for a few days to see Chou and Mao and that strange bunch of Commies. Remember? I told you about it several weeks ago. Anyhow, would you be a real pal and keep an eye on the White House while I'm out? If you get hungry, all you have to do is pick up the telephone and tell the operator you want to order some food. Same thing if you want to go out. Get the operator and say, "I want to go out." She'll say some Lng-like, "Do you want to go bowling, or do you want to go to the Azores to see Pompidou, or what?" The thing is, Spiro, she has to know whether to order the limousine or the helicopter or one of the big jets, so don't tell her it's none of her busi- ness where you want to go. She is just trying to be helpful. Now about using my desk. . . When you sit down at the desk you'll ? see a lot of buttons. Whatever you do . , . and I really mean this, old buddy .. don't push any of those buttons. Okay? I mean, really, Spiro, keep your 'fingers off the buttons, okay? We don't want to have any nuclear mis- takes. On second thought, it might be a good idea if you didn't use my desk. Get the White House operator and ask her to have somebody set you up a little desk of your own by the window without any buttons. There's a terrific view of the Wash- ington Monument from the window. If you want to be photographed for the newspapers there, just get the operator and say you want your picture in the papers, and she'll do the rest.. About the Hot Line: If the Hot Line rings, pick it up and say, "Hello- ovich, Gospodin. Have you got bad news for me?" If the voice on the other end says "Nyet," you can quit worrying because they are just play- ing around again. If the voice says, "Da," you've got a problem. The best thing is to see if ydu can get hold of Mel Laird. Also it might be a good idea to go to the air-raid shelter. Pick up the phone. Get the White House operator and tell her you want to go to the aireraid shelter and she will arrange for you to be taken down there. Oh, almost forgot Congress. There's a Congress going on at the Capitol. A Congress is a big swarm of Demo- OBSERVER If they come around and start tor- menting you while you're out walking on the White House lawn, don't argue with them. Just tell them, "If you don't like me here, why don't you go back to New Hampshire?" If they insist on coming right on into the White House, just get hold of the operator and tell her the Democrats are giving you trouble and she'll get hold of somebody who will have them removed. Incidentally, Spiro-Congress loves to get messages from the White House. It makes them feel important, as though somebody still needs them. If you've got some spare time, Send them a White House message on something and urge them to pass an important new bill. If you want-to send a message to Congress, all you have to do is get the White House operator and tell her what you have in mind and she will. send in some message-to-Con- gress writers. I can't think of much else' that might go wrong before I get back, although there's a possibility that a certain fast-buck roofing contractor will drop by and give you that line about how he was working in the neighborhood and just happened to see some loose shingles around the White House chimneys and thinks you ought to have him go up there and see if you don't need some roof work done. What he does then is go up there wearing hob-nailed boots and kick holes through the tar paper, which I then have to pay him to patch up. If this character takes ad- vantage of my absence to show up, just pick up the phone and get the White House operator. She will know how to have him put out quietly. That's about all I can think of, Spiro, except don't let any hippies in. You don't have to worry about any routine foreign crises. If.. you get a sudden crisis, the National Security Council, will meet and tell you what to do. Of course, you don't have to accept their advice. If you're in doubt about whether to do it their way or not, get hold of the White House operator and tell her your problem and she'll work it out for you. . .Last thing: "What do I do if I pick up the phone and the operator isn't there?" you're going to ask. Don't worry 'about it, Spiro. Believe me, I've lived with the same question for STATINTL ears ApprOweANk oo, aorRelaaaee n "./0409 a yQ~I R R8#t@I*604RQ01300390001-8 the White House. They have places ways. of their own-the Capitol, New See you on the telly. STATINTL Approved For Release 2001 '!O3/ `'"'L CA-4 80-01601 13 F ti3 3972 Hoes Pinned on Vast Re forff' at Stafe Dept BY PAUL HOUSTON Times Staff Writer WASHINGTON-As is, the' practice of diplomats, William B. Mzcc)niber ush- ered the visitor away from his desk and over to the more relaxed setting of couch and side chairs. "Somebody said the on- ly thing that had changed in American diplomacy over all these years was the" invention of the teTe- graph," Macomber laughed. "Well, now we have about :00 o t h e r thingg ." Macomber, deputy un- dersecretary of state for management, is in charge of implementing a vast re- form program that rather desperately seeks to re- store to the State Depart- ment some measure of its old clout-if not its former preeminence. New Catchwords hence, Foggy Bottom has some new catchwords- --"Openness" (seeking more contact with the rest of the foreign affairs coni- munity).; --"Creativity" (encour- aging more dissent . from the official line); -"Democratization" (ridding foreign- missions of the hierarchal struc- ture topped by an authori- tarian ambassador); -"Functional speciali- zation" (turning all-pur- pose diplomats into politi- cal, economic, administra- tive and consular-visa- staniping-speci alist~ ). After World War II, the accelerating complexity of international affairs brought many other government departments (Defense, Treasury, Com- merce, Agriculture, -etc.) and agencies (for intel- ligence, foreign aid, propa- ganda) into the foreign policy arena in a big way. State was slow to learn that it was losing prom- inence by dealing with these "interlopers" at arm's length. Security Council Bises recently retired, "A lot of. max---New ideas, divergent the old corps spirit has opinion and "creative dis- been not only permitted to sent" have been encour- die but encouraged to die." aged, M a c o m b e r says, What rubs old guards- through the use of special men most is the develop- message channels, n e w ment of a collective bar- staff functions and some- gain i n g unit among thing called the Open For- Meanwhile, Congress in foreign service officers um Panel. At weekly, 1947 established a Nation- ..i the establishment of closed-door meetings of al Security Council to re- strong employe grievance the panel, younger officers view, coordinate and con- procedures. take issue with various trol American foreign poli- One disgruntled senior American policies and ad- cy. This led to the eclipse official says, "There's a vance their views in pa- of State's traditional quar- great deal of outcry for pers to the Secretary of terback role in the foreign rights and benefits, but State. policy process. there 'is very little talk of -A complete overhaul It is the hope-some say duty." of the controversial "selec- t.he vain dream-of many 400 Changes Made tibn out" and promotion in the foreign service that system also is aimed at en- reforms will persuade fu- Despite these criticisms, couraging officers to take ture presidents to have the reforms secm to have unpopular positions. the State Department take gained wide acceptance in over some of the National a bureaucracy that-must Automatic Retirement Security Council's duties. have the biggest group of - Formerly, a,.lowel? or There is not much belief frustrated intellectuals in middle-grade officer had that President Nixon will government. ' to think twice about stick- charge his preference for Macomber, noted that Ing his neck out, because a National Security Coun- 400 recommendations for if he failed to in a promo- cil directing foreign policy change have been imple- tion to the next grade under a special assistant, mented out of 500 put for- within a certain number of Henry A. Kissinger. ward in an inch-thick plan years, he was involuntari- Charles W. Bray III, ~8, 17 months ago. , lv retired without a pen- is one of the aging "Young He cites the following sion. Turks" who prodded the changes as "solid and sig- The system, when fairly, State Department into in- nificant. although not the administered, was inval- .tituting a massive intro- millenium": uable in shedding dead speetire study that led to -Modern management wood. But it was widely the reforms. techniques have been in- judged to be unfairly arbi- "Historically," he says, stituted using s y s t e in s trarv. in many cases-in- 'the foreign service has analysis a n d ? interdisci- clucfirig that of Charles been a very closed torpor- plinary teams of senior of- Thomas. ation with a highly pater- ficials. The aim is to Men- After Thomas, the father nalistic system of internal tify priority issues, assign of three, was selected out administration. . the right kind of manp?w- at the age of 46, he had no "To some of us the de. er to each issue and re- success with 2,000 job ap- partment's isolation from view policies periodically plications (being over- the American mainstream, In toughminded adversary qualified or o v e r -age). and its declining influence proceedings. Last May he shot himself fn Washington, were in. Computer Indexing to death. tolerable." With the micromfilmin,g The suicide stirred a As', one Indication of and computer indexing of furore and prevented for- changing department atti- 25,000 documents reuir- mer State personnel direc- tudes, there was a time Inc, action at the State De- for Howard P. Mace from r, hen Bray's foreign _ser- partment every year, it is being confirmed by the vice career was in doubt. hoped there will be no re- Ms agitating almost got peats of the kind of embar- Sierra Leone, reform Now, after a junior offi- him exiled. But then, as rassment that hit the de- him became the "in; partment in .1067 during cer passes a certain low taring, Bray rose with un- the Arab-Israeli six day t h r e s h o 1 d, he is guar- years common nr m o n swiftness last anteed tenure of 20 years war. plus a pension-and may February to become the. American officials could p p department's spokesman not find the copy of a cru- gain promotions in compe- at daily press briefings. cial letter former Secreta- tition with others in his As might be expected, rv of State John Foster specialty, the reforms have not been Dulles had written to Is- A major problem re- universally cheered. ? raeli Prime Minister Da- mains, however, and . it "A lot of schisms have vid Ben-Gurion in 1956. will be aggravated by the been created," complains a Sheepishly , the State De- tenure system. State is former high official who partment had to ask Israel topheavy with senior offi- h f ti t cers w o re re o re use Approved For Release 2001/03/d$drti,W='Rb 0-0160*RO 1ha00:2g000" STATINTL Ii V YO:: TS~?ES /OV044FRDl)P Approved For Release 2001 ' R"ATI 0TP LAOTIANS ON THE MOVE: Soldiers board plane at Ban Xon, Laos, for flight to- Long Tieng, a base operated by the,Central Intelligence Agency that was recently under siege. The Airline, Air America, is also supported. by C.I.A. l `irst Congressional Restraints Are Imposed on C.I.A. I forts of Senators Clifford P.I'cumvention . of Congressional By BENJAMIN WELLES '(Case, Republican of New eJr-!iintent in the funding of activi- Special to The New York Times I sey; Frank Church, Democrat a ties such as the Thai troops in WASHINGTON, Feb. 12-The of Idaho, and Stuart Svlning-Laos through C.I.A. rather than foreign aid authorization bill, ton. Democrat of Missouri. f through more open Government signed. by President Nixon on They are members of thel agencies." Monday, includes for the first Foreign Relations Committee.] "It would also," he said, time in a quarter-century new Together with the committee's] "eliminate the possibility that controls on the operations, cost !Chairman, J. W. Fulbright,' the Cooper-Church prohibitions and personnel of the Central Democrat of Arkansas, they , against the use of American Intelligence Agency. I have protested increasingly' in troops or advisers in Cambodia The controls, which thus fan recent months that Congress could be skirted by using C.I.A. have attracted little public at- has too little knowledge of, let, personnel." tention, are the first to bel alone control over, the agency's Stennis Their Irritant added since Congress creaotedl activities, particularly in South-i the agency through the Na- east Asia. The ire of the committee (members is reported to be less tional Security Act of 1947, a' Senator Case urged on July against the reported than measure that wsa amended inj 12 a tightening of restrictions. 1949. l over the Defense Department's] against Senator John C. Sten- This act exempts the CIA use of its funds overseas and nis, Democrat of Mississippi, from most fiscal and personnel, over its power to transfer "sur- Chairman of the Armed Serv- and Appropriations committees ,plus four members of the For- eign Relations Committee. It is ';supposed to watch over all the lagency's activities. Under Senator Stennis's di- rection, however, it did not meet at all in 1971-to the an- noyance of Senators from the Foreign Relations Committee, who contend that C.I.A. activi- ties around the world intimate- ly and sometimes decisively af- fect the conduct of United States foreign policy. They have now moved to by- pass Senator Stennis and to gain some control over the agency's funds, personnel and activities by writing controls into the aid bill. Some Congres-t sional sources say, however, that there are still loopholes. Specifically, according to (legislative specialists, the new controls will require the fol- lowing atcions. ices Committee and of. the so-1 controls imposed on other fed-I plus" military material to other eral -agencies. Funds, personnel: United States agencies. Mr. called "Oversight" Committee and material voted by Congress: Case insisted that the C.I.A. be, for the agency. The Oversight to other agencies, such as the included in the restrictions lest Committee comprises senior d States involvement in members of the Armed Services Defense De artment c n f Unit p , a , or e example, be switched legally to Cambodia develop surrepti- the C. I. A. tiously, as he said it had in. The controls were insert t Laos. = various poiA Drtwe rror RSlti 9vQQ01 M? : CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001- aid bill largely roueh the ef- ;said, "would precept e. cir- 1; FEB 1972 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 NEW, RULES URGED Other Possibility The other possibility suggest- ed was merely that present laws be ued. These'we en hen only legis ON SECRET PAPERS; e Security Agency Proposes a Presidential Order on Law $peeiel to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Feb. 10-The National Security Council has proposed an Executive order tightening regulations govern- ing. the handling of classified information and suggested the possibility that the President might seek legislation to make it a crime for unauthorized per- sons to receive secret docu- ments, a White House officiial said Thursday night. The legislative suggestion, if accepted, would result in a pro- posal by the President of a tough. new law similar to the British Official Secrets Act, which imposes stiff penalties on those who receive as well as on those who disclose classi- fied information. This was one of three alter- natives suggested for the Presi- dent in a draft proposal now being circulated among the De- partments of State, Defense and Justice, the Central Intelligence, Agency, and other governmen- tal bodies, the White House of- ficial said. Of the two others, the draft suggested that the President might seek revision of a sec-, tion. of the Federal Esp!onage Act to make it a crime to give classified information to any unauthorized person. The law now provides penalties for dis- closure: to,"a foreign agent." lative suggestions in the draft proposals, which were offered in response to the President's demand for a study of the handling of classifed material,: made shortly after the publica-j tion of the Pentagon Papers, the Defense Department's se- cret study of the United States drift into the Vietnam War. The other suggestions in the draft proposal applied primarily to the classification of Govern- ment documents, setting . up regulations over how materials should be classified, the length of time certain documents could remain classified, and who would be allowed to re- ceive them. These, the draft proposal said, could be effected in a re- vision of the Executive order that now controls the handling of classified information. The draft was being circulat- ed to the various agencies for their comments. STATINTL .Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 ~tASHS;r~iQ:i QST 2' Fk6 l?72 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001 Pentagon Figh ts Secrets Plan By Sanford J. Ungar The Defense Department is opposing a National Security 'Council recommendation that a11. classified government in. formation be made public after being kept secret for a maximum of 30 years. Crit.cizing an NSC draft re- ,vision of government security regulations, the Pentagon has appealed for a "savings clause" that would permit agency heads to designate ma- terial affecting foreign rela- Ren. Williarr S Moorhend'Policy Significantly, related to (1)-Pa.), whose House Subcom- the ?iateona, security" or mittee on Fore,;;n Operations "jeopardy to the lives of pris- and _xovernme tt Information oners-af-war.!' dill open new hearings next ? "Contidential" refers to north, complained yesterday: national security information that the NSC draft was or- material, the unauthorized "aimed only - . t closing infor- j disclosure of which could*rea- matio.t leaks i n , the executive; sonably : ause damage to the branch r they than (making)'"national . security." No exam ilable to i -m ava more inforntat les war? listed in this cafe- - the public and to Congress.!' P Mo.n:ead aatd he had re- gory. The t'etitagon also said that queste~t a copy of the NSC "}t is imperative that these re- remain secret' indefinitely in draft ti mt the White House. strictions be imposed only the interest of "national sc Ear;, -in the day, the Of- where there is an established 111111curity. " iI fice of . egg1 Counsel at the need. li d d But the Defense Depart- ment also questions some sec-1, of the Moorhead subcommit- proposes: requirement that! tions of the NSC draft as un-I tee, saying that it was only every classified document be duly restrictive and has sug "a working draft." marked to indicate who had ;gested changes that might The Jan. 11, letter of trans- declared it secret. Buzhardt's 'have the effect of reducing mittal which accompanied the memo called this condition the number of classified docu- NSC proposal when it was "both un, ealistic and unwork- ments in government archives. sent to the Departments of able. . The Pentagon suggestions State. Defense and Justice, the huu,yestit.n Its strongest objection ap- are 'contained in a memoran- Central Intelligence Agency eared to involve the NSC durn to the National Security and the Atomic Energy Com fora 30-year rule Council from J. Fred Buz- mission, however, called it guaranteeing that all secret r l d e en- t '' d v ease ocumen e re s a hardt, general counsel of the "th' final draft. Defense Department. The Defense Department tuft 11Y. The Washington Post hasi recommendations concerning "A sav!rgs clause to provide obtained a copy of that memo-j the draft, sent to the NSC on for exceptions to be exercised head con the agenc b l randum, one of several that will be considered by the Na- ec ne Justice Department The Defense Department ob-I to provide a copy to the staff jetted, however, to the NSC'sl STATINTL. y y y Jan. 21, were the product of a oi the three military cerned is essential to 'prevent review b y tional Security Council beforeI departments and "a` working damage to national security," submitting the draft for presi- group composed of classifica- ;the Pentagon recommenda? intelligence tions said lion specialists , dential approval. Meanwhile, members of experts and lawyers,' accord- "There are certain contin- Congress and other experts on ing to Buzhardt's memoran- gency plans dating from the IIt,m, 1920s which should be exempt security classification attacked Buzhart observed in the from the 30-year rule," the; the NSC draft for cutting back remo that the Pentagon Pentagon critique added "Re- vern- ment pond so many problems with lease of such documents expanding it. information rather than he draft that it should "be would be unacceptable from a Rep. substantially reworked before l foreign relations standpoint the author nof E. Moss the Freedom fof submission to the President." for an indefinite period." Information Act, said that "no \m~n othe,- matters, the! Willia;it G. Florence, a re- more stringent regulations are Defense Deparnnent urged an tired security expert for the needed. They are the antithe- updating of the definitions of Air Force. complained yester sis of a free society." the three security classifica-I day that the NSC draft, as re-j Commenting an details of tions in follows: . i ported in The Washington the NSC draft as revealed in ? "l'ha test for assigning Pist, wll continue to permit The Washington Post yester- 'Top Secret' classification 1 hundreds of thousands of peo- day, Moss was especially criti- shall be whether its unauthor ; pie to continue putting unwar .cal of the suggestion that the ized (hsclosurc -ould reasona-i~ratited security classifications President seek legislation, bly be expecter to cause ex on information." similar to the British Official ceptionally grave damage to Florence referred to the Secrets Act, which would se-v- the nation or :ts citizens." practice as "illegal censor- erely punish anyone who re- As examples of :,u.h dam-' ship. ceives classifier' information age, it cited a range of situa- fts well as those who disclose I tions from "armed hostilities it. against the Urited States or Such legislation. Moss said, its allies" to the compromise "would be ;n outrageous im- of cryptologic and communica- tions intelligence systems " people. 