Legislative Provisions for the Organization and Structure of Career Service in CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01826R000500140011-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2000
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 8, 1953
• Content Type: MF

OGC HAS REVIEWED.
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Sec~ty Information
$ October 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Legislative Provisions for the Organization
and Structure of Career Service in CIA
1. PROBLEM
To determine what legislative provisions should be sought concerning
the structure of the CIA Career Staff and the. organization of the CIA
Career Service Program.
Note: While the Task Force as a whole supports the general tenor
.of the conclusions of this study, individual members do not necessarily
concur in the various arguments supporting those conclusions.
2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
a. CIA Regulation-equates the Career Staff to the group of
career employees in the Agency, who are defined as one of the two
gronos of Agency employees. the other group being temporary employees.
b. CIA Regulation establishes the over-all policy and' the
organizational structure for administering the Career Service Program
within CIA; it provides for the CIA Career Service Board and for com-
ponent, career service boards, and specifies their membership and
functions.
C, paragraph 12, Minutes of the 8th Meeting, CIA Career Service.
Board records the Board's decision to appoint a legislative task force
to work with the General Counsel and with the. Chairman, CIA Career
Service Board, "in preparing a program of legislation to be presented
to the Second Session of the .,3rd Congress. "
d. Memorandum for Chairman. CIA Career Service Board, from its
Executive Secretary, subject, "Matters Affecting a Legislative Program. "
dated 26 June 1953. lists eighteen topics "which should be considered in
the development of a legislative program" and I. presumed to be the
basis of the Board's action in paragraph l2, Minutes of 8th Meeting.
e. Public Law 724 - 79th Congress, the "Foreign Service Act of 1946. "
states that its objectives are to "develop and strengthen the Foreign
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Service of the United States. " It establishes: a short title, objectives,
and definitions; governing bodies for the direction of the Service; duties
of officers and employees; categories and salaries of personnel; mechanisms
for appointments and assignments of various categories of personnel;
administration of efficiency records, promotions, separations, and
inspections; the Foreign Service Institute; the Foreign.Service retirement
and disability system; allowances and benefits, rules of leaves, and
provisions for medical services; and, among various miscellaneous
provisions, lists prohibitions on members of the Foreign Service and
its employees.
3. DISCUSSION
a. The subject of this staff study is not included specifically in the
list of eighteen topics in the Executive Secretary's tb June memorandum.
The Task Force agreed, however, that this matter, like certain other
topics added. to the -list of eighteen. was too important to be neglected
and properly came within the more general charge to the Task Force in
paragraph 1Z of the Minutes of the Career Service Board's :8th Meeting.
b. The problem of this study seems to resolve itself most appropri-
ately into terms of finding answers to.twoi questions: First, is it
desirable that some sort of, explicit legislative recognition be given to
the CIA Career Service Program? Second, what specific provisions.
if any, of CIA Regulations , or what other provisions 25X1A
of an organisational and structural nature, should be proposed for
inclusion in legislation? The Task Force considers that these questions
are, separable from those of the specific benefits to be sought by
legislation for members of the CIA Career Staff, which are the subjects
of other studies submitted by this Task Force. The question of
legislative statement of specific obligations on CIA employees, though
possibly important in the organisation of career service, is presented
in a separate study.
c. It immediately became clear that no easy answer to these questions
would be forthcoming. The Task Force heard and considered thoughtful
supuort of both affirmative and negative positions on the first question
and discussed various suggestions relative to the second question.
d. On the one hand, it was argued that a career service established
by law gains dignity and substance over a service that is established only
in Agency regulations, and that it fosters a growth of tradition and bs`rit
de corps. It was pointed out that, in addition to the Foreign Service,
ah-er career services, such as the Coast Guard and the
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Public Health Service. derive their basic terms of reference from laws,
and that the Civil Service itself is founded in statute. The logical
conclusion from these arguments would lead to proposals for a law
that, drawing on the Foreign Service Act of 1946 for general guidance
though with the knowledge that many of its provisions themselves or
even its titles would not be appropriate for an intelligence service.
would be somewhat similar to that act in its general tenor and character.
