CIA CAREER COUNCIL 40TH MEETING THURSDAY, 7 FEBRUARY 1957 ROOM 154, ADMINISTRATION BUILDING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01826R000800040038-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2002
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: February 7, 1957
• Content Type: MIN

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COPY 1 of 5 COPIES
CIA CAREER COUNCIL
40th Meeting
Thursday, 7 February 1957
Room 154+, Administration Building
Distribution:
Original
- Executive Secretary,
Career Council
- DD/Pers
- General Counsel
- Legislative Counsel
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CIA CAREER COUNCIL
40th Meeting
Thursday, 7 February 1957
Room 154, Administration Building
25X1A9A
Gordon M. Stewart
Director of Personnel
Chairman
Robert Amory, Jr.
Deputy Director (Intelligence)
Member
Acting Deputy Director, Office of Training
Alternate for D/TR, Member
25X1A9A
25X1A9A
25X1A9A
25X1A9A
Acting Chief, FI Staff
Alternate for DD/P, Member
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General
Member
Director of Communications
Member
Lawrence K. White
Deputy Director (Support)
Member
DD Pers PD
Executive Secretary
Office of Personnel
Reporter
Guests
25X1A9A
Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel
Office of General Counsel
Norman S. Paul, Legislative Counsel
rT
1~ AA,
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. . The 40th meeting of the CIA Career Council convened at 3:00 p.m.,
Thursday, 7 February 1957, in Room 154, Administration Building, with Mr. Gordon M.
Stewart presiding . . . .
MR, STEWART: The meeting will please come to order.
The minutes of the last meeting have not been prepared. They will
be circulated before the next meeting along with the minutes of this meeting, and
we will review them at that time.
The only subject before the Career Council this afternoon is the
question of legislation. Mr. Norman Paul will begin with a review of our position
and with the recommendations that he and others working with him have drawn up for
your consideration. Mr. Paul?
MR. PAUL: I think I might present the case by giving a bit of background,
more as a reminder than anything else, and tell you something of the latest devel-
opments, and then move on, at the end of a few minutes' presentation, to the pro-
posals that, at the staff level, at least, we have worked out in consultation with
Mr. Houston.
You will recall we forwarded to the Budget Bureau on the 10th of
December a rather large legislative package which had in it a lot of benefits,
primarily aimed at overseas employees, a few procurement provisions and a few odds
and ends such as raising the ceiling of retired military officers, and a retirement
proposal. The legislation was quite wordy. This was done purposely, as it had been
last year in the bill we introduced to Congress, because it had been decided as a
matter of policy that we ought to seek our own authorities wherever possible and
not simply rely on references to various other bills, such as the Foreign Service
Act, when we sent these forth. There have been two reactions to this that have be-
come related in the sense that I present to you. The first of these was that the
Director when he first went up to see Mr. Vinson, the Chairman of the Armed Services
Committee of the House, this session, mentioned that we after all put some legis-
lation in last year and hoped to do so this year in the hopes Congress would act
this time on it, at which point Mr. Vinson said he hoped that we would avoid legis-
lation if at all possible, and if not possible to completely avoid it to put in as
little as possible. Now just why - he didn't make himself too clear, except that
he seemed to feel that bringing up a large package of legislation for CIA would
simply bring us out onto the floor once more and open it up to all kinds of debate
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which might bring in the joint committees and a lot of other things. The idea is
to keep us off the floor if at all possible. The Director said he agreed with
Mr. Vinson. Mr. Vinson also made a very significant statement, that we should try
to stretch our legislation to the very limit--
MR. HOUSTON: Of existing authorities--
MR. PAUL: Yes. And the Director noted that and said he would do what
he could. Now we haven't seen Senator Russell and discussed this specifically with
him but I think the Director feels, and I certainly feel, that he would probably
go along with that one hundred percent--that the less he would have to do with us
on the floor, the better he would like it. So our instructions from the Director
from that time on have been to try to shave down our legislation and try to limit
it, if we could, and come back to him and suggest what kind of package the Agency
should go forward with. In the meantime we have sent over our larger package to the
Budget Bureau and they have reacted by sending forward to us an unsigned letter
from Philip Young, which, though unsigned, has been checked with Young--he didn't
sign it for the reason he wanted to see if we couldn't work out the difficulties
without getting into a lot of formal exchanges. I think the Budget Bureau goes
along pretty much with the Young proposals. That is one of the tabs in the papers
before you L Tab 2 of the agendaJ. So we have two jobs, the drafting job, and a
very considerable one of seeing whether we need legislation. And also the problem
of dealing with the substantive comments that we have from Young's office.