1 wiL tight it, and I! ? "Secret" is to be usea tot would hope that every enlight- prevent "set,nus damage" ened AmerA~y+&8ttPbr ~64s~r ICIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 Approved For RekWIfff-1/03/041:JCFAER1 80-0 'enry Kissinger sits at the round table in the corner of his blue-and-gold office. His back is to the window, and beyond the window the White House lawn is just touched by the winter sun. With the lone exception of Richard Nixon, who is 50 paces down the hall and already deep into the morning's routine, Kissinger is the most talked about, most analyzed and most important man in Washington. There is not a No. 2 man in history who has ever wielded such power, with such authority. He has devoured his dietary portion of scrambled eggs, crunched through half an English muffin and now is pouring black coffee. He has read hastily through the cover stories on him in both TIME and Newsweek. After a few'iraustic comments about how journalists think the National Security Council works, he grins and says, "I asked [White House speechwriter] Bill Sa- fire if he thought I could survive two cover stories in a single week. Safire said, 'No, Henry, but what a way to go.' " Henry is not going. Now, suddenly, he seems to drop a cur- tain between this office and such notions as public image. He leans forward, his brow furrowed. His eyes are wide, even gen- tle. His physical presence is again unassuming. He is the pro- fessor, sure enough of himself and the knowledge he brings, but nevertheless aware of how much he does not yet know and of how uncertain are the affairs of men. . "I'm concerned about American civilization," he says, his hands fumbling with each other, his voice slow. "We live in a world in which some countries pursue ruthless policies.... We are in a period which someday maybe compared to one of the re- ligious ages, when whole values change.... We are a warm- hearted people, concerning ourselves with a lot that is superficial, not willing to believe that we can make irrevocable errors, not willing to trust the judgment of the leaders until all the facts are in and it is usually too late, absorbed in bureaucratic infighting and indulging in various forms of debilitating nostalgia." being where he is. Richard Nixon, gut-bucket Middle American, and Henry Kissinger, Harvard intellectual, share doubts about the future. They also share something else-the. belief that their particular talents are the right ones for these times, to arrest the national decay and help revi- talize the American spirit. Kissinger looks uneasily at the lighted buttons on his huge phone console, the fever chart of the White House. "The historian in me says it can't be done. The political man in me says it is possi- ble. This is an elemental country, capable of tre- mendous effort when moved." Optimism is clear- Ly ascendant this morning with Henry Kissinger -and most mornings. Part of it comes from the' sheer joy of power, a glandular stimulant that is not four}d in Widener Library stacks or in grad- uate seminars on international affairs. Another part is the realization that three years of the Nix- on-Kissinger sense of objective and order have perceptibly calmed the world and nurtured hope. . "That's our major concern about Vietnam," Kissinger says, shifting so lie can watch the prog- ress of the thin sun against the frost on the win- dow panes. He throws a leg over the chair arm. "The President very badly wants to end the war, but not in a way that breaks the American spirit, in a way.that this country can preserve its confi- dence in itself." Behind him are shelves of books on history and politics, a kind of background tap- estry to Kissinger's life. Since his childhood in Germany, he has lived in a world of collapsing po- litical systems. A "sense of things failing" has been the subject of his scholarship, and guided the choice of one. of his major study areas, the five weeks of miscalculation and error which preced- ed-World War 1. "History is not a cookbook from which you can get recipes," Kissinger has said.., But his cardinal rule of diplomatic planning In hie cl nrn-ndrda~nnlnG~lnl~3ne;fil~i~f fi~'~Iflk 7~h~fcQn~ SfY~~~ ~ I 14 c)kcal prec- t 1r,t'{ I ~'rL$ 1 '~3T Approved For Release 2001/03/) 'NSC U T~, Q rial originated by.foreign gov-` ance of official duties or con- Seeking legislation like "'N SC 4J ernmcnts or international or- tractual obligations." the British Official Secrets) " . m:..t,...r _--+-1 nvnr "rlic.!I At which crveraly nnnishes Live information or material" semination outs de the ixecu- i tnose wno aisciose anu receivei Law Mitter ut by the heads of five Branch" to such organiza- classified information. I led i ng o s agencies ' and "information or tions as the Rand Corp. in Cal- Touching on an issue that l material-which warrants some ifornia, which performs de- was repeatedly raised during' ree of classification for an. fense research under govern-I! the court cases involving the] de g On Secrets aennire periou? I'll'.^~ ? Fc+ahlichmnnt of safe- draft also instructs: special categories and intro-I keeping standards by the Gen- "In no case shall informa- I Tlic National Security Coun- duces a "30-year rule" setting) eral Services Administration tion be classified in order to cil is proposing tougher regu- the time limit for declassifica- to assure that all classified conceal inefficiency or admin- lations to keep classified infor- tion of all future secret gov-I material is appropriately istrative error, to prevent em-1 mation out of the hands of un- ernment information. locked up and guarded. barrassment to a person on authorized government offi- The time period over which ? Markings on every classi- ageny, to restrain competition cials, defense contractors and some documents would he au- fied document to make it.pos- or independent initiative, or the public. tomatically down-graded in se- sible to "identify the individ- to prevent for any other rea- It suggests that President curity classification and even- ual or individuals who origi- son the release of information Nixon, may want to go as far tually declassified would be nally classified : each - compo- , which does ,not require protec- -as seeking legislation similar reduced from 12 to 10 years, gent." tion in the ? interest of na-i ?to the British Official Secrets Documents o r i g i n a l l y ? Establishment of its own , tional security." l Act, which would have the ef- stamped "top secret" could be I rules by every government i Several judges ruled last: !feet of imposing stiff criminal made public after 10 years.! agency on when and how it it summer that publication of {penalties on anyone who re- Those marked "secret" could', will make classified informa- the Pentagon papers, a historv ceives classified information, be declassified after 8 years,j tion available to Congress or';of American involvement in, as well as on those who dis- and those with a "confiden- the courts. Vietnam, might cause embar close it. tial" stamp after 6 years. The NSC draft lists 41 gov rassment do g overnment of;; The recommendations are But before that time has' ernment agencies which would ficials but would not endanger 1contained in the draft revision passed, the NSC draft . sug-1 have the authority to put class the national well-being. of the executive order that has Bests, "classified information! sification stamps on docu- The draft also substitutes] governed the security classifi- or material no longer neededi ments and other materials. the term "'national security" cation system since 1953. in current working files" may] They range from the White wherever "national- defense" The 'draft was submitted to be "promptly destroyed, trans-! House and Atomic Energy was used in the previous regu- the Departments of State, De- ferred or retired" to reduces Commission to the Panama lation core olling the classifi- ':fence and Justice, the Central stockpiles of classified docu Canal Co. and the Federal cation of information. Intelligence Agency and the ments and cut the costs of 1 One expert on security clas- Maritime Commission. Atomic Energy Commission handling them. sification said yesterday that last month for their com- A House subcommittee in- Several agencies which pre- i national security is generally j ments. A copy was obtained by g viously did not have such au- vests ating the, avail ability of considered a broader term ? The Washington Post yester- classfied information has esti- thority are added to the list, which permits the classifica-1 day. - mated the cost of maintaining I such as the White House Of-Ilion of more material. After suggestions have come Tice of Telecommunications g secret government archives at The NSC draft also provides - back from those agencies, a re- Policy and the ExportImport $60 million to $80 million an- Bank. Ifor classification of anything 'vised draft is expected to be nually. whose "unauthorized disclo- ,sent to the President for ap- Although the special review Only two agencies-AC sure could reasonably be ex- ,-c on his return from of classification procedures TION, successor to the Peace pected to r. esult" in damn x- China, was commissioned by Press- Corps, and the Tennessee Val- The National Security Coun- ley Authority-are to be re- to. the nation, a less stringent dent Nixone long before the oil draft is the result of a top-secret Pentagon papers on stricted to the use of "classi- condition 'than was previously' imposed. year's work by a special inter- the war in Vietnam were dis- fied" stamps, and banned from The preamble to the draft. agency committee headed by closed to the public last sum- classifying documents "top se- William- H. Rehnquist, for- mer, the NSC draft reflects a cret" or "secret." states that "it is essential tha' Except for its final pages, the citizens of the United., merly an assistant attorney number of the problems on which are stamped "For Offi- States be informed to the bated during the Pentagon general,and now a Justice of cial Use Only," the copy of the maximum extent possible eon- the Supreme. Court. Among the episode. recommendations eerning the activities of their NSC draft obtained by The but adds that it " government , National Security Council in the NSC draft are: Post bears no security mark- is "equally essential for their sources Sara yesterday rrraL It is in the final pages that r_uver111iLC11L Rehnquist's contributions to agency review committee,", the National Security Council official information against the revision were "`very impor- `Whose chairman would be ap ! pointed by the President, disclosure. taut. . - He did yeoman all , to makes its recommendations NSC, is " supervise a government secu Rehnqu i st resigned from the city classification activity and for revising criminal statutes The draft, says the e. work-" " to deal with unauthorized dis- intended "to provide for a just onflict be- inter-agehcY' committee when handle complaints from the closure of classified informa-!. tween resolesolution these of two the ceconflict he- he was sworn in as a member public about overclassifica tion. The President is offered " lion three options: tional interests. include "information or mate- connection witti his perform-1 of the high court last month, ? An annual "physical in- ? Leaving existing law un- and he has not been replaced. ventory" by each agency hold- changed. - If adopted in its current. ing classified material to beI ? Revising. one section of form, 'the NSC draft would sure that security has been 1 the federal espionage act' to freeze fhe existing secrecy strictly preserved. 1 omit the requirement that dis- stamps on thousands of docu- ? Establishment of a re- closure, to be considered crim- ments now in special catego- quirement that everyone using inal, must be "to a foreign ries exempt from automatic classified material not only; agent." The revision would declassification over a period have a security clearance, but; make it a crime to disclose of T12 years he exec iI fiC" lrrJcwe41 Dq~ Rel UM ~O3 c 'psi Pe "e-91 access" to particular items in gYiatrt . . 11300390001-8 Approved For Release 2O V ! .P~p TRDP80-01601 R 5 FEB F31 7 STATINTL Report.s',' Ixon btu U.S. - .For Upcoming China. Visit By Paul G. Edwards Washiu?ton Post staff Writer KEY BISCAYNE, Fla., Feb. 4 - President Nixon spent today at his Florida retreat reading State Department and National Security Council re- ports in preparation for his teiligence Agency; David Packard, former deputy Secre-' tary of Defense, and Gen. Earle G. Wheeler.- former chairman of the Joint Chiefs. of Staff. Those who have resigned, are William Casey, chairman upcoming trip to China. or the Securities and Ex- Press secretary Ronald Zieg- change Commission: Cyrus ler said at a morning briefing Vance, former Secretary of that Mr. Nixon plans to study 1; the Army; Peter G. Peterson, about 500 pages of material on newly appointed Secretary of- China during the weekend, in- "Commerce, and Douglas Di1- eluding transcripts of discus- ion, former Secretary of the sions between White House Treasury. foreign affairs adviser Henry Mr. Nixon was ? greeted at Kissinger and Chinese Pre- Miami International Airport mier Chou En-lai. by personal friend Charles G. Ziegler said the President (Bebe) Rebozo when the presi- also has with him some of the dential plane landed at 9:36 (books on China that he has p.m. Thursday night. been reading, but he said that At 4 o'clock, the President! -Mr. Nixon had asked that the took an hour-long break for a, titles of the books not be re- ride on Biscayne Bay in Rebo-j leased. zo's boat, the Coco Lobo III.' The press secretary was On board with Mr. Nixon were asked if the books included Rebozo and the President's the thoughts of Mao, the "Lit- younger daughter and son-inc- tle Red Look" of party doe- law, Julie and David Eisen Chairman, Mao Tse-tung. Zie- gler replied that he did not know. On national employment fig- ures released today, Ziegler said that the addition of 240 000 workers to the job hower. ' The weather was sunny but windy with the temperature in the mid-60s. The plane left Andrews Ait? Force Base at 7:04 p.m. On board with the President on the trip was National Football force, last month and resulting League. Commissioner Pete decline in unemployment.from 6 per cent to 5.9 per cent of the work force "give us a sense of optimism." "If the growth in employ- ment continues at this magni- tude," he said, "we feel it will cut away at the unemployment rate." - . - Ziegler also announced ap- pointment by the President of four former top government officials -to the general advi- sory committee of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma- ment Agency. If confirmed by the Senate, the, nominees will replace four, members of the committee who have resigned: - Appointed were Robert Ells iroii6edifamRe(ea 001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01.601 R001300390001-8 NATO; John A. McCone, for- mer director of the Central In- STATINTL THE LONDON DAILY GRAPH MA Approved For Release 2401 : TA-RDP80-011 When Britain pulled -out of Rhodesia after the 1965 Unil2 the CIA worked . to ferret out details of the sanction-bust In the popular, traditions of spying, secret documents disa were used to convey messages in invisible ink. It was a shock one of the informers was a prominent lawyer. But it was. not the CIA had expanded into an area where the British were una -active in Egypt, Iran and Syria. E. H. COOKRIDGE ends his and looks at the Director, Richard Helms - ANY of the bright young L 'J ,,+ . - ' recruited to CIA from [ i Other Cl, law offices and univer- British sanction policy became, British and SIS men were were Cal -;ties had gained their fT ti, ices consular o spurs in London, where they were sent supposed to watch the steady flow of former A to glean some of the methods of the Rhodesian pig-ir.n, tobacco, and other Francis P British Secret Intelligence Service. products through the Portuguese ports who had cloak-anc Dulles enjoyed making' wisecracks of Lorenqo Marues and Beira in East clo and -about the Victorian and Indian Army Africa to Europe and the Far East clo traditions still surviving in the British Merchants and shippers there had Wigant, secret service, but he had a healthy made fortunes out of the traffic which Congo dL respect for its unrivalled experience the Portuguese were bound, by United and sever and great professionalism. He knew the most Nations resolutions and agreements ward ' ard as illegal. Edward CIA could learn a lot from the to re i i h B g n, with ta at r t British about operations in the Middle After the closure of British missions - 'East and Africa, where its stations in Salisbury all -information about 1957 from the State Department; were rapidly expanding. from 1959 he headed the East and Rhodesian exports dried up at source. African section and, at the time After Archibald Roosevelt, one At this juncture CIA stepped in to South ~.' CIA's foremost "Arabists", had re- - assist the British. it was not merely a of his new appointment, was Station stored cordial relations with SIS when ead in Pretoria. Among his various labour of love. American tobacco exploits he was reputed to have station head in London, a plan of co- syndicates in Virginia, Georgia, initiated the first contacts between the mof the ;on was devised for Africa, d North and South Carolina, Ten- South African government and Dr most ose independence, prm ish h colonies had nessee and Kentucky greatly in- . Banda of Malawi. cmin and were and creased their production and sales to The CIA agents were perpetually cooming subject t to to strong ong Soviet t annd Europe when Rhodesian tobacco -journeying between Salisbury and the ill Chinese pressure. Roosevelt was st in 1965, Rhodesia growers lost most of their trade Mozambique ports, and Murray was in London when, made her momentous "Unilateral through sanctions. Traditionally, temporarily posted to Lusaka to main- STATINTL Rhodesian tobacco was used for cigar twin . personal contact with British whichraeo dn of Independence" the conflict t the and cigarette manufacture in Belgium, officials resident in Zambia. Mr Ian which G toverr thenment. coct with h the Holland, Germany and Switzerland. Smith and hcabinet colleague, Mr British G When these supplies dried. up, Euro- J. H. and his i Howman, who looks after foreign