Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 6, 2000
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 13, 1972
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7.pdf2.88 MB
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7 BEST CO Available Approved For Release 200.1/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7 TATI NTL STAtINTLAPQrs By ORR KELLY Star-News Staff Writer In the glacial movement of congressional seniority, it took Eddie Hebert 30 years from the time he entered Congress to become chair- man of the House Armed Services Committee and thus one of the half dozen or so most ,powerful men in Washington. "There's no kidding. The chairman's got power!" Hebert says. "An 'admiral .was in here the other day. There was a little 'dilution' going to take ? place in the Eighth Naval District. The ad- miral was sitting down where you are sitting. . "And I looked at him and said, 'Admiral, I don't know whether you heard it or not but ?Mendel Rivers died a year and a half ago. I Have you heard? He's dead!' "Weil, he got the message." ? Rep. F. Edward Hebert, D-La., has a particular concern for the welfare of the cotgressman from Louisiana's First Congres- sional District. "The only election I take in is eVery two gears in the First Congressional District of ;Louisiana when I support the incumbent with ? Vigor," he says. I If you live in Ilebert's New Orleans dis- trict, you have to be 53 years old ? to have voted for anyone else who was elected to Congress. He confidendy expects to be elected for the ;17th time this November?more times than ; . Ianyore has be6 elected to public office in the history of Louisi,ana; ; Staying Power RCITI WASHINGTON STAR L0.11D72. . ? /pi is-, uTt715tp.p84)116 r i ? It s this remarkable staying power that :made it possible for Hebert to be there when ,the chairmanship of the committee opened 'up with the death of Rivers in 1970. A Louisiana !friend has a theory of how Hebert got the Ichairmanship, and thus his present position of .power. Hebert, a Jesuit-educated Roman Catholic, tells the story this way: "He says, that Fella upstairs wanted He- bert. He wanted one of His boys to be chair- man instead of that Baptist, Mendel Rivers. 11 what does He do? (Rep. Philip J.). Philbin's in the way. He's block-in'. So He goes over there to Boston, gets that Jesuit (the Rev. Robert F.) Drinan?another one of the boys? to beat Philbin. So that clears the way for Hebert. Then He grabs Rivers an,d takes him ?off." ? Whether lie got there by accident of age or ; polities or by divine intervention, the way the-. ? foamer newspaperman from New Orleans has chosen to use his immense power in the last year and a half has been interesting and not !entirely predictable. When Hebert came to Corigrqss in 1941 as .part of, a political deal, he was 38 years old and had behind him a career as a,newspaper- ? rnan in ianawhich iplisel_brol: psej#616ndi 'in Louis. k m 10VeCIeia a e In 1952, as head of the House investigating 'subcommittee, he conducted a series of widely procurement mistakes. "I'm supposed to be the patsy of the Pen- tagon," he says. "I know that's what people think. But way before Proxmire ever ' could spell `waste,' let alone get it in print, I had a chamber of horrors. That was one of the most devastating investigations of the Pentagon that was ever conducted." ? In another investigation, he uncovered a scandal in the airframe industry and saw a corrupt labor leader hustled off to jail. - But now that he is chairman, Hebert's in- vestigative zeal seems to have cooled. In- stead, he has concentrated on reforms within the committee?a committee on which the chairman has traditionally been aa stern auto- crat. Asked in a recent interview what image he would like to create, Hebert replied: "The image I'd like to have is that I'm fair, that I'm not swayed by partisanship and that I believe in giving every man his day in court. That I'm trustworthy and that when I say something I mean it. I think that's the im- age I'd want most." Thus, under Hebert's chairmanship, each member of the committee is allowed just five minutes to question witnesses and then wait his turn again. Each is/tailed in the order of se- niority among these present when the session begins. This contrasts with .hearings under Rivers, when the chairman did most of the questioning and his friends?including Hebert? did the rest, or with the days of Carl Vinson, who didn't even know the names of the junior members on his committee. Even with those members of the commit- tee with whom he has the greatest political, ideological and generational differences, He- bert has generally managed to maintain ? a ? friendly personal relationship, and he has given some of :them important assignments they would not have received under Rivers. Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich., for example, has been"made chairman of the special sub- / committee on ;the Central Intelligence Agency/ ? with the mandate to take a close look At the government's whole intelligence operation. ? Hebert's relations even seem to be reason- ably good with Rep. Michael Harrington, D- Mass., who is just half as old as Hebert and who has gotten into a couple o: rather nasty little exChanges with him in committee ses- siOns. "I think he would say mine is the minority of the minority point of view," Harrington said. He agrees that Hebert has made an effort at fairness in running the committee?partly because Hebert has the votes, both in the com- mittee and in Congress. "But I think there is much more the form of fairness than the substance of fairness," Harrington said. "They can play a pretty rough 16011IAnP PnPa1fR members and the more senior?and generally more conservative?members of-the committee . "I have a feeling that there as a reluctai to share information," he said. As committee chairman, Hebert dispens what he calls the "goodies"?generally airpla] rides to interesting places. He encourages t! committee members to travel because "LI best way that a man knows what he's doing to absolutely touch the thing and see it." Thus; when Harington, a brand new mei her of the committee, wanted to go to Seut east Asia, Hebert told him he was welcome go to South Vietnam?but not to Laos or Car bodi a . "He .couldn't understand that," Hobe said. "I said; well, I got enough trouble. ." "We fenced for a year on Laos and Car bodia," Harrington said. "Finally, I said surrendered, and would agree to his groin rule's." Even Hebert's critics don't accuse him using his power to influence the location military bases or the awarding of military co: tracts for political purposes ? aside from h acknowledged protection of installations a ready in the New Orleans area. But the fact that. military installations ar defense contracts are economically importai in many parts of the country has made It di fieult?virtually impossible, in any meaningfi sense?for the would-be rebels on Hebert committee to get together in a concerted effo' to make major changes in the defense budge' in committee. And yet, it is only in committee that the' is a realistic chance to make changes. Th year, for example, the committee cut the ministration's $23 billion military precuremei and research bill by $1.5 billion-abut fiche; proudly notes that there was not a sing change made in the bill on the House floor. Likes Laird The committee handles two major chunl of the defense budget each year?the sarocuri ment and research budget of about $22 billie and the military construction budget of shot $2 billion. But it also has a strong influence o the operations and maintenance account, an it sets the pay scales. In effect, it thus has d. rect or indirect control over the entire &fens budget of about $85 billion. Hebert's concentration on reform withii the committee is probably based to some ex tent on his general feeling that things are goin pretty well at the Pentagon under Defeo& Secretary Melvin Laird. "I think Laird's a great man," Heber said. "I put Laird in the class with Forrestal Forrestal is my favorite." The late Jame: Forrestal was the first secretary of defense But. Hebert, who talks with an accen CWcfPg9qOPttqtsof ofNevr Orleans?am Brooklyn than th South?would probably run the COT P11J differently if Robert S. McNamara were stil DE potomed llorlRelease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016oiRomokonoom REGISTER M ? 250,261 S ? 515,710 ? MA? i7 17 Democra lc St ate Convention To Vote on Vast U.S. Reforms Delegates to the Democratic State' Presidential Convention here Saturday will be asked to !approve a Platform calling for vast changes in the federal gov- ernment. A Platform Committee draft calls for tax reform, congres- sional reform, legalization of marijuana, abolition of abortion laws, prion reform, -an-6nd to Mernment secrecy and politi- c a 1 campaign finance dis- ? closure. Included in. the recommenda- tions: A limitation of $25,000 in gov- ernment support payments to any one farmer or. corporation. Legislation eliminating tax ? loopholes that allow a non- farmec to benefit from tax loss- es in .agriculture. Increase, of farm support prices to 100 per cent of parity with the 1910-14 period as the index years. ' Eliminate the seniority sys- tem in Congress, prevent any congressman from chairing one 'committee more than six years and elect chairman by votes of ?committee Members. Require a congressional com- mittee to hold open meetings Unless a majority of the mem- bers vote to close the session. , Full disclosure by all public i officials of all income from cor- porate holdings, salaries and bonuses. Forbid a public official from taking office unless he has dis- closed his campaign finances. Required recognition within ,90 days of any new foreign gov- ernment regardless of the cir- cumstances which brought the :government to power. Closer scrutiny of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) by 'the foreign affairs -C'elTirirtts of the House and Senate. ' Abolishment of executive privilege, the doctrine that the national administrations follow to deny information to Con- gress. Withdrawal of all troops from Indochina by the end of the year, and a constitutional guar- antee that no person can be required to serve in combat un- less Congress has declared war. Amnesty to draft dodgers and deserters 'after the withdrawal of American forces from the Vietnam war. Require that no future mili- tary commitments can be made without the consent of Con- gress. ? Abolish wage-price controls or C ontrol all wages, income, prices, profits, interests and dividends. Place an arms embargo on the Mideast. Increase funding of the Fed- eral Communications Commis- - ion to permit an investigation of American Telephone and Telegraph. Legislation permitting m and women to take matern y leave and forbidding pena - ization of job loss, pay or sen- iority benefits. A policy :that makes drug abuse a social problem rather than a criminal problem. - Funding of research for de- velopment of a birth control pill for men. Financing of public school systems to be shared equally by the federal, state and local governments. A tax credit for parents of children in private schools. Busing of school children when it will improve their educational opportunities. Abolition of the Subversive Activities Control Board and the House Internal Security Committee. Legislation making it illegal to investigate a person's crimi- nal record once his civil and legal rights have been restored. Abolition of capital punish- ment in the United States. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0t601R001400200001-7 9 Houf;ToAPPEQYed For Release 2001/03/04: co.ARTrgisp-oi ciirtolgaiE E ? 303,041 E; ? 353,314 ( 1973 i F.,--, r 0 ,;.- (-74 I..; : ' l'; Ei i t 1 , BY :TIOTITON c7'h Sur-11s --- Central In- telligence Agency training Inc local police, a program with murky orl:;ins worthy el the nation's 101) fY agency, will continue "crily in the most compelling eireunistances ars" with my parsonal aliphaval," the CliA's, ii :c; director said. Director jarnes it. Schlesin- .ger's statement was sant to several members of Congress and released by Rep. Cat Ho- lifield, D-Cal., chairman of the Faure Government Opera- tion Coinit tee. ,Holifield had snggcsted the "compelling Cream:dal lac s" limit for Ch?., training anct ice a p p r.o v e ci of adoption ofit. Rep. Koch, D-N.Y., who had urged Holif iold to inveJ.6tte the program, raid that any CIA involvement in internal affairs 13 Illegal under the I 17 law that set up the r,a- knoviletli?e of CIA training far local palice, as has another tion's foreign inteliigon'ev ? former rii.a.iicy official now in agency. police Nvur:; ilai?ert?Kiley. According to ITolifield Kiley was special assistant others who haVe received CA to former OA. 11irecter Iitieh- briolio,s, the police Int,,jiTL-vard Henna, left the CIA in jirog,rat-in st%tited rnc Iti71 to the Police Fowicla- last par at the autfuesticri c flanahd last year hecame reprosantative only. yo:.(3 Publicfety adviser to Bos- ton Alayor Kevin White. Founcintion, hut art effoirt the Chicago Sun-Tim e liilcv told :mother former tract: clown the program's eri- race Few:dation official now gins proved Boston, 'Mark Furatenbcrg, Wayne Kerstetter, fermer said that they could find no head cf hisreden ser6:e in trace that Liaston police re- the New Yell:. 0:--:):Lrtnicnt cciv2a c-1 tr'dnin:7'.' but lut new direet6r or: the u,c to said that thi'i CIA had nalned the hlosl on de- roan of investittiation, sistid part.nent banclxiary of that he cenhl not yen-A-hitt:iv who In st the program. CIA. help in'.."Citir, tro NI in-dilig to the aides, the taint-Tam evaluation syiAcin CL'5. sad that Boston plice for itie'sy Vold:. participatedin a t w o or Icen,t.c.t..,.e s i aid that lith,, i.eit. three-day traning session. ary in l'?'.c.: Vcrk. v,'as i,et,id liy Kolifrild ss;sitli that nine de- a I'ord lili'citi.latlon. su'a:Ifliary, I) 1i t Ili.1 e n L '; ICcei'VCci such th'i PerIC'3 l',;(1.;d:iiiv. - ).1-s, it'!, in s,utili. techniques as said that h::: did trit. ,-....J''n i record handiing, clandestine CIA tnlining sos,jens and opli. Pilluiography, surveillance of is no tri k and identiri -a`if ? "I have never in my life Met of ryplos-,i;it a CIA agent," Li addition, 110 said, six tic- Kerstetter's former sane;.1.- part:mitts received briefings or, wiaimaIT i nu Ii, leio .:7;n Imlay or two On ;,-,Techic: teenniques. s r j7'.1 Ff r:"*V:,) f t: .4 1: 1,1 a fl 0 0 p (.! 17 r'--\ C L \ t;Li i Jiir ii "except hi unusual or compel- eircumst leei4." In a House speech com- menting on Schlesinger's re- sponse, Bonfield said that "provision for assistanesl lii exceptional circumstanetJ warranted, in illy judgment. "I can conceive that in .tp-ie- cial situntiona, such115 involving forenin criminals cr International drug traffichcro? the President might call noon the CIA to assist in a parti- cular effort, and the dira.eto.ii.' should not In compli?tely stopped from providing 6W:a assistance." STATI NTL attend a sits ion September in Arlington, itla 'Fite Chicago police depart- ment ist to have re- Smith 1 ?