I think I'd like to just go through very briefly the sense of what
I got out of the Young letter, and those of us who analyzed it, to see what kind
of comments they have given us, and I'd like to deal with everything short of the
retirement provisions at this time and treat that separately at the end of the
meeting, because that is the critical issue before the Council today. It might be
said in summary that all of the other comments in the Young letter, although they
were addressed to the substance I don't think are going to involve us in any real
argument with the Bureau of the Budget or with Young. We are not clear yet on the
coverage which they are going to allow us. They seem at one point in the letter to
be saying, with respect to certain of our provisions, certain of our benefits, such
as the travel expenses of employees and dependents, storage of household effects,
bringing the remains of deceased employees home, etc., should apply anywhere outside
the continental U. S. Well, in this respect they are suggesting a broadening of
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what we are asking for. As to the transportation of automobiles and moving families
and dependents out of dangerous areas., and transportation for education, and one
or two others, they say should be restricted to areas outside of the United States
and the territories and possessions. Now we are not clear on whether they are
going to be willing to leave the trust territories covered yet in those sections.
We certainly recommend to the Council and will to the Director, if you approve,
that we continue to press for this one, because I think we should have it, and they
haven't presented any substantive arguments as to why we shouldn't. fn fact, they
might be saying okay. That is one subject on which we would like this Council's
view. I have assumed you would want us to press for that. Now they have in other
places suggested largely that we consolidate our authorities with those of the For-
eign Service. In other words, instead of repetitious language, to deal with those
provisions of the Foreign Service Act we think we should have, by reference to the
Foreign Service Act. Well this, coincidentally, would fit in with the objective
the Director has given us of shortening our bill, anyway, and none of us can see
why this isn't perfectly feasible f if we say--,7 "as amended" or "as may be amended
hereafter." In one or two places we had tried, if you will recall, to build into
our bill not only everything that was in the Foreign Service Act with respect to
certain benefits, but also everything that we have been able to find in any legis-
lation that has been proposed by the Administration during the last session, whether
or not it passed the Congress. Well, this was duly noted Llaughte7, and in a
couple of quite irrelevant paragraphs the Young office seems to be saying we should
settle down, but they don't like. the Foreign Service Act and their Act is going to
repeal the Foreign Service, particularly on the allowances bill. But what it gets
down to is to stick with the Foreign Service, and what we have asked for over and
beyond what the Foreign Service now has doesn't really amount to much. And if the
Administration goes forward with the allowances bill, which I understand they will,
it will'probably pass and it will take the place of any sections of the Foreign
Service Act anyway, with which it is inconsistent. So I don't think there is any
real problem there. We will just have to negotiate that out with them. I think in
summary that handles their comments, apart from the retirement.
Now on the other parts of the bill which this did not comment on,
such as the procurement section, we are working now on a number of alternative
approaches. To some extent this applies not only to the procurement but also to the
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section 5 benefits, and we would like to get the Council's view on what would be the
preferable of three alternative proposals along these lines, bearing in mind the
Director's instructions to try to cut this down as much as possible. I could take
a whack at it, Larry, but perhaps you would prefer to present that.
MR. HOUSTON: I might again give just a little history. When we first
went up in 1948 there was some debate in the committees as to whether they shouldn't
just pass a general section, which would be the section 10 of our present bill,
which are the very broad, general authorities, without regard to the other provisions
of the law and let us ride on those. But after some debate and after the view of
the Comptroller General had been considered, they decided to put in the specific
authorities which are now contained in section 3, the procurement authorities, and
section 5, the overseas benefits. This has always been a complicating factor. You
never know quite when you are depending on section 10 and when on the specific
authorities, and to some extent both sections 3 and 5 have been outmoded and both
need amendment. If you take Mr. Vinson's statement most literally the logical end
would be to rescind sections 3 and 5 entirely and get an expression of intent from
the committee report, that it was the intent of Congress to use section 10 in its
broad authorities to accomplish all these purposes. We would need a very specific
statement to this effect to get the Comptroller General to go along since he is the
one that wants us to have specific authorities for those administrative purposes
which are not peculiar to this Agency. Whether that is politically feasible is a
question we would like some views on. It is the simplest and most clear-cut
technique.
