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December 29, 2000
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December 31, 1971
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NEW YORK TIMES Approved For Release 2a.coompi: CIA-RDP80-01 Kissinger's Kissinger Alexander Meigs Haig Jr. , By JAMES M. NAUGHTON Special to The Now York Times WASHINGTON, Dec. 30 ? The most interesting aspect of the White House advance party that is on its way to China to complete the prep- arations for President Nixon's journey may be the fact that: the delegation is led by some- one ? other than the Presi- dent's assistant for national security affairs, Man Henry A. Kissin- ger. The man in charge is the News next best thing? "Kissinger's Kis- singer," as he was described here today. He is Brig. Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., a but- ton-down, Ivy League-style career Army officer who is, above ,all, loyal to the next man up in the chain of com- mand. General Haig, at age 47, is the arch type of the military- political staff man who con- siders his ability to operate-- and to advance his own career?to be inversely pro- portional to the amount of public notice he attracts. The general's success can be measured, in two ways. A colonel when he entered the White House, he made brigadier general within nine months. After barely two years he is on the selection' list for promotion to major general. Still Virtually Unknown ? "Selection boards pay at- tention to commendation let- ters from the White House," a senior Pentagon official ex- plained. Then too, the official added, senior military men eager to advance their views in policy circles "recognize who a guy works for, and Al Haig works for Henry Kis- singer." In the Defense Department there is already talk about the prospect that General Haig might one day become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. . Even more significant ? Until Mr. Nixon thrust Gen- eral Haig into public focus as head of the advance team that passion for ano- nymity. In three years Gen- eral Haig has risen from be- ing virtually unknown senior military adviser to the Na- tional Security Council to be- come a virtually unknown deputy assistant to the Presi- dent for national securiM? s ApprovedifcorqRelle nerg,d as the one member Associated Press His loyalty pays off of Mr. Kissinger's staff of 120 with any -clout of his own. At least twice the President has sent General Haig to Southeast Asia to gather mili- tary and political information, and it is believed that he made several other unan- nounced trips to South Viet- nam and Cambodia, catching even the State Department unaware. More often, however, Gen- eral Haig, slouching slightly, sits for 14 hours or more seven days a week at his desk outside Mr. Kissinger's office. He was on duty on the Saturday in November when the Atomic Energy Commission detonated a nu- clear warhead under Amchit- ka Island in Alaska. It was he who telephoned the Presi- dent ? in Florida with Mr. Kissinger ? to assure ? him that the test had been suc- cessful. Thrives Under Pressure Mr. Kissinger's demands on his staff have been such as to drive a number of them, feeling tired and unapprecia- ted, back into private re- search positions. None have been under more pressure than General Haig, who albite sees what Mr. Kissinger sees and who must take drafts of STATI NTL national security study mem- orandums, and the sweeping scope is attested by titles such as "Laos Peace Initia- tives," "Uranium Enrichment Defense Nceds" and "Vietnam Riot Control." Some former Kissinger sides believe General Haig has thrived under pressure by "not disagreeing on is- sues." Joseph A. Califano, for whom he worked at the Defense Department under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and who urged Mr. Kissinger to hire him in 1969, recalls him as the "ul- timate professional" dedicat- ed solely to "doing the job and doing it right." Even critics acknowledge General Haig's abilities as Mr. Kissinger's chief of staff. "Henry is just a dreadful administrator," one said. "He's preoccupied with pol- icy. But Haig is enormously effective at keeping the ma- chinery moving." ? Whatever their reasons, Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have developed sufficient re- spect for General Haig that, on occasion, he fills in for his boss in briefings of the President. A West Pointer Alexander M. Haig Jr., who was born in Philadelphia on Dec. 2, 1924 lost his father, a lawyer, before he was 10. He attended Notre. Dame for a year before winning a wartime appoint- ment to West Point, from which he graduated in 1947. As a junior aide to Gen. of the Army Douglas MacArthur in occupied Japan, he met and married Patricia Fox, daughter of a senior Army officer. Their three children?Al- exander, 19 and a sophomore at Georgetown University; Brian, 18 and a plebe at West Point, and Barbara, 15 and in high school here?do not see as much of the general as they used to, Nor does he get many opportunities, aside from an occasional tennis or. handball match, to relax. Rarely can he count on being sure of using theater or con- cert tickets. option papers and security Nonetheless, his wife, pre- memoranda, with Mr. Kissin- paring to spend New Year's ger's criticism scrawled on Eve half a world away from the margins, back to the au- her husband, had no doubt thors for improvement, that he was fascinated with The sheer volume of effort his grueling job. involved is reflected by the "I don't think an man can aseh20011/0410141(01tA-RDP89413604R001300400001 -6 ger cf roughly .`?;,,. classifi t ungs, she said. Approved For Release 261?//tiM4RFM-RbIbtioCt16 2 cp.,. 1971 The CHIl's Ketu Cover ?The Rope Dancer by Victor Marchetti. Grosset & Dunlap, 361 pp., $6.95 Richard J. Barnet In late November the Central Intel- ligence Agency conducted a series of "senior seminars" so that some of its Important bureaucrats could consider its public image. I was invited to attend one session and to give my views on the proper role of the Agency. I suggested that its legitimate activities were limited to studying newspapers and published statistics, listening to the radio, thinking about the world, interpreting data of recon- naissance satellites, and occasionally ? publishing the names of foreign spies. I had been led by conversations with a number of CIA officials to believe that they were thinking along the same lines. One CIA man after another eagerly joined the discussion to assure me that the days of the flamboyant covert operations were over. The upper-class amateurs of the OSS who stayed to mastermind operations in \tuatemala, Iran, the Congo, and else- where--Allen Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt, Richard Bissell, Tracy Barnes, Robert Amory, Desmond Fitzgerald?had died or departed. In their place, I was assured, was a small army of professionals devoted to preparing intelligence "estimates" for the President and collecting informa- tion the clean, modern way, mostly with sensors, computers, and sophis- ticated reconnaissance devices. Even Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, would now be as much a museum piece as Mata -Hari. (There are about 18,000 em- ployees in the CIA and 200,000 in the entire "intelligence community" itself. The cost of maintaining them is some- where between $5 billion and 56 billion annually. The employment figures do not include foreign agents or mercenaries, such as the CIA's 100,000- man hired army in Laos.) A week after my visit to the "senior seminar" Newsweek ran a long story n "the new espionage" with a picture of CIA Director Richard Helms on the cover. The reporters clearly had spoken to some of the same people I had. As Newsweek said, adventurer has passed in the American spy business; the bureaucratic age of Richard C. Helms and his gray spe- cialists has settled in." I began to have an uneasy feeling that Newsweek's article was a cover story in more than one sense. Elle *Ope the ingt kno fina ingt vote An ceili It has always been difficult to faile analyze organizations that engage in A false advertising about themselves. Part of of the responsibility of the CIA is to lad) spread confusion about its own work, the The world of Richard Helms and his "specialists" does indeed differ .from that of Allen Dulles. Intelligence organ- izations, in spite of their predilection for what English judges used to call "frolics of their own," are servants of policy. When policy changes, they must eventually change too, although because of the atmosphere of secrecy and deception in Which they operate, such changes are exceptionally hard to control. To understand the "new espionage" one must see it as ipart of the Nixon Doctrine which, in. essence, er is a global strategy for maintaining US Ih power and influence without overtly reol involving the nation in another ground Ile, war. ne But we cannot comprehend recent lige developments in the "intelligence corn- uel munity" without understanding what fur Mr. Helms and his employees actually Prc do. In a speech before the National i13 Press Club, the director discouraged/ journalists from making the attempt. d( "You've just got to trust us. We are honorable men." The same speech is made each year to the small but growing number of senators who want a closer check on the CIA. In asking, on November 10, for a "Select Com- mittee on the Coordination of United States Activities Abroad to oversee activities of the Central Intelligence Agency," Senator Stuart Symington noted that "the subcommittee having oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency has not met once this year." Symington, a former Secretary of the Air Force and veteran member of ? the Armed Services Committee, has t also said that "there is no federal agency in our government whose activ- ities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA." Moreover, soon after Symington spoke, Senator Allen J. becz ized ovei lige, Age Bur the cen ove: vice Age imp nf P: STATINTL ATOproVedrFeirtRelease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 1 ELSHINGTON FOSZ Approved For Release 20AEliE4 :1E1A-RDP80-016 Murrey Mctrder SECRETARY OF STATE William P. Rogers at- tempted at year's end to lift the crumpled morale of the Foreign Service out of a slough of gloom with a burst of holiday praise. If effusive words alone could suffice, the Secretary, who is a professional opti- mist, would have accom- plished a small miracle. But to diplomats to specialize in soft verbiage to cloak hard realities, the warm com- mendation of the Foreign Service for "outstanding work" carried about as much comfort as a diplo- matic communique express- ing- "agreement in princi- ple." This has been "a good year In terms of foreign af- fairs" said Rogers on Thurs- day; brimming with enthusi- asm over his listing of "very substantial accomplish- ments." But for members of -the American Foreign Serv- ice, it has been indeed been a poor year. The main body of profes- sional American diplomats at State was frozen out of most high strategy-making In 1971, they ruefully con- cede. , Even Rogers himself re- ceived only the most fleet- ing mention in the White House citations of the year's foreign policy accomplish- ments, in comparison to the great pre-eminence accorded to presidential national se- curity adviser Henry A. Kis- singer. Rogers even ran a distant third in personal at- tention on the White House accounting to the space and prominence given to presi- dential counsellor Robert H. Finch's "mission to six na- tions in Latin America." Is the conduct or state of STATINFIL uble Setback at State ceives what attention in the White House pecking order, or by whether the Foreign Service happens to be happy or glum?. The blunt answer is that in many respects it matters little or not at all in national dimensions. What does imatter to the nation is whether its resources in di- plomacy, as in other fields, are used fully and wisely. FROM their own view- point, which is not wholly impartial, a very large num- ber of the most experienced professionals in the Ameri- can Foreign Service deplore what they regard as the wholly inadezuate use being made of ,their talents. This past year brought a double blow. The State De- partment long had been eclipsed In this administra- tion by the Kissinger opera- tion in the White House;: suddenly State was pre- empted from another, unex- pected direction?the Treas- ury Department, where free- wheeling Secretary John B. Connally suddenly vaulted Into a dominant position across the economic-foreign policy horizon. State found itself not only operating on the fringes of high strategy, but perform- ing what one chagrined dip- lomat called a "sweeper's role": sweeping up and trying to piece together the shards of allies' egos shat- tered by the shock of the a& ministration's bold ventures in China and in interna- tional monetary and trade policy. A minority inside the State Department responds, as one expressed it, "So what? What is so bad about being a 'service' or- ganization? If the President wants to centralize all poli- the State Department, that's his prerogative. Every Presi- dent has his own ideas about how he wants to oper- ate; that's his choice." What is lost in this proc- ess, others protest, is not only morale but the full range of expertise and bal- ance that can be brought to bear on a given interna- tional problem, uncolored by the political-centered focus of the White House. It is the prerogative of the White House to accept or re- ject this advice, it is argued; what is important is that the President have access to it. Dr. Kissinger maintains that 'this is precisely what is pro- vided for in his elaborate National Security Council system. But the realty, in- siders protest, is that the most important policy deci- sions never enter that elabo- rate mechanism. With a critical election year ahead, the process of policy making is shrinking with increasing secretive- ness into the confines of the White House. What is emerg- ing is soaring optimism in place of realities about the outside world. This, too, is not without precedent in an election year. The risk comes, as the Johnson ad- ministration discovered, when the optimists let them- selves be engulfed by their own product. tgicaarflfeca' atireigsrt Voit.3 CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 J NEVI YORIC DAILY STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03W:Wk-RDP80-016 Nev's Arotind Mats vnrk r (777Y 9 - re, VZ,7tAl , - By GEORGE MAESTAN The White House will be the subject of two major tele- vision specials this month, one on CBS dealing with the Christmas season and the other on NBC covering a day in dent Agnew; presentation of diplomatic credentials by ambas- sadors from Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan and Portugal, and a meeting of the Quadriad, the President's four major economic advisers. Chancellor said that for se- curity reasons NBC cameras were excluded from a part of every Meeting. "Among the unsched- uled events that oecured during the day," he said, "was a visit from Nixon's daughter, Julie Ei- senhower. CIS' speCial "Christmas at the White House," will, be tele- vised on Christmas Eve, from 10:30 to 11 p.m. It will follow the First Family through its various activities preparing for the Yuletide season. Julie Eisen- hower will join Charles Kuralt the life of the President. NBC's special, titled "Dec. 6, 3971: A Day in the Presidency," will be presented next Tuesday, from 7::10 to 8:30 p.m., with John Chancellor as host. It will cover President Nixon through an entire work day, focusing on every meeting-, on his schedule, includ- ing the first part? of a top-level session of the Washington Special Action Group of the National Security Council. ? This segment will show the President discussing the Indian- Pakistani war with Secretary of John Lucille Chancellor Ball State William Rogers, presiden- tial aid Henry Kissinger, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Pack- ard, Gen. William Westmoreland I and Richard Helms, director of 4 the Central Intelligence Agency. Reuven Frank' president of NBC News, said this is the first time the White House has given permission to film a program of this type. "We have been asking to do a show on the Presidency since 1948," he said. "We got the go-ahead in mid-November after several meetings with John Scali, a special consultant to the President." The President's work day on the day of filming (Dec. 6) began at 7:45 a.m., with a breakfast for congressional leaders, and ended shortly before 11. p.m., following -a dinner for Canadian Prime /viinister Pierre Elliott 'Prudent:. Other events on Nixon's sched- ule that will be seen on the tele- cast included-: a domestic council Ineeting, chaired by Vice Presi _ 0 n r iIYc4 and Marya 'McLaughlin for the. report. Filming for the telecast began last weekend. STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001103/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 NEW 1.'027.-C DAILY Approved For Release 2001Ipi/r? q1A-RDP80.0 News Arobaci mats r-,71 ? c.:71 - By GEORGE MAKSIAN . - The White House will be the subject of two major tele- vision specials this month, one on CBS dealing with the Christmas season and the other on .NBC covering a day in the life of the President. NBC's special, titled "Dec. 6, 1071: A Day in the Presidency," will be presented next Tuesday, front 7:30 to 8:30 p.m., with John Chancellor as host. It will cover President Nixon through an entire work day, focusing on every meeting on his schedule, includ- ing the first part - of a top-level session of the Washington Special Action -Group of the National ? Security Council. This segment will show the President discussing the Indian- Pakistani war with Secretary of STATI NTL 0'i iir 1.7 John Chancellor Lucille Ball ? State 'William Rogers, presiden- tial aid Henry Kissinger, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Pack- ard, Gen. William Westmoreland and Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Reuven Frank, president of NBC News, said this is the first time the White House has given permission to film a program of this type. "We have been asking ' to do a show on the Presidency since 1948," he said. "We got the go-ahead in mid-November after several meetings with John Scali, special consultant to the President." The President's work day on the day of filming (Dec. 6) began at 7:45 a.m., with a breakfast for congressional leaders, and ended shortly before 11 p.m., following a dinner for Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trinket!. Other events on Nixon's sched- tile that will be seen on the tele- Cast included: a domestic council meeting chaired by Vice Presi- . dent Agnew; presentation of diplomatic credentials by ambas- sadors from. In dOneSia, Morocco, Pakistan and Portugal, and a meeting of the Quadriad, the President's four major economic advisers. Chancellor said that for se- curity reasons NBC cameras were excluded from a part of every meeting. "Among the unsched- uled events that occ.ured during the day," he said, "was a visit from. Nixon's daughter, Julie Ei- senhower. CBS' special "Christmas at the White House," will, be tele- vised on Christmas Eve, from 10:30 to 11 p.m. It will follow the First Family through itS various activities preparing for the Yuletide season. Julie Eisen- hower will join Charles Kuralt it-;.01/10-(7.) and Marya McLaughlin for the report. Filming for the telecast began last weekend. ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 STATI NTL Approved For?trOgrapEn2001/03/043: 1311A-1OP80-01601R YTT7-0. CT Cil =TTU tirP7 3 - c, ? ? 41-," ? 7! 1. -fi 3 0 ? t,'/''Y (Ne urn, ai,u C4I) - 3 ? 2 6 Tay [i priry11-21;CII [ 0 -9 STATI NTL ? fl ,?? ,.,....?...." ,.,," Ile e, .=..,_:?.., p. t _T-rn , I n o ?s- ? Li...a u, ..?.,... ? ,, ,," - , - . .Dy Jonnne Leccloin ? agency was hard for me to identify at first. ' Staff writer of The Christian Scier.ce Monitor I began -first to criticize the waste. This is .a_ .. : ridiculous, I thought. We could be doing the - Bostol i .. job for $2 billion less. '. ? In the baSement of his home in Oakton "The second thing that was Most annoying . ?, Va., with dogs and children running have to? me was the military influence. This is very pervasive. When the Secretary of De- around him, Victor' Marchetti wrote a spy ?fense controls 85 percent of the assets, he Dc- novel last year. Today Mr. Marchetti and l'ils new book "The Rope Dancer" are stir- [the CIA director] doesn't have the muscle ? ring up 'havoc of another kind just a few to make changes. The military influence in miles from his borne, at Central Intelligence many ways is the greatest single factor of Agency ? (CIA) headquarters where Mr. .waste. They want to know more and more Marchetti was an official just two years ago. and are responsible for C'ollection overkill." ..Toclay Mr. Marchetti is the spy "who To these two criticisms, the former CIA came in from the cold?into hot waterpn official who worked close to the director to Mote one of his friends. Now an out- and who responded for The Christian Science ?spoken critic of the agency, Mr. Marchetti Monitor, partly 'agreed. "There is unfor- . has been traveling around the country pro-. tunately an awful lot of duplication," he ' meting his expos?f the spy's world and said, but added,. "What is needed is tighter crusading-for reform in the CIA. control over the military [not the CIA]. It's not. a question of the CIA duplicating the Mr. l'ilarchetti left the CIA after a 14- military but of the military duplicating year career in protdt over what he asserts t the' CIA does ' is its waste ' and duplicity in intelligence ILation is a strong. The Preside:-,t s aeorga- ' move in the 'rsight' diiec- gathering, its increasing involvement withtion " .th'e military, its amorality, and what heAjaother one of Mr. Marchetti 's corn- . says now is its subtle shifts to "domestic plaints is that the traditional intelligence spying." ? -1.7,,ork of gathering and infoaana- Reform, he says, in the entire intelligence ? assessing - " ? ti "" netvRa-k .should be three-pronged: (I) -re- on has been contaminated with para- organizing responibilities, (2) reducing size clered by Preaidezit Nixon. Placing CIA di- rector Richard Helms as overall coordina- tor of national intelligence recently was in .,part aimed at eliminating the waste in the Cancer-11 noticed ? "In recent years as domeatic unrest in- creased, I've noticed the CIA is concerned about the FBI's apparent inability to handle subversion in this country. I think there's an effort to convince the nation that the CIA should get into domestic intelligence." "Ridiculous," snapped the former CIA administrator, and left this charge at that. ,To reform the intelligence network, Mr. Marchetti says there should be a reorgani- zation to limit the Defense Department to the routine intelligence needs Of various de, p?artments -- Army, Navy, etc. "Then I'd put the National Security Agency under the control of the ?Presiden1 and Congress," elaborated Mr. Marchetti "Congress has very little: knowlc;dge about what goes on. The Pentagon papers and the way the Supreme Court 'acted strips away the shield.intelligence has always had. .We need to let a little sunshine in; that's the best safeguard." Laos example ciled The former administrator insists, how. aver, that there are already adequate con. military activity. - tirols through special -congressional corn. A prime example is Lao S where the CIVnittees which control appropriations and recruited and armed thousands of natives' military affairs. "If you had the whole says Mr. Marchetti, who worked in the CIA -Congress and. Senate debating these issuen as an intelligence analyst, 'as special assist- in executive session, you might as well ?dc ant to the chief of plans, programs, and away with it [secret intelligence opera- budgets, to ? the executive director, and tions]. Inevitably ,there would be leaks." finally as executive assistant to the agency's "Of course there would be leaks,", admit- deputy director.- ? ? - . ,ted Mr. Marchetti. "What I'm really saying "[At the time] perhaps a handful of key is that in the final analysis if we made the . congressmen and senators might have'President walk through it [his decision to nation's $3 billion/200,000-man intelligence .operation which spans a dozen governrnen- .and funding and (3) exposing the intelli- gence community to more public control and scrutiny. . Silence rnahataltied - The CIA, in its turn, has remained custo- marily silent to.the public attack. However, one former top CIA official, who asked to -remain anonymous, ? agreed with some of Mr.- Marehetti's points but disputed his main .arguments. Since Mr. Marchetti began speaking out ?. several months ago, a major restructuring in the intelligence community has been or- tal agencies. It was also aimed at tailoring intelligence output More closely to White -Rouse needs. This reform ahd. Mr. Ma.rehetti's own criti- cism come at a time when Congress, too, is demanding more knowledge -.and -control over the intelligence networks. For the first time Congress has ordered public hearings on the CIA next year, and Mr. Marchetti Plans to testify. ? ? ? ? ? . . linoavn about this ? activity in Laos. ThE public knew nothing," he declared. ? According to the former CIA adminis- trator, however, paramilitary activity is shifting out of the CIA now and into the Army. "But. in' any case," .he said, "the CIA doesn't decide on this activity; they are directed by the President and the Na- -tional Security Council." If there, is to be reform in the use of the CIA, he argues, it must come from the President's direction.- While Mr. Marchetti is highly critical of the CIA's paramilitary and .clandestine in- terVentions in other countries, he insists that the real threat of the CIA today is that it may "unleash" itself on this- country. uSe covert forces in foreign countries], the President would see it's all not worth it. Then if we deny ourselves these alterna- tives. we'd have to act in a diplomatic fashion." . Military ii2PA,Nov.ved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDI380-01601R001300400001-6 In Boston Mr. archetti explained his own ? "defection": "My discontent with the pAuy.... WP_ELD - - P,..rfwggi 'F 0 riRe 1 9,asp 3. o4P? .i . .1 FrJ ? \ 7. ...,-.1 . - b 11 1:. 7.' :1 -.:1 ' i t LI _..., 1., '' ?I i I 1 :. Li Li .......-3 .. L.........J ,.....i? 1__!, ,..1 ,; .. 17.11' r ; Fl L Li La ?71 By 'Gus Man l? LLJU L1 b\ AFD 601 _0d:2cm:1,50i:rotary, Communist Part/ U.S.A. ? it\ t the last meeting of our National Committee, four months ago we said: "World capitalism has lost the source of its momentum. It cannot sustain periods. of stability. Instability is now the more basic charac- teristic of world capitalism. It is a social system in a continuous crisis. Life is giving ever more dramatic evidence that this is indeed the last stage of capital- ist development." About the present moment in history, we said: . "War U.S. imperialism this is a moment when the heoldwintls are thre; take over. This is a po?ierl when the countor-fercos have Locorne anefl'ectivet counterl:;nlance.. tc; U.S. imperialist policies. Iricrensin:Jy thcy are cancolino out U.S. influc.,nces... "Areas of cli:iiculties are turning into severe In world relations, U.S. imperialism is forced :o seek new tions, because the old cp:ions have p u t the U.S. on a precarious limbo. .? "The options that cra open. are either detOin; Or re:rents and incrensir,* the detours are turning into - . "The new element that now more and more forces ? itself inio cll. U.S. imperialist operations is element of al a forced retreat." What we have said is correct. It is a guide to understanding the nature of the present historic mo- ment.. But the dramatic events of the past months, and even days,. force us to probe further and to consider even more far-raching conclusions. . ? ? , Needless to say, the contradictions, currents, rela- tionship of forces giving rise to this 'Moment are ex- tremely complex. . There are 'currents \and - counter- currents. The 'capitalist, world is in an extremely un- settled state. ? Events unfold with unusual impact and speed. The moment is complex because the basic post-' war point or reference for the capitalist world has crumbled. It is not only the capitalist currencies that are "floating." Political forces in the capitalist world ,are in a flux, each seeking for neN,v relationships, for new points of reference. - What is.. the basic nature' of ,this critical . mo- ment? What is it that has changed? ? ' In a -nutshell, the economic, political, and military edifice of the post-war capitalist world is now crum- bling. It can never be rebuilt on the old basis. The old relationships of forces cannot be reconstituted along past patterns. The capitalist world is trying to find a new world structure. U.S. imperialism is. trying to do this on its own terms. The ? task of our people., and the anti-imperialist forces,oi_the gorlcl, is torevent the r_egroupintrIZPFPNONcrpctrpOetieast 3/0 ? STATI NTL ? We need to dismantle the institutions of aggression within the country?the military-industrial complex, the Pentagon-CIA, the invisible government, the Na- tional Security Council, and the rest. This is the mo- ment to demand the dismantling of all U.S. military bases and alliances of aggression. The 'curbing of the post-war capitalist system. is of great historic signifi- cance. . With this collapse of the post-war economic, politi- cal and military capitalist edifice, the general crisis of world capitalism ig entering a new stage. The strategic U.S.-built imperialist cold war structure is in shambles. For U.S. imperialism this is the year of the boomerang. .One ? cold war policy after another is boomeranging. The "roll back of Communism" policy is turning into a roll back for imperialism. ? The isolator has become isolated. The initiative in world affairs is more and more in the hands of the socialist countries. The trade blockers are at .Work trying to break through the trade walls they them- selves have built. The U.S.-United Nations policy is boomeranging. Nixon is, pleading, "Vote us down but please do not. dance and sing'in your victory." With the Chiria vote, the 25 years of U.S. domination of ?the, UN carne to an end. 0. The post-war-world, capitalist economic structure oi satellites and appendages that are bound to, and dorni- na?ted by, U.S. imperialism: is floundering fn chaos and contusion. The Centrifugal force generated by tha inner contradictions of capitalism has brought to a breaking point the post-war ties fashioned under U.S. economic, dominance; . The post-war. capitalist political structure of poli- tical and military alliance's under U.S.- control are be- coming skeletons of past relationships: This is reflected in the grab bag diplomacy of the Nixon .Administra- tion. The traditional post-war allies of -U.S. imperial- ism are often left "holding the bag.",? ? . ? With this new 'stage in the general crisis of 'world capitalism has come a new shift in, the balance of world forces. It is more than an .ordinary shift. It is ? a new qualitative shift of great historic significance. What is the basic cause for this shift .on the world scene? Ile processes leading to this shift have been pres- ent fpr a long time. The contradictions were .born with the post-war setup. Tile prime source for capital that has sustained the reconstruction of post-war world. capitalism has been the accumulated loot, the riches of U.S. monopoly. capitalism. This ha S lie.en the re- servoir that has been the source of what stability -there has been in the capitalist world. The U.S. has been the main sour& for the working capital for most of. the capitalist countries. It has also been the instru- ment of U:S. imperialist domination. U.S. 'domination of world capitalism gave rise to a 49,rettwDp8die1eettRi0041300400M-6, voy.2tiln).0 STATINTL ! STATINTL s ARMED FOROTS JOURNAL Approved For Release 2001/03/04DECIA:43DP80-01601R r: - r- r- iS r. ? ? Better Deal for Service Spooks? WHITE HOUSE SOURCES tell The JOURNAL that the intelligence rear- ganjzation announced last month by the President means a better deaf, not less authority?as the country's press has been reporting?for members of the defense intelligence community. * Among the specifics cited: ? . .0 More "supetgrades" (GS-16' to GS-18 civilian billets) for Defense Intel- ligence Agency: O Assignment of top-caliber military personnel to DIA (v,,hich in past years has had trouble getting the most quali- fied inilitary personnel assigned to it and proper fecognition for their work in intelligence fields); O Better promotion opportunities for intelligence zmialysts (who in the past have seldom been able to advance to top 'management levels without first break- ing out into adniinistrative posts that make little use of their analytical capa- bilities). This last point stems from a major White House concern with the nation's intelligence product: "95% of the em- phasis has been on collection, only 5% on analysis and production," as one White House staffer describes it. Yet good analysfs,.he points out, have faced major hurdles in getting recognition and advancement. Moreover, they have been "overwhelmed" by the amount of raw data collected by their counterparts in the more glamorous, more powerful, and better rewarded collection fields. The supergrade problem, has been of special concern td the White House. A high Administration official, who asked .not to be named, told The JOURNAL that the "White House [has] pledged to get Civil Service Commission approval" for a GS-18 billet which had been urgently requested by DIA Director LGen Donald V. Bennett. Bennett, he said, first requested the billet more than a year ago. Even though DIA has not - Our.Outgunt.ied Spies A QUICK JOURNAL SURVEY of government-wide supergrade authorizations shows clearly that the Service side of the intelligence community, and DIA in particular, has been "low man on the supergrade totem pole" and makes clear why the White }louse intelligence reorganization is aimed, in part at least, at giving Service "spooks" better recognition and more attractive career opportunities. Here are typical (in some cases, ludicrous) comparisons that can be drawn from Part 11 of the Appendix to the Fiscal Year 1972 Budget of the United States, a 1,112-page tome which gives, by federal agency, a detailed schedule of all permanent Civil Service positions: O DIA has 3,088 Civil Service employees, but only 15 supergrades?roughly one for every 200 spooks. O DoD's Office of Civil Defense has 721 Civil Service personnel, bat 27 supergrades? one for every 27 employees, a ratio eight-to-one better than DIA's. O The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, with only 776 civil servants, ? has 36 supergrades'?one out of every 22, nine times better than DIA. The Peace Cops also outguns DIA nine to one, with 52 Foreign Service billets in the GS-16 to GS-18 salary brackets for only 1,188 permanent federal positions. O The National Security Council staff has a 23-to-one advantage, 73 staffers and nine supergrade (or higher) billets. Even NSC's one to-n;ne supergrade-to-staff ratio, however, pales by comparison with the President's Office of Science and Technology, which has 23 superposts but only 60 people! Here's how the supergrade-to-people bean count for key federal agencies compares with DIA's (where authorized, executive level 1 through V posts are included in supergrade count): Defense Intelligence Agency 1-206 Office, Secretary of Defense 1- 95 Library of Congress 1- 51 Office of Management & Budget 1- 78 .' Office of Economic Opportunity 1- 54 General Accounting Office 1- 68 Smithsok' p roved For Release.2001403104:- CIA-RDF ;Is Civil Service ommission -113 Federal Maritime Commission 1- 14 had any authorization fo a 8, it took almost 10 months for the paper needed to justify the single high-level slot to filter through lower echelon administrative channels in the Pentagon before they could be forwarded, with a ".?stfong endorsement" from Deputy De- fense Secretary David Packard, to the Civil Service Commission. Ironicatly, just one . day after The JOURNAL was told of the White House's determination to help get the billet approved, it was learned that the Civil Service Commission had neverthe- less denied the request. Instead, it of- fered DIA a choice of having an addi- tional GS-17 slot or of having a Public, Law 313 post (which would require that DIA first recruit an indjvidUal highly qualified enough to justify the appoint- ment). DIA's supergrade structure, neverthe- less, is going to improve dramatically. For at least three years, the agency has been authorized only 15 supergracies, but will get 24 more under a plan just endorsed by Dr. Albert C. Hall, DoD's new Assistant Secretary for Intelligence. The posts are known to be endorsed strongly by both Defense Secretary Mel- vin Laird and Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, and apparently enjoy strong backing from the White House. as well. ?? By going from 15 to a total of_39 supergrade billets, DIA will be able not only to recruit higher caliber civilian personnel .but to promote more or its own qualified analysts into these covet- ed, higher paying posts. Pres.Misses the Point Press reports on the intelligence reor- ganization convey. a much different pie': ture than the above highlights and White: House sources, suggest. In a 22 Novem- ber feature, U.S. News & World Report .noted in a lead paragraph'. that "The ' Pentagon appears to be a loser in the. latest reshuffle." Deputy Defense Secre- tary David Packard is probably the man most responsible for such interpreta- tions. In a 4 November meeting with Pentagon reporters, just one day before N/ the White House announced that CIA Director Richard Helms was being given new, community-wiele responsibilities with authority over all intelligence bud- gets, Packard said: "There have been people thinking if we just had someone over in the White House to ride herd on this overall intelligence that things would be improved. I don't really sup- port that view. ... I think if anything we peed a little less coordination from that point than more ...." The White House's determination to make the-defense intelligence field more goiltcyo fnedittreiriffiva as civil- ian)* personnerparalThir reps taken ear- lier this year by LGen John Norton, Commanding General of the Army's ?? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R0 DAYTON, OHIO JOURNAL HERALD) DEC Tap - 111,867 STATI NTL le:lance Priormes . .Congress must monitor C/A operations President Nixon's irritation at the qual- ity of information coming to him from the nation's fragmented intelligence appara- tus is understandable. However, his ef forts to streamline operations, while wel- come, are not without hazard to the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches of the federal " government. The President has given to Richard Helms, director of the Cen12414.elligence 'Agency, coordinating responsioillIT and strilid budgeting authority over the diverse intelligence community. Coordination and economy both seem desirable. The various intelligence agencies employ about 200,000 -persons and spend about $6 billion an- nually. ? To the extent that the President has i made the intelligence operation more effe- ? cient and responsive?as indeed it should be ? he has increased the security of the ? United States. But he will also have further eroded Congress' role in formulat- ing national policy if the legislative branch of government does not balance executive access to unlimited intelligence data with more intensive congressional scrutiny of and control over the nature and scope of intelligence activities. special congressional watchdog corn-. mittee is supposed to review CIA ()Ora-. tions and funding. Unfortunately, it '6el- dom meets except to confer congressional blessings on CIA affairs, This congres- sional abdication of its. responsibility for exercising a positive role in the formation of national policy reduces it to a rubber stamp for an omniscient executive. This has virtually been the case in foreign affairs since the National Security Act of 1947 unified the services and created the National Security Council and the CIA. . An efficient intelligence operation is vital to the interests of the American 'people. ,But the operation does not always serve the interests of the people when it strays into political and military activities such as the formation of coups d'etat,' direction of clandestine wars and the practice of political assassination. President Nixon's changes appear to offer increased efficiency, and in Helms the President seems to have a supervisor who is _pre-eminently concerned with gath- ering and evaluating intelligence data. But only a vigilant and responsible Congress can serve to restrain the executive branch of government from abusing the vast power and influence available to it through these necessarily covert. intelli-, gence J Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 FOREIGN POLICY Arti314DTANkEor Release 2001/03/041GIAADP80-01601R0 KIISSINGET{TS , policy position is preferred by his State Department; but he side-steps the NSC on occasion to carry his demurrer, dissent or ? alternate position Co the President. biivatcly. Atop Washington's complex foreign affairs - --Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird is bureaucracy sits the National Security Coun, less personally involved in the NSC process, cil, a 24-year-old body given new status in having apparent indifference to wj-rat he 1969, when President Nixon moved to make ? believes is unnecessary NSC paperwork, which it a kind of command and control center for his foreign policy. The new Nixon NSC sys- tem, run from the White House by Henry A. Kissinger, has now existed for nearly three years, producing 133 numbered study memo- ' randa, reaching 127 formal decisions, and employing a permanent staff of .about 120 ? personnel (more than double the pre-Nixon figure). Though the substance of its opera- tions are necessarily secret, interviews with officials .permit tentative evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the Kissinger NSC. There is broad agreement on the follow- ? by John P. Leacacos operates within the Nsc system and also utilizes it as. a forum to establish whatever ing seven points: NSC has served President Nixon more or less as he desired, that is, in the ordered style of formal ansWers to detailed questionnaires. The volume.of this paperwork has at times been staggering, but it has sharpened - focus on the search for policy - choices. --The answers and alternatives for action. "coming up through the NSC" have produced few panaceas, but have contributed greater coherence of outlook in foreign affairs man- ? agement. 