taties, The short title. for example, might well be "The Intelligence
Service Act of l9Sao " A section devoted to intent would have the Congress
declare that the objectives of the act are first, to foster and establish
an Intelligence Service composed of fully qualified people who will
accent an obligation to devote themselves permanently to the needs of
the Intelligence Service of the United States, ' and, further, to insure
the attainment of such other purposes, paralleling those of the Foreign
Service Act. as it seemed wise to enumerate to justify setting up by
law a career service in intelligence. The separate legislative existence
of the Intelligence Service would be stressed by including. in a section
devoted to defining terms in shortened form. the word 'Service' for the
Intelligence Service on the same level as 'Agency' for the Central Intel.
ligence Agency. 'Director' for Director of Central Intelligence, and
any other short forms it seemed well to include. A title. analogous to
Title II of the Foreign Service Act on governing bodies. would outline
the authority of the Director in administering the Service, and might
well include the CIA Career Service Board or provide some other body
analogous to the Board of the Foreign Service. A title on duties would
include the obligation of members of the Intelligence Service to perform
duties at any time, in any place. and under any circumstances, and
list any restrictions. universally applicable to members of the Intel-
ligence Service, that it seemed well to include, to justify the special
benefits later provided. FinaVty, in later titles devoted to retirement,
medical benefits, and the like. the benefits would be stated as applicable
to members of the Intelligence Service rather than to employees of CIA.
e. On the other hand. It was argued that the minimum of legislative
provisions are the least encumbering to sound administration. Particularly
since it is not clear that the CIA Career Staff possesses the common
denominator of similar backgrounds,, professional skills. and interests
that is conspicuous in legislatively established career services, and,
will therefore need less rigid and more easily alterable rules for its
government. It was further argued that the experience of the State
Department -- In internal administration, in public relations, and at
the hands of investigating bodies -- is reason against rather than for a
legislatively established career service separate from the generality of
employees. Finally. it was thought that the proper encouragement for
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legislative establishment of an "Intelligence Service" on the analogy
of the Foreign Service or other services established by legislation.
The logical conclusion from these 'arguments would lead to a law
resembling the CIA Act of 1949 rather than the Foreign Service Act
of 1946. The proposed short title would not contain the words "Intel-
ligence Service" but would be "CIA Employees Act" or "CIA Act of
1954" or the like. If a section on intent is necessary (Public Law 110
has none), that section would have the Congress declare that the
objective of the act is to strengthen and develop the Central Intelligence
Agency by providing conditions and advantages of service proportionate
to special obligations necessarily assumed by employees of the Agency,
and conducive to retention by the Agency of'experienced employees who
will 'make a career of intelligence service. , If a way is found to include
in the law provisions freeing the Director to some degree from restric-
tions due to Veterans' preference laws and other governmental machinery
for Civil Service review, further intent might be stated to provide for
prompt elimination in an equitable manner of employees who fail to
perform as effective members of the Agency. There seems no reason,
however, for the lengthy statement of objectives found in the Foreign
Service Act. Since no "Intelligence Service" is to be set ups the word
"Service" will not need to be included in the list of short forms defined,
and, further, there will be no section providing for the government of
the "Service", There would be no initially proposed title on duties and
obligations, both because of present lack of unanimity as to just what
duties and obligations apply to the entire CIA Career Staff, and because,
even were there present agreement, it seems wiser to reserve the
greatest possible administrative freedom for the Director to meet
changing conditions. It was recognized, however, that a certain amount
of bargaining room may be needed, and a minimum statement of obliga-
tions might later be introduced if discussions with Congreastonal
committees indicated such a section as a desirable counterpar* to the
sections on benefits. And, finally, the later sections on benefits would
make the benefits applicable to CIA employees rather than to members
in, or officers and employees of, the "Intelligence Service",
f. The Task Fore* has finally reached the opinion that the disadvantages
of a legislatively established CIA career intelligence service outweigh
the advantages.
(1) It was not found that any dignity and substance gained by the
legislatively established career service to the :hind of the prospective
employee would benefit the Agency. Much of the substance of the
Foreign service. from the point of view of the applicant, arises from.
