(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01826R000100140002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1A6c
Approved For Re arse 2001103/04: CIA-RDP80-01 WR000100140002-8
I will try to list the general grievances and problems which have plagued
our generation, i.e. college '50 - '511,who were recruited at the high tide of
international tension. These, I feel, should be considered and approached in
a positive way by the powers that be if they intend to lessen the attrition
rate. Perhaps steps have already been made in this direction, and if so the
progress, if only partial, should be published to all potential career of-
ficers. This would be a good start in compensating for the lack of career
planning presented to us from the outset., I start out with a chronological
phase break-down of our careers ultimately trying to cite what appear to me
to be the basic evils and a few recommendations. I should emphasize that
the points which I cite as far as grievances and complaints themselves are
concerned do not completely stem from my own experiences but are often the
result of others' experiences with whom I have talked.
I. Recruiting: We were recruited quite superficially in the rush
and tenseness surrounding 1950-51. The interviews could hardly have been
termed same, often contingent upon an affirmative answer to such questions
as are you willing to jump out of an airplane? I think it is safe to say
that outside'of college education, language ability, for the few amongst us
who had it, the recruiter had no true knowledge as to how capable we really
were or into what slot we really fit. At the time we felt that there must
have been other reasons for our recruitment.
II. Post Recruiting Lull: The hopeful expectation of being
greeted with a definite program of training pointing toward a definite
assignment was not met. We often arrived in Washington, having been
Approved.For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01826R000100140002-8
 wApproved For Refuse 200170'3/4': CIA-RDP80-0186R0001,00140002-8
hurried away from other tasks only to face days, weeks, and in some cases
months of sitting in some kind of an isolated pool for flunkies with no
apparent connection to any future assignment. This, of course, did not jibe
at all with the importance which we had been led to believe would be part
and parcel of our assignment in the recruitment stage.
III. Training: After our clearances were completed we finally
got our teeth into some real opportunities for development. Most of the
courses in TRD were very good and most of us ate them up, expecting to be
closely watched and criticized on our activities. This was not possible
with the mass production of the school and few of us got any close assessment.
Those who did receive close attention did not seem to be smarter or in any
higher positions, but only the lucky recipients of some arbitrary division.
(This applies only to TRD.) We left our schooling anxious to get our teeth
into some practical application. Once again many of us sat around (I for one
month) waiting for our departure overseas.
IV. Post Training Lull: Here again prior to our departure, we
felt that at least during this period we might have been given some language
training. Instead, many of us never got beyond some female secretary who
always managed to shunt us off to the library to read books, interesting,
but this was only minutely helpful in overcoming the fact that no one ever
said you have now proven yourself in training and have deserved a chance to
serve in a junior case officer job overseas in this or that capacity. We
waited for the red tape of getting tickets to various parts of the globe,
once more with a glimmer of hope that things would be more organized in the
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01826R000100140002-8
 Approved For Refuse 2001/63304 : CIA-RDP80-01WR000100140002-8
V. Assignment Overseas: Most of us departed for this phase with a
resurgence of hope. We felt that out where the job was being done the con-
fusion and inefficiency couldn't be as bad as we had found it in Washington.
Upon arrival most of us got a rude shock however. The agency personalities
with whom we initially came in contact had no idea who we were, what training
we had been given, or what jobs we were suited for. There was no apparent
coordination from Washington, but then perhaps the latter didn't really
know enough about us to staff any personnel reports. Most of us got jobs
purely on the basis of immediate need, and by this I mean in accordance with
which chiefs had yelled the loudest and hardest and been able to persuade
the people at COM that they really needed bodies for the fulfillment of
their mission. I am speaking now mostly of the OPC side of things. My ex-
periences with OSO during the last year have been much different, but then I
have the distinct feeling that most of the young people who quit were
initially assigned to OPC. After finally having been given a job, many
people still found that they still didn't have a full-day's work. Bosses
often had to rack their brains thinking up things for their young apprentices
to do. They couldn't have let the young man immediately seek other employ-
ment, as this would have lessened the prestige of the chief's position at
headquarters. The younger group of newly-hired in OPC also were greeted
with a fantastic array of over-paid people. People who were running very
poor operations got raises. This in itself is not too bad except when the
ultimate failure of the operation leaves the intellectual honesty and moral
integrity of the top man in question. It is not hard to visualize that the
young man who had been the product of some bureaucratic inefficiency, often
just an organization suffering from growing pains, would look upon the high-
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01826R000100140002-8
 Approved For Release 2001/03/04 CIA-RDP80-01WR000100140002-8
level wage scales of OPC with an added feeling of disgust. Also in OPC the
young man was given a glimpse of incidents where the actual honesty of the
superior was involved, this later became obvious to Headquarters, the man
was reprimanded in the field, but subsequently, we heard, ended up in
Washington with a better job. We saw other instances where the honesty or
good basic judgment of a man was often in question and yet somehow he
managed to get a raise either through connections to some top-level type
in Washington or because he wasable to fill out a fantastic job description
including functions which he wasn't actually doing, i.e. were being per-
formed by some contract employee, or simply based on broad terminology which
actually gave no true picture of the actual job being done in man-hours
and effectiveness.