3,:sc recommendations are more pragmatic than academic, reflecting Kis- singer's view: "We don't make foreign policy by logical syllogism." insistence on the "limited" -nature of U.S. power and the need for ? greater restraint and cautious deliberation - about its exercise have been reinforced at the highest level by Nixon's habit of withdrawing :to make final decisions in solitude and of frequently deciding on no-action rather than 'accepting advice to initiate new action. ?By being close to the President and keep- ing his fingers on all aspects of the NSC process personally, Kissinger without question is the prime mover in the NSC system. The question. arises whether the NSC would func- tion as effectively without Kissinger, and whether it can bequeath a heritage of.accom- he leaves to his .deputy, David Packard. Laud's main day-to-day operational preoccu- pation is with the 'exit of U.S. forces from Vietnam. His International Security Affairs Bureau in the Pentagon performs poorly b Washington bureaucratic standards. --The influence on foreign policy of the military, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are usually represented in the NSC proc- ess, .is at the lowest point in several years. This has been attributed to the anticlimactic winding-down atmosphere of the Vietnam war, and to the fact that the Chiefs' once die- hard views and abstract argumentation on Strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union have been successfully emulsified into the Nixon-Kissinger basic principles for SALT negotiations. with Russia. Kissinger has com- mented: "In? my experience with the military, they are more likely to accept decisions they do not like than any other group." ? From time .to time, gears have clashed within the system. The State Department has complained bitterly of the "Procrustean bed" fashioned by the Kissinger staff. Meeting excessive White House deinands, bureaucrats allege, robs State and Defense of manpower hours needed for day-to-day operations. After his first year; Kissinger conceded: "Making foreign policy is easy; what is difficult is its coordination and implementation." White House NSC staffers, on the other hand, exuberant at their top-dog status, ex-.. press a degree of condescension for the work of the traditional departments. ? In 1969 Kis-. singer staffers rated State-chaired studies and recommendations only "50 to 70 percent acceptable" and based on mediocre reporting which failed to sift wheat from chaff in the political cables constantly .arriving from 117 U.S. embassies. overseas. The Kissinger staff say that they. have to hammer out the real choices on the hard- issues, since a cynical and sometimes bOred bureaucracy offers up too plishment to be absorbed by the permanent anx !"straw )tions." State's' planners, for :machinery ofilt,PWAYea. For Release 20 4_ nuira-LY, TRPRceATO 044R944,30040000 1-6 ?Secretary of State William P. Rogers f).11 STATI NTL FOREIGN POLICY STATINTL viinter Approved For Release 20.01/03/04 : CIA7RDP80-01601 . The Nixon MC (2) cracy to implement such a strategy once set. Kissinger found a kindred spirit in a CAN ONE MAN DO? DO? President whose campaign had denounced the by I. M. Destle) t he clandestine journey of Henry Kissinger to Peking was a tactical coup such as no other high American foreign 'policy-maker . has achieved for many years. It also offered a dramatic illustration of the Nixon-Kissinger style. The circle of men in on its preparation was very restricted. And it involved one of - those large issues of strategic choice which both the President and his Assistant for National Security Affairs consider to be suitable outlets for their talents. ? Together with other summer 1971 develop- ments--a Berlin agreement, -apparent progress in the SALT talks?the new China policy has ?brought enhanced prestige to the Nixon Administration and its foreign policy-making institutions. Even Dean Acheson, in one of his. last writings, was moved to temper his ,disappioval of the White House staff role in ? foreign affairs.l Yet despite frequent disms- sion of Kissinger as an individual, seldom do outside analysts take a serious look at the strengths and limitations, of the Nixon foreign policy-making system More generally. - It has given us an unusually. effective Presidential Assistant. But is it enough for a President - seeking to control the foreign affairs bureau- cracy to have as his predominant instrument one talented White House adviser supported by a'50-man professional staff? The Shape of the System When Kissinger came to Washington he told a number of people of his determination to concentrate on matters of general strategy ? and leave "operations" to the departments Some ds missed this as the typical disclaimer of a new White House staff man. Yet much it Kissinger's writings suggests that his inten- tion to devote himself to broad "policy" was real. He had repeatedly criticized our govern- ment's tendency to treat problems as "isolated - cases," and "to identify foreign policy with . the solution of immediate issues" rather than developing an interconnected strategy for coping with the world over a period of years.' And his emphasis was primarily on problems of decision-making. He defined the problem basically in terms ? of how to get the government .to setyreolvieiit . is V eTal ce 2004/02404 CIA4RDRION, Kennedy-Johnson de-emphasis on formai national security Planning in favor of "catch- talkfests." And the system he 4:itit together for Nixon is designed above all to facilitate and illuminate major Presidential foreign policy choices. Well over 100 "NSSM'S" (National Security Study Memoranda) have ? been issued by the White House to the various foreign affairs government agencies, calling for analysis of major issues and devcl-. opment of realistic alternative policy "op- tions" on them. These studies are cleared through a network of general interdepart- mental committees responsible. to Kissinger, and the most important issues they raise are argued out before the President in the Na- tional Security council. Nixon then makes a decision from among the options, usually "aft'er further private deliberation."' ? No one. pretends that matters end there, that implementation of the decision follows automatically. The Nixon system provides for coordination of actual agency operations in several ways--in the work of Kissinger's 23-man "Operation Staff"; in crisis coordina- tion by the Kissinger-chaired Washington Special Actions Group (wsAo); in the Secre- tary of State's, formal role of overseeing "the execution of_ foreign policy"; and in the operational Coordination work.of the inter- departmental Under Secretaries Committee headed by his deputy; Still, the system as dc- signed and described clearly treats the carry- ing out of Presidential aims as a secOndary problem. Wherea.s Kennedy, in McGeorge Bundy's oft-quoted words, "deliberately rubbed out the distinction between planning and operation,?" Nixon has sought to restore it. Rejecting the Kennedy-Johnson assump- tion that the problem of Presidential control over foreign policy is mainly one of interven- ing in operational issues to. bring clay-today bureaucratic actions intb line with Presidential wishes, Nixon has emphasized the priority of: "policy" over 'operations." As he expressed it in his first general foreign policy message to Congress: "In central areas of policy, we have arranged our procedure of policy-making so as to address the broader questions of long:- term objectives first; w.e define our. purposes,' and then address the sPecific operational issues."' The Nixon system is well-designed for forc- ing consideration of such "broader cities- priorities and sgy, an ia cen ow to STATI NTL ? (116(KR001300400001-6 recognize the difficulty of getting the bureau- partially emulates, the National Security STATI NTL LIBERTY MT-ER Approved For Release 2001/0344?. t1ARDP80-01601R ? EDITORIALS There is only one answer to this. It Its to organize a political counter,force, THE SUBVERSIVE C.F.R. land we don't mean the Republican or When President Nixon appointed ,Democratic party. Both of these are part. Henry Kissinger as his assistant for na7 of the problem and any politician who ;tional sccurity'affairs we pointed out that ,calls himself either is in some degree con- :he was hardly qualified for his job be- :trolled. If he's honest, he will admit it. ? cause he was a security risk himself. And -. .we proved it. LIBERTY LOBBY Many people thought that we were is the answer?a political force which is crazy, or "extremists," to say such nasty completely independent of all pressure things about a man appointed to such groups and 'parties. a high position by an allegedly "conserva- And when we say LIBERTY LOBBY, tive" Republican. , -we don't mean an imitation, such as - HENRY KISSINGER "Common Cause" or some other phoney organization which has been set up by is the architect of President Nixon's pro- the CFR to lead you down. the road a Red China policy, which has already little further. The CFR-Zionist cabal is caused our roost massive foreign policy expert at setting up this sort of thing to defeat since the recognition of the confuse its opposition. . ? U.S.S.R. by Roosevelt. He was hand- ) picked for his job by the subversive There is plenty of evidence that i'Council on Foreign Relations.. Nixon's fiasco in the UN and forced The CFR . is a private organization busing of kids to integrated schools are ." Which controls our foreign policy. It. is waking up the voters as nothing else ever itself run for the benefit of the multi- has. Public apathy is giving way to alarm. billionaire internationalists who profit The people are looking up from their ? from our continuing sellout to conr- boob tubes and wondering what is going minim. They picked Kissinger for ? , on. Let's tell them?and let's tell them Nixon and had Nixon put him in control Of our foreign policy because they wanted that there is 'only ? one way to fight d- i fectively?LIBERTY LOBBY,. to be certain that "American" policy con- ? tinues td be made for their benefit, rather than the benefit of America. . - Kissinger has been So successful in do- ing a job for his bosses in the CFR that ;on-Nov. 6 Nixon signed an order putting 'him . in charge of all intelligence opera- tions?the FBI, CIA, Mi'litary Intelli- !gence, Departments of Treasury, Defense, and State, and Atomic Energy intelli- gence. Now, through Kissinner's National Security Council, the CI-Td can plug in ? to medtings of patriots who may be plan- ning to overthrow at the polls the inter- nationalist regime in Washington. Soon, it will be a "crime" to read an editorial like this unless the people wake up. But THE PEOPLE ARE CATCHING ON to the fact that ihe government is in the hands of ruthless pressure group bosses who wish to run our country for their exclusive benefit. They want to steal all your wealth "legally," through confisca- tory taxes (the super-rich very seldom pa'y any taxes at all), inflation and in tercst on their Federal Reserve Notes, which they force us to use as "money." A poll. reports that in 1964, 62% of the people believed that the government was run for the benefit of all.. After John- son and Nixon that figure is now down to 37%. fool)f \tiAifits#00 ParellWie 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80--01601R001300400001-6 Release 2001'63901V:1 STATIN.TL te never came to terms with the new age it was not because he failed to understand its. seriousness but because he 'dis- dained it." ? . . IT!-1 THESE WORDS, A HARVARD : thesis-writer named Henry Kissinger introduced Clemens Metternich, Austria's greatest foreign minister and a man whose .diplomatic life he has sought 'to relive. As Richard Nixon's most influential advisor. on - foreign policy, Kissinger has embodied the role of the 10th century balance-of-power diplomat. He is cunning, elusive, ? and all-powerful in the sprawling sector of government which seeks to advise the President on national security "matters. As Nixon's personal emissary to foreign dignitaries, to academia, and?as "a high White House official",----to the press, he is vague and unpredictable?yet he is the single authoritative carrier of national policy, besides the President himself. Like the Austrian minister who became his greatest polit- ?? ical herd,. Kissinger has used his position in government as a protective cloak to conceal his larger _ambitions .and pur- poses.. Far from being the detached, objective arbiter of presidential decision-making, he has become a _crucial molder and supporter of Nixon's foreign policy. Instead of merely holding the bureaucracy at comfortable arm's length, he has entangled it in a web of useless projects and studies,. cleverly shifting an important locus of advisory power from the Cabinet departments to his own office. And as a confi- dential advisor to the President, he never speaks for the record, cannot be made to testify before Congress, and is identified with presidential policy only on a semi-public . level. His activity is even less subject to domestic con- straints than that of Nixon himself. Not that any of this is very surprising, however, because s ? Kissinger has emerged from that strain Of-policy thinking which is fiercely anti-popular and anti-bureaucratic in its s origins. Like 'the ministers who ruled post-Napoleonic Eur-, ope from the conference table at Vienna?and the Eastern ,?Establishment figures who preceded him as policy-makers of a later ag,e--Kissinger believes that legislative bodies,. bureaucracies, and Jun-of-the-mill citizenries all lack the training and temperament that are needed in the diplomatic field. He is only slightly less moved by- the academics who " parade down to Washington to be with the great man and peddle their ideas. And when one sets aside popular opinion, Congress, the ? bureaucracy, and the academic community, - there remains the President alone. The inescapable conclu- sion is 'that Henry Kissinger's only meaningful constitu- ? Arc) of Henr t?.1Ss1116ut "He ,was a Rococo figure, complex, finely carved, all sur- face, like an intricately cut prism. His face was delicate but without depth, his conversation brilliant but without ulti- mate seriousness. Equally at home in the salon and in the Cabinet, he was the beau-ideal of [an] aristocracy which justified itself not by its truth but by its existence. And if ency is a constituency of one. ? At a superficial level, the comparison with Metternich breaks down. As ?opposed to a finely carved figure, Kis, singer is only of average height, slightly overweight, excessively plain, and somewhat stooped. Far from beau-ideal, he isa Jewish refugee, and he speaks with a foreign accent. Despite the image of the gay divorce', the ruminations abo'ut his social activity seem to be grounded more in jour- nalism.than in fact. ? But without being a butterfly, Kissinger is a deeper indi- vidual than the man he wrote about, and he possesses qual- ities Which have attracted him a great deal more' popuhrit -.A proved. For Release 2001/03104 : CIA- Lanclau nine" ouslc.s 1161.1.1 ?fikobti sseuld seem to P89. Ul U 1.11.10.d. vAialy 1,.; V Ell S 7 N prri Approved For Release 21:2)0.1i0-o3v-/046CIA-RtTP1bliti CIA f-L)c,,c.)fr:,,c; t n- rrr r;'7, n 47, A trz. '1017(1 117 p nrr, cn p.)Ll 3 V Behind the scenes President Nixon's ? - confidence in Central Intelligence By HENRY J. TAYLOR Agency Director Ric:hard M. Helms -* - has taken a new leap forwarc.I..Mr. Nixon Ports directly to Under Secretary 01 believes (correctly) that our nation's State John N. Irwin II, it is understand- intelligence setup is a sick elephant. ably jealous of its prerogatives, and .He has quietly assigned Mr; Helms traditionally it plays its findings very to correct it. close to its vest. ? A sick elephant is a formidable danger. Additional intelligence agencies?all Aricl secrecy keeps our public from growing, all sprawling, all costly? knowing even the size of this elephant, spread out into the world from the of- to say nothing of how sick it is. fice of the secreta.ryi?of defense, the Atomic Enemy Commission, National Aeronautics and Spabe Ad-ministration (NASA) and even the Department of Commerce. rz.D 'L) Incre(libly, we spend 'close to $6? ? : billion I? year for intelligence. Just the CIA ahr;:]C is larger in scone than the State Depn:Ime.nt and STY'd.s pirtre t:Ii;:,: twice as much money. In fact, there are so many additional f , hush-hush agencies that recently in Wcst [ Legennary Gen. William J. ("Wild and East Berlin alone there were at least Bill") Donovan's Office of Strategic 40 U.S: intelligence agencies Services conducted our entire World and their branches?most of them corn- War II espionage throughout four year - peting with one another. and throughout the world for -a total . . m r. Helms hirnseir dennes inteill- STATI NTL self-piotective vagueness and dangerous rivalries. He has made it clear that he wants its output brought- closer to the needs of the ? Presidents so-called 40 Committee (actually six men), which serves the National Security Council and the President himself. In amputating much of the sick ele- phant, 'Mr. Helms' directive is to cut down orrthe surprises. And the President could not have p;cked a more knowing, no-nonsense man to do it.. . of $135 million. The budget of the CIA (secret) is at least S1.5 billion a year. Next to the Pentanon with its 25 miles of corridors, the world's largest office building, the CIA's headquarters in ? suburban Langley, Va., is the largest .:building in the Washington area. The CIA has jurisdiction only abroad, .not in the United Slates. But the CIA main- tains secret oflices in most major U.S. cities, totally unknown to the About 10,000 people work at Langley and another 5,000 are scattered across the world, burrowing .cverywhere for intelligence. These include; many, many unsung heroes who secretly risk their lives for our country in the dark and unknown battles of espionage and treach- ery. could name many. And as a part of its veil of secrecy the CIA has its own clap.clestlnc, communications system viu Washington and the world, _ The Pentagon spends $3 billion a year. on intelligence, _twice as much as the CIA. Like the CIA, its Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence arms operate world:vide, of course, and?largely .unknown?they also have an immense adjunct called .the National Security Agency which rivals the _ CIA in size and cost. ? ? gence as - b!all the things which should be knownin advance of initiating a course of action." The acquisition of intelli- gence is one thing; the .interpretatiori of it is another; and the use of it is. a third. The 1947 statute creating the CIA limits it to the first two. It ?also makes the CIA directly responsible to the President. But it is simply not true that the CIA-is the over-all responsible agency, as is so widely believed. Again and again, no one and everyone is responsible. T.lee function of intelligence is to protect us from surprises. It's not working tIlf:t way. The sick elephant is threatenhig our national security by surprise, surprise, ? Alarmed President Nixon has given Mr. Helms new. and sweeping in_telli-. zence reorganization authority on an over-all basis. He has given him the first authority ever given anyone to re- view, and thus affect, all our foreign intelligenCe agencies' budgets. The Pres- ident believes Mr. HeInns, this .under- covet ? world's most experienced pro, can cut at least Si billion out -of the ? ? morass. ? ? Then there exists the? iMportant In- :elligence Section or the State Depart- The President confided that he is to- vent, woridwide its aller , tally fed up with the intelligence corn- pproVOCI-For 1e R001 CIA Diroctor Richard Holms hr acts up the 15,C00-rnan intelligenco operation- that is no h e vroanillned. TITE ECOlaralIST 20-26 Koar 1911 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R ? Spks get together There is one secret that 'the intelligence fraternity in Washington has not been - able to keep under cover : its own lines , ;of communication have become badly e, scrambled. In an attempt to get rid of the worst, discrepancies and overlaps President Nixon has announced a reorganisation of the, multiple branches of the secret service under the direction of 'Mr Richard Hehris, the present and . very -able head of the Central Intelli- jgence Agency. Mr Helms will now ? head the new United States Intelligence r 'Board and will co-ordinate the activi- 'ties and the budgets of the various nichord Helms: master-spy ,intelligence networks?the first time information, on the war .in Vietnam. that anyone has had power- to. do this. And now there is a struggle: bri ewng ? The board will be directly responsible over the extent of the reported " to ? the National 'Security Council. At build-up of missiles by the Soviet Union the same time two new panels will be set up within the NSC. One, under the direction of Mr Henry Kissinger, the chief of the council, will analyse all. the intelligence, reports. (In the rush - to collect raw facts their interpretation has Often been neglected.) The other will compare ?the strength of the Soviet forces as a Whole with those .of the United States. - . ? The tangles Within the intelligence World go back beyond- the crisis over missiles in Cuba. On numerous Occa- sions the many military spies?the three 'services have their own intelligence net- works, and then the Department of Defence has, still another?have Come . up with assessments that differ from ithose -of the civilian agencies such as \I the CIA and the intelligence division ? of the State Department. Although the CIA has a 'hawkish image in foreign . eyes, it is generally the military men who have _over-estimated the resources available to the other side, partly in an effort to boost support in Congress for their own defence budget. Further- Andre, relations have been strained recently between. the CIA, which gathers information from abroad, and .the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which manages surveillance at home.- This year the. confusion has been more noticeable. than most. The abbr- tive commando raid a year ago to free prisoners of war from the deserted camp at. Son Tay in North Vietnam caused acute embarrassment. Then the Pentagon papers revealed that there had earlier been some serious discrepan- cies .betwecn -military and civilian at a time when the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms are reaching a crucial stage. ? Congress, which has always been suspicious of the secrecy surrounding the intelligence world, has .also been prodding the President. The conserva- tives in the Senate, led, rather surpris- ingly, by Senator Ellender, Who used to be the spies' best friend, want_ to cut the,. money that goes on military intelligence ; in the Age of expensive satellite spies about $5 billion a year is spent on this out of an annual intel- ligence budget of around $6 billion. The liberals, on the other hand, claim that Congress has too little control over the intelligence networks ;. in particular they feel that the CIA has too great an influence on foreign po.licy. What, they ask, is the CIA doing in Laos' ? It will be no consolation to these critics that Mr Kissinger will now have greater authority over spying. As a presidential ? aide he is not responsible to Congress. ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 IS Approved For Release 201/(14014 _:i9ILA-RDP80.-0 A v.:AA n jd =\ Reshuffling, With More Positions Going. to Military Men, Worries Key Ltf:vrnakers --WASIIINGTON (UPI)---- Key senators are.ed n- .- cerned that CIA .Director ? Richard Helms might have been . "kicked up- stairs" in the reshuffle of : AMeric, a' s intelligence ?. community, with more in- fluence in spy activities going to military men. : Helms has assured . in- . quiring senators that he had no reason to believe he had,been shuffled aside In the nation's intelligence hierarchy. . ' But there is concern on Capitol . Hill that Helms has lost out in the shakeup of the intelligence net- work ordered by President Nixon 'last month: Sens. Stuart Syrnz.rigton i:- .(D-Mo.) and J. William Fulbright (D - Ark.) are 'concerned that the shaketip h a s increased P e nta.gon predominance . in the intelligence ? field, -and Sen. John .Stennis (D.:. ,Miss.) is conducting an in- vestigation to find out . what happened. '? What has disturbed Helms' friends in the Sen- 'ate is that the day-to-day, control of the CIA ap- parently has been relin- quished to a military man, -Lt. 'Gen. Robert E. Cush- man Jr., in order to free Helms for his new duties as overall director of the CIA and all other intel- ligence units. Cushman, a marine, is deputy director of the CIA. .- .? . :. :Also, the Joint .Chiefs of . Staff and the deputy sec- retary of defense . have been given a new voice in the intelligence command through membership on .a ? 'committee, which, under - the direction of presiden- - tial adviser Henry A. Kis- singer, will oversee .intel- ligence. Helms, in a closed-door meeting with the Senate Armed Services Commit- tee this week, said he did not think he- was being shoved out of the way. Stennis, the committee. chairman, said Helms "as- sured me that his domin- ance over it (the CIA), his effectiveness, his powers over it will not be dimin- ished one bit." , . , ? But Stennis indicated he still was ,not satisfied and we aregOing into it and. we are going toanalyze it and study it and have an investigation ? if one wants to use that word?if necessary. We do not take these things lightly. The stakes are too high." . No one in the .Senate really knows what his happened at the CIA. Not .even senafors like Stennis, w1-1.6 are let in on the na- tion's intelligence secrets, were told in advance,- nc? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R061300400001-6 NATIONAL FaiNIET,./ BULLETIN NOV. 1971 Approved For Release 2001/03/04.: CI-A-RDP80-O ? ccpri,e01 DCOligliti (-4 ? Dateline Washington o "Was Richard. Helms promoted or fired?" was the 'question roost being asked around Washington last week. The CIA Director's new . post as -coordinator of all U.S. .intelligence activities was interpreted by some observers ? as a kick upstairs and by others as a promotion of Helms to "intelligence czar." In fact, the change represents a . move to bring. U.S. intelligence activitres more directly under White House control. Helms will work under the close supervision of Henry -.. Kissinger, who is now running the newly created Na- -Vona! Security Council Intelligence Committee. Like the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy, the newIntelligence Committee is designed to eliminate pro- cedural difficulties and to consolidate information?thus avoiding interagency conflicts.. Under Kissinger, Helms will work as a high-level administrator, not so much for- mulating policy as providing information upon which po- licy will be based. Implicitly, the new post will put Helms over FBI head J. -Edgar Hoover, though relations with Hoover will continue to be handled through Hoover's titular superior Attorney General John Mitchell. Mitchell is a member of the Committee because Justice probably handles more -interagency intelligence questions- than any other department in the government, including ?De- .ferise. ? ? Besides consolidating intelligence .activities under the White House, the President also is trying to avoid the .horrendous duplication that.hes ensued from the proli- feration of intelligence operations. Some of the overlap .presumably will be trimmed away by Helms, though some observers believe this' is, for the most part, wishful think- ing on the President's part. They note that the individual service- branches, the Treasury Department, the FBI, the Bureau of NarcOtics, the CIA and even the White House police force are so jealous of their prerogatives that re- form would take major surgery?more. than either the President or Helms is willing to undertake at this time. ?WINSTON STATI NTL ;.' Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 Approved For Release 2001/03/0Ft-1NbP80-01601R0 MONROE, LA. ? NEVIS-STAR V,i3V 24 1371 -- 15,121 ". , e PA:01:1 : . The White Hope is not pleased at all with "the record posted by ?.the American intelligence commun- ity. The .displeasure doesn't appar- ently extend to the .Central Intelli- 'Once -Ageney-4CIA)--beClin-Se'w-ffsw director, Richard Helms, has been .placed in charge. of all intelligence agencieS. Further, the President added to Henry Kissinger's author- ity. by giving him the power to -evaluate intelligence reports. The public is advised of this turn of events through the efforts of a government worker who leaked a -secret "decision memorandum" to Newsweek mag,a'zine. . In. the memorandum, Nixon sin- gled out five instances in which American agents were not up to ;- snuff. ..He complained not only of faultrintelligence, but also run- away. budgets and a disparity be- , tweet' a glut of. facts and a pover- ty of analysis. . ? . -Specifically, he found five areas of defective snooping, to wit -- Failure to predict the extent of North Vietnamese resistance in the. Laotian campaign early this year. --;Misinforination leading to the , Son Tay .prisoner of war camp which turned out to be empty. : Incorrect esthnates of yipt Cong S.upplies flowing through the . Cambodian port of Sihanoukville. ? Lateness in detecting Russian :built surface to air missiles in the Mideast cease-fire zorie -- An eighth month delay in the strategic arms limitation . talks while the White House checked 111 (1.7A varying intelligence reports on how the United States could ? de- tect possible -Soviet violations of the arms control agreement. The magazine article suggested that some of the gripes might con- ceal Mistakes more properly laid' at the Administration's door. How- ever, it went on to credit Nixon with efforts to remove all possible bugs from the intelligence system as it faces what is 'likely its most !critical test of recent years: solv- ing the mystery of the apparent Soviet -missile build-up.. ? ? The Pentagon Papers showed rather conchisively that 'Ll,& mili- tary - intelligence in yietwara did not compare very well with its civilian counterpart. Time:and time -again. the CIA and the State De- partment intelligence. arm proved to be correct in their appraisals of the enemy situation and optimistic :forecasts by military agents and their superiors wrong.. There's 11.6' telling how .man' tragedies or near - tragedies could have been avoided had. those charged with. keeping 'track of the ,North Vietnamese and Vietcong had had more up-to-date.inforina- tion. My 'Lai was supposed to be a hotbed of Vietcong. It had been, of course, but when Charlie CoMpany struck, there was no resistance. The VC had fled. Within the last 24 hours, those in charge of Firebase Mary Mn where 33 GIs lost their lives in a VC sapper raid have been told they will be demoted oryeprimand- ed for a lax defense periineter arid. lack of troop preparedness. Those be punished include a. two-star general and four other high-yanking officers. American intelligence cannot, of 1 course, maintain an umblemishod 1, record. The Communist enemy, wherever he is, spends a great deal! i of time trying to outwit free world! agents.. He has notched some not :- able siiccesses. Credit President Nixon with trying to :streamline the U.S. intelligence system . so t h`a t doomsday won't arrive due to Sec- ret agents asleep at the switch?... --..._ _ 1 ..: Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 1\3 e?e qVC3 c vrtii ./,7 ) Ay roved For Reiga4e,2.0,0. 3/04-: - , \ rTh ? , ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04.: 141'4:4 _ -RD080 ? , STAT. I - 1JS & 7/ORD BP0.11\11 fikl-f0A44 PC fiCRD ny cf..r,-)i-A /7- IL ? -vA INI: fl N L . ti GE NJ C ? .5TATINTL ? An urgent need for faster and more accurate in- formation underlies latest moves by the President. Upshot: more say for civilians, less for military. Once again, the vast U. S. intelligence :establishment is being reshaped by the White House. As a result: . 0 Presidential reins on the 5-billion- .dollar-a-year "intelligence community" are to be tightened even more. Primary goal is to avoid repetition of recent dis- appointments in the quality of Ameri- can intelligence. ? 0 Fresh effort will be made to reduce costly duplication, overlapping and com- petition among the military intelligence ? agencies. The Pentagon appears to be a sj loser in the latest reshuffle. The civilian head of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, is ? ? being given broader authority over the entire U. S. intelligence network?civilian and military. . Key Man in the reorganization is 'Mr. Helms, a veteran of nearly 30 years in his field, who took over in June, 1900, the dual job of heading the CIA plus his role ? as the President's principal ad- viser on .all intelligence. Now, under a presidential order of November 5, Mr. Helms has the biggest say on how to allocate men, money and machines in the gathering of foreign in- telligence for the U. S. At the same time, the President as- signed Henry Kissinger, the top White House -adviser and Director of the Na- tional Security Council staff, new powers "which give Mr. Kissinger a larger voice in determining the direction U. S. Intel- ligence will take and in assessing the final results. 'Behind it all. According to Coyern7 ment insiders, a major reason for the President's action was growing "consum- er" dissatisfaction with the intelligence product, particularly with interpretation of the secret data collected. . ? Too often, these sources say, the Pres- ident has been inundated with informa- tion he does not need, or fails to receive in sufficient quality or quantity the data he considers vital for decisiehs. The most recent example, one White House aide disclosed, was unhappiness over the length of time it took to get reliable intelligence on current develop- ? ,rnents in Red China. The Communist - Government had been undergOing a lead- ership crisis just at the time Of delicate Washington-Peking negotiations on the ,President's forthcoming trip to the Chi- nese mainland, but weeks went by :be- fore the U. S. was able to sift through a . welter of conflicting reports. - Officials say that - another big reason behind revamping of the intelligence command was the daring?but unsuc- cessful?attempt by. the Army and Air Force on Nov. 21, 1970, to rescue U. S. prisoners of war from the North Viet- namese prison camp at Sontay, 23 miles west of Hanoi. American commandos landed at the camp by helicopter in a well-planned and executed raid. But in- telligence had lagged, and the camp was empty. The prisoners had been moved. . _ . One official in a position to know ex- plains that after the White House made the initial decision to rescue the POW's, the CIA supplied a model of the camp and details Of Sontay's daily .operations as they were known at that time. The actual rescue assignment was given., to the Army and Air Force, which had to select, train and rehearse the, Commando team. By the time the operation was launched, intelligence was out of date. According to this official: "If Helms had been responsible for the operation? as- he would be now under the reorga- .nization?he could have kept current, probably would have. learned that the prisoners were moved, and probably would have scrubbed the operation." - Government sources say .the President also was irritated by failure- of his intel- ligence agencies .to forecast accurately North Vietnamesn reaction to the South Vietnamese invasion of Southern Laos list February and March. Congress has had harsh words for the military. The House Appropriations Committee on November .11 declared that "the upward trend in total intelli- gence expenditures must be arrested" and recommended a 181-million-dollar cut in the Defense Department's military- intelligence appropriations. - The Committee took aim at duplica- tion of effort. "The same information is sought and obtained: by various means and by various organizations," it said. The President hopes to overcome these shortcomings by giving Mr. Helms what Mr. Nixon termed "an enhanced leader ship role" in planning, co-ordinating and evaluating all intelligence"operations. _ The Central Intelligence Director has had for years, on paper, the responsibil-? ity of co-ordinating military and civilian intelligence. But _this has not always worked in practice.' The reason, accord- ing, to One U.S. official: bureaucratic ri- valry among . competing intelligence agencies. Mr. Helms also becomes". chairman of a newly formed committee which will advise on formulation of a consolidated foreign-intelligence budget for the en- tire Government. This committee will decide which intelligence service has the people and assets to do a particular job efficiently and. cheaply. Reshapinv the network. The Presi- dent took these actions to strengthen the American intelligence system: * Reorganized the U. S. Intelligence Board, which sets intelligence require- ments and priorities. The Board, head- ed by Mr. Helms, includes representa- tives of the CIA, FBI, Treasury, Atomic Energy Commission and Defense and State Department intelligence agencies. O Established a National Security Council Intelligence Committee, with Mr. Kissinger as chairman. It will in- clude, besides Mr. Helms, the Attorney General, the Chairman of the Joint ? Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 rsonfi nu ad READING, PA. NO /18,419 - 85,704 ? 0.1 i1ov01/For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 . _ 14]aker:.1'7ii.ilitary- Affairs 0 uviTni -U/LI 70 77Y2 er7fri)7i7oco v.,/ STATI NTL 77 7 o. 77-D 0 ft.? . _..? _ /773) / 17 013 ???? f-rb ? , ?? ''.77)7/ Li.)1/ /7 1.1j ill Ty7)-- %r- ../ Ve,Z,C, ,Y C./ 0 o ]f GEN. IRA C. EAKER, USAF (Het.) inant in the intelligence community'. are Richard Helms and Henry Kissinger: The former wears three hats in the new setup and the latter two hats plus the all- important responsibility of personally determining what the President secs. No defense leader, civilian or military, active or retired, so far as I lpicnv, ques- tions the ability or loyalty of either Helms or Kissinger, but soand organization should not be based on persgnalities since they are always transient and sometimes fallible. Strangely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who by law are designated. as the. nrincipal military advisers to the President, are ohm- including a director of n n- .A release from the White House Nov. 5 announced a drastic reorganization- of ,the whole U.S. intelligence community. . The reasons given for the big shake-up , were ."to improve the efficiency and effective- ness of the U.S. foreign intelligence c o in m u - nity." Ii e reorganization provides four new boards or Committees central intelligence. The Mated, for all practical purposes, from Cent r al Intelligence /intelligence evaluation. ? ? Agehey?ndirector, Rink./ The whole purpose of foreign in- Gcn. Eckel ard Helms, takes on this' telligence is -to observe adequately and job in addition to his assess -accurately the military strength of duties as CIA director. other nations and thus evaluate the hazards - There is a National Security Council ?intelligehbe committee with henry Kis- singer, the President's principal national . ? ? . security adviser, as chairman. There is a net assessment group within the. National :Security Council (Kissinger shop) and an intelligence resources advisory board which 'Mins also heads. ? The U.S: intelligence board is "re- constituted," according to the White House release, and Helms' deputy at CIA is chairman. ? n . It is generally believed that the White .House was unhappy with the sometimes -:conflicting estimates of enemy Military strength supplied by the U.S. intelligence ? community. There were also charges that :the military deliberately overestimated enemy strength to get increased defense 'appropriations, and that intelligence was costing too much, about $5 to $6 billion an- nually. The intelligence apparatus needed :therefore to be streamlined, reduced in size and cost and military influence curtailed, . according to this view. ? : There is no doubt but that the reorganization does greatly reduce military influence in the intelligence apparatus. .Of' the 20-odd members of the four new layers, boards or committees at the highest levels to our own security. The U.S.' Defense Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the intelligence a.gerneles of the armed services are best qualified by education and experience for sound advice in these areas. , The -intelligence apbratus has not been streamlined and reduced in size and cost. Instead, all the. new layers., boards and. committees now will have to be manned. A minimum ,of 500 top-level intelligence peo- ple eventually will be forind in or serving these new echelons, considerably increasing the overall cost of intelligence. These ,new agencies. .if used. also will create delays and make intelligence less, responsive to the decision makers. Rather than streamlining the ap-- paratus,' the new organization. further frag- ments the intelligence community by add- ing the four additional advisory or ad- ministrative echelorls., The new system also increases the possibility that intelligence estimates and foreign "assessments can be doctored to support decisions prOilously made rather than the other way around. It would be safer and sounder for presidents to get, as they did in earlier times, the daily intelligence summaries from the ? defense department, the. state department and the CIA uncensored by any intermediary. The President's principal national security adviser might well digest these estimates and assessments but he never should delay their presentation Oiler their ine'aninq. ? ' on the .tete pprOVddlebr?116ige 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 are military me . 'The two men who now are clearly dam- n_ 1-b????,' ALBANY, GA. likit3Apijrpoved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 E ? 30,407 9 ? 31,092 NOV 2 0 1971 Reorganizing U.S. President Nixon has reorganized the Federal Government's intelligence operations which, in essence, gives Cier,frpl?Intel,li5enee,,,.,P.T.n,e7,? Director Richard Helms a broader mandate to coordinate all of the various activities in this field. In the meantime Mr. Nixon also created a National Security Council Intelligence Committee to be chaired by his national security af- fairs adviser, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger. These steps have drawn immediate objections from Senators J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and Stuart Sy- mington on the grounds that Congress was not consulted in advance about them, and that what Mr. Nixon evi- dently is trying to accomplish is a removal of Congressional overseeing of any intellligence activities by vest- ing the area almost wholly with. Executive immunity. But the fact of the matter is that the President has dealt solely with the Executive Branch in taking this action, as he is unques- tionably authorized to do. What irks the Senators is that they cannot, un- der the new setup, bring Doctor Kissinger before their committee to be interrogated in this area of Gov- ernment. What may have prompted Mr. Nix- on's action was recent history. That details how President Kennedy got \ some bad intelligence from the mili- tary on the gay of Pigs, and Lyndon Johnson some even worse intelligence from his White House people and some of the military on Vietnam. The story is that the. CIA was not responsible for these -bum steers. Consequently, President -Nixon now wants the bulk of his intelligence to come through the hands of a polished professional, CIA Director Helms ? Intelligence a trusted adviser, Doctor Kissinger. Certainly that is his privilege, how- ever the Senators may fret. As Director Helms told the ,edi- tors: "We (the (IA) not only have no stake in policy debate, but we can not and must not take .sides. The role of intelligence in policy formu- lation is limited to providing facts ? the agreed facts ? and the whole known range of facts ? relevant to the problem under consideration. Our iole extends to the estimative func- tion ? the projection of likely de- velopments from the facts ? but not to advocacy, or recommendations for one course of action or another. "As the President's principal in- telligence officer, I am an adviser to the National Security Council, not a member, and when there is debate over alternative policy options, I do not and must not line up, with either side. "If I should take sides and recom- mend one solution, the other side. is going to suspect ? it not believe ? that the intelligence presentation has been stacked to support my position, and the credibility of the CIA goes out the window." To the journalistic profession, whose watchword is objectivity, which equates with a presentation of bal- anced facts as free from personal emo- tionalism, bias or bent as it is human- ly possible to record ,.flies:ez:n_rri, of Richard Helms are heartenin if. is in a strong sense, one of us. In- deed, as he himself put it, "objectiv- ity puts me on familiar ground as an old wire service hand, but it is even more important to an intelligence or- ganization serving the policymaker." It is reassuring to realize that a man of this singular dedication and rational approach has been empow- 20170SlaM-6 preacentec appearance beiore the the nation's foremost intethgence oi- American Society of Newspaper Edi- ficer. Ile has our best wishes in an THE 11E1 REPT.IBLIC 20 NOV. 1911 STATINT . ...?.., Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :. CIA-RDP80-01601 py V e-:(503 sued, this eoncept obviously will change the mission b 1_,?