There is no better instance of the pean manufacturers turned to Ameri- affairs as well as security and the strengthening of CIA-SIS collabora- ed can growers. But by and by Rhodesian secret service of.the Rhodesian regime, lion than the hitherto undisclosed exports began to flow again, by the were not unaware of.the unwelcome story of the services CIA rendered use of false certificates of origin and operations of the Americans. They the British authorities in Rhodesia, smuggling through the Portuguese suffered them for the sake of avoiding particularly since about, 1968. ports and through Durban in South an open clash with Washington. Their indeed, in assisting the British 5IS Africa, much' to the displeasure of the patience, however, became frayed in its thankless task of implementing Americans. when it was discovered that secret the policy of economic sanctions Thus, obliging the British and help- documents had disappeared from the against the Smith regime, CIA put its ing American business, CIA ordered hof the ruling Rhodesian relations with the Portuguese in its agents to ferret out the secrets of the National headquarters Front Party. Subsequently, jeopardy. It has an enduring under- sanction-busting schemes devised by standing with the Portuguese Govern- Mr Ian Smith's regime. Soon the CIA ment and its PIDE secret service on station in Salisbury was bustling with many aspects: NATO security, anti- activity. Since 1962 it had been headed communist operations, the use of radio by Richard L-t Macchia, a senior CIA stations in Portugal and her colonies, official, who had joined it in 1952 from and of bases,~q~a ~ k~as~ 01~ 0 doy! IP80-016018001300390001-8 and Special ForZ`e$ in AngoTa, ' in the guise of an o ~cial bique and Macao. However thin .the to Africa pontinue+ the U.S. Development Aid Agency. To NEW RE[?UBZIC STATI NTL Approved For Release 20 8"d/=04.9 A-RDP80-01601 R The Nixon Watch Shooting at Henry, The worst possible judge of the need for secrecy in government and of the ethics of officials who break the rules of secrecy is a working reporter such as my- self. I do what I can to penetrate the official fog and I'd welcome a lot more collaboration in that endeavor than I get at the Nixon White House. It is with diffi- dence, therefore, that I state at the outset of this note on a recent breach of government secrecy that in my opinion the official who must have been responsible for the breach is a rat who should be dug out of his hole and fired. The occasion for this observation is the theft from classified government files of documents that were given to columnist Jack Anderson in early December and have been publicized by him in fragments and in text since then. "Theft" is the proper word, although the responsible official looted his own files and gave facsimiles to Anderson. Jack Anderson inherited the "Washington Merry-Go-Round" newspaper column when its founder and his employer, Drew Pearson, died in 1969. Pearson Was and Anderson is a master seeker ' and purveyor of secrets. Conducted as it is in the Anderson column, the traffic in secrets is a bus- iness that makes the columnist the instrument of sources ,who may be trying to use him for the noblest or the most vicious ends. My infrequent reading of "Merry-Go-Round" indicates tome that Anderson does his best to conduct it in a decent way. He appears to be more careful than Pearson was to deny the column and its outlets in some 700 newspapers to self-servers and back-stabbers. It is believable that Anderson believed, as he says he did, that the initial source of the docu- ments in question made them available because he was convinced that the Nixon policy toward India and Pak- istan was disastrously mistaken and ought to be ex- posed and discredited. It is also believable that Jack Anderson was had. The difficulty with the explanation that he. says he accepted is that the policy was already known and discredited. Another columnist, Joseph Kraft, presented a more credible explanation of the original act of disclosure when he wrote that "most. of the evidence suggests that the true cause is a vul- gar bureaucratic row aimed at getting the President's chief assistant for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger:" . ' Only. five of the many documents that Anderson says he garnered in his December haul and later are alluded to here. Four of them are official and verbatim: accounts of meetings of.' the Washington Special Action Group, the action arm of the National Security Council, on December 3, 4 and 6. The fifth document it the parapApp abFDraRekbaSfer2IIeQ O4 can Senator Kenneth Keating, the US ambassador in New Delhi, sent the State Department on December 8. I deduce from Anderson's cautious account of how he obtained the documents that the WSAG texts came from a single source who first offered him a dozen or so classified items and subsequently, under pressure from the columnist, let him take his pick from "a STATIN' whole massive file of documents." Anderson says that the stuff. came from "plural" sources and implies that their rank is such that public identification of them would embarrass the Nixon administration. The nature and variety of the documents on which Anderson has drawn in successive columns indicate that this is true of the total haul. The WSAG texts are special. Their content suggests to me, as it did to Joe Kraft, that the official who gave them to Anderson was shooting at Henry Kissinger and only incidentally, if at all, at the Indo-Pakistan and perhaps other policies with which Kissinger is associated. It is this official whom I take to be a high-ranking rat. Kissinger' issinger brought the publication of three of the four WSAG texts, and extensive printed quotations from the fourth, upon himself with his remark that ,previous references to him in Anderson columns were "out of context." Anderson, angered, gave the texts to The Washington Post, The New York Times and sev- eral other newspapers in order to prove that his Kis- singer references were accurate understatements. The texts are fascinating documents. They illumine a part A the Nixon-Kissinger policy operation as it has never before -been exposed. But it. is important to distinguish between the parts of the policy process that the WSAG texts do and do not illumine. They do not, as one com- mentator thought they did, show how "the decisional process" actually works. The Special Action Group deals with policy after it has been laid down. Kissin- ger's job when he functions as WSAG chairman is to see that the military services, State, Defense, CIA and other agencies involved in foreign policy understand exactly what the President has decided and implement the decided policy exactly as he wants it to be imple- mented. The Anderson texts show that Kissinger per- forms this task with a certitude, an arrogance, a dis- play of proxied presidential authority that smothers any tendency toward dissent that there may be in the WSAG forum. A reader may gather from the published texts that Kissinger dominates subordinate NSC bodies where preliminary policy options are discussed in the same way with the same effect. But the WSAG texts do not prove that this is.-the case. They make it difficult but not impossible to believe, as I have been told at the White House and elsewhere for three years, that Kis- singer in these formative sessions and in the course of directing preliminary policy studies for the NSC and :f ClA RDP d6nb i Wo0` 1cY81b&ob eoands a Wks,1IINGTON POST. STATINTL Approved For Release 200'YQ3(J1:1O7 -RDP80-01601 The Washington Herry-Go-Rou>tnd ixon to omy. via' .N 'con By' Jack Anderson . President Nixon has called an abrupt halt to military cut- backs and will grant the of the next budget. I big Soviet warheads. For this' his friends. (.'roxmire Room." Hurt, how-. He has-decided to us~~i]! ?divvedc uer,Releasea 2:Q 0t l/0t4ni G#A-RDRW ,160$RQ&IZN399001 finder what In the leaked report on the Special do not authorize sales to the ultimate the Government now will do to tighten Actiori'Group's White House meeting on recipient, such as Pakistan." protection of its secrets. LEND] Approved For Re ease M in1A'~3~/W 6rk-kbP80-0160 i n JAN ?1972 ? STATINTL o-Washington Whispers Administration officials are more con- cerned over publication of the so- called Anderson papers detailing secret National Security Council meetings on the Indian-Pakistani war than they were about the Pentagon papers on Vietnam. Says one: "The leak to Jack Anderson, the syndicated columnist, came from the 'inner sanctum' of the Administration. If you can't trust the people in the White House Situation Room, who can you trust?" Chou En-lai startled American offi- cials with the tough demands the Chinese Communists intend to present to President Nixon during his Peking visit next month. The Reds want the U. S. to cancel its 1954 security treaty with Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan and to announce publicly that the island is an integral part of mainland China. Aides say Mr. Nixon has no intention of going a fraction of that distance. The 10-year-old Berlin Wall and other massive barriers have failed to dam the flow of escapes from Communist East Germany. In the past 12 months, nearly 17,000 East Germans made it safely to the West. Approved For Release 2001103/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 j~QS A,rGyLES TIMES Approved For Release 2( 0q I O C1A-RDP80-0160 STATINTL SECRET U.S. DOCUMENTS India Aim Seen to Cru~~ ~akdstan Exclusive to The Time: from against Indian out of per- secretary of state for -Near the' Chicago Sun?Time$ sonal pique or to protect Eastern affairs. WASHINGTON -- CIA relations with China, Kis- S i s c o reportedly said Director Richard Helms . 'I has been putting that "if the situation were er not want to be even-hand- ed. The President believes that India. is the attacker. We are trying to get across the idea that India has jeopardized relations with told the White-House that smb India did not intend. to out word that the CI A of- ' to evolve as Dr. Kissinger' the United States." stop fighting with Pakis- fered "conclusive proof" of had indicated, then, of The day b e f o re .t h e tan until Pakistani air and an Indian intention to de- course, there was a serious WSAG meeting was held, armored defenses were de- molish Pakistani defenses risk . to the viability of Kissinger told reporters at stroyed, a new set of An- and dismember Pakistan. West Pakistan. a b a c k g r o under that derson papers revealed. The Anderson document Expressed Doubt' "there have been some Presidential a d v is e r says Helms told the Mr. Sisco doubted, comments that the Admin- tion is anti Indian. Henry A. Kissinger re- WSAG, "It is reported that however, that the Indians istrstraa is isy inaccurate." This sponded that "elimination prior to terminating pre- had this as their objective. discussed ed of Pak armored and air sent hostilities, Mrs. Ghan- He indicated that Foreign The possible ways, WSAG in discss forces would make the di (Indira Ghandi, Indian Minister (Swaran) Singh psi le ways, "turn the screw" words, Paks defenseless. It would prime minister) intends to t o 1 d ambassador (Ken- ger's in the situation, turn Western Pakistan attempt to eliminate Pa- neth) Keating that India apparently vassal." force capabilities." any Pak territory. none. The newest set of secret Threat to Kashmir "Mr. Sisco said it must There is no mention in documents released by col- Kissinger and H e I m s also be kept in mind that the document of the plan um n i s t Jack Anderson agreed that India intended Kashmir is really disputed that. Kissinger now says tend . to support current to seize Azad Kashmir, the territory. - was successful-a forceful claims by Kissinger that, portion of the disputed After further discussion, message to the Soviet fear of an Indian assault p on West Pakistan was the northern territory in Kissinger said that "what T K a s h m i r in Pakistani we may be witnessing is a Union insisting that Rus- U.S. policy to ar "tPa" in hands. The documents do situation wherein a coun- sia stop her ally, India, tan policy toward Pcin not make f u l l y c l e a r try.(India), equipped and from attacking West Pa- eluded in war. the recently con whether it was thought supported by the Soviets, kistan. lu the Indians were intent on may be turning half of Pa- According to the doc- First Indication still further "dismember- kistan into an impotent T h .e latest document, ment" of Pakistan. state and the other half ' unfents, it was King Hus- minutes of a meeting of Kissinger said that "if into a vassal. We must sein of Jordan who initiat- the Washington Special the Indians smash the Pak consider what other coup- ed an offer to provide Action Group on Dec. 8, is air force and the armored tries may be thinking of, eight U.$. built jet fight- the first of the Anderson forces we would have a de- our action." ens to Pakistan, another papers to give any indica- liberate Indian attempt to Kissinger said that "we Muslim country. Previous tion oI U.S. motives dur- force the disintegration of are not trying to be even installments of the Ander- ing the crisis. Pakistan." handed. There can be no ? son papers implied that Amid speculation that A dissent was registered doubt what the President the United States had President Nixon a c t e d by Jospeh Sisco, assistant wants. The President does - thought up the plan. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001?-8 UW XORK TIMES Approved For Release 2db5lAW1~2CIA-RDP80 STATINTL R on' IndianPakistafl War Text of Memo. gram to which Mr. Williams d k WASHINGTON, Jan. 14- 'Following is the text of a memorandum on a meeting of a National Security Coun- cil committee on Indian. Pakistani hostilities, made public today by the columnist Jack Anderson: SECRET/SENSITIVE THE JOINT STAFF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 ?8 DECEMBER 1971 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Washington Spe- cial Action Group meeting on Indo - Pakistan hostilities; 8 December 1971 1. The N.S.C. Washington Special Action Group met in the Situation Room, the White House, at 1100, Wednesday, 8-December to consider the Indo-Pakistan situation. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Kissinger. 2. ATTENDEES / A. PRINCIPALS. Dr. Henry J Kissenger, Mr. Richard Helms, C.I.A., Gen. John Ryan, J.C.S., Mr. Donald MacDonald, A.LD., Mr. David Packard; De- fense, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, State. B. OTHERS: Mr. Maurice Williams, A.I.D., Mr. John Waller, C.I.A., Col. Richard Kennedy, N.S.C., Air. Samuel Iloskanson, N.S.C., Mr. Harold Saunders, N.S.C., Mr. Armi- stead Selden, Defense, Mr. James Noyes, Defense, Mr. Christopher Van Hollen, State, Mr. Samuel De Palma, State, Mr. Bruce Laingen, State, Mr. David Schneider, State, Mr. Joseph Sisco, State, Rear Adm. Robert Welander, O.J.C.S., Capt., Howard Kay, O.J.C.S. Group 4 downgraded at 3- year intervals; declassified after 12 years. .3. Summary. Dr. Kissinger suggested that India might be attempting, through calculat- ed destruction of Pak armored and aic forces to render Pak- istan impotent. He requested that the Jordanian interest in assisting Pakistan not be turned off, but rather kept in it holding pattern. He asked that Pak capabilities in Kash- tnir be assessed. 4. Mr. Helms opened the meeting by briefing the cur- rent situation. In the East, the Indians have broken the line at Comilla. Only major river crossings prevent them from investing~vd Indians are add c ng rapid- ly throughout East Pakistan. All major Pak L.O.C.'s in the Associated Press East are now vulnerable. In the West, the Paks are now claiming Punch, inside the Indian border. However, the. Paks are admitting fairly heavy casualties in the fight- ing. Tank battles are appar- ently taking place in the Sind/Raiasthan area. Mrs. Gandhi has indicated that be- fore heeding a U.N. call for cease-fire, she intends to straighten out the southern border of Azad Kashmir. It is reported that prior to termi- nating present hostilities, Mrs. Gandhi intends to at- tempt to eliminate Pakistan's armor and air force capabil- ities. Thus far only India and Bhutan have recognized Ban- gladesh. It is believed that the Soviets have held off rec- ognition primarily so as not to rupture relations with the Paks. Soviet action on the matter of recognition, how- ever, may be forthcoming in the near future. 5. A4r. Sisco inquired how long the Paks might be ex- pected to hold out in East Pakistan, to which Mr. Helms ake owners p, e 7. Dr. kisstnger as how long it would take to responded that nothing was shift Indian forces from East under negotiation at the t time sen . to West. General Ryan said pre it might take a reasonably 13. Dr. Kissinger inquired long time to move all the, about next year's [A.LD.] forces, but that 'the airborne budget. AIr. Williams stated brigade could be moved that what goes into the quickly, probably within a budget did not represent a matter of five or six days. commitment. Dr. Kissinger 8. Dr. Kissinger inquired stated that current orders about refugee aid. After a are not to put anything into discussion with Mr. Williams the budget for A.I.D. to it was determined that only India. It was not to be a very small number of U.S. leaked that A.I.D. had put dollars earmarked for ref- money in the budget for ugee relief was actually India, only to have the entering the Indian economy. wicked" White House take Contrary to the sense of the it out. 14. Dr. Kissinger suggested last meeting, toest Indians foreign n that the key issue if the have actually Indians turn on West Pakis- exch exchange in n the process of tan is Azad Kashmir. If the event, the entirrefugees. I any Indians smash the Pak air fort e. relief e susnended force and the armored forces In is c India and Pakistan. we would have a deliberate in both t then Indian attempt to force the 9. zed Kissinger thhen em- disintegration of Pakistan. phasied that the President The elimination of-the . Pak has made it clear that no armored and air forces further foreign exchange, would make the Paks de- velo -480 p ? ment l oans coul ld or be de- fenseless. It would turn West signed to Indcould as. Pakistan into a client state. signed of India the a Witwitho ut se. The possibility elicits a num- proval of Witte House. ter of questions. Can we al- Mr. Williams stated there low a U.S. ally to go down was no nroblem of anything completely while we partic. ah. sliding throe ssi ipate in a blockade? Can we Dr. 10. the next tur iofth the allow the Indians to scare what i next turn of the us off, believing that if U.S. screw m might be. Mr. Williams supplies are needed they will said that the only other pos- sible option was taking a po- sition concerning aid material currently . under contract. This h' v; ever would be a very messy problem inas- much as we would be dealing with irrevocable letters of credit. Mr. Williams further stated that we would have to take possession of material that was being consigned to the Indians by U.S. contrac- tors and thus would be com- pelled to pay U.S. suppliers, resulting in claims against the U.S.G. 11. Mr. Packard said that all of this could be done, but agreed that it would be a very laborious and difficult problem. He further elaborat- ed that all the items involved would have to be located, the United States would have to t settle with hi It the situation were to evolve as Dr. Kissinger had indicated then, of course, there was a serious risk to the viability of West Paki- stan. Mr. Sisco doubted, how- ever, that the Indians had this as their objective. He indicated that Foreign Min- ister Singh told Ambassador Keating that India had no intention of taking any Pak territory. Mr. Sisco said it must also be kept in mind that Kashmir is really dis- puted territory. 16. Mr. Helms then stated that earlier he had omitted mentioning that Madame Gandhi, when referring to China, expressed the hope that there would be no Chi- nese intervention in the West. She said that the So- viet had cautioned her tha time to reach the ultimate climax is probably a func- etc. Nevertheless, if such was' the Chinese might rattle the lion of the difficulties en- desired it could be done. Mr. sword in Laddakh but that Williams said that in a very the Soviets have promisee countered in river crossings, limited way this type of ac- to take appropriate counter. 