-id that it \`''''-'s il'i eeiveel z.dvieri c.;1 a toclinigni, ,1. mpressiou that the 11F,L for e.,,,,,.,,i,,,i-,. i.;: a snspeet sugge'ic'n ('1 '.-ii'l'ing fc'r Y?''. has handleiti metal Cijects. , trainhis; came from H. lit ,..../ Harris, a fc....mcr. (-IAi?.?._,?.,.,?.? The cerres..,:idence. between 1 servirut, as rt isco,,- yor?t ,.,?:,,i,ce itei3, illehlK id Pnii ; c.,,,,,1,1,.-iel cons,alt...iat u...i.1(r a i,r,,,nt!. f.t... ii did wit revaid. v,ho in the Ci,?, the I:cider:II :iiverhancill's b:ri v: made. tip-, 0.siciidcin to asiiis tieEnforcment Assistance! "',.' T el-4 ri'-'13cel linirjstratien Ci,l.i. ' Al. .0..i.- he CFA. ',yid defers-led the I Thcrrizi, ?, J:?" .ao_ t n?i l' i?,., decislan on the tt,faiiiti hin contact( d, iv ,:c,:riJi,?ti 0; PT,litie tr.ttoi.-ei; ?,,,?;,s; 3:),., cyplic. I.,E.AA'S 1..i;_: tv ;?.',?,,..:: (01 !, :,,. itlY 1(,!bitidea. by Ilia itl,l7 :\i'a ? tii.nal ,..iil.. (Unity ACi. ;11,6 V.?:: -; liCki i: kii:,;:ieo :;:;,,HII-1,:. 11.,.. wrote thz, 1.::.t ..,,_t 1 c,, ,,,,. . p,... ,,ilily autiniii 1.7nd hy il. i S__/ cc Jii, y ?iii.,, c:i,7,,....-.,r 'L. li'-'; Ortrilliict Ci line Coat:01, the i\ 1 ,,,i ofrir;t? ani:1 tni.ii .!,litiiis s :ill P,- In liiii ?int.ter 101 2-hlesingor, t? the: gove:Iii,...,, (*.f n.,..i .%.! : ':::...i( ,i i 1 ii::::. ,1, pvc,id (..i.!Sy Tilt! :.C:.?11r,,' Penns: Ivania. ?_,,, h o i: I d fil.e,:iiiiitite ti till Approved Fo-rik ' ceiee-6-126i iibY a - il 4 : 'CIA-RDP80701601 R001400200001-7 1 i ., ApproViEfdflir, Release 2001/0V40g7A15,084:;)11,60 HERALD TR p,',?r7:LEM a 'louse speech he had asl:ed RECOn D?M,IFf.11i. CAN the now CIA director to 4isr?ontinue the training ot D & S CIRC N? A (al poflce.) Prodrriat testified at a k i ? C. t ?-? t..,if?..i council hr ar:ng to explore I I'ilF;t1; Patroim:N? Ask , . . Trasons why a 1. 6 3 - p a 7. e report, "Crime in Boston," v;as "suppressed" or not cir- culated after printing b y Yilev. , i . ? 1 . The p o ii c e pa trolemen's , 1 :loader said hs men are ' , disturbed that Irile, profeFs?? ? Hing to have no law onforc.e- il . rent eNperince, d i c t a t e d 0 0-1 ' that the report rot be given r .--,!! li ;,:-='' (.77-, r !: ,a.dministrotion blessing. ..,...? , .!-: ` a Kiley said he found the 1 '. ; By ROBELT F. HANNAN statistical material on crime :incidence was not of much The bead of the Boston ?qlitte as r Pollee Patrdmen's Assn. told denied ,,sptii7ented. But he ) { resing" t h e the City Council yesterday he ? report, 70() copies of which believes t h a t CIA-oriented were printed arld in a s 1 1 y versons and not C a m m r . - disseminated to agencies. The Robert diC;raah run 't h e , report, was compiled b y police department. Mayor White's Safe Streets Chester Broderir, head of Act. bureau. . the patrolmen's gym!), said, Broderick said the mayor ?"It's multi:2 to light that . and Kiley set police aims for C"ITRI 1'l-c11"7.J) c op I e , the police deportment. lie are infihri,rino police depart- . said he kuri...?.s that velpi.;,..n ? ,ments throttehont the country. superior officers on the force That is a 1;-vi'i, Ilf.:n7." . have hoc ii left out of decision Mayor White's ,ad,visor c.:11 making. He said he believes e/ police 1)m 'tio''-', ''"7'rt ' that include Supt.-in-Chief Kiley, a runner CIA ernployP v,:iijinni J. Taylor. . who refused to attend the "We're afraid of what will council committee hearing, result. In t%ko years ,?,-h.en termed the Brodrtrick ac- they're all gone, we'll be left ." cusations "atomly ahsnrd.absurd.''with their Bay of rigs, ve sari diCra7ia a n d Bradciiik ?nd. ? . dicIrazia alH)e lo malzina, Ile added: "Some of them policy decisiol!s for t h e . were formerly connected ,,,,Ith ? department. . the CIA wilcii had tile Bay ? (In Washinomn yey;!erdav, ' of Pi,y,?" ',le said he still it was In a r" 11"lt i a 111E'; P. ,..ond(Ts "if they are on tile 4., Sohle.,-incr, ti-, no. \,,, director . CIA p-,vrop.,, . of the CIA, has ordered the Broderick Fail the 21 rival amIcy to Firp training local of Kiley, aststant G a r r y police of fici s ey.i..eof, in the Noyes; Ivlarl; Furst !iil,)e,rg, "most cc m p e I 1 1 n g cir- director of planning an d curnstance7?" and even then research: 1ThTha Marl?,',, an proval." e. to diGn1,..ia hrol,:;2:11. frorn en]' with "rny peronal art-aid St. I.r,uis Ce;nny, 1`,7e.; ;,..nd (Schk-sin;:er's ordoc w a s Bol)ert 1,,(-F.: int,n, with Oa,: revealr,d ice lettint he v.rotc :-Ia-yor's F.:;?ife Strect73 A c t 1.S. PA. p. Clil 1IoliIeld (1)- /(1 up liii, ft(.0:-:?,.. (721f2), '11'''''llin "I i" 11('-''r! Nil( ,. and W;-eor.ormr,,ii had ccr':ev"mcn C)PH.'lirirc r o'''1- , 1:'Nn ,,,.th he Pil;,:. l'odnda- nOtee, ',k11J1 \';'s' TY,T,111'..--',1 ' ten in ',Va.*H,,:ton. by dc''Ic'?'.11-"- 11`. 0 Cl A r,H,, !-,,,f.,i, c,viunitit7r.,? P-:-Alis lad h-7.1 ..,-1 traxl 1.01!(C' , ( hM,'N',!Ir ca?i;,..--,r A. Utt17-er:: iit :.:e..,,- Yesit, ,2'-'or: ,,/1.. i.H,:,,-,1 Bt,in-,..1., 'Alio and whify EIrr;op,liiin at,7.a.s. ju,t I ,--,??!,,,,1 a copy of the pal no 1 eilor!, to ' tead it, disetr, it w.i.h 2,sociaCon of i I,- J.?-, _t_',1-0.Li. i?oc., vice.cs Approved For Release 2001/03?0(''0(A-KpP80-0160.1 R001400200001-7 t ?t, ? , ,,, t ? 1, . .. v s.=:a II 4 ( is , iS Il 11 ,17,-) ? ' r.i . K.. ';:,,i,i Li g 40011111111111?101111001141110.41.4, STATI NTL WASHINGTON ZOST Approved For Release gI0N0349A: CIA-RDP80-01601 7" ? '??? ??? Letters rfle, " STATI NTL One Who Was There Assesses the CIA's Job in Laos ? A brief article in The Washington Post of December 27 quoted Congressman G. V. jMontgomery as saying "What I know about Laos is that the CIA has done a pretty lousy job and has been ineffective." One could answer such an assertion by simply saying that as the chairman of the , House Select Committee on U. S. Involve- ment in Southeast Asia, he should know , more about Laos than that, particularly when what little he knows is manifestly wrong. spent 17 years as a CIA employee and left in early 1968 because of my basic opposi- tion to United States involvement in South- east Asia. My last four years in the agency were totally involved with Asian affairs. My knowledge of what CIA has done and has not done are obviously more detailed than Mr. Montgomery's, but it seems to me that if ha is going to make public statements, he should at least take into consideration facts which have been well publicized. It is clear (at least to me) from the Saigon dateline on the piece in question, that the congressman arrived at his remarkable con- clusion after discussion with military sources in Vietnam who have been itching for at least six years to expand their own op- erations into Laos. Their desires in this direction must increase daily as the Amen- can role in Vietnam winds down. If they don't find something new, the time may come when they have no war at all to fight. ' In order to assess CIA performance in Laos it is necessary to know what it was asked to do. CIA involvement in Laos stems from. the agreement by the U.S.A., and other powers involved, to withdraw all foreign troops from Laos. The agreement was signed in 1962. It became apparent immediately there- -after that the North Vietnamese, in violation of the agreement, were continuing to send irregular forces and supplies to the Commu- nist Pathet Lao. Their purpose was clear?to establish a Communist government in Vien- tiane which would allow the North Viet- namese free access to the Portion of the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos and the road across central Laos to Thailand. The government of the United States decided to mount an oper- ation to thwart the North Vietnamese pur- pose. ,Because the Geneva agreement pre- cluded the use of 'U.S. military forces or ad- visers, CIA was designated as the executive agent to handle the training and support of the non-Communist Meo tribes who lived in and. around the Plain of Jars. The Meo force was the only army in Laos capable of stop- ping the Pathet Lao (supported by the North Vietnamese) from quickly over-running the Plain of Jars, which was essential to the Communist purpose. The point to remember here is that the de- cision to act was a U.S. government decision; not one arrived at by CIA. I think the deci- sion was wrong, just as I think almost every other decision with regard to our involve- ment in Indochina has been and continues to be wrong. That is not the point under dis- cussion. The question is: what kind of job did CIA do with the task assigned it in Laos? The answer, based on any comparison with the U.S. military effort in Vietnam, would have to be. A spectacular success. My personal knowledge of the operation ended in mid-1967, the last time I visited Long Tieng, the seat of the headquarters of Gen. yang Pao, the Meo leader. At that time there were roughly 35,000 Meo tribesmen under arms fighting daily with the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese irregulars. This force had been fighting successfully for five years and- inasmuch as they held Long Tieng until a few days ago, continued for another four years to beat off a vastly superior Com- munist army. The CIA contingent support- ing them in Laos and in Thailand did not exceed 40 Americans, plus a small air con- tingent which air-delivered supplies and personnel. Imagine 40 Americans in support of 35,000 friendly tribesmen. Compare this with the situation in Vietnam in 1967 when we had about 400,000 U.S. troops fighting for, and supporting, an army of roughly 1 million Vietnamese, and they were losing at every turn. Had the U.S. Army had, the re- sponsibility for the support a the Meo, we probably would have had a minimum of 15,000 U.S. troops in Laos. Naturally that fig- ure would have included cooks, bakers, pas- try chefs, many chauffeurs for the many generals, PX managers, laundry officers, radio and television station personnel, mo- tion picture projectionists, historians, social scientists, chaplains and a variety of simi- lar types essential to the conduct of a war by the U.S. military, but which the CIA op- eration with the Meo seemed to be able to forgo. For eight years this ragtag force defended its area of responsibility, protecting the backside of the South Vietnamese?with no U.S. troops fighting at their side, not to say in front of them as in Vietnam. They accom- plished this with the support of a handful of Americans and with the loss of perhaps three or four American lives. Can anyone seriously suggest that this was a lousy job? In fairness to Congressman Montgomery, it is not entirely his fault that he is not fully informed. The role of the CIA with the "Meo has been an open secret for years; known to Lao of high and low degree, foreign journal- ists, diplomats in Vientiane and almost any- one else with the interest to find out. Given this situation it would be comic if it were not tragic that the Executive branch of the U.S. government was willing to share this se- cret with Lao generals known to be traffick- ing in opium, but not with the Congress of the United States. Perhaps someday Mr. Montgomery and his colleagues in the Congress will establish a real CIA watchdog committee, long overdue, which will give the agency the scrutiny re- quired. When that is clone I am sure a sub- stantial number of lousy operations will be uncovered. I am confident, however, that when they take a long hard look at the CIA operation with the Meo in the general con- text of the war in Southeast Asia, there will be general approval. THOMAS F. MeCOY. Washington.__., Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7 , VEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS Approved For Release 20?1(01110,114-MA-RDP80-0 in-Le CHA's Bev. COIRDT, ---- - Ope .Elle The Rope Dancer . ? adventurer has passed in the American the by Victor Marchetti. - spy business; the bureaucratic age of ingt Grosset & Dunlap, 361 pp., $6.95 Richard C. Helms and his gray spe- kno Richard J. Barnet cialists has settled in." I began to have fina an uneasy feeling that Newsweek's ingt article was a cover story in more than vote I one sense. An . . ceili In late November the Central Intel- it has always been difficult to faille ligence Agency conducted a series of analyze organizations that engage in A "senior seminars" so that some of its false advertising about themselves. Part of i important bureaucrats could consider of the responsibility of the CIA is to lari _ its public image. I was invited to spread confusion about its own work. the attend one session and to give my The world of Richard Helms and his bec views on the proper role of the "specialists" does indeed differ .from ized Agency. I suggested that its legitimate that of Allen Dulles. Intelligence organ- Hel) activities were limited to studying izations, in spite of their predilection ovei newspapers and published statistics, for what English judges used to call lige] listening to the radio, thinking about "frolics of their own," are servants of Age the world, interpreting data of recon- policy. When policy changes, they Bur naissance satellites, and occasionally must eventually change too, although the ? publishing the names of foreign spies. I because of the atmosphere of secrecy cen had been led by conversations with a and deception in Which they operate, ove: number of CIA officials to believe that such changes are exceptionally hard to vice they were thinking along the same control. To understand the "new Age lines. One CIA man after another espionage" one must see it as ipart of imp ? eagerly joined the discussion to assure the Nixon Doctrine which, in.essenee, f-rh me that the days of the flamboyant is a global strategy for maintaining US .1 covert operations : were over. The power and influence without overtly reol upper-class amateurs of the OSS who involving the nation in another ground Hel stayed to mastermind operations in war. nel, \iGuatemala, Iran, the Congo, and else- But we cannot comprehend recent IrgE where?Allen Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt, developments in the "intelligence corn- no Richard Bissell, Tracy Barnes, Robert munity" without understanding what fur Amory, Desmond Fitzgerald?had died Mr. Helms and his employees actually Pre or departed. . do. In a speech before the National)m In their place, I was assured, was a Press Club, the director discourage w small army of professionals devoted to journalists from making the attempt. d, preparing intelligence "estimates" for "You've just got to trust us. We are h, the President and collecting informa- honorable men." _The same speech is p tion the clean, modern way, mostly made each year to the small but with sensors, computers, and sophis- growing number of senators who want h ticated reconnaissance devices. Even a closer check on the CIA. In asking, ti Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, would now on November 10, for a "Select Com- c 4 be as much a museum piece as Mata mittee on the Coordination of United h -Hari. (There are about 18,000 em- States Activities Abroad to oversee p ployees in the CIA and 200,000 in the activities of the Central Intelligence t entire "intelligence