-py and emphasis of the various intelligence agencies: . - ? Some will wax, other wane. But they'll_ still compete. ' As recently as .April 14 Richard Helms, director of Rep: Nedzi, head .of the subcommittee on intelligence ,../ the. Central Intellionce .Agency, assured the world ' that "the quality of. foreign . intelligence available to oversight for the House Armed Services Committee, n ' the United. States Government in 1971 is better than it has been lookig up and down the well-shaded streets ' has ever been before." That's all right, the adminis- of the Intelligence Community. and finds that, "There (ration has now said., but it costs too much and the is indeed real competition among the various agencies." ' He is not certain Helms' budget authority will do any- u1overlapping and competition arriong agencies is waste- f thing more than. feed interagency suspicions. There and inefficient.. The revelations. of former CIA /official Victor Marchetti (at one time an aide to the will be the argument that intelligence requires coma partmentalization at the cost of efficiency, that budget deputy director of CIA) that the combined intelligence budget is $6 billion puts it a billion or so higher control will mean a monolithic intelligence voice in- 'than previous . . estimates. Over 200,000 employees are 'stead of healthy if, costly rivalry. Nedzi is concerned . involved. Hence the President's new reorganization but philosophical, gearing up for his duties by going 'order. Mr. Helms is to have "enhanced leadership" to back to the basics .set forth in Compton McKenzie's 'bring all the fiefdoms under control. spoof on British intelligence, 'Water on the Brain. . - . The White House announcement produced wo In that classic the fictitious Sir William Westmacott, t head of the Security of the.Realm, is addressing a neW telligence budget and (b) a new evaluation group, principal reorganizational ools: (a) a new joint in- recruit. "After all, the whole point of the secret serv- f , which theoretically will affect the missions in D ice is that it should be secret."efense; ? State, the" National Security 'Agency, and the CIA, 1 to narne the mOst prominent. All intelligence agencies will. submit their budgets to Helms. instead of to the . ?'Bureau of the Budget, and he is to sort out the wheat ? from the chaff. This. is .not really a new grant of authority. The National Security Act or 1947 gave two jobs to the CIA director ? command, of the agency'. itself, and coordinating responsibility as director of central Intelligence, chairing the United States In- ) . .telligence Board. He also sits on the National Security Council. The idea of central supervision, has. been there from-the start. But the idea has foundered on the realities, of power; that is to say, the Pentagon. That outfit is run by the Secretary of a department,. -while the CIA director is still just the head of .an 'STATINTL agency. For large overseas operations, as in Vietnam and Laos, CIA is completely belicilclen to the Pentagon. . ' Bureaucratically, Helms is also in an Unfavorable position, although this .may not have been the Presi- dent's intention. Helms will make his combined budget recommendations not directly to the National Security . Council, but to a new National Security Intelligence Conimittee, headed by Henry Kfssinger. The -reorgani- zation scheme struck Senators Symington, and Ful- . i bright as. an. attempt to wrest from Congress its over- sight responsibilities in intelligence matters.. Kissinger is . inaccssible in the White House, protected from congressional questioning by executive privilege. , Kissinger gains more Power through the other presi- dential innovation, the Net Assessment Group headed by 'Anthony Marshall in .Kissinger's office. This -' gronp's. task is to define the situatiou . for the United States vis-?is the great powers,, or any other Proba lem it? wants to designate as a crisis. Vigorously pUr- Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 BALTIMOI E1S AIERICAIT STATINTL 1 7 NOV 1971 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R -.17MPYITY J. '111111.YL:9 Utile 1E1100t-)nli, flo it - it ? ? ." ? ?? ? . ?.. ?Behind the scenes President Nixon's confidence In Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard ? M. Helms has ,taken a new leap forward. Mr. Nix- On believes (correctly) that our nation's in- telligence setup is a sick elephant. He has quietly - assigned Mr. Helms to correct it: ..? . . A sick ,clephnat is a formidable danger. And secrecy keeps our public from knowing even the size of this elephant, to say nothing of how sick itis. . Inceedibly, we spend close to $6 billion a year. for intelligence. Just the CIA alone is larger in scope than the State Department and spends more than twice as much money. Legendary Gen. William J. ("Wild. Bill") Donovan's Office of Strategic Fprvices conducted our entire World War H espionage throughout four years anil throughout the world for a total $135 million. The budget of the CIA (secret) is at least $1.5 billion ? . NEXT TO THE PENTAGON with its 25 miles of corridors, the world's largest office building, ? the CIA's headquarters in suburban Langley, Va., ' is the largest building in the Washington area. The CIA has jurisdiction only abroad, not in the United States. l3ut the CIA maintains secret offices in / most major U.S. cities, totally unknown to the public.. - - . . . . . . . . .. , ? . . About 10,000 people ?work at Langley and another 5,000 are scattered across the world, bur- rowing everywhere for intelligence. These include many, many unsung heroes who secretly risk their lives for our country in the dark and unknown battles of espionage and treachery. I could name many. And as a part of its veil of secrecy the CIA has its .own clandestine communications system with Washington and the world. - ? - - The Pentagon spends $3 billion a year on in- telligence, twice as much as the CIA. Like the CIA, its Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence arms operate worldwide, of COUrS,2, and -- largely unknown ? they also have an immense adjunct called the National Security Agency which . rivals the. CIA in size. and cost. . . ,. . ' Then there .exists the Important Intelligence - Section of the State Department, likewise world- wide. Its chief reports directly to Under Secretary ? ? ?; ? ? . ? ". ? of State John N. Irwin 2nd; it is unclerstandabl very close to its vest. --STATINTL ? - - ADDITIONAL. intelligence agencies al growing, all sprawling, all costly spread out Id to the world from the Office Of the Secretary o Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, Nationa Aeronautics & Space .Adminis tratien (NAM) , an. even the Department of Commerce. In fact, there are so many additional hush-husl agencies that recently in West and East Bulb alone there 'were at least 40 known U.S. in telligence. agencies and their branches ? most o them" competing with one another. - Mr. Helms himself defines intelligence as "al the things which should be known in advance o initiating a course of action." The acquisition o intelligence is one thing; the interpretation of it i another; and the use of it is a third. The 191 statute creating the CIA limits it to the first two. I also makes the CIA directly responsible to th President. But it is simply not true that the Cf is the over-all responsible agency, as is so widel . believed. ? Again and again, no one and everyone responsible, ' ?' ? ? . . THE FUNCTION of intelligence is to protect us from surprises. It's not working that way. The sick elephant is threatening our national security by' surprise, surprise, surprise. Alarmed President Nixon has given Mr. Helms new and sweeping intelligence reorganization authority on an oyer?all'basis. He has given him the first authority ever given anyone to rewl. and thus effect, all our foreign intelligence. agencies' budgets. The President believes Mr. Helms, this undercover world's most experienced pro, can cut at least $1. billion out of the morass. The President confided that he is totally fed uP': With the intelligence community's duplications; contradictions, self-protective vagueness and dangerous rivalries. He has made it clear that he - -wants its output breu?glit closer to the needs of the.. President's so-called 40 Committee (actually six Men), which serves the National Security Council. and the President himself. . ? In amputating much of the sick elephant, Mr; Helms' directive is to cut down on the surprises. And the President could not have picked a more knowing, no-nonsense man to do it.. ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 Approved For Release 200114?/NY: i9a-RDP80-01601 YRESSU RE-COOKER ATMOSPHERE ' Erg Se'y ? - old ri S "11 kids L L 1,cf-JJ0.17i!.e../ \llssrii-vp.fileP . . . BY ANN BLACKMAN - : Alsociale3 Press Writer - . - First Interviews ? ;WASHINGTON?Status ? - For most of those inter- on Henry A. Kissinger's viewed, the sessions were staff isn't, winging:. out to.. the first time they had au- an Clemente on a thilita-.. thority to talk to a repor- . . -ry jet, or top-secret- securi- ter since joining the Na- ty clearance, or even ac- tional Security Council , cess to the White House staff. All were instructed ? tennis court.? ? . , by Kissinger's d e p u t y, - ' - ? ' Brig. Gen. Alexander M. Status for the 48 mem- Hai,* to keep the conver- hers of the National Secur- ''' sations "non-substantive,"- ity Council staff is access?mesninz policy and na- to .Kissinger. ? "The only 1 ti-o'i, a- I security matters thing that counts around were not to be discussed. here is your slot with Hen- "iey weren't. Nor were ry," said one of them. . the staff members free , . Interviews ? with 18 Se- NVith. anecdotes about the . :.curity Council aides offer boss, mindful perhaps of ; a glimpSe into the pres- the time Kissinger roper- ; sure - cooker atmosphere tally opened a staff meet- that surrounds those ing by asking, "And who closest to Kissinger, who. here is repreenting the _,...? heads the council as Pres- New York Times?" ( ident Nixon's special assis- Under the ground rules, \-..? taut for national security as laid down byHaig, the . , affairs. .. . . . conversation t e n d e d to Personal Abilitiescenter on the demands ..- "Youdo things for lien-- Kissinger makeson his IT you didn't think ' staff, and the, satisfaction -- - ; you , Were . capable .of," said. ..the staff gets. from work- Winston Lord, 34, of New. ing_. fo2.' him. . ... .... ? . York City. "He may know motivation comes :better than the persons - from working at the cm- ' themselves what they're' 'Lel' of foreign policy," said . . ., Lord, who came to the Na- capable of.". ? ? ? . ? . In oeaanizina- his staff,' Coital Security Council af- - -o e. ter service in both the De-. ' Kissinger dipped into the' fenso and State depart- - .federal bureaucracy, re- cruiting members .f r o m . ' ments? i ,partments and the Central special diploinatic m i s- As a troubleshooter for . :the State and Defense de- !Intelligence Agency. But siOns, with emphasis on he .also went outside the the Far East, Lord sees . government and hired a the boss more than. most. half dozen bright young - He was one of two staffers people, some of them un- der 30 and some of them to accompany Kissinger Democrats, to go t t h e. on the first i 'mission. to ? benefit, of their expertise C o m in u n I s t China. .1'1 in the specific areas. . think of Henry as a .Vince Among them are - 26- . Lombardi in the ? pursuitof year-old Mary Brownell of eXcellence," Lord.Said. : STATI NTL Sachs, a Berkeley grad- staffers have to be -objec- uate with master's degrees tive transmitters of any in economics and urban position on any issu e.' regional planning .f r o an They sit at the apex of p01- the University.of Pennsy-1- icy machinery in the vania, is responsible for government. The only analyzing military a n d problems, they deal with economic assistance . pro- are the mast complex. The grams. He j?o ined the . easier ones are solved council staff from the Of- down along the line." . .. flee of Management and A senior staff member the Budget. Like most of his col- explained th e council's function this way: leagues, Sachs works in? . the Exe t iv e Office "The objective is not to reach a consensus for its Building next to the own sake or to develop a White House. With few.ex- course of action in which' ceptions, the- council of- the President has only to, fices are small, utilitarian choose, yes or no, approve or disapprove; but rather and:furnished in. "early . ? . . . it is to give him a clear de- bureaucrat" . p s tion of the options he : :broWn sofas, ? 'cheap lin- really has so he c a n ? ?presisiOnist prints and thin choose, knowing what the costs and consequences of rugs the color' of cement . But if the . staffers' be'." of these options will fides are not impressive, ue. , Latin Affairs." their- responsibilities are. -One of their duties is to Several younger aides write what they tall "talk- came to the council staff Straight from academia, lug points" . for presiden- with advanced ? degrees tial neWs c ferenc S, questions they think re- and 'prestigious f e 11 o w- porters will ask, aild pre- ships fattening their re- pare the answers. .sumes.4 "It's great to watch one -The youngest, MiS 'Brownell, is a University ? of these things and hear your question me up," of North Carolina graduate co one staff or ',you with a master's degree in know exactly what the Latin: - American studies . President is going to say from the University of Texas.- She joined _Kissin- swer yourself. And. the ibecause you wrote the an- gees team two years ago, - m- arid her work is primarily ? pressive thing is that he expands on your answer connected with tin with his own ideas and in- American affairs. ? sights:" -Her counterpart in the Also, the staff is expect- Mideastern - affairs section is Miss Neaher, .a Smith ed consult with .various government departments College' graduate who has b drawing studied 'Arablc. and taught efore up memos Asheville, N.C., whose spe- ? ? ? Dennis H. Sachs, 28, of, ? ? ? - - reports, recommendat-ions school in Kuwait.. She was ? cialty is Latin America; Portland, Ore., 'a greedand options. These go to. recruited two years ago ? 28-year- old Rosemary with Lord that the. job sa-: Neaher of Garden City? tisfaction stems from be- N.Y., ? an expert on the ing at the center of power. Middle East, and 28-year- "There's a psychic income old Robert D. Hormats of Of being associated at- this Baltimore, an. economic high level with decision _ _a_aencm _ ro epar .adviser. Appro.ved Forrae leased 20 01 /63/04's' eigellipcmc4g94011Agunii-6 the President who can from the Middle East In- then make a decision with statute. full awareness of agency ? While y o it n g e r staff . positions and national se- members occasionally' rep-' curit *In Ai at* - . resent the Security Coun- ? . ? ? - ?said Uen.. aig. .1 Liese bOntiptloa -.13AGJo:o Approved For Release 2i6flihi CIA-RDP80-01601 R001 -0,1 TY1 --- ? ? ,,.\ (7;1-4 STATINTL , r2:1 1: : STATINTL Li J. \L. ?. STATINTL In the opinion?of American observers, -no ()the aspect .Of U.S. foreign -policy with the exception of the Vietnam war has :yoked such vigorous co:' ? Mienmation and protest as the subversive actions o the ? U.S: ? intelligence service, its covert and not infrequently overt intererenee in the internal ' affairs of other states, its complicity in all kinds -o reactionary eonspira- ,. cie?,and putsches. The generally known failures ant scandalous -exposures ? of its intelligence service have certainly impaired the prestige of the - United States. . . ? A I?IONST-ER TOWERING OVER CONGRESS Irnmediatcly after the. Ena of World War II, seeking a gre:s ter 'say. h policy-I-nal:in ? the most powerful spolc:7sinen of with the CIA).. the matters of hire and dismissal the CIA director is not ? bound by any political CT legal norm.s; pro- cedures or reccannendation.S,. ob- . liatory. for government - - tutiOns; : ?-? The Central Intelligence ;kg.' ? cncy, subordinat2d directly to re .to be carried out in such a - was stress?ed, we, . emu Was authorized to Ilse the .programmes of colleges. The Central Intelligence Ng; operations, it the President, became the first -way that the U.S. go \.,crnment . to institute- and heep up diffe- PostwaT ine-Penclen't iriteffige,:1- could, if, disas':ociate rent foundations,. cultural '.soe: ce organi7at1on, It was charged itself from them, Thus, in the leties and -publishing - houses. with collecting, intelligence data o - ?rs + , ye,a.]::. of Jts oxistc.rme., the Moreover, it coulds'pend.inater- CIA was assi,2ned functillis in! .means ? in disl?cgarOf the . which no other intelli.:,,ec..s,J.? laws or rules established ;. for vice has ever had.. . . ..-!.. ' , government institutions. and . have its aceOunts certified only formation in. :both secret anti , In 1949 .Congress adopted,.ari'.. ' by le g:11 ways, , (2) to ? g.cucvilize, . I an, addition- to the : N!Itionz.1 its directer The lattef was ', ' the information collected bY Security. Act, a special lay, on thus In ?i position 16 .?-pend ?any smn from 'the 31..'as.t ? allocations monopoly enplial secured re- and ;:t the Same time engin:?2r- langanization. of the entire go- jag subversion in other states vernment. rn2,.chin:e:ry of the tasks: .. Ur.ited States.* In July 1947 the (1) To obtain intcllivnce in- National Security Act was pro mulgated,. cnvisagin g. cardinal ?reconstruetion of the milifarY 'depot-la-lents, the .establi,?hm2nt ? ,, b,,, :,.? ,s , .1, ,... the Centr?Ol Intelligence .k,gen-- of .a sin,l,le Depart-mu:It of De ics, evaluate it. ;and 'submit to ? - - cv-. Eu this ?act the United Sta- i without any control or explana- ... ... -Inept for ii first time in man-- Pa'rija. carmarli special stuns to be Lions The CIA r,vaS anowc&to . , Jence,- a .Joint chiefs of :silo', paii1ielans in a for n, s,.litabio. 1.--;,' goverrrment and i kmd s history, Openly elevated spent by its persdnnel abroad. connnittec and a Deportment, for utilitation, (3) to prepare, . ., , . It ' .coutcl conclude contracts ...' of the Air. Force. At the sire in secret, interference in the . time there e.:^?n----tituted the, affairs of other' m:tions in i.:ase, . c-'P!enage:?nt?ad- till,.)%!?:....,n,k of 5-tate. with U611-goVernment - . ? institu- - appycved mothetls of a.c?inilo-.ola?io).'...etihonisrrooinect:ste. conduct of i-esear? : National Security. c3uneii, thp orders came regarding the n-cd PJ.1--` highest,: after. the ,Pre!-Ident. for such interference, 'Illus. the %T.:lying interference. in the in- body called upon to Play an IM siaimal Security !Act cilablel tern:I affairs of other a int'-ie- However,- publicly promulga- - portant 'role- in ;,?baring U.S. the CIA to exert its influche. 1 i .1 , c t _-_s ted lax,vs do not give a fullicle.a foreign polic?,,.:. :.- ,?.. ? on. matterc of state imnortanc:-? zinc' v'cs."Itiun of .ilicir s-G-vcr23" - 1 . -' gntv - of the extent of tbc:.?:poWcrs ,\,vi? ? " -- . - - .-, 1?.....1 . :1th which the CIA is vestc-d?' During .the .re.or,-'inization of something on -.v.-Itieh the advo- . - ? . ? .: ... ,_.. Al- the military and:. political lc-ad ca?tcs of a "-positions-ef-strength , .1:1:'- ?" of 19c1;9.alreo.'33. 0Pcn- , ong with them there exis.t top-- ership.of the cetIntry the great policy" pressing for the- ii Ii placed *intelligence abctve i secret' directive.- of the .Nation- est attention was paid to int C1- tariiation of the-.economy?ana :all Arnecican. legislature: it de i al SeCu,.-it-:..Couneil.. TO. be &bre, - ligeri' ce.. Drawing ' upcn the ex , social life- of the United States prived the congressional . corn- : Allera Dulls. wrote, --there'- .i.St/ perience Of IlitiTT',. Germany, insisted with particular - vigour,. ? mittees of the right, to inter. the secret -as-pct .of? tile 'Matter, th U S eriaIist t bout 1 establishing, their own system act gave American intelligence t? ..ana the laf,v authorizes th?e. NSC e .',. imp so t According to Allen Indies,' this 'N.-one in :matters' pc?rtaining thc organizaticn - am' activiti-s r:(i.e..--, aot-L'iony .the ?Prcsident) of total espionage-- on a ,co , ??_ --- - : --,---- !cf ? the CIA .andf gave' its head la more hfluential positlim- in _ ? - ? to entrust' the CIA with -=:ome lossal Fcale as ''befit:s:" the Un- ? unitnnted freedom of action, . - ? id?c,-,' to those !...??-3.. government than ..that held. by ...,.?4:,,, 1,i.,-, .,...7o, ,1,1..?4 dint: ,.?P.c.''''''''Nrs In at. 11.-.11 . te,e, a U.S.. intelligence theore-- . . Lc- in per US. 9:11Z CI L% could , ate .aat - ? ---` -"1-. -ccified in the law7These prwcrs ited St'ate: of kmerica, Q. Pet , intellience in any other count ' '?.." '''''..-- -- ..-, .,. ? given .Piublieity. .What . 4 ? 1 _ i ry of Inc world.? . - 'Celan, w,rote that to exercise, , ,, , .- - , , ,i; -- -?,f,,,k: ignore fe,.dera.1 la,'.vs and ordin- Is involved .here _is ."special op- 1N. Cl,L1...,ING 1 011E., Ob. C... , icadcrship of the world. in".all ances..kvhose obsenvance Could: evoic.r,s7: .,gi:1:.(L. olan.dc,?z.tit-,,e .ac?, ce.ntinents, of all type of '''''s A?mericall a uf-h ar'-' -cia.ilTh, involve divulgence of infc, tions deSignce. to int fl (oft;;eir, .s. sta-' : to-, :,od. sooal Evstoms of :111, the per,\?cr of the ?C?fA- and. of . Con aboutits structure, RI:tic-HI-Ire-ugh rnilitTi'ry ec,up....$) reaet- yaces and religious il any sc,,0 1 its chief has been grc,wix.-g in. tions, names,: official c1,,.:igna-' ionary pro-11,...S, :regimes; enjoy- 301 gmtrical pgs.sicn, In al fini,ncial and political - , e,:onelni-c and nolitical eon.: a eorore lions, -ii th , .e .size of the , 0,g. the eition, the united states nes 11943 the NSC is.smed a. secret - pur:sonnol (the TreasurY , wras sUpperti-Or. the American ruling , cy,,6 Im,.,,,,,,.11, ?,.,,,l, i, et-der authorizing the, CIA to in pot .to report to -Con- circles ar.,f1. the .bictest Mon-opo, ra.n,1:7?,ii4 inteApproymifoe fRtii6afel2br11/0310srclAr-RDP8041601 R04/1190400001t4 . ly these ?actions ? ien_s on .7.:reign erd,oriz,s.,ile - became as organic part ? Of the CIA's' practical ?ai-ctiVitie.S. - - Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80- DANVILLE, VA. BEE Noy 16 1971 E 17,120 I.S..,?,py Network STATI NTL .It is amazing that in all the years that the .United.States has been a super power, there was.; - not a?.super intelligence agency to determine the - relative strategic balance between major powers. . - This. would have enabled- our defense department to correct any faults that were found, and to meet all challenges to our security. . That the Soviet buildup of nuclear arms and naval power could reach such proportions,. before we took measures to counter them, is a cause for national dismay. This development is believed to have brought about the reorganization of the Ainerican intelligence community into a network - that perhaps should have been organized long ago. Richard Helms, director of the Central Intel- ligence Agency, has been given 30 days-tb- nor- ganize hs--own office so that he can become the head of the new network, to coordinate civilian aicl .military intelligence and bring the military role under civilian control. Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Helms' deputy, will take over operating reSponsibilities for CIA. Unofficially, the various intelligence agencies ? in the government are said to employ an army of 200,000 persons, at hothe and abroad, at a. cost of 'sOine $5 billion a year. It is a huge and very im- portant Undertaking. Helms will supervise the con- solidated intelligence network and the budget it will require. He will be responsible for national intelligence reauirements and priorities, the se- curity of intelligence data and the protection of sOurces and methods used. The results will be channeled to the National.. Security Council, which will make White .House ?-assessments of the relative strategic balance be- . riViC011 major powers and evaluate - intelligence ,-quality. If this plan creates the intelligence that - Can keep the nation at peace through strength,. it ill be worth the huge outlay of men and money:' Colleeting it. _ Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 BOSTON, MASS.'. HERALD TRAVELER 1\)0 16 i42111 ? 194,557 ThG Presicienrs Prerociative ? President Nixon has realigned the,: top echeloia- of the vast military-civilian intelligence complex in a manner he has deemed best suited to his oneeds. Predictably, a couple of senatorial scolds Pave raised a fuss. Richard Helms, director of the Central Intel- ligence tlgency (CIA) has been freed from his,day- ; to-day. supervision of the CIA to coordinate that agency's work with the input of other intelligence- gathering; departments, including the Defense In- telligence,. Agency and the National Security, Agency. 1. . . Morewer, the ? President has created a National Security Council Intelligeve Committee, which wilD naturally include CIA director Helms but whichfwill be chaired by Henry A. Kissinger, the President's special assistant for national security affairs and executive secretary of the National Security Council staff. ???? Senators J. William Fulbright and Stuart Symington, object. They object, they say, because _Congress vas not consulted in advance and because -Mr. Kissinger's executive immunity from con- gressional supervision "further erodes congression- al control oyer the intelligence community." The President, of course, does not have to consult with or obtain the permission of Congress to create or reshtfffle intelligence (or other) corn- mittees within the Executive- Branch. Further- - More, the complaint that Congressional Control over the intelligence community is being "eroded" would have some credibility if direct congressional control were actually exercised or if such agencies as the CIA Were created to serve Congress in- ? stead of the PreSident. The real target of the complaints is Mr. Kissinger, whom Sen. Fulbright and others have tried (unsuccessfully) to hale before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for inter- rogation. But to complain about Mr. Kissinger's position as chairman of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee is to cavil about titles. The fact is the CIA (and thus Mr. Helms) serves directly under the National Security Council and the. Council's staff (and functions) are already under Mr. Kissinger's direction. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 YEIP;,[4. Approved For Release 20011M4449611A-RDP80-01601R INTELLIGENCE: He at the Helm For months the talk in Washington was that- the President was about to reorder the 'nation's. vast, $6 billion military-civil- ian intelligence complex. Last week,. in a two-page low-key announcement, the White House disclosed that Mr. Nixon/ had given Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms, 58, a broad mandate to unsnarl the U.S. intelligence- gathering agencies. Putting Helms at the helm, insiders predicted, might prove to be the most significant power realign- ment in U.S. intelligence since the CIA was founded in 1947. Helms's new job falls well short of over-all intelligence "czar." Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger is still virtually the sole conduit of intelligence informa- tion to the President. And, significantly, Kissinger will chair the new National Security Council Intelligence Committee, which Mr. Nixon also created, to evalu- 'ate White Hcuse-bound data. But the President's order frees Helms of many of his routine CIA duties (which will be taken over by his deputy, Lt. Gen. Rob- eli H. Cushman Jr.) so that he can devote his time to the task of coordinat- ing and streamlining the nation's far-flung and disparate intelligence organizations, which include the CIA, the Defense In-' telligence Agency and the National Secu- rity Agency. STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016 , HOUSTON, TEXAS H ? -Nov 19-11 POST M ? 294,677 S 29,710 .? - . ...- .+..,.??-,. -,,,. ? --.-- , ,? it - -fill c, ? . - - _J- ,, 1 ---t i? h Ei 6 ,--, kr 0 1 yi 41 % la -11-rr-i' - ' 11 'r'''''- . [Irsti'51 a, -1_,-11- i I-LC-T.. 4-lit A ?- -IL L 4..,1, ?r _ 1 i - ' 0 ? - 1 . - The Nixon -administration's plan to conSolidate the , activities of U.S. intelligence agencies operating abroad. ,-.? is a step toward further efficiency and economy in this . ? -vital and expensive bulwark of our national security. ., Under the administration plan, Central Intelligence' ?Agency director Richard Helms will supervise all U.S. ? foreign intelligence gathering operations. The revamp,' log holds the promise of reducing conflicting and over- lapping efforts by -r plethora of U.S. intelligence or- L ? ? ganizations. , . -Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield and Re-., \ . publican Sen. George D.' Aiken, both members of a : special -Senate review panel for CIA activities, have endorsed the reorganization plan.'SP&Iking of the need . for centralized administration of our intelligence work, . Sen..Aiken said: ? : "We've had too many iritelligence. agencies. Every4i agency of government seems to have one -- the De- fense bepartment, the Navy, the Army, and God knows ? how many others. If you have more than two agencies . Of government working on the same thing they always - try to undercut each other." ,..;?.-? ? The public gets only sketchy indications of the huge i .. sums spent by government agencies on intelligence ; ? - - - gathering precisely because Most such activities are ? 'classified. One indication appeared a few months ago ' in a Senate Foreign Relations -Committee ?staff .report , ... -,. that the CIA spent well over $100 million last year to , ? ., halt North. Vietnamese advances in Laos. ? ; . -- It remains to be seen what economics can be effected ! . ? ' in intelligence agency budgets but it is reasonable to , j .. 'assume that some money can be saved through reduced . : duplication of effort arid coordinated planning. The ? main goal, however, is improved efficiency. This coun- , . ? ? #?? - Ary's economic troubles dictate that we get more mile-4' age from our intelligence???gathering dollars as from . - othey, forms of government spending. , , ? - , ... STATINTL ' Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0 MeV:ESTER, N.H. UNION-LEADER D -. 58,903 N.H. NEWS S 49,019 NO 'II 4 tan - de Who's Kissinger Now Walter Trohan (see. column oppo- site Page) may have something.,in his 'charge that it is Henry Kissinger who ; mesmerized Mr. Nixon into 180-de- flipflops on Red China and the .:SoVIcts. Trohan cites earlier writings of the Iidrvard ?swinger" to show -::that his own "complete about face" on Vire Communists has been as fla- &ant. as the President's and prob- ably prededed it. Nixon, be it noted, took to reers- -J11g his stands on major foreign and 'domestic issues only after he promo- ed the lady-killer to be his most trust- - ed aide. Since then the President has vested increaSing power in his "ad- viser for National Security Affairs," by-passing the the rest of his cabinet, in- cluding Sec. of State Rogers.. Last week this culminated in the appointment of Kissinger to head up a committee which will shake up, and thereafter supervise; all the intelli- gence agencies inCluding CIA. CIA's highly regarded director, 'Richard Helms, was, booted upstairs to the. nominal post of overall intelligence chief, under Kissinger's direct con- .Angry protests came froin Con- gress,'. whose members charge a de- liberate attempt. ,bY Mr. .NixOn to erode the statutes which give them at least theoretical control of the in- telligence community. Congress was _ ? . ? ? . ? STATI NTL furnishea no -details' shakeup nor the reasons for it. .Mean- while rumors persist that Mr. Nixon - is taking steps to get rid of J. Edgar Hoover. Is Kissinger to take over . both the CIA and the-FBI? And what is .it that our double- back-soniersaulting President and his fair-haired boy have in mind as new directions for the intelligence agents? Will the latter now be hamstrung in-: their probes of 06mmunist espionage, already redoubled by the Soviets and.' certain to be stepped up by Peking's' appointees to the UN? ? We find, the emergence: of Kissin- ger as boss, of intelligence even Mere, disturbing than. his role as de-facto Secretary of State. Who is this male Mata Hari really working for? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE Approved For Release 2141kilii/OWCIA-kii.V1611-6 recavAtaa IYeafee Get - iniel[Hpre.)-fritco eon! e By Andrew Telly The Mcnaught Syndicate, Inc.' WASHINGTON. ? Dr. Henry Kissinger by now is 'known to most Americans who are inter- ested in the news as a White House personality who moon- lights as a man-about-town with an eye for a. pretty girl. Since this is evidence that President Nixon's asSistant for National Security Affairs is human, I am capable of restraining my en- thusiasm for the role Kissinger .has been given in Nixon's re- Organization of the intelligence community. ? Indeed, I find myself wonder- ing whether Kissinger's power over foreign policy rivals that of the President, which is not , good. It is not good because the doctor would be less than the human being he has reveal- ed himself to be if he did not enjoy power, and use it. Most reports on the re-order- ,Ing of our 'spy shop have em- phasized that ? CIA Director ? Richard Helms will be the czar of all intelligence agencies, in- ? cluding those inside the Penta- gon. His most powerful weapon, In a government where one name for the 'power' game- is the dollar, will be in his new assignment to draw up one budget for the entire espionage establishment. That's splendid because Helms 'was not born yesterday and he Is aware that President Nixon is annoyed at the high cost of international snooping ? some $5 billion a year.. No one has to tell Helms his No. 1 priority is to get 'intelligence as whole- sale as possible. But it says here that the real boss of intelligence could very well be Henry Kissinger, whose new title is chairman of the new National Security Council 'Intelligence Committee, charged with providing "guidance 'and direction" to Chief Helms. In effect, Kissinger through his committee- not only will tell Helms how to run the show, but will - decide which intelligence assessments find their way to the President's desk. Power in Washington lies not only in hav- ing the ear of the President; it is also in refusing the Presi- dent's ear to others of a dis- senting viewpoint. In his new' role, Kissinger will have it both ways. His com- mittee and his personal staff will initiate intelligence studies, and then will edit the resulting opinions and. options before pre- sentation to the Oval Office. To be sure, Helm has the power to submit his own recom- mendations directly to Nixon, and so have Secretary of State William Rogers, Defense Secre- tary Melvin Laird and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But since Kis- singer's -job is to take the task of reviewing options off the presidential shoulders, a dis-, seater already will have two strikes on him. Nixon does not _ ? often give a subordinate an as- signment and then second-guess. him; he lives by the executive book.. And you can count the occasions on the fingers of one, hand when the President has. overruled his highly competent national security aide.. a Indeed, Nixon's reorganization. has merely put into fine print what Kissinger has been doing for three years. Without any spelled-out authority, Kissinger's , Senior Review Group has always V been Nixon's personal State De- partment. Under a Presidential. directive, the Group invites pol- icy options from State, Defense, CIA, then recommends what ac- tion the President should take. The difference now is' that there is a document bearing Richard Nixon's signature which says no intelligence as- sessment or proposed operation will be approved until it has gone through Kissinger's shop. Richard Helms is the czar of a/ all the 'intelligence czars, but only at Henry Kissinger's pleas- ure. . The new system may be the best possible solution to bring- ing the sprawling intelligence community, with its more than 200,500 employes, under Presi- dential control.?At the same. time, I don't consider it overly boorish to point out who's got the real power in this one. Con- templating 'Kissinger's new role, in. some leafy haven across the Styx, Richelieu must be frantic with envy, . Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 DAILY VORLD Approved For Release 2ocoivitack:VA-RDFs'?r0i_?&?_? , e"..; fi ? - hdrire NOUNSO Cara5P" ? k&Jt:, The concentration of ever greater power in the: White House and the inner circles of the Nixon Ad- ministration is continuing to an alarming extent. ' The latest development is the concentration of the enormous intelligence (in plain words, spying) net-. work in the hands of a sub-committee of the National Security Council. This sub-committee is headed by Henry Kissinger, Nixon's adviser on national security affairs. It includes Attorney General John Mitchell, an ultra-Rightist of the Nixon brand, the head of the Joint ? Chiefs o( Staff, the Under Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Richard Helms, direaor of.the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), will have an enhanced "overall supervisory role." The setup is like a dream of the military-industri- al .complex come true. It fists into the increasingly. tighter state-monopoly capitalist framework of the ? United States and the developing fascistic patterns the. most aggressive, oppressive and racist sections of the tate-monopoly capitalist setup are imposing. ? Nixon's action was caustically denounced, by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo) as "a further erosion of Con-- gressional control Over the 'intelligence community."' Nixon, has on various occasions invaded the area assigned to Congress by the Constitution, as in his ex- pansion of the powers of the Suversive Activities Con- trol Board, or in the Treasury Department's arbitrary decision to give corporations a $37 billion tax bonanza over ten years. .? - Just as the Nixon economic policy contains the- "seeds of a fascist economic structure," these moves are the seeds ?fa fascist political structure. STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RpP80-01601R00130.0400001-6 Approved For Release 2001/03/04.: CIA-RDP8 'KEOKUK , IOWA GATE. CITY NOV 13 9971 ? 81 9 3_0. . (27 ? 171-3,1f) . , /7.7/./.7 if" . ? i-I It is amazing that in all the years that the 'United States has been a super power, there was not a super intelli- gence agency to determine the relative otrategic balance between major powers. ? This would have enabled our defense de- ; partiniCrit te correct any faults that were - found, and to meet all challenges to our ??` security. , , That' the Soviet buildup of nuclear arms and naval power could reach such proportions, before we took measures to counter them, is a cause for national dismay, This development is believed to . have brought about the. reorgmlization of the American intelligence community .. into a network that perhaps should have /been organized long ago. . Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has been given 30 : days to Teorganize its own office so that . . he can become the head of the new 'network, to coordinate civilian and mill- = tary intelligence and bring the military ? ? role under civilian control. Lt. Gem Robert E. Cushman, Helms' deputy, will take over operating responsibilities for CIA. . ''Unofficially, the various intelligence agencies in. the government are said to employ an army of 200,000- persons, at home and abroad, at a cost of some $5 ' billion a year. It is a huge and very im- portant undertaking. Helms )vill super- visevise the consolidated intelligence network and the budget it will require. He will be responsible for national in. telligence requirements and priorities, the security of intelligence data and the protection of sources and methods used. The results will be channeled to the INational Security Council, whelli will make White HOW3 assessments of the relative strategic balance between major powers and evaluate intelligence quality. IC this plan creates the intelligence that can keep the nation at peace through strength, it will be worth the huge out- lay of men and money collecting it. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160 MILWAUKEE, WISC. JOURNAL. 1 2 1071 359,036 S 37 , 67.5 STATI NTL ?C' loalt and Dagger Hidden From Congress The US intelligence 'network, a hydralike structure of vhich the Central/Intelligence Agency is a major portion, has always been a headache for the executiVe and ; Congress. For the White House there has been the problem of management a n d co-ordination; - for Congress the problem of de- termining accountability. President Nixon has attempted to solve his management problem. Last week he announced a reorga- nization, that would elevate CIA Director Richard Helms to a posi- tion of super-co-ordinator of all intellig,ence activities. He tied the , whole apparatus more tightly into the National Security Coun ell -through a new National Security 'Council Intelligence Committee heade (1' by presidential adviser Mssinger. Presumably the White IIouse hopes to be better able to keep its thumb on intelligence op- erations and budgets, to suppress the petty jealousies that exist be- tween such units as the FBI and ! -the CIA and to cut down on the competitive duplication of work done by various intelligence orga- nizations both in and out of the military. It is a valiant attempt. Former Defense .Secretary Mc- Namara tried it within the Penta- gon structure and achieved only a ? modicum of ,success. The administration move s, however, do not solve the needs of the n'ioney granting body, Con- gress. In fact; Senators Fulbright and Symington Thursday ex- pressed strong fears that tucking the intelligence community more firmly into the White house struc- ture will withdraw it even further from congressional monitoring. Their point is well taken. Right now there are few requirements for the CIA to tell Congre.s-s what it is doing. Its budget is secreted in other agencies. There is every , reason to believe that Kissin;:. ger will refuse to testify before Congress as he has before, claim- ing executive privilege. Tradition- al coneessional checks are miss- ing. And thatis a dangerous situ- ation. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 CliriIST1AN SCIENCE Approved For Release 200/1/01s44 TdiA-RDP80-01601 f.) 11 -?1 i rfir_va i3 ea \i " 9 ? . President Nixon has made an interest- ing move intended, to correct a condition ? which got his predecessor, Lyndon John- son, into a lot of trouble. We can only . hope, for the sake of the future welfare of the American republic; that much comes of it. / The move is to give to Richard Helms, director of the CIA (Central Intelligence - %Agency), a broader mandate aimed at co- ordinating intelligence gathering and weighing in Washington.. The condition that needs correcting has been documented. in two recent publica- tions. Lyndon Johnson's nevi book, "The Vantage Point" does it gently?The chap- ter on the Tet offensive carries the fol- lowing statements: ?`. . we did not expect them to attack as many (population centers) as they did. . ." S. "We expected a large force to attack; it was larger than we estimated." ". . the scale of the 34:tacks and the size Of the Communist force were. greater than I had anticipated." In other words the information about the capabilities of the enemy in Vietnam. which got through to the President in the White House was not very good. If better information was available, he didn't get it. " The Pentagon papers provide much more and broader detail on the same sub- ject, and also point out where and ,how it happened. ? .They show that in the American intelli- gence community there are many houses, and two of them almost always got their assessments right, but that they didn't succeed in getting through to the Presi- dent (perhaps in part because it wasn't . what he wanted to hear). . . . ? It comes out clearly from "the papers" that Mr. Johnson agreed to the big escala- tion of the American commitment in Viet- nam in 1965 on the assumption that a half million Americans in a relatively small' Asian ? country would "nail the coon- skin to the door" in ample. time for the presidential election of 1963. But the basis for such a mistaken evalu- ation did not come from either the CIA irr m. 11.1.1.tA_Lti1I . . ? or froth the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Rese.arch. These two offices were consistently skeptical about. what could be done in Vietnam with the American forces allotted to the task. The optimism which lay behind the 1965 deci- sion came from within Mr. Johnson's own White House and from the separate intel- ligence Operations of the various armed forces at the Pentagon. . And it was from non-CIA and non-State . sources that Mr. Johnson got a general impression of the military situation which .caused him surprise at the time of Tet. The logical answer is, of course, to take the to man from the agency which had the best track record on intelligence dur- ing the Vietnam war and put him in broader charge of all the much uncoordi- nated intelligence activities of the federal government. And this, of course, is pre- cisely what Mr. Nixon is trying to do. Mr. Helms IS told, in effect, to survey the whole intelligence scene in Washing- ton; try to draw it together; try. to make it more efficient and less expensive; and get it in shape to produce the kind of in- telligence analysis which will not mislead future presidents as Mr. Johnion was mise It sounds easy. It isn't. A president may try to do something like this. But there is . no fury like that of an .armed service deprived of its own ? special intelligence branch, for it is on the evaluations of its own intelligence that its appropriations for the following year are based. Army intelligence stresses the might of the Russian Army. Navy intelligence stresses the might of the Russian Navy. Etc., etc. . Intelligence in Washington can neither be coordinated nor made less expensive by avoidance of overlapping work except after a battle on every frontier. Every de- partment and branch thereof in Washing- ton is a stockade of privilege and vested interest. Mr: Helms is like an Indian chieftain on the Ainerican frontier who sets out to overrun every white stockade from Fort Laramie back to the Mississippi River. We wish him well. C-1172LIVIS Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 .STATINTL DAILY WORLD 2 NOV 19.71 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80.01601 1 /7 (.__ \,....., .,...- xiyOza....1. - . --31---1 1 ??.-..?,,---- ) 4 ?,--5() \I ..?....) . . - - Tie awe- paiillee, tureal ? _ ? . . ?- ? ? The restructuring of - the U.S. intelligence agencies . ? . ordered by President Nixon recalls the promotion of Admi- ral Wilhelm Canaris by. Hitler a generation ago. Canaris was installed as head of the Nazi intelligence agencies to ? make them. into a more effective instrument of the fascist- , regime.- ? -.?.. . ? The new responsibilities Placed .by the president on Henry Kissinger and Richard Helms are intended, similar- to i 11y, concentrate Control of the nation's "seeret police n !Nixon's hands. - ? ? ? . Kissinger- will head the National Security Council's intelligence committee which will also include Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Attorney Gen- eral.John Mitchell; the Under Secretary of State; the Dep $y Secretary of -Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. - ? . ' ? _ .7 It will thus embrace the major law-enfercement, civ- ilian espionage. and military intelligence forces. " - Secret police operations will be coordinated by the ) Unite.d Stat6s Intelligence Board headed by Helms. The-. .board will also include the deputy CIA director, the State -Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and representatives, of the Treasury Department, the Federal .Bureau of Investigation, and the Atomic Energy Commis- ' The effect of the President's action is. as Senators J.W. Fulbright and Stuart Symington have said, to insu- late the secret police -operations from Congressional in- quiry or control. That is to .be accomplished by claiming White House "executive privilege" for them through Kis- singer. ? - : ? - - The:Senate itself has abetted Nixon's moves, for the Senate subcommittee which is supposed to supervise the CIA -has not met once tin? year." as Symington admitted. Thosentralization. of control over .the secret. police for6eS iS."a'Step toward the -Creation of the police-state which Nixon has in Mind. His, attempt to subvert the Su- preme Court and his creation of the Pay Board to hand- cuff the trade union movement are part of the same pro- gram: --e. - :- ? ? ?-? :7;7 The President's. secret-police move S are a threat to Constitutional government as it exists in the United States. They merit the.animosity and opposition of all Americans. '-STATINTL . Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 Approved For Release 2001/03/04.: CIA-RDP80-01 ? T. LOUIS, 1,10. POST?DISPATCH E 326,76 S 541,868 NOV 1 2 1971 STATI NTL More Executive Secrecy? ' . A further indication of the tendency of the Nixon Administration to keep vital information from Congress is suggested by the recent White , House announcement of a reorganization of the 'government's intelligence 6Perations. The re- - /organization An would, among other things, V give Richard Helms, director of the Central In- telligence- Agency, the authority to co-ordinate ? his own budget with those. of intelligence agencies in the State and Defense departments. - But more significantly, from the standpoint of ,. - Congress, if would vest responsfAity for mak- ing the so-called "net as se ssm en t" of in- telligence data in a unit working under .Dr. Henry Kissinger as .head of the National . Security Council staff. . .: Senators Symington and Fulbright are prop- erly concerned that this overhaul may mean ? that Intelligence -operations will be even further . beyond tile reach of Congress than they already : are. Despite repeated attempts in the Senate - to enact bills requiring the CIA to make reports -. . to responsible Senate and House committees ?," ? and to compel the CIA at least to reveal its .- gross budget. Congress has so far not acted. . With Dr, Kissinger having, final responsibil- ity for ' making the intelligence -assessment on which the Pr e aid ant presumably will act, .. . . ......., Senator Fulbright for good reason sees "a further erosion of congressional control over the intelligence. community." O?n the basis of a claim of executive privilege, Dr. Kissinger has avoided testifying before congressional com- mittees. ? While conceding that the changes could be constructive, Senator Symington wants to hold hearings on the reorganization in order to ask questions about what it means as. to the assign- ment given by Congress to the CIA. Obviously, Congress should be kept informed -About in- telligence activities, not only because Congress L expected to appropriate money for them but also because, in legislating in response to presidential requests, the legislators should have access to the same data on which the executive is relying for making its judgments. -Recent disparate analyses by the CIA and the .Defense Department as to the nature and strength of Soviet capabilities lead to the suspicion that the White House would like to . produce an iirtelligence estimate over which ? it has firmer control and which Congress would have to accept. Such a development would hamper Congress in making. independent legis- lative-judgments and in serving as a check upon the excessive power of the executive. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP89-01601R001300400001-6 DAILY. WORLD Approved For Release 20011/140. ;196A-RDP80-0 STATINTL ?. White House gins by intelligence shift H ".. ?:-- ?? . WASHINGTON -- Sens. Stuart Symington (D-Mo) and.J. William (D-Ark)Fulbright charged Wednesday that President Nixon reshaped the U.S. intelligence network, placing more control in the hands of Hen- ry Kissinger. his adviser on national security, to evade Congressional supervision. ? ? ? .Symington irade the charge in a Senate speech. ? -? Fulbright told a reporter that the reorganization of the spy and in- telligence network was "a further erosion of Congressional 'control over the intelligence community." He pointed out that Kissihger has steadily. refused to testify before Congressional cbthmittees. ?-? ": ? The new development began with the announeerrient by, the. White --HouSe last Fridaithat intelligence. ViaS being' reorganiieci' to "irnprove ? efficiency and effectiveness.' ? *. . ? . Richard Helms, currently CIA director, was given charge Of all Intelligence operations, including those of the military services. Kis- singer was put in charge of a subcommittee of the National Security Council whose ftindtiOn is. to reviewintelligenee Operaticins. On this new tuticomtnittee with Kissinger it Attorney General John Mitchell and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. . ? ' ?? 2: 1:-; ? : Symington asked whether this 'new White House committee "has been given authority and/or responsibility which heretofore was the responsibility of the CIA, and which the Congress, under the National Security Act, vested in the agency." -. - . ? ? He also charged that the White House action, "unilaterally de- creed," did not reveal what caused the shakeup, and in effect was hiding :information from Congress. , Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 STATI NTL ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160 NEW 01),I_Y.ANg , LA. . TIMES - i9635 M S 303,9,19 P31 Tighteuino Lip - - . -Soy System ileforms in the structure of the nation's "intelligence community" :recently _announced by the Prost-- dent are aimed at producing three needed results: more coherent over- all direction and budgeting, more , control over the .inilitary agencies ; by the civilian agency and more 'control over it all by the P.resident. :C entr a 1._ Intelligence Agency director Richard Ill:elms is to have: the government:wide coordinating role, his authority .backed- up by his ? holding the budgetary of the military agencies as well as his own. . ? A new National Security Council - intelligence committee, headed by ; the presidential adviser on national 2 security affairs, klenry Kissinger, ? will be the. direct conduit to the President as both giver of. orders and evaluator of results. ? It is denied but openly suspected i? that the 'reforms took this: particu- lar shape because of top-level dis--! satisfactiop with the performances of the military intelligence branch- -es. ? - ? It is necessary for an intelligence . system to :have - several - different sources and. channels of informa- ? --ton. It may be More. costly, involve :'- some dupliCa tion and promote Lcross-purposes and complexity, but ..the alternative is a : monolithic ? agency whose reports may. not have the needed balance and cannot easi- -ly be evaluated ? by the chief user, ? i the -President. Placing the. smaller branches un- ;-der . stricter coordination by the ?i larger, we hope, can keep the best : features of this situation While eliminating many: of the worst. ? / Approved For Release 2001/03/04: C.IA-RDP80-01601R00130040000.1-6 STATI NTL STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R0 PHILADELPHIA, PA. INQUIRER ? 463,503 ? 87,81O QV 1,1 Washing WA Dateline ma tor a Challenge ntelligeno Shuffle Sens. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) and J. William Ful- bright (D, Ark.) said Wednesday that President Nixon had v reshaped the nation's intelligence network to vest more con- trol in the hands of White House ad- visor Henry Kissinger without. Con- gressional,advice. "Symington, in a Senate speech, called for a full review by the Sen- ate Armed Services Committee. He charged that critical aspeets of in- telligence analysis had been taken out of the hands of career profes- sionals and vested in the military , and the White House staff. Fulbright, asked for comment by ; a reporter, said the reorganization ? was "a further erosion of Congres- sional control. over the intelligence -Sen. Symington ? ? community" on grounds that Kissin- ger,. in his position as the President's national security ad- viser, was insulated from Congressional scrutiny. The White House announced last Friday that intelligence ? activities were being-restructed to improve their- "efficiency :and effectiveiress'A,CIAlisector Richard Helms was given control over all intelligence activities while Kissinger was placed in charge of a subcommittee of the National Security Council to review intelligence operations: , Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 CS ST. LOUIS, MO. ? GLOBE-Dm:SO:Wed For . MORNING - 292,789 WEEKEND - 306,889 , ? Nov 1 1 lati. elease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R 0 all q II C tfi E1 II g ? STATI NTL ? ; ? By EDWARD '1,V.? O'BRIEN ? 4?? I t Chief of the Glohe-Danocrat 0 0 ? tit Washington Bureau P 're'm 4' , WASHINGTON ? Sen. Stuart ? Syrnington (Dern.), Missouri, . said Wednesday the "integrity" ; of U.S. intelligence analyses ? may be threatened by a recent : White House move which he -charged gives more power to presidential adviser Henry A. r.Kissinger., In a Senate speech Syming- ton challenged the intelligence reorganization announced last Friday for the White House as designed to shift responsibility for "the most critical aspects" .of intelligence interpretation and vest it. instead in "a com- bination of military profession- ?als and the White House staff.? . Symington asked the Senate Armed Services Committee to hold hearings on the reorgani- zation and obtain "answers" . Which have not been disclosed by the White House. ' THE ..COMMITTEE chairman, Sen. John C. Stennis (Dem.), Mississippi, made no immedi- ate reply. " In his speech Symington noted acidly that the Senate central ;intelligence subcommittee, a ? unit of the armed services .group, "has not met once this :year." The subcommittee is sup- posedly one of the key agencies which Congress uses to assure 'itself of proper supervision of 'highly secret intelligence opera- tions around the world. ,? ? Though Symington mentioned Kissinger only by job title and ;:not by name, his speech .amounted to a renewed criti- ? cism that Kissinger, as Presi- dent Nixon's top security as- . sistant, has been giVen tre- . mendous powers and yet is be- yond the reach of congressional ?. committees which want to ques- ? tion him. ? I IN A. PREVIOUS headline- . making speech, Symington charged that Kissinger is wide- ly regarded around town as the real secretary of state. . In his latest speech, Syming- ton suggested that the same downgrading may be happen-. ing to Richard Helms, the high- ly regarded chief of theS,IA. Symington's wori7?7', fie int-' plied, is that ,such critical analyses as comparisons of tile. United States and the Soviet . in strategic military weaponry may be influenced or manipu- lated to make them fit presiden- tial and Pentagon policies. The White .house announce- ment Friday asserted. that Helms will enjoy "an unhanced leadership role" in the new setup. ? BUT SYMINGTON SAID: 'How is the leadership role. of the CIA director "enhanced' by the creation of a new and , obviously more powerful super- visory committee chaired by the adviser to the President for national security affairs (Kis- singer), on which new board sits not only the attorney gen- eral but also the ?Wrman of the Pentagon pint chiefs of '44 - staff?" The effect of the reorganiza- tion, Symington said, will be to "bring the most iMportant as- pects of intelligence production. and coordination directly under.' the White House." Congress already is "severely restricted" in obtaining intelli- 'gence analyses, he said, and ' may find itself in worse shape through increased application by the President of the doctrine ? ?? of "executive privilege" in re- fusing to' sharesecret informa- tirin with Congress. In an intervievi, .Sen. j. W. Fulbright ,(Dem:), Arkansas,' agreed with Symington that the, ?eorganization ? -means fur.- ther erosion of congressional controls" over intelligence oper.- ations. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-e 1%;TI4S/ed For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP E ? 326,576 S ? 511c868 NOV 1 1 10.1=t_ e.u.nrc,311. "[tab J.?encialrit L, -?) -Jur re uan /3y LAWRENCE E. TAYLOR A Washington Correspondent ?? of the Post-Dispatch ? - i i: ? WASHINGTON, Nov. 11 - ? : ,-- Senator Stuart Symington - ( e .),issouri, calledyeAer- ay for ? congressional hearings ,... on . the Nixon Administration's t reorganization of American in- telligence operations. ?Symington said in S t ? 'speech that although many ? questions about the restructur- ing, were unanswered, one thing :was clear: The White House ? "does not consider either the organization or theoperations. - . _.. ?,.of the intelligence community . ? .to be matters of concern to the ?Congress." . ' The changes ordered last Fri- by President Richard M. Nikon brought American intelli- gence and spying operations un- der closer control of the White ?1 House. - There were reports, however, that the move had 1 - been made, in part, because of what Symington termed "gen- ? era!- unhappiness about various ' specifie intelligence estimates." "Unfortunately, however, it has been impossible for the? public, or even concerned mem- bers of Congress, to obtain 'enough information on this sub- ject for informed judgment," .he. said. . . ;Symington said he had asked ? for hearings by the Senate For- .eign Relations Committee or by Jits subcommittee on the ggptrals, s intemgensce sAac.pcy. He is ? member of each. - ? 'The intelligence shake-up last week provided a stronger role ..?Ifor Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, .. and created several new groups , to assess and direct intelligence . :. operations. . ? . . ? . Among them was the cstab- ? ' lishment of a ?"net assessment 7 group" within the National Se- curity Connell. There were in- dications that one of the group's _ chief concerns would be. an evaluation _ of the balance be- tween the United States and . :Russia in terms of weapons, : economies and politics. ? In recent months Government ? experts have. disagreed on the balance of power between the two nations. Department of De- fense analysts, including Secre- tary Melvin R. Laird, have con- tended that the USSR was gain- ing- strength rapidly. The CIA hand,on the other hccl .peared more skeptical about Russian power and capabilities. Nixon said that the reor- ganization was ordered after. full study by the National Se- curity Council and the Office of Management and Budget. Senator J. William Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Commit- tee, said the reorganization was "a further erosion of congress- ional control over the intelli- gence community." He pointed out that Henry A. Kissinger, placed in charge .of the review group, was insulated from congressional scrutiny in his position as the President's national security adviser. Symington, in his address, said that the changes could be constructive, but, he said, Con- gress should not be eliminated from the picture. He said that he Would not accept the proposition "tha.t our only current and continuing re- sponsibility is to appropriate whatever number of billions of dollars the executive branch requests to handle this work." Instead, Congress 'needs an- swers to such questions as what were the deficiencies in the U.S. intelligence operation, in what way should it be .made more responsive and what is implied by the White House reference to "strengthened leadership" in intelligence? Symington questioned h o w Helms's leadership .role would be "enhanced," as the. White House contended, "by the crea- tion of a new and ,obviously more powerful supervisory com- mittee chaired by the adviser to' the President for national security affairs (Kissinger), on which new board .not only sits the Attorney General but also the. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." "Has this neW White House committee been given authority r/and responsibility which eretofore was the responsibility of the CIA; and which the Con- gress, under the National Secur- ity Act, vested in the agency?" Symington asked. "How can the integrity Of the intelligence product be assured when responsibility for the most critical aspects of intelligence analysis is taken out of the ? hands of career professionals .and vested in a combination of 'military professionals and the White House staff?" STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04': CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 TEE SAN DIEGO UNION Approved For Release 2001/03/041-PM-Rtifli80-01601R00 EFFICIENCY NOT SOLE TEST n? ? t, n ci e e rwves Secun k- e y. To most Americans the intelligence Therefore, the proposed adminis trative action which narrows the sources of information that the gov- ernment uses to develop foreign poli- cy decisions does raise some genuine qualms. Is it, for example, wise to have the same person who has something close to final authority. on which inter- national infol?mation should be passed on to the President also serve as the chief foreign policy adviser to the chief executive? gathering activities abroad by the United Stales of America ? spying in least charitable terms ? is a mys- terious matter. Their closest brush with it is usually a glamorized but 'distorted James Bond movie. Thus the action of President Nixon to integrate the far-flung activities of .1 the Central Intelligence Agency, and many other similar groups, is unlike- ly to arouse the average citizen for long, although it should. It is his own survival, as well as his tax dollar, that are at stake. By the same token, the Complexity and cryptic qualities of these agencies make the average citizen unqualified to discuss the specifics of the subject with any authority. He is obliged to speak Of the problems of national intelligence in terms of goals and principles. As a first principle, the average citizen would agree that we must always undertake whatever level of intelligence-gathering that is essential tO our security. In carrying out this principle we, should not be surprised if on occasion the pursuit of informa- tion is not savory, for this is a game without rules. We should not be sur- prised at -the cost, because intelli- gence ranges from the observations of a lookotit posted on a hill in Cam- bodia to information acquired by the most sophisticated and expensive electronic masterpieces. As a second principle we should en- sure that there always is a diversity of sources reporting to the President, and that there are adequate checks and balances as to the validity of the information provided. Over the years Congress has au- thorized a number of intelligence agencies that range froni those in the exceptive branch of government to those in the military services. On oc- casion the information that they have given the President has been conflict- ing, but by and large the combined STATI NTL Further, does the consolidation have the effect of making the in- telligence operations even more dis- tant and cryptic by removing them farther from the Congress and the ex- ecutive branch? Finally, Meriting some in- trospection, is the thought that it is better for the United States to have a degree of redundancy and even waste in its intelligence system than to have it become so -efficient that it may become a security problem on its own. 'Able' To Leap Tall Buildings... effort has bqk inprovettfor Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 1 1:LO;-;? STAT INTL Approved 'For Release 2Rigy31194 : CIA-RDP8 Y;ibEiP )') ri ?e - 11.1 Ci , ? .11"; ) ?Zi i ? I ? F I e \Li ,n -11-11 (I I; 471 1:1) i (L.) ;? THE REORGANi ZAT10:g :of the intelligence commu- Itity announced last week :looks at first glance like a mere administrative tighten- ing. The producers of -the raw intelligence are sim- 'plY:. being made. more re- - sPonsivc to the needs of the .Consumers' in the White -House. - But the Nixon administra- _lion is no more free than 'most 'others of the itch to 'onforce conformity. 'Unless very-. carefully lynched, the new set-up could be one more device for destroying independent. cent or s of analysis and information in- Side government. The reorganization has ...two main components. For one :thing, Richard Helms, the directIr of the Central intelligence Agency, h a s ,becn given authority to co- Ordinate his own budget .with. those of the intelli- gence units within the De- fense and State Depart- ments. ? : Since Helms as CIA direc- tor is a member of most of the, ? high-level policy com- niittees in government, he is alert to the intelligence .needs of the President and big closest advisors. Presum- ably he will be ablc----per- Imps with considerable say- frig of money?to make the work of such intelligence outfits as the National Secu- illy' Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency more relevant to White House needs. his part of the reorg- anization seems relatively ? . - . ? Under the Ellenhower ad- '.tached analysis, ?still less to minis-traion the net a.sscss- ? hear news out of -keeping wont was. handled by a se- with prejudices and commit- cret subcommittee of the . manta. National Security Council A nice ease in point is the. headed by a geilr.T:il officer defense program reviewi and V,',Orkillg out of the ?pc.n7 committee set up under tagon. In the Kennedy and Kissinger hackgroup Purpose of r90-31101.) ?to cast a cold, analytic eve johnson 'Ad wan ts,ra the net assessments were es- sentially. .rnade. under the on the defense budget, and some of, the best analysts in, and out of government signed on to do the staff' But the President has backed the big ? spending program of Defe;re Secre- tary La:rd. The revi,:w emu- ?n?iltce has been allowed to wither on the vine:. dwelt of the analysts nected with it have 1-6' . - signed, and the. senior offi- cial presently concerned, Dr. K .Wayne Smith, is rumored..v/ to be leaving soon. '?No 'serious high level cri- ique of the defense budget is now being made any- where in government. That is one of the reasons the. Congress, and those of us in, the press, are floundering so when it comes to defense ex-. penditures. . What - all this means is that the new intelligence; National Security Council. set-uP should be watched staff, Dr. Henry Kissingerdwith great care. It looks like The official itinnediately a sensible arrangement. But - re- it could easily become one, .sponsible for the net assess- more instrument for ? ments will be Andrew re- shall,Mar- who nowi leaves the strieting information and criticism to the disadvan- Rand corporation where. he has been serving as an ana.. tage of all of those on the f, lyst to take a place on the outside o government. . NSC staff. . Mr: Marshall is by all ac- s-traightforward. .counts an extremely . good THE SECOND PART .of man?cxperienced, reliable and discriminating in judg- the reorganization involves' .ment. Pre.sumably he can do What is called "net assess-- serious jet) of pulling Ment." That is a fancy term to- orf the -ana\.-;,er to the clues- .gelher the vast range of complicated data required; lion: How does the strategic direction ief Secretary Rob- ert McNamara in the Sys- tems Analysis Division of the Department of Defense. Under the Nixon adminis- tration there has been no central responsibility for net assessment. The result has been a chaotic battle featur- ing many protagonists. In general, Secretary Of De- fense Melvin Laird, with the .backing of his director of re- search John Foster and to the delight of congressional hawks, has tended to rate the Soviet threat very highly. The CIA, to the de- light of congressional doves; has been more ? skeptical about the Communist men7 ace. Under the new reorganiza- tion, responsibility for mak- ing the net assessment will be vested in a ing under the head of the balance stand between Ens- for making ,the nett 'S ssass- in and the United States? me making That question,. with deep BUT IT IS a serials clues; ramifications in politics and tion whether that offic,0 economics as well as foreign should be performed in such. policy, is to the various pri- close range to the White; Nate and public interests House. For the atmosphere ,that come to a heal in gov- in the White House is Irony-. ernment what a pio.ce of red fly political. There is no meat is to a pack of starving. ? disno,Atioji to \vard de; ilogApproved forReke'ase 2001/03/04 :-CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300400001 -6 STATINTL 5.-qm /atm illaima) Approved For Release 20011/0M47CIA-RDP80-01601R -11 . . o - ti 1__,. ? C.) ? . . . . , HONOLULU -7-- . (AP) ? 1 % . -i ? . , .yli-,) : 7.,r? ,, .s, -i'l,) 1 % 1 1"--?) T? Secretary of Defense Melvin -_,_ -Laird said Saturday that tiv..% A -7L-1----). -----1-' (---.:',...: .1----i -Pentagon is 'ready to carry Out quickly President Nixon's genus_ arms. new order S to consolidate . Recalling streamlining pro:, federal intelligence-gathering posals by his own blue-rib- operations. .. . ? bon defense panel, Laird said .. ? "we have paid particular at- "I the Department tendon to intelligence, of Defense Defense will be able ulti- eluding the need to maintain. rnately to reduce costs be- the intelligence capabilities cause of these actions," Laird of the four armed services." said in Honolulu for a stop- Even before the White over while he was flying House acted, Laird had creat- from Saigon to Washington ed a new assistant secretary ? after surveying the Vietnam of defense slot which he said situation for Ni:-:on.. "will increase .civilian super- . . - ? ? vision of intelligence matters , DI-i,TENSE officials said in my office." the consolidations should ? The new post is held by save millions of dollars Dr. Albert C. Hall, until re- through elimination of dupli- cently a vice president of an cations and reductions in aerospace company. staff but they said it is .too . ? - early to estimate accurately . BUT LAIRD never has fol how much costs will .be cut. lowed through on ? a, The full extent c,i defense mendation by th.e blue-ribbon intelligence operations in - panel that would have stri.p- their.various forms never has Ped command of fo,reign in- been disclosed publicly, but a ?telligence from tne J a i n t ? hint of their magnitude can Chiefs of Sta,i. be gleaned from an estimate Pentagon authorities said that they involve about 150,- that Lt. Gen..Donald V. Ben- 000 people and about $3 mil- nett, head of the Defense In- lion a year: ' , ' .- . ? ? : telligence Agency; and Hall . ? rank as co-equals. ? - Laird's - statement- came a The Defense chief said that ? day after the White House establishment of a National announced a reorganization Cryptologic Command, to of the wide-ranging intelli- handle all code-cracking and gence apparatus of the goy... communications intelligence, Iernment, -giving Central In- "wil' proceed in an orderly te,Iligence Age a c y Director ?- Richard Helms "an enhanced manner." Arid he said his ...- 'leadership role" and coordi-. staff is working on estaohs natin authority. meat of of a . Defense Map g Agency and an Office of De- IN urn statement, Laird fense Investigati;n: . : appeared to be backing up '. the generals' and admirals' view that each armed force - must have its own intelli- . , . STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 )11.:Ins Approved For Release 2001/6361! :bA-RDP80-01601 STATINTL r-1,- TFrii MI -1'- rri101-1-1::-.1 T. T. .? - -I , t ,,,, r ' ' * ' ?./ -, . 1\zi. Lams s outies here. vzill he ? 1'041,0 J. 0,U z.,? i . -assumed, by his ,dert:,.7, L.rit::;.1.1.,(4'. lio'nfl:;:ecaPi:el3;1::(Fil:11,neLseePloleiLgi3iedlltasecceiS,3if-sia)t-iiii, , - --,'.1----- f-i?iL fi C :1.1. RObi'rt E.. Cusot,i.:tn.,t,. . I I 09;4 i' if -;!, .;tii. i_,! ,,,? ,,,.....? -,'. It creates .a ne-, ,naell,.1.-, ,.. its au Rit. , ._ ilUM1U?i- 11-L'i?"''I'-L6 f;ence subconrnittee unot.,: 4,,,.. (111-2Tsh(Vrcise.Et0 per. cent of cv-- . i National Security Council with erything the United States the aim of tailoring' the daily spends for intelligence," he- NiXOtt -Order Alf113 ai: Liot.';/A? "ITO Chid." garnered -hy the na- said. `i lie President hasn't giv- . ?Intelligonce Cancring lion's vast overseas hdelligence en Helms control Of the D.O.D.'s netAvorl; closer to the needs of intelligence budget, but at least ? . .._....____??, .. . 'the "consumers". President lie can now see it and advise I:.?,y LIENjAI-all IVELI,Ei:.; - Presumably, intelligence sour- on it:before its prescnted P.S a . . ? Nixon and his top staff. WASHINGTON, Nov. 6 ? \yin be merged in to the coml. fait accompli." _?..... SiAcial to M.?. Nu.; York 7-1il! . cos say, the Forty Committee President Nixon has given ell's new subcommittee since Richard Helms, his 3).iroctor of the membership of each is iden- Central Intelligence, new or-. Cent: 'dors-- and new authority?to: /'-,lot 1.:Z . trim costs and improveAhvays esponsiv the out-1 . - _put of the nation's global in- --Til? I'veslils-i- d31, Henry telligence system. ? . - [Kissinger] 'ha\ e felt that the intJligence we were coiled:in- In a E':...ateille.Ilt i5;SiIP.0 y?sr-e-. day by the White Lt,?11,._,0 ..,_ wasn't always respOtisiVS- to, under circiunstances strong1ty their needs," said one source sugrsting, it was designed ''They suspected that one yea- to attract as little public. notice as son was because the intelli- possible----Mr. Nixon disclosed gence community had no way details of a far-reachin .of knov,-IN; day to day what OE, rc- rganization. the - President and Kissinger \ - I Intelligence expert, bare b,,:,.i needed. This . is a new lin: be- ?,1 -hove that Mr.' Dehns, P.I.Tr:C4 twe.:31-)rci(luccrs `..-nd consumers We'll have to ,wait and see if with Ids 710A7 Pre.sidentlai hacit-! ing, may be able in the comin:,,,? , it works." Mr. Kissinger Nvill mid the months. to cut $I--billion from chairmanship of the new sub- the S5-billion to S6-billion that committee to several others he the United States spends year- ly to ascertain, with shy satel- ? PireadY li?1("s* . .E.tes, electronic eavesdropping, Another development in the Alecret agents and other soLtr- president's reorganization is the / ces, Soviet and Chinese Corn- cit soon cf a "net assessment 1. 7, ip" hiside Mr. Kissinger's munist i niliia ry developm ents . ?E"c-' National Security Council stall. The reorganiaation plan, which has been under study at the It will be headed by -Andrew Office of Management ? and hr. Marshall, a con.sultent with Iludget for at least a year; -_ the Land Corporation of Los ? makes three main changes, in- Angeles. , torments say: "Net assessment means corn- ? I, It gives Mr. Helms, who Is paring oyer-all U.S.S.R. forces! ? ti3 years old, the fir:t authority and capabilities those of ever given an intelligence chief the U.S.," said a;1 American to revic.,:w----and thus affect-- 5nteligence expert. "It's as coin- 'the _budgets of all the nation's. -placated a calculus as exists. 1 foreign intelligence agencies as We in the inteligence world of- well as the Central Intelligence' 'ten know more about Soviet Agency, which he will continue forces and capabilities than we to head. The other agencies in- -do about our own------and this dude units within the 3.)efonse DOW group is intended to pull it ,and State Departments, the al together in one place for thei'A.to7-nie Energy Commission and President," - . --'- ? the Federal Bureau of Investi- . .? ? Resources Committee -galion.? . : 2. It will free Mr. rlehrts Under the new plan Mr. , ibility for espionage, counter- from much day-lo-d,sy respon- Plelms ? wil also head an Intel- / ligence Resources - Advisory espionage and such 'covert ope- Committee" on which will be xations as the White House represented the state and De- pot-lb:Really orders through its tense Departments, the office secret 'Folly Committee." of Management and Pudget and - This committee, named for a the C.I.A. ? Mlnlbered rileMoraLduni - in- The white house announce- dudes Henry A. Kissinger, tht. meat said that the committee J V White Muse national sectifiv' Nyill."advise tlx D.C.I. on the assistant, Attorney General preparation of a consolidated .. john N. Mitchell, tit,dter Secre- program budget." Ti-ds, in the tary of State John N. Irwin 2d, view of experts, is Mr. Holm's Deputy Defense Secfetery Da- new authority to supervise and, vid .Pachard, Adm. Thomas H. at least partly, - control tr,.: Moot or, 'chairman of the joint volved . in collecting inteligence. Chiefs of Staff, and Mr. Helms.1 ? ? - Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01-601R001300400001-6 STATINTL .? WASIIINGTON STICt?, Approved For Release 2001/04/Q4W MAi-RDP80-0160 I 11 111 Ili 0 1"--'. ! i- r wic:'''''' il ii ! t,.. :::.:d IA ii i? 11 ji tik, ti \\ A /1," ._ 0 if; I ,_?-, cr:z "7.7-4 ri, , , /7.:.:) ra c ?,\.., , I t, f.i .1 ?..'::. ii t..) t;..;") it b ii ,' ? : V..-a-J L r.3 .,. By GEORGE SHERMAN - Star Staff Writer Y'resident Nixon's drastic reordering of the intelligence com- munity brings still more power to that White house adviseir- extra.ordinaire----Ilenry A. Kissinger. ',. People rnwt intimately involved see the erstwhile proles- ,/ sor's passion for order and efficiency triumphing. Or) one level CIA Director Richard Belms was given a man-? date to become director of all 1 s American intelligence. in fact, 1 Options Discussed as well as in mune, - . The . options also are dis- ' - '- But on the White House level, , cussed by the National Security Kissinger was put at lno , oe r the_ I Council--whose chairman is the 1 i-,, ? , resident, and wnose members new "National Security Council Include the secretaries of State intelligence Committee' provid- and Defense. Furthermore' the int.; "guidance and direction" to. State Department, through Rog- Helms. i ers, has the power to submit its own recommendations directly In other words, under the re-. to the President on any given shaping'orclered Friday, helms option. has the job of coordinating the, But in nearly three years, ? ; 1 i work of the often-warring ?011-e--.KiAnger's driving energy and ligence agencies, inside and OtH devotion to detailed staff work -side the Pentagon. For the first!: ' a,u - ? , i per- i---plus his rsputco ntellec- time, with en expanded ..tual power?h m ave given hi the so 1l staff, he will be in charge of drawing up one intelligence upper hand. Be and his staff budget-- now unofficially reck- oned at $5 billion yearly. Kissinger at Helm But the direction in which his machine goes will be deter- c;) initiate government-wide policy studies, and precious little na- tional security policy is decided by the President against Kissin- ger's advice. mined by Kissinger's commit- In the intelligence shake-up tee. This group, of which Helms, the Kissinger apparatus will Attorney General John N. Mitch- . also get powers at the lower oil, undersecretaries from the levels. The mechanism is a new State and Defense Departments, iNet Assessment GrQup (NAG) .and the chairman of the Joint ,headed by Anthony Marshall, a Chiefs of Staff also are merit-senior member of Kissinger's hers, will determine the intel-; White House staff. ligence assessments which get "The functions of NAG- will to President Nixon. be just what the rIST110. sug- gests," said one insider ? "to nag the intelligence commit- : That means the group is to be 'responsible for suggestiers to Helms & Co. that they should assess what results might flow abroad from :any policy under consideration in the White' House. Naturally, Kissinger, chairman of the Sensor Review Group, will be in a position to know, what those possible pol- icies are. So the Kissinger shop becomes practically the coordi- nator between policy and intel- ligence. The job of NAG- also will be to produce comparative assess- ments of the relative strength of various world powers. It -will do this by pulling together in- telligence estimates from all 1/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 . ? The new committee is simply the latest addition to that na- ?tional security council system "Kissinger has systematically set :up in almost three years in the :White House. It is roughly akin / to the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also heads, re- - sponsible for filtering the for- eign policy options which reach .the, President. According to most insiders, this Review Group has been the vehicle for Kissinger's virtually 'taking control of foreign policy ;away from more passive Score- tory of State William P. Rogers. ,Interdepartme;ntal groups from the state, defense and other in- ?terested departments feed pol- icy options into the Kissinger :shop,. which reviews them for ApprEfitd11.2bOfee 20 over the government?political, military and ccenomic. Por in- stance, .NAG v,,ould assess tlic strategic balance between the U.S. .and Soviet Union, or be- tween the Arab world ,e.nd All of which adds up to a ma- jor new 'responsibility for Kis- singer. It also marks a major step in Nixon's drive to put cen- tralized control. over every vital government function in the White House. STATINTIL ? STATI.I\ITL Approved For Release 2001l3l104 itiA-RDP8 STATIN ay ALNOLD it, ISAACS Washington Eureau of The Sun Washington?Fresident Nixon moved yesterday to improve co-. ordination among. the govern- ment agencies involved in for- eign intelligence activities. Part of the plan would tie the intelligence effort more ? closely into, the National Security Coun- cil apparatus headed by Ms. Nixon's most influential foreign- policy adviser, Henry A. Kissin-, gar. . ? - ? The reorganization also will mean that Mel-lard Ilelms, the -director of centrallintelligence,- Will turn over many of his agen- cy's day-to-day operations to his deputy and spend more time as the government'. general gence overseer. i ? The CIA chief theorotieelk; has been the head of the v.lioio "intelligence community" clue, '1 1 lI i 1 1 1 v 1 1 I the l-ilennedy administration, ? ItKliftAti.11 it li-j.,i.NIS DENRY I.OSSINMilia. . . . t ? , Prealdtrig Over the United States the world. The unit will be holid- It . Proposals to revamp the Intel- .across the border when North , tj. ]McIllgence Donal. But the Jim- ed bY Andrew Marshall, tile.] ligence structure have been Vietnamese forces in the Iron- its of his authority novel: 1111Ve. I; and Corporation's former floating through the adminislra- tier .:,:one proved to be?fac strong- beLII defined very precisely. director of strategic stud;as, - . lion for Many nlonths. tfhtil plan a than had ken anticiil.??tcd. 1 The White- Home, announcing The clA director 1,,,;11 he ?iven announced yesterday was. draft- .. ?, ..._,?.?. the new structures -yesterday, ,,, ?, ., .,_, ?, ,,, ,,,,, . c., ? ed primarily by the National Se- SE11(1 thi...y ere designed "to irn. rin ebnencco ..paia:t.Aup Imo', ? . entity Council staff and the Of scrving as chairman of a_ rc?2-On? lice of Manar,crnent and Midget. prove the. efficiency and effec- , ,-? tiVeness? of the intelligence- stiii---,11.(1 ll 1-e,'S' in nc telligee bi.-)ard , - -- 2 fon6s--cited in , . n? agencies, V, -Nell together employ all? also ha h' a new 11" MI estimated 200,000 persons-- gelice Besourcea AdvisqlY Com-./ Questions about the present three-fol.niths of them military, ,mitfcci which Will dr"\'''_,U,4) 1,)r: SYStelll' effeCtiveness seemed set vicenlell ? an .1 spend about posals for a consolidaleo onager to collier mainly on the Defense billion a year. . -for allthe MtelligenCe agellAS, 71ALel " 11.lgth'. ? ' .11A e ? Mr. Nixon also ordered the . -. . Two notable intelligence fail- Li , Marine in charge \/ e.alion of a hew National Peru - - , - ? -- Pres inlndoehina have Lem cit- i -cid as causing-. the failure Of an rity Co;.tnell hilell-genc cont'.. Officials said this means that initro.i.., v.h,H, 1,),?? Eif.,,inger win - the CIA's deputy director, Lt.' / if 11 .I. 1 U.S.. troops in No II ou,se i yil direction Marine Corp -I ti,,,?:L The comp:1;11(.0,- the white Gen. Robert E. Cwritisihillakno oof\tielic.y .vene.; 1.1i i c):;, 1)4, to rescue Anieri- 1 sad, " \i p;ivc s, IUI,ahance on 1.,;;Jionai intern., - m,ut.;11 Of. the responsibility fOr I can prisoners of war from the .; n.!ii .poi2ds,, and ninvile fo,. a the CIA's own operations. . 1 S011fay P11 00 ca m p in North Vietwitin . and as having Ii on contit.uin,:i ( volual'a of. intelli-? - . Government agencies repre- ; ? ttenef pro:hick," . Seated on the intelligence beard I pared the South 'Vietnamese '. ' .Tinis si.:tfined to ad-ate, that include, beside the CIA, the; campaign in Laos last February ? STATINTL. -the council will have greatly -ex- State DeParImeot's burn? of Inth e ne ellt'e and Research ; the panded authority over the. differ- ' efense, -Department's National nit oLfencies. DSecurity Agency, WilliC11 Special- tile:: council's . lees in code-cracking; the Pe- i a new "net, assassement group," tense Intelligence Agency, which also will ba created; The group has sea: ate Army, Navy and ,svill evaluate intelligence data and make studies 'on the relative balances ApOrovedeForim and March. . In 1110 Sontay attempt, the Army -and Air Force raiders lamied only to discover that all the P.O.W.'s lind? been moved out. , Air Force components working; In the. Laos eampaig,n, the cm military intelligence; the; South Vietnamese Army suft, 400 il04/04,,,Y?1101A4kbP8044604R001300400001-6 -units? were sent reeling back. f m?ission. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 HARRISBURG , PA . PATRIOT' PATRIOT ?NEWS S ? 1591880 f4r.:1! 6 ?v:?1,1 " STATI NTL . ?An intelligence -committee /1-F. - . will be set up within the Na- Tr At\ . rill- ' 4, 02 --fl,, i 1---tt.p cm, f-;-.1 t: tional Security Council which 1,..ftiL.4,.../.?._ . , . j ''''' t I 1 --11--"-il ',; -U- It:4-1C:- 4:-''').'. ' will be headed by Jr. Henry A. . Kissinger, presidential adviser - on national security affairs. , The committee will include the CIA director, the attorney gem \\7fr'' Tiof II N _ } I, -II -Pi 0 1 T.11...,.....u..,L: defense and the chairman of T 1' '1 9 ' , the Joint Chiefs of Staff. C .'. , From The Patriot Wire SeMees But Nedzi questioned the ad- ?A "net assessment group" WASHINGTON -- CIA Direc- be 9 ; will . established within the ditional duties given Hehns. tor Richard A. Helms has been WNT a t i o a a I Security Council ci c t th b doubts about e apal yv given broad overall supervision have ;Nvhich will be responsible for in an overhaul of the United of any. one person to be able to; reviewing and evaluating all States' intelligence gathering oversee the entire inielligencentelligence, Operations, the White House operation .and at the same time announced yesterday. - ' administer the CIA," the con- Officials said Helms would gressman said. be freed from some operational The reorganization also re- responsibility at the Central In- vived the old U,S. Intelligence telligence Agency to assume Board whose membership will "communitywide responsi- include Helms, FBI Director J. bilities of the several scattered Edgar Hoover, the chief of the intelligence operations." Defense intelligence agency Chairman .George H. Mahon and representatives of. other of the House Appropriations agencies with a stake in in- Committee, which has ? been telligenee operations. among congressional critics of Time. magazine -reported in U.S. intelligence operations, its October 25 issue that Hen- said after a: White House brief- ver recently had "effectively lug on the reoranization that cut off the international from it was a step in the right direc- ? the national intelligence effort": tion, but it was too early to pre- by limiting contacts between ..dict results. , FBI and CIA men. But officials "I believe we can save per- flatly denied the report.? . 'sonnel- and money and get eral, the under .secretary of state, the deputy secretary of j more intelligence," Mahon told Time n the same article said a reporter, but he quickly Hoover also had abolished a - added that intelligence oper. seven-man FBI section that ations had been repeatedly maintained. eanta.ct with other U.S. intelligence units, in-: , reorganized with but limited ' . ' eluding the- defense inie. lligence . success. agency. Rep. Lucien Nedzi, chairman of a -House armed ,seryices subcommittee with su- pervisory responsibility for the CIA and Pentagon intelligence operations, said he did not find the new shakeup particularly _ . _ The-White Hons.?, announce, e n t listed these specific steps: --helms will assume 1"en- hanced leadership" in plan- ning, reviewing, coordinating and evaluating ll intelligence ,programs and activities. . Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 LOS .1-1-1:10ELES TIiSLf Approved For Release 200(1/63V040CIATREDINKLO CIA's 1--hAm; Sn Po Cur, hicncy Do,eograckd zind S 1R :cive ilcv( Povms .1rSi DA'017) ERAST.,01,?V r?ww.0 Chid AVA.SHINGTON .-- The White Ifouse announced Friday a shakeup of. the government's massive Intel- ligence 'bureaucracy that could have. major import in enabling the Pres- Merit to assess mo-re accurately any Societ -threat to the United States. Richard Helms, director of the Central I n Le-1). igence Agency, emerges from the long-planned reor- ganization as an even stronger fig- ure. with responsibility for coordi- nating all intelligence activities. Some sources said Helms' role could develop into that, of an intelligence czar. Henry A. Kissinger, President, Nixon's assi'stant for rational securi- ty. affairs, and the National Security Council' staff also are given signifi- cant new powers in the shakeup. Pniclg?:4-Clearing i'rocethlre ? The Pentagon's hugh Defense In- telligence Agency is downgraded and will be required, along with oth- er intelligence .arms of the govern- /Anent, to clear its budget through a / new Intelligenc..e Resources Advi-:_,0. ry Committee chaired by Helms. Informed sources said the shakeup reflected the President's unhappi- ness with the quality of information supplied :him on occasion and his be- lief that the splintered intellige.nee activities can be coordinated better.. :The President also is. convinced, it was said, that the government's in.. telligence reliably estimated at about $5 billion .a year now?is mmccessazily high. Administration OfZicials -hope to achieve a saving of at least. several. hundred million dol- lars along with greater efficiency. For years Many in Congress mid in the executive branch have thought that . the govern-Merit's intelligcmce : effort, because of grov?,th of at a f f and. ... fragmentation among va-rious agen. cies, was becoming unmanageable 1,r,:id that the cost; was getting cut of hand. . . The. studies that led to Friday':; an ricu nee rcicr, v,,ere Iat inched. se_: cretly by the National ? Sceurity Council more than a year ago.'? A major change, which for the first time will give the White House the expert .capability. to make its own intelligence evaluation of such 'strategic problems as the Soviet mis- Helnas' 'strengthened po- sition vihi derive in large measure from his new au- h or it y over what the White House described as? a "consolidated i ii t ligence program budget." Never before has there been. a single intelligence budget. Under the present system each agency en- sile threat, is the establishment of gaged in intellig,ence the Net Assessmant Group withinisubmits its on budget the National Security Council; staff. quest to the lite House. The group will be headed by a se- Under the reorganize- nior staff member. A 1,yhite: House ;Jon the budget requests source said that job o.vould go to An will go to the committee drew W. llOW director ofj chaired by Helms and STATI NTL strategic studies at. the Rand Corp. ..'