6.' Assessing the situation tiori had been taken against action if this should occur. In the West, General Ryan some Mid-East countries, but Mr. Helms indicated that indicated that he did not see that it had taken years to there was no Chinese build- the Indians pushing, too hard settle the claims. up at this time but, never- N ~e " 4Y&3C0? 'rn ial a dl' i r x 6fl oe' '~u ie8 lion. - year's development. loan pro- ans and rattle the sword.'. STATINTL WASHINGTON PQST roved, FR lease 2001 /03 0 JO AA DP80-01601 RO Ap ~i wept ra t Undermi HIGH POLICY differ. ences are widely supposed to have prompted the leak of secret documents on the Indo-Pakistani crisis to Jack Anderson. But most of the evidence suggests that the true cause is a vulgar bu- reaucratic row aimed at get- ting the President's chief as- sistant for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger. The most striking evi- dence is like the evidence of the dog that didn't bark in the Sherlock Holmes story. The fact is that no enduring policy issue of high impor- tance is involved in the leaks. The fight over East Ben- gal is largely a one-shot af= fair. Hardly anything that happens on the subcontinent is' central to international politics. The United States had already tipped toward Pakistan - and practically everybody knew it-when the leaks were sprung. At the time, as some of Dr. Kis- singer's comments make plain, the administration was anticipating a return to more normal relations with New. Delhi. A SECOND BIT of evi- dence' involves Mr. Ander- son himself. He is not deeply versed in foreign af- ,fairs. No one who aimed to change a line of interna- tional policy would single out Mr. Anderson as the agent for deflecting that re- sult through the leak of se- cret information. Mr. Anderson's specialty- and it is an important spec- ialty-is putting the jour- nalistic arm on wrong-doers. By no mere accident the chief fruit of his disclosures was not something that af- fected policy. The chief eon- sequence was to impugn the integrity of Dr. Kissinger. As a third bit of evidence there is the state of rela- tions among senior officials and principal agencies of the foreign affairs commu- nity in the Nixon adminis- tration. Washington veter- ans tell me that to find a fit counterpart they have to go back to 1950, and the deadly you-or-me rivalry between Dean Acheson at the State 4010, and Louis Johnson, who then'rul'ed the roost at the g Kissingei Pentagon. In any case, rela- tions nowadays are marked by paranoia, jealousy and hatred. The chief target for most of the venom is Dr. Kissin- ger, and some of the fault is his. He has a sharp tongue, and he has been unnecessar- ily unkind in comments about some of the senior of- ficials of the most pres- tigous departments. But most of the resentment has been caused by what Dr. Kissinger does in the serv- ice of the President. The present administration has expanded the job of special assistant for national secu- rity affairs way beyond what it was under Walt Rostow and McGeorge Bundy. Dr. Kissinger has virtually elim- inated from the decision- making business some of the most high-powered men and agencies in town. The office of Secretary of Defense is perhaps the chief victim. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird is going to be stepping down soon with practically nothing to his credit. Even his claim (which has at least some foundation) to be the author of the policy for getting out of Vietnam is not widely be- lieved. He seems hostile to the administration's policy on an arms control agreement, and he was completely cut out of plans for the Presi- dent's visit to China. His general reputation for trick- iness has caused the cognos- centi, rightly or wrongly, to establish him as the short- odds favorite for almost all leaks regarding national se- curity these days. Indeed, sonic White House officials at first believed Mr. Laird leaked the Pentagon papers. formed military are in the habit of leaking classified information to serve their own interests. Not that the State Depart. ment or other civilian agen-. cies can be entirely ex- empted from suspicion .Except as regards the Near .East, Dr. Kissinger has taken over the whole realm of foreign policy-including even negotiation with for- eign officials. This assump. tion of the State Depart- .mont's traditional role is bit- terly resented by many of the department's leading of- ficials. Indeed, one of them, not long ago, voiced the sus- picion that Dr. Kissinger spent an extra day on his last trip to China in order to embarrass the State De- partment which was han ating the United Nations vote on Chinese admission. With suspicions at that level, there is every reason to figure bureaucractic ri- valry as the key element in the background of the An- derson papers. There is no case for lionizing, or even protecting.the sources of the of the leaks. On the contrary, for orice there is a case for a presi- dential crackdown. Mr. Nix- on's interest-and that of the country-is to find the source of the leaks and fire them fast. STATINTL THE UNIFORMED MILI- TARY comes a close second in the odds. Many of them do not like the way the White House is winding down the war in Vietnam. Almost all are opposed to the arms con- trol, agreement which the White House is now negoti- ating with the Russians. Some are hostile to the Oki- nawa reversion agreement which the White House has- ~fUPtRL3 `fie t ian2 Oi 1O8I04 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 in the government, the uni- UW YORK TIMES Approved For Release 200@1/,=0Q72QlA-&8bLT)~16 ouse Too teps to titop Lea Ls Months Before Anderson Disclosures !+i T According to one source, Mr. By ROBERT M. SMITH Krogh and Special to The I:ew York Times Mr. Young are , authorized. to call on the F.B.I. kWASIJINGTON, Jan. 8-The but hold d the principal re- columnist Jack Anderson hasls "it is a been able to disclose secretiponsonsibil Hot se because problem" and b a rriemoranda concerning . Na-IW]iite "it would be inappro- tional Security Council meet-1priate to send some F.B.I. man House recently despite Whitojaround to talk with people like Kruse steps months ago to! the Secretary of State." It is not prevent leaks ec reporters known whether Mr. Rogers proceedings. the secrecy of co uncil cil'Ihimself was interviewed. The article that prompted According to reliable sources, the move was written by the the White House quietly orderedPentagon correspondent of The David R. Young of Henry A. Times, William Beecher. They ' American proposals had been made orally at negotiations in Helsinki but that specific draft agreements were still being written in Washington. According to one Govern- ment official, the disclosure came "during a very critical stage of the negotiations" and the proposals involved "were nnt even in any written memo." He said the Administration's feeling was that the informa- tion had to come from someone present at the discussions of the National Security Council. / Officials at council meetings include representatives of the Kissinger s national secuxityi article reported that American staff and Egil Krogh Jr. of negotiators had proposed to John D. staff hman s domestic , he Soviet Union an arms-con- advisory staff to investigate the trol agreement that would halt leaks and to stop them. The ac construction of both land-based tion was prompted, according missiles and missile submarines. to Government sources, after er Mr. Beecher also reported that an article in The New a companion proposal would j Times July 23 that dealt with allow as many as 300 defensive the talks on limitation of strategic arms and caused con- cern in the White House. It' is not known specifically what Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young have done in the five months since the security assignment was added to their duties. They are reported to have reviewed the procedures used by the counCil'and to. have inquired into the methods used by coun- missiles in both the United States and the Soviet Union to protect offensive missiles. The article said that the cil members, such as Secretary of State William P. Rogers, to 'prepare for meetings and to handle the council's papers. F.B.I. Called In presumably, Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young have had their task made more difficult by the dis- closures by Mr. Anderson. The Justice Departure-nt has con- firmed that the Administration had called on the 'Federal Bureau of Investigation to in- vegigate the leaks. Defense and State Departments, the intelligence community and t Chiefs of Staff. i n the Jo The F.B.I. has conducted an' extensive investigation over more than four months in an effort to uncover Mr. Beecher's sources. The inquiry has been Conducted here, elsewhere in the United States and abroad, and was still. going on last week.. STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 NEW YORK TIf r"s STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/U84 1 A-RDP80-01601 R he. Anderson now going to Peking and Moscow to negotiate .a "generation of peace." Never mind what "third parties" think. Never mind the human con- sequences of the massacres In East Pakistan. Never mind the strategic implications of losing influence in India to the Russians. Never mind doing one thing and saying another.' :`list do as the President says! document or understanding? And WASHINGTON though the Senate is supposed to ratify such treaties, nobody on Capitol .'Council's Special Action Group for Hill seems to know about any secret Dec. 3, 4 and 6, it is hard to get the understanding with India or Pakistan. ,impression that Dr. 'Henry Kissinger Even the President seems to be left nd other top officials are really in the dark at points under this sys- la tem. For here is Kissinger, in the Dec. grappling with the political, strategic 4 meeting, saying that whoever was and moral problems of the Indo- Pakistani crisis. Mainly they are being putting out "background" information 'told by Dr. Kissinger, who is obviously on the Indo-Pakistani war was gro- under pressure from his boss, what voking Presidential wrath. "The .the President wants done-he wants- President is under the 'illusion,'" Dr. no even-handed stuff but wants to Kissinge is quoted as saying. "that he favor Pakistan-and there is a clear is giving instructions; not that he is suggestion that the bureaucrats are merely being kept apprised of affairs opposing the President, as they progress. Dr. Kissinger asks that this should be kept in mind." "I'm getting hell every half hour Again from the Dec. 4 memo: "Dr.- 'from the President," says Dr. Kis- Kissinger said he did not care how singer, "that we are not being tough third parties [countries] might react, enough on India . . . the President is so long as Ambassador Bush under- blaming me, but you people are in the stands what he should say." clear." It is an Interesting approach for a TJ'ti~I n e4sr~eAFn 41 the a~e s ~haUAc t 9~f i eQ18001300390001-8 AMA9along with his friends in Pakistan, would "bring us together"-and Is and that the official explanations were 'so;inacturate-orincomplete that even the American Ambassador in New that they "did not add to our position, or, more importantly, to American credibility." It is the old story, and it has poisoned American policy and di- plomacy under both Presidents Johnson and Nixon for almost a decade, The issue is "credibility." Something new seems to have come over American political life, and it is not official lying. It is the wide- WASHINGTON - The Anderson ?pread public tolerance of misleading Papers on the U. S. Government's official statements, and even a general handling of the Indo-Pakistani war tendency not to denounce the twisters .suggest that the Nixon Administration who indulge in this practice but the has learned very little from the reporters who expose it. damning disclosures of the Pentagon ' The Johnson and Nixon Administra- Papers on the Vietnam war. tions have been deceitful, clumsy and t For Jack Anderson's classified docu- unsuccessful, but even after the Penta- n-i nts tell much the same story of gun Papers and the Anderson Papers, damaging decisions arrived at in the reaction seems to be, not that they secret; of subjective Presidential or- were wrong and deceptive, but that ders imposed on the objective analysis they were caught. of the President's own principal ad- It is clear that policy is being vsers; of official explanations which planned, not in the State Department, mislead the Congress and the American but in the White House, and that in the people, and finally of defiant dis- Indo-Pakistani case it was being guided closures of the true facts by officials primarily by Dr. Kissinger, who is not who have lost faith In the judgment available for questioning even in and truthfulness of their superiors. secret by the responsible committees Every time these official deceptions of the Congress. are published, the Issue is presented "We need to think about our treaty to the public as a conflict between obligations," Dr. Kissinger told the the Government and the press, but National Security Council Special the issue is much deeper than that. Action Group in the Dec. 3 meeting. It Is a conflict within the Government "I remember a letter or memo inter- itself on how to make and present preting our existing treaty with, a policy in such a way as to retain the special Indian tilt, When I visited confidence and trust of the civil serv- Pakistan in January, 1562, I was ice, the Congress, the nation, and the briefed on a secret document or oral other governments of the world. understanding about contingencies If you read the official reports on arising in other than a SEATO con- the meetings of the National Security text . . ." What does that mean? What secret Papers DAILY WORLD Approved For Release82dOtI/M4 : CIA-RDP80-0160 By CONRAD KOMOROWSKI Andrsc'nF p r The bloodhounds are baying on the tracks of Jack Anderson, who conducts a weekly news column, The Washington . Merry-Go-Round, published in 700 news- papers at home and abroad. Investigators for the FBI, State Department, De- partment of Justice and probably other agencies are / hot on his trail. Rep. F. Edward Hebert (D-La.), V anti-union, racist chairman of the House Armed Ser- vices Committee, announced Thursday a subcommittee will get into the act immediately when Congress opens on Jan. 18. Anderson has published in his column excerpts from the minutes of the Washington Special Action Group (a subcommittee of the National Security Coun- cil, abbreviated as WSAG) and other documents and memoranda meant only for the inner circles of the Administration. They expose the double-dealing and lying of the Nixon Administration, particularly in rela- tion to the Indian-Pakistani conflict. Anderson has also made some of this material available to the press generally. Among the information Anderson disclosed is the revelation that Nixon's adviser on national security affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger, on the one hand pub- licly told the press that the Administration was friendly to India and on the other hand told the Wash- ington Special Action Group behind the screen of of- ficial secrecy that Nixon "wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan" and that Nixon believed "we are not being tough enough on India." It is quite possible, after the exposure of the gov- ernmental lying during five Administrations, Democrat- ic'and Republican. in the Pentagon papers, that some governmental figures may have begun to think twice about the questionable "wisdom" - from a pro- capitalist point of view - of Nixcn's policies in the Bangla Desh situation and in Asia generally. The differences in the ruling class and its collabo- rators on this score are useful to the people. Besides the facts revealed by Anderson, there is an important issue involved in his disclosures. That is the right of the people to know. Anderson has not made this a major feature of his expose, but it is there any- -way. It, is also involved in the defense of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo, who are being prosecuted and persecuted for their part in tearing away the veil of secrecy in which the searing facts of the conspiracy which plunged the United States into barbaric aggres- sion in Indochina had been buried. STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 a;lirt aVi{li I)4?LY ~tG;VS't 8 JAN 197Z Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80T016101 R00 t~aa~eee sera ',~_. By FRANK JACKMAN Washington, Jan. 7-0ne of the local television sta- tions has been showing old Marx Brothers movies on the late show this week-possibly as a sort of relief from the real-life zaniness that abounds here in the capital of the Free World. Certainly, Groucho's role in "Horsefeathers" as Prof. Quincy Adams Wagstaff, president of Mythical Huxley U and head coach of its woefully inept football team, seems no more nutty than the Chico to Harpo To Groucho .-To Henry? flap over the so-called Pakistani tilt in the latest secret papers caper. Nor can it compare with those early-morning presidential phone calls to pro football coaches. (In fact, President Nixon's pros. pensity for ringing up Washington's Redskins coach George Allen with play suggestions prompted one sportswriter to remark that the chief executive actually wasn't interested in running for the presidency again, but rather was bidding for the opening as head coach of the Chicago Bears. "If he gets it," the wise guy added, "look for Martha Mitchell to work the phones.") . For those of you who may not remember, what plot there Is in "Horsefeathers" revolves around the theft of Huxley U's secret foot- ball signals. Of course, any team whose backfield includes Harpo Marx riding a horse-drawn. sani- tation cart certainly doesn't need any secret plays, right Mr. Prez -uh, Coach? In the end, Huxley wins and everybody exits singing. (In the case of Groucho, ni a k e that leering.) But what, you ask in wonderment, does this have to do with Washington. Well, substitute secret papers for s e c r e t signals, fellows and girls,' and you h a v e a real-life "Horsefeathers," right down to a swinging Groucho like professor (guess who?). - In the beginning, there was -columnist Jack Anderson charg- ing that secret White House and Pentagon documents in his pos- session showed there was a sharp conflict between what the Nixon administration said in public and what it said in private during the -India-Pakistan War. Anderson said that the President-whose suggestion of an end-around play to Coach Allen lost the Redskins 13 crucial yards during their Harpo Marx The hero of the white wines playoff with San Francisco-wanted U.S. Policy to "tilt in favor 0 Pakistan." You may recall that the Paks lost a lot more than 13 yards in their game, so the Nixon coaching record remains Un- blemished at .000. - Then Nixon's national security affairs adviser, Henry Kissinger, while flying out of the Western White House with the chief execu- tive, did something he swore he wouldn't do again-he briefed the newsmen on board the plane, "not for attribution." He claimed that remarks attributed to him by Anderson were taken "out of context." This prompted Anderson to leak some of the confidential goodie he had to some of his newspaper clients before they got copies 0 his column, so they could. get a running start on the story. Is Somebody Going Through the Garbage? But this, in turn, roused other newspapers, so Anderson had to release the text of three secret memoranda of meetings of the hush- hush 'Washington Special Action Group. In the words of the Im- mortal Kingfish, Anderson, who once was the leakee, thus become the leaker. And he didn't like it much. Pretty soon, he had to take his phone off the hook and go into seclusion to get any work done. Secrets-hungry reporters were calling him from everywhere, badger. ing his secretary and office staff for new revelations. There were reports that the FBI was going through his garbage. Meanwhile, back at the White House, certain high officials were hinting that maybe the administration wasn't going to look too closely into who did the leaking because maybe they sort of wanted this stuff leaked. It would take the likes of the late IIarpo, complete' with ever-tooting bicycle horn, to figure that one