community" itself. Agency," Senator Stuart Symington p ? The cost of maintaining them is some- noted that "the subcommittee having j where between 55 billion and S6oversight of the Central Intelligence 1: billion annually. The employment Agency has not met once this year." t figures do not include foreign agents or Symington, a former Secretary of t mercenaries, such as the CIA's 100,000: the Air Force and veteran member of 1 'man hired army in Laos.) the Armed Services Committee, hast A week after my visit to the "senior- also said that "there is no federal scrutiny and control STATINTL s1 of CIA Director Richard Helms on the ! ss than the CIA." Moreover, soon after , seminar" Newsweek ran a long story agency in our government whose activ- n "the new espionage" with a picture ities receive le , sge a All tfot05713(4: : CIA-RD080-01601R001400200001-7 e Senator Allen J. , cover. The repfiikem.digxi lecipkce to some of tWIrme Mei?MAN. Newsweek said, "The gaudy era of the " ' ' Li BALTIMOIZE NEws JRICAI Approved For Release 200120%M: INA-RDP80-01601 JOHN P. ROCHE , Secret The "Secret War" in Laos popped up again in the Senate in a dialogue between Sen. Allen Ellender, chairman of the, five-man committee that oversees U.S. intelligence operations, and Sen. J. W. Ful bright. Fu:bright inquired caustically whether Ellender was aware that the CIA had a private army in Laos, whether the watchdog committee was privy to the opeartion. Ellender's reply was a bit confused ? the old protege of Huey Long is pow 81 ? but it could certainly be construed as a denial of knowledge.' Fulbright and his friends, who have been attaching executive autonomy, scored a rhetorical victory, though from 'another perspective me might argue that if the Senate "watchdog" goes to sleep, it. is hardly a reflection on the President. HOWEVER, the most interesting aspect of this exchange is that no literate American needs a watchdog committee to fill him in on the CIA's ac- itiviaes in Laos. All he needs is $12.50 to purchase Arthur J. Dommen's "Conflict In Laos: The Politics, of Neutralization" (Praeger), published last spring. If he is not feeling that strongly about the subject, he can probably get the book froma apublic library. As indicated here before?in connection with the "Pentagon Papers" ? there is an enormous and de- tailed corpus of scholarly writing on Indochina that makes most -senational "revelations" about American policy old stuff to anyone who has taken the trouble read. To cite but one example, the only thing the 'Pentagon Papers" tell us about the anti-Diem coup that Robert Shaplen omitted in Chapter VI of his "The Lost Evolution" (1965) are the exact names of the players (which Shaplen, of course, knew but left ..:tit on prudential grounds). .. To return to Laos. Dommen has provided readers wilf an inch-by-inch development of American in volvement. His central thesis is that the reasonable .policy for Laos is neutralization under Great-Power auspices, that* (with a' certain amount of wobbling) this became American and Soviet policy by 1962, but :that Hanoi simply would not co-operate. As. he carefully documents, from the day Ho Chi Minh and his cadres launched their insurgency against the French, the North Vietnamese set their sights on the - Creation of a Communist successor re.,-ime for the whole of Indochina, that is, for Annam, Tonkin, and Cochin China in Vietnam proper, and for Laos and Cambodia. TEMPORARILY FRUSTRATED at Geneva in 1954 because neither Moscow (which had a private deal underway with the French to scuttle the European defense community) nor Peking (which was licking Its wounds from the Korean War) would support their demands, the North Vietnamese quietly proceeded to build up their forces for another round. j STATI NTL . This involved securing the lines of communication to South Vietnam or ? in terms of the topography of Indochina ? the Laotian. Panhandle, subsequently notable for the Ho Chi Minh Trail. And, as base areas for the Laotian guerrillas, the Pathet Lao, as well as North Vietnamese regulars, they took -de facto sovereignty over the two Northern Laotian provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly. But what interests us is the American response. Without going over farniliar.;grouncl, it is fair to say that Dornmen has missed nothing significant that oc- curred prior to 19t'!) (when I left the White House and access to intelligence materials). The whole story is there including the ad'! SCIZT. of Phou Pita Thi, the mountaintop in Sain Neua, where the U.S. had in- stalled a beacon (rieht in the enemy heartland) to guide the bombers heading for North Vietnam. Also for the first time due credit has been given to Vang Pao and his Meo Army?usually dismissed as "met- cenaries"?for their courage and tribal patriotism (Laos is not a 'Ination"). Whether our course of action was correct or in- correct is open to argument. Many of Dornmen*s criticisms am devastating, but he is alwaj.s fair- minded in pointing out that ? whether we !.hould or' should not have reactsd as we did ? we v. ere up -*against an ehemy demanding and planning totalsic- tory. I just hope that if any of you .have a renstor or representative who is wandering eround nreeiaming about the "Secret War in Laos," you will send him this book for Christmas. . STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7 ??? Cet. WASHINGTON VIST Approved For Release 200 3J IgIA-RDP80-01601 Despite Its Being in the Telephone Book C Is an Unlisted Number ? SO FAR as I've found in a lot of traveling, the United States is the only country in the world which lists its central intelligence agency In the telephone book, and enables anyone to call up and speak to the director's office. ? But an extraordinary exchange on the floor of the Senate recently made clear how little else the people who put up the money for in- telligence know about how it's spent. Tho debate took place on the day the military ap- propriations bill was finally passed so it at- ,tracted little attention, but it was revealing. It was provoked by Sen. Stuart Symington .03-Mo.) who offered an amendment provid- ing that not more than $4 billion in the de- fense budget could go for the intelligence services, including the CIA, the National Se- curity Agency and the intelligence branches :of the various armed services. Symington's point was not only to set a limit, but to set a 'precedent. c+.9 . CONGRESS does appropriate all the money that goes to intelligence, but it doesn't know how much, or even when and how. That's because it is hidden in the de- fense budget, with the result .that Congress doesn't really know just what it is appropri- ating any military money for because it ? never knows which items have been selected. ? for padding to hide extra funds for intelli- gence. Evidently, Symington believes that the ac- tual amount spent is a little over $4 billion, intsead of the $6 billion reported in the press, because he wasn't trying to cut intelli- ( gence funds except for CIA payments to -4 Thai soldiers in Laos. He is one of the nine senators entitled to go to meetings of the Appropriations Subcommittee on .the CIA, ,supposedly the confidential watchdog over pe agency. As he pointed out though, there hasn't been a full meeting all this year. ? What he wanted to do was to establish that Congress does have some rights to mon- itor the intelligence empire which it created by law, and he was driven to the attempt be- ;cause of exasperation at President Nixon's ,recent intelligence reorganization. It was an- By Flora Lewis en STATI NTL nounced, to the public as an upgrading of CIA Director Richard Helms and a better method to avoid waste and establish politi- cal control. Senator Symington and Many other well-informed CIA watchers In Washington, are convinced that Helms has been kicked upstairs. The result, they believe, will be an increase In military influence over intelli- gence?which has been recognized as a dan- ger throughout the history of intelligence because it tends to become self-serving, the doctor diagnosing himself according to the therapy he likes. There is also a concern that the reorgani- zation, which melees the President's National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger top dog over intelligence, will centralize the system so much that it will become a tool for White House aims, not an outside source of techni- cal expertise. Responsible political control over the in- telligence community's actions, as distinct from its factual and analytical reports, is necessary and desirable. But despite the public impression, in the last few years the CIA has been the most honest source of in- formation for Congress on sensitive issues such as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, while the Pentagon, State and White house have? dealt in obfuscations. Whatever his Depart- ment of Dirty Tricks might be doing,' Helms has been more straightforward with his se- cret session testimony on what is really hap- pening in these unhappy places than the, people who do have to explain and justify,' their funding to Congress. c-+.9 BUT, as the Senate debate showed, that. Isn't saying very much. Sen. Allen Ellender. (D-La.), who heads the CIA subcommittee,. pointed out that 20 years ago only two sena- ' tors and twoeconeressmen were allowed to know what the CIA was spending, and now there are five on each side of the Capitol. He implied that they also knew what the CIA was spending its money for. Sen. Wil- onaress Ham Fulbright (D-Ark.), had the wit to ask if that mean Ellender knew, before the CIA set up its secret army in Laos, that this was the purpose of the appropriation. Ellencier said, "It was not, I did not know anything about it . . . it never dawned on me to ask about it." Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), had the humor to point out that there has been a lot in the press about the CIA Laotian army in v the past couple of years, and asked whether, Ellender has now inquired about it. Mender said, "I have not inquired." Cranston pointed out that since nobody else in Con- gress has Ellender's right to check the CIA, that meant nobody in Congress knows. El.. lender replied, "Probably not." Symington's amendment was defeated.' But at least the record is now clear. A re- cent Newsweek article quoted a former CIA official as saying, "There is no federal. agency of our government whose activities receive closer scrutiny and 'control' than the CIA." "The reverse of that statement is true," said Symington, "and it Is shameful for the . American people to be misled." The record' proves him right. Oo 1971. by Newsday. pletrIbutel by Los Anaeles Times eypd1eatb. STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R0 DAYTON, OHIO JOURNAL HERALD) DEC i370 - ? 111,867 Inter! ence . . noriTIZS ...Congress mint monitor CIA operati4ns mittee is supposed to review CIA opra- tions and funding. Unfortunately, it 'iel- dom meets except to confer congressional blessings on CIA affairs. This congres- sional abdication of its. responsibility for exercising a positive role in the formation of national policy reduces it to a rubber stamp for an omniscient executive. This has virtually been the case in foreign affairs since the National Security Act of 1947 unified the services and created the National Security Council and the CIA. An efficient intelligence operation iS vital 'to the interests of the American people. iBut the operation does not always serve the interests of the people when it strays into political and military activities such as ? the formation of coups d'etat, direction of clandestine wars and the practice of political assassination. President Nixon's changes appear to offer increased efficiency, and in Helms the President seems to have a supervisor who is pre-eminently concerned with gath- ering and evaluating intelligence data. But, only a vigilant and responsible Congressi can serve to restrain the executive branch of government from abusing the vast power and influence available to it through these necessarily covert intelli- gence activities. President Nixon's irritation at the qual- ity of information coming to him from the nation's fragmented intelligence appara- tus is understandable. However, his ef- forts to streamline operations, while we!- . come, are not without hazard to the ? balance of power between the executive and legislative branches of the federal 'government. The President has given to Richard Helms, director of the Cent4 Intelligence Agency, coordinating respon-sibility ?and stflid budgeting authority over the diverse intelligence community. Coordination and economy both seem desirable. The various intelligence agencies employ about 200,000 persons and spend about $6 billion an- nually. " To the extent that the President has made the intelligence operation more effe- ' cient and responsive?as indeed it should be ? he has increased the security of the ? United States. But he will also have further eroded Congress' role in formulat- ing national policy if the legislative branch of government does not balance executive ? access to unlimited intelligence data with more intensive congressional scrutiny of and control over the nature and scope of intelligence activities. A special congressional watchdog corn- Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7 WASNIECTT.ON DAITar. Approved For Release 2001/634014C:VC41RDP80-01 HC-77ON'S fL7 imr2t;r-, p-,71 ,.217(i r-71 /7,7 c.' t'rf \-)(! .? ? 4 ? (IND?The Senate refused yesterday to Emit ;U.S. intelligence agencies spending after a ? rare open discussion on how Congress super- vises the secret spy network. The proposed ,T.4 million ceiling, an amend- ment by Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., to a defense money bill, was rejected b3 to -31. Sen. Symington, a former secrtary of the Air Force, said that tho he served on the armed services and foreign relations committees he had no idea bow much is spent on -intelligence gathering. He said the .`34 billion limit was just a shot in the dark. LESS SCRUTINY , "The point," he told senators during the din- _ ner-hour debate, "is that we do not have the facts required to allocate the resources of the country." ? ."There is no federal agency of our govern- ment whose activities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA," Sen. Symington said, and the same is true of other intelli- gence agencies of the government." As a case in point, Sen. Symington cited the central intelligence subcommittee of the Arm- ed Services Committee headed by Sen. John Stennis. ? He is one of five senators entrusted with- the details of the intelligence budget, it came out 'during the debate. ? Another of the five, Sen. Allen Ellender, D- La., chairman of the appropriations :commit- STATINTL tee, acknowledged that intelligence outlay were .hidden by padding out line item apPro priations in various bills. He said he could not reveal how much is spent on intelligence because "that's a-top Se-: cret." -Sen. Ellender conceded he did not know in advance about the CIA's financing of any army in Laos.. Sen, J. William Fulbright, chairman of the- foreign relations committee, argued that such lack' of congressional knowledge demonstrated the.need for more accountability.. "One of the things that worries me most of all is the CIA going off and conducting a war. of its own," Sen. Fulbright said. He disputed Stennis' contention that revealing the total budgets of intelligence agencies Would disclose any military secrets, . "I don't believe it is tragic" for the Senate to demand the information thru such a device as the Symington amendment, Sen. Fulbright said. "The. Senate is due an explanation." Seri'. Symington a1, one point shouted "I can be trusted" in *expressing his frustration over being kept in the dark. - Sen. Stennis argued that Congress itself had set up the agencies. He told senators: "You're just gbing, to have to make up your mind that you can't have an accounting ? shut your eyes and take .what cornea". Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7 STATINTL kl ST. LOU Wppf8ved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601 RO POST?DISVAICH E - 326,576 S ? 511,868 Nov11101-t ; ? .? e ? 74 3T1.1 43 ri? v -1 tire nu cat r? A kb -11-6 1ato By LAWRENCE E. TAYLOR A Washington Correspondent ? of the Post-Dispatch ? ? WASHINGTON, Nov. 11 ; . Senator Stuart Symington (J)em.), Missouri, called yester- (lay for congressional. hearings .on the Nixon Administration's reorganization of American in- telligence operations. Syming,ton said in a Senate' speech that although m a ti y ' questions about the restructur- Ing were unanswered, one thing :was clear: The White house "does not consider either the ,organization or the operations. ? of the intelligence community . ?? to be matters of concern to. the .Congress." : The changes ordered last Fri- by President Richard M. ? Nikon brought American intelli- gence and spying operations un- der closer control of the White ; House. There were reports, .however, that the move had - been made, in part, because of what Symington termed "gen- - i erab unhappiness about various specifie intelligence estimates." ! "Unfortunately, however, it has been impossible for the' public, or even concerned mom- 'hers of Congress, to obtain , enough information on this sub- ject for informed judgment," .he said.. t?. -,Symington said he had asked ! for hearings by the Senate For- ' .eign Relations Committee or by its subcommittee on the ril . In recent months Government -experts have, disagreed on the balance of power between the two nations. Department of De- fense analysts, including Secre- tary Melvin R. Laird, have con- tended that the USSR was gain- ing- strength rapidly. The CIA ? on the other hand, had ap- peared more skeptical about Russian power and capabilities. Nixon said that the reor- ganization was ordered after' a full study by the National Se- - curity Council and the Office of Management and Budget. Senator J. William Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Commit- tee, said the reorganization was "a further erosion of congress- ional control over the intelli- gence community." He pointed out that Henry A. Kissinger, placed in charge .of the review group, was insulated from congressional scrutiny in his position as the President's national security adviser. Symington, in his address, said that the changes could be constructive, but, he said, Con- gress should not be eliminated from the picture. He said that he Would not accept the proposition "tha-t our only current and continuing re- sponsibility is to appropriate whatever number of billions of dollars 'the executive branch requests to handle this Ivork." Instead, Congress needs an- swers to such questions as what were the deficiencies in the U.S. intelligence operation, in what way should it be _made niore responsive and what is implied by the White House reference to "strengthened leadership" in intelligence? Symington questioned h o w Helms's leadership "role would be "enhanced," as the White House contended, "by the crea- tion of a new and .obviously more powerful supervisory com- mittee chaired by the adviser - to' the President for national security affairs (Kissinger), On which new board not ,only sits e is- a' ? member of each. ?-'The intelligence shake-up last - -- week- provided a stronger role . for Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and created several new groups to assess and direct intelligence operations. ? Among them was the estab- lishment of a -"net assessment ? group" within the National Se- curity Council. There were in- dications that one of the group's chief concerns would be. an evaluation of the balance be- tween the United States and :Russia in terms of weapons, ; economies and politics. ? ? ? 0- -Diem Pence .- STATI NTL the. Attorney General but also the chairman of the. Joint Chiefs or Staff." "Has this new 'White House committee been given authority r/and responsibility which eretofore was the responsibility of the CIA; and which the Con- - gress, under the National Secur- ity Act, vested in the agency?" Symington asked. "How can the integrity of the intelligence product be assured when responsibility for the most critical aspects of intelligence analysis is taken out of the ? hands of career professionals ?and vested in a combination of 'military professionals and the White House staff?" STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04': CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7 TA-SHIEGT011 POST: Approved For Release 200110S/04V: SA-RDP80701601 it( UI1b1 (.../ ? ? I I kin 3r11-1 E111,0 if/9 -fit 11 Po vvers ? By Murrey Marder Washington Inst Staff Writer ? . STATI NTL - Sens. Stuart Symington (D- Mo.) and J. W. Fulbright (D- ? This arrangement, - Syming: ton;.saidr-can bring ? the most Ark.) expressed concern yes- imPortant aspects of. mtelli terday that new powers given gence production and ?rdi- to ,Henry A. Kissinger over . ,nation "directly under the U.S. intelligence operations White House" and "thus with- might be used to deny infor- iii the scope of i,'hat the Pres- t6 Congress. ident believes. he can deny to 'In part this is the latest ver- the Congress through the ex- sion of a running controversy. ereise of executive privilege." over what some senators see Fulbright, chairman of the as the ever-growing power of Senate Foreign Relations Com- the President's influential na _ mittee, told newsmen that KIS-. -Coital security adviser, who is singer's new authority repre- beyond the reach of Congress. rents "a further erosion of con- ? ,But it also represents suspi- 'elan that the White House may be creating"new barriers LW- which could- restrict Con- _ _ gress access to diering? intel- ligence evaluations. Symington, on the -Senate floor, called for hearing"; to gressional control over the intelligence conimunity." Ful- bright earlier this year inti-e- duced what was dubbed "the Kissinger bill," to set up new rules to limit the exercise of executive privilege, which examine the purpose and con-, the President can invoke .to sequences of the Nixon admin-ti keep Congress from question- istration's reorganization of ; ing Kissinger and other White the control structure for the House advisers. national intelligence systems,. Symington said that last Sat- announced last Friday. He protested that there was no advance consultation, and that "the Executive Branch does not consider either the organi- zation, or the operation, of the ? before either that committee intelligence community to be or its Subcommitteg. on the matters of concern to the Con- Central Intelligence ? Agency. urday he wrote Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), chairman .of the Armed Services Commit- tee, urging _hearings on the intelligence shift be held gress." _ Congressional access to in- formation about T.J.S. inte.111- As a senior member of both groups, Symington disclosed yesterday that despite claims F that there is constant congres- .gence activities is "already si ? severly restricted far moreonal supervision of the CIA, ..? the Senate CIA Subconimittee than other aspect of the .fed- eral budget," Symington pro-- Symington is the only con- tested. - : ? - gressman who is a member Of It may be that the retirgaiii- both the Senate Foreign Re- lations and Armed Services za,tion "Is . a . constructive committees. . , , Mew". to 'eliminate. dupiica- lieu_ and Waste, said Syming- ton;Tand- that should be exam- ined. However, he said, the new plan will lead to "the creation of a new and obviously. more powerful supervisory commit- tee chaired by the adviser to the president for national -Se- curity affairs (Kissinger) Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7 S 1.79D6 !STATI.NTL STATINTL A Approved Por RO-fdageL2001703/04):`-CIA:RDPB0=0511-e01 Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I agree that the foreign aid program needs a very careful review next year, when we re- Convene. . I also agree that certain things need to be done. I agree that there should be re-- form. Meanwhile, I want a, program that will help people. Ninety-three percent of the funds spent ? in the foreign aid program are spent :within the United States. They involve ?? .the labors of 5,000 companies and over '-60,000 people, many of whom would be out of work by the ending o fsuch a pro- ? gram arbitrarily or by its excesive di- ? minution. This is a program to help people. That Is why the AFL-CIO is interested in it and has long been interested in it. - It is a program to help people, too, in . the other .countries of the world. It is a - program 'to help children through - UNICEF. It is a program to help the de- veloping countries by means of the de- veloping funds, the multilateral funds, and many of the bilateral funds. It is a program by which we are en- a?bled to keep our promises and our treaties. It is a program by which we have undertaken to see that, asave with- draw from a long and unpopular war, we do not leave those who remain totally ? abandoned, utterly unprovided for, and, - ? further, embittered at the ingratitude of the United States. ? As a Nation, we have made our cove- nants. We have given our bonds. We have furnished our assurances to the other , peoples of the world, If, for no other rea- ? son, we will have to continue the pro-. gram. Then after we do, let us, by all means, review it. After all, any program that has been in existence for 25 years can stand review. ? Let us see if we cannot get one which Is less expensive, one which iS less costly in the misunderstandings it brings about, one which is more fully in the calight- - cued self-interest of America, and one which does DIOre fully meet the modern problems of the rest of the world, rather - than being structured on the basis of the problems of the world as they were 25- . years ago. I think that the Senate in a spirit of conciliation and compromise is about ready to adopt the proposed new foreign aid program. I think the Senate is per- fectly capable of writing a good and a new one. I think we can write it on Capi- tol M. I think that we know our job and are prepared to perform in accord- ance with it. Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, what - the Committee on Foreign Relations re- , ported was a less expensivo program. What the administration wants is a con- tinuing resolution, which would be a more expensive program. Furthermore, ' the -program has turned into an arms sales a-nd an arms grant program, by means of which we shift, to a large ex- tent, Obsolete weapons of various kinds - to various countries and, in that way, , build up a dependency, a process which ? I think is open to question. country o has become the largest arms dealer in the ? .world. I think it is about time to put A StOg to this kind of program and to call it what it is. That is the purpose of the two bilk which will be "before the Senate to- day and tomorrow. I am only sorry that the-proposals were not broken down into three parts?economic, humanitarian, and military. This was attempted. Un- fortunately, the. votes were not present to operate on that basis. I hope, and I am very sure, the Senate will take a close and a hard look at the proposals now before it. Mr. SYaHNGTON. Mr. President, I should like to associate myself with the words of the distinguished majority leader. In listening to the news media last night and this morning, many high of- ficials in this administration were lec- turing the Senate as to its recent actions on foreign aid. -I, for one, do not intend to be sandbagged by any heavy onslaught against the decisions of the Senate. I also believe it is about time we rec- ognize that the American taxpayer can- not afford to spend tens of billions of dollars to destroy many of those coun- tries?only recently we started on an- other one, (arnbodia?and then spend tens of billions of dollars bringing them back to some form of reasonable eco- nomic stability. I would like to alsb associate myself with the remarks of the majority leader with respect to the continuing resolution. In my opinion, at this point and under these circumstances, a continuing resolu- tion would be an abandonment on the part of the legislative. branch of its pre- rogatives and responsibilities under the Constitution. ? ORDER OF BUSINESS ? The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. In accordance with the previous order, the distinguished Senator from Missouri is now recognized for hot to exceed 15 minutes. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, last Friday the White House anndunced that the President "had ordered a reorganiza- tion of the intelligence conmumity. I ask unanimous consent that their press re- lease to this end be printed in the Rso- ORD at the conclusion of these remarks. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.) Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, as reported by the press, the administra- tion's plan creates an "enhanced leader- ship role" for the Director of the Con teal Intelligence Agency, turns more of the operating responsibility for that Agency over to the Deputy Director, who is a lieutenant general in the Marine Corps, and creates Or reconstitutes a variety of boards, committees, and groups who are charged with important respon- sibilities within the intelligence COMMU- nity. The reported aim of the reorganization Is to improve the "efficiency and effective- ness" of U.S. intelligence activities and press comments on this move include re, fercnces to alleged concern over thee-leo A ' 1 I ,A i /11.1 1 Inki and cost, a., 21 a .1gcsnee opera ions; a SO to general unhappiness about various specific intelligence estimates. Such re- ports have been officially denied, but it is aicknottled:,?