?hose membership wilt Iii Santa :\lonica. . 'include representatives of The different interpretations that the state and Defense do- tile Pentagon and the CIA have giv- z..nd Office en to the construction of about. COv '1" of Management and Budg- missile silos in the Soviet Union is expected to be one .of the first, strate- gic policy problems to be put 'before the NAG. . The. SiZO. Of tire defense budget and the strategic arms linliThtiOn talks with the Russians could be af- fected by whatever sion the President finally 3nakes regardin's the pur- pose of thqse still-empty silos. Pentagon analysts have tended to a more alarmist reading of the silo con- struction, suggesting the 'Russians may be develop- ing a new weapons system for offensive purposes. ? :While not ruling, out that possibility, the CIA, it is understood, tends to the view that the silos are de- signed primarily to afford greater protection for mis- siles already in being and are therefore defensive. Thus, where differences arise in the intelligence community on strategic questions, the NAG would be expected to reduce such disputes ? to manageable proportions for the Pres- et. Also among the 'major management improv e- ments" announced by the White House were: ?"An enhanced lead- ership role" for the direc- tor of central intelligence (Helms) in "planning, re- vie-Wing, coordinating and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of national intelligence." . --Establishment of a National Security Council I n t elligence Committee, -.chaired ?by the President's nationel security assistant (Kissinger), whose mem- bership "will include the attorney ? general, the di- rector ? of central ir4el- ligence, the undersecreta- ry of state, the deputy sec- reedy of defense and the chairman .of . the Joint Chiefs of Staff. - " That "committee is to "give direction and guid- ance on national intel- li?e.nee needs and provide for a continuing evalua- tion of Intelligence prod- ucts from the viewpoint of. the intelligence user." Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016 PHIL.ADELP HI A , P A . QUIRER M - 463,503 SS67,S10 NOV 6 197)L:. IA\ D-q..-Trorzi-kr!-4-117," . v? kLp .1:(Lp /veilLuli, / . 1 ::??? ? WASHINPTON (UPI). The White House announced on Friday president Nixon has ordered an ovprhall of the , government's intelligence op- &aliens", assigning Richard ? Helms, director of the Central ? Intelligence Agency, a broad- ;er overall supervisory role. jAdministration officials said' that Helms would be freed' from some -operational re- sponsibilities at the CIA and assume "community-wide re- sponsibilities" in the U. S. foreign intelligence gathering ? operations; The White House announce- ? o L ;OI A -;n Tr v./ ,1_,/ STATINTL 0 ;11 1 trZy1-1! GO-gra p A 1.1J ? RICHARD HELMS wider restionsibility meat listed these specific steps: ?HELMS WILL assume " 1 ed leadership" in en ianc ? ________. _ planning, reviewing, coordina- ting and evaluating all intelli- . gence programs and activit- ies. --AN INTELLIGENCE committee will be set up with- in the National Security Coun- cil which will be. headed by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Pres: ?idential adviser en national security affairs. The commit- tee will include the CIA direc-- tor, -the attorney general, the under secretary of state; the deputy secretary of defense and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. ?A ? "NET ASSESSMENT 7 - 0 ] . p I? ? . 1;1)(9 0 rdis ? group" will be established . . within .the .national security council which will be respell- ? sible for reviewing and evalu- ating all intelligence. " ?AN "INTELLIGENCE-, - resources advisory commit- - tee," headed by Helms, will advise on the preparation of a , consolidated intelligencepro- . . gram budget.' : The White House said that a national cryptologic com- mand, a code-breaking organ- ization, would be set up under the National Security Agency to consolidate work now being 'carried out in differenl agen- cies. . _ Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01 PHILADELPHIA, PA. VULLETIN -1\10\1 6 w)7) E 634,371 S - 701,743 I I '1,7 ? r) , - Mr. 'Nixon also ordered re- construction of the United States Intelligence Board to be headed by Helms .and to include representativeso f the CIA, the Federal Bureau of 1 ? ,.: 11 . Investigation, . the Treasury iv,inr111,,r[, Department, Atomic. Energy ii d U'C7 6 t???11.' Commission and the National Security Agency. g'-'' r '' ri. I . i i '?.'.1 i4 IA ," ?I V ': t! til4 df._-1, V' ' t,li , Rep: Lucian Ne .(D-')/ Mich),chairman of a House Armed Services subcommittee CI 0 with supervisory responsi- bility for the CIA and Penta- gon intelligence operations, saidh eh ad doubts "about the capacity of any one person to .,? be able to oversee the entire intelligence operation and at the same time tinea dminis- ter h CIeA." . . it. Gen. Robert E. Cush- man, deputy director of the CIA, was expected to take over many helms' operating responsibilities. Other provisions .. include creation of a "net assessment j group" within the National Security Council to evaluate.. all intelligence; and estab- lishment of a "intelligencer ?e- sources advisory committee," headed by Helms and which will advise on the preparation of a consolidated intelligence program budget. ? ? ? Nixon Desionotos Direcipr Aupncie's Washington --- (UPI) -- President Nixon has ordered the nation's scattered military andcivilian intelligence gath- ecringo perations to be consoli- dated under the leadership of Cia Director Richard M. Helms. "---The White House said ?Helms wads bed some of his duties as director of the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency to spy and . counter-spy agenciqs tral Intelligence Agency to cbordinate the work of U.S. spy and counter-spy agencies as the result of al engthy ex- ecutive branch study of dupli- cation of efforts in their oper- ations. ? - Congress?onaI committec's :have long been critical of al- leged overlapping of intelli- gence activities and the ,new plan won ;tentative -approvale of one keY. lawinaker, Rep. George H. Mahon -(D-Tex) chairman. of the House .appro- priaticms Committee. ? Helms will work with a new National Security Council in- telligence committee headed by presidential aide Henry .Eissinger and consisting. of the attorney general, the .chairman Of the Joint Chiefs .of Staff and .representatives of ; the Statedild Defense Depar.t- m.ts ? ? STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 Approved For Release Ot ?,0 ? 1t,11011A11?171 RELMS . . . intelligence chief t11/71 Ii I c); 0 c , .11- GEN. 111-01111RT CUSI1MAN ... new CIA duties _ I 401 he may assume his neV,,. gbv- Tim White House announce?? ernment-w?ide responsibili Les, merit zilso said that P1 \1 i officials said. has -ordered three -consolida-I He will turn over many of , ePtitagon's intcl i .-i ? his operating responsibilitiesirons in the - ligence organization: : for the Central Intelligence . 0 A natimial cryptologicl : A.gency to his deputy director, Marine Lt. Gcn., Robert F. command to consolidate all! Cushman -Jr. . - . communications intelligence I I' Cushman served folic xcars activities tinder the clii?ector of as the -national security aide the National Security Agency,1 of then-Vice President Nixon ?the monitoring and cot-10'0'1.0a.- -from 1957 to 1950, and is con- ing agency with headquarters sidered close to Mr. Nixon. at Fort Meade, Md. ? Helms ?will become chair- 0 An office of Defense In- man Of a reconstituted U.S. inv vestigations, to consolidate all telligence board to considei? personnel security investiga- national intelligence require-. tions in the Defense Depart.- . ments and priorities, the semi- ment.idly ? 0 A Defense m-ap agency to Of intelligence data and the protection of intelligence "Inhirm the now separate ? mapping, charting and geo- sources and methods. detic.organizations of the mill- Other members of the board tiny services. ? Officials said the reorganiza: ?vill be Cushman, chiefs of ? the major intelligence agen- tion is "not a plan to save ? cies Of the Defense and State. Departments and representa- tives. of the Treasury Depart- 77 ? 3nellt, Federal Bureau of In- 0, Deputy Defense Secoe-../Viashillorit-o?il- ttiry David Packard,. ono of they National Terms moat outspoken government of- ficials, indicated he was lint ell- 1)1e,:so,,f; by the way the struggile had worhed out. ? ? '".1.'hore have. keen prone thinking if we just had someone over in the. White House to ride herd on this over-all intelligence that things would be improved," he said. "I don't really support that view. After having experi- ence with a .lot of people- in the White house the last couple. of years, trying to coordinate all kinds of things, I think if any- thing we need a little less-.C.301.- dinationofrom that point than -Because the Defense Depart- ment spends most of the. money and employs, most of the peo- ple and. machines involved in the changes.. will have a major impact there. Consolidation Is Hey The President ordered the consolidation of all Defense De- partment security investigations into a s,:ngle Office, of.))eferise Investigations and the consoli- dation of all mapping and chart- ing activities into a Defense Map Agency. Defense officials Although the tendency is to think in terms of national 'in- telligence?the kind of informa- tion on v.rhich the President bases major decisions, for ex- -bulk of the intel- ligence gathered by the various agencies is ol a tactical nature, involving such things as the day- to-day movements of potentially hostile ships. The -White House said Helms a career intelligence officer, would tura over most of his CIA operational responsibilities to his deputy, Marine Lt. Gtm. Robert E. Cushman Jr., So' he can devote more time to the leadership of the -over-all in- telligence community. . Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mictn, 0? chairman of a House ?Armed Services subcop?,ittee that has ;been looking into the nation's intelligence operations, said his concern is that the changes or- dered by the President place / an added burden on Helms who, he said, already has a. "super- j ? human ob." ? . 'One wonders if any human is- apable of that kind. of respon- sibility,' he STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-13DP80-01601R001300400001-6 I J ,N Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :[clAkRpri80-016 HICTITAT if) HELMS IIENTri: ISSJisCFfl C 04&./ c.\ji (7 :11 if If- !!' 0 ? r ii , ' - I/ , 13 ri ? I + 1. ri i..n cl i.r.11i 'ij:".i 11 li ij i ii c-,2) i 11 11 :1 \:-..-':::., t! LI !i :-.-T`l \.:::,::? il IA ,,,-.1 ? By GARNETT D. 110nNER -Star Staff Writer The White House announced a series of steps today aimed Among other changes .ordered at improving U.S. foreign intellk;ence. . by the President the White. . - The new setup in effect makes Central Intellic,"cnce Agency House said, a National Crypto- Director Richard Helms a sort of super boss of all government logic Command will be set up intelligence operations, inlcuding Fentaon activities in this field, under the director o'f. the Nation- As the White House put it, Helms will have "an enhanc'ed al Seclirity Agenc,y to consoli- leadership role" in planning, re- lec-7-17311Je1 intethgence pro. date code-brealdnq ,, activities viewing, and evaluating, all incl - grarn budet.." now carried out .by sepearate ligence progriuns and activities. In this 'role, the offichds said_ agencies. -? . 'Officials said the CIA director the CIA director v,ould have a To rir.! C.onsolidatea will delegate moat of his CIA key voice in the allocation. of Another change involves con- operational responsibilities to available rescul'ces b c t vi 0 0 n solida tion of ml Defense Depart- . the deputy director, now Marine so-called "tactical intelligence" inent personnel security investi-. Lt. Oen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., of the military service intelli- gations into a single Office of in order to give more - time to gence arms and broader-scale Defense Inve.stigations. I leadership of the intelligence 'activities. - The President also directed community as a whole.l The CIA director also is made that a Defense Map Agency be 1 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, pres..i_Ichairman of a reconstituted U.S. created by combining the now- dent NixOn's assistant for na- intelligence board, which in separate ma ping charting and tional security arfa-i,c; .0;,.,., ,, dudes di.rectors of the State De- eodetic organizations of the given a key role in -16,,,,,',..partment s Bureau of ? Int0M military services in order to gence field as chairman oefaja genc! arld Research, the N ationr.achieve maximum efficiency National Security Council Intelli- ' Security Agency, the director , and economy. of the Defense Intellicience i The White House said the gence Committee. ,., Agency, and representatives of President's cl?jectives in order- - The WhiLe House said this the Treasury Department, the inn the changes in the intelli- committee "will give direction FBI and the Atomic Energy igence field n0 to ITSUre continu- and guidance on notional MI:011i- oornihissi011. . I mi,c review of the responsiveness, gence needs ,and provide for a This board, the White Rouse of intelligence effort to national commumg evaluation of nitelli- said, will "advise and assist" 1 i needs; streng,thend leadership gence products from Lle v-7-'w- the CIA director "with respect for the community as a whole; ? point of the intelligence user." to the production of rational in-. more efficient use of rcsourcs The CIA director will be a mom- telligence, the establishment of in the collection of intelligence ber of this committee. national intelligence reginre- information; elimination of less Much of the CIA director's ments and priorities, the super- efficient or out-moded activities, new power wilt come from his vision of the dissemmation and .and "improvement in the quail- role as chairman of a new Intel- security of intelligence material, ty, scope and timeliness of intel- ligence H e s o u r c e s Advisory and the protection of intelligence ligence information," Committee, which will actykx; sources and inethods." . -.him "on the Preparation of a . . Approved. For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 ? STATINTL ? WASIIIIIGT011 POG9 Approved For Release 2 .'e1?-',., j ',..... 0 - \ 0 1- 0 Sri .. ?. t ? ????,, ,-- - hft ,..,, ?., i/MOCICIA-RDP80-01601 STATI NTL 14114 v -tv Fi1 s I I, y Li!ltek,k Cited in By Sttntley Karnow. _ , There et-c'e these, particu- 'won either NVfty, F311Ce PC- ' . 1- 1 1.1 d Anthony Astrachan .. . laylv inside the official U.S. ling had a:..:,Teed to the pies_ foreit?tn Po-lie. aPParatus, ,ident's visit ss Ii te. t the . wasbalatoa P.xA St p.f f Writer.-; . . Wl10 - See it latigely as a mc- outcome at the U.N." Q. Mr. SeerefulT, wil11 00 rhanical failure sustained by in terms of energey ex. poll think We lost? the bureaucracy. They con- Tended for results attained, ? , A. We . didn't /one the: . tend that the day could have- they , 41e. real American aa Votes, (Laughter) been saved had the united loser at the U.N. seems to 1. . Q. Seriously, 1 mewl ? : ? . States had more time to sell have been the State Depart- Secretary of State William its position and, anl?rIg ment. Its setback appears to riori,iersi4News confcrencc, Oct. other things, had certain reinforce the prevailing 26, him A m e r 5 e a n ambassadors Washington view that its . Last MonclaV ni,lit the abroadi,?erformed better. role in foreign affairs is neg. _United States' rnet.%"-stitit- M th any of ese officials ligible compared b..," the . . also argue that the adminis- power wielded by the Presi- . ning diplomatic defeat as a , tration's "dual 1? r1 dc?if, and Kla5iinf,fer. majority of the -General As. lion" proposal was biller- Preparatiofts for the Gen- sembly voted to expel Na, ently contradicted, by 11 that .,.., --le eral Assembly vote at oc- ,tionalist China from the Presenee of IlenrY 1\-Issin- curred on Monday night United Nations and seat the per, President Nixon's na- . reach back to the U.N. de. 'Chinese Communist 'regime ti?nal security athlsen, in bate on China that took its the intermitional 01 'III roking just as Yaso,Ingtou pittee llearlY?a Year ago. zation, :. .waS urging nations to sup- . The U.S. setback appeared port a U.N. position viru- , then, the United Stittes Ii For two decades before to he devastating because so ,,, . ,,"1)().st'cl . , bY the systematically rejected the Jenny ijrnany American officials in ? idea of bringing the Chinese kaninese uommunisis. On tile other side, several - a na \ s s 111 ?111( 011 - 0 the U0111MUniStS pointer- -Washington, New York and ... 1 .,..i ? . i t - f ti government e x p r e s s the national organization in any 'around the World had ". worked so hard to Prevent- opinion that the entire U N shape 2r forrOal. But on Nov. that outcome. exercise Was actually a Clla. ? ? 12, 1910, there *Was a hint that the old U.S. line was - Early this month, for ex- rade staged by the adminis- . . --ample, Secretary of State tration for two essential mo- shifting'. Christopher Rogers talked with a tot es- al of tiv- -to fend off the Presi- Ambassador , If. Phillips, the deputy chief 92 foreign ministers and dent's conservative critic's - at home and to assure of the American mission to . America's conservative al- the U.N., asserted in a other foreign delegates in an . effort to persuade them ,. ? speech that day that the failed of adoption, however, because the United Stales had won its motion to Make the issue an "important question" requiring a two- thirds margin. . The narrowness of that victory made it plain to the White house that the United States urgently needed a new policy lest it suffer a defeat in the next round on-China. On Nov. 19, 1970, consequently, Kissin- ? ger sent a National Security- Memorandum to Secretary Rogers requesting the crea- tion of a special committee to review the Chinese repre- sentation issue and. to Yee- ommend fresh strategy. Headed by Assistant Sec- retary of State Samuel de Palma, chief of. the Bureau of International Organiza- tion Affairs, the committee comprised ? about 35 State Department and Central In ? V i LS tisk- ? Cr (IL" paper to be sent to the Na- tional Security Council, which inturn would advise which in turn would advise As it held its delibera- tions, the committee grad- ually became pOlarized be abroad that the United to' support the U S. position 4- United. et`,1e31 110 K i to See . to eon members who favored -, states does not betray its which favored the entry of friends. , - . Communist China "play a ' Pc! without ousting partisa?s of this lb constructive role aniong the all-out support for Peking s Chiang Kaiisheh's National- consider it significant that family of nations." . admission to the U.N. and ists. George Bush; the chief the President carefully re- ? Phillips implied in the advocates of both Com- s . American. representative at frained from -dep c- lorin the same speech that the United m u n i t and Nationalist repyesentzttion in the inter- Texas Politician to swing' instead de o dr It des ' . the U.N., lobbied lit a ztclyerse U.N. vote itseff but S.:0?1-tis t\i'.1.e?111.1_(-1Lxii.iv.?ckieltrAate tleo ii 1101 body. Nobody .be - votes behind the "dual rep- who cheered the final seore. -block the ouster of National- lieved, ? in short, that the neuncega resentation" proposal.informants with aCOSS to 1st China. The article stipu. Communists could be kept. c ' Meanwhile, U.S. envoys in Kissinger also now rceall lates that a member nation out. ? that he treatea the U.N. can only be expelled by a in February, Waal' examin- places as familiar DS LOnclon "as if it didn't nuttier." and as exotic aF, the' Trucial jssue tWo-thirds vole.- 111'1 a wide assortment Of Straddling these divergent Although it was not en- ,b Coast were striving to sway the consmittee Sb-- kingpre- s, dictators, Presidents, explanations, so3ne sources tirely clear at the time, the sent ed the White House ttons, premiers and lesser foreign point out that the choice Phillips statement signalled ?? prineipal Options dignitaries into baching the facing the administration that the United States was wl":?1 two American stance, was never as cicarcut as it e'dging towards the 'dual arnal'a'31e4,. li What went wrong?.01. was ceemed to be--and that, in rePresenUltion" Position it `'ne o' ?lase' 1 av?red TV a-is these who wanted to S2C the result of the U?N? void so lits Cu White Nouse .would later ' put forth. in now ,i,),.)roaoh was prompted .only the Communists in the really a failure for 11-10 preferred to shroucl ils strat- ' 'I' U.N., became lenot?vn ill egy in atnbiguity. by the 1970 vote on China. s.11oo State Department. jargon as Nixon administration? . . In the post mortems that For the first time 1 "se " follow uc sh historic . epi? "From the President's the U.N. strutgOe the inl with the ship . over . so les versions of 'What, how, there were risks Chinese! representation had geunbit It recommended? that the administration con, and as the event unfolclud and gains in eithe r r begun esult bn, , the s1 ii Al ? Unite to back the Natioirl- inevitably differ etecording and he wfts ivepared to ae- ? , banian appeal etilling for Pe. ? : ' - ? ' `? ist.? ex, lusit eV-- huts ith a , ept ocuo says one of these s - s ' - a - : i ' full awai eness that they nd the ?exoul to the ViCAVpoint of the l'iar- --- ? . Ariiltitliwa. 141?C.:1. 1411111's c ? ? (!) a? :,? clan Qf the Nationahqs?car- ' - . "--- tr. .., ?OtWA t.? win 1 v.' eas q)2rwl-11 3 , 1 . wolil,?Ao,,e,and thus open WMM?dit-Nocking's entry. ,int,r.. tior0/014ctiltlicic lAiIROPc80,1316111R001,3004 .broad categories ? 0 CP.t TIATTOITAIJ oumaual Approved For Release 200f/034O411A-RDP80- By Robert Barkan Pacific News Set vice .. Washington "1984" may arrive ahead of schedule. While Army intelligence agents have been quietly amassing extensive files on dissidents, scientists have even more quiet- rj. fl ?? 111, f; k;s . . ?..S.:..) Q..' STATI NTL A.concfltion for bai! 7file transponders proposed by Meyer would be attached to the "subscribers" as a condition of bail or parole. Each subscriber Would be identified by a code transmitted. several times a minute to a. computer via a network of transceivers deployed around ly been developing the technology that will town like police call-boxes. The computer enable a computer. to control "criminal" would record the "subscriber's" location actions and emotions. ' and compare it with his "normal sche- "1984" is still fiction, but no longer ' club," checking for any "territorial or cur- science fiction.. The technology of the po- lice state is ready. All that remains is for . the governmen CU). implement it. ' ? ? The first 'covert slop in that direction may have already been taken. In the Janu- -ry issue of Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, engineer Joseph Meyer proposed attaching miniature electronic tracking devices to 20 million Americans. These "transponders" would be linked by radio to a computer which would monitor the wearers' locations and implement cur-- few and territorial restrictions. Pentac;on silant ? . . .Meyer, a computer specialist, has spent his last 17 years working for the Defense Department. Yet the Pentagon has made' no public statement concerning his propos- al. Interestingly, Moyer neglected in his ar- ticle to name the particular Defense De- partment agency he works for and he gave his home rather than his business address, an uncommon practice in. technical jour- nals.- Reached by phone in their suburban home, Meyer's wife nervously refused to divulge Mcye:r's telephone number at work, insisting that he could be reached only at 'homer early in the?moffiing. The next day, Meyer laconically refused to name which agency of the Defense Department he works for, but a check with the switch- board operator at the National Security Agency (NSA). found an extension for him there: ? ? Meyer's reticence in naming the Nation- al Security Agency is understandable. The NSA is the most secretive of the dbzen of . _ so agencies that make up the U.S. intern- gence community. Established in 1952 by :a still-classified presidential directive, the agency has remained shrouded in secrecy. 'The NSA has more personnel and larger fa- cilities than the Central Intelligence Agen- cy and twice its budget, yet while volumes have been written about the operations of ?the CIA, very little has been discovered or few restrictions." If the subscriber was out of lino, the computer would instruct the .transponder to "warn" the subscriber of .his violation. The transponders would be "attached" to "subscribers" in such a way that they couldn't be removed without the computer knowing it. Tampering with or discarding transponders would be a felony and a sub- scriber who .did so, would be forced into hiding "everywhere he goes," sought by the FBI. Meyer wants the transponders as- signed "on a fairly long-term basis," so that the "subscriber" "will acquire long exper- ience in not committing crimes." The scheme's purpose, says Meyer, is to "constrain criminals and arrestees into be- having like law-abiding citizens," but in practice the computer?and its human pro- grammer?would control the everyday acti- vities of the people plugged into it."Stib- scribers" would be identified by a code transmitted several times a minute to a computer via a network of transceivers will "stay close to home; to avoid being impli- cated in crimes." At work a "human sur- veillance system" will keep them under control. Estimating that the number of trans- ceivers needed for surveillance in a large city would be about the same as the num- ber of policemen, Meyer has all the details worked out. In New York City's black community of Harlem, for example, the transceivers would be strung at one block, intervals "along 110th Street, 114th, 118th, etc., from 8th Avenue to tiu. river." North-south strings' of transceivers would surveillance .system," he fears, "tunnels be installed "on 8th Avenue and several could _be. dug under the streets or move- n-lain streets to the east." Only about 250 ment through the sewer system. could be . transceivers would be "capable of monia tried." Worse yet, there might be "massive toring the whole region on a street- destruction" of transponders in "mutinies by-street basis." . .? ? ; and large-scale. confrontations." Like every good engineer, Meyer covers ; "An outright revolt by 25 million arrest- all the "system parameters" in his propos- ees and criminals," Meyer warns, "would al?including its social implications. If laws, be troublesome." , police, prosecutors, courts, prisons, news feet, he says, then his scheme could be proved on the .basis of its "efficiency." But he admits that criminal acts are frequently a response to "the social and economic system." Most people arrested are poor, members of minoritygroups, or "products of deplorable circumstances." Coat a pro hdm, The Pentagon engineer nonetheless comes out predictably on the side of law . and order. The basic problem in preventing the pc.). and the black from committing the "criminal acts". with which they re- spond to the system and their deplorable circumstances is to ."persuade or conch-- tion" them to "play by the rather arbitrary rules of 'the social. system." This .can. be done, says Meyer, "by providing costs for misbehavior and payoffs .for compliance." But the' costs - are much clearer than? the payoffs--"attaching transponders to arrest- ees and criminals will put. them into an electronic surveillance system that will make it very difficult for them to commit crimes, or even to violate territorial or cur- few restrictions, without immediate ap- prehension." Joseph Meyer recognizes that his transponder, surveillance system could lead to a "police state," but "the same could be said about police, jails, courts, Jaws, taxes and so on." . . Transponders, he thinks; will help the .government protect itself from the people. For example, they might be used as "puni- tive devices" against political "criminals," that- is, "for arrests following riots or con- frontations." If the system is successful, Meyer 'proposes_ that plans be made for "monitoring aliens and political sub- groups." Later, when the U.S. again .me.d- dies- in the internal affairs of another coun- try, transponders might be used for "de- fense purposes, to monitor guerrilla or dis- sident activities in foreign areas." Rent a transponde- Meanwhile' Meyer worries that his sys- tem will not ,work. "To evade the street- disclosed about he NSA. ? meduaaa ".sccarety..a'? p - Approved For Release zuuliu3iu4 : LAA-mDM-01601R001300400004-6 ? l'iASIIINGT,01.4 UST 2 ocT 1971 STATINT Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-016 iT II" .11 11 JILi 1/5 k) By Chalmers M. Roberts Additions and omissions mark former President Johnson's account of the 1964-65 escalation of the Vietnam war, it is evident from the excerpts from his book published today. Probably the single most .disPuted issue in Mr. John- son's conduct of the war was the alleged Aug. 4, 1904, at- tack in the Tonkin Gulf by North Vietnamese boats on ? two American destroyers, the Maddox and Turner Joy. Mr. Johnson declared then, and reaffirms in his book, that the evidence of the at- :tack was conclusive. As a re- sult he sought and got the Tonkin Gulf Resolution from Congress. , But his critios contend the attack either never took place or even if something did occur Mr. Johnson blew it up out of all proportion because he already was de- termined to strike North Vietnam from the air. At least three books have now been written about the af- fair and the thrust of each has been on the critical side. American intercepts of North Vietnamese messages were heavily relied upon at the time to prove that the . f!711(2 1., 114' ? attack took place. Their texts, however, have never been made public though Defense Secretary Robert S. -McNamara in 1958 did sum- marize them for the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- tee and show the texts to the senators in private. Now the former President quotes from two of the messages and concludes that "clearly the North Vietnamese knew they were attacking' us." ,The quotes will not satisfy the doubters.. Why did not Mr. Johnson reveal the com- plete texts, they will ask? And why not, indeed. Cryp- tographic protection is the usual answer but it is not convincing, given the nature of current procedures at the time. Mr. Johnson thus would seem only to have re- opened the argument. In this installment of his memoirs the former Presi- dent discusses four of the first five major Vietnam de- cisions. The Tonkin retalia- tion was one of them; the Johns Hopkins speech an- other; the policy of reprisal by air another. The fifth "and by far the hardest" was sending ground troops to Vietnam to join the bat- tle. As the former :President Co Ce )ri (1_1-vq 11"( Jzi / td . describes all these decisions, each was reached with great soul searching. Yet, read as a whole in hindsight, there was an inevitable progres- sion from one to the other, especially from Rolling Thunder, the air campaign against the North,- to the shipment of massive num- bers of troops to the South, ? As he so often did while in office, Mr. ,Iohnsen saw his actions as steps logically following the policies of his two predecessors, Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. Omitted from today's ex- cerpts arc descriptions of Gen. Eisenhower's personal encouragement to his. John- son.) The air war simply was not enough; only ground forces could save South Vietnam. In March, 1955, Gen., William Westmore- land's request for the first two Marine battalions was granted. Then on April I came the bill decision to beef up the manpower though the Army forces still were described as "logistic and support." It would be only a matter of time, however, until combat forces would have to go as such. ? Mr. Johnson's account of the April 1 decision lists three steps as "among the .).r,L1P) !. 1.-/ ? Q.) 1.1 ( specific military actions I approved." But the Penta- gon papers made public something the former Presi- dent totally skips: his in- structions to avoid telling the American public about the major steps he was tak- ing. This was contained in the National Security Action Memorandum 328, over the. signature of McGeorge Bundy, to the Secretaries of ? State and Defense and the head of the CIA detailing Mr. Johnson's "decisions." It was this memorandum which contained the state- ment that "the President de- sires" that "premature pub- licity be avoided by all pos- sible precaution" on the key new military steps. "The President's desire," the. memo concluded, "is that 'these movements and changes should be under- stood as being. gradual and . wholly consistent with exist- ing policy." If this decision then was to be painted as "wholly consistent with existing pol- icy" how can it now be "by far the hardest" of five, deci- sions Mr. Johnson had then taken E,Lbout the war? lierein lies part of the credibility gap that plagued him in of- fice and which today's in- stallment fails to dispel. STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 WASHINGTON FQ.SY, STATI NTL Approved For Release 266)1_.0 :ICIA-RDP80-01601R00 1f7 71 OfiSgreQ95 ./ e10) 30111VE/IZ C.) ? 11110II 0iTIL11.Th1 filitte-ltac, Obi!, This is the fourth of 15 'excerpts from former President Johnson's book, "The Vantage Point," an cm- count of his presidency, to be pub- lished shortly. . "CIIAT,LENCE AND RESPONSE ' ,VIETNAM 1961-1065" In August 1904 an unexpected crisis developed, one that threatened for a time to change the nature of the war In 'Vietnam. During the early hours.of. .Suuday morning, August 2, a high- priority message came in reporting that North Vietnamese torpedo boats had attacked the destroyer USS Mad- dox in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Maddox was on what we called the De Soto patrol. One purpose was to spot evidence of Hanoi's continuing infiltration of men and war supplies into South Vietnam by sea. Another .was to gather electronic intelligence. Another form of naval activity, not connected' with our patrol, was going 17 on in the area. During 1954 the South) Vietnamese navy made small-scale strikes against installations along the North Vietnamese coast. The purpose was to interfere with Hanoi's continu- ing program of sending men and sup- plies into the South by sea. Senators - and Representatives designated to oversee our intelligence op'erations were fully briefed on these South Viet- namese activities, and on our support- ing role, in January 1964, again in May, twice in June, and again in e.arly Au- - se- ??, va31110,a61.1cJe - 4 k kti) 1.112,11, . During the afternoon additional in ' reports flowed in. We inter 'cepted a message from one of the a :tacking North Vietnamese boats Ic which it boasted of ha.ving fired at tw "enemy airplanes" and claimed to hay damaged one. The North Vietnamest skipper reported that his unit had "sacrificed two comrades." Our experts-STATINTL said this meant either two enemy boats or two in the attack group. An-- other message to North Vietnamese PT boat headquarters boasted: "Enemy vessel perhaps wounded." Clearly the North Vietnamese knew they were at- tacking us.. Action ?reports continued to arrive from our destroyers, and from the Pa- cific Command. A few were ambigu- ous. One from the destroyer Maddox questioned whether the many reports of enemy torpedo firings were all valid. I instructed McNamara to investi- ? gate these reports and obtain clarifica- tion. lie immediately got in touch with Admiral U. S. G. Sharp jr., the Com- mander in Chief, Pacific, and the Ad- miral in turn made contact with the De Soto patrol. McNamara and his ci- vilian and military specialist went over all the evidence in specific detail. We wanted to be absolutely certain that our ships had .actually been attacked before we 'retaliated. Admiral Sharp called McNamara to The . message that 'strongly Indicated the North Vietnamese Were preparing an- - , - ? other attack on our ships in the Ton- from the destroyer ly.Tadclox that its tailed studies made after the incident kin Gulf. Soon we roceived messages reached the same firm conclusion. De- radar and that of the USS C. ".Curnen? to be hostile. The enemy ships ap- peared to be preparing an ambush, and our plans for a sharp but limited Joy had spotted vessels they believed The Maddox and C. Turner ;Toy had changed course to avoid contact, but they then sent word that the enemy vessels, were closing in at high speed. sional resolution of support for our en- Within an hour the destroyers advised that they were being attacked by tor- pedoes and were firing on the enemy PT boats. As messages flowed in from Namara passed along the key facts to Pacific Command Headquarters, Mc- with me." me. cuss the situation in Cyprus, and say- that session. ? . the National Security Council to dis, fairs or in the domestic field. oral key Advisers had assembled for We had scheduled a noon meeting of ion that 'I .k . _.--- _ report that after checking all the re- ports and evidence he had no doubt whatsoever that an attack had taken place. McNamara and his associates confirmed this judgment. p.m. to discuss in detail the incident. response. About seven o'clock I met Council for another meeting at 6:15 with the congressional leadership in the White House for the same purpose. further action, and that I did not I told them that I believed a emigres- tire position in Southeast Asia was hand. I said that vie might be forced to necessary and would strengthen our became President, to seek the fullest "want to go in unless Congress goes in .itpport of Congress for any major Re- told Secretaries -Rusk and McNamara that I never wanted to receive any rec- ommendation for action we might have I summoned the National Security I was determined, from the time 1 Concerning Vietnam, I repeatedly 'I took, whether in foreign af- . . . attacks would occur. .. ? I closed the NSC meeting and asked o take unless it was accompanied by a Two days later the North Vietnam- Rusk, McNamara, Vance, T,IcConc, and proposal for assuring the backing of ? .: cso struck again at our destroyers, this _Bundy to join me for lunch. The unani- Congress. ? ' Because of tins time at night (midmorning \Ir a s iii n g to n mous view of those advisers was that f suggestions ons all contingency plans to include , It became routine . . time) on August 4. A few minutes after we could not ignore this second provo- ? ? for ? inform ? .ing Congress nine o'clock I had a call from Mc- cation and that the attack required re-' and winning its support. As we consul- Namara. -Ha in ?ormed me that our in- tallatione I agreed. We decided on air ered the possibility of having to ex- telligenco pc PPraQVildrRYgReicta$0403101014viGAIRDR8 TO NA ?fmtowittoonit,00,voIrs, .boats and their bases plus a strike on became part of the normal contingency' . fe.:emet i'r,t) ca gust. Secretary McNamara?cle-scribed the operations, codonamed 34-A, in a, closed session with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee - on August 3, 1901. ? One 34-A attack occurred on July 30. At the time, the destroyer Maddox had not started its patrol and was 1.20 miles away. A second South Vietnamese at- tack took place the night of August 3 when the Do Soto patrol was at least '10 iniloc away. It was later alleged that our destroyers were supporting the, South Vietnamese naval action. The fact is our De Soto commanders did :not- even know where or when the 34-A Approved For Release 2o9rattf: wil;-R? DP80-01 STATIN 1,Q) IL h k, 21. ? IrrT1 Ift(-0) I C'T 114 t " 0 .6 ? ! v , i I-. ..?,, :?F-5. - ..1 A ., ,--,.1 y-7-, ,:.,--- .11 :-, 1 i .----? .1 il .; ,---\, ---'!'-'-', 6M CI ilic''''.-r'r) ( i) .' .? '' - .11. 1.j...-...1. 10?\,-I. - Ail WI L_:-/,.?L -?) "--,a, -- _-). JON) lik----0 1 1 i -I 1,--' 1.,,i I 1:- Lli .. , . ? ? - - ? - - .... -... .? By mew Deci,yriall agencies. Diplomatic cables _ go first to Kissinger is occasionally called, and . .- . . . _? -_ Mr. Eteoliiman 7 the Department of State, intelligence A IcAlanus receives several calls a is a member, ?of Tile ibu c s Washington atn eon ? reports are routed to the Central Intellk,/ week on the White Ifou hone se p next to Trn.' . . e is. gence Agency, and military up-dates his bed. &signed to the ,White. House. d . ' are moved to the Pentagon. . Ile and James Fazio, 33, deputy di- ' WASIIINGTON--Mom than.1,POO intel- However, intelligence- outposts, when- rector of the Situation Room, take turns ...,. cc they are radar stations in the frozen being "on call " 'Whoever is on call Pence reports a day poCC into a plainly - Arctic keeping an eye on flight patterns never goes to !?-? 1 without telephoning decorated suite of rooms nestled into 'a corner of the White House basement'. Many are routine but the knowledge of Soviet bombers. over the North Pole, the, duty officer for an update on re- or intelligence vessels tailing a Soviet ports and, when not in bed, is never that reports of any attack on the United States by a hostile power would reach submarine off the North Carolina coast, without a "page boy," an electronic first creates a re?cooker 1 aye the ca,pability to flash information device the size of a tiny transistor radio directly to the White House.: - Nvhose buzz can be adivated in the Situ-? here. pressu at- . naosphere for the young staff that mans: ation Room, signalling its carrier to the facility 24 hours a day, seven days Dozen- Teletype illechines immediately telephone his office. a week. . ? The overthrow of a head of state, The two young intelligence analysts There are no holidays in the, 'White unusual bomber deployments by a po- ' ' . i.a.,Iso tal,-.?, turns comino- inta the (nee c' . , . oril- af!er d'orn to put the finishing' lious.e Situation Room, the strategically . imp-ortant focal point Upell Whin the 0. . . . , tentially hostile power or the sigiAing ,, , / '- ?:' i missiles heading toward the United gence briefing.. on the President's daily !LIME-. President of the. United States must sates W01114 be flamed directly to the - The three. or four page report., carry: rely for instant information, Modern White House Situation Robm. ing 10 to 12 single or double paragraph communications, Well-orzanized (lissom- Inc reports move into the White items, represents the highlights of re - illation procedures and a dedicated House on one of a dozen teletype ma- . ports received durii-zg the previous 24 staff are intertwined with a world-w'ide chines in the 'bomb shelter under the hours. Kissinger wants it by 8 a. in. intelligence network and aimed at a East Wirw and are dispatched immedi- and sometimes asks that items be ' re - goal of inforining. the President of atei to ti.:1', a. . ;51tuation Room, in the West events anyv.,hCie in the world within ., . Y . ' , 1 wordad to more accurately reflect his Wing, via a pneumatic tube, arrivirri '-). .feeling on a subject. ? :Minutes after they occur. . there 34 seconds later. . i Dependent on Other Agencies 4 "It's our daily newspaper," said Mo- onOne of the two or three duty . officers Manus, "but we don't try to be.compre- ? duty receives the report and has the hensive." An effort is made, however,. David ..-.1e:\-lanus, 34, the quietly confi- authority to instantly and personally to foeus On what CLUTently is under dis- dent director of the Situation Room is contact :the President, regardless of the . cussion in the National Security Coon- quick to -emphasize that the success of time of day or night, if he believes the . Ills operation is dependent, in a large report is of such importance. The ea- cil. The daily briefing, which Kissinger m ne easure, to similar intelligereceiv- pability for instant Presidential contact ing facilities in the Departments of is maintained by the Army Signal Carries in to the President, is not intend- w? p, State and Defense, and in the Central Corps and is there whether theed to serve as a orking aper but is Presi- ,. Intelligence Agency., dent is sleeping in the White House res- designed to present, in capsule form for ' - "We ?live off the fruits of other agen- idence, working in his Oval Office, On the chief executive, the latest develop- cies," he said during an interview in board Air Force I over.. the Pacific, or milts thruout the .world. the paneled conference room, where the riding in a motorcade thru downtown Daily status reports on the action in South Viet Now are included. Several Indirect lighting, the cork wall designed Belgrade. weeks ago, Nixon learned the results of ? for easy stamping of world maps, and "if the missiles' are coming - our way, a bombing raid he had ordered to wipe the President has to know it," ?Mc- out a fuel clump nea'r the demilitarized. the impressive-looking rectangular con- ference table leave a visitor with the Manus explained. ? . ? zone in North Viet Nam, when he read feeling that the room could be usect as Those same duty officers also have,. the report from the Situation Room. a - movie - prop for a Mita House war the authority to immediately contact Nixon has spent _little time in the room. . . . Henry Kissinger, Nixon's assistant for guration, in marked room since his inau ? national security affairs, or McMinus, contrast to his predecessor. . Il_cl,\Ianus, in an obvious. effort to if a report arrives that requires some "President Johnson was here a lot," EtifIc,, interagency rivalries that once eMaii rampant in the United States in- quick attention. , . ? recalled McManus, who served as Eat- telligence community, estimated that 07 T-r? ? - ., Occasionally Called . 0gei per cent -of 11,11L,.atrarts.icsi'63;;Ii-:t Lease2001 103/0"4,1sCIALRI1P80 -01 601 R001360*(46'4 " .Situat ion RooSP-His9M-Ptiaill-- -6 dozen rooms---are relayed thru Other called by one of the duty officers, bUt . , -(3 ? - - - -.