out, friends, so don't try. There's No Substitute for Henry K One thing becomes clear upon closer reading of the top-secret memos, however, and that is that Central Intelligence Director V, Richard M. Helms and Kissinger apparently are the only senior biggies who go to all the meetings they're scheduled to go to. Th other members of the Washington Special Action Group all sen~ substitutes, even such relatively obscure types as the head of the Agency for International Development. In Kissing?er's case, it's easy, to see why he was at all the meetings; after all, it's his club, Down the Pike From Appomattox One of the faithful WSAG attendees was the Hon. Armistead I. :ielden Jr., who now rejoices in the title of principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. A. Democratic congressman from Alabama for 16 years, Selden was involuntarily retired from elective politics in 1968 after lie was defeated in a bid for his party's Senate nomination. At that time, his colleagues were predictably effusive in their praise of his service. "The greatest hour of Robert E. Lee came not when he was com- manding the great army of the Confederacy, but after he had met military defeat and surrendered his sword to Grant at Appomattox," said the late Rep. George Andrews (D-Ala.). How right Andrews was proved out a few months later when Selden took his last congressional junket, a taxpayer-financed tour of Latin America. Just to make. sure that there would be no com- munications gap, Selden's office thoughtfully provided a full bean of pre-dated handouts and statements from the lawmakers for usg during the first week of the trip. .. . STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 CHICAGAppLoved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 ITRIBUN'Z M - 767,793 en agon J. with Kissinger 's remarks dur- I ciet court cited a 1963 decision that Dgec. a 7. briefing of newsmen on "any system of prior restraint D Kissinger held a lengthy and of expression comes to this unusual briefing on that day court bearing a heavy pre- detailing what he said were the sumption against. its constitu- Nixon administration's actions tional validity." h regarding the India-Pakistan conflict. BY JOHN 1 IACLEAN "Kissinger: I am getting hell administration more than it All the Anderson documents', [Chicago Tribune Press service] % every half hour from the would me," he said. "It would were marked "secret/sensi- WASHINGTON, Jan. The resident that we are not be- make a very funny story ." Live," but it is doubted the Federal Bureau of Investiga- ing tough enough on India. Ile Anderson said his sources for I federal government will take tecret(memloranda of high-level has just called me again. He the story consider United States any action to stop publication. White House consultations clur-does not believe we are carry- handling of the Indian-Pakistan The Supreme Court's decision the India-Pakistan War. mg out his wishes. He wants affairs a "colossal blunder." last June in the Pentagon Pa- to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He I Anderson released the docu- Jack Anderson, whose syndi- feels everything we do comes menu to newsmen with the pers dispute ruled in favor of rated column Washington newspapers publishing the sc- out otherwise. 1urging that they compare them I'' t stud The hi~=h Merry-Go-Round appears in "Dr. Kissinger said that who- 700 newspapers, released the ever was putting out back- t text of the secre papers? ground information relative to Anderson has been writing I the current situation is pro- columns from the material ahd I yoking Presidential wrath. The has concluded "that Presiden- president is under the `illu- tial braintruster Henry Kiss- ! sion' that he is giving instruc- inger lied to reporters when he tions; not that he is merely told then the Nixon adminis- tration wasn't anti-India." Why Papers Released Anderson released the papers -because Kissinger, President Nixon's chief adviser on na- being kept appraised of affairs as they progress. Dr. Kissinger asked that this be kept in mind." - "Dr. Kissinger said . . . 'it is quite obvious that the Presi- tional s e c u r i t y affairs, said dent is not inclined to let the Anderson "took out of context" Paks be defeated.' " remarks indicating the admin- "Dr. Kissinger then asked istration was against India in q whether we have the right to its recent war with Pakistan. authorize Jordan or Saudi Ara- The FBI investigation re- I bia to transfer military equip- portedly has narrowed down ment to Pakistan." [Anderson to the National Security Coun- said this morning on the tele cil after checks in the Depart- vision program Today that he merits of State and Defense, has additional memos which Spokesman for the W h i t e show that fighter planes were House, State Department, and l among the things being con- Pentagon used nearly identical sidered in a scheme to He disclosed that India had attacked Pakistan even tho the STATINTL United States has informed I A typical exchange ? involved India that Pakistan was willing 1 Kissinger and Maurice W'il- to make concessions. Hams, of the State Department 'India a Great Country' staff.,, "There have been some corn- During the Dec. 6 meeting, ments that the administration Kissinger asked if there al- I is anti-Indian," Kissinger said. ready had been a massacre of "This is totally inaccurate. Bihari people living in East "India is a great country ... Pakistan. Williams said he ex- when we have differed with petted there would he killing India, as we have in recent of these people in reprisal for weeks, we do so with great their support of West Pakistan. sadness." ' . "Mr. Williams states that The memoranda released by perhaps an international hu- Anderson deal with meetings manitarian effort could be held before this briefing, the launched on- their behalf. Dr. - phrases as they declined to ; "sneak" aid to the Pakistanis. last one on the day before the answer all questions on the A cutoff of military aid to briefing, 'Dec. 6. subject. The response of Charles Pakistan was ordered early The sessions were attended Bray, State Department spokes- man, was typical when he told reporters: "I won't discuss the issue." Asked why he wouldn't, he said, "because I won't." The documents are minutes of, three meetings of a special action group of high level of- ficials of the National Security Council. Some of I iighlights Excerpted ?tdiirr%yecxIE, here are some of the high- lights: _ Iasi. yea"' Chiefs of "Dr. Kissinger also directed- by heads of the Joint Ci e that henceforth we show a cer- Staff, C e n t r :>jg gon tain coolness to the Indians. Agency, and representatives of The Indian ambassador is not the Defense and State Depart- to be treated at too high a I ments. level." Kissinger was chairman of From High Sources the meetings, which typically involved an appraisal of the Anderson indicated the docu- situation in the India-f akistan menu came from high sources conflict followed by discussion within the Nixon administra- ivoRelease 2001/03/04 "If the. sources were identi. fied, it would embarrass the en The Supreme Court said t that government had failed to meet- the "heavy burden" needed to justify such a move. Kissinger asked whether we should be calling attention to', the plight of these people now. Ir. Williams said that most of . these people were centered, around the rail centers . . and that some efforts on their behalf might now well be ; started thru the United Na- tions. , "Dr. Kissinger suggested that this be done quickly to prevent a bloodbath. Mr. Sisco [Joseph A=1 1 p8U-d'16.61,koost .O(A8 Oi gir sastein af- 90i2tinU;3d r.y Xtp Approved For Release 260 3)W : CIp~~1 IVTp~gpL016 5 I-A Disturbed Nixon administration officials; Washington; Jan. 5 (NEWS Bureau) - admitted today, after a two week intensive manhunt, that they have failed to uncover; the ' source 'of the most sensational -leak of White House secrets in modern history _; The secrets, revealing in now ies of cables, orders, (u'ectwes painful detail the inner debates and official recommendations. Coun- of the National Security t The administration was caught t ii o c on of cil's Washington Special Ac Group at the peak of the Ind o- aflat-footed leak tn Dect 14 11when the first Pakistan war, were wrapped in three long- memoranda for the Anderson about appeared, quot-held record. White House Silent barely a week treated rquicklyu and t Syndicated columnist J a c k Anderson released texts of the memos to the press generally to- day. Ile has been -quoting seg.- 1 has been regarded as of tl Ill occasional I the case meets o pem ti ative" affair and i i " pen were au the hunt for the source was be- gun id that to date, ne official sa n s adm an weeks t f . wo or columns The White House, which is di- not a cause for criminal action. irecting the search for the leak, There were 11 officials at the refu.ed comment on the case. but first meeting and 19 at each of ii,, private officials expressed die next two. Henry liissiuger, #?: aye concern that sensptn e I ?r. irfe niation distri- foreign affairs adviser to the k now bated only on a "need to b:c"i~ could become public so Swill lly. There was no denial of the authenticity of the documents. Anderson, amused at, the ad- ministration's discomfort, said the papers Caine from high sources, and added, "If the sources were identified, it would embarrass the administration .more than it would me." meetings, and Central Intelli- gence Agency Director' Richard Helms was present at all of them, but representatives from tip c. State Department and the Pen- tagon varied. Y FBI Makes Check - , An official close to the nman- 1'tunt denied that a "high source." was involved with the leak but would not amplify the statenment. The FBI, asked to assist the search, has made a cursory check but because of the, small number of top level officials who were present at the Special Action Group meetings, has not launched ,in intensive investigation ' vet. The case is considered of vastly greater importance than that of Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagot; _papers, because it is undeniable evidence that someone with - a pipeline to innermost [`"bite Rouse. consultations has other than the interests of Presidents `Nixon at heart. ( However; because of the nature of the documents, and despite: -their super - sensitivity, it was 'suggested by some officials that the individual concerned probably would not be prosecuted, but merely fired, if his identity be- came known. The memos were records of notes of the Special A c t i o n Group meetings on Dec. 3, 4 and 6, not official transcripts. While the papers were stamped "secret 'sensitive," they (lid not include, as did the Pentagon papers, cop-. STATINTL - Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 M YORK T 9 STATINTL Approved For Release 2CPJ$/Q4z: CIA-RDP80-016 u.Z): iiscussions of Indian-Pakistani Wa. `texts of secret Documents on "lop-Leve Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Jan. 5-Following ai a the texts of three secret documents made public today by the columnist Jack Anderson describ- ing meetings of the National Security C'ouncil's Washington Special ,Action, Group on the crisis between India and Pakistan: M on Dec 3 Meeting emo. Secret Sensitive :'ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE { WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301 Refer to: 1-29643/71 ,International Security Affairs ;Memorandum for Record SUBJECT WSAG meeting on India/Pakistan rparticipants. `Assistant. to the President for national security affairs-Henry A. Kissinger 'Under Secretary. of State-John N. Irwin Deputy Secretary of Defense-David Packard Director, Central Intelligence Agency- Richard M. Helms Deputy Administrator (A.I.D.)-Maurice J. Williams 'Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff- Adm. Thomas H. Moorer Assistant Secretary of State (N.E.E.A.R.) -Joseph J. Sisco Assistant Secretary of Defense (I.S.A.) =G. Warren Nutter Assistant Secretary of State (I.0.)- Samuel De Palma Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (I.S.A.)-Armistead I. Selden Jr. ,Assistant Administrator (A.I.D/N.E.S.A.) -Donald G. MacDonald TIME AND PLACE 3 December 1971, 1100 hours, Situa- tion Room, White House. SUMMARY Reviewed conflicting reports about major -actions in the west wing. C.I.A. 1 agreed to produce map showing areas .of East Pakistan occupied by India. .The President orders hold on issuance of additional irrevocable letters of credit involving $99-million, and a hold ton. further action implementing the $7- 'million P.L. 480 credit.. Convening of Security Council meeting planned con- .tingent on discussion with Pak Ambas- ,.sador this afternoon plus further clari- I f t of situation in West tea lon o actual SISCO: We will have a recommenda- tion for you this afternoon, after the meeting with the Ambassador. In order to give the Ambassador time to wire ,home, we could tentatively plan to con- vene the Security Council tomorrow. KISSINGER: We have to take action. The President is blaming me, but you people are in the clear. SISCO: That's ideal! KISSINGER: The earlier draft for Bush is too even-handed. SISCO: To recapitulate, after we have seen the Pak Ambassador, the Secretary will report to you. We will update the draft speech for Bush. KISSINGER: We can say we favor political accommodation but the real job of the Security Council is to prevent military action. SISCO: We have never had a reply either from Kosygin or Mrs. Gandhi. WILLIAMS: Are we to take economic steps with Pakistan also? KISSINGER: Wait until I talk with the President. He hasn't addressed this problem in connection with Pakistan yet. SISCO: If we act on the Indian side, we can say we are keeping the Pakistan situation "under review." KISSINGER: It's hard to tilt toward Pakistan if we have to match every Indian step with a Pakistan step. If you wait until Monday, I can get a Presiden- tial decision. PACKARD: It should be easy for us to inform the banks involved to defer action inasmuch as we are so- near the weekend. KISSINGER: We need a WSAG in the morning. We need to think about our treaty obligations. I remember a letter or memo interpreting our existing treaty with a special India tilt. When I visited Pakistan in January, 1962, I was briefed on a secret document or oral understanding about contingencies aris- ing in other than the SEATO context. Perhaps it was a Presidential letter. This was a special interpretation of the March, 1959, bilateral agreement. Prepared by: /S/ initials JAMES M. NOYES Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Asian Af-. in view of conditions on the pended Eastern, African and South Pakistan. Kissinger asked for clarifica- subcontinent. The next issue is the U.N. fairs ton of secret special interpretation of IRWIN: The Secretary is calling in the =March, 1959, bilateral U. S. agreement Pak Ambassador this afternoon, and the Approved: e signature) g with Pakistan. Secretary leans toward making a U.S. For G. KISSINGER: I am getting hell every move in the U.N. soon. F Warren Nutter Assistant onal half-hour from the President that we KISSINGER: The President is in favor retary of Denfense for International are not being tough enough on India. of this as soon as we have some con- Security Affairs 'He has just called me again. He does firmation of this large-scale new action. Distribution: S , DASD: NEASA not believe we are carrying out his If the U.N. can't operate in this kind of ASD(ISA), PDASD(IS (ISA) DASD: wishes. He w o, a a be till lit,~o , l~ ~?,~'; Q 0 6` -8 Pakistan. He e s everyt Ing to an end an it is use ess to t Ink o comes. out otherwise. - U.N. guarantees in the Middle East. Q~lit iit: t7 i2 tion in the west wing, there are con- flicting reports from both sides and the only common ground is the Pak attacks on the Amritsar, Pathankot and Srina- gar airports. The Paks say the Indians are attacking all along the border; but the Indian officials say this is a lie. In the east wing the action is becoming larger and the Paks claim there are now seven separate fronts involved. KISSINGER: Are the Indians seizing territory? HELMS: Yes; small bits of territory, definitely. SISCO: It would help if you could `provide a map with a shading of. the areas occupied by India. What is hap- pening in the West-is a full-scale at- tack likely? MOORER: The present pattern is puz- zling in that the Paks have only struck at three small airfields which do not house significant 'numbers of Indian combat aircraft. HELMS: Mrs. Gandhi's speech at 1:30 may well announce recognition of Bangladesh. MOORER: The Pak attack is not credible. It has been made during late afternoon, which doesn't make sense. We do not seem to have sufficient facts on this yet. KISSINGER: Is it possible that the Indians attacked first and the Paks sim- ply (lid what they could before dark in response? MOORER: This is certainly possible. KISSINGER: The President wants no more irrevocable letters of credit issued under the $99-million credit. He wants the $72-million P.L. 480 credit also held. WILLIAMS: Word will soon get around when we -do this. Does the President understand that? KISSINGER: That is his order, but I will check with the President again. If our whole economic program and that the granting of fresh aid is being sus- STATINTL NEW YORK TIMES STATINTL Approved For Release 62MIl/d3704 : CIA-RDP80-0160 US, ENVOY IN INDIA DISPUTED POLICIES BAChI~GPP,KISTAN' Keating Said Explanation of Nixon's Stand Was Hurting Americans' Credibility FACTS ALSO QUESTIONED Ambassador's Cable Bared by Columnist, Who Also Replies to Kissinger The documents provide an' unusual look into the thinking and actions of Mr. Nixon and his advisers on nationaa se- curity affairs at the start of the crisis,. which eventually led to the Indian capture of East Pakistan and the establishment of , a breakaway state there white noise on Dec. under the name Bangladesh. forth the Administration's just _j Operations, came close by say Because the White House Se- fication for its policy. ing it would take one to two curity Action Group, known That briefing also became a I weeks, but there is no sign yet here as WSAG, did not have a source of contention between that he was correct in predict- 14r. Kissinger and Mr. Antler- ing that the Russians would formal structure, the language ush for ermanent use of a p p t' said tn t Ki i o es ss t r. of Mr. Kissinger and the other' son. In the United States was not base at Visag, on India's east participants was often looser,,! "anti-Indian" but was opposed coast. more piquant and franker than to India's recent actions. Mr. I Often Mr. Helms simply read that. in public statements by Anderson, seizing on the denial, rival claims by Pakistan and rove that the Ad- India, without making any ht to p sou Mr. Kissinger and other Admin?, istration spokesmen at the ministration was "anti-Indian," judgment on, their accuracy-1 and therefore lying. indicating that the United f States had no independent in time. R li e e On Dec. 3, the day that full-' Dispute over formation. scale fighting broke out, Mr. In his briefing Mr. Kissinger Fears for West Pakistan a Kissinger told the white Houser the United things, allocated! By Dec. 6, when it was clear strategy session, according toll to avert famine ins that the Indians would win in one document: East Pakistan at India's "spe-1 East Pakistan. Mr. Sisco said IF ' "I am getting hell every half- By BERNARD GWERTZMAN Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Jan. 5-Ken- neth B. Keating, United States Ambassador to India, com- plained in a secret cablegram to Pakistani war that the Nixon wants to tilt in favor o a `-'settlement on grounds such an !can intelligence community Administration's justification for 'tan. He feels everything we do effort might serve to bail out".ihad reason to believe that its pro-Pakistan-politydetracted comes out otherwise." Gen. Agha Mohammad Yahya,'there were forces in India The group included John N.! Khan, then President of Paki-, pushing for total victory but from American credibility and Irwin, under secreta of state' y~tan, who was displaced after: that under pressure from the was inconsistent with his know)- Richard Helms, Director of1`he loss of East Pakistan. United States the Soviet Union edge of events. The Ambassador noted that' convinced India to order a The