-ed that this reorganization is the result of "an exhaustive study" of the U.S. intelligence activities. It could be that the reorganization an- nounced last week by the White House is a constructive move. In recent years there has- been a growing belief that there was heavy duplication and therefore waste within the overall intelligence commu- nity.Unfortunately, however, it has been impossible for the putblic, or even con- cerned Members of Congress, to obtain enough information on this subject for informed judgment. By the same token; it Is. equally im- possible to determine, at least at this time, whether the organization changes now decreed will accomplish their stated purposes, or to deterthine what will be their practical effect. One thing is clear,, based on the man- ner in which the reorganization was handled Eni..1 announced; namely, the executive bar ch does not consider either the organization, or the operation, of the intelligence community to be matters of concern- to the Congress. To my knowl- edge there was no advance consultation whatever with the Congress regarding this reorganization, or even any advance notice- cilf what had been decided. In ism the Central Intelligence Agency was established by act of Congress. Its powers; and duties are specified by law. Its Ditector and Deputy Director are subjetti. to confirmation by the Senate. Las 1 year the Congress appropriated an analunt estimated by the press to be betweux, $5 and $6 billion for the activi- ties -176 this Agency and the other com- Pone& parts of the intelligence com- mmittyi. ? As sue Member of the Senate, I will not atrrept the proposition that the role of Congress in organizing the intelligence community ended 24 Years ago with the passa21 of the National Security Act, or that aur only current and continuing responsibility is to appropriate whatever nutalra!- of billions of dollars the execu- tive Ixanch requests so as to handle this work. La-sit Saturday, when I learned from the :Tress about this intelligence reor- galliaatiOn, RS ranking member of the Comnittee on 'Armed Services, I wrote the chairman of that committee, request- ing luarings either by the full committee or by the CIA subcommittee, of which I have !keen a member for some 15 years. , In tint. letter I presented the fact that this subcommittee has not met once this year. This latest reorganization on the face of it mites questions about past, Present, and lame performance of our multi- billion dollar annually intelligence corn- munitz: questions such as:. If iii has been inefficient, what and where were its deficiencies? Viat sense does it need to be more "responsive?" - Whattis implied about the past by the referenco in the press release to the oh- jective of insuring "strengthened leader- ship" the future? 1971 Approved For Release 2001/03/04.: CIA-RDP80-01601R00140020000117 Approved For Release/001103104 ; CIA-RDP80-01 sl;F1211-.'211t 1971 A la_ f C) ? , byWrihry, R Cocon of Newspaper E 1 be supervised i Intelligence Ag, ?:7-777' The time is lo ? supervisory rolc Central Intellig War. Under thi. CIA adrninistra ? of inquiry by i and specificalk, requiring discir titles, salaries CIA; (ii) expo lions on expel the Director's without adver Government the Governme for staff abroai their families 1949 Central I Director a lice For some time I have been disturbed by the way the CIA has been diverted from its originarassignment. It has become an operational and. at times policy-making arm of the government. I never thought when I set up the rin that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and- dagger opera-tions. ?ex-President Harry S. Truman. OTHING h'as happened since ttiat pronouncement by the agency's creator in December 196:3 to remove or reduce the cause for concern over the CIA's develop- ment. As currently organized, supervised, structured and led, it may be that the CIA has outlived its usefulness. ? Conceivably, its very existence causes the President and the J National Security Council to rely too much on clandestine operations. Possibly its reputation, regardless of the facts, is noW so bad that as a foreign policy instrument the agency has become counter-productive. Unfortunately the issue ot - its efficiency, as measured by its performance in preventing past intelligence failures arid consequent foreign policy . fiascos, is always avoided on grounds of "secrecy". So American taxpayers provide upwards 'of $750,000,000 a year for the CIA without knowing how the money is spent or to what extent the CIA fulfils or exceeds its authorized intelligence functions. The gathering of intelligence is a necessary and -legitimate activity in time of peace as well as in war. But it does, raise a very real problem of the proper place and control of agents who are required, or authorized on their own recognizance., to commit acts of espionage. In a democracy it also poses the dilemma of secret activities and the values of a free society. Secrecy is obviously essential for espionage but it can be ? and has been ? perverted to hide intelligence activities even from those with the constitutional re- sponsibility to?sanction them. A common rationalization the phrase "If the Ambassador/Secretary/President doesn t know he won't have to lie to cover up." The prolonged birth of the CIA was marked by a reluctance on the part ol politicians and others to face these difficulties, and the agency as it came to exist still bears the marks of this . indecision. What we need to do is to examine how the U.S. gathers made the U.S. Ambassador to Singapore look like . the . its intelligence, and consider how effective its instruments proverbial cuckold, the final outcome being a situation - / pre and what room there is for imprOvement. Every govern- wherein the United States Government lied in public ..? V ment agenceippromectFortRelease200110,3/04theCiAr2kb0661tiltgOlR001400200001-7 CIA's Director, acknowledged before the American Society With so rni. is seen by rnE- Stine- coups, in Guatemala Mossadegh i the -Cuban I failure). The President Ker 28, 1961, 'z heralded ? y Because the agency's "m..._ ? representative of the unending gamnitry any life human aspect of espionage and secret operations. At this level the stakes are lower and the "struggle" frequently takes bizarre and even ludicrous twists. For, as Alexander Foote noted in his Ilandbbok for Spies, the average agent's ."real . difficulties are concerned with. the practice of his trade. The ? setting up of his transmitters, the obtaining of funds, and the arrangement of his rendezvous. The irritating administra- tive details occupy a disproportionate portion of his waking life." As an example of the administrative hazards, one day in 1960 a technical administrative employee of the CIA . stationed at its quasi-secret headquarters in Japan flew to V Singapore to conduct a reliability test of a local recruit. On arrival he checked into one of Singapore's older hotels to receive the would-be spy and his CIA recruiter. Contact was made. The recruit was instructed in what a lie detector test -does and was wired up, and the technician . plugged. the machine into the room's electrical outlet. Thereupon it blew out all the hotel's lights. The ensuing confusion and darkness did not cover a getaway by the trio. They were discovered, arrested, and jailed as American spies. ? By itself the incident sounds like a sequence from an old Peters Sellers movie, however, its consequences were not nearly so funny. In performing this routine mission the CIA set off a two-stage international incident between England.. and the United States, caused the Secretary of State to write letter of apology to a foreign chief of state, STATI NTL Approved For On the Issues C0.1crioz9(02,,Art QuART-ovy 01601R - CIA: COVICAMSS IN D Since ? the Central Intelligence ,Agency was given authority in 1949 to operate without. normal legislative Oversight, an uneasy tension has existed between an un- informed Congress and an uninformative CIA. In the last two decades nearly 200 bills aimed at making the CIA more accountable to the legislative branch have been introduced. Two such bills have been reported from committee. None has been adopted. The push is on again. Some members of Congress are insisting they should know more about the CIA and .about what the CIA knows. The clandestine military operations in Laos run by the CIA appear to .be this year's impetus. Sen. Stuart Symington '(D Mo.), a member of the Armed Services Intelligence Operations Subcommittee and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee deal log with U.S. corn mit ment s abroad, briefed the Senate June 7 b'ehind closed doors on how deeply the CIA was involved" in the Laotian. turmoil. Ile based his briefing on a staff report. (Weekly Report p. 1709, 1660, 1268) lie told the Senate in that closed session: "In all my committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on in Laos. 'We do not know the cost of the bombing. We do not know about the .people we maintain there. It is a secret war." As a member of two key subcommittees dealing with the activities of the CIA, Symington should be privy to more classified information about the agency than most other members of Congress. But Symington told the Sen- ate h.e. had to dispatch two committee staff members to Laos in order to find out what the CIA was doing. If Symington does not know what the CIA has been doing, hen what kind of oversight function does Congress exercise over the super-secret organization? (Secrec;y feet sheet, Weekly Report p. 1785) A Congressional Quarterly examination of the over- sight system exercised by the legislative branch, a study of sanitized secret documents relating to the CIA and interviews with key staff members and members of Con- - guess indicated that the real power to gain knowledge about CIA activities and expenditures' rests in the hands Of four powerful committee chairmen and several key members of their committees?Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. The extent to which these men exercise their power in ferreting out the details of what the CIA does with its secret appropriation determines the quality of legislative oversight on this executive agency that Congress voted into existence 24 years ago. The CIA Answers to... ?\-1 (PI, 80-253), the 'Central Intelligence Agency was ac- . As established by the National Security Act .of 1947 countable to the President and the .Nal.i'onal Security ?) ACTIVIrLS, PLANg Council. In the, original Act there was no language which excluded the agency from scrutiny by Congress, but also no provision which required such examination. - To clear up any confusion as to the legislative intent of the 1947 law, Congress passed the 1919. Central Intel- ligenc.c Act (PL 81-110) which exempted the CIA from all federal laws requiring disclosure of the "functions,. names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed by the agency. The law gave the CIA director power to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of govern- ment funds." Since the CIA became a functioning organi- zation in 1949, its budgeted funds have been submerged into the general accounts of other government agencies, hidden from the scrutiny of the public and all but a se- lect group of ranking members of Congress. (Congress ond the Notion Vol. I, p. 306, 249) THE SENATE In the Senate, the system by which committees check on CIA activities and budget requests is straight- forward. Nine ? men---on two committees?hold positions of seniority which allow them to participate in the regular annual legislative oversight function. Other committees are briefed by the CIA, but only on topical matters and not on a regular basis. Appropriations. William W. Woodruff, counsel for the Senate Appropriations Committee' and the only staff man for the oversight subcommittee, 'explained that when the CIA comes before the five-man subcommittee, more is discussed than just the CIA's budget. "We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the Defense Department budget that .you can get," Woodruff told Congressional Quarterly. He said that CIA Director Richard Helms provided the subcommittee with his estimate of budget needs for all government intelligence operations. Woodruff explained that although the oversight subcommittee was responsible for reviewing the CIA bud- get, any substantive legislation dealing with the agency would originate in the Armed Services Committee, not Appropriations. No tranScripts are kept when the CIA representative (usually Hehns) testifies before the subcommittee. Wood- ruff said the material' covered in the hearings was so highly classified that ?any transcripts would have to be kept under armed guard 24 hours a day. Woodruff does , take detailed notes on the sessions, however, which are held for him by the CIA. "All I have to do is call," he said, "and they're on my desk in an hour.' Armed Services. "The CIA budget itself does not legally require any review by Congress," said T. Edward Braswell, chief counsel for the Senate Armed Services Committee and the only staff man used by the Intelli- gence Operations Subcommittee. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7 j nu e d z unpus (Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160 - 223,673 ? 318,040 / 0 ) O7.. hu '11 ./ ? ,,,,,,,,f- -0 (I" 0 -II ---;\ /;:isr 0 n _ - ,7- l'Irkri'M.,'-r.1 r'l i I .?, V i. i ? il /1--0 ::-1.1 ('f1 ri)-1,,.., v, , , 1 i I , J - t, 1, ,1--- .... .... . ,?., H \-\ ''.. IS.: _,/ V -IA, ...)- ? \4_1'1 -Li- -!,:i-.;.1.'Q-_-1 . - V ...,:i_.t!... L./,_.r.,- ...::!?., . . ? ? N - , Tip (c-f-? 6)-f. \&_.1 Kt } (er - ? ? ? ? N ? ? - ? ' DLI;crich Wershinglon Purcarr WASIIINGTON If the best qualification for a super- sleuth is to be inconspicuous, then the government's hush- hush intelligence network had better watch its secrets.. They'd better watch them ---loccuse if all the 535 mem - hers of Congress were assem- bled together, Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, might be the least noticeable. And Nedzi has just been 71 ;9 med to ex- plore the intelligence net- ':- work's hidden operations. 1 ? NEM! IS a small, plump man with scanty - hair, at- though only in his rind-40s, of t ?: paddling walk rather than !ii"aci ibeen a part of' the (cia- Ill do just that." ? purposeful s t r i d e , whose Tense establishment, its ways Hobert, may be right. Nod- somewhat moo?nlike face is not to be. qta .es ti o ne d too zi's fellow subcommitteemen - marked customarily by a deeply. ; are four hawkish establish- somewhat bewildered expres- So Nedzi's selection was a miint men?illelvin Price of shock---tat least to those 'NvIlio Illinois and 0. C. Fisher of : -lie is, moreover, a dove, did not know ;Hebert once was Texas, DOMOCTatS, and Wil- , membars of the llouse esto... ,an inyestigation-minded NEW. liam :G. Pray of Indiana and iishment ?regard him as a Orleans city e d i t o r who di- Alvin E. O'Kons'ki. of Wiscon- sin, Republicans?all of ] rebel on the House hawk -like: nc-t:e'cl. the lirS1 "Pse ?17. tthc : Armed Services Committee. 