The second way of approaching it is to amend section 3 and section 5
with fairly simple language--section 3 merely adopting the general authorities of
the Armed Services procurement regulations without exception - they are now just
partially included--and adding a provision for five year availability of funds for
each station development project. This would be fairly short and fairly simple
language and might be acceptable. Again, we have the retirement thing completely
outside of this. It doesn't fit in either of those alternatives.
And the third alternative, as we discussed it, was to go into the
fuller provisions somewhat similar to our original act but incorporating by refer-
ence as much as possible and including those other provisions which are not covered
by section 3 and section 5.
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MR. PAUL: There was one alternative I thought we had discussed--was to
leave the bill completely alone, with all its obsolete and obsolescent authorities
there. This would be, I think, from Vinson's point of view - this would be ideal
because this would not bring the bill out on the floor, but all we would get would
be perhaps a letter from the committee saying, "We want you to use your authorities
and we recognize certain of them are obsolete."
MR. HOUSTON: Or we could address a letter to the committee saying
portions of sections 3 and 5 and possibly others are obsolete or are confusing and
that we intend, therefore, if the Congress approves, to take care of those portions
not presently covered by our legislation by enlarging on the use of section 10, and
if we got a response saying to the Comptroller General that that was now the intent
of Congress--
MR. KIP1 ATRICK: Does a committee resolution constitute the intent of
Congress?
MR. HOUSTON: There was no clear intent in the original deliberations and
the Comptroller General says it wasn`t the intent of Congress, and we are hoping to
overcome that by a committee decision rather than full consideration.
MR. KIRKpATPICK: Say you got this committee to say their intent now is
thus and so, regardless of what the intent of the first Armed Services subcommittee
was, could he not then argue that this is contrary to the intent of the Congress
that passed the legislation?
MR. HOUSTON: He could, and to do it this way would take some careful
deliberations around the back halls.
MR. PAUL: If you want a recommendation--I feel very strongly that if we
go up under either the alternative of leaving the bill alone and getting an ex-
change of letters or through a rescission of the existing authorities of sections
5 and 3 and a statement in the report to the effect that we should use section 10
to the maximum degree possible--I think either one of those might get us into a
real peck of trouble in that in any event, or certainly in the second event, a bill
would have to come onto the floor anyway. If we go up there and get a bill out on
the floor of Congress which rescinds all specific authorities and simply says in
effect the Director can do anything he wants to do, that this would give, in our
opinion, our enemies up there or those who want closer supervision of the Agency,
whether they're enemies or not, a real hook to hang their arguments on - and a
pretty good one.
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MR. KIRKE'ATRICK: You think Vinson's meaning is to keep any bill off the
floor, if possible?
MR. PAUL: If possible. I think he could be persuaded to bring a bill
out but he doesn't want a long bill.
Now it seems to me the other alternative, as Larry described, the
procurement section, which would be vastly shorter than our present proposal or
our present legislation plus the new look on section 5, which is more or less in-
corporated in the draft, in the papers before you today, which cuts down our bill
by some seventeen pages and leaves it two or three double-spaced pages at the most,
that seems to me to be the wiser course, particularly on the assumption that we are
going to go up for some kind of retirement, because that has to be handled, as I
understand it, Larry, that really has to be handled by some kind of legislation
unless you really stretch--maybe you can squeeze that in under your section 10
authorities--
MR. HOUSTON: We don't see how you can get out of provisions for the re-
tirement--not paying any attention to specific requirements, including the re-
quirements for veterans, requirements for reduction--
COLONEL WHITE: Larry, how important do you feel the procurement part of
MR. HOUSTON: There are certain things we are doing now that are certain-
ly technically improper. We have never been called on them. Some of them we are
probably getting away with because we are putting them on unvouchered, even though
they are not necessarily classified items. It doesn't bother me too much, and
normally we would try to do it on vouchered but we can't handle it that way. The
one place where we might get in the worst jam would be on the lack of extending
the availability of funds. We have been doing that in a rather irregular fashion
and gotten away with it so far because we had plenty of money left over from prior
appropriations. And what we do, as an example, if we obligate the full amount in
the first year and then when the three years are up the availability of that appro-
priation lapses--your expenditure, and you are still going ahead with the contract
and making payments and termination--what we are doing is going back and making
available the next available year, etc., and it's completely against the rules.