O 1t*r basic things which discouraged the young man in the field were
the generally poor security and the promotion situation. As far as both of
these problems are concerned, in my opinion, they both need to be solved on
a high level and the base chief or section head in the field can do very
little. The question of semi-covert positions is of course part and parcel
of the cover problem on the whole. We often saw large well-known organiza-
tions housing not only the higher level administrative types, but also many
of those who actually were in relatively sensitive positions. We never saw
nor heard of one example of those few among us who were under deep cover
which indicated that they had been given the sufficient amount of training
or time to actually live their cover jobs, or know enough about them to
avoid being caught up on precise questions. We often were invited to parties
including everything from high-level administrative types to actual case
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01826R000100140002-8
 Approved For Relearse 2001/DW04 : CIA-RDP80-01$a6R000100140002-8
officers from many bases or offices. The concept of compartmentation just
didn't seem to exist when it came to making social sacrifices. None of us
ever saw a really good example of living your cover. There just wasn't the
time to spend on this basic concept.
Many of us have also become discouraged with the general system of pro-
motions. Due to the inordinate wage-scales in OPC and the normal psycology
of security which actually develops in the government, many young people have
acquired the feeling that they must either keep up with the others or get lost
in a whirlpool, or that just because they have been working for a certain
period they are automatically entitled to receive a raise. When raises are
made they are often based too much on age, time in service and not individual
ability. I would be the first to agree that the general scales in the entire
agency with the emphasis on OPC are too high. The way to solve it, however,
and
is not to restrict everyone to some common denominator of age, length of ser-
VI. Return Home: I have no way to judge this except from what I
have heard from those who have gone before. Apparently the reception depends
on the luck in who you see, and. often consists of meeting some Washington
bureaucrat who has no idea of the field per se and doesn't want to learn
anything about it. Apparently the returnee from the field is rarely enthus-
iastically queried about the experience he has gained in the field, etc. Also
the same old routine of waiting and having no real assignment for quite some
time often reappears. Often again, Washington has no idea who the returnee
is, what he has done or is capable of going.
Out of all of this emerges the fact that if the organization wants to
attract young men for a cmcr, they must treat them as career personnel,
with a management program similar to those offered by large companies. We
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01826R000100140002-8
 Approved For Release 2001/03/OAF:brA-RDP80-018 $R000100140002-8
were all asked at the outset if we wanted to make a career of this work. The
answers probably varied terrifically. Those who had their wits about them
undoubtedly gave an indefinite answer due to their lack of knowledge as to
what lay in store for them. Most of them now have become discouraged on a
career basis as they have only heard in vague terms of some career program
which. they are inclined to treat with some degree of skepticism due to other
experiences indicating that the entire outfit is too large and unwieldly to,
even handle promising young men on an individual basis career-wise.
As suggestions I would offer the following. As mentioned before steps
are probably being taken in many of these lines already.
a. Each young organization trainee should be hired only after he
has been thoroughly tested and investigated. This should be done in such a
fashion so as not only to determine whether a person has been a member of com-
munist front organizations, et al, but should attempt to determine a person's
ability to get along with others, analytical thinking prowess, languages and
area ability) willingness to mix for the most part with peoples of foreign
countries and give up the social life he has probably lived in the United
States, determination, ingenuity, and the like. If this were the case,almost
immediately after a person were hired he could be presented wit).i a general
description of his possible future use and, development. He should. be informed
that a few years will be required in doing low-level tasks so as to learn
the business from the ground up. It should be emphasized from the outset,
however, that in each stage of development the young man must meet a certain
standard or else he will be dropped. It is desirable that the young man be
hired on a competitive basis. Many security hazards could be minimized if
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01826R000100140002-8
 Approved For Rel a 2001/03/447. CIA-RDP80-01& R000100140002-8
there were a most careful selection prior to recruitment. It is obvious
today that with the great personnel turnover, the security risk is great,
as with many young people who resign or are dropped there was very little
really known about them prior to hiring and there may be numerous problems
in convincing some of these that they must be quiet about their past
activities. As the career apprentice passes the first few stages of his
development then the factor of being dropped should completely disappear
except in cases of gross carelessness and negligence (by this time the out-
fit should have a pretty fair idea as to whether or not the candidate is
essentially capable of performing his job from the standpoint of basic intel-
ligence.). The element of competition should still be held out to the young
apprentice as a basis for advancing to the higher stages of a career manage-
ment program. The competitive spirit on the whole is lacking for the most
part amongst the younger generation today in the outfit. They were never
approached on this basis.