1 ahleY Long 'e:Inl?Pi're. whom rank Nedzi in senior- : Thus it was that when. AN EVEN GREATER. isur-: it:Y. ' :. Committee Chairman F. Fel-- priE.;e, was when a-lehe,it ;ex_I NEDZI COMES to his new i ward Hebert, D-La., suddenly a-)anded 'Lhe suhcammittee's` job with little knowledge namcid the Michigan la\v- authority to in c lira .? ;ove.v-: about -the intelligence field. i ; maker, a veteran of less than sight of the ill)efense Intelli-' This could be a help in im- 10 Years in Congress and on- 'cr ence Agency and; the super-. ly the. ninth-ranking member of the committee, as the House overseer of the Intel- , Hence establishment, there .. were gasps of amazement from all over. ? : -1 ;amendment, has opposed the . bomber and the Sale- .? , ii Tuard missile system. ? SO WHY DID Hebert. jump - _ . ,... -1 ? :Nedzi cyer several of his seniors? "Because he is an honest man, and will do an honest job," said Hebert, Ncidzi.'s explanation w a s that Hebert was interested in having "a reVieW in this area we understand each other. ..I... know. wher e he - -- - -- - .1-lands and an open mind. but stands and he knows where I 'lie knows what he wants to stand.. I have never deceived find out, ? him and he has 110Vec re- ? ''. fleeted deception to me, He ' " WANTS T0 new if th-i: feels that we need to call a dividual rights are being pre-_ Tr r.,, T .(.0- -1 \ 7 slmcir., a spade and he feels tected.?,that is, have the in- ' telligenee. agencies cut ? out their domestic intelligence ac- tivities. Ile will check to see if it is proper for CIA to manage secret operations such as ? those in -Laos and other covert operations not related to intellige.nce, gath- ering as such; if there is too much overlapping and too lit- tle coordination between in- telligence operations and. if enormous budgets for these operations channel informa- Ilion to proper authorities at ;the right time; of the whole Isystem of security classifica- ?tion should be revised; and what is the real and defini- tive basis for arriving at de- 1 cisions ?ill national intelli- g,cn'oe estimates. .'? There may be not hi. Ti g ; wrong with the overall intelli- gence operation. But if 'there is something wrong, those responsible had better . riot put in Nedzi's Presumably, that was etc 1 .1 ., ni,rninriii, Seeming vagueness any faith wi-iy it ,would b e tin d err lIebeit, (:` '4-1. - - ''' ?; ' that he will not uncover their infuriated STATI NTL looking into the Pueblo af- fairs. He had met CIA Di- j rector Richard. Helms. But lie has never had any direct 1 contact with GIA. He does not. know Lt. Gen. Donald V'i .1Bennett, director of the De), :f ense Intelligence Agency,; - ' nor Vice Adm. Noel ? Gayler, I director of the National Se- curity Agency.. Thus, he comes to his new-i : iv assigned task with clean .. TRADITIONALLY, the sub- committ!ee that oversees Cern tnal Intelligence Agency oper- ations is :Laded by the full committee chairman. scaret National S cCu: t y Agency. iNed-zi's ec d on the :A at ;m ot 'Services :c(Mlniiticya bas not been of e 'kind that had ;endeared him to the more. senior, and generaily m.0 C. conservative, members ?of that panel----he gra d, as matter of fact, been one of a quintet in-' eluding ;Ohio's Charles W:hai en Jr., .0.1.-Dayton, who partial inquiry, because m the past, only senior mem- bers of the Armed Services Committee knew and rarely let their juniors in on the. se- crets. Nedzi had :brief expo.sure to the intelligence field as a member of a subcommittee . _ Approved F secret faults. ? ' 'Ibeciuse the CIA. traditionellilL l'redeeesscrr '1M ptcroctiloiriplep; : CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7 unsuccessful en dt Ii e-w a a Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-0160 11?,NTON HARBOR, MICH. NEWS?PALLADIUM ? 2'7,329 /WC) 20 .d.[ICIA(?; ; kL; 'II 0 17-74.) VP' IT / , ' /Z)4z,,,dI STATI NTL fri1V1 7T ji f 7-17 r11 1/ 1/ 'PCP .90 LI b Congressman linden Nedzi of -Michigan may yet wind, up with the biggest bureau in Washing- ton. The, Wayne county Democrat bids fair to have iieed of more detectives than J. hdgar .Hoover, more lawyers than the Justice department, and more scientists than NASA. Nedzi ha S tahen on a monu- Mental task. He will be the louse Armed ,.s.=.',f-;:vices Commit- tee's watchdog on t he Centql,, Intelligence Agency, the Defense .- Intelligence AcieV:T.and the Na- tional Security Agency, On assuming his new duties, Nedzi said his primary goal will be "to reconcile the public's right to know with national security," ? It's going to be tough enough to ferret out just what it is the CIA, the DIA and NSA are doing; he'll need plenty of super- ? sleuths for that. But that 's the straightfor- ward, easy part of his job. It's when he -finds out what the secrets are that Nedzi will have a really big job.,. He'll have to - decide whether to bare the secrets, to the public. First, he'll need the expert advice Of scientif,ic experts so he , won't be giving the Russians ? some new piece of military tech- nology they didn't ?already have. Then he'll, need the lawyers to tell him -whether he's acting The case -of the Pentagon Papers Made it clear some regu- latory agency needs to weed out the secret -files every so often. But it looks like Congressman Nedzi will soon find the job is more than one man can bear. ? , - - Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7 ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04 .:-CIARRD11/8"06.01.601RI AIM , Tn. STATESMAN E 31,3oe 'GOOD MAN' New watchdog over the Ceur,,A Agency for the House ol'--sri.c&ri7resentatives? Rep. Lucien N. Ne.dzi, D-Mich., is one of the lower chamber's prominent doves. Lahled a "gorKI man" despite their divergence on the war issue , Nedzi was named chairman of the intelligence supervisory subcommittee by E. Edward Hebert, fl-La., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7 ? \\X (777) ih,\?1-;-] ? --'?? 0.01:n "1.?.oc'lc. is en a brier vacation, bat ho will, con- throe to v,-rlte leis columns, prOmincnt not it cot figures cec:nionally contrit:,nth-?; fir,lest c.??)7.1dr:Ins? tfo- clo;,"s contrihutor icc en.7.1.;.:hert ic.17.tanphrey, 3.).? fcruler v!(?e, prcoJ dcc zne .1V,Y,1; a lendIng Iheinveralle loDpefal. ? We have vAtnessed in :went years a gradual and potcntialiy dangerous isolation and insulation of po\Ver within the Executive branch of government. I am particularly sersittvo to this sihotion, having Scrved in the United States. Senate for 1_5 years and. as vice president Sec ' ? Nowhere is the tendency toward isolation more apparent than in the field of national rerttity. I believe it is at least in part responsible for some of the divisiveness and the search for seapezcats generated by the recent publication of, the "Pentagon p?rrr?rs " ,Vit 'hY l;',.AVE NOT l'?:AD the meCla-i?nyi for adequate cc. lotion betv.-een Congress and the En-- - cent vs branch in the formulation of national security ? The President and hey government officials moot or?ca...71onally with the leaders of Cen:.tris on an in- ?Sermal basis. There 'arc several ccm;ressional com- mittees that deal v.lth some aspects of national security. Dot decision?mahing is fragmented. I- have propeF.ed that. we cad that frn.-nentation. provide fot. closer consultation by csttlblishiaz a permanent jeint congresslonal Conmrittee on National Security. (-1 STATINTL t-r.n.i:,?? rl',;111-q 11 `,; 1!. ? 5c) j j!J Anlr,..,1' 12, 1 ?7 1 I IC:: The committee v,?ould have these main ZulIction-,: .0 First, to -study ancli 111P.1:.e recommendzItions on all .issues ,ceilcerning national. security. This would include review of. the President's report on the state of the world, the defense btid7,et and foreign assistance programs as ?thcy relate to national security goals. acid U.S. disarmament 1.10.C1C'S as part of cur defense censideratiens, O SeCC0.-:, to review, study and e?-aluate the "Pcntogen End other &kr:I-nuts, ?,,,-heth:er published heretofore or tint, covering U.S. involve- ment in Vietnam. ? ? ? ;third, to study and mat-co recommendations on governme:)t practices of classification and , declassification of doct.ments. Fc?drCI, to conduct a contl..,ing review of the operations of the Central Intelli:;ence Agency, ? the departments of Defense and State, cart other agencies intimately involved with car foreign policy. , EN UN )2.111; ICS.LIUNF of the committee would be the composition of its membership. It. would have representation 1r.):`.1 those inr_Hv!alal and. committee jurisdictions that have primar;?,, responsibility ? in military, foreign relations and congressional. leadership. It would include the President: 'it?ro Tempore of the .Senate; the Speaker of the House; .the ma:xity cccl minority leaders of both houses, and the chairmen and, ranl-dng minority members of the committees on appi . opriations, foreign relations and armed services and tco itoicct Committee on Atomic Energy. It woUld not usurp the legislative or investigative functions of any present committees, but supplement , and coodinate?their efforts in a mere comprehensive framework. . ? Nor is ii designed to usurn the President's historic role z.ts Cornim.:nder-Tn-Cief. nor to put the Congress in an adversary relationship? with the. Executive branch. .STATINTL .. T iS. ltz?All'=, A NEW .7.0:1)`*, to be coMposed of members of both parties and beAll houses of Congress, that will make possible closer consultation end cooperation between the President and the Cougress. The concentration of pov,ier v,ithin the Executive branch is ciulte understandable considering our ex- perience in World War P and afterwatxl. But times change, and F'D must our institutions and responses. ? . I cannot help but believe that if. the CO:17eSs had shared mcn.,a Tully in momentons decisions, these in Vietnam, we would be less divided as a nation by Approved For Release 2001103/-04I clAIRD 76 0-01,601 R001400200001 -7 A new framewori-: for the .1,317111nd:on of nationnl security pcic.y, I 1-al!,2vc, can bring t.ts cf n er to tl.o ideal we rh share Sec Itt. 5 or peace. 0 sTA-R ? Approved For Release 2001/03/t4RgIA4RDP80-01601R0 D0 \41:11-I 1 '4J, i 7 1/C J'k_Jil N 1 1 I r.7.? ? ? 11 I ' t--,???-???74 ? . - -STATINTL 'fl r(f-, By ?rut KELLY . _ _, _ ._ __ ? - ---- - --- -- ? - - ??'? - Star Staff Wfitcr. ? ? "The senior members were on 3 ?Are individual rights being : Shortly after Congress returns the Central Intelligence subcom- ?protected? Nedzi is aware that .. from its August recess, five con-. 'Thittee and we were not privy to 'military intelligence people have gressmcn will turn off the I their deliberations. We had abso- been told to cut out their domes- George ewashingion Memorial' .ilutely no information on the tic intelligence activities, bkhe Parkway at an ninnarked exit, _budgets of the agencies or what Avents to make sure the net,v swing back across the parkway ,t.1-1ey were up to. Periodically,. -rules aT?e being obeyed, - on than overpass and suddenly. we . got intelligence reports," 4--- Is it-proper for the CIA to emerge into a spacious, tree- Nedzi- said. manage operations such as those dotted parking lot surrounding a 'The fiVe-man subcommittee in Laos? I ,al - it) white blInClirlY WaS, in the past, made up of the "There - is a oue4ion of wheth- Only after they have parked chairmen of the full committee and entered the building will and the two senior members they see their first solid evi- from each party. The senior dence ? inlaid into the floor in a members serving with Nedzi giant seal ? that this is the headquarters of the Central In- telligence Agency. Heading the little group of congressmen will be Rep. Lu- cien Nor b or Nedzi, a 46-year-old Democrat who has represented the' eastern portion tee looking into the capture oft of Detroit since 1662, and who the U.S.S. Pueblo by the North t has just .been named ? to the ,Koreans. surprise of many?as the chair-. man 'of the House Armed Sexy- Has Met Helms ices Committee's subcommittee- Ile has met Richard Helms on central intelligence. director of Central Intelligence, ? Nedzi's record has not been., on several occasions when the kind that would, on the sun- 1Helms has appeared before the face, endear him to the morel! committee and he thinks highly senior ? and generally more: of him. But Nedzi has never vis- conservative ? members of the I Red the CIA, has never called on the CIA for a special intelligence briefing, and does not know Lt.. Can. Donald V. Bennett, director', of the Defense t Intelligence' Agency, or Vice Mm. Noel Gayler, director of the super-secret National Security Agency. T.he only time a top intelli- gence official has appeared in an open hearing in the last dec- ade, was on June 2, 1961 when Helms, then No. 2 man in the CIA, testified before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee. Nor- mally, Helms and other CIA offi- cials not only testify in closed hearings but their names and the name of their agency are deleted before a transcript on the hearing is made public, will be Reps. Melvin Price, D-Ill., 0. C. Fisher, D-Tex., Wil- liam G. Bray, R-Ind., and Alvin E. O'Konski, R-Wis. Nedzi had some brief exposure I to the intelligence field when he served on a special subcominite committee. Ile co-sponsored an, end-the-war ammendment in the1 House, has opposed the B11 bomber and the Safeguard mis- sile 'defense system, and is one of a tiny group of rebels on the 41-man committee known as the Fearless Five. Why did Rep. F. Edward He- bert, a Democrat from Louisi- ana, choose Nedzi. for one of the most important subcommittee assignments ? a post tradition- ally held by the chairman him- , ? - self? ? Nedzi Explains Choice "The chairman was generally Interested in having a review of this area," Nedzi explained in an -interview "My experience 'with him has been ex'cellent ? we understand each other. I know where he stands, and he knows where I stand: I have never decived him and he has never reflected deception to me. "He feels that we need to call a spade a spade and he feels I'll do just that." Nedzi comes to his new assign- ment ? which will cover all in- telligence agencies, not just the CIA ? with few preconceptions and, in fact,ApprinVedof10 edge of the field. . er we should be involved in Suchl operations and the further ques- tions of whether this agency isl the proper one to do it," Nedzi said. : 5-- Should the whole system of security classification be re- vised? I -"That this is a difficult area, I I realize," Nedzi said, "and I'm I not sure' we're going to be able to come up with a Solomon-like decision." 6? How are the national intel- ligence estimates arrived at? What really is the basis for ar- riving at decisions? Since his selection for the new job announced earlier this week, Nedzi said, his phone has been constantly busy with callers vol- unteering information about H.S. intelligence operations. . "We will give them an 'appro- priate audience," he said. "We are hearing from people with all sorts of axes -to grind. We'll screen them all for substance, but: no one .is peremptorily dis- missed." .? Sets Priorities - ? Despite his lack of experience in the area, Ncdzi has a pretty good idea of the areas be would like to explore and he listed them this way: 1? Is there too much overlap- ping of functions among the CIA and the State and Defense De- partment intelligence Opera- tions? 2 ?Are the budgets the proper sand doees_all the informa- I RI- ease 200110341046 CIA-RDP80-01.601R001400200001-7 get to the man who needs it when he needs it? Approved for Release 2001/u;s/04 : ulA-KuP80-01601R0 .4 AUG 1.371 Notes on Peopki z?