It doesn't bother me too much, and the Comptroller General knows we are doing it.
But if we ran out of funds we would be in a real jam. So while Logistics wants it
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very much, I don't think the procurement aspects are essentially the point, if
they are the only thing we can go after. But if we take something up I think we
should try for something on that.
COLONEL WHITE: Even retirement? I was trying to disassociate the two.
MR. HOUSTON: If we go up with anything the procurement is probably the
least controversial. It's just following common practice in the last few years in
Government. As you know, the Defense Department has gone almost entirely on "no
year" funds for procurement purposes. So it would be, I think, fairly non-contro-
versial.
COLONEL WHITE: All we are doing is taking certain provisions of law
which are already provided for in the Defense Department.
MR. HOUSTON: If we can justify it. In fact, we would probably do it by
admitting we were doing it anyway.
MR. STEWART: I gather that of the four possibilities for handling procure-
ment benefits that we have eliminated two - one to leave the bill alone and the
other is to ask that paragraphs 3 and 5 be rescinded and then ask for a letter of
intent. Is it the sense of the meeting that these two possibilities are set aside
at this time?
MR. PAUL: I was just giving that as my own view.
MR. STEWART: I think we should try to fix on what general line we're
going to follow, and then we can clean up some of the questions.
MR. HOUSTON: I agree with Norm that while the revision of sections 3 and
5 with a committee report saying we should use section 10 is technically the best,
it probably is loaded also with the most pitfalls - but I don't think we can com-
pletely discard it. I think we ought to try to sound out, certainly - possibly
with the Bureau of the Budget, and depending on Norm.'s and the Boss' judgment,
whether there is any use in talking to anyone on the Hill about it.
MR. STEWART: ,tell, actually if you were to do that then further legis-
lation is not necessary.
MR. HOUSTON: The decision would itself be legislation.
MR. STEWART: We are talking about everything except retirement at this
point, are we not?
MR. PAUL: But you sort of have to have a general assumption you're going
to ask for some retirement provision.
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MR. STEWART: We will debate that later in the meeting, but for those
matters other than retirement the sense of the meeting, then, or your recommenda-
tion,Larry, is that we consider rescinding these provisions and asking for a
statement of intent by the committee and explore that with the Bureau of the
Budget.
MR. HOUSTON: I would like to explore it as far as we can without raising
it to the point that will get it in the light of public debate, because there is
no question technically it is the most satisfactory. It would eliminate this whole
confusion between specific and general authorities and clean up our legislation
very nicely. But I agree with Norman that if someone wants to make trouble on the
unfettered actions of the Agency, that would give them a nice platform to start on.
MR. PAUL: Would you agree to a slight modification of that proposal -
that we try that technique out on the Director? And, also, the alternative of a
much shorter but specific bill which not only rescinds but puts in by reference
or otherwise, the authorities of the other laws? And see which he wants.
MR. KIBKPATRICK: Why not reverse that? Why not prepare your shorter
and more specific bill. Then that is the first thing, with the alternatives then
falling in line, that you will get the statement of intent, if you can, to
straighten out your procurement authorities, and then you can yield to the com-
mittee's Judgment--and we certainly could respect Vinson's views as to what chance
you would have on the floor and what chance there was they would use this bill as
a hinge on which to go after us on a broad front.
MR. HOUSTON: You mean as a technique to get this proposal before them?
MR. KIRKPATRICK: A shortened version of the bill. I think all these
arguments for a shortened version are very sound. I don't know whether you intend
tab 4 as a general idea of what you have in mind, but I think that is fine. Start
with that, and then be prepared to fall back on successive defensive lines if
that one gets pushed aside.
MR. HOUSTON: Let me see if I understand. We propose this shortened
bill and then could use that proposal for the Director somewhere along the line to
ask the committeets consideration of the alternative of revision?
MR. KIRKPATRICK: Right.
MR. HOUSTON-. But just say this is a technical matter of handling--
MR. KIRKPATRICK: If you think its preferable. If you put in the bill
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for everything you certainly can shorten the bill far easier than go up there and
start over again.
MR. HOUSTON: That is a good way to approach it.
COLONEL WHITE: I would think that. would be a good approach.
MR. AMORY: Yes.
MR,.STEWART, Is there a motion that we follow that approach?