b. A definite career management program should be made known to
the applicant soon after his recruitment. It seems clear that only the most
fanatically motivated will devote themselves to a career if they have no
general idea where they can expect to be in another 5, 10 or 15 years provid-
ing they prove themselves to be of top-flight caliber. Such a career manage-
ment program should include the following points:
1. A sensible, slow development of the ,young man to become an
expert in the field of operations Each person should be given the opportun-
-------------
ity to get some experience in a cover trade or occupation. If after 10 years
a man knows nothing except the basis of operations, it will not only be
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01826R000100140002-8
 _8_
Approved For Rel5e 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-018R000100140002-8
extremely difficult for him to have any cover, but also difficult for him to
get contacts amongst the important sectors of a foreign population.
2. The prescribed rotation of headquarters & field personnel.
There has never been a good officer in military service, as far as I know,
who has not spent many years with the troops prior to going to the Pentagon,
3. A definite program for bridging the gap between specialist
and executive. A young man should be told and shown exactly how, if he be-
comes one of the top specialists in a particular field, i.e. CE, positive,
ops, or OPC type work, and has the required potential, he will be able to
become station chief, chief of a foreign division,awAd a member of plans staffs.
Something concrete should be held out to him providing once more.,he is one
of the most capable among his particular contemporaries.
c. All efforts should be made to develop a personnel board which
is fully experienced in operations. They would be much more capable of
selecting the proper candidates to begin with. They would be capable of
analyzing critically and perhaps even drawing up the job descriptions of
each overseas station. The fact that the present system allows people to
draw up their own, job descriptions, is not,to my way of thinking)good.
There are too many who jump at the opportunity to build up their own positions.
I don't feel this latter tendency is due primarily to dishonesty, though I
am sure in some cases it is. With the salary pitched at the level it is today
a person feels that he must do something to. keep up with the general t rend,
i.e. OPC types hired at 12's & 13's whereas OSO people with several years of
experience often were hired at 9 or 11. An operationally experienced per-
sonnel board would be much more--capable of deciding what a man is actually
worth.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01826R000100140002-8
 Approved For Release 2001/0310 .: CIA-RDP80-0186R0001 00140002-8
d. With regard to promotions the word of the base chief or recom-
mending party should be taken as final except where a case of empire-
building exists. I assume, however, that gradually empire-builders will no
longer be base or project chiefs. The point I am trying to make is that the
recommending officer has the best idea of the actual value of an employee.
It seems to me that all the higher boards can do is to approve or disapprove
on the basis of age, years in service and the like. This, of course, would
be different were each personnel man operationally experienced and capable
of discussing the problem with the base chief. It is a quick way to snap
incentive if a person knows he can't get a certain grade until he reaches
a certain age, etc.
e. As the young career trainee is sent out to the field or
assigned to Washington desk, each base or delegated section chief should
have as one of his important responsibilities the guided on the job training
of his subordinates. There are good systems of on-the-job training at work
today, but in many instances it just isn't in existence. Many higher officers
simply do not rave either the time, ability or desire or combinations of
these three to devote to the younger man. This must be changed and emphasis
must come from Washington that the development of the young career officer
is important and each chief responsible for fitness reports, must report
on the young man in terms of his future potential. If such phrases as "I
consider this man to be a below-average junior case officer who will be
ready for operations of his own only after several years of basic funda-
mentals", then the reporting officer would be put on the spot as regards
his judgment on younger men. Each person with young career employees under
tko&r control should also be responsible for reporting at set intervals
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01826R000100140002-8
 Approved For Rel a 2001/03/0: CIA-RDPBO-01 8QPR0001 00140002-8
on exactly what steps have been taken to train the young man during that
period. These requirements would emphasize the importance in training younger
men to all hands and would also help preWent inaccurate or intentionally
inaccurate assessments of junior officers by the more experienced superiors.
In conclusion, each man should be called in for conferences on their fit-
ness reports by the reporting officer. Only in this fashion can a young
man learn exactly how he is doing, where he stands, and what mistakes must
be corrected.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01826R000100140002-8