-,?.? ?? --"??????1 I F. EdIvard I.Til;bert, chair- , . . _.... - - . , ..:?:-... J.? n ri,r1 Lc'tL man of the Home, Armed Services C;ommittee, has 1.--.p- poInted an active antiwz-:r ClonLres?srnan, Lnelz-ri N: ? ? Nedz.i, a 2\..Tichigan Democrat, chairman of the Hoase sub- committe.s that keeps Fa eye on the Conti al Intt-,-Iligence , Agency. , Why? "Because lie's a good an, even though we're . opposed philosophically," . Mr, II6bert, who instlucted ' Mr. Neclzi "to make periodic . ? inquiries into all phaes of intelligence activities wi-hin the 1/ep2rtment of D,:,Tense and within the agencies es- tablished u icr the Netionel Securities Act." Mr. Nedzi said thet Mr. Tibert, a I.ouisiana Demo- crat, had placed "no restric- tions of z,rly sort." on him, evc,n thr.plfh he's hem 'highly ----- --- Critical of the war in Viet- United Pnees inttzrnati:n31 .-ziant and Pentagon policies. Lucien N. 1130z. STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7 "17 ? Approved. For Release 2001103/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001 PA ,PNILADFLPUTA, INQUIRER M 463,503 S 867,010 AUG 4 is ve to J.-,,eep an Eye-Qn__GIA,. one of the. most active doves and Pentagon critics in ?thoflouse has been named chairman of a super-secret sub- olnrnittee charged with keeping tabs an the CIA and other, ,intelligence agencies. n-Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D., Mich.) said one of the first things do is visit the headquarters ;of the Central Intelligence Agency in ?Lari;,-,,ley, Va. -.1,..,i,?After nal, said Nedzi, he hopes to hold puNie hearings on U. S. in- Jelligence gathering activities. ,.The subcommittee Nedzi is tak- Ing,over was considered so vital by ,.?Rep. L. Mendel Rivers (D., " S. C.) ?;.that the late chairman of the.Armcd ryices Committcc! alv,Rlys reserved -that chairmanship .for himself, ,Besides the CIA, Nedzi rill have jurisdiction over the Defense Intel- . lig,ence Agency and. the National Se, cth'ity Agency, two hush-hush -?'branches of the Pentagon, STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400260001-7 ? I.i.iiON SI Approved .For Release 2001/03/94vSlAyRDP80-01601R0 fi-1 g 11 El I! /7Fl (7'7"4 A .4? ri Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7 ? - :3 DET1-?0IT, FREE PREApproved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R0 1,1 - 530,264 ;S 578,254 it.:!;cgi` 1 !Ti GES PO'SrP 1,..,1 , .. tl - ,-, T'fi- 171-1--, "Trii _ -t---i 1-1).11 "ll (c'.1 (7.-..1%. 1 i I '',l(-1-1:)-q,7- iCt. ??? ! (01, ,-"?:-. iii i .(-7:-. at ..1.1_U?' '0,,id'U ille' '4_1--' \?.'" c?'?:.:J . T ?-.4 c , iL BY SAUL FIIIEDMAN conservative, maintained tight , Fres Prcss Washintcqi Staff WASIUNGTON--In an unex- pected and potentially ir?p6r-e tont move, the conservative, Ii awkish chairman of the House Armed Services Corn- mittee has ?zippointed a liberal drove to head the sup,,u?sensi- live subcommittee on Ameri- can intelligence operations. '1'h e new subcommittee chairman is Rep. Lucien Nedzi, Ji-Mich., who became de.eply disillusioned by t h c Viotreau war and recently sponsored unsuccessful legis- lation calling for a pullout by the end of the year. Nedzi was notified. Wednes- day of his appointment. by committee Chairman F. Ed- control of the subcommittee. and kept liberals off. Hebert, for a time, put the full committee in charge of in- telligence supervision, but re- cently decided to reappoint a subcommittee. ? ? Why he would- choose Nedzi, who has been critical of intel- ligence estimates on the Viet- Jiain war and on Soviet miti- .?tary strength, was a mystery I ithirt had Heu.:u3.,!,:th.e,ta_bn .7.77 mg. Wednesday when thee. learned of the appointment. Sources close to the situa- tion suggested -it was an indi- cation that Hebert and other committee conservatives have become. concerned at the se- crets the Executive Branch ward Hebert, 1)-La., who put has been keeping from Con- no strings on Nedzi's ability t?..gress and. at the extent or probe into the operations of all American interfe&lee in the intelligence organizations in-- internal affairs of other ca- eluding the Central tions. ? genec .Agency and the 'al SO:hiritY Agency. ALTHOUGH Nedzi declined Hc,,bert sent Nedzi a formal to say 'what inquiries he will mandate to make "periodic in- (pursue, he has publicly chat- quiries. into all intelligence ac- lenged the basis for national tivities." b 'intellioence estimates which . the Pentagon has used to aesk ALTHOUGH Hebert, as the for new weapons systems. He f U 11 committee chairman, may therefore -bc exepcted to maintains an ex-officio seat on renew his challenge in the sub- the subcommittee and other : committee, which almost al- members fire conservatives, it ways mcct s. behind closed will be the first lime in recent doors. years that perhaps the most Nodzi, in Congress since sensitive, subcommittee in the. 1961, was one of the original House Will be chaired by a lib- eral. Until his death earlier this year, former COMMittee Chairman L. Mendel Rivers, D.-S.-C., who was c'Areely. members of t h e "Fearless Five," a group of liberals on S. h e generally conservative committee MI..) fought against increases in defense spending and weapons like the' anti-bal- listic Hebert appointed Nedzi over ' seven more senior committee members. It was speculated that Hebert, in addition to Nedzi's reputation for hard work and competence, is seek- big more harmony- with tiK., moderates and liberals on the committee. ? Other's who will serve on the subcommittee- with Nedzi. are: ; Melvin Price, D-111., 0.. C. Fishe r, D-Tex., Alvin E. O'Konski, R-Wis., and William Bray, R-Ind. ? STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7 DEYFROIT, MICH. PEWS .Approvedl prOR,Ilm ?001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-0160 E - 592616-i S 827,086 0 fl It ti I: ..y i.; II, 7-0 (c:7-111 1:1 11 ? 11 1 1 ti ./ STATI NTL By RICHARD A. RYAN xoys wRstitt:zoti mit-cau WASHINGTON:? How do the many govern- - -meat intelligence agencies function? How does. the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA differ from the Defense Intelligence How are the Many agenci es funded? - Whom 'do they inves- tigate? Do they over- lap ? and duplicate their f forts? ? ? Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, Detroit Demo- crat, intends to seek the answers to these and other questions about: the supersecret intelligence organiza- tions. Nedzi yeste'rday was appointed chair- man of a new intelligence subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. The sub- committee was organized and ifs chairman appointed by Rep. F. Edward Hebert, Louis- iana Democrat, chairman of the parent corn- mitt cc.? ? ,Serving with Nedzi viIl be the two ranking Democrats and Republicans of the Armed' Services Committee -----.Democratic Reps, Mel- vin Price of Illinois, and 0. C. Fisher, of Texas, and Republican Reps. Alvin E. -O'Konski, of WiSconsin, and William G. Bray, of Indiana. ? IZep. 1.ocic2t1 ledzi -? "WE KNOW WC are spending billions in the -field of intelligence," Nedzi said in an inter- view after his appointment, "but no one really knows how much. The budgets for the various 'agencies are not a matter of public knowledge. _ 'I want to review their physical operation's and sIctermine the scope of their activity. And _I think it is appropriate to inquire whether we need all that intelligence." ?The veteran Detroit legislator said he is cer- tain there is duplication of effort among the CIA, DIA' and the intelligence arms of the mili- tary services.' - As a member of the subcommittee thatln- .vestiga.ted the Jan. 23, 1963 seizure of the USS Pueblo by the North Koreans, Nedzi said it was apparent from facts uncovered then that there was much duplication of effort. talOtriO4c)'qrrikl.0(Mg4.1-c0?V93/?4' led 1 people it should have reached," Nedzi said. The congressman feels the intelligence sub- in Congress in that it must "reconcile national security with basic constitutional rights." 'Military intelligence activities came under Senate scrutiny earlier this year when John M. O'Brien, a former Army intelligence agent, said in a letter to Senator Sam Ervin, North Carolina Democrat, that the Army had kept several political figures under surveillance for alleged anti-war activities. ? ? AMONG THOSE mc.litioned by O'Brien were Senator Adlai E. Stevenson 111, IllinoisDcmo- crat, who was Illinois state treasurer at the time, and Rep. Abner J. Mikva, Illinois Demo- Cr t The Army denied the charges but Ervin con- ducted Senate hearings on the whole question., of military Surveillance. The extent of the surveillance was under- -scored by a former Air Force intelligence ser- geant who testified that of the 119 persons. attending an anti-war dcmonstration.on Sept.' 1, 1969, outside Carson, Colo., 53 were intelli- gence agents or members of the press. Assistant Defense Secretary Robert J. Frouhlke told the committee that the DIA had .cards on 25 million "personalities" and, on 700:000 organizations and incidents. The new subcommittee, Nedzi said, is re-. quired to make periodic inquiries into all aspects of intelligence activities and, when appropriate, make legislative rucommeuda-. dons. ? The subcommittee -also will look into the whole problem of classification of official docu- ments, Nedzi said. "WE WANT to find out what is required Iron) a rational security standpoint in the way of classification," Ncdzi said. "It may be that more information can be given to the public without jeopardizing national security." Document classification became a national issue with the publication of the Pentagon papers. ? ? This is the first subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that Nedzi has chaired. The Detroit congressman fell out of favor with the former committee chairman, L. --Mendel Rivers, for repeatedly opposing the autocratic chairman on military bills. When Rivers, who died earlier this year, was committee chairman, he personally headed what was then known as the CIA subcommit- tee. It's activities then were limited and se- cret. When Hebert ascended to the chairman- CI 1 11 e IROlqrtiriat 01 IA00140020 0 0 0 1-7 He re-formed it. yesterday, however, but at the same time gave it a much broader scope4 STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/p4 :j9t1A;RpP80-01601Ril ? 'II- 9 -F ? . ? -1 19 , e?-) ? BY .E.1.1,NEST No doubt Riiehard Nixon's instinct, like? that these s:essions should be inore frequent, that of any Preside3at faced with the same more tl-ii:irou?gh-- -and the result is;I IlLplore tuation, is to resist Ilse growing demands readily available to congressmen and sena- that "his" CIA be required to :7Jive Cciinran ft;rs who are not members of the select pa- the same bind of intelligence report and nets. thriates tint it gives tlin situation of Sens. Alan Cranston 2.nd John Tunney. They represent 20 Just one seerets-spilline; blabbarmouth rililicri Califc:rnians obviciusly have. a. stake in Capitol Hill could do incalculable hi mi to issues ire,'olving war and peace., and the interest. :Besides, preeidantial ting of. a .plaver TO of national priorities. are involved, Neither, hos.vcver, sits on any of the cora- The thoitght occurs, however, that the raittees. which deal with ferein policy and Administration iniglA Lc?. better advised to nationtl. :1;!G;_?. Con-ic,,-; to VOI.0 recognize that frustrated senators and con- ? tion s or sunse-of-Cnngress resolutions about gressruen have a point. Corti'.;.reis.f.tuirt Can't. \lac Tut cni.?:,cyttly Instead, as a. practical matter, they.nntst ..{'.'acts.; Are either accept or ignore the word of col- How can they b.::: expected to yo'tJe intl. le:q;1.123 V.'1?MEC:'. committees deal vlith foreign Itigntly and rospon dUly on presidentilil ,prp. policy and national security questions on a posals in the fields of fol-cign policy and. 1ni-rogular tional sccurity unless they have reasonabla And, e,-ccept for the foreigii relations cern- access to th.2,..intelgeriee. on which these' mittces, these are prcityclista.cled with proposals are based? PeoPle vlio believe in a strong clofens'e Uow can. they latow whether an appropri-esuliii.--,hrnent------and are, therefore, not in- anon for a new ABM site or for mere Elcsei- dined In pass along intelligence which don mi:,.;siles is really nccded unless they-- might. support a contrary viewpoint., or colleagues whom they trust.---know some- Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ny,) lnas ii 11111 of what the Execitti,??0 Branch kno \vs troduced a bill which v,:-ould requirc: tho CIA of ,S',oviet driployment? as a mattcr of law, rather than of presidon- The answer is that they can't. tial discretion, to supply "Congress, through its appropriate committees, the sane intel- It should be understood, of course, that the n og,enc,e conclusions, facts and analyses that CIA is exposed to congressional scrutiny of a are now available to the Executive Branch," sort now. Vietnam, they have no direct access to per- tinent classified information, These intelligence materials, in turn, Just about any Houss--2 or 2enate commit- would be made available to any member of /tee, can, upon request, obtain a closed-doer Congress who asks foi: them. . ..,./ briefing from CIA Director Richard Hchns a other top officials of the ageilay. The trouble is, of co,ars nd e, that a secret which is made, available to upveards of a The CIA's supersecret budget, Is revicw.ed thousand people (including staff etriploYe.$) in both houses by special panels drawn from ',yid not remain a sccret very long. Certainly the Appropriations and Armed SCrviCCS Com-, not \vhen those people are in the proreion ntiLtees. Since 1(',57 eci:,:aii.11 members of the of politics, and certainly not when a lot of ? Senate Foreign Relations .Committee also them, like Sen. idike Gravel of Alaska, have been invited to sit in On these watch- might feel morally obligated to decide for dog 2e.:',s1ons. themselves what should be. released, . . There- bas always bean a certain die-anus- The best -,olittion, ono suspects, is a change faction with this setup, and this dissatisfac- Nvhich would broaden the kindE; of people on lion is growing. Capitol Hill with access to CIA intelligence,' In the first place,:the Ci \. brieliors are without, greatly increasing theit nun:nbers.t. given not as a matter of congressional right In that context, former Vice Presiden'e. but of prei'ltlerilia u l cortey M s, any (Th.:.,ghlin.. Dmt , .4 - L,ai c . ? 'api.,ey baa come up with an at- fled lawmakers are. convinced, in any event, ii_,--1L?t:,? -.11,-,,:nati,_.