4
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oubltc knowledge of its functions and public discussion of its require-
ments, from its system of irritten examinations and from the. schools
set up specifically for the purpose of helping applicants pass these
examinations. In short, it is possible for an interested prospect to
discuss the Foreign'Service with its members and with his friends
and to make, even before taking its examinations. 'a reasonably
intelligent decision as to whether he wants to make it his life's work.
It is doubtful whether sufficient information can be published on many
CIA activities to permit reasonable lifetime decision by an applicant;
for it is very unlikely that the Agency will ever publicly discuss
detailed desired qualifications of its members or ' that unclassified
schools will cram for Agency examinations based on those require-
meats. Therefore, there would be danger that applicants drawn to the
"Intelligence Service" by (ti legislative provisions might be largely
those influenced by security of tenure --? not necessarily the best
motivation for CIA. The type of employee desired could hardly be
expected to make a life-time decision until toward the end of a
rather long provisional period, at which time the legal provisions
establishing the service will probably not be of as great moment as
what he has learned of the administrative direction of the Agency and
the nature of its work.
(Z) it may be granted that, from the point of. view of the employee
of say two.'years standieg' as distinguished from the applicant there
may be some initial satisfaction in belonging to a service specifically
named and authorised by law. But from the Agency's point of view,
the tree bs ritde corps will 'enter in the Agency itself. not in an
association of Agency employees, just .as the spirit of a military
unit, though possibly helped somewhat by the traditions of the unit,
is largely based, on the present state of the unit, its success in battles
in which its members have participated, and its confidence in its
commander, and is an asset to the army because it makes the unit
rather than less, immediately responsive to the will of the
snore
,
commander. CIA employees will wish to continue with the Agency if it
is a good place to work. if it has a record of achievement, if they
see the competent rewarded and the incompetent disappear --- conditions
depending not on legislative provisions but on the administrative skill
with which the Agency. including of course the Agency's own career
service program, is administered.
(3) The specialised nature of CIA operations is considered suffi-
cient to justify proceeding on a path dictated by the Agency's own interests.
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(4) The argument that this Agency should by all. means avoid
seeking' legislation -- with its restrictions on' freedom of adminis-
trative action and possible searching into Agency operations
for any object that can be ' achie vsd without iegislatioa, seems parti-
cularly cogent.
4. CONCLUSIONS
a. The Task Force therefore concludes:
41) The proposed legislation should neither authorize nor mention
any entity such as an "Intelligence Services.
(2) The objecctives of the law, if General. Counsel' thinks. such a
section indicated, should refer to the Central Intelligence Agency
rather than to an Intelligence Service" and should be stated in terms
of strengthening CIA by creating conditions conducive to retention
of exrerienced employees over the long term; and, if as propria*A' in
the light of later sections, conditions favoring the prompt but equitable
elimination of the ineffective;
(3) Since no "Service" is set up, no pro.isions for the government
of such a service will be necessary;
(4) In sections dealing with benefits, benefits should be made
available under prescribed conditions to employees of the Agency
rather than to members of an "Intelligence Service.
b. The Task Force suggests the following tq;cts of pertinent titles as
a drift conveying the intent of the Career Service Board to the General
Counsel's o 4fice:
SHORT TITLE: This act may hie cited as the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1954
DECLARATION OF INTENT: The .Congress hereby declares that
the objectives of this act are to strengthen and develop the Central
Intelligence Agency by providing:
(1) conditions and advantages of service proportionate to the
special obligations necessarily assumed by employees of the
Agency, and conducive to retention by the Agency of ex )erienced
employees who will make a career of intelligence service
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(2) prom-t elimination in an equitable manner of employees
who fail to perform as effective members of the Agency
5, RECOMMENDATIONS
as That the CIA Career Service Board approve the above conclusions,
and secure approval by the Director of Central Intelligence;
b. That the office of the General Counsel be requested to irepare
legislation consistent with the above conclusions;
c. That the Deputy Director (Administration) be requested to ass zzne
over-all responsibility for action.
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