MR..KIRKPATRICK: So move.
. . . This motion was then seconded and passed . . .
MR. STEWART: Could I go back and clean up one or two points that you've
raised before we go to the retirement.
You asked whether the Council would agree to fighting for
25X1
25X1A6A
MR. KIRKPATRICK: That is the one most considered.
MR. STEWART: Would someone make a. motion that we either do or do not?
COLONEL WHITE: I move that we do.
MR. AMORY: Query. I know so little about this. On the average how
many staff employees, rather than agents, do we have
25X9A2 COLONEL WHITE: We have about
25X1A9A MR.
25X1A6A
I would say. Isn't that about right?
MR. AMORY: It certainly is necessary de facto. But the minute you
start a broad definition of trust territories then some Congressman has going
through his mind the lovely lush tropical places that may be trust territories now,
and this would cause a racket and get us all out of whack
25X1A6A
etc. Is there any possibility of handling that covertly--I mean, by an internal
regulation that we go along on an ordinary basis and just have an understanding
25X1 A6A that the grade structure for
will be 1-plus and all of that will be handled
in such a way that the guy's retirement would come out the way it would on this
25X1 C4A
25X1A6A
MR. AMORY: I'm not wedded to that, I'm just using it as an illustration.
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MR. KIRKPATRICK: Then you would have
25X1A8A MR' AMORY: What is the justification for our people doing better than
25X1
I have a first cousin who is 25X1A6A
COLONEL WHITE: As I understand it, Phil Young and his boys are support-
ing this.
MR. AMORY: Well, you just have Phil Young. We were asked do we fight
for it? I would say get it if we can but don't jeopardize the rest of the program.
MR. HOUSTON: I think that is in your recommendation.
MR. PAUL: Yes.
MR. AMORY: Okay.
MR. STEWART: There is a motion. Is there a second?
MR. KIRKPATRICK: Second.
. . . This motion was then passed . . .
MR. STEWART: The second point you raised was whether we consolidate
with the Foreign Service, that is, refer to. their provisions instead of quoting
them, as I understand it. Is there a motion on that?
MR. KIRKPATRICK: I move we do.
25X1A9A MR`
. . . This motion was then passed . . .
MR. AMORY: Is it included in that that when you get before the com-
mittees and others that you do the inverse, that appropriate amendment go into
the Foreign Service Act that says, "The following provisions shall apply to
employees of the Central. Intelligence Agency."
MR. HOUSTON: No.
MR. AMORY: What we are doing is linking the two. I realize yours
pushes for a CIA bill that. incorporates the Foreign. Service Act by reference, but
it just could be that when you. get up to the drafting stage somebody would say do
it the other way.
MR. KIRKPATRICK: The Foreign Service wouldn't like that very much.
MR. PAUL: No one would suggest that except possibly the Foreign Affairs.
Committee, and this would get the congressional jurisdiction problem all mixed up.
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I don't think it's likely to happen.
MR. HOUSTON: It couldn't be as simple as one, over-all incorporation.
It would have to be a little like this draft, but it would be a far simpler way -
the present spelling out.
MR. STEWART: Then the third point was that we stay with the Foreign
Service with regard to allowances.
MR, PAUL: Yes. What kinds of things did we stick in there? We threw
in a few very minor items such as temporary quarters allowance, etc., that we had
seen in Administration bills. I urge that we stick with the Foreign Service and
not complicate that because it would mean that we couldn't do them by reference
in the first place; and, secondly, if this is the Administration policy, sooner
or later it's going to be reflected in legislation anyhow.
25X1A9A
Does the Administration have a bill on allowances
MR. PAUL: They are working on one.
25X1A9A
This would apply to all Government employees
MR. PAUL: It rescinded those of the Foreign Service Act and our Act and
made it uniform, and they were, generally speaking, broader than anything that had
been done heretofor.
25X1A9A
If young is right in his letter that the Admini-
stration is going to put in a bill to cover everybody, aren't we in a bad position
to try to get exception that treats us more favorably?
25X1A9A MRi
The Training temporary allowance is being calculated
against the maximum per diem.
MR. PAUL: That is one of those instances where they are in effect criti-
cizing the present legislation that is applicable to the Foreign Service, because
in that respect we took the Foreign Service authorities.
25X1A9A MR. II The Foreign Service has temporary allowances over the
cost of quarters rather than per diem, so if you said you could pay up through
the aggregate of per diem allowable you would establish a ceiling much higher than
what they have been actually getting.