-,e. Approved For Release 2001/0W04 :C1A-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7 d itiatanm.r.Q54. Approved For Release 2001101/9tacitpiRDP80- a Congress Tuins to the CIA Congress,- in its continuing Vietnam-inspired effort to break the Executive's near monopoly a osvers in foreign affairs, is now tac:aling the V Central Intelligence Agency. This is understand- able, and was to be expected, too. The agency's powers are great?or so one suspects; no one representing the public is really in a position to know. Yet because it operates under virtually absolute secrecy, it does not receive even that incomplete measure of public scrutiny which the Defense and State Departments undergo. The proposals in Congress affecting the CIA fall into two categories. Those in the first category start from the premise that the CIA is essentially an operations agency and an ominous one, which Es beyond public control and which must somehow be restrained?for the good of American foreign policy and for the health of the American demo- cratic system alike. So Senator case has introduced legislation to prevent CIA from financing a second country's military operations in a third country (e.g., Thais In -Laos) and to impose on the agency the same [imitations on disposing of "surplus" military materiel as are already imposed on Defense. The thrust of these provisions is to stop the Executive from doing secretly what the Congress has for- bidden it to do openly. Unquestionably they would restrict Executive flexibility, since the government .would have to justify before a body not beholden to it the particular actions it wishes to take. The 'advantage to the Executive would be that the Congress would then have to share responsibility for the actions undertaken. Since these actions involve making war and ensuring the security of Americans, if not preserving their very lives, we cannot see how ?a serious legislature can evade attempts to bring them under proper control. ? Senator McGovern's proposal that all CIA ex- penditures and appropriations should appear in the budget .as a single line item is another matter. lie -argues that taxpayers could then decide whether they wanted to spend more or less on Intelligence than, say, education. We wonder, though, whether a serious judgment on national priorities, or on CIA's value and its needs, can be based on knowing just its budget total. In that figure, critics might have a blunt instrument for polemics but citizens Would not have the fine instrument required for analysis. In the. House, ? Congressman Badillo recently Offered an amendment to confine the 'CIA to . . . ""e"- ? 7?I STATINTL gathering and analyzing intelligence. This is the traditional rallying cry, of those who feel either that the United States has no business running secret operations or that operational duties warp intelligence production. The amendment, , unen- forceable anyway under existing conditions, lost 172 to 46, but floor debate on it did bring out a principal reason why concerned legislators despair of the status quo: Earlier this 'year Hoyse Armed ./ Services chairman Hebert simply abolished the. 10-man CIA oversight subcommittee and arrogated complete responsibility to himself. Congressman Badillo?is now seeking a way to reconstitute the 'subcommittee. This is a useful sequence to keep in mind when the agency's defenders claim, as they regularly do, that CIA already is adequately overseen by the Congress. Between these proposals and Senator Cooper's, however, lies a critical difference. Far from re- garding CIA as an ominous operational agency whose work must be checked, he regards it as an essential and expert intelligence agency whose "conclusions, facts and analyses" ought to be dis- tributed "fully and currently" to the germane committees of Congress as well as to the Executive Branch. He would amend the 'National Security Act to that end. His proposal is, in our view, the most interesting and far-reaching of the lot. To Mr. Cooper, knowledge is not only power but nesponsibility. A former ambassador, he accepts? perhaps a bit too readily--that a large part of national security policy is formulated on the basis of information classified as secret. If the Congress is to fulfill its responsibilities in the conduct of foreign affairs, he says, then it must have available the same information on which the Executive acts ?and not as a matter of discretion or chance but of right. Otherwise Congress will find itself again and again put off by an Executive saying, as was said, for instance, in the ABM fight, "if you only knew what we knew ." Otherwise Congress will forever be running to catch up with Executive trains that have already, left the station. . The Cooper. proposal obviously raises sharp questions of Executive privilege and of Executive - prerogative in foreign policymaking ? to leave aside the issue of keeping classified information secure. But they are questions which a responsible Congress cannot Ignore. We trust the Cooper proposal will .become a vehicle for debating them ?....... in depth?and in public, too. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDp80-01601R001400200001-7 STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001103/04: CIA-RDP80-0161111 COLUMBUS, OHIO ? DISPATCH 1 E ? 223,673 S ? 318,040 JUN. 3 Ian ,? ? versi tit of MERICANS are fully aware government,LT .their like ? every other nation, has an in ...?telligence gathering apparatus and while the whole business ? of spying is inherently evil, it : is necessary. - The primary U.S. spy group F. is called the Central Intelli- gence Agency and it operates pretty much in the dark as it 'seeks to provide its own unique " 'kind of shield ag?ainst any ? -threat to this nation's security. Because of the very nature of the spy business, the CIA ? .. ????' --writes its own rules and laws and they very well may be in -....conflict with -established stat- utes and mores. ,.? - -? _ - . ?? EVEN THOUGH the CIA ?nocessarily must operate in its ?- :- own shadowy sphere, ? it re- quires financing. That comes from the American taxpayer, yet these funds are entirely secret, being seeded here and -there in vaxioUs departments of the federal budget. - . - ? Congress does attempt to maintain some Contact with the ;CIA's doings . through .a Hale- y known Senate watchdog sub- committee established in 1955. 4.? But thiS Panel has met only three times in the last two ? years and not once So far in 1971. A 'RECENT closed door ses- sion of the entire Senate delved into the doing's of. the CIA in . ? Indochina. It was then re- 77. ita vealed the CIA, :using Ameri- can tax money, had been fi- nancing 4,800 mercenaries from Thailand to cross their border and fight Laotian and North Vietnam C orn munist troops in Laos. Sen. Clifford Case of New Jersey is iricensed by the rev- elation, contending this activ- ity is not only a violation of a 1970 congressional ban against . such incursions but is an ex- ample of the CIA "setting ma- joi policy." ? ? ? ? THE INCURSION aspect of the Thai-Laos operation is nothing new on the CIA agenda: Witness history's re- , cording of such places as the Bay of Pigs and. an earlier bit of action in Guatemala. But if the CIA is "setting .1 major policy" by its Indochina program, then ,Americans are faced with .a touchy problem. It well could be a case of one -government agency creating al new "front" in one part of , Indochina while the President is making a concerted effort to:, extract the American presence from another! Vietnam. - ? 1 AN OVERSIGHT of the CIA: is necessary. Its secrecy must: be protected. But it cannot be permitted to "set policy" while: carrying out its intelligence- gathering duties. Policy must be established by duly elected and appointed officials operat- ing clearly in the open. :? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7, STATI NTL ?Appfeved7For-Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160 HOUSTON, TEX. ? CHRONICLE E 2N,Lb 319.n r S ? 333,807 C-11 , BY MILES BENSON &1971, Newhouse News Service :- Washington?When the Sen- t ate barred its doors- Monday and sat down to hear details I of how the United States was ? financing mercereary -Thai ,:troops fighting in Laos, it was - ethe first - most senators had . heard about the operation. I ? But a privileged handful ap- : parently had known all about 1 it for more than a year. They ljust never had told their col- t/ leagues. . !-. This incenses Sen. Clifford I P. Case, R-N.J., who feels his colleagues k e op too many - "major policy" secrets from each other?and from the pub- lic. , ' ? Watchdog Panel .The "insiders" were mem- bers of a little-known subcom- mittee set up in 1955 to act as t,a watchdog over activities of ;- the Central Intelligence Agen- cy. The con4ittee has?fnet ieonly three. times in the last two years. It is the CIA that has been financing 4800 Thai mercenaries?the State De- partment calls them "volun- teers"?in violation of a 1970 congressional ban, critics con- ' ; tend. 1. The secrecy surrounding the f operation was defended by . I Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D- t Wash., who argues that if all the other senators knew of it, it would not have been a se-. ?? I But Case insists such a ma- jor policy move should be public business. Burying Information . And IN .no-t just the CIA committee, Case contends, that is guilty of such "institu- tionalized secrecy." Another special panel operating the same way, he charges, is the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. "Sen. Stuart Symington, D. Mo., for instance, never knew anything about the location of missiles around the world un- til he got on that committee, and he was startled by the in- formation he got," Case de- clared. The AEC committee is giv- en access to classified infor- mation on the location and power of nuclear warheads the United States keeps at the ready around the world. . "The point is that informa- tion on major policy ought to be public information," Case said. "And the public's partic- ipation in these matters, through their representatives in Congress, is the real goal ? we are seeking." ? Prior to the closed Senate session on Laos, Case doubted that even the CIA oversight commitee had been informed of the mercenary operations. .' Case's criticism of the CIA: and AEC committees is count- ered by -.Jackson, who serveS. on _both panels. He says they.: work so well that he wants another one set up to oversee the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation, a proposal he has been ? quietly pushing.. "These committees were set up on the theory that certain 'sensitive things should be on a 'need-to-know' basis," he said. "If you let everybody know, ther is no longer a secret." _ ? ? Case ? challenges the useful- ,.--ness of the CIA commiittee, , saying that it "serves as a : means for burying informa- ? ton rather than bringing it out into the open." - - Asked if the. CIA committee had been informed of the CIA support for Thai mercenaries in Laos, Jackson replied:. "Yes, we were told. They have kept us currently in formed." ? ? The CIA oversight subconi= mittee, chaired by Sen. Johrt Stennis, D-Miss., who also heads the p a r e'n t Sag-67 Armed Service Committees , has yet to meet this year. W 1 last met March 20, 1970. if' also sat Jan. 30, 1970. In 1969 it met only once, on Feb. 21c At each of the three meetingsi: the only witness was CIA Director Richard Helms.- The, committee met twice in 1968 and five times in 1967. "'-'? Besides Stennis and Jack-, son, other members of the committee are Symington, Pe ter' H. Dominick, R-Colo., and. Barry M. Goldwater, ' Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R LOS ANGELES, CAL. HERALD ?EXAMINER E ? 540,793 S 529,466 stet. :e.R, 7 1911 i--i'- r-,1 2ills.\ 011 - U.S.. Sen. Henry M. (Scoop) ackson, D-Wash., has called r a. "watchdog" committee to yersee activities of the Federal :ureau of Investigation to "pro- pet its good name." rnrr 17J - 191 11(`) rl best interests of the American; people and to protect the good, name of the FBI, it would be wise to have a watchdog com- mittee of Congress oversee their, activities." Jackson, mentioned as a pos-1 Jackson said his suggestion in ble presidential hopeful, made ,no way meant he supporttcl or ie proposal yesterday at aldisbelieved charges of improperi 'pl,v.s conference in the Holly- investigationsleveled at the: 'cod Plaza Hotel following a !FBI and its chief, J. Edgar Hoo- Jeeting with 10 Southern Cali- rnia labor leaders. Ile then ei,v to Palm Springs to meet ith other potential backers for presidential bid, although he JR has not announced he will a definite contender for the ,.ernocratic nomination or enter IC new Hampshire primary. "I have great respect for te high degree of professional- an and efficiency of the FBI" lid the former attorney and rosecutor. "In light of the con- ver, .recently by Rep. .Halel Boggs, D-La., and several Detn-; ocratic presidential aspirants. He said he respected Boggs but had seen no proof of his! - charges of illegal wire-tapping. Jackson said he also "has seen: no evidence" that Hoover is too old at 70 to perform his job. Any decision to replace the FBI chief, he said, should be left to President Richard M. Nixon. The watchdog committee, he said, would be similar to the viersy that has arisen, in the 'Joint Appropriations Armed ? 'ervices Watchdog Committee ver the CIA which now audits 'and supeiViies' the Central In- telligence Agency. "The FBI has been a highly efficient organization . . . nev- er involved in any scandal," he said. "The accusation is that they have been too efficient." Jackson also said he would fa- . vor United Nations sea ting . for, both Nationalist and Mainlan China but doubts the issue "cL, i be resolved that easily." ? - ? - - - - ----- --- STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400200001-7 Approved For ReleaiW/26r 461380-01 (7; I, I ' ? 2 ? CS to sT:-...?:2 te":1 v:il'an wal.L-s dosr s c. a (L.:f to all%a 1713 :::.;?anay reztore it to te- 1;,';:an," sr.ys sianct-.:.y. In fact, cne c: c`n!af "E.orrte cia-ys ;: as I c all lit.-1 2 tal procas?.2ation3 11-s to erase tlle. 'Orian I L i',:rortor as a man l'alove ztter v;:lat's mysta.7, lattinz Llr.:111 1-,acret"valy arc ;varl-fi. 0 to ?n-ialta 7.;1; La :-" enc:rals r.nti rjalzi,' on C.; p:.-et2:1:t of "saol-rity," ba:an he is a very v;sr:-.:3 ilt-taly tone of fie in ?r:?. (.0 lunollos Egocerr-ivo 1.-.1.:::zot cuts, 'calla-ace Cr C ICC C e CC-Ca- have all itsC 2 CC1 Ct71 C Ia re:.? near tile ?? > . ? ? ? ? rattr,f; 1 is 1 to 102 lass 1 r.. G`'''2"'"--1' may ta!teIo-prov- 1113 n cr,la 7-To t71cl? cor..-?.-:al.y or at's:active 'beo?a*glse c: t'n0 cr;ao:ty of t"....; 07` AAra 11 C CT :171:T p;_::-trier and genoe ea.anoies to tl:e ? Cratic arld his - princi?alfer-Z_-?.n ta.c;airs in 1,-?T; ? ?ad inter sted e ? _ ?, - ? c..Ly-zrz cz f?1-'7-2r DO-i-i ;tur4y iI"???? . or:ratio --t.titcanay G.2naral. an:-.1 he doesn't try to s...7.)stitute pirtipz, for c?.::::aiersation, that old liss!nz.Jr, are sa'd to Prlacc?o- 3 Cl. ce thnt roma of Alta oona.:',.1n.l.ty :13 arnia:a.i fr.a. tpwn use." to C 12 C C cornplaha th^t at,,33 lar ?, tQ tQ 0: tncst c,:?..;.ez that he 1-1.533 it, Or....sornetl:nez, 0-.1;don--1:.-'n!n2. a vlIth rara :0: o--rn ar-d SCrt :2,11 C: ;i. ea?., c.. to Cr0;44.01:ad a, 001:;:i?-:-.-"?co-c:ed 1.t.e1ins and his city- LIt%.2 ccici or vii7e. in t.7.12 ;^-,0.3:1.2 columns TIOn' to r_lany 1---"-gaz of to nation's int?'%ClQ?lals c1 C0:ess,, to La c:7.;):".?al? ter, Yet, II 18Liyos tLa a;pearar.oe ? ? t'C 3.