A. T. & T. EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01826R000300060008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: November 21, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

OfnONAI iOAM NO Approved For,jlease 2000/08/16: CIA-RDP80-01826,~O,p0300060008-9
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT .. , ,. wm~
Memorandum
TO : Director of Training
: Chief, Management Training Faculty
DATE: 21 November 1961
SUBJECT: A. T. & T. Executive Development Program
1. The attached material is by no means self-explanatory.
The major unknown is the nature of the relationship between the
A. T. & T. corporate superstructure and the various levels of
organization of the subsidiaries (if they are that).
2. However, four points seem to stand out:
a. The A. T. & T. plan implies a degree of centralized
personnel control which the CIA does not have now.
b.. The Plan seems to be aimed at the problem of a
shortage rather than a surplus of management personnel.
c. The interchangeability of management manpower in
A. T. & T. is almost certainly greater than in the
CIA due to the fact that the former's work is ''more
of a piece."
d. A. T. & T.'s "college recruitment" program is
presumably similar to CIA's JOT program. There is
not enough data in the attached material to make any
meaningful comparison.
3. Centralized Personnel Control
If the attached program operates as the chart specifies,
A. T. & T. top management presumably can, and does, exercise
decisive centralized control over the promotion and assignment of
employees with a "high potential" both at the corporate and the
subsidiary levels. Once a man has risen within the decentralized
operational organization to the point where he becomes visible to
the upper managE:nent (which apparently includes all six levels of
management delineated on the chart), his subsequent training,
development, promotion and assignment are progressively taken out
of local hands and placed in those of top management. Corollary
to this, it must follow that the decentralized components accept
at least a dent in their autonomy by being forced to accept the
decisions of higher authority in the placement of promising executives.
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Translated into Agency terms, a similar management
development program would seem to require that inter-Directorate,
inter-Office, and inter-Divisional transfers or placements would
be made by some equivalent of A. T. & T.'s "General Personnel
Relations Department" (at the DCI level) with the active parti-
cipation of the "State General Manager's " office --- the latter
presumably equivalent to staff functions within the DD/I, DD/P,
and DD/S.
Without pushing this point too far, it seems obvious that
the A. T. & T. plan assumes a management philosophy of centralized
personnel control and decentralized operation that is not easily
applicable, given the CIA's management history and habits. To
put any such plan into effect in the Agency would require fund-
amental changes in our manner of operation, as well as changes
in the formal organization. The fact that the DD/P, DD/S and
DD/I have skill requirements which in some cases are unique to
the Directorate concerned further complicates the problem.
4. Shortage vs. Surplus of Management Personnel
A. T. & T. is, and has been, a growth corporation. One
could assume safely that the Plan would be directed toward re-
cruiting and identifying managerial skills even if it did not
specifically say so. But it does say so. In fact, we gain the
impression from the attached chart that A. T. & T. officials are
continuously combing the records of their "college recruits" and
other personnel to find managers for their 10-15 year projection
of line and staff needs.
Perhaps the CIA should be doing likewise, but as far
as we know, our current problems of budget cut and surplus
personnel make the A. T. & T. "shortage" perspective difficult
to assimilate.
5. In Conclusion
However directly applicable or inapplicable the
A. T. & T. plan might be to the CIA today, there are a number
of organizational lessons we can learn from it. Aro^g these
are (1) the heavy ;.phasis ca early of "high
potential" personnel; (2) the provision at both subsidiary and
corporate levels for "on-the-job coaching, plargied job rotation,
special assignments, formal management courses; in fact every
form of training; (3) the clean responsibility of every level
of management to take action following the identification of
"high potential" personnel, not just for the unit concerned,
but for the over-all organization.
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