secret message to the Central Intelligence, and Adm. the briefing said that the Indian' cease-fire once East Pakistan made Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman. Ambassador in Washington, L.1 surrendered. State Department was of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 'K. Jha, was informed on Nov.! This version of events has available 6. "The New York The next day, Dec. 4, the l9 that the United Sttates and! been officially denied by New Times at its request by the syn- United States called for a meet- Pakistan were prepared to dis I Delhi, which said it had no dicated columnist Jack Ander- ing of the United Nations Sc- cuss a precise schedule for PO-I plans to invade West Pakistan. son, who says he has received curity Council to discuss the,litical autonomy in East Paki-' But in documents made olublic by war and to press India for a stan but that India had Sabo the p by from,'un"identifled United States`ed the efforts by starting the! Mr. Anderson there seemed Government informants "scores" sistant Secretary of state for war. considerable confusion in the of highly, classified documents Near Eastern and South Asian "The only message I have on Administration. At one point relating 'to the conflict last Affairs, told newsmen that the record of this conversation Mr. Kissinger said that Mr. month. United States believed that makes no reference to this crit- :Nixon might want to honor India bore "the major respon- ical fact," Mr. Keating said. )any requests from Pakistan for Today Mr. Anderson-assert sibility" for the fighting. Mr. Kissinger said at the 1 American arias - despite an ing-that he was irked by a coin The decision by the Adminis. briefing, that when Prime Min- I American embargo on arms to metit from Henry A. Kissinger,ltration to attach blame to India istcr Indira Ghandi was in I India or Pakistan. President Nixon's adviser onicame as something of a surprise Washington in early November, it was decided at the Dec. 6 national security disputing the in Washington since most dip-"we adreason to believe session to look into the possi-. lomats and officials had ex military action was that bility of shipping arms quietly accuracy of some of his recentpected a more neutral stance. unminent and that we did not to Pakistan. But the State De- Folumns-released the Defense, shave time to begin to work on partment said today that no ,ii-jEpartment s record of threeI Disagreed With 'Tilt'' la peaceful resolution." action was taken. top level White House strategy Critics of the Administratloni "With vast and voluminous Carrier Sent to 1160111 such as Senator Edward M.,efforts of intelligence commu- .kthe twossians -week held at war. the start of (Kennedy, Democrat of Massa ,pity, reporting from both Delhi "It quite obvious that the t chusetts, and Senator Frank and islamabad, and my own President is not inclined to let `Secret Sensitive' Reports Church, Democrat of Idaho, had decisions in Washington, I do the Pales be defeated," are. The reports of the meetings been complaining about ibir.:not understand statement that Kissinger said, apparently s failure to criticize Paki-'Washington was not given the ferring to the possibility of the s tan for her bloody represscion'slightest inkling that any mill loss of West Pakistan. of fled " Dec. 3, 4 secret and 6, sensitive." were A classilow- Nixon's `-of the East Pakistani autonomy Lary operation was in any way Later on in the crisis the key, investigation is underway movement and the arrest of its imminent,'" Mr. Keating re- United states sent the nuclear- to, ascertain who leaked the leader, Sheik Mujibur Rhaman. sponded. He said that on Nov. Powered aircaft carrier Enter- documents to Mr. Anderson. He Mr. Anderson has indicated 12 he sent a cable "stating prise into the Indian ocean, ap- said arently as a show of force to s P today that he was read that the documents in his pas quite Q -n deter an attack on West Pak- sag }y r le by o fi specifically that war is if necessary, ppl'ovedi t3~ ~i6 g X1{11 /04n'TFie PeLiQPdfOffl~l i! time.( hour from the President that e Pakistan. 'Ambassador ' Keating' Gated that intelligence informa- is also understood to have tion on the situation in South argued since March, when the. Asia was quite thin, at least repression began, for a stateI in the early stages. ment against Pakistan. Mr. Helms and the Joint Mr. Keating' cable, dated Mr. of Staff-while agreeing Dec. 8, was in response to the) that India would win in East United States Information Pakistan - disagreed on the Agency's account of a briefing t the time it would take. Adm. Elmo a from a political point o cific request." I that Mr. Keating said that his;. view our efforts would have to directed at keeping the In- recollection from a conversa-lib we are not vemg wugn enuu};n! tion withtion with Foreign Min-Indians from extinguishing west on India. He has just called me lister Swaran Singh was that `IPakistan." _- Ig out his wishes. He Irelief program started in East:lNixon said in an interview in ribr to a nnlitlcalITime magazine that: the Ameri- P ki t an p a s the Government. [Details on Administrations tit Page, .,," d House strategy:sessionsindi CAlatlniled WASHINGTON EDS2 Approved For Release 2001/03 04 ? IA- 01 R House Committee Will Probe Classification of Documents By Sanford J. Ungar memoranda describing meet- ,~CI;UTA ings Ur VIe IN UUIUU T_ ^- Specie I;yep. F. Edward Hebert . (D-. Council's Washington Action Group Armed Services Committee, The sources stressed that yesterday announced "a mayor the memoranda,,prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and inquiry into the problem of for G. Warren Nutter, assist- proper classification and han- ant secretary of defense for sling of government informa- international security affairs, Lion involving the national se- had been circulated only " ' . within the Pentagon. eurity. He said it was "a-- coinci- to be more progressive and ment, as in the case of the They said they were espe- minded." Pentagon papers. dente" that. the investigation dally surprised by the leak of peace- The New York Times said ne f l t e, o emen would come on the heels o the memoranda, because it' In San C the release by syndicated col- it would publish the docu- umnist Jack Anderson of se- would be relatively easy to Japanese diplomat in the ments in today's editions. trace their limited distribu- Sato party told Washington; Responding to Anderson's Bret government documents tion. Post reporter Stanley Karnow suggestion Tuesday that the concerning American policy in I . Other government officials, that it was ?alarming' tojsecret documents and others th' Indo-Pakistani war Nonetheless, the disclosure however, pointed their fingers learn the content of the secret; in his -possession could be elsewhere. :, American papers. . I made available to Congress as of Pentagon -j One White House officiali "I must pay my compliments 1 the basis for an investigation papers the on top- the secret history of Viet and war last summer, and said he suspected that the to the White House," he added, l of American policy toward State Department was the however. "They ,understand.) India and Pakistan, a high- now renAnderson's , release afcur to - source of the security breach.; Japanese attitudes very well."; rent documents, appeared ppe ranking aide for the Senate "You know that place leaksI The diplomat said he was ,have focused new concern j , orein~n Relations Committee throughout the government like a sieve," he said, especial-I especially concerned by refer- iI said, "I think that's fine." ,over the troubled security ly in instances that might epees in today's Anderson~I Sen. J. W. Fuibright (D- make Henry A. Kissinger,; column to growing interest]mittee, !classification system.. Ark.), chairman of the com- Hebert assigned the new President Nixon's national se-; in Japan in a revision of the was in the Caribbean 1 probe, which will begin curity adviser, look bad. American-Japanese security ,ion vacation and could not be' shortly after Congress recon At the Pentagon, on the treaty. breached for comment. venes Jan. 18, to a subcommit- other hand, attention was di-'; Assistant White House press) Fuibright staff aides. direct- tee headed by Rep. Lucien vented to the National Secur- secretary Gerald Warren con-lied attention, however, to a, Nedzi (D-Mich ), a critic of the ity Council. . tinued to refuse comment on !,;report issued by the Foreign+ ~ '' the Pentagon and of administra-1 The Justice Department con- any of the disclosures in tion policy in Vietnam. tinued to decline comment on', Anderson columns, and Kis-; In 'a. telephone interview+ the continuing FBI investiga-. singer, who is in San Clemente last night, Nedzi said that "it tion. with the President, refused to is not my intent to investigate Anderson continues his bat-1 dscuss them. 16, which said, "The problem! for Congress in the foreign! affairs field ... goes beyond; reducing unnecessary classi-' i the leak" of documents to An- tie against government secrecy In response to a question fication." derson. today, switching from the! about Kissinger's earlier com- The report added, "It in- "What we what to go into] Indo-Pakistani war to secret!, ment to reporters that Ander-. volves finding a way for Con- t used I t b t t k tain that it n er d are the general problems of classification and security, ,how much is required and how ocumt s son had taken commen s a ou gress o r- t N bite House by President Nixon in prep-, India and Pakistan "out of con- receives the full information; aration for meetings at Sani text," Warren said, "I am sure necessary for exercising itsj Clemente with Japanese Prime!, Dr. Kissinger stands by what war and foreign policy pow it is handled and what kind of Minister Eisaku Sato. he said.... The President is 1 ers, including information .'new legislation may be neces- I In a column distributed to aware of the matter." which most people would Anderson said Tuesday thatlagree should be kept secret sary," Nedzi said. 700 newspapers, including The He acknowledged, however, Washington Post, Anderson he was releasing the full texts j from potential enemies. I that the Anderson documents, discloses the contents of brief- of the three documents to re-1 "It may also involve finding three of which appeared in ing papers prepared for the fute Kissinger's claim. la way for Congress to share, full in The Washington Post President. There was a run on Ander-' in determining what informa, yesterday, would "almost nec- Those papers, Anderson son's Washington office yes-I tion is classified and thus says indicate that Sato has terday for copies of the secret kept secret from the Ameri- iessarity" come up during the , been dismayed with American " ;prone. documents which had ap- can people. policy in the Far East and is peared in The Washington That appeared to be the t Meanwhile, government in. considering an independent, post. focus of the upcoming inves- ivestigators pressed their ef. Japanese aproach to China. By day's end, a member of Itigation by the House Armed !forts to locate the source of Anderson quotes a cable ;tin staff said, 18 news organi-'Services Subcommittee. Nedzi! from Armin Meyer, U. S-I zations had picked up copies said that it might not be; Anderson's documents. Ambassador to Japan, which! of the three memoranda and "appropriate" to look into Kis-j another nine had asked that singer's activities, but saidI A report circulated yester- said that "whereas heretofore! day among high-level adminis- anti-Americanism was pretty! they be sent in the mail. the probe would focus on the! d tration sources t /~s e~Qg q~ V s Qhandle tigatiori had A ~ I7fn dsitiali~~j s ~1YRZQ4&r ab -?Y'ithL~s,"T!i60UEE~YFHi]i~9d4rtYl ~lYt. pointed offices In the Pentag-l tendentious press, develop-i Francisco Chronicle and The, ~pu~ ~_ ?:BC~ on as the probable source oft ments of past few months have? fostered'seeds of doubt within I Boston Globe all published the i d n n a oriented texts of the memoran yonrmally American- ommunity." yesterday's editions after they A?nunr DI CA fnlrl WVachinntnn rprpiver1 them from the that the Japanese have the Los Angeles Times-Washing- "Impression that Japan is ton Post News Service. k war confrontation posture of the documents in news-1 while President's mission to papers throughout the coun? Peking gives (the U.S. govern- try appeared to obviate the possibility of any action in ment) advantage of appearing court by the Justice Depart WASHI.Ii.G1O2 P_0S1 Approved For Release 2001IOSId N G' R5T*_&Lb1JJ0 U.So Stance on India Baffled Diplomats .By Laurence Stern Washington Post'Staff Writer In inid-April last year a. ? s "secret" cable from New Delhi dropped into the in- ' coming traffic of Secretary of State William P. Rogers. "Pakistan is probably fin- ?` fished as a unified state," ,.said the message from U.S. `Ambassador Kenneth B. Keating. "India is clearly t the predominant actual and potential power in this area of ' the world. Bangladesh, with limited potential and massive problems, is proba- -:bly emerging as an inde- pendent country. "There is much the ,'United States can do ..." The classified cable was the, first attempt by the U.S. embassy in New Delhi to set out in comprehensive terms a policy for meeting the on- .coming, holocaust in the sub- continent. Its substance was to be re- peated at least a dozen times, in varying form, as the pattern of armed con- frontation between India and Pakistan hardened into a full-scale military conflict. But, as events unfolded, the Washington view of how to deal with the threat of war on the subcontinent began to diverge ever more sharply from the course that was being propounded by the U.S, officials "on the ground" in India and East Bengal. Initial puzzlement at the responses of Washington gave way, among the diplo- mats in the field, to incre- dulity and privately ex- pressed anger at America's Increasingly isolated posi- tion on the subcontinent, ex- cept In West Pakistan. The only top-ranking American diplomat in the region who seemed to be in phase with the Nixon admin- istration's evolving policy of partiality to Pakistan was Ambassador Joseph S. Far- land, who heads the U.S. embassy in the West Paki- stan capital of Islamabad. The cardinal points of dis- agreement bApprav 3d ington and the officials In on the magnitude of the kill- ing were disbelieved at the time in Washington. The dis- patches, It was said here, were considered "alarmist." choice arises, we should be the field were anticipated in A petition was circulated guided by the new power, at the Dacca consulate by the first Keating cable last realities in South Asia_ L VL11. V11C was yuCn issue ' with the administra- which fortunately, in the of whether the he United ted present lion's policy of silence at the case, largely paral- States should forcefully tell lel the moral realities 215 civilian massacres in East STATINTL the Bengali majority in East the document, but passed it the systematic slaughter, Pakistan, as well as to insist starting on the night of one to Islamabad and Wash- upon the release of Shiekh March 25, of Bengali civil- inbton with appropriate clas- Mujibur Rahman, the pre- fans by the Pakistani army sification. eminent political leader of and its local On June 5, Blood returned paramilitary to the United States. Al- the Bengali state. forces in the former Prov- though he had been sched- Keating advised Rogers ince of East Pakistan. uled for another been sch 18-month that the United States Just how many Bengalis tour In Pakistan after home should "encourage the GOP were slaughtered in the leave, he never. returned to (Government of Pakistan) to ensuing eight months is sub- leave, post. He was eturned to change its policy of military ject to a wider range of con- repression ..." as well as to jecture. "I would not serf. the personnel department at make a clear statement of ously consider any estimate the State Department in "displeasure at the use of of less than 250.000," said ar Washington. American arms and mate- American official who The administration chose riel" in East Bengal. served in Dacca during the not to make an issue of the Keating also proposed reign of terror, repressive tactics employed that the United States voice Most Western estimates against the Bengalis, a n d its concern to Yahya over are in the range of 300.000 particularly Awami League the fate of the sheikh, who to 500,000. The Bangladesh supporters, on grounds that was imprisoned in West government puts the toll of the United States would Pakistan after having been victims at closer to 2 mil- have lost diplomatic lever- arrested March 25 at his lion. There is no ready way age Wit h Yahya's ? govern- home in Dacca. to count because of the ab- ment. At the time, the Nixon Only three months earlier sence of accurate census fig- administration said it was the sheikh and his Awami ures or. burial markers and pursuing a course of "quiet League had won 167 of the the speed of decomposition diplomacy" to avert war. 169 seats allotted to East in the warm, loamy and But it'has been acidly ob. Bengal in the Pakistan Na- bone-scattered soil of East served by U.S. officials in' tional Assembly. Bengal. the field that "uiet p diplo- In addition the m But American eyewit- macy" was widely construed bassador said an American am nesses and other western in India and Bangladesh to expression of hope newsmen who were whisked mean American ae uiesence political early settlemmeen nt a in an out of Dacca at the begin- in one of the bloodiest re- early East Bengal would, "if sou- ning of the terror spoke of pressions in recent times of pled with termination of thousands-of killings in the a largely unarmed civilian American military supplies first week after Pakistani population by a modern and suspension of economic troops surged out of their army using American weap- assistance, have a sobering garrisons. They reported the ons. effect" on Yahya's govern- chine-gun clatter of ma- Some 10 million Bengalis, ment. -gun and small-arms about 13 per cent of East "Moreover," the Keating fire and the sight of flames Bengal's led f rising throughout the city as population, flee cable said, such a course of tudent buildings, Hindu across the borders into the U.S. action would be consist- students and residential surrounding states of India, distric ant with the realities of Pak- strongholds of the sheikh's already among the most ov- istan's deterioration, India's strong easheik on erpopulated and destitute predominance and of Bang- Awami Ldesggo the their anion areas of the world. ladesh's emergence ... were razed . From the standpoint of The secret message went bitants incinerated or ma- the American diplomat In on to say it was of question- chine-gunned. the field, the administra- able value to American in- The civilian slaughters be- tion's assertion of a quiet terests to "continue to refer came another point of con- and even-handed style of di- in official communication tention between the admin- plomacy in the subcontinent and public statements to Istration in Washington and strained credulity with the ArQ,erica fcialswho h she subcontinen[t..~. the midst of the war. CtP t !r' A affair' in this context has be, Archer Blood former come a code phrase in India U.S. consul-general in 'and Pakistan for acquiesc- Dacca, cabled detailed re- ence in the military repres- ports on the killings to the sions." embassy in Pakistan. But "In short," Keating con- government sources in eluded, "the United States Washington said the reports Pakistan and Bangladesh which probably. cannot be equally well served. "Where the necessity for wksul zo PQSl Approved For Release 204141/d47?CIA-Q1DNQ'L6 The "Anderson papers" - secret summaries of to Pakistan, Dr. Kissinger "indicated he would like e r,enar by tmmnrroW." 