- :ii- 11 , _ ?....,:_. ......._.. -11-itI). -i-..1 In (:.,...? ?.., .,,.... ? 1 .._, d . , .)::?,.?).-. 1...? U).L., L.. rOmlaCIT KITAIRS October 1.971 Apprc?lePI-.6t9t; .1.Riga.IM9PI49WS WIRJ.9?13 FOREIGN. POLICY ? ? By G4erles T. Yost 177'-',IIIER.E are many diffefent ways of conducting a govern- ,' : ment. In the United States the executive authority is both -- more formally centralized in the President and. more sharply separated. from the legislature than in most democracies. This is particularly true of the conduct of foreign. affairs, where the authority of the President has been seriously challenged . only in those rare instances, such as the Versailles Treaty or the Vietnam war, when he seems to be grossly ignoring or overriding the opinions bath of the Congress and of the public.' In general, he has been free to conduct fol'eign affairs more or less as he chooses, to use traditional instruments, to set up new ones or to carry on diplomacy from his own hip pocket. There is little use arguing whether or not he has the constitutional right to do so. As our government is organized., he has both the re- sponsibility and the power. Critics in or out of the Congress can makefthings.difficult for him, but they can neither conduct for- eign affairs themselves nor prevent him from doing so. Of course, ?11 wise President will consult the Congress closely, in fact as well as in form, on matters of major import, which reeent presidents have often foolishly failed to do. . Our donce'rn 'here, _however, is with the instruments which Presidents UN for the conduct, of foreign affairs. Up until the .19305 the instrument wa.s almost always the traditional one, the Secretary and Department of State, except in those not infre- quent cases where a strong President, such as Theodore Roose- velt and Woodrow Wilson, chose to ,carry on a particular exer- cise in diplomacy himself, sometimes with the help of a personal adviser or emissary. Nevertheless,, as late as 1931, President Hoover, though . not himself inexperienced. in foreign affairs, relied on Secretary Stimsoa .to deal, in. so far as the United_ States was prCTar.ed to deal, with the Manchurian crises. Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, just at the moment when the rise to power of ambitious dictators in both Europe and Asia made inevitable much deeper American involvement in foreign affairs, named as Secretary of State, almost entirely for domestic political reasons, an eminent Senator, Cordell Hull, who had 'unhappily neither the 'taste nor the talent for the conduct of foreign affairs. -Nevertheless, again for domestic political .rea- sons, he remained in office for nearly 12 years, longer than any previous Secretary of State. This did not seriously disturb FDR, who was contemptuous of the diplomatic establishment and overestimated his ov,rn capacity to direct domestic and for- eign, and later military, affairs personally and.simultaneously. ? Even Roosevelt, however,- while bypassing Hull as much as he 'could, at first placed his own men, On whom he did to some ex- tent rely, inside the State Department itself?Y./dies and. later Stettinius as Undel.'? Secretary, Moley and Berle as. Assistant Secretaries and Bullitt an 1, K-crne a aS''',f11.01s a tile API:K.91110E*.130q.#1,-Z9,Plipt (94,A, ti$t- i(47351.R01$141V0400001-6ont . c inuod. STATI-NTL ly 1 Approved For Release ttt40,51.,:rcIA-RDP80-01 :For some time I have been disturbed by the way the CIA has been diverted from its original 'assignment. It has become an operational and. at times policy-making arm of the government. I never thought when I set up the rin that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and- dagger operations. ?ox-President Harry S. Truman. OTI I ING .has happened since that prOnouncement by the agency's creator in December 1963 to remove or reduce the cause for concern over the CIA's develop- ment. As currently organized, supervised, structured and led, it may be that the CIA has outlived its usefulness. Conceivably, its very existence causes the President and the J National Security Council to rely too much on clandestine operations. Possibly its reputation,- regardless of the facts, is now so bad that as a foreign policy instrument the agency has become counter-productive. Unfortunately the issue of its efficiency, as measured by its performance in preventing past intelligence failures and consequent foreign policy fiascos, is always avoided on grounds of "secrecy". So American taxpayers provide upwards 'of 57.50,000,000 a year for the CIA without knowing how the money is spent or to what extent the CIA. fulfils or exceeds its authorized intelligence functions. ? The gathering of intelligence is a necessary and legitimate activity in time of peace as well as in war. But it does, raise a very real problem of the proper place and control of agents who are required, or authorized on their own _ recognizance., to commit acts of espionage. In a democracy it also poses the dilemma of secret activities and the values of a free society. Secrecy is obviously essential for espionage but it can be ? and has been ? perverted to hide intelligence activities even . from those with the constitutional re- sponsibility to sanction them. A common rationalization is, the phrase "If the Ambassador/Secretary/President doesn't know he won't have to lie to cover up." The prolonged birth of the CIA was marked by a reluctance on the part of. politicians and others to face these difficulties, and the agency as it came to exist still bears the marks of this indecision. ? Wiiat we need to do is to examine how the .U.S. gathers its intelligence and consider how effective its instruments are and what room there is for improvement. Every govern- ment agen4y?pproomedcFornReEeasei2001t03104.tht lkiiltikV41-601R001300400001,6 - ho CIA's Director, acknowledged before the American Society of Newspaper F be supervised i Intelligence Agi The time is lo supervisory rolc Central Intellig War. Under thi. CIA administra of inquiry by i and specificall\ requiring disci' titles, salaries CIA; (ii) expo tions on expel the Director's without adver Government the Governmc for staff abroai their families 1949 Central I Director a lice With so mi. is seen by rnE stine. Coups, in Guatemala Mossadegh i the ? Cuban failure). The President Kw 28, 1961, \A heralded -- y Because the agency's ?"m..._ ? representative of the unending gar-not-try alit.) life human aspect of espionage? and secret operations. At this 'eye! the stakes are lower and the "struggle" frequently takes bizarre and even ludicrous twists. For, as Alexander Foote noted in his Ilandbbok for Spies, the average agent's real difficulties are concerned with the practice of his trade. The setting up of his transmitters, the obtaining of funds, and the arrangement of his rendezvous. The irritating administra- tive details occupy a disproportionate portion of his waking life." As an example of the administrative hazards, one day in 1960 a technical administrative employee of the CIA stationed at its quasi-secret headquarters in Japan flew to Singapore to conduct a reliability test of a local recruit. On arrivl he checked into one of Singapore's older hotels to receive the would-be spy and his CIA recruiter. Contact was made. The recruit was instructed in what a lie detector test does and was wired up, and the technician, plugged ? tile machine into the room's electrical outlet. Thereupon it blew out all the hotel's lights.. The ensuing confusion and darkness did not cover, a getaway .by the trio. They were discovered, arrested, and jailed as American spies. ? By itself the incident sounds like a sequence from an old Peters Sellers movie, however, its consequences were not nearly so funny. In performing this routine mission the CIA set off a two-stage international incident between England.. and the United States, caused the Secretary of State to write a letter of apology to a foreign chief of state, made the U.S. Ambassador to Singapore look like the proverbial cuckold, the final outcome being a situation wherein the United States Government lied in public STATINTL V STAT I NTL Approved For Release 294:11,49017: gi,kRppso- roe 19 5,40 ,e e ? e "...Although this entire !;e7;CS or eis- rivalries .to be sure, but once thc deci- ettstions was "off the r,ecorci", the Si o.hs are reoefied at the top they arc p.1:*:?et or Ciscussior. for . this riet:c11- carried out with the monolithic tone or 1?.r ineeting v;as especisily ? S517C state power. ? . -flud Subleet. to the previously nu- - riouqed restrictiore." Tho,intelligence community now ---C. Di.-Aig!pis Dillon '. plays an expanded ? and critical role in Dy ini'y.',? Ac;.-22.2 1.--1.e..e'.;arch Croup creating and administering the rea l_ stuff of American foreign policy. CIA . The Central. Intelligence Agency is ' Director Richard Helms presides over a ?one .of the few goverrmental agencies U.S. Intelligence Beard which links the .whose public image has actually im- secret services of all government agen-. proved as a result of the publication of cies, including the FBI. In the White Ithe Pentagon l''apers. Despite disclo- House, Henry Kissinger presides over sures .of "The Agency's" role in assassi- an expanded National Security Cotincil ?nations, sabotage, and coup d'etat s structure which 'Further centralizes consciously intended to subvert rritei?no- covert foreign policy planning. It is here tional law, America's secret agentry that the contingency plans are cooked has actually emerged in some quarters up and the "options" 'se carefully :with the.yeneration?due prophets, or at ' worked out. It is in these closed chain- least the respect. due its suggested effi- ?be_rs, and strangelevian "situation ciency- and accuracy. . rooms" that plans affecting the, lives of Virtually every newspaper edito,r, n,c,it millions are formulated for subsequent 1.6 _mention Daniel Ellsberg himself,. has executiori by a 11:y1:lad of U.S. con- heaped praise on the CIA for the accu- trolled ageneies.and agents. - racy of its estimates detailing the U.S. . ,Increasingly, these schCrnes rely on defeat in VietnameTirne and aahin, the covert tactics whose full rheanir'ig is se- Agency's "level headed professional- dom perceived by. the people affected --:- ism" has been contrasted -with the esca-- be they Americans or people of foreign lotion-overkill orientation of the Penta- cOuntries. The old empires, with. their -gen or the-President's advisers. The colonial_ administrators ? and civilizing .1 -editor of the Christian Science Monitor mission have given way to the more. .even called upon policy makers teson- subtle craftsman Of intervention. Their 'stilt .the CIA more, calling it a "re- manipulations take placc in the. front markably accurate source of infdrma- rooms of neo-colonial institutions and 'tion." But such backhanded praise for the parlors of dependent third world. -Conspirators confuses public under- elites. In this world of realpolitik,--ap- ?tanding of the important and closely pearances are often purposely deceptive -Integrated role which the CIA plays in and political - stances intentionally 1T:is- :advancing the Pax Americana on a leading. The U.S. aggression in Viet- ? ;global scale.: ? ... - ? nam, lest anyone forget, began as-a . For -many, the Pentagon Papers covert involvement largely engineered' provided a? first peck into the inner by the CIA. Similar covert interven- ; sanctum of foreign policy making. As tioris now underway elseWhere in the the government's attempt to suppress world may' be fueling tomorrow's Viet- the study illustrates, the people are-not narns. ' . .-. supposed to have access to the real It. is for. this reason that the Africa plans of their government. On close Research Group, an independent radi-.' inspection, what einerges is not an "inv- .cal res;etrch collective, is .now making -isible government" but an indivisible public Major excerpts from a document system in which each agency offers its Nvhich offers an informed insider's vievl.. own specialized input, and is delegated of the-secret workings of the American its own slice of responsibility. Coordi- intelligance apparatus abroad. Never he complete. text of the document will noted inter-departMental agencies work ..intended for publication, it was made be avail:111)1e for Si in late?Octobr from th 1:5WirroYIR-6110r.aser20041031'04G.rerk-IFthPil Afric.a Research Group, P.O. Box 213, out e diviA . . FleY1 6CUROATt30041001101,6 ' are disagreetnentS an areaueratic lish theentiretext in October, I CIA manipulations. Richard Bissell, the man who led the 1 Cottncil discussion that riight, was well equipped to talk about the CIA. A one- time Yale professor and currently an executive of the United Aircraft Corpo- ration, Bissell served as the CIA's Dep- uty Director until he "resigned" in the wake of the abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba. The blue-ribbon g,roup to which he spoke included-a number of intAig- ence experts including Robert Amory, another former Deputy Director, and-the late CIA chief, AllanDulles, ;long. considered the grand bidman of American' espionage. Their presence was important enough an occasion for international banker Douglas Dillon to ? Q01.45.rtty.,00. i:oriIWS KdER:CC.tlif Approved For Release 2001M3/D4T:CIARDP80-016 IT) 774-7 ,7,21Y.;77'r!li)2 P7 i!. ? ,.._ ., ...- \ [ 6, \.; ,,-----,, ...., .,..i ?,.?;... jolnie'lie is en a 11ple.t vacation, but he will con- tilltci Wr:te 1,111 promiirier.t lit (CI figures contrit).1.1r.,?; e.,)1,,1I10,3, TO centriholor is Sen. Ilchert P. Eltunpbrey, 1`41on., mr,v a Perneeratie I're,;identiat hopcM. We have witnessed in receat years a gradual and potentially dangerous isolation and insulation of power within Inc iiiIsecutive branch of government., an particularly sensitive to this sit.u;_tt On,havin.; served in the linite.c1 States Senate for 15 years z.nd as vice president for tom% ? No\vhere is the tendency toward isolation more apparent than in the field of national :,ecurity. I believe it is, at Ice st in part responsihie for some of the divisiveness and the search for scan,ezoats generated by the recent publication of the "Pentagon ? .Papers." NOT the PI2C1,.:sin for adequate consultation bet,,een Congress and the Pa- ? ccutive branch in the formulation of national security policy The President and key government officials meet ? ocea:,,lonally with the leaders of Cenpresa On an in- ? formal basis. There 'are several congressional com- mittees that deal v,,ith some aspects of national. security. 'Flot decision-nta%ing is frazinented. I? have proposed that. we end that fragmentation and provide for. closer consultation by cstalili,711ing permanent joint cen:ressional Committee on Nat j1 Security. ? r-Z) ; ? i; N . A T:11,771 TO) 7 ... 11, !: 12, .?7 1 C The committee would have these main functions: First, to ?study and malte recommendittions en concerning national.- security. This v???ould include review of the President's report en the stale C f ti'' ?,vorid, the defense bud.f.,:et . and foreign assistance programs as ? they relate. to national security goals, and U.S. disarmament 7..;3_1(7*.i0S as a part of our defense Considerations. 0 Second, to review, study and evaluate the / "Pentagon il'au?-c.,rs," and other do?-_!unneitts, whePfcr. published lli..retofore or not, covering U.S, involve- ? me:It 5n 'N'iettram. ? ? 0 .Third, to study mtd make recontmend:ations on government practices of classification and ? declasslfication of clecttments. 0 Fourth, to cenduct a continuing :review of the opet'ations- of the Central Intelligence Agency, the departments of Defense and State, and other agencies intimately invc,,ived With Cr.T foreign policy.. 73a; UNItraliI,', 1,'IlLATU;l.l'i3 of the committee would be the composition of its membership. It would have representation irone these individual and. cennuittec jurisdictions that have primary responsibility in military, foreign...relations and congre?ssional leadership. It would include the President Pro Tenni:ore of the ..Senate; the Speaker et the Douse; .the majority znid minority leaders of both houses, and the chairmen and ranking minority members of the committees on tippropriations, foreign relations and armed services and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. It would not usurp the le.gistalive or investigative functions of any present committees, hut supplement and cordinate?their efforts in a more comprehensive framework. . Nor is it designed to usurp the President's historic Tole as Commancler-In-Chief, nor to pot the Congress in an adversary relationship with the. Executive. branch,. . IT :ES, rATITER, A Na,i 7MDY, to be COthpOSCC1 Of members of both parties and both houses of Congress, that will male possible closer consultation and cooperation bet;veon the President and the Congress. 'Inc concentration of power within the Exe.cutive branch is quite understandahle considering our CN- pairince in World War II and afterward. Put limes change,and secant our Institutions ard respons. ? I cannot brIg but believe that if tile Con-gels had shared mere fully in momentous decisions, like those ? ? in Vietnam, we would he less divided as a nation by Approved For Release 21301103/04,:,-VARDP8Ou01601.R091300400001ntLiona- -6 A :ley.' frarneworlt for the formulation o, sect.trity policy, I believe, can bring us closer to Inc ideal ,,v0 all silar for la.;tin.?.: STATI NTL STATI NTL DE,Trurirr I ram nEv.fs Approv%ThlikkIftlelease -- 592,616 S ? 827,086 AUG 8 _ ss. .,: ? --":;,_:21 t i t.,, . (.;? t .- \ \ i i iit' ..,1,... 1 i / ,./._'\ - \-- 1 .1 / -- \ ' -:- 1..i / ?. ? ? "1' r. Irr,?1 ? 1 \:?'-?-?,-1'" H By GEORGE KEI \ITER A ? News w;:stanotem ttureau NASHINGTONI---Since it opened in the late 1950's, the head- ' quarters of the super-scicret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in nearby Virginia has been sereenc:d from public view j ] by ii border of woodland. ? i ? ? X,hat screen is soon to be lost. The land is to be developed by , 'the National Park Service , ? ? .- "for 'camping, hiking and pie- is?:?':'s::':::: ?'?''' -----: ? -..?-?,.,-;::'':?:?:?:::::?:'::::':E-s??::--: niaing. And even as CIA t::::::::ss]s: : ? ? - ir,- -s,?,:::::;::::?:::,..:E:?:,i?-? ..ikeadquarters itself becomes -: ':'?.::'::::',,.."::;-:-t?! ?? more visible, an effort_ is be- ? .:::.:::?':'.'.4:. t ginning in Congress to open ; .. ,a -winckiw on the CIA activi- ties \vithin the building. ::?T'hiese developments on 'Capitol Hill point up the ef- fort:: ? ' p.. ',Ile troubled reaction of ? some Senate members to the JcliscloLgire last week that the CIA., a:,cl the United States were more deeply involved in a clandestine military actio a in Laos than ii as hes?oofore publicly known or li:-_:(:_-.T veil. . ' r:, the appointment of an in.ii-war Michigan con-_-,,ress- 1,s, Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, :tetroit Democrat, the chair- nails:hip of Et special House subcommittee on intelligence, and to Lis-hopc of staging open hearings on the CIA. . .Action in Cong,ress, already halfway through the legislative R proce;:js, In put a halt to secret CIA financing of Radio Free tr .I.M?up,e and Radio Liberty, which beam news behind the Iron in Curtain. ' ' ' ? , . L 0 . ." .; I:- 111 3 ? ? . - - -? 'However, SOMe Members of Congress do not feel, despite the informed briefings, that procedures exist that make the . CIA at least partially accountable to Congress: NEDZI SAID THE OTHER DAY, "My feeling is that the old. subcommitlee (the informal group) served more as a vehicle for the Chief Executive, to enable him to say he had consulted and advised Congress. But I'm not aware that there has been any congressional oversight of the. CIA . . . I think ii impor- ant that the window be opened a hit.' He said later, "Everybody .apiveciates that elements of re- traint are involved. The difficulty is in drawing that line'be- ween the national security and:public disclosure.", ? The effort to focus more attention on the CIA is of a rend in recent years, toward More public disclosure by the ongress. This trend has seen public repelling of congressmen's net :.?orth and ineeme, liberalized rules in Bouse and Senate, the. tdoption of recorded teller votes in the House, reform of cam-- aig n spending and reporting of that. spending, and a move sward more open hearings of congressional committees. - Publication of a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff eport on laos last week indicated that CIA-supervised troops umbering more than 30,000 were actually bearing the brunt the combat against the enemy in Laos. , -7?? i, 1 .1/4\ ... i f i n j \ i 9 ci-.3 , ?.....1 ?,, i ,a ,:\ - '''r V ' . i \\ -,,.., V , , . -1?,,,....--7 ? .......N.; ......`? ..- 0 - ,.., '',::::,.. I d '', ' _L ? 4 \,\,,$) \ 1 V ..,/ Following are texts of key documents from the Pentagon's 'tistory of the Vietnam war, covering events of August, 1964,. !o February, 1965, the 'period in which the bombing of North Vietnam was planned. Except where excerpting is specified, t1ie. locuments are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typo-: jraphical errors correted. Rusk Cable to lmnbassy in Laos cacch and n rIAC igh t . - ? _ ' ? ! . . - : ... , ? - , ? . Cablegram from Secretary of State Dean Rush to the United States Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, Aug. 26,-1964, 4 copy of this message, was. sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific. . ? - We agree with your assessment of Importance SAR operations that Air America pilots can play critically im- portant role, and SAR efforts should not - discriminate between rescuing Ameri- anS, Thais and Lao. You are also here- = D7 granted as requested discretionary -authority to use A.A pilots in T-28's ,for SAR operations. when you consider this indispensable rpt indispensable to success of operation and with under- standing that you will seek advance _Washington authorization wherever sit- nation permits. ? At same time, we believe time has ? come to review - scope and control ar- rangements for, T-28 operations extend- inginto future. Such a review is especi- ally indicated view fact that these op.. -erations more or less automatically im- pose demands for use of US personnel in SAR operations. Moreover, increased -AA capability clearly means possibilities of .loss somewhat increased, and each loss with accompanying SAR operations involves chance of escalation from one action to another in ways that may not ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? - - be desirable in wider picture. On other side, v.,ci naturally recognize T-28 opera- tions are vital both for their military and psychological effects in Laos and as negotiating card - in support of Souvanna's position. Request your view whether balance of above factors would call for some reduction in scale of op orations and-or dropping of some of better-defended targets. (Possible exten- sion T-28 operations to Panhandle would be separate issue and will be covered by septa) ? On central problem our understand- ing is that Thai pilots fly missions strictly controlled by your Air Com- Mand Center with [word illegible] in effective control, but that this not -true of Lao pilots. We have impression latter not really under any kind of firm con- trol. Request your -evaluation and recom- mendations as to future scope T-28 op- erations and your comments as to whether our impressions present con- trol structure correct and whether steps could be taken to tighten this. , .. . . Rusk 0etV _. ,,.. - ? ...- 0 i to vlentane Embass. 3.7. - ? . .. . . , v. ,- -- ? On Desirability of Laos Cease-Fire .. . ? . . . . . ? ? .. . , ' ? - .. ? . - . ? - . , . Cablegram from Secretary of State Rush to the United States Embassy in Laos, Aug. 7, 1964. Copies were also sent, with a request for comment, to the American missions in London, Paris, Saigon, Bangkok, Ottawa, New Delhi, Moscow, Pnompenh and hong Kong, and to the Pacific command and the. mission at the United Nations. . . ? ? . . ' , . .? . . ... . . ? . . - . . , ? ? - . . ? . .? . ???. I. As pointed out in your 219, our 0-at recent RI-G-s-neceSse.s and reported' objective in Laos is to stabilize the situa- low PL morale may lead to some escala- tion again, if possible tv?ithin framework tion from Communist side, which we do of the 1992 Geneva settlement. Essen_ ! not now wish to have to deal with. Cal to stabilization w uld be estalAis,14- I 2. Until now, Souvatma's and our po- . 1A?p ;ant of milita ay equi promeutrisoftpReateen2ptipt04,,HCIALR and that si.0 precondition ference. Que m ritorial ga; !vided they c practice bra equilibrium no longer m Lao withdra Lion to 14-n fact though cured to So is alai touc to Butler (: Souvanna.a& PDJ with evitably ins gains, -and present fa division.. I were to be 'best be don it might be usea oy ouvanria as mu-gum- ?ing counter in obtaining satisfaction on his other condition that he attend con- ;fcrence as head of Laotian Government. Remaining condition would be cease- fire: While under present conditions cease-fire might not be of net advantage to Souvanna--we are thinking primarily of T-28 operations---Pathet Lao would no doubt insist on it. If so, Souvanna could press for effective ICC policing of cease-fire. Latter could be of. importance in upcoming period. ?? 3. Above is written- with thought in ..mind that Polish proposals [one word il- legible] effectively collapsed. and that: pressures continue for Geneva [word il- legible] conference and will no doubt ? be intensified by current crisis brought on by DRV naval attacks. Conference on Laos might be uaeful safety valve for these. generalized. pressures while at same time providing some deterrent to escalation of hostilities on that -part of .the "front." We would insist that con-; *ference be limited to Laos and believe that it could in fact be se limited, if - necessary by bur withdrawing from the 'conference room if any other subject brought up as we did in 1961-62. Side ;discussions on other topics could not be avoided but we see no 'great difficulty with this; venue for informal coreidor discussion with Ph, DRV, and Chicoms ? could be valuable at this juncture. 4. In considering'thia course of action, . key initial question is of course whether ? Souvanna himself is prepared to drop his withdra wal precOnditicn and wheth- er, if he did, he could maintain himself in power in Vientiane. We gather that answer to first question is probably yes but we are much more dubious about DP80-016-01R001300400001-6 t.t Wo".... have some concern 3.vou,c1 require at. -ao witIldrawal ? ; from areas seized in PDJ since May 15 STATINTL ; .1721;7112..tik.I.L.VjA 1 4 JUN t971 STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016 '11, was charged by then Sen. . . Tp;TI, - -.)1 -i-,r), r., 1 "ti (./ ' WV.,11:1 Morse (D-Ore.) that the 1 3 r,---)1,1c.:,-,--tro,T,,-1,,:)..,,,,,-,? r-,,,r2,-,,,,-,,,,,,,,,,,y, rTin'ri,,Ti,,,,,.i,k-c.-?-,,,,,,,., . ,o,..,,,, ,7i"--q.liarfteLe attacks c.43 1 k . ',I ? 11 i' ' ,1.... P. '1 i i 11 \I i '1 ,.1' 1 ' j ; ??.I.,./ t;.. '-', P 11 %.1 1 ' 1 ?4,....V.[1. 11 .112,,,,,?,a1,1-. Jr., North Vietnamese 'Drees an Ithe Gulf of Tonkin caused the *\_\ ..r 7. Tr-i 0 -il (-111 North Vietnamese to fire upon iiilri..\Tiz.(.5..n...," in..1.114, ..i ,,,,,,\,,, (ft, iy,,-.i i.. iil ,1,, tol --ti it ,f-t.rn 1.-:::?... '..!..-,,, ?..--t.N.,?? (.7. 1II.S. destroyers MarldoN and C. KJ).1-1.C.,J!,.-s'i.. \LI, Ji a . . N ?4. P .11. 0,i1....ile) .i-t. ',.L...ii.I.1 -,....i.' ' Turner joy. 311 eNarn at a, in . . ? ? ? . By Murrey Marder ? 1: N a ti o n at Security Action' . ? ? - ' 'Memorandum of March 17 ' and Chalinc.srs M. Roberts Wastithz:ton i ost -Act t I te,S li)36, pre.sumobly tie' result of 1 -? a presidential clecision, set out The Johnson administration both the administration's po- planned for major American hum aims and the basis for military action against North its military planning. A cable, .Vietnam nearly five months he; sent three days later by the ?f ?re the 1964 Tonkin Gulf in- ri.esident to Henry Cabot "11 to secret goy-- Lodge, I then the. AI112311Call a111- j1,968, told thr.s. ;.-lenate corrinalt- -- however, that it was action" then was "prematnre." I tee' Mr. Jo1"3?11 offered ,;:.''s .?1,1e1 the United Slates "induced "monstrous" to insinuate that reason ' that statemeni th4ithe iuevierc 1,- t as an "exeusa" "re expect a showdown be- to take retallatm:y action. Tine tween the Chinese and Soviet. r.etaliatory action was the Communist parties and action 'opening rounds. of U.S. bomb- against the North will be more ing attacks upon North vet., pradicable after than before a.' Rain. . showdown." According to the information The President also told disclosed by the limes, tie - cident, accm. t ug,. . ernment documents made pub- bassador in Saigon, illurni-1 Lo?dge that pert of his job Plan 34-A operations against lie yesterday by The Net'.' York yiates his haentLein. . ? then was " ink, ._..0 ag l wl the Times. 1 The memorandum says that idea of neutralization" of Viet- These plans V:ere. made, the "we seek an independent non- Lam, in idea advanced by document5. show, at a ? time Communist. South Vietnam" then French President Charles when the United ...States al- ibut "do not require that it deGaun 0, "wherever it rears ready was directing clandes- I serve as a Western base Or as its ugly bead and on this point tine sabotage operations in the I a member of a Western alli- I think that nothing is more North. Two months before the at- free, however, to accept out- 1 mace. South Vietnam must be itack on, two American. clestro" side assistance al, required to ' -' *- e ssity" Repeating, language from a planning is shown in seretca salon control of Gen. Paul D. documents. Put other de,ett- II Harkins, then chief of the Ins. McNamara memorandum of 1 (language in part drawn Ili., as Dec. 21, 1963, a memoran- with joint planning by the assistance command, , ments also show that as early? military March 16 to the President . iMeN"mara. on Rim 22 from 1 Sonth Vietnamese who carried turn from a naernorandmil to. dun from McNamara to presin (the ' chairman of the joint "plans for covert out the operations themselves: I dent Johnson IeferreCi i(31 :Chiefs of Staff, Gen, "i\taxwc,?11 action into or with "hired personnel." l\Zorth Vietnam" that "present . Nven before thc:,,c covert cp.; , n , D. Taylor) the National Se- / ? ? - 1 a wine variety co. sabotage and re- ? - li ,-'4" -that orations began, however, the'. - 7 , ? ? the North during M-ol. ranged from U-2 spy plane ;lights to parachnting sabotage and psy- chological warfare teams into the Nonth Vietnamese ciGar 1., seadamiehed commando raids on rail and high\vay bridges important than to stop neutral- and bombardment of. coastal 1st talk wherever we can by ,instanati.ons in? boats. whatever means we Can." These attacks were da- l' in on - ? ? ? The resulting contingency scribed as being under the em in the Cul o on Aug. 2, and 4, 1964,. the admin.- istration sent a Canadian dip- lomat, J. Blair Seaborn, on a secret .Mission to Hanoi where he is quoted as telling Pre- mier Plain Von Dong that "in the (Went of escalation (of the war) the greatest devastation would result for the D.R.V. STATINTii (North Yietnam) itself.," cu-city Council document. . psychologicalo a-va o fleets the prevailing belief in - " U.S.Joint Chiefs of Staff were should "provide maximum pressure with ronureurn reported recommending "un creasingly bolder actions in- cluding "aerial bombing of key North Vietnamese tar- gets" and use of "United States forces as necessary in direct actions against North Vietnam." After the August, 1901, Gulf of Tonkin breakthrough to more open U.S. involvement in the fighting, the published documentation shows mendations for considerably expanded covert operations against the North. A memorandum prepared for Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy shows that part of the clandestine operations against the North were suspended immediately "after the first Tonkin Gulf in- cident" on Aug. 2, 1064, but that "successful maritime and airborne operations" were car- ried out in October. The documents discuss clan- fivstiiie operations carried out not only from South Vietnam but from Laos, against North Vietnamotas of I e 1.1 Taos. On (10c- 4a0w010'' against enemy- ''' it \vas the ionkm inmeni. _e?lied totally unprovoked by what President Eisenhower the administratio-n?---which led had called the "domino effect" of the loss of Sou Congress on Aug. 7, 190-1, to South Vietnam, pass a resolution declaring Unless the objective is as achieved in South Vietnam, it that the United States w sa?Ys, "almost all of Southeast "prepared, as the President cli- 'sects, ;.40 .tal,e. all. necessary Asia will probably fall uner steps; including the use ? of Communist dominance" or n- amed force," to .assist ,itauth commodatc to Communism. - The Philippines, it was Vietnam. It was on this resolu- judged, "would become shaky" tion that President Johnson and "the threat to India ..on subsequently leaned heavily to the west, Australia and New 'i ? widen the war. , ? , Zealand to the South, and Tel- - ! 1-he documents are Part of a wan, Korea, and Japan to the 'initlii-volumed, . collection of north would be greatly in- records and -comments aSSenl- creased:, . The policy decision, ,...then, then Secretary bled under the direction of i I ?-- of Defense was to "prepare iminetnately, 1?Iiert. S. MeNalmra? The' to be iso a position on 72 hours bulk of the documents . dis- closed thus far by the Times are of military origin but in- clude some White House and Stale Department papers that reached the Pentagon. Other documents Were only &haled notice to .initiate toe full range of Laotian and Cambo- dian 'border control actions' " as well as "the 'retaliatory ac- tions' against North ViC:illaal and to ba in a position on 30 days' notice to initiate the pro- to or quoted fronnin the news- gram of 'graduated overt mill - paper's story. tory pressure' against North . ' Vietnam . . ." - The President's cable to Lodge says that "our planning North is Approved Fck.Oirenagea'aiclOb, Aig31 gronds that ."overtomilitaty This clandestine program became "Operation Plan 31- A," launched on Feb. I, 1904. It was described in a Nationed Security memorandum .the next month as "a modest 'cov- ert" program operated by South Vietn.amese (and a few Chinese Nationalist)---a pro- gram so limited that it IN un- likely to have any significant effect ..." One source yesterday said, In retrospect, that these covert' operations were in fact "very modest--and highly unsuccess- ful." But they came to have profound significance in the Tonkin Gulf incident. Mc- Namara, even in noa testi- mony reexamining the 1964 Tonkin affair, professed to know little about the plan :14- A operations. Le told Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbrig,lat (D- Ark.) that they were carried out by South Vietnamese against the North, "utilising to some degree U.S. equipment.". "I can't describe the exact or illiNitprribiAr-Orpietat-461, PuinriL;ht,""MiltlfETY %11-M1- happy to try to obtain the in- formation for you." I L., 'S T.1.1111, 7/ I 4 JUN 971 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160 THE NATION Insecure Council fit the shrouded pyramid of ascending levels of governmental- secrecy, the Na- tional Security Council stands at the apex. Yet when it meets and turns out the lights for a briefing, an outsider can walk right in. So, at least, claims for- mer Presidential Press Secretary Pierre Salinger, who reveals that such a bi- zarre incident in his first novel, On In- 7 structions of My Government, was based v on an actual happening in 1961. As Salinger tells it, Seattle Television Executive Elroy McCaw (who died in 1969) arrived in Washington to attend a Pentagon meeting of a volunteer cit- izens' advisory group of which he was a member. The meeting was canceled be- cause the Berlin crisis was hot and the top military chiefs were attending an NSC meeting at the White House. Un- aware of this, McCaw called Air Force General Curtis LeMay's office and was directed by a confused secretary to the meeting at the White House. According to Salinger, Brigadier General Chester ("Ted") Clifton, President Kennedy's military aide, escorted McCaw to a dark- cued room where slides of Soviet troop concentrations wei.e being shown. When the lights were turned on, McCaw was astonished to find the President there ?and the generals were even more shocked to see McCaw. To ensure se- curity, they considered recalling him to active Air Force ,duty, but finally ac- cepted his pledge of total secrecy. 1/AIINIL ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 (- 4 )I CPC tIi1S STATINTL ?3 '84 1'6 ? Approved For Release 200 ./03/ : A-RDP80-016 ,.__... . , 1 \i/ t ((" . i ) ? ? " f /h/ rc, V-. ? ) `Iric7-A , , cey c .1. 11 v .4'5\ . , il 0 LO,Jci.- are the teX63 ,Of .... ..-?,4?,9_ the Pentagon's stvdy- of .the Vietnr. December, 1963, through .the Ton?ii 12, 1964,- and its aftermath. Except.tviter the doelm'ents are printa verbatim; :typorri.yphi.c.(.1,167TOr8 corrected. _..._ . - 1 4,1 41,1, .10 ? .3 t, ALS t ? - j 1.1 ? - .1A the ;:?:,,i.i.,L`c`-.1L.I.011 Memorandum, '.`Viatnoin Situation," from Secretary of Defens:? Robert S. ? 'McNamara to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Dec. 21, 1933. In accordance with your request this (and also by John McCone), and T do not This- morning, this is a summary of Iny con- think he is consciously rejecting our Ire'LlitlY elusions after my visit to Vietnam on advice; he has just operated as a loner (V.IPit-!-1 < December 19-20. - all his life and cannot readily changecsta(-7,131ais: 1.Stunralry. The situation is very 11?17. disturbing. Current trends, unless re- Lodge's newly-designated deputy, Stti''-1101 .versed in the next 2-3 mont113, will lead David Nes, was With us and seems a ?IT'S 13 to neutralization at hest and more likely highly COIllpEtc;nt team player.? I have I-16v scerl to n Conimunist-controllecl state. , stated the situation franlEly to him and tkihly in recent months. General Hark- he has sEdd he would do all h3 could to 105 still hopes these areas may be' made 2. The netv Lovernmeat is the greatest' ?.source. of colleen). It is i.ndecisive. and :constitute N',11?.t Would in effect be an tte.relt3yrir!':,1 tecurc Lttcr half nh executive committee op. a?, helot,/ the Ithough Mi stEctes that 11a level of the. Ambassador. ? iA gtoorny foutiinfl nicture, an rather than the Committee of Generals, ? is making decisions, it is r,ct clear that As to the grave rc,p-olling weakness,J .8):C.,ptIon to tn.. LI' r:nd oZ Viet Cong both Defense and ClA must take major cess may be provided Ly 1:113 possible this is actually co. 11 any event, neither he no tilt' Com , steps to .improve this. John McCono and arlherence to the government of the r mittee are experioneen nave ctscussed. it and axe. a.cting yosor- in political a.drainisfration a.nd so far ously in our respective spheres. - ?? . they show little talent for it. There is no ;clear conept on how to re-shape or Viet Cong progress has been great conduct the strategic hamlet program; during the period since the coup, with the Province Chiefs, most oe whom are my best guess being that the situation new and.. inexperienced, are ? receiving .has in fact been deteriorating in the or ?10 direction because the gen.: .countryside since July to a far greater ends are so preoccupied with ossenti3.11y extent than we realized because of 'our Political .affairs, A specific example a undue .depondence, on distorted Viet- the . present situation is that General names?. reporting. The Viet Cong now lama illegible] is spending little or no control very high proportions of the tune commanding In Corps, which is in People la certain key provinces, par- tite vital zone around Saigon and needs ticularly those directly south and west .full-time direction. I made these points of Saigon. -1113 Strategic narilletP1:03ram as strongly as possible to Minh, Don, was seriously over-extended in those if,irn, ? and Tho. _. .? .. , prottinces, cud the Viet Cong has been : 3. l'ho'Conntry Teem is the second able' to (le''''::roy many hamlets; while otlie:s hav3 been abandoned or in some major weakness. It lacks leadership, has ? been poorly luformed, and is not work- cases 1,3tr.iyed or pillaged by th,3 gOVC111- ment's own Self Def ii Corp.. in these . irks.; to a common plan. A rt,?cent exempi7 e of confusion. has been conflicting USOM key provinces, the Viet Cong have de-; t ';,zinci rAilit.niy recommeadation3 bOth .to ,stroyed abIlOSt all major roads, and are ''... tlite Government of Vietnam and to collecting taxes at tvill. As remedial measures', we must get . ' \'f 'din on no size of the mi littuy ' ' .inttlget. Above all, Lodge has virtually the governnicnt 1 its militaiy ' ?no official contact v,-ith Itsrkius. Lod7;e, forces so eiltIt RS Off0CtiVe Sire;t13th in s ends iri reports with major military tiles? provinces is essentially drodil'ed, po7:-.1...nt in n: " read and he eCt`3il't try to 5i -s Vic;!zinzton 1-17,-.:s. .. ? flirting for conversai.ion, nat cid Henry Icissin,7,:er, are said to re.g-Ird Princcton routine that s-ernn of the con7ounity as a mirrz-::,1 blessing: th3 colu:-...nists arou.-.c1 intrinsic:11y 1..a.-,;,orte.lit Co the United Soma of his cri,.:los complain that Stntres but far too bis- and too prono he is tei close to the pres ?oven to ele,Soure cliffeiencas of pinioli? though Llo:.,t a3-ree. CC:71t 1:2 US-73 it, or, sometimes, no c,1i1ion--1:aiiinl a with rare finesse, fo: .his scraenof-woz?d5. his agency's cr:C.s. Sarr,e d3 t Consiclere6' a colci-1,1c04:eri neces- frequent m5nUon of Ilielms ant" his city in tI, Cold v7.-,r days, t eIecy 11,.11.1CiSC:111,17:7.3 In C1-2 ,?,:f03:7Ip columns ? troy; seems to many steat3, li"ceral P-ag33 Of t::13 nition's intellectuals and Collg.ressiren, to be capital.- rinderno.eyatic, cons2iratcri,11, sinister. Yet, if he Eives t.":a apis,arance of Tine recent years fha.t inaeucianc--...,---hre is witty, gregarious, have naf'..-e the af,ecysaspect thee, itsa.ctivitia...'s 15 oullle 1st A131a, the a hish-vsltaga el 'just' ?Coivje, G-.1:Ite..(1.ala, the Lay of Pigs; be...-leath the sucfac. Yelans is the U-1 fl::::;ilts; its seciet 1-unding of apf-arent through 'front" fou7,-.7:2a.tions of the so"f-discip1i.-2eA a-.:-.1.1outwasdlyrela.:red, National Stuclent Association plus 3abcd1 in the essential yet fasoi-, private and law- na.t.2..1 by the A former foreign yors' gC013, and, Lally, tvo -:/-zears o"eseryes nuahand ST AT I NTL eie azo, the GrIt-ea Z 0 eretuLia.L.. 00 viti*Rtypo-01601R0013004000ui-b 53-ytIPPFCIVITTM 11:947,-,13 41,.? 11 .11 LA this, better than most. As the first C.:7.- pl.aCe---Wilat gova each uromarn wore _roar officer to treach the to a dinr.;.