25X1A9A We are hearing this all the time--until their
household goods arrive. I don't recall what they paid for that, but I've heard
squawks they are not getting enough.
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retirement provisions for some of the agency's overseas
positions, it is our opinion that the present proposal is
excessively generous. It is difficult to believe that
all of the overseas CIA employees are subjected to the
degree of tension and hazard described in the section
analysis. It is more likely that many of them are con-
cerned with fact-gathering and subjected to no more
tension or hazard than employees of other agencies station-
ed at the same post who have somewhat similar responsi-
bilities.
"Attention is called to the fact that investigative people
get no extra credit for any part of their service. The
Retirement Act provides that subject to certain conditions,
such employees are permitted to retire at age 50 after 20
years of service at full annuities computed at 2~. Foreign
Service officers likewise are not granted extra credit for
service at posts involving extraordinarily difficult con-
ditions unless they have waived payment of any applicable
post differential in order to obtain such extra credit.
Prior to amendment of the Foreign Service Act by P.L. 22,
84th Congress, Foreign Service Officers were not eligible
for post differentials, but they were granted extra service
credits of 6 months for each year of service at certain
differential posts.-
"As proposed by CIA, its employees who serve abroad would
be entitled both to any applicable post differentials and
extra service credits which would double the actual time
served at extremely difficult posts, and extra credits of
six months for each year of service at any post abroad.
With the increases in the annuity computation rates effect-
ed by P.L. 854, 84th Congress, which now provides that all
service over 10 years be computed at 2%, CIA's proposal
would provide for its employees abroad retirement terms far
more generous than are presently available to any other
group of United States Government employees. This office
cannot support such a proposal, but would suggest that CIA
develop a proposal which would be more nearly comparable to
the provisions applicable to investigative personnel, with-
out provision for extra service credits unless developed
along the lines now applicable to Foreign Service Officers."
Mr. Paul was called from the meeting
MR. KIRKPATRICK: My comment on this--which I will expurgate--the
Civil Service Commission still doesn't know what this Agency does, because there
are too many statements in here that indicate that. In the first place, with
the exception of the relative handful that Bob has overseas, to say our people
are exactly the same as anybody else overseas--my only comment on that is that
they are not doing their job then. As far as "investigative personnel" - perhaps
it was unfortunate that we used that term, but for investigative personnel in
this country shadowing some crook or penetrating the Communist Party - that has
no relationship to our clandestine personnel overseas at all. The stresses and
strains are minor by comparison. My only comment is Civil Service doesn't realize
what we do and they want to put us in the same basket with the rest of the Federal
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Government, and the sooner we get out of that basket the better for our Agency.
MR. AMORY: I don't dispute you, Kirk, but I just don't think you're
going to make a sale,, at such a price as here - where you come out with such a
large cake. There's another piece in the tab here that points out that Foreign
Service Officers by and large pick the bird in hand rather than the bird in the
bush - that they don't waive their post differentials.
MR. KIRKPATRICK: That is for a different reason than why we are proposing
it, really.
MR'AMORY: I have traveled around a good deal and been very cordially
received by DD/P types in various places, but at least a substantial majority of
our people are doing what he says here. I am not talking about DD/I types. The
25X1A6A
liaison boys have no more difficulty than the embassy boys dealing with.
the Board of Trade. They're riding in nice cars and are not doing a thing where
they could be beaten with a rubber hose.
25X1A9A
25X1A9A
So long as they are in
25X1A6A way from. a guy sitting in
25X1
boys? It's a spectrum - you get all the
If you can't
make it for all then you are prejudicing the cases of the really deserving ones.
I think it would be a hell of a job. In other words, even if Phil Young and his
boys, whoever drafted this letter from over there, even if they had ten weeks'
briefing in the Agency, I don't think you would make a sale. That is the only
may
point I am making. Look at the boys that were just beat up in nd 5X1A6A
be thrown out this afternoon - they don't get any differential for service behind
the Iron Curtain, and the implication to naive people is that we are talking about
people in the
have too many of them!
25X1A9A MR.
25X1A8A
I think there is a lot in what Bob Amory says, Kirk.
I think it comes down to a matter of what we can actually get here, and I don't
think we are ever really going to convince the Civil Service Commission on the
appropriateness of this so long as we continue to keep sizeable numbers within
. . . Mr. Paul rejoined the meeting . . .