4hn r,,,te%.Pakistan; crisis. made public by columnist ; tho ~Anrlersnn naners is not inconsistent with a Jack Anderson - confirm the starkly anti-India policy dedicated to the principle of national terri- aspect of American policy and. illuminate its seem- torial integrity. India did invade Pakistan: its viola- ing cynicism as well. For, although Mr. Nixon in- tion was extremely serious. We continue to believe, gists the United States acted for "the principle that however, that the best chance of preserving Paki- any nation has a right to its integrity," nowhere in stan lay in much early, heavy and sustained Ameri- the Anderson papers is there a single reference to can pressure on President Yahya Khan-such pres- any purpose except to "tilt toward Pakistan." "I sure was never applied-and that once Pakistan am getting hell every half hour from the President had dumped 10 million refugees into India, India that we are not being tough enough on India," , had a provocation and a pretext that probably no 'Henry Kissinger, his leading aide, said at one point. country could have withstood. In those conditions, "He does not believe we are carrying out his an American tilt toward Pakistan,'in the name of wishes. Ile wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan." Pakistani integrity, seemed to us at the time-and Mr. Nixon succeeded, too. For months, the United seems to us even more now, with publication of the 'States had avoided condemning Pakistan for mur- Anderson papers-as a baffling flight into geo- dering tens of thousands of Bengalis and for ex- political fantasy. polling millions of others into India. But now, with cw some Biharis threatened by Bengalis, "Dr. Kissinger Or is it so baffling? Could it not be that Mr. suggested that Ian international appeal] be done Nixon's endlessly trumpeted invitation to Peking quickly in order to prevent a bloodbath." Impartial is almost enough to explain the gratuitous fervor observers had long believed that a political settle- of American support for Islamabad? It is all very ment required release of the imprisoned Bengali well to talk about respecting the principle of terri- leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Now, according torial integrity. But it could not have been far from to a paraphrase by the author of these reports, Dr. the President's mind that if he went to Peking Kissinger said "we will go along in general terms having just let a client go down the drain, or having with reference to political accommodation in East seemed to, his position might have been consider- Pakistan but we will certainly not imply or suggest ably undermined. If this is so, then the long lead- -any specifics, such as the release of Mujib." time of the Peking trip-seven months from an- nouncement to scheduled arrival-did in fact put Advised that Security Council action against In- Mr. Nixon in hock to a Pakistani regime that lie 'dia was unlikely, Dr. Kissinger said, according to otherwise could have treated with the coolness it 'the documents, "Everyone knows how all this will deserved. A similar observation might be made dome out and everyone knows that India will ulti- about Mr. Nixon's trip to Moscow, although there irately occupy East Pakistan. We must, therefore, other complicating factors obtain. make clear our position, table our resolution." Ad- We cannot know for sure. But we know a lot ;ministration statements on the war, its steps on aid more than we did, and for that we can all be grate- cutoffs: all had to show "tilt." Among the deci- ful to Jack Anderson, who has brought to the pub-, lions: "Dr. Kissinger also directed that henceforth lie's attention material essential to the public's ,we show a certain coolness to the Indians; the In- understanding. If the Anderson papers do not solve dian Ambassador is not to be treated at too high a every riddle of American policy in the Indo-Paki- level." Told that the law prevented transfer of stani crisis, they are an undoubted contribution to Jordanian, or Saudi Arabian military equipment - the public's right tq know. -:.. Now we are aware that the material. revealed Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 _ a is ? i OLN DAIL., '0V Wu Approved For Release 20814 Id 2 CIA-RDP80-016 --jack Anderson:' A funny story By TED KNAP Scripps Howard staff writer The Justice Department has directed the `FBI to investigate who leaked highly embar- rassing classified documents detailing White House policy meetings on the India-Pakistan ?war to columnist Jack Anderson, administra- tion sources said today. A Justice Department spokesman ended sev- eral days of "no comment" by admitting for the first time that the matter was "under investigation." Earlier reports were that a search for the source of the leak was being conducted only within each of the departments which had offi- cials at the secret meetings. Government sources said the probe now has moved to a 'higher level with the calling in of the FBI and ,also the Internal Security Division of the Jus- tice Department, which would handle any pro- secution. NO MUZZLE ,press further publication of the Anderson col- umns, as it did after initial publication of the Pentagon papers last year. .. The Washington Post today said Mr. Ander- son gave it the full texts of three of the secret documents. The Post, which carries Mr. An- derson's column, said the three documents were on the letterhead of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of Warren G. Nutter, assistant secre- tary of defense for international security af- fairs. The Post quoted Mr. Anderson as saying his .sources for the papers hold high positions in STATINTL left, and Henry Kissin- ger. hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India." Mr. Anderson said the documents disclose that Dr. Kissinger sought to get around the ban on U.S. arms shipments to Pakistan by having them sneaked in thru Jordan or Saudi Arabia "Dr. Kissinger asked whether we have the right to authorize Jordan or Saudi Arabia to transfer military equipment to Pakistan," =Mr. Anderson quoted from the Dec. 6 minutes. "Mr. (Christopher) Van Hollen (State Depart- ment Asia expert) stated that the United States cannot permit a third country to trans- fer arms which we have provided them when we, ourselves, do not authorize the sale direct to the ultimate recipient." ,OUT OF CONTEXT' - - had been crippled by initial Indian' attacks. The war was over in two weeks, before any such shipment was made. Mr. Anderson said the documents indicate that a final decision had not been reached. Mr. Anderson said the President overrode the advice of State Department senior officials to appeal to the West Pakistan government to atop persecuting Bengalis in East Pakistan, and to remain neutral between West Pakistan and India. One of those participating in the secret meetings wrote this report, according to Mr. Anderson: Dr. Kissinger said that we are not trying to be even-handed. The President does not want to be even-handed. The President believes. that India is the attacker... . "Dr: Kissinger said that we cannot afford to ease India's state of mind. "The Lady' (Mrs. Indira Gandhi, India's prime minister) is cold-blooded and tough and will not turn into a Soviet satellite merely because of pique. We should not ease her mind. He invited anyone who objected to this approach to take his case to the President." STATE LEAK Speculation here is that the leak came from the State Department, which has had its ego bruised lately by Dr. Kissinger's emergence as: the dominant foreign policy figure in the ad-' ministration. Mr. Anderson refused to pinpoint his source. The minutes described meetings in early De- cember of the Special Action Group, com- prised of State, Defense, CIA, and White', House officials. The papers were variously including "secret sensitive." Mr. lassified , c Cle- Anderson said he has received two calls from "out "friends" in the government warning that he 11. l1IC. 3VU11- .. 111e1ILG, L.a1u., a.,u.. ------ quoted Mr. Anderson, "it would embarrass the of context" from the documents, but refused to could be indicted. administration more than it would me. It elaborate. In response, Mr. Anderson told Government officials said that altho classifi- would make a very funny story." Scripps-Howard newspapers he would make cations were violated, the substance of the re- Mr. Anderson said the documents show that, the full memoranda available to the public. ports indicates they would not be covered by contrary to the administration's professions of Mr. Anderson wrote that a cable from Ken- laws against sabotage or espionage.: strict neutrality, Mr. Nixon sided strongly with neth Keating, U.S. ambassador to India, When several newspapers published excerpts the military dictatorship in West Pakistan warned that "any action other than rejection of the secret Pentagon papers last year, Atty. against the world's largest democracy in In- (of the plan to ship planes to Pakistan by way Gen. John Mitchell asked the courts to sur- dia. of Jordan) would pose enormous further diffi- press further publication. His request was re- 'GETTING HELL' culties in Indo-U.S. relations." jected by the U.S. Supreme Court. Following the government is prose- Dr: Henry Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's chief ad- The documents indicated the United States an FBI investigation, viser on national security, was quoted as say- was considering sending eight F104s via Jor- cuting Daniel Ellsberg for having leaked the which papers to the press. Pakistan air force h l , e y t ing in, a Dec. 3 strategy session, "I am getting dan to resupp Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 c WASHING.-TON POSX. Approved For Release 2001/0 UM 4W1-RB1PAQ4OJ1IB-01 turned over to !he Washing- ton Post yesterday by Syndi- cated columnist Jack Ander- son. SECRET SENSITIVE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 r >~- '"Refer to: 1-29643/71 DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEARS INTERVALS (Illegible) Not Automatically Declassified INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: WSAG Meeting on India/Pakistan of the secret documents further actioii implementing KISSINGER: Is it possible a~~inoer: 9 Am. Ue He'll .~_ 6, ''? 11 1 1 olro t e Participants: Assistant to the President for Nation- al Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger Under Secretary of State- John N. Irwin Deputy Secretary of Defense -David Packard Director, Central Intelli- gence Agency-Richard M. Helms Deputy Administrator (AID) Maurice J. Williams II Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff-Admiral Thomas Moorer Assistant Secretary of State (NEA)--Joseph J. Sisco Assistant Secretary of De- fense (ISA)-G. Warren Nutter Assistant Secretary of State (10)-Samuel DePalma Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)-Armistead I. Sel- ci'en' jr. AssistAnt Administrator (AI:DINESA)-Donald G. MacDonald Time and Place: 3 December 1971, 1100 hours, Situation Room. White House. the $72 million PL 480 cred- that the Indians attacked it. Convening of. Security first, and the Paks simply Council meeting planned (lid what they could before contingent on discussion dark in response? with Pak Ambassador this MMOORER: This is certain- afternoon plus further clari- iy pusgible. fication of actual situation KISSINGER: The Presi- in Nest Pakistan. Kissinger (T nt wants no more irrevo- asked for clarification of ;?;;hle letters of credit issued secret special interpretation :ruler the $99 million credit. of 'March 1959 bilateral U.S. ' i,, wai-,ts the $72 million agreement with Pakistan. 1'I. 4;P) credit also held. KISSINGER: I am getting 11-IMAADIS: Word will hell every half hour from soon et around when we the President that we are do rhi, Does the President not being tough enough on underst and that? India. He has just called KISSI GER: That is his me again. He does not be- order, but I will check with lieve we are carrying out the P r e s i d e n t again. If his wishes. He wants to tilt asked. ,we _can say we are in favor of Pakistan. He reviewing our whole eco- feels everything we do nomic proiram and that the comes out otherwise. granting of fresh aid is being IIEL. IS: Concerning the suspended yin view of condi- reported action in the West tions on 'the Subcontinent. Wing, there are conflicting The next issue is the UN, reports from both sides and IRWIN: The Secretary is the only common ground is calling in the Pak Ambas- the Pak attacks on the Am- sador this afternoon, an ritsar. ?Pathankat, and Srin- the Secretary Raps toward alai- airports. The Paks say making a U.S, move in the the Indians are attacking all U.N. soon. along the border: but the KISSINGER: The Presi- Indian officials says this is dent is in favor of this as a lie. In the East Wing. the soon as we have some con- action' is becoming larger firmation of this large- and the Paks claim there are scale new action. If the now seven separate fronts U.N. can't operate in this involved. kind of situation effectively, KISSINGER: Are the In- its utility has come to an dams seizing territory? / end and it is useless to HELMS: Yes: small bits q think of U.N. guarantees in territory, definitely. the Middle East. SISCO: It would help if SISCO: We will have a you could provide a map with a shading of the areas recommendation for you occupied by India. What is this afternoon, after the happening in the West-is a meeting with the Ambassa- full-scale attack likely? dor. In order to give the MOORER: The present Ambassador time to wire pattern is puzzling in that home, we could tentatively the Pales have only struck at plan to convene the Secu- three small airfields which rity Council tomorrow. do not house significant. KISSINGER: We have to numbers of Indian combat take action. The President SUMMARY: aircraft is blaming me, but you Reviewed conflicting re- HELMS: Mrs. Gandhi's people are in the clear, ,pbrts about major action in speech at 1;30 may well an- SISCO: That's ideal!. the West Wing. CIA agreed nounce recognition of Ban- KISSINGER: The earlier to' produce map showing gla Desh. draft statement for Bush is areas of East Pakistan oc- MOOLER: The Pak attack too evenhanded.. cupied by India.' The Presi- is not credible. It has been SISCO: To recapitulate, dent orders hold on issuance made during late afternoon, after we have seen the Pak of additional irrevocable which doesn't make sense. Ambassador, the Secretary KISSINGER: We can say we favor political accommo- dation but the real job of the Security Council is to prevent military. action. . SISCO: We have nevar had a reply either from Ko- sygin or Mrs. Gandhi. STATINTI WILLIAMS: Are e to STATI NTL take economic steps with Pakistan also? KISSINGER: Wait until I talk. 'with the President. Ile hasn't addressed this problem in connection with Pakistan yet. SISCO: If we act on the Indian side, we can say we are keeping the Pakistan sit- uation "under review." KISSINGER: It's hard to tilt toward Pakistan if we have to match every Indian step with a Pakistan step. If you wait until Monday, I can get a Presidential de- cision. Pt' CKARD: It, should be easy for us to inform the banks involved to defer ac- tion inasmuch as we are so near the weekend. KISSINGER: We need a tVSAG in the morning. We need to think about our treaty obligations. I remem- ber a letter or memo inter- preting our existing treaty with a special India tilt. When I visited Pakistan in January 1962, I was briefed on a secret document or oral understanding about contin- gencies arising in other than the SEATO context. Perhaps it was a Presidential letter. This was a special interpre- tation of the March 1959 bilateral agreement. Prepared by: /s/initials James H. Noyes Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs Approved: Illegible signature for G. Warren Nutter Assistant Secretary of De- fense for International Se- curity affairs letters of er dit i , 6 Fibric R tape t2@?dt/03/04aatf eI eF ' 4~e6~fh1`~ 161 R001300390001-8 $99 million, 1P.P Bush.. t COt2ii::'~~d WASHINGTON ILQ&T . Approved For Release 20b113 1 A-RDP80-016 STATINTL By Sanford J. Ungar Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, in a major challenge to the secrecy surrounding U.S. policy in the Indo-Pakistani war, last night gave The Washington Post the full texts of three secret documents describing meetings of the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group (WSAG). The documents indicate that Henry A. Kis- singer, President Nixon's national security ad- viser, instructed government agencies to take a hard line with India in public statements and private actions during last month's war on the Indian subcontinent. Anderson released the documents after Kis singer told reporters Monday during an air- borne conversation en route to the Western White House in San Clemente that the col- umnist, in stories based on the materials, had taken "out cf context" remarks indicating that the administration was against India. Among the significant statements bearing on U.S. policy in the documents were the following: ? "KISSINGER: I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. lie has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out this wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakis- tan. He feels everything we do comes out 'otherwise." ? "Dr, Kissinger said that whoever was put- ting out background information relative to the current situation is provoking presidential wrath. The President is under the 'illusion' that he is giving instructions; not that he is merely being kept apprised of affairs as they progress. Dr. Kissinger asked that this be kept in mind." ? "Dr. Kissinger also directed that hence- forth we show a certain coolness to the In- dians; the Indian Ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level." %' ? "Dr. Kissinger ... asked whether we- have the right to authorize Jordan or Saudi Arabia to transfer military equipment to Pak- istan. Mr. (Christopher) Van. Hollen (deputy .assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs) stated the United States cannot permit a third country to transfer arms which we have provided them when we, ourselves. do not authorize sale direct to the ultimate re- cipient, such as Pakistan." ? "Mr. (Joseph) Sisco (assistant secretary of estate for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs) suggested that what we are really interested in are what supplies and equipment could be dors to India and Pakistan, as' well as numerous other docu- ments bearing on American policy. He showed this reporter a briefcase with about 20 file l folders, each containing some' of the documents. Anderson declined to name, his sources, but suggested that; they occupy high positions in the Nixon administration. "If the sources were identi- j fied," he said "it would em- barrass the administration I more than it would me, It would make a very funny story." Since the controversy last year over release of the Penta- 1 gon Papers, a top-secret his- tory of U.S. policy in Vietnam, Anderson said, his sources had become more, rather than less, material. The texts obtained by The Post provide substantial de- tails of the back:-and-forth at Special Action Group meet- ings among representatives l of the White House, State and Defense departments, Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, Na- tional Security Couiacil, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Agency for International Development. The three texts are: ? A "memorandum for rec- ord" about a 1i'SAG meeting in the Situation Room of the White House on Dec. 3, by James H. Noyes, deputy as- sistant secretary of defense for STATINTL r Near Eastern. African and J South Asian affairs. it was ap- ,proved by G. Warren Nutter, as- sistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, and was printed on iris station- ery. ' '? A memorandum for the way by Joint Chiefs of staff, on their made available, and the modes of delivery of agents. They said the scope of stationery,' concerning a meet- this equipment. He stated from a political their investigation would be in on Dec. 4, by Navy Capt. point of view our efforts would have to be narrow because "very few peo- I Howard N. Kay, a JCS staffer. directed at keeping the Indians from 'extin- pie" have access to minutes of ? Another memorandum by guishing' West Pakistan." the meetings. Kay on JCS stationery about ? "Mr. Si t ~ jj~ ee~~~~(~ri~ m~id ink _ OR 14 Paks increas P?