--;r c".7d SVnC1C should,er strap. _ )` f' 1"*"1 _ K_ARprove,s1 J\_ y .o.r,Rel5aseld_ J , ?i By Luther lit Newspaper editors must our attention, it must burst to achieve a more serious, more the surface in some disruptive, sophisticated perspective on exceptional (and hence news- their jobs. Revise their basic worthy) event. Even when we concept of news and quit being know what is happening under "suckers" for either side of the the surface, we are forever proponents of change, Newbold waiting for a traditional news Noyes, president of The Amen- peg to hang the story on. What can Society of Newspaper Edi- are we thinking of, sticking to tors, told several hundeed edi- such old-fashioned concepts in tors at the opening session of a time of revolutionary ? move- the society's annual convention went? If we have so little faith in Washington April 1.1. in the intelligence of our read- "The newspapers," said Noyes, ers, how can we expert them who is editor of the Wci:sb fog- to have faith in us? No wonder (D.C.) Star, "are not exact- the readers constantly feel that ly writing a glorious chapter" events are ?very:helloing them, in the history of the profession unawares." Newsmen, Noyes ' and have "a good deal to an- said, are not "merely spectate swer for at the bar of public on the unfolding scene." opinion." are the. people who cee-??J, whether we like it or not, ds- If the reader confidence in the new,,piper pr.?, is at cid e what is worthy of r.,:s17: attention ,anil who must iieted? it is beCause "we are lazy and mine the way it is to be porting" and fail to give read- p: ? superficial in much of our re- seated. The. dielculty ot task has made it conven'ent ers the information acid under- fon us to hide behind simplistic, standing that \yin "permit them even childish formulas as to to sort out the forces at work what is news, the slinnIest and in society and to decide where most childish being chat this, their true interesfs lie." after all, is what pe,:?plo no Noyes "heynotesspeech", ally weint to read." the society adopted a report of New techniques must be de- its freedom of inforroatioit co LW that will permit news- mittee which recommended en- papers to convey to renders the actment of a National Shield Law to protect newsmen from truest possible picture of what He disclosing confidential infoema- 'ransPires' Neyes asset ted. acknowleelged that he did not tion or the sources of such in - know what these te?shiliqueS aee foemation: agreed to let Con know told the editors that "we grass know that it cernosed ef- m fortis of the Staggers subcom- ust grow up, must change, be- cause our readers are changing mittee to subpoena Columbia Broadcasting Systems and tran- scripts of its documentary on "The Selling of the Pentagon"; voted against a proposal to es- tablish ?national press councils but authorized formation of an ad hoe committee to select some specific ethical violation by a newspaper and conduct a "dry run" trial to see how the press council idea might work. Noyes criticized the press for maintaining steno-typed stand- ards of news coverage. "Not only do we devote SO per cent of our time and space to stere- typed happenings, but we alSo insist these happenings are newsworthy only if they meet certain stereotyped standards". Noyes said, "there is no story and growing up. They are de- manding more of us now, and ate, those of the Federal Bureau they are entitled to more from of Investigation and the Atomic us than what they are getting." Energy Commission." All of t.P.a2.41rt ,1 L doubt the Pent makes makes suckers of but no more eas New Left does. W to me, tnagically. velop foe our reach ingfol perepective? ties of such smeir In the first publ has made as dirt Central Intern ger Richard Helms tomi can Seciety of tors that the work criticized CIA - is "Permit this county in a fearsome wor1 its way into a bed peaceful one." "We are, after this democracy, an in it," Helms, a fiet and advertising sr "We would not ? our work distort and its principles. to adapt intelligeree. icon society, not vice versa." Helms said that the quality of foreign intelligence available to the United States government in 1071 is better than it has ever been before. He said that the "intelligence cceomunity? a name for all of the intern- gr.:11,.!C assets at the disposal of the United States, comprised the CIA, the Defense inselli- genre Agency, the intelligence components of the various rifled services, the National Secovity Agency, the intelli- gence elements of Department of State and?when appropri- , these agencies are represented ' "Change we must have ' on the United States Intern- Noyes went on, "but the trick gi:nce T3oard, cheised by the is to give our readers a basis, director of Central Intelligence, factual and intellectual, for as- not as head of the CIA, but as sessing the paths of change into the principal intelligence ad- which they are bc.,.ing pushed, visor to the presidnt and the form rational choices while the National Security Council." choice is still theirs. "By necessity" Helms said, "I think the worst of our "intelligence organiaaticins do lazy and superficial perform- not. publish the extent of their once today is that we of the knowledge and they do not press- are allowing ourselves to challoin;e criticism of their op- be manipulated by various in- editions. We answen to those terests?some for change and we serve in govermoent." some against it?smile power- The CIA, he said, is the only fully in support of the system, one of the organizations named some destructively seeking to in a speech AA ? ? f _ Fieg it doo---c-akiiiimar tz once or whae fe.,per,, 10..s ease - I it involves conflict or surprise. nesses, our laziness, our super- i!efore a situation isworthy of ficiality, our gullibility. No STATI NTL many to Will I kind of report for a very few." Helms gave a detailed report- of the C part in the Cuban missile crisis of 1062. He cited the agencies success in disprov- ing various reports, such as that light bombers were being stored in a particular cave and that what was reported as a rounded dome covering missiles was actually a relatively now movie theatre in Havana. "Our intelligence tiles in Washington, however ? thanks to U-2 photography of the So- viet Union and to a number of well-placed and courageous Rus- sians who helped?included a wealth of information on Soviet missile systems. We had descrip- tions or photographs of the mis- slice, their transporters and Other associated equipment and characteristic sites in the Soviet Union. We knew what to look for. "Guided by this background, the interrogators were able to sort out from the flood, of reports the ones which estab- lished the arrival of MTIT3M and IPTIM equipment in Cuba. We- weee then aide to locate the sites ender construction and tell President 'Kennedy the exact scope of the threat." The CIA's eiforts to obtain foreign intelligence in this counLr, said, "? gcn- A-RDP80-01601R001 4000016 300 of the most viru- lent ceiticism of the aoency. They have led to charges that STATI NTL 2001/013104 1.0A-RDP80 HE NEW STATE=STATIN . Cooper gives a most human, and often ?.The .Long Side ,- ? humorous, account of the Geneva Confer- GEOFFREN/ McDERMOTT The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam by `. CHESTER COOPER MacGibbon & Kee 13.75 "The Military Art of People's War: Selected writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap edited by RUSSELL STETLER Monthly Review Press .0.90 We in the West can take hope from both of these utterly contrasting books about Viet- nam: in utterly contrasting ways, of course. Chester Cooper was the leading expert on Vietnam in the Central Intelligence Agency ,for much of the 1950s and 1960s. His excel- lent book is a study in frustration, both per- sonal and national. He is a living proof that, contrary to what many people believe, there are members of that powerful agency who take infinite pains to judge critical internat- ional problems objectively, and to suggest doveish rather than hawkish policies as far as possible. Unfortunately, the hawks both in the CIA and the US government have too often had the last word, so far. If there is something missing from Cooper's account, which is both comprehensive and subtle, it is perhaps an analysis of the conflicting in- fluences inside the National .Security Coun- cil, including the CIA; but this is easily com- prehensible, even in the absence of an Offic- ial Secrets Act in the US. ? Cooper's style shows that great diplomatic affairs can be effectively described con brio and without dryness or pomposity; which is seldom the case in books written by British diplomats. While never in favour of action for action's sake, he conies across as an activist amongst diplomats; so he was, and this characteristic gave mc much pleasure in my close collaboration with him. His atti- tude to Britain, where he has Many, friends, is always objective; he has no time for illu- s'ions about 'the special relationship'. He lays bare the enormity of the part played through- :out by France, right up to De Gaulle's fatuous suggestion that all South-East Asia should be neutralised. This suggestion is be- ing revived, equally inanely, in some British government circles today. The whole dreadful story of escalation is related with both objectivity and passion. ,from the foundation of the Viet Minh in .1941 up to 1970. Ho Chi Minh ? 'He who Enlightens,' formerly named 'He Who Will be Victorious' and 'The Patriot' ? is of course central to developments right up to his death in September 1969. Cooper reminds .us that Gap in 1945 paid tribute to 'the par- ticularly intimate relations with thina and thspnited States, which it is a pleasant duty to dwell upon'. In Giap's book the pleasure has turned hit? rage and vituperation where the US is concerned? ence of 1954, which he calls 'blueprint for a house of cards'. For the first time Com- munist Chinese and Indochinese attend a conference in the West. Eden irreparably offends Dulles. Dien Bien Phu falls in the middle of the conference, without the atomic intervention by the US which had been pre- dicted. 'What filially emerged was not very attractive . . such pious platitudes as "ob- serving. the principles of Geneva" are good political slogans but bad policy.' I agree. Successive British governments were too often to ignore this fact. It would not be too cynical to say that the Geneva 'agree- ments' were signed ? by other participants but not by the US government ? because the word 'democratic', freely used in their texts, meant diametrically opposed things to the two sides. From Geneva Cooper rushed off to Manila to help Dulles set up Seat?, the most effective achievement of which was to provide the US with a justification, on paper, for intervening in Vietnam. The Dulles dominoes theory followed logically enough. The serious escalation of US forces in Vietnam began under President Kennedy and his whiez-kid Secretary of Defence Mc- Namara. With a weak Secretary of State in Dean Rusk, the military-industrial complex headed by NIcNatuara increasingly took over. Where there had been sonic 700 `milit- nry advisers' in Vietnam when Kennedy be- came President, the troop level had reached ,16,500 by his death in 1963. Cooper was now an adviser in the White House, but he was unable to stem the flow. NfcNatuara's atti- tude of 'what is good for Ford is good for the US and the world', and his extraordin- arily dehumanised approach to the problem throughout his baneful reign of seven years, emerge very clearly from his own disagree- able little book, The Essence of Security. Under President Johnson, McNamara and the near-Strangelove type General West- moreland were completely let loose on their policy of 'more is better'. Forces and mod- ern armaments were poured into the war, be- cause the human computer McNamara' cal- culated that sheer weight was bound to wint. and what general, even if brighter than West- moreland, has ever declined to have more forces under his command? Moreover, at about six-monthly intervals, top US poli- tical authorities ? as often as not septuagen- arians ? would rush about all over Asia and elsewhere, and report that the situation was vastly improved and would shortly be under control completely. President Johnson was not sensitive to the widening of the credi- bility gap, or the ever mounting protests against the war, in the US and far beyond. Cooper was a first-class official; but try as he might he could not restrain the boys in the big league. He quit the White House but kept in the closest touch with Vietnam- ese problems as assistant to Averell Harri- abortive, ane sometimes tarcicat. Brown-Kosygin peace discussions in 1966-7, which I described in the NS of 18 December 1970. For some of the time he was, pecul- iarly, used by Wilson as a sort of Perman- ent Under-Secretary of the British Foreign Office. All rather frantic, and unavailing. And in 1969 the new President Nixon in- herited a legacy of 541,000 US troops stuck in the theatre, not to mention some tens of thousands of naval and air force personnel. Not a single Russian or Chinese was fight- ing there. ? 'Where, then, is the hope in all this that I mentioned? In Cooper's last chapters, and in President Nixon's policy. In `No More Vietnams' and 'Crusades, Commitments, and Constraints' Cooper deals with the besetting sin of US foreign policy in the past, mis- directed moral fervour, and pleads for a more realistic approach to the major prob- lems. in the nuclear sphere and that of relations with the Soviet Union in general, togetner with those of a gravely disunited society at home in the US. He chides Presi- dent Nixon for his Cambodian adventure, and would no doubt say as much about Laos. But the facts now are that the US forces are being reduced, the South Vietnamese are stronger, and a relatively stable government rules in Saigon. Giap depicts the other side of the coin. He too covers the history of Indochina since the 1940s. He defines his curious title at length on pages 175-6, emphasising the revolutionary, class, and Party character of our nalitary art. Its characteristic is to ? defeat material force with moral force, de- feat what is strong with what is weak, de- feat what is modem with what is primitive In the context of Vietnam he never considers it necessary to mention nuclear weapons; and the communists simply do without air power. 'The strategic orientation is to pro- mote a war by the entire people, a total and protracted war? He repeatedly praises 'rev- olutionary violence'. He echoes Cooper's metaphor of the US seeing itself as a knight on a crusade. On a point of fact, it is inter- esting that he dates the first US bombing of Hanoi, in June 1966, eight days earlier than Cooper. It is indeed possible to admire the milit- ary achievements of the various commun- ist forces in Indochina, both in opposition to the French and to the Americans and their allies. They have, up to a point, put into practice the principles enunciated by Giap; and no doubt his style of writing and rigid Marxist-Leninism are a heady brew for the faithful. It strikes a non-communist, however, quite differently,, for a variety of reasons. Giap carries de-humanisation a whole stage further than McNamara. The word is never once used; nor are any individual names save Uncle Ho ? always revered ? and, scattered about, those of half a dozen men who performed particu- Approved For Releage2C100i3ffilicii.tiAllthiVoi-VitOMANSWA, Even Giap can- a t of his account STATINTL . Approved For Release 2001-41/04:1A?RDP80-01 5 A?::, -.1Z0-.?? P LS From ? Cee !elmsto taThm WASHINGTON, April 14? Following are excerpts from. an address by Richard Helms, Director - of Central Intellia ? gence, before the Atneriegn Society of Newspaper Editors: I welcome this oppcg?tunity to speak to you today about the place of an intelligence service in a democratic gov- ernment. In doing so, I recognize that there is a paradox which' I hope can be dispelled: On the one hand, I can as- sure you that the quality of foreign intelligence available to the United States Govern- ment in 1971 is better than it has ever been before. On the other hand, at a time when it seems to me to be self-evident that our Gov- ernment must be kept fully informed on- foreign develop- ments, there is a persistent and growing body of criti- cism which questions the need and the propriety for a demo- cratic society to have a Cen- tral Intelligence Agency. I am referring to the as- sertions that the Central In- telligence Agency is an "in- ? visible government," a law unto itself, engaged in pro vocative covert activit;es re- pugnant to a democratic so- ciety and subject to no con- trols. This is art outgrowth, "[sup- pose, of an inherent Ameri- can distaste for the peace- time gathering of intelli- gence. Our mission, in the eyes of many thoughtful AtnericanS, may appear to be in conflict with some the traditions and ideals of our free society. _ May emphasize at this point that the statute [Na- tional Security Act of 1947] ? specifically forbids the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency to have any police, subpoena or law-enforcement powers, or any domestic security func- tions. I can 'assure you that except for the normal re- sponsibilities for protecting the physical security of our own personnel, our facilities, and our classified informa- tion, we do not have an'- such powers' and functions; we have never souaht any: we do not exercise any. ".fundamen;:al question or rec- short, we do not target on onciling the security needs American citizens, of an intelligence service In matters directly affect- with the basic principles of ,ing the security of the United our democratic society. At Stales, the President and his the root of the problem is .National want wise 14?011:faQ.7). r EUcriebva. labectl Qalaia . 'tional" intelligence--evalua- service ? whatever type of tions which reflect the con- government it serves?must aast wrnn it:-;c?if in as much se- of all Of the intelligem;Se Com- ponents of the United States Governme4.t,. The production and dissemination o f this national intelligence is the responsibility. and the pri- mary'function of the Central Intelligence Agency. We not only have no stake in policy debates, but we can not and must not take sides. The role of intelligence in policy formulation is limited to providing facts-the agreed facts?and the whole known -range of facts?relevant to the problem under consideration. Our role extends to the es- timate function?the projec- tion of likely developments from the facts?but not to advocacy. Ironically, our efforts to? obtain foreign intelligence in this country have generated. 'some of the more virulentcri- ticism of the Central Intelli- gence Agency. It is a feel that we have, as I said, no domestic secur- ity role, but if 'there is a chance that a private Amer- ican citizen traveling abroad has acquired foreign infotiaa- tion that can be useful to the American policy-makes, we are certainly going to try to interview him. If there is a competent young graduate student who is interested in worktog for the United States Govern- merit, we may well try to hire him. The trouble is that to those who insist on seciag us as a pernicious and per- vasive secret government, our words "interview" and "hire" translate into suborn, subvert and seduce, or some- thing worse. We use no compulsion If a possible source of infor- mation does not want to talk to us, we go away quietly. If some student groups ob- ject to our recruitinub on campus, we ?-fall back to the nearest Federal office build- ing. gSimilarily, we welcome the opportunity to place re- search contracts with the universities, but again,, these are strictly voluntary. And so I come to the -of . C3.,' 17,7 crecy as possible in order to operate effectively. If we disclose how much we know, the opposition is handed on a platter highly damaging indication's of how and where we obtained the information, in what way his security is vulnerable, and who may have helped us. can seal off the breach in his defenses, roll up Vie agents, and shut off the flow of information. I cannot give you art. easy answer to the oblectkaas raised by those who consider intelligence work incomps.t- i'ole with democratic princi- ples. The- nation must to. a degree take it on faith that we too are honorable nen devoted to her service. I an assure you that we are, lilt I am precluded from dem- onstrating it to the public. I can assure you that ssllmt I have .asked you to take on faith, the elected efficialsof the United States Go-sem- meat watch over extensively, intensively and continuously. Starting with the eaecttiv branch, the Central Intdli gence Agency operates an- der the constant supers-is:in and direction of the Natioral Security Council. No sigrM- cant foreign program of nay kind is undertaken withfut the prior approval of an N.S.C. subcommittee with includes representatives of . the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. In addition,' we report pe- riodically and in detail on ? the whole -range. of foreign intelligence activities to the President's Foreign Intalli- gence Advisory Board,, a group of men who have dis- The same objectivity which makes Us useful to our Government and our country leaves us uncomfort- ably aware of our ambiguous place in it. We. may chafe under the criticism we do not answer, but we under- stand as well as anyone the difficulties and Coe contradic- tions of concluctiog foreign - intelligence operations on be- half of a-free society. We are, after all, a part of this democracy, and we . believe in it. We would not want to see our work distort.- its values and its principles. We propose to adapt intel- ligence to American society, , not vice versa, We believe, and I say this solemnly, that our work is necessary to permit this country to grow on in a fear- some world and to find its way into a better and more peaceful one. STATI NTL tinguished 'themselves in Grr- ? eminent, industry, educaiion and the professions. Our budget is gene liver line for line by the Oce of Management and BAet and by the appropriate cosn7 mittees of the Congress as well. There are elements of the Appropriations and Arned Services Committees in lath the Senate and the Raise which?lilra the Presidmt's -board?are told more aiout our activities and our opra- tions than is known to latest of the personnel in our-Ngh- ly compartmented agar:eye But how, in the end, we are 9)4-pgrA024.0.1' GM-Rom 300400001-6 In short, the Central In- telligence Agency is not and ? ApprovSPOTOPAlease 2001/0/047:-:01A-MP80-01 15 AP,; ?ler 3.12 do) C. 7..A. Associated Prass Richard Helms addresses editors in Washington. _ Rare Speech Discloses Some Russians Aided U.S. in Criioarz Crisis Excerpts from linns acidness will be found on Page 30, By RICHARD HALLORAN SNclat to Tile New To:k nros WASHINGTON, April 14 ? The Director of Central Intelli- gence, Richard Helms, vigorous- ly defended his agency today. as necessary to the survival of a democratic society and asked the nation to "take it ortl faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service." Mr. Helms asserted, in his first public address since be- coming head of the Central In- telligence Agency in 1966, that "we propose to adapt intelli- gence work to American so- ciety, not vice versa." He spoke with the specific approval of President Nixon before a luncheon meeting of the American Society of News- paper Editors. In a footnote to history, Mr. Helms revealed that American intelligence in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis was aided by "a number Of well:placed and courageous Russians." He told reporters later that he was alluding not only to Col. Oleg V. Penkovsky, who was identified previously, but also to .-others who provided -in- 'formation on Soviet missile sys- tems. When asked for their names, Mr. Helms laughed. ? Colonel Penkovsky was a So- viet intelligence officer secretly Working for the Americans in 1961 and 1962. He was detect- ed in October, 1962, and ex- ecuted in May, 1963. The pub- lication of his alleged memoirs in the West in 1965 aroused. considerable controversy over .th.eir authenticity. Mr. Helms asserted today' that United States intelligence would have "a major and vital another matter when soese of Approved foCke egsga rrt any into 6a6Lifitit aa a re's' o ri ' - Ici n_g deet,a f ato4 : tdiARktai480,41-61A Noting that the Soviet Union engaged in intellizer.ce. say things, that are either vicious Fad rejected proposals for in- . or just plain silly." Mr. Helms Said tee United States could undertake an agreement to limit such arms ".only if it has adequate in- telligence to assure itself thatl the Soviets are living up toi their part." ' China Held Police State At a time when the visit of an American table tennis team to mainland China has aae.ner- ".ated official hopes for . better relations with Peking, Mr. Helms told his audiende that "some. of our most important intelligence targets lie in totali- tarian countries where collec- tion is impeded by Ch:. security defenses of a police state?for example, Communist China." Mr. Helms's rare psdelic ap- pearance today was initiated by Newbold Noyes, editor of The Washington Star and president of the society of editors. When Mr. Helms said he could speak only with the approval of the White House, Mr. Noyes wrote to Herbert G. Klein. the Presi- dent's director of communica- tions. Mr. Klein said today. _that President Nixon had readily ap- proved Mr. Helms's appearance. He said the Administration thought it a good time for the American public to have Mr. Helms explain the role of the C.I.A., since the agency was not under the kind of fire that had been directed toward it in the past. Mr. Helms noted in his ad- dress that in Britain and other European democracies. "it would be unheard of for the head of intelligence services to talk to a nongovernmental' group as I am talking to you today." Dulles Talks Recalled A spokesman for the C.I.A., rti response to an inquiry, said later that Allen Dulles. the Di- rector of Central Inte.iligence from 1933 to 1961, spoke- pub- licly about twice a year. But he could not recall an instance , in which Mr. Dulles's succes- sors, John A. McCone and Adm. William -SR. Reborn, delivered public addresses. Thus. Mr. Helms's speech was probably the first from an intelligence director in 10 years. Mr. Helms, who has a rep- utation as a skilled adardnis- trator, said, "There is a per- sistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency. "It is difficult for me to agree with this view." he said, "but I respect it. It is quite . _ No Domestic Functions Mr. Helms emphasized thati - the agency had no domestic curitv functions and had never: sought any. "In short," he said, "we do .not target on American citi- zensh.e" T agency was discovered in 1967 to have financed sev- eral international activities. ofl the National Student Associa-1 tion and to have given subsid-! ie.s to unions, foundations and. publications. More recently, the agency was implicated in the Govern- ment's surveillance of political dissidents in the- United States by -the testimony of former mil- itary intelligence agents giv- en before a Senate subcommit- tee. Mr. Helms asserted that the, enency had no stake in .policy' debates. 'Must Not Take Sides' "We can not and must not take sides." he said. "When there is debate over alternative policy options in the National Security Council. to which he is an adviser, "I do not andi must not line up with eitheri If e recommended .one solu- tion to a problem, those. recom- mending another would suspect "that the intelligence presenta- tion has been stacked to sue- port my position, and the credi-! bilitv of C.I.A. goes. out the, window," he said. Mr. Helms. after asking; that! the nation believe that the azqn! cy's onerations were compatible' with democratic principles, said: "I can assure you that what II have asked yoti to take on faith,i the elected officials of the Un- ited States Government watchl over extensively, intensively, r and continuously." He said the National Security Council, the President's Foreign rIntelligence Advisory Board the-- Office of Management and Bud-1 get and four committees of Congress regularly reviewed the . agency's operations, plans and. organization. STATI NTL 01300400001-6 OK Approved Fg-rraVae 2001/Citietiq66-RDP8 3 - , ;\k, been .lookg into tnis probtenl, still -By J.V,IES RESTON WASHINGTON, April 1?The recent ? disclosetres? abou: extensive Govern- i,ment spying onprivate citizens raises a practical questicim Why not a domes- ' tic intelligen, advisory -board to help the: President maintain a balance be- tween the security of the nation and the rights of its citizens? In short, a cpunterpa. k in the domestic intellie gerice field to the excellent committee of distinguished citizens now serving as President Nixon's Foreign. Intelli- gence Advisory Board? The foreign intelligency board was ;originally proposed by the Hoover Commission and established by Presi- dent Eisenhower on a-limited basis in 1956, 'when it was discovered that --Separate intelligence operations were ..,preacling from the State and Defense, _Departments into other agencies of the Government without effective coordi- nation and often without the knov,d- , edge of the President himself. When President Kennedy stumbled into the Bay of Pigs disaster in Cuba n 1961, he revived this board and gave it wider powers to supervise the operations of all foreign intelligence gathering agencies. No such protection has been provided for the President and the people in the domestic intelli- gence field, however, despite the fact that the F.B.I., the armed services, and :other' arms of the Government, aided .by all the new technological means of 'gathering, storing and retrieving infor- mation, have been increasing their surveillance over private citizens. ? Much ..has been written about both the dang,ers of subversion and crime on the one hand, and the dangers of unregulated_ Government snooping on the other, but the question now is what can be done about it? The Gov- ernment clearly has a duty to preserve "domestic tranquility" and needs to gather accurate information to prevent or detect serious crimes or threats of rebellion, but this dilemma cannot be resolved either by relying on what the Justice Department calls the "self- discipline" of the intelligence com- munity, or by abolishing. secrecy. Intelligence operations, as a distill= -guished and experienced lawyer here has 'pointed out, are not the same as the usual methods of public .scrutiny. Glying'the Congress or the publii as- the security flieF, could in many .'ways-do -greeter harm to the riehts of individuals than the present policy at .rigid secrecy. At the same time, the regent..dis:- closures about the F.B.I.'s u-se of in- ? WASHINGTON or go to the Srivict. Union for a 1-e.v days clearly- indicate that relying on the self-discipline of J. Edgar Hoover is scarcely the answer to the problem.. Paid informers have the perspectives and prejudices of the,: trade. They are trained to gather and use information, not to weigh its ?alue or ,.v.or:y too much about the civil liberties of the people. Also, officials at the tep of the Government' who use this kind of formation don't always have time to police the methods used by tile snoop- ers cr the means to check the accuracy of the information or limit its distrihu- . tion. . Even if the Congress takes the armed services out of the business of Spying on private citizens and poli- ticians at home, there will still be a need for some kind of organization to supervise the projects and methods used by the various intelligence agen- cies, and here the instructions to the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board suggest a useful guide. It was instructed to advise the President concerning the objectives, conduct, management and coordina,. tion of the various activities making UD the national intelligence effort; to conduct a continuin.-_,, review and as- sessment of intelligence and related activities; and to report to the Presi- dent on its findings, appraisals and recommendations. ' More important, in his Executive order establishing the board, President Kennedy instructed the heads of all foreign intelligence agencies "to make available to the boara any information with respect to fereign intelligence matters which the board may require," and provided the board with an ade- quate independent staff to help meet ? its responsibilitieS. The evidence is that this system worked well, first under Dr. James R. Killian Jr. of later under Clark _Clifford before he became Secretary of Defense, and now under Admiral George W. Anderson (retired). Much depends, however, oft the id- dependence, integrity arid knowledge of the members of-the board, and par- ticularly on the confidence and coop- eration of the President. In President Kennedy's case, he regarded the board not only as a protection' to the nation, but as a means or knowing what was going on, and therefore as a protection, for himself and his Administration. He did not; however, have a similar, formers, teivi onera.tar.: aru ? t,al employ ? pyggtr9A, keasef2001103/04 retlIA-RDE110-01601 R001300400001 -6 intelligence field, nor does President ais who attend antiwar demonstrations and the close surveillance of individu- Nixon today. In fact, even Senator ? S.1711 Frvin \rnr-t1-1 r/rnI7n-1 1TrTI, 11,c does got know who was supervising the Army's domestic spying operations. "1 ;doubt," said Jerome B. Wiesner, the new head of M.I.T., "that anyone is aware of the full extent of the sur- veillance and information collection - activities that go on in this nation," and nobody yet has come forward to. remove his doubts. The President, however, .has the. power to create an advisory committee, without delay and is new cOnsidering, .doing so. All he has to do is sign the appropriate Executive order, and this .would have the,' support of almost everybody in the capital, with the pos- sible exception of J. Edgar Hoover. . , s-Amcited For Release .(00iitfi?/C141:1CIA-RDP8 The. Nixon \A/atch, ? c After saying, at a press conference on Match 4 that Secretary of State William P. Rogers is "the fore,ign policy adviser for the. President" and "the chief foreign policy spokesman for' the President," 'Mr. Nixon con- tinned: "Now, the role of Dr. Kissinger is a different one., He is the White I louse adviser tb the President. '? He ,covers nOt only foreign policy but national security policy; the coordination of those policies.' - There was a sufficient, and convincing answer to the question to which the President was addressing himself.-The ques- tion, -as he stated it a moment later, was "whether either Secretary Rogers or Dr. Kissinger is the top adviser:: and the answer implicit in what Mr:Nixon had said was that Henry A. Kissinger is "the top adviser." But the President didn't leave it' at that. He felt` that he had- to repeat him-self and say that the answer to the 'question as he had phrased it "is very , simply that the Secretary of State is always the chief ? foreign ?policy 'adviser and chief foreign policy spc;kcsmati of the Administration." ? It. was a .sensitive question for the President, one .that had been 'rubbing him raw since early February: His reaction then to a casual and generally overlooked 'statement by George D. Aiken, the Republican dean '? of the Senate, showed when it became known that Mr. Nixon- was beginning to realize tliat his prized System 'of foreign and national security policy develop- ment?had seriously impaired the position and effective- ness of Secretary Rogers. A brief news item quoted Aiken's remark that Rogers did not seem to be in- volved in major foreign policy' decisions. Mr. Nixon immediately ?yroteta letter to the senator, assuring him that Rogers was involved in *all major foreign policy decisions. Aiken said nothing about the letter until March 2, when a Nixon assistant startled him by asking him not only to release it but to publicize it at. a press conference. Senator Aiken declined to call a press con- ference, ? but he agreed to answer any questions' that he might he asked aboul the letter and to have it printed in the CoHgcssionfil Record. ? The request lo Aiken was one of 'several White House responses, capped by -the .Prcident's remarks on March 4, to the.-complaints. 01 twa other senators that Henry Kissinger had damagingly overshadowed Rogers and, what \vas. worse, had done it in a fashion that denied CongresS as a whole and the Senate ,For- eign Relations Committee- in particular their proper roles in the evolution arid execution of foreign policy. The.comrnittee chairman, Senator' Fulbright, and one of its members, Stuart Symington, .raised the?old and tattered issue of. "executive privilege." They said that Kissi tiger, bikt3Of&krEf6)?1 mm 141-60Ft(20tii 3Y.64 coittee qutti aaothng, had rrustratet t -tem anc tneir ?._ colleagues in their right and efforts to get at the- real ? origins and intent of Nixon policy.' Symington, graph- ically detailing .the structure of departmental commit- tees, groups and staff processes that Kissinger devised and directs, said that the President's assistant forSTATINT national security affairs is "the most powerful Man in the Nixon Administration next to the. .President him- self" and asserted that his immunity from committee interrogation "nullifies the basic concept of advice and consent." Eulbright drafted a bill that woltId require Kissinger and 'other Presidential assistants to. appear upon command before the -Foreign Relations and other committees; if only to say that they had been .specifi- cally directed in writing by the President to refune. to testify. It was- a 'feeble 'threat, likely to die ?Ful- bright's commiitee, and the President would probably have ridden Out the furor in silence if Kissinger's ascendancy had not been related to what ? Symington called "a resultant obvious decline in tile prestige and position or the Secretary or State and his department." . Symington also said in a Senate speech, "Wherever one goes in We afternoon or evening around this town, one hears our very able Secretary of State laitglrtod at. People say he is Secretary of State in title only." That did it. A White blouse assistant forthwith g9t in touch. with Senator' Aiken, as noted. Mr. Nixon ordered his press secretary; Ronald Ziegler,. to tell reporters that "President Nixon has the utmost confaence in the f:re'cretary of State" -artd.that "those whb may have ,?the impression tlult the Secretary of State is not the Presi- dent's chief adviser on foreign affairs are misleading theniselv'es and others." The' staff of Monday,. a, -weekly propaganda sheet put out by the. Republican National Committee, polled tWo Washington society columnists and four "pronainent?Washing,ton hostesses" and reported their "Unanimous" testimony that "they 11c1 never heard the Secretary of State laughed at.", Mr. Nixon made the difficulty for himself and for his Secretary' of State when he fulfilled, his campaign pledge "to restore tht Nationitl Security Council to its preeminent role in national security planning." Henry Kissinger's preeminence, his ,own skills apart, is -a prodhct of that promised and, accomplished preemi- nence. Symington recognized this when he maintained, on the Senate 'floor and personally to Rogers, that he was aiming at neither Rogers 'nor Kissinger but .at "the concentration of foreign policy decision-making power in the White Hotrie" and at the isolation of that power cent'ettfrom Congress. Senator Jacob Javits, agreeing with Symington. that "excessive use of executive privi- lege" had impeded congressional oversight of foreign - policy, ?vent to the core of the matter when he asked, "Why' should we not hold the President himself, re- spor4ble rather than Dr. Kissinger for the effect -upon congress .of the or.ganization of his Presidency respect- ing international security affairs?" Mr. Nixon, re..act- '4100fditoGiii Dij Q14 in the aoinet, tn0 .i e ecretary o- Jtate, ac mowteugthe re.- J_ ,ri 1961 Approved For Release 2001103/04: IA-RDP80-01601 STATINTL THE 'VICTORY' WESTMORELAND LOST A confidential Pentagon paper details the plan the military.had three years ago to end the Viet- nam war. Gen. William Westmoreland, then top man in Saigon, and Gen. Earle Wheeler, then 'chairman of the Joint Chiefs, worked it out clur- ing height of Hanoi's. Tot offensive in 1968. Westmoreland read Tet as a shift to all-out war by Hanoi and wanted to match it. He also viewed, It as a last gasp that would leave North Viet- 'lards army badly mauled. His plan called fdr 206,000 more men (a total of 731,000) and Moves -on. all fronts?stopping anticipated assaults from the north, seizing sanctuaries in Laos and Cam- bodia, blocking the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex in those countries, invading North Vietnam and bombing the 'port of IIaiphong. .? On Feb. 12, the proposals were discussed at a White House meeting involving LBJ, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, CIA chief Richard -Helms; Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Clark Clifford, Walt Rostow and Wheeler. On Feb. 23, Wheeler met Westmoreland in Saigon and after three days brought details of the plan back to Washington. Shortly afterward, the 206,000-man request was revealed in a Pentagon "leak"?a move, West- moreland says, designed to "prejudice the Presi- dent's* appraisal." On March 24, Wheeler met Westmoreland privately in Manila. The word: no new bombing, no invasions, no 731,000 men. The only thing Wheeler could not tell his field ..commander was something he did not know him- self?that on March 31, LBJ was bowing out of the way and out of the White House. RUSSIA ORBITS ANOTHER RIDDLE The Soviet Union seems about to write a new. cliapter in manned Spaceflight?but no one knows ? it will reveal. In November and December and again last month, the -U.S.S.R. fired off three shots that all looked like tests of a new manned vehicle. The first two satellites evidently carried recorded voices; they executed maneuvers that outdid any by previous manned satellites. U.S. experts say they don't quite fit a program for a manned space station (which the Russians are working on) nor a moon shot. Beyond that, the experts are baffled. TROUBLE ON THE WELCOME MAT Chile's new Marxist government faces a delicate problem in its efforts to forge new, friendly links to Red China. After President Salvador Allende granted Peking diplomatic recognition, the Na- tionalist Chinese envoy left but gave the Chinese Embassy ( bought by China before World War II) to Chile's League Against Cancer for use as a hospital. Peking's athbassador wants it back, and Allende's opponent's in the .Chilean Congress have vowed to block the move. MOSCOW DROPS A HINT For the first time in memory, a Soviet radio . broadcast this week listed all Russian vessels mOving to and from North Vietnam. (Except for a tanker, all carried non-military cargo.) The rea- son, U.S.- analysts think, is that Moscow, fearing that the U.S. may resume full-scale bombing M North Vietnam, Is -hinting at immunity for its ships from American aircraft. ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 ST&TINTL - ' Approved For Kelease 200-1103/04 ? CIA-RDP80-0 - g - eV(1'-d -611: oh. ? EX CIMONS ? .Yirftl?WI ?76!tr Lonneit syste'm anc: trom ?is to keep the 2?a.c.1tnel-y 'the l'resident. the Cabin::: F deoartmcnts: st-id ? a:.iencies, iu hr., j, vor azre _ the 'Me 1.1..U;.C: stair, , 0?- ,1-)f that, 1L ac ncrv lIrn gcess, foreign goverrirrie-nt. failed. . and the . She dcscrilKs.i. z 'We get about SOO pieces of paper a month,' she said. "Our system -is de- signcd to control it and keep track of every ooc- ument. We ii \C a doe-..? urrient control organiza- tion that, as each piece Comes in, assigns it a num- ber, a security classifica- tion, and keeps a record or who sent it and where it's going." ? ? ? ? ? ? Extreme precautions are taken to protect the secur- ity of the system. "We' have safes and' vaults Where the classified Material is stored," she .said. 'This building, is se-? - CUIC,! and everyone who c,on-tcs in must be cleared. "Every eineument is hanr.learried. We have a se.curity officer who V.,-ati-lies for -unintentional breiches. And. of .couuc, everyone involved in this operation has had a thou- Quell security edema nee." c, Mrs: Davis had to un- dergo a similar clearance' v.-hen she moved over from- the State Depart- ment, an elaborate elc?a- r.ance involving in te r- views with neighbors, era- ploy9rs and friends. .3,-Thoroult. Check 'They check every ad- dress: every place you've ever- worked," she said. They examine your loyal- ty?asking such things as she ever said any- thing against this Colin- try?', 'Has she belonged to any subversive organiza- tion s? 'W h a t are her &inking habits?' " `.; T d he probe idn't bother. her. "If I \\TH. on the outside 'and someone else had this job, I would want to know that they v-ere completely trustwort0y," she said. "I --,:vould want the govern- ment to be aware of their per?sonal habits and weak? nesses." She is close to her hoss .Kissinger but says that, because she is not a policy-- ? ? : WASHINGTON ---- When- ever-Jeanne.' WilS0)1 Davis goes to parties, she usually keeps quiet when :the cock- tail conversation g6ts around to foreign policy. 'I'm sure everyone must think I'm ter- ribly stupid,' she said. But there's a 'very gooii ?.reason for her silence. ? ; "51 I were to comment on , foreign affairs," she said, 'I ? couldn't alv,-ays he sure whe- ther I ?was saying something rd read in a. newspaper that morning-7-or in a top-secret document." ?? '?-? :11-e w a s exaggerating somewhat, of course, but Mrs. Davis still must exer- cise- great' caution. As staff ? secretanTto the- National So- 'curity Council and head of. .its secretariat, she has access tO every piece of classified foreign policy information that passe.s among members . of the highest levels of the U.S. government. -? nigh Security , . "We're all, very coriscio513 .of our responsibility," she said. "We're always aware of the extremely high see ui ity classification. I guess be- ?CatiSe of this, you learn to live with it always in the back of your mind. It's alrea- dy a part -of my life.? Mrs. Davis, a tall, slim, gray-haired wornan of 50 who V.-3 :3 born in Long Beach, came to the National Securi- ty Council and.? its chief, De. Henry A. Kissingec, in March, 1000, on-loan" from the State Departnpent.,,vhe-ret she .had held a similar jOb,' '? She describes hcrself?as "sott of a traffic manager," , who prepares briefing books for Kissinger and the Pres- - ident, coordinates staff work as a man ci "failtz,,,tie en- ergy. and. ?.enteiect-si:d pnity" vs-ry :long hea.its. - "He's here before S a.m. ? and often doesn't leave un- til after 11. p.m.;" Eike said. "lle's very demanding of his staff, but ?doem't de- mand anything he won't do himself. "Ile has a knack ffor ask- ing the (-1U:est:ions vigt hope he ask- -tics hard ones. He has a marvelous wit. And I must say, I -think his social imag s has been grossly exag,g-tratecl." Government-riede ' Mrs. Davis, a resent re- cipient of the FcrIclial Wo- m a n' s- Award kr her career ac.complislments, feels that women lave an important p:iace. Ha high government pesitiki-s. "I've. never ? thcerght of my sex as a handicap," she said. !Tye been my for- tunate'. I've ; alwzys had. ;basses - who hi--tve judgcal me as an iudiviclutd, and I 'had a very undmitandiug bvsband." - Her" husband, ;a former attorney with Alk State- Dapartment, cli ccif our years ago. Her 16-Y-ear-old daughter attends iehool in Cennecticut ? always. mid men working for me," she said. "Marly - people Juice asked me if I've had prinibleres. I figure if a man le troubled. bi2cause hek Worling for zt." woman?he has nc prob- lem, not me., ' Her day begins at 7:30 a.m.- when she kayos her ?)t)-acrie farm Ito Broad Run, Va., for th-c drive to Washingtion. It's a long commute'(a't Inst- an %out. each way) but fills loves it -- espeelidly the drive home. ?"Aaer the tension of the da, it's lilac a decompression c h a M. her," she said. STATINTL anda'gtr-V ?_ ,ri1e416r;401 -110144 -RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 ? ar1borv4. the?Natior:: , :i he I.; \ Tv job I 1:IE STATI NTL. Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP8 8 MAR 91 The Predominance of Kisinger ?? I its orderly march of ideas, its thoroughness and its con- ceptual Veadth, President Nixon's wide-ranging foreign policy report -demonstrates again the predominant. influence of Henry Kissinger, his articulate National Security As- , sistant. The. former Harvard professor's strength is his ab- horrence of sloganeering in world .affairs and his knack for breaking complex problems down totheir more specific and manageable components. At one ?and the same time, claims one White House observer, he is -"Richard Nixon's Ri- chelieu, and his Metternich." ? Kissinger bega.n to solicit suggestions for the report last Oc- tober from the Department of State, the Defense De- partment and the. CiA. On the day after Christmas he took five of his 49 aides to San Clemente to begin drafting the doc- ument. He discussed its outlines in detail with Nixon in Jan- uary. A rough draft was then circulated to the key 'agencies for their comments, and the National Security Council re- viewed both the draft and the comments. The final policy de- cisions were ' Made last Month by Nixon, Kissinger and Secretary of State William Rogers at Key Biscayne. As the drafting and the final polishing continued, Kis- ? singer drove his staff with all the harshness of a. plantation overseer. It- was easy to detect which members of his staff had worked on the, final drafts;Kissing,er says. "They had ma- niacal -expressions on their faces." As the deadline for the final draft approached, Kissinger kept telephoning his men with last-minute thoughts. Exasperated, they finally stopped taking his calls so that they could' complete their work, Tyrannical taskmaster that he is, Kissinger has already run through three administrative aides, who decided to es- cape the pressure. But the irrepressible Kissinger can read- ily joke about his reputation, as a ruthless boss. Says he of his overworked staff: -"The circles under the eyes don't both- er me. It's only when I see the flecks of foam at the, cor- ners of the mouth that I worry." Approved For Release.2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6 Cl..aClACO, y ? Approved For Release 20,01/03/04 : CRLRDP80.701 By Thomas B. Ross- ? Sifti-Tirns Eluroz-iu \VASIL ? This provincial capital of the non.-Commu- nist world was struck dumb last week when a former pillar of the establishment stood up and said the emperor's minister . has no clothes. It has long been part of the insider's wisdom here that Sec. Of Stale William P. Rogers plays a secondary role to White -Hence adviser Henry A. Kissinger in the formulation of Presi- dent Nixon's foreign policy. High ranhing officials have been saying as rimch privately for Mere than a year and newspapers have been speculating about it even longer. But it was considered bad form in OIL; protocol-conscious town for any titled member of the goeern- . snout to say sb publicly.. s Then, last Tuesday, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo), race a proper Member of th-2'.. Cold War Club, rose on the Ssmate floor to declare to the outside world that Rogers is "laughed at" en -Washington's cocktail- circuit beca.use Kissinger is considered "secretary of state in everything but title." SVI)IINGTON, a former secretary of the Air Force and hawk turned dove on Vietnam,. asserted that Kissinger is "the actual architect of our foreign policy." 'The senator's point: was that either Rogers' poser should be testored or he should be replaced by Kissinger- as. the Presi- dent's spokesman in testiniony before Congress. ? Mr. Nixon promptly called a press conference to defend ."nay oldest and closest friend in the Cabinet." But his re- marks did little to change any minds and, in fact,, implicitly conceded Symington's case, ? .For tile President, while describing, Rogers as "the chief for'eign policy spokesman or the administration," indicated. that Kissinger has a broader role ? "not only foreign Policy but national secitrity policy -- the co-ordination of thine pol- icies." In other words, Kissinger stands at the focal point not only of the State Depattment's recommendations but also those of the Defense Department and thost_c.0.10::.:111genc.3 Agency, which command much more money and probably have more influence over U.S. operations abroad. KISSINGE.R'S POWER grows out or los position as director of the .Natiorial Security Council which, under Mr. Nixon, has been restored to its original pre-eminence. The NSC was created in 1947 to enable President Truman to conduct the cold War with the same type of strong, central ' control that Franklin D. Roosevelt exercised in World War it. By statute, it includes the President, the vice president, and .the secretaries of State and Defense. . Under Mr. Truman and President Eisenhower, it was domi- nated by two- forceful secretaries or state,- Dealt Ache-sea and ;John Foster Dukes, and developed an elaborate staff that 'represented a mini-State Department-Pentagon-CIA. ? Gem Eisenhower ran it much like a military staff with the Jdirector presiding as thief of staff dyer a wide range of cora- miti:ces 405X/Ofriqillreii4 226ofi01764'1. _foreign o ? icss tss The members of the NSC then debated, revised and ap- rorover,1 tte papers and .director was charged with seeing STATI NTL that they were put into effect. President Kennedy decided, even, before he, took office, that the NSC routine had degenerated into bureaucratic formalism. In one of his first official acts, in the words of his adviser ArtlAtIr Schlesinger, Mr: Kennedy "slaughtered committees right and left." The stated object was to restr4e the President's personal control over foreign pelicy and also to re-assert the pre- rogatives of the secretary of State, which had begun to wane under Dulles' successor, Christian Herter. Ilov.,ever, Dean Rusk failed to assert himself to Mr. Kenne:. ?dy's satisfaction and, again according to Schlesinger, he was{ soon complaining: "damrait, (McGeorge) Bundy and J get ? more done in ono day in the Vhite. House than they do in six r?riontits at the State Department.'' ? . Bundy, Mr. Kennedy's special assistant for national security - affairs, was seen exeteisingrthe powers of the NSC without the old encumbrances of the committee structure and, the format debates ainong the members. ? ? Meanwhile, Defense See. Robert S. McNamara was cutting into the State Department's domain by issuing an annual "posture statement," A precursor to the state of the, world, Message now prepared by Kissinger fon Mr. Nixon, it was full of sweeping foreign policy pronouncements. D.ES.PITE-lcileNAINLVRA.'S COMPETITION, Bundy wielded " - considerably more prr,v-er than any previous director of the NSC. And his-successor, Walt W. Rostov', sustained the status . of the job under President Johnson despite a resurgence in Rusk's influence. When Mr. Nixon took office, be restored the Eisenhower- type staff structure to the NSC but, at the same time, retained the Bundy-type dominance of the director. Thus, Kissinger ? inherited the best of both worlds, a large, loyal staff and a tradition of equality with the Cabinet officers. Defense Sec. Melvin It.. .Laird has not achieved the influence of McNamara under Mr. Kennedy. And Rogers, who lacked his predecessor's diplomatic ,,:ground, has net achheved! Rush's influence under Mr. Johnson, Kissinger, a brilliant scholar of foreign affairs and a stir- . prisingly aggressive administrator, has filled the vacuum to become, in the opinion of Kactically all experts here, the dofninant administration figure in international affairs. As such, Symington', Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) and other critic 7 of the war have sought to hold him accountable.. particularly on Vietnam. , . KISSINGER HAS AGREED to a number of informal meet.: jugs, including at least. one visit to Fulbright's home. But the senators want hint 'on more formal terms, possibly under tile hot lights for a televised hearing. - Mr. Nixon has refused, invoking "executive privilege", the theory that.the President has the right under the constitutional. separation of powers to decide, who should and who should not. . testify before Congress. - The senators have counterattacked with the argument titat the Constitution directs the President to seek the Senate's' - "advice and consent" on foreign policy., P 16-.e2trrf0.01414-13011,-40000eltireClitteabt.rie torATTnu i.4t. "- Soviet Union, ;ranee coordination before .the "Our kneaaledge of prbsent Communist China and 'other abortive Sontay prisoner-of- Soviet' capabilities . allows countries that might harm the war raid of No. 21," at which Ienry and others to criticize nation's security. time the C.I.A. was virtuall$\ us for serne? sponginess about When tactical Intelligance shut out of Pentagon planning. predicting future Soviet pol- ' ? ' ' , in V ieLnam and Germany and By contrast, the specialists icy," an informed source con- reeonnaissance by overseas point out, timely intelligence. ceded. "It's pretty hard to look commands is included, the en- helps in decision-making, down the road with the same rural figure exceeds 85-billion , It was Mr. Cline who spot- ertainty."- experts say. ThAy . PAC Re-1'001101 - 44s:sZI D R80 -04 604 Pad o" *he AdministratieM's partment spends o e than 8 , ' - - marine buildup. at. Cienfuegos, put and organization of ..tne clogglhas;" in the secrecy. shrouded _intelligence "com- munity." sourcas and personnel?much of it talented--in formulating policy. In addition to the C.I.A., Two Cases in Point. . --Helms Said to Rate High -Sodreles close to the White House, say' that Mr. Nixon and his foreign-policy advisers --Mr.. Kissinger and Secretary or State William P., Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird?respect the professional competence. of -Mr. Helms, who is 57. and is :the first career head of the Central Intelligence. Agency. ; Appointed by - President 'Lyndon. B. Johnson in June, 1966, Helm has been essentially apolitical. He is said to have brought profes- sional ability-. -to bear ? in "lowering the profile" of the agency, tightening .discipline and divesting it of.. manY fringe activities that have aroused criticism in Congress and. among the public.. His standing with Congress and among the - professionals is high. According to White House soufces, President Nixon, backed by the Congressional leadership, recently offered Mt. Helms added authority to 'coordinate the activities of the other ? board meanbers. ? He is reported to have declined. A' major problem, according to those who know the situa- tion, is that while Mr. Helms is the. President's representa- tive on the Intelligence Board, ROO ?130040009111 .10 per .cent--Sa ion - to ? ? $TAT1NTL rioi; YORK -S Approved For Release 200103,404 iMA-RDP80- at...... , - ? ili--), 1 ' - - l'";i ' ./. ' '.'' - ' An astessment of the ;policy! added billions, he Won. the 1 11, I '-- -11 .1 $ ..11._ ' A CA. e,' - position and influence of inili- 't--0 --"'C'' i 0 ''''i - '-'-- 0 ' C ''''.7 ? ? 0 1C " 0 17 a - . - Cet,' ''. regard of the brass because] tary and civilian Defense Dc- they felt like full paitners - rx ''. - - 5 'I. . ()NUL - ' r .t,l-ff 1,..,.%..?. ..,,....iA . ....., ? . , e...,...,_ ? 0 ....- t. %..., , 4 IP ---) ..--,, ----, A fa -,-.-^ 0 ? --,-:, p, q / IS par.tment leaders in the foreign- - -a - poluty arena makes it clear that shrinking budgets. the hard choices required' byl the stereotypes of hawks in the One reason forthe relati'on? ,- , . _ . ? Pentagon and doves elsewhere ship is the mutual respect -and Following, is the fourth in a series of at exploring no longer prevail. Nowadelys a . .. . , .. .... ...,. , warmth between the Defense the Nixon Administration s style in foreign variety of shifting allia.nees in i;Secretary and the Joint Chiefs _', policy: the Administration sometimes that was obviously tacking 'oil . 'By WILLIAM Bnt'CIllitil ? , pair the Joint Chiefs and the both sides during ttho McNa- .? _ Special to The 'sea To Times .. . State Department against the. imara era, ??-:-:- WASHINGTON, Jan. 20?' -- Pentagon's civilian leaders; at _ Nonetheless, ;Mr., Latird"nas, That happened in the spring -other Thmes civilians are ar- .. ? ;Though the Defense Department ' retained a principal planning raved aat hist t'ne milita- ? then r a ? ' ? " - 0 innovation of Mr. McNamara.'s: of 1969, following the shooting :remain? the largest, richest and down of an unarmed spy plan'e ag)-.-i'n,'?'''''' ''''' ' '''Y' Icy ?White House ',staff dividinr, the budget among .most f in mi Governent off the coast of North Ko tea, men may be pushing: for bold the mca'jor military mitsions. lien the mill ta ry strssed the ? "agency, it, like other agencies, ,, w - = ? ., , racoJes, against opposition from that must be fulfilled, not - I ?ioatteity of forces available in the th, di Aomats and the nhilitar ' has lost to the Nixon White iv' - - , . , . ; . 1 . , 1 .. . . ? among the armed . services as' arouse some of its influence on:. - face of Iva. Nixon s India in- leaders. - such l'he first decision' on 'sey ' clination to bomb some North To gain sornr. insight into the strat.egie misSiles is li'cr:v :.foi?aign policy. , ? Korean airfields. As the, mill,- conside- ble I i" f P^ r- ? - ? - a ? - - ?? t. . , .?, are needed and of what kind, t'? Senior military men have the tary slowly moved air and sea infitt-tence in fornian olic , one . ..P_. 3a-.. . .and only then is it determined -satisfaction- of sitting as equals reinforcements toward Korea, .. must Juin to .the beginning of how much money will go to his anger cool-d and he cle. ,the various missile programs. ' on all major policy boards with cide.d against retaliatoloy ?Hs, ithe nni2Leen sixties, when Rob- civilian leaders of the ' Ponta- During the recent Jordanian Ica S? .i.leNarntira was John F. ? There is no doubt that civil- / gon, the. State, Department and. 'crisis, after hundreds of Syrian !Yenriet/s SecrotarY of De- tan control continues at the .the Central 'Intelligence tanks hacl gone into Jordan to f fense. che Pentagon of Seere-? Pentagon. SecretarY Laird end Agency. They' get their views support the Palestinian guer- t?a' Mtivin H. Laird is Vastly DaTuty Secretary David Pack l - t, , s, rillas against the troops of different, in style and sub- aid make the final decisions direct y o the President un- King Hussein the Joint Chief stance, from the establishinent on such questions 'as whether filtered by civilians. But thoselsupported .by officials of the molded over a seven-yeart to develop and build a Navy fighter or an Army tank and yicavs are rejectecl by ;the Pre s1-1 State and Def.a.rise Departments, _spt,C.,;i2dd biyhrao,ILil?g. h?aleilsn,Taa.:;ntari;f. Nii:Ifiro on the nutnber of combat divi- dent as often as they aro ac.!tirgcd caution lest a misstep . . 'copied_. ; trigger a confrontation with' 351ihson's Presidency, ;sions and aircraft car riers that .. ?.._ . , ? i- ; -- - e the Soviet 'Un i?vill be maintained as the nili Li-ton Brilliant But Abaaaive . While President Lyndon. B. On the other hand, on issues I 'tary 'establishment shrinks. Johnson was jealous of the pre- in which the White House, for Mr? McNamara, a . brilliatq Under Mr. McNamara and his but. abrasive manager, or successor, Clark M. Clifford it rogatives of Presidential power, strategic reasons, was receptive ,y c ,a tains h ' too', ? , ? . ? on, to toe . e an options offered by the Samzed a team of bright- Young. %YRS CiVilian analysts wrho for- .. tactical,ci.villan analys.Ls who helped ntulated the options, with the fratary support for, his tough mreialsitoag _f_ or essentially as in the case cyfrhim take decision-making from military coming . in later on decisions, whether on Vietnam. tee rebuttal; now the military iii force invasion and!the armed services .. and . ;,lie Joint Chiers . and central- i- force levels or on the khid of the heavy bo abatrikcs on air- ti ate specitic- proposals on? how antimissile missile he Wanted defense sites 'and sup:A-5, ize it in his office, In the prb- the defense pie wilt be cut, ? to build. President Nixon in dumps. in North Vietnam _ cess the views of militaty mei, ?with civilian analysts making , ' , , - , supportehard-lfne . military policy was V:ere consistently brushed 'their comments before ultimate contrast, seldom seems to feel . d. ? . . _ aside, or so the military felt. With the not-Me excePtion :, During the long team of - tdecision. ? - the -peed for a public military' . endorsement of his actions. . An linpression lingtpported of .Vietnam strategy, Mr. Mc-. Mr. McNamara and the brief"r Even when the Defense. De- Mr. Nixon's stand has some-,Namaia succeened in gaining one of Mr. Clifford, the Office. artment times given rise to the impre.s-'virtual autonorn.y over policy of Internationt'd Searity Affairs p can present a united sion that military men arc, in,cleci.sions, even tnos.e. with 1,arge --roughly 300 speeialists w1o. front of civilian and militarY the ascenclancy. Early las.t;foreign - policy . implications. advise the Secretary of Defense planners pushing a project, the month, after two intensive air.And in a world in which the on. foreign policy.-- . included White House has shown no re_ strikes on North. Vietnam an. d?Urated States has commitments isome of the brightest and most luctance to _ impose its own a commando-type raid on a pm is to raore than 40 countries, there, 'assertive' officials in Washing- _ oner-of-war camp near -Hanoi, is little the Pentagon does or iton. . ? -- . -solution.. Mr. -Nixon overruled Senator J. W., Fulbright as- contemplates that lacks rami-t i . the Joint Chiefs of- Staff when serted that the Pentagon was fications abroad. _ , I Urged Pullout '. they araaied against the uni- "taking over the. primary role It wa.s Secretary 1,,leNamara Nov according to 'people in lateral elimination of- stodts in our foreign policy." rather than the President oi- other agencies who rietai with Ci biological w-eapons. Since those bard-line actions the Secretary of Stale who each them, the caeca staff,?with a seemed to break a patterni of January published a "posture few . notable exceptions, i.s -- He overruled them again more than a year's duration n 'statement" otalinint= worldwide; weaker. A senior State Deont- when they urged that the Rus- which the Administration ap- problems and how the United merit official commented: "In -slams . be offered a package naared to be fulfilling its States intended to: deal. with the McNamara era State proposal on nuclear-arms n- - coeledge of negotiation rather them, dealt with I.S.A. because that's trol that . would - not Prevent than confrontation, the Ar- Into that setting stepped Mr. ,where the strong men Were at construction of a full 12-site kansas Democrat's allegation Laird, a smooth, political-t Defense. Now we tend more Safeguard antimissilesystem; may have struck a responsive ly shrewd, Congressman from,. and more to deal with the the offer, instead, was eitlIcr chord around the -nation. . -Wisconsin .t.ilio had gained his; Joint Start and the services. for . no missile defen w se or for Hoc as it prompted_ a knowledge of defense matters On the large stage of policy,- -one limited to protectina only ranking Administration official during more than a decade on, Mr. Laird- has chosen a limited' a . the capitals of the Sevier 'Union to .say that he had missed:the the House Military Appropria? number of key positions aad ( and the? United Stales. ? . point on the g01,11d that it is tions Subcominittee. ? lobied- hard for their accept- - Moreover, on ? at ? least two not that the Pentagon has "in- He de-emphasized the impor- ance, bdth- in the Administra- . occasions when . the military ordinate 'influence on . our for- lance or civilian analysts and tion :id in Congress. . chiefs prevailed on a major eip policy but rather that the returned to the military a sub-I One was his insistence that, policy matter at the V/htte .Administration is itself . more stantial role in the makinvt' of' in addition to the stress by the i - - -- House, it was in straint on a Pr, , itf atiaokai....inclinact to a. p hard,Itne bias in defenate ra-4:i I' lthougl 11;,ctutry-816.-iiwat..s, 1.2eparia ciTtorReleasen2001/03/ 41110C1 Et '(? OttaiblUi m, 0 . . . . toward hold action. ' et, to which_Mr...fpNamara had, gon andumirco114;blne..'t YrY." . ? STATINTL . - e) , r, 10-:ii Approved For Release_2001Y03/04i:ICIA-RDP80-01 . -, a ,, 1 , 6 ' in ,?"--, '4 how 0 r 1 1 ,., how soon and how effectively er'el C *,lr-'ii I*3 r''''' ' -' ' ? 11.2.k.'h(-, .-". .r"."0 C.,'4 i e'rn IMr. Nixon's new council can b.t.iks to politicac6.6.6.1.;.6i_aEruirocavi-tigil gain control over the rival in - i . .. mg --- with only occasional terests that have been opera.t- 1 i victirri of interagency Rhe United States relatively jso- i, Following is arc third in a that the White House often lia.c1 toted. series of artinis cieproi.iiig.-thelto resolve on an improvised Crucial Issue in hPan guidance and frequently impro- Nixon Adminisirittion's styre in!libasi5. i A ia*.ilure to settle trade' ..-I 'Yised White House. decisions.-- : !i 'The ? establishment of the l' investment questions rii,u ? ..,,, foreign policy:. ? -v,iithAri: nine Government depart- . , . inew machinery was not .a sim- Japan--a 'much more acute po- Ments and at least a dozen Ili y TAD'a..1I,C . lpie ? bm-eauccatic. Tilove out a liticaLproblem. in Tokyo _than agencies. - Spzclnl tb Tir.-nr?.? 1::-:% T;Ines .. major effort to cope.-../ith the has *been generally acknoWl- '- ? -In addition to the State Dc- WASHING1ION, Jan. 19--De- rapidly, changing interilatii,i?n,i; edged l. in Washington?could, partment, which is charged with spite deteriorating economic economic situatiOn, ..airr..,...,,,,. in Tile ..opinion of American -of- negotiating most of the econom- R?1 "'idols, weaken the pro-Ameri- le agreements but whose role relations betwepn the United posing grave foreigii?-Pcille.Y. can . Government and induce is. gradually diminishing, the States and the two otbc.r gre['it problems for the Unitad StateS More* active -econOnalc if not Defense, Treasury, Commerce, trading powers - --- til,e EuroPeall Traditional questions. 0-iirse .. diplomatic relations between Justice Transportation, .Lahor Common Market and Jcpall--- curny and diplomacy :are tc., . Japcn . and .(ioimiiiiiiist cluna. Agriculture and . Inten.lor Do- ?Nixon Arirohlistration ilaS ginriing to bi-. overshacloWe' h- noi,v such poliiiical lin- partments participate in mal the . . . L1 . .). plications have often been lost ing foreign economic policy. been - ?unalilci in the last. two l'isieZ . Protectionism hero ancfrom sig.lit in the Nixon Ad- That is not all. The Central years to develop a Comprehen. abroad, by fears of trade :%,,,4s ministration's conduct of for- Intelligence Agency, the Atom- sive foreign cconoritiC Policy. I and by de.i?pcining : .C.olmn ' ,.., . . _ true eign economic policy. A high ic Energy Commission, the Th.?,t; stair.; e,f affairs, piivalcly idisplites with the - European- .., .1,. 1 - ?-.1ti, . ?j- . fc .cir St' t . De Y rtr----it offickd re- United.. States . Tariff, Commis- i . mat,,t.:i ?i,ce.? y. "I ? ii n siorithe -GC'neral S.6r vices Ad- described by high Achiiinislra- 'Economic Gcimmtinity? and at- econoMic policy we are - in a ministration; tile Maritime Com- lion officials as a long -.ici-10cl pan-the two other great. traa. state of drift. One hand often mission, the National Advisory of drift marked by polic.y cell- in powers--as well as by dif does not know what the other Council,- 0.1e . _E,xport-Imp.ort ,traclicticins and failures, has forences..,dith the. un.clerde,,?,,31., hand is doing." . :- ?.? . - .: Balnk, the:1'.Civil.:- ?ACrOnautics Mcausing concern. in Wasii- opal nations 'a ?nd by. the' prob. Divisions have occurred ' in Board, the Federal Aviation bee official ranks and in the .busi- Agency, the Federal Comm- ington, in foreign capitols and lems of economic and military miss community. Industry and meations Commission and other lin the' American business, labor a.ssistance...- : '.T - ? :i... farm groups are- divPled bi- . agencies also have a voice.' '1 -? . lanbl? farm Coirirnunities. FreeTrade* I.illd6r'Fire tween. protectionism and 'free! - Even before IVir. Nixon estab- ? The foreign view has been trade. Organized. labor is thin- I lish th ed "e-:.couricii; it. was the . .,, ' . The economic- problems have ing, toward protectionism.: " iWhite 'Houk that had Ito* step that only the exercise of United 'Western Euro ,ie and Ja.pari, . Government departments in.: 'into *recent em.ergencies to co fr -- States aclersiiip Call rrcst a th-reataai .. -i American markets ereasillz1::1Y 'act as spokesmen. ordina.te Policy %Olen agencies . .i growing trend 10 rd .worldab,,md fin-ci ,_, \,,,,,,?,,,, ,. (.10,. for the econoinie.intcrestS. clos-. directly ;responsible for , 'oce-. . ? mes tic mark et, has brought Depa?ri. meta, its voic, -,,,?eal,,c4,..11 fatter. ' - ' est - to them while the -,..ita...e.,nt.,inio.- ::'affairs appeared to econeici conflict, l'j " Mt, i ma' for coordinating divergent in-, attempts to kee traditional Last p traditional! Last " -Saturday be dispatched' It wa.s in recogmtion of the pressure to change the United States' traditional free-trade: foreign-policy objectives:. fore-YUrvier: Secretary of State John :doviestic ail d overSeaS lilti,T- philo,ophy. . . -lrWin 2c1 to Teheran and esls at. a time of deepaning ' most, ? - - - ,. . ? ? '' :- ' ?-. ? -- ' ' 'several Arab capitals as,a long- As . Americans have lost to .. ''' CongresS bIay Intehvene : . the six Members of the Elito-* Official -:...: ?brc,wing and lar?,gely. ignbred, ly,-the*Achninistration 'crisis ."7r0SC involving deroands' crisis 5n the international trade,. . monetary and mu stn fields pean Common - Market tl.,,e:ir remains.. committed, to free .by producing co 'nines for a that President Nixon today place as the principal tradel-S trade. Thus far the President greater share of the 'profits istabtished a .Cabinet -level ancl as the domestic rece.s sion - has tended to decide tariff Om. earned by American oil com.-, ,Council op international Eco- . troversics in favor of the free panieS. The White House also; non-dc Policy... ' * eign competition, has added to concern the Acimird cit.& for. s-. flo.w of imports,. but Congress directed the Justice' Departmentl ' * maY inv014e severe 1.12:Sisl'i'ltive to lift antimonopoly.. could ies .strictures mounting protectionist restrictions this year. ? ' * '. so that the compan . ,. Mr. Nixon, the chairman of tration has found itself under the new body, named Peter 3. The chief task. of the :new unite in dealing -with the, pro- Pcterson of Chicago, chairmanure Ja pan s gi.ow in- econs:d nic u White House ccnc.II, inn -em diming countries. .,. ?..:. --..? - ?. ,, .. S. ' of the board of Bell L o 5e1 eeffect, is tO pull tog-el:11er under the Simitarly, ..the- White.: House potential has had a similar _ .- - - president's control ,the over-all virtually overruled the State The conoinie probleins have direction of foreign economic Department -last week to obtain. Coil1Prmy, to be executive direc- . tor. . , political implications that ma v policy. That has already been thei:,caticellation of a riegotiat The council's task is to pullsignific.antly alter . i oreL,on done with diplomatic and s' inn' in session with the European -.. ..... po 1,..3.. .. curity affairs, which ..are CO.l- Cominon Market countries mid together military t1.11.C1 econonlic A trade war with Western . . !Europe, ter the curily Council in which henry for mined at contilluing all orclinated by the National :Se.- , t, - - ? ? Japan, set for- Jan.?24 .in.Frank- aid, intoinational .tracie and particadarly monetary, financial, investment ? Common .. Market is expancled A, Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's *SPE.i7. ancelnent hit hung steel a' and commodities matters into , ports to the United. States,- Britain' and others, could result cial assistant for national-secur- with the anticipated - entry of a. cohesive body of. policy, tak- in a European shift. tovford the it' affairs, plays the key role.. Foreign economic .policy- had 1 cancellation to influence the i The White Earn forced _the ing into account the -require- Communist countries, on the been the missing link in _the domestic steel industry to cur- merits of foreign policy. Model of West Ciermany's l'Ost- centralization. The new cpuncil, tail price:. increases,. using the Until the establishment of the politick." ? . . -. - which ineludimg Secretary :-'Cif threat of import's as a ' weapon c6tincil, recommended by .an .. That, policy, inaugurated by State Will,iam P. Rogers as vice, in the battle against inflation, advisory committee on Govc;rn- chairman, as well as ? Mr. Kis- Legislation Was DelaYel . - ? - Chancellor \Villy Brandt wand designed .to achieve rapproach- singer and Paul V. Mc:Cracker", . . meat organization, the author- rant betwee a \Vest Gerinany chairinan of the council -of With foreign economic policy ity and capacity to mana,g6 all and the. Soviet bloc, has already Eccinoinic Advlsers; - provides au orphan , Mr. Nixon and the international economic ?Yes- caused * some nervousness in the bridge between foreign af- In-. Kissinger have -Concen teat- irons have been scattered Washington. Many officials fairs ancl the domestic policy ,ed- their attentionelsci,vei-e, througla the GDVernmezit. For groups, v.thich -are in the do- the Adininistration delayed the, here. ' believe that closer, eco- eign ?economic policy ?.? no n& ties betiNeen We-stern rnain coordinated John D. submission. -of,the measures Was- "le and Eastern Europe may lead Erliehman, another. assistant to signed '-to -re:Organize. the' for-. ? -anis. Al, Approved or Release 2001/03/0 .0 a PACIA6WaREgliaM4400;r:'$ -- . ._ .. ,.. , `. k t, 4--? .2: STATINTL ?I q jp,ci Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP . - - or tryinc, c Z',Z1+7 away ? ? ii a k tr!, ? f ? t p ? 'r the / 4 (14 " ( i" the Vietnam war arid prevcr.,1-- Yeritd -down Jt ? .,--. ? - ? , , c".." e , ? ' Followingi. the ''second in a :sail:35 of ortiate.f; exploring. the 1Nixon Administration's style in 'foreign policy and the Presi- dent's relationship with his staff earl with Government - TIEDRICKStJlfli volt WASHINGTON, Jan. 187--A IIaava al professor namc?i.l. r.enry A. Kissingei!. Cursed. his luck wilen. Richard M. ? Nixon de- feated Nelson A. Rockefeller for the Piesidential nomination at the ltl:38 Republican convention in Miami. Friends recall that Mr: Kis- singer, then Governor Rocke- feller's chief expert on foreign policy, spoke with a tart, par- tisan bitterness ? about Mr, Nixon. Ile 1.';'es sharply critical of what he felt were the nomi- nee's vague and elusive policy prononneemeths and was. ?vor- Tied that Mr:- Nixon would be unable to lead the nalion out of Vietnam. Yet: Mr. Kissinger has b the hilstrument by which Prasi- - !dent Nixon has centrali?zed the. ? ?, ....t.? ??,..,...... .". Nonetheless, the system has ..???? g,iven Mr. Nixon Et sufflcR_ it on policy so that he has d in m ??? not been forceto ajor de- cisions by sheer bureaucratic M momentu or. high pressure from any quarter. There has been no repetition of President! john F. 'Kennedy's Bay of Pigsi disaster. ' Imitable Atom-Age. Shift ! in the nuclear age it was virtually inevitable that power would drift from the State. De- partment to the White house. Any President wants. to assert ultimate command in moments of crisis and on key issues. To reconcile the positions of 40-. odd agencies -dealing in foreignt affairs, he needs his own for- eign-policy staff. The patterfl. had already emerged in,pre-vi- oils Administrations; the Nixon Ailmnis itration has brought about significant change. ? In the architecture of govern- me.nt, the pillars of the new centralism. are a rejtrvenated National Security Council but- t?? ? : tressed. by ?, network of inter- agency committees designed-- and all headed?by Mr. Kis- singer. They inject the White House deep into the develop- of policy on defense and . ? ? '"` intelligence. 3riatters as well as fai.cll.JPc,13. On (111)10111a cy. ? Tic'TirY?1" Kissinger withPres1(1'?'"t Nixon, for wIlein 11.'' . In the more Intangible cur- management of foreign policy has become the Inost- a3.-leulate si,o1,.esmant on p,olley. rency of incluencn in this in the White House as never capital, the change is demon- . . beforc---much -as S?cr,:!tary of recommended co ire of aotion, ! strated by Mr. Kissinger's rep- " Active I-Innd in Diplomacy Defense .1tobert S. Tyl-c.Nainara ? ? ' " ? 1 'ence vtatior --- in the Government, once centralized Control over of the .Pentagon. . In the 1063 campa.ign he de- portant foreign visitors, meet- ,Secretary of State William P. In the process the Presi- dared his intention to purge the jog with the most prestigious Rogers or Secretary of Defense dent's brilliant and generally State Department and recast it ambassadors and troubled Melvin R. Laird. None of his - ? - !and on rare predecessors enjoyed such cm, herd line speokil assistant for more to his ov,,n lilting. Once 'olc'casions, 1.11.,,nn,.;,, sensitive reputation. . I national -security affairs 1-"ts elected, he ,chose instead. t? negotiations. lio gets actively ? Ii:i the personal trappin::;? cir, eim.ri:;ad not only as li!,3 rilWI: lUtVe. the department in a sec- engarA, cheeks with the Presi- status, the- syrabOls- inch-de. his' o-iefre; p-)sit;on and to build dent and reports bac', to bun basement office to bright, emergence from a White House swank, Hilton-style quarters oh. the ground floor near the President's Oval OffiCe. There . he. directs his growing staff, winch is considerably bigger than those of his preJacessors. In protocol, a secretary said jokingly, Mr. Kissinger comes "just below God"---a jibe at his ego as well as his power.. , ? Nixon Style and Personality leaving him TiO choice but ap- Despite is in proval or disapproval. He ?Mr. Kissinger takes an inereas- Congress, the press and among .?. ? ingly active hand in diplomacy, the embassies?as a? more the -competing bureaucrams.wanted more "options." - seeing select a vyverful fieure than either influential foi?eign-policy ad- viser but also as a natural ally in cutloolt and strategy. It is a far ci7y from - up the foreign-policy machin- ery of the White House. ? departments, jealous of The results - are, now dear. what they consider their pre tiVeS often complain The President, who holds the The Administration's tactics' about White. House ' usurplaq, final deterrninationF. cp.-Oen-elan may continue to evolve, butl but White House' official?s ? that this is the way th decided to concentrate respon-i set --- it is a Nixon-Kissingerea. the system warl-Its hue-inc-es sist e policy Molly in his own bands, pattern of doingisibilit at the .White House. , . los; net eiccet then gave Mr. Kissinger au- Mr. Kissinger Is the pivotalf lelon on some Ii s been top rovide more order- pattern. thority to operate virtually so welt ,sely...,olod is Le: issucs_highly y policy oimu at , a super-Cabinet officer inan-1 in international allfair. that posals -for the negotations indicate pro- af fairs community major issues centers on him arms, for example. Conversely, aging the sprawling, {02-caw) conceptual planning on roost with the Russians- on strategic . , ?I geopolitics makes President nor 1:, adviser c , in area$ where neither the .. end his staff of 110. His under- ,--a ..;termine.d to h?-? ' ha, .., Mr. Ni.:.:on P.SSINIM, f,,,110., t..,.-Isanding _ ,, ._ _,_ , ,,.. , , 1 . ' . , , 1 , r- -, -In take charge of !oll'ihirn the most articulate, and shown great personal ,intercst, ieian policy and not 10 lease itinost frequently used, -,r:(..:1,-te.F,- such as foreign eeneMic. P-011Y, i there is serious disarray. The Vinite House. has not ito the diplomats. Ile skunned!man f0.1' policy, albeit thn.,.uah the anonymous pronouncements ' ithe Eisenhower pattern or ITIv: .. ifor,,,e grand compromises and, pre:sent ? him with. r si-roe I 1. ,,,,,,,.. baen spent reachin7, rouch time and. energy have .to crises ting the cApproveciFo Re*igd IOVI03/04 -:eqrA;4100 itythpian- Why has he become so cen- tral to the Administration's pat- tern of operation? Primarily be- cause of the style and person- ality of President Nixon, most important his determination In take the policy lead himself; and his feeling that foreign af-1 fairs is his strong suit. 0120040001 -a foreign. Policy," be said during the 10 :%S campaign, "I have strong con-i C! OTT:CE P.10.1if T07? T, ? .,,,Ft '" 9 8 JAN 1971: ? ..... rovecLhorixelease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80- ? '71 7 ?. ? ? T1,Ie 7q1) (rT1 . ) j 11 f j 0 7f 0 ft. -i. for eotr? ,}.L.11 (.1}Q.J.;./ ? og LI] L)e 1.1 STATI NTL By, Courtney R. Sheldon Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Are they as strongly opposed on a broad advocate. My position has to be that of help-; } ? " Washington range of fundamental foreign-policy ques- ing the President make his decisions." .. . ? - tions as has _been portrayed in reports in ' i . ' White House. aides .in any administration this newspaper and in other periodicals? And at another point, Mr Kissinger corn- can learn with guillotine swiftness that they Valued staff assistants are ind mented:- ependent- ' -, ?. ? must accommodate themselves to a Pres- i-nincled and from varied backgrounds. They ."The first thing to understand is that no- dent's style of decisionmakinEf,. . ' .. ;sometimes see the actions .of their bosses body gets to be president who suffers from I Those President Nixon has summoned to through tinted lenses. Some .are conserva- a weak will. And, ther'efore, no president is! the White House apparently have done, so Live, others liberal. They know much but likely to take only one person's advice. No 7:resident can afford to take only one.per-! in good grace. They may find it enormously not all. They calmot be expectgd to know' 1 draining, but also often personally pleasant what goes on when Mr. Rogers, Dr. KiSsin- son's ad Vice." ,. ' - - ? '. - I and certainly viable. - . . . ger, and President /\.ixon consult in piiva e. , "If my view differs from that .of one of . ?ithe ?Cabinet members "then the President ' In these last hectic' days of preparation yould hear the Cabinet member. the ' of budget, economic, and State of the Union 14-1Pelr'a'al-3;ces 13.011ed ,. ? ? - .. e ? . messages,? aid and comfort from White Despite the above reports, the available way the ?Pitsident makes decisions, in any : "rouge advisers is vital to the presidency. facts today. seem to indicate ?that at the :event, isn't that he calls in a series of peo- . In one sense they are middlemen --be- hour of crisis in foreign affalits, there has pie individually. VThat he generally does is 1 tween the- Cabinet" members and the Presi- been a better Working arrangement at the to call all the interested parties together. ' dentleesifters of opinion and bureaucratic very top levels of. government than is gen-in my field that is inevitably the Secretary ? . ? l regulators who supply the. President with erally.assumed. - !of State, the Secretary of Defense; almo . .., ,i . the relevant facts' for decisionmaking. This applies to such sensitive judgments: always the d latch- director of the Central Inte- ? as how to respond to the Soviet missile, gClICC Agency and the chairman of the Joint Close :.,.I Land. ? . ? ' -? ' crisis- id the L?liddle. East - and how to im- Chiefs of Staff." . . "- 13ut the elite .of the ?White House h-iner prove relations with Communist China, for Then he asks me, on the basis of pre- , ? - liminary work that has been done in sub- 'cir'cle are also closer 'at hand than the Cabi- examPle? . .. w is,, net, and the President asks their advice, tco. And, further, it is difficult to put Dr.. Kis-.'ordinate bodies, to explain hat the ite Everyone invblved r ognizes Ulat the Pr sinrer in the role of a direct. competitor of is, lie almost inevitably calls on the Sc the State Department, for. his job entails retary of State first to state -his recom- "! rustling around in military and intelligence memlations; Then everybody else has an- areas as well as diplomatic. He is called opportunity to state his views." ? upon to look upon issues from a somewhat broader perspective than is the State De- partment. ? . -? - e . ..? ? ? I ? dent must take the ultimate praise or blame. Any aide who is overall:dons to have the public know of his personal good works ob- viously destroys his value to the .presidency. " The press listens for the slightest hints on who originated what opinion, and the Presi- clent and his.aides read the media s specu,a- met od tion sometimes grimly, 'sometimes apProv-.. . ingly, sometimes laughingly. i Are there personality differences between How can diverse personalities, such inde- Dr. Kissinger, an acknowledged ' expert in pendent, intellectual powerhouses as a Kis- foreign and military affairs, and Mr. Rogers, singer, a Moynihan, and a Shultz find. the a longtime confidant of Mr. Nixon and an cd- magical formula for serving the presidency viser on a broad range of subjects, beyond :without impairing their own integrities and those that men of goodwill mutually tolerate, futures? .. . . . recognizing that those of differing back-. - One 1:vay is to play neither the role of an grounds can make a contribution to the Pres- antagonist, at least not early in the deCision- ident's knowledge? .. ? . .. ? ? ' . making process, nor to give substance to This question is almost beside the noint any suspicion of supplanting, duplicating' or when one takes into account President undermining the role of Cabinet members. .. - . Nixon's mode of -decisionmal;ing as ex- Kissii-P-'er rok 1-3ole'd ' ? . plained by Dr. Kissinger. . ? 0 - .?. As one would expect there is speculation The role of Dr. Kissinger, in particular, is on the growth of influence of -the staff of easily misunderstood. lie described it.on TV Dr, Henry. A. Kissinger, Assistant to the recently: "The Secretaries of State and De- President for National Security Affairs, fense haye a. responsibility tq make specific vis-a-vis the State Department and Score- recommendations . to the President? I have tary of State William P. Rogers. . ? ?two responsibilities. One is to make Sure that With no assistance from either Dr. Kissin the PresideiAt gets as many choices put be- ger or Mr. Rogers in making this kind of fore him as possible ---- as many realistic comparison, one source of information has choices put .before him as possible. .been the informal views of. sorrie of the ,. "The second is to see to it that when issues assistants of le two men ious denartments that each de- And. this i!i? e.rovedLEg;reReletatecpti6M4/04/14bA4RDP8omeotRool300400001-6 rf?cy as it jF objectilaShl- to, Dr.icissinern . case to the. President. ? "My basic position cannot be' that .of an admitted, eon be. as vulnerable to inaccu- - t. ?r Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80- AMICAN OP IT. ION JEM. 1911 [7.77.11 7 ed Look At The . Frank A. Capell is a professiodal intelli- gence specialist of almost thirty years' I standing. He is Editor and Publisher of \ the fortnightly newsletter, The Herald Of Freedom, has contributed to such impor- tant national magazines as The Review Of ? .The News, anci is author of Robert E. Kennedy --. A Political Biography, The Untouchables, and other books of inter- est to Conservatives. Mr. Cap ell appears frequently on radio and television, lectures widely, and never :I-ears controversy.. He lives in New Jersey, is an active Cath- olic layman, and . father of seven thus. .?. \ i (r 1 1 \1_2?1 171. j \ \.:23 _C., .7_ "Well, in addition to all the informatio which OSS was getting on Latin America he had access to the cables which the OS was getting in from its agents abroad worldwide information of various sorts and the OSS had an agreement wit! the State Department whereby he als could see State Department cables oi vital issues.".. Halperin was Chief of 111 O.S.S. Latin American Division at - th( time when, as Miss Bentley hs sworn, hi was one of her . contacts in a Sovie espionage ring. Carl Aldo Marzani was Chief of th Editorial Section of the O.S.S. Marzat has been several times identified ? undf oath as a member of the Cormnuni Party. Using the most highly classific information, he supervised the making charts on technical reports for higher ech Ions of' the Army, the Navy, the Joi Chiefs of Staff, and the 0.S.S. Comra . Ma.rzani made policy decisions and wa: liaison officer between the Deputy Chie of Staff of the Army and the Office the Undersecretary of War. When questioned before a Congre sional'Committee, Irving Fajans of 0.S. took the Fifth Amendment rather tha admit to his Communist Party memb ship and long history of activities behalf of the Soviets. Comrade Faj was a key O.S.S. operative despite t fact that he was known to have bee member of the Communist Party and have served in the Communists' Abrah Lincoln Brigade in Spain during the ye 1937-1938. . Robert Talbott Miller III was anot contact of Soviet courier Elizabeth Be Icy. An O.S.S. employee State Department, he was Assistant Ch in the Division of Research. On a trip Moscow, Comrade Miller married a me ber of the staff of the Moscow News. Leonard E. Mins, a writer who h worked for the International .Union Revolutionary Writers .in Moscow a written for New Masses, was also on staff of the 'top secret 0.S.S.. Coinr 1,,lins took the Fifth Amendment ratl 0120011/03/04,11t $31APROP80411601 R001300400001-6 ship in the Communist Party. ile refu: to deny that he was.a Soviet agent ever r.3 THE. Central Intelligence .Agency was established in 1947 after its wartiine predecessor, the 'Office. of Strategic Serv- ices (0.S.S.), was expo'Sed as thoroughly infiltrated by the Communists. .Let us examine some of that O.S.S. personnel. In 1948, former Communist spy Eliza- both Bentley appeared as a witness before the Douse Committee on. Un-American Activities. On Page 529 of the formal report of those Hearings is the record of Miss Bentley's testimony about intelli- gence she received from Comrades inside ?O.S.S.. while she was operating as a Soviet courier: ? All types of infonnation Ivere ?given, highly secret information on what the OSS was, doing, such as, for example, that they were trying to make secret negotiations with governments in the Balkan bloc in case the war ended, that they were parachuting people into Hungary, ' that they were sending OSS people ? into Turkey,. to operate in the ? Balkans, and so on. The fact that General Donovan [head of 0.S.S.] was interested in having, an ex- chimge between the NKVD [the Soviet .secret. police] and. the OSS. That's right, O.S.S. and the N.K.V.D. were working very close indeed. When asked what kind of information Communist Apiyi,oVe , todariYir Ei61 Halperin gave r to be rwarued to The 'Soviet -Union, Miss Bentley testified: STATINTL