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L Lt
subway. And unless you guys aren't coming clean, you don't
25X1A6A
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25X1A9A
25X1A6Ao do it--I
25X1A9
A
want this for. We want people overseas, and if you are dealing with a GS-7 or
GS-8 who has to take his family overseas and buy a lot of stuff that he wouldn't
buy here and can't use when he comes back, and if you want him to do this - two
years here and then two years overseas and then two here and then two overseas for
the next 30 years we have to make it sufficiently attractive so that he will want
they're going through a lot of inconveniences, and even living in the best houses
you can get they're never heated above 60. It's a hard life, and I want them.
to be willing to go there and stay there for a long time under those conditions.
MR. And I think the big attractiveness--the situation we
are trying to create is not that a fellow can retire a millionaire in 25 years
but that he will be able to retire in 20 years at a pretty equitable and reason-
able annuity. It's not so much the amounts involved here - the extra payments
that we approve. That is important to us from a career point of view and from an
Agency point of view, especially in the DD/P. We want to feel after 20 years of
good, hard and intensive effort a guy subjected to these stresses and strains can
feel in 20 years, "I've made it and can retire and maybe continue my work in a
contract capacity on a 3, Vii- or 5-hour day." If we can achieve that.
MR. KIRKPATRICK: And the other point is the Agency is going to be faced
more and more each year with a critical over-supply of senior officers, and we
simply have not enough billets around Washington to handle them..
25X1A9A
I
factor on an equitable basis, I think we should consider we have been highly suc-
cessful in the achievement of our objectives.
MR. HOUSTON: That brings up another question of whether you could com-
pel retirement at that point.
25X1A9A
I don't know whether it's just the hazard that we
If we can get what we want in terms of the time
You couldn't unless you further amended the Civil Service
MR. HOUSTON: Except there is one gimmick, which
25X1A9A
has pointed
out, if they are involuntarily separated at that point they go under the Civil
Service retirement, whereas if they voluntarily retire they go under this - which
is a higher annuity. So you just point out the facts of life to them.
MR. STEWART: If they think you can get them on an involuntary retirement.
15
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25X1A9A
in the United States."
25X1A9A mR,
MR. HOUSTON: You can, if you want to set the regulations up that way.
You can always tell them, "There's no job for you
Or if you tell them they're going to be down-graded--
MR. STEWART: The proposal we have here is retirement at 50 years of
age, and I know Rud will want to discuss the various ways you could acquire your
annuity, whether a year and a half or waiting for five years to get it, or at
other rates. We do not have before us at this stage a proposal which will take
care of extra money for the person who is serving in a position which places him
under extra tension. Now you can't categorize that as an "unhealthful" post
unless you're talking in a very special sense because great tension and danger can
occur in places that are otherwise considered to be perfectly healthy and by no
means of a hardship nature. And the breakdowns that we have had so far, that I
have been able to observe, occur quite without relationship to whether it's' a bad
climate or a good climate. There are some cases of just plain getting dysentery
because of too much of this or that, but we have had breakdowns of people else-
where, and quite understandably. I have been very much perplexed about legislat-
ing for that type of tension or that type of wearing down of an individual. I
just don't think it is possible in a bill to categorize certain positions that
will automatically gain you certain types of benefits. I can't see it. I can't
see that we can list the post or anything else. I think the Agency should very
seriously consider some type of review or position analysis which would permit us
at the conclusion of a person's tour in a place that has cost him a fairly heavy
toll, some benefit that we could then give him either in the way of a bonus or an
award or something that would be within the Director's authorities and would be
equitable. I think there is a need for that. I have seen enough cases to convince
me it would be a great thing for morale. If we insist that a man, for example,
because he is a key.man stay in a really miserable post for a period up to 8 or 10
years--we have carried some people a rather long time in rather difficult positions--
then I think we should be in a position to reward him for having done that.
MR. KIRKPATRICK: I agree but I think on this business of hardship posts
that as far as this Agency is concerned it isn't necessarily the climate or the
living conditions; for instance,
25X1A6A
25X1A9A
was a hardship post.
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It sort of averages out. We don't keep them there anything like five years. The
longest I've had a man in one place is four years. You just know you are going
to get a bad post and a good post, and it will average out over a career. It
does in the military.