&"t e?I 3tF~'6cf'~With te"Fort"SN'tTP W-t "fi'rkl`-ti~~iM Q getting emergency requests from them . . . had copies of cables to Wash-! ings was held on the openingI pr. Kissinger said that the President may ington.from the U.S. ambassa-J day of full-scale hostilities be- want to honor those reque'sts:? The matter has not been brought to Presidential atten- tion but it is quite obvious that the President is. not inclined to let the Paks be defeated." After getting the documents .from Anderson, The Post de- cided to print the full texts in today's editions. Anderson said he would make the documents avail. able to other members of the press today, and he invited Sen. J. W. Fulbright, chair- man of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to use them as the basis for 'an in- vestigation of U.S policy in South Asia. Fulbright, out of Washing- ton during the congressional recess, could not be reached for comment. The columnist also suggested that other members of Con- gress might wish to investi- gate government security clas- sification policy. Most of the significant. state- ments in the three documents released last night had al- ready appeared in Anderson's column, which is distributed to 700 newspapers, including The. Washington Post. The Justice Department ac- knowledged yesterday that the FBI is investigating the nature of the security leak that. led to the disclosures. But Anderson, who said he will write several more col- umns based on the documents, pointed out that no govern- ment agent had visited him and that he had received no request to halt publication. The Post has not received any such request either. Pentagon sources said an- other investigation is under- A WASHINGTON STAR Approved For Release 2001/%3 :1 ,4-RDPiW b4R erson kelleSeS pers ecrat U.S. Pocy Sess's By ORR KELLY Star Staff Writer Syndicated columnist Jack ' "I am getting hell every half / Anderson has made public hour from the President that ~/ "SECRET SENSITIVE" min- we are not being tough enough utes of three White House on India. He has just called meetings dealing with the In- Me again. He does not believe dia-Pakistan War. we are carrying out his wish- The documents show the es. Ile wants to tilt in favor of government was secretly fa- Pakistan. He feels everything voring Pakistan in the war we do comes out other wise." while saying publicly that it The d o c u m e n t s provide was not taking sides. more detail on the meetings Anderson used extensive than had been made public quotations from the docu- previously, but many of the ments in recent columns and essential details had already then released the dull text as a been used by Anderson in his deliberate challenge to the syndicated column. government's system of classi- He did not release what he lying information. said were ."dozens" of other .After the Anderson columns documents giving what he appeared, the White House be- called a complete picture of gan coordinating a broad-scale the government's decision- investigation to learn who making process during the In- leaked the documents to him, dia - Pakistan War. Material Confirmed Meetings of WSAG The 'hite House today re- say whether the pub- fused to lfshed material is authentic. But a State Department offi- cial who asked not to be identi- fied said there is no question of the authenticity of the docu- a.nents. . Anderson released the docu- Iments after Henry A. Kissin- tger, , presidential ?adviser for (national security affairs, told iaewsmen yesterday he was . uoted out of context in ex- The papers published by An- derson, on the other hand, cov- er a current international cri- sis. The minutes of the meeting of Dec. 3 were made by James H. Noyes, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs,- and approved by his boss, G. Warren Nutter, assistant defense secretary for international security affairs. The minutes of the Dec. 4 and 6 meetings were prepared by Navy Captain H.N. Kay, who works in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon. Government sources said an investigation of the source of the apparent leak to Anderson was being coordinated from the White House and ; in- volved security agencies at the D t epar - The papers released by An- State and Defense derson covered meetings 01 meats as well as the Secret the Washington Special Action Service. Contrary to earllier Group at the White House oon reports, the Federal Bureau of Dec. 3, 4 and 6. The WSAG is a Investigation has not been top advisory committee to the cailled into the case so far. National Security Council. Officials at the State and All the. d o c u m e n t s are Defense Departments seemed marked "SECRET SENSI- to be most concerned about "In view of the sensitivity of The Concern information in the NSC (Na- Several officials called at- ;cerpts from the documents tional Security Council) sys- :printed. earlier by Anderson. tem and the detailed nature of . Anderson gave the docu- this memorandum, it is re- lnents to the Washington post quested that access to it be last night, and the paper print- limited to a strict need-to- ed them today. The Star ob- know basis." tained its own copies of the The documents appeared to documents. have come from two different Anderson said in an inter- offices in the Pentagon- View last night that his column although it is quite possible kepared for release tomorrow that copies of the minutes also would carry excerpts from se- would be available in the other cret documents dealing with areas of the government. relations between the United Anderson says he has even States and Japan. The column more such documents. The will appear on the same day disclosures amount to a major President Nixon meets with leak of -sensitive government Japanese Prime Minister Ei- papers-in some way even Calif. ernment officials than the re- lease of the Pentagon Papers VI Am ...Getting Hell" earlier this year. One of the documents rg- In that case, the documents 'eased by AAP li'o tt@ Ll~( bo t di u 1 ng a Kissinger as telling a White ?L 'listory en douse Meeting on Dec. 3 that: tention to a column published by Anderson on Dec. 28 de- scribing a secret intelligence report in which Emory Swank, U.S. ambassador to Cambodia, gave an unflattering assess- ment of top Cambodian offi- cials. Publication of the re- port, the U.S. officials said, will greatly complicate Swank's task in dealing with the Cambodian government. Anderson acknowledged that an argument could be made that the cables of an ambassa- dor to his government should Assistant Secretary of State be classified. Joseph Sisco said that "as the "But I think I had a duty to Paks increasingly feel the heat report his warning that the we will be getting emergency country (Cambodia) is about requests from them." " he said. to collapse, that a pattern of leaks now may make government offi- cials reluctant, in the future, to offer proposals that might be embarrassing if they were published, or to be candid in their comments on policies un- der consideration. The Anderson documents re- veal what appear to be two major discrepancies between what the administration was doing - or thinking about doing - at the height of the India - Pakistan crisis and what it was telling the public. Anderson suggested a com- parison be made between the minutes of the sessions - par- ticularly Kissinger's comment that he was getting hell from the President for not being tough enough on India - and a Kissinger "background" brief- ing for the press on Dec. 7. Anderson said the comparison would show the government "lied" to the public. In that backgrounder, Kis- singer ..denied the administra- tion was "anti-Indian." Arms Transfer Suggested The other major discrepan- cy noted by Anderson arises from the minutes of the Dec. 6 meeting in which Kissinger is said to have asked whether the United States could authorize Jordan or Saudi Arabia to transfer American military equipment to Pakistan. Two State Department offi- cials responded that such a transfer would be illegal and that the Jordanians would probably be grateful if the United States "could get them off the hook" by denying au- thority for such a transfer. The government said public- ly at that time that it was not providing aid to either coun- "Dr. Kissinger said that the Two Key Discrepancies President t may want to honor 04heQl r~-AilfiOlP n.-' ffi0'1"t~e3~lfa';Un~t about the Anderson papers is STATINTL NEW YORK TIMES Approved For Release 2t0)jR3{9A: CIA-fib A601 .olunnist Says Nixon Pressed Policy Against India J By TERENCE SMITH 1 1 to The New Yo:r Times a S pa NVASIIINGTON, Jan. 3-Pres-,crises , that dealt with the India-i This instruction was ampl " with; Pakistan conflict. The meetings Ified on Dec. 8, when, accor ddent Nixon was "furious his subordinates during the re-were held in early December. irg to the column, "Dr. Kissi cent India Pakistan war for not, Notes by Pentagon Aides ger stated that current ordc taking a stronger stand against; are not to put anything in th ndicated colum- The notes he has published bud et for India. It was als s t h i y e Ind a, mist Jack Anderson reported so far, the columnist said, ate not to be leaked that AID had today. from those taken for tho De. put money in the budget only Mr. Anderson quoted Henry fense Department - and are to have the 'wicked' White A. Kissinger, the President's ad? signed by two Pentagon offi- House -take it out." viser on national security, as cials. . On Dec. 4, the Administra- having told a meeting of senior Mr. Anderson said he had "ion suspended its aid program Administration . officials: "I'm received scores of other classi- in India. getting hell every half-hour fied documents, including se- front the President that we are cret intelligence reports and not being tough enough on In- cablegrams, that he intended to dia." publish during the next two According to Mr. Anderson weeks. IMr. Kissinger directed that al: "I am trying to force a show- United States officials "show a!mown with the Administration "The Indian Ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level," he is quoted as having said. The quotations in Mr. An- I in the public interest in a? dOrson's column today were the'demecracy." latest in a series of verbatim ! Mr. Anderson said neither reports of secret White House he nor members of his staff had strategy sessions dealing with the crisis that the columnist has, yet been questioned by Gov. published during the last several ernment investigators, but that , he had "positive" information dayIsiss column is syndicated to that the F.B.I. had alreedy in- 700 newspapers, 100 of them terrogated individuals at the White House and State and De- overseas. Mr. Anderson took fense departments in an effort lover the column on the death to discover who had provided of his colleague Drew Pearson him with the documents. In September, 1969. Aide Declines Comment The publication of the re- Gerald L. Warren, the acting ports, which Mr. Anderson says Press Secretary at the White are classified "secret sensitive," House, declined today to say has infuriated the White House whether an investigation had land unsettled national security been ordered. He also declined I officials. I all. comment on the Anderson Government sources can columns. firmed today that an investiga-I In the column published to White House to determine who leaked the classified documents. Tho sources said the new in- vestigation, reportedly being conducted by the Federal Bu- reau of Investigation, is directed at individuals in the State and Defense Departments, and on the National Security Council .staff who have had access to the notes quoted by Mr. Ander- son. The quotations published by the columnist are not official minutes of the meetings, butt rather notes prepared by repre- .sentatives of the various de- ;partments attending. In a telephone interview to- day, Mr. Anderson said he had ben given two complete sets f mates of e over their classification sys-. / ten,," the columnist said. "Ev- erything Kissinger does-even; the toilet paper he uses-is be. day, Mr. Anderson quotes from notes taken during the Wash- ington Special Action Group's meetings of Dec. 3, Dec. 4 and Dec, 8. In the first session, he quotes Richard Helms, director of Cen- tral Intelligence, as saying the Indians were "currently en- gaged in a no-holds-barred at- J STATINTL? !tack on East Pakistan and that tve t o,~ ~~aslxingtan IGroup, ?a high-level strategy 1committee assembled during they had crossed the border on all sides." "Dr. Kissinger remarked that it the Indians have announced a full-scale invasion," the col- umn continues, ,this fact must be reflected in our U.N. state- ment.' On Dec. 4, Mr. Kissinger is quoted matters the President wants to p1 11 CIA-RDP80-01601 R001 300390001-8 Ifor International Development. FOREIGN .ate s Approved For Release 2001/ 10. CIA ${ Dl 1:1!? THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING By Chester L. Cooper cording to the actual. conditions. When we study the causes of the mistakes we have mad we find that they all arose because we departed from the actual situation . . . and wer subjective in determining our working policies."-"The Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung." 11N bucolic McLean, Virginia, screened by trees and sur j rounded by a high fence, squats a vast expanse of concret and glass known familiarly as the "Pickle Factory," an more formally as "Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency. Chiselled into the marble which is the only relieving feature o the building's sterile main entrance are the words, "The Trut Shall Make You Free." The quotation from St. John was personally chosen for the new building by Allen W. Dulles over / the objection of several subordinates who felt that the Agency, then still reeling from the Bay of Pigs debacle, should adopt a .somewhat less lofty motto. (In those dark days of late 196r, some suggested that a more appropriate choice would be "Look Before You Leap.") But Dulles had a deeper sense of history than most. Although he was a casualty of the By of Pigs and never .sat in the Director's office with its view over the Potomac, he left a permanent mark not only on the Agency which he had fashioned but on its building which he had planned. Allen Dulles was famous among many and notorious among some for his consummate skill as an intelligence operative ("spook" in current parlance), but one of his greatest contribu- tions in nurturing the frail arrangements he helped to create to provide intelligence support to Washington's top-level foreign- policy-makers. Harry Truman, whose Administration gave birth to both the / National Security Council and the Central- Intelligence Agency, ,I recalls that, "Each time the National Security Council is about to consider a certain policy-let us say a policy having to do with Southeast Asia-it immediately calls upon the CIA to present an estimate of the effects such a policy is likely to have. ...1 President Truman painted a somewhat more cozy relationship between the NSC and the CIA than probably existed during, and certainly since, his Administration. None the less, it is fair to say that the intelligence community, and espe- cially the CIA, played an important advisory role in high-level policy deliberations during the i95os and early r96os. To provide the most informed intelligence judgments on the effects a contemplated policy might have on American na- tional security interests, a group especially tailored for the task was organized in rgso within the CIA. While this step would probably have been taken sooner or later, the communist victory STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8 Approved For ReleaWAQY%./Q4s CIA-RDP80-01601 R 1 JAN 1972 The Washington Itlerry-Go.-Round By Jack Anderson Pakistan wasn't the only loser of the bloody, two-week war over Bangladesh. The In- dian blitz also badly damaged two bigger victims. We have already shown .from the secret White House Papers that the United States isuffered a strategic defeat. Thanks to President Nixon's n , bungling, Russia has emerged) replied Kissinger. "Let's go as India's partner, and thel ahead and put in our own United States is out In the cold I statement anyway regardless on the Indian'subcontinent. I of what other countries want The other big loser is the to do. We need now to make United Nations, which failed our stand clear even though it dismally to keep the peace be-i has taken us two weeks of fid- tween India and Pakistan. The Idling." U.N.'s Impotence, as it groped for an International consensus I Kissillger's Comments to end the struggle, caused President Nixon's foreign pol- icy adviser, Henry Kissinger, to blurt at a secret White House rneeting: "If the U.N. can't operate In this kind of situation effec- tively, Its utility has come to an end, and it Is useless to think of U.N. guarantees in the Middle East." ama"ed"b ''In'dian Blitz' White House strategy session on Dec. 4: "We will have difficulty In the U.N.," suggested Samuel DePalma, the State Depart- ment's specialist In Interna- tional organizations, "because most of the countries who might go with us do not want to tilt toward Pakistan to the extent we do.". "We have told the Paks we would make our stateme t " The secret minutes con- tinue: "Dr. Kissinger (said) it was Important that we register our position. The exercise in the U.N. Is likely to be an ex- ercise in futility, Inasmuch as the Soviets can be expected to veto. The U.N. itself, will In all probability do little to ter. minate the war." At this point, Kissinger de- America's U.N. Ambassador, I Glared: "Nothing will happen George Bush, suggested in one at the Security Council be- secret report that Secretary General U Thant's ineffective. 'General might be attributed to "physical strain due to his re- cent illness." But Kissinger put the matter more bluntly by calling the U.N. wrangle a "farce," Kissinger made clear his contempt for the U.N. at a cause of Soviet vetoes. The whole thing is a farce." "The Soviet tactic will he to stall, as they do not want a cease-fire yet," agreed Christo- pher Van Hollen, another State Department expert. DePalma said the Indians "could shilly-shally for three or four days"-long enough, chimed in CIA director Rich and Helms, "far them to occu- py Past Pakistan. Footnote: When Indian troops threatened Dacca, Sec- retary General U Thant's first reaction was to evacuate the U.N. mission. This brought stern, secret instructions from State Secre- tary Bill Rogers to Ambassa- dor Bush: "Request U.S.U.N. (U.S. delegation) to convey to SYG (Secretary General) or appropriate senior official our deep concern regarding deci- sion of SYG to withdraw all ago. The court recommended Kennedy receive $100,000. Sub. sequently, however, he was stricken with cancer. So th? Justice Department promptly sought to cut down his award on the ground that cancer had reduced his life expectancy, Now Kennedy has died and his wife and child need the award more than ever. PX Blues-Three separate surveys taken by the Penta- gon, a civilian research firm and the Army itself have turn< ed up widespread dissatisfac- tion with the multibillion-do1- U.N. officials from East Paki-; lar commissary system. The ctan nc rirtnnnrinrl by Tertian i Pentagon study found "custom. government. "In earlier message from Dacca, U.N. group in East Pak- ers rated commissary service unsatisfactory." The civilian survey showed 76.9 per cent of commissary customers -wanted instructed.. by U.N.N.Y. (U.N.~a better selection. The Army headquarters) to 'defer evacu- I discovered that, out of eight ation of U.N. officials so they may be in place for possible assistance in arranging cease- fire .. . "Suggest In course of discus- sion you stress critical role which U.N. can play in pro- tecting human rights and seek. ing peace during current cri- sis." Washington Whirl Reverse Justice-We re- ported earlier that the Justice Department was trying to re- duce a U.S. Court of Claims commissioner's damage recom. mendation to a Miami Herald photographer named Doug Kennedy who was wounded by American Marines in the Do- minican Republic six years aspects of military life, the commissaries and post ex. changes ranked seventh. Mean- while, despite revelations of waste and corruption in the system, the generals in charge, continue to assure Dcfense? Secretary Mel Laird that all is well. Dole's Dunning-Sen. Bob Dole (R-Kan.), _ the brassy Re.. publican National -Chairman, has sent out letters soliciting. $50 and $75 contributions for the Senate campaign of his: old pal, Sen. Bob Griffin (R- Mich.). But the letters were sent to non-Michigan money Wren, thus angering other GOP candidates who see the dun. ning as ponching, on their, homestate preserves. 01972, Uc TMcClure 8ynd1c&t4 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8