NEA, where a good part of the stations are located in that one area.
25X1A9A
25X1A9A
MR.
25X1A9A MR,
They are already getting a differential.
But you have certain geographic components, such as
I am not arguing the point, but that is what makes it
tough. If you get an Arabic-speaking fellow then it's hard career-wise to say we
can afford the luxury of taking this rare jewel and sending him down to the other
end of WH for rest and relaxation, because you need him too urgently.
MR. STEWART: I visited yesterday a man who just spent the last six
years in
25X1A6A
and he is pretty badly shot up from the pressure of work.
MR. KIRKPATRICK: And the tension of being in a danger area.
25X1A9A MR.
And what is dangerous for CIA is different for the Foreign
Service because of association with the clandestine apparatus.
25X1A6A
MR. STEWART: 60 or 70% of our people in
I lare not under tension.
25X1A6A
MR. KIRKPATRICK: But every one of our people in is exposed to
possibly kidnapping or something else.
MR. AMORY: Again, aren't there a lot of CIC civilians. I have a sneak-
ing suspicion that is what Phil Young has in mind, rather than local shadows and
schmoos.
25X1
MR. KIRKPATRICK: CIC civilians - don't they have military privileges,
most of them?
25X1A9A MR I am quite sure they do. They carry military identi-
fication.
MR. KIRKPATRICK: So I think Young is thinking more of the civilian
components. But I get the sense of this meeting to be "let's get after accelerated
retirement and forget accelerated cash."'
COLONEL WHITE: I think as a practical matter that we have got about as
much chance as the proverbial snowball of getting something into a bill which will
satisfy, as Gordon said, this need, but recognizing that it is there - maybe there
is some other way to solve it.
MR. PAUL: Use your lOb authorities.
: We have a formula here which actually comes within 2% of
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the Foreign Service no matter how you calculate it. In one extreme it is 98%
of the Foreign Service annuity; in the other case it's 102%.
MR.AMORY: What was the reason for not using the Foreign Service itself?
25X1A9A MR,
Because we are for all practical purposes coming to the
Foreign Service concept through this device or "gimmick" if you want to call it
that--the Foreign Service has identified a group of Foreign Service Officers who
have to serve overseas. That is not true of CIA, and as a matter of policy we
have decided not to identify such a group, because all of our secretaries, our
drivers, our finance people, are in our Career Service. We have identified this
new group by saying five years overseas constitutes the group we are talking about;
therefore a person who has served five years overseas has in fact demonstrated he
is a career overseas type, whether he's a Commo man or a few cases of the DD/I
or a few more in the DDS or the many in the Clandestine Services. We have used
that to identify the group we are talking about. Then we say, "All right, we
will apply a special retirement to this group which has identified itself as being
overseas type." The formula which we have computed here, and this comes out of
our discussion at your staff meeting yesterday f indicating Colonel White, and
that is formula G. These are for these six types of service and four types of
levels, and so on - these come within 2% of what the Foreign Service would be
according to their formula. In other words, if you compare formula A, which is
in the agenda, with formula G, you will get a direct comparison between the Foreign
Service annuity dollar figure and the proposal which we are making. Now in A to G
throughout this whole array of figures the percentage differences range from 98%
on the one hand to 102% on the other. We have therefore met the Civil Service
Commission and Bureau of the Budget's position that we previously have asked for
something excessively generous. We have not now asked for anything excessively
generous because we are right on the nose with the Foreign Service. We have not
asked, and we don't propose - and I personally don't recommend the differential
for a hardship or unhealthful post for the simple reason that it is ineffective
as long as you give the option and nobody is going to, I believe--over the dead
body of the Bureau of the Budget are they going to let us have both. I personally
believe it's an "eat your cake and have it" to persist in both, and I think it
jeopardizes the entire program to continue to persist in both.
25X1A9A MR.
Was it stated anywhere that you intend to eliminate the
post differential?
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r?o Nw
MR. PAUL: We get the post differential with our analogy with the
Foreign Service. What we have eliminated is this two years for one, which was
the way we had put it, but they said that's "have your cake and eat it." But as
I understand it, the Foreign Service people all take the post differential.
25X1A9A MR.
The way it works now at a 25~o differential post--
MR. AMORY: $10,000 versus $400 a year. That is 25 annual payments,
and if you discount value, you would have to be more than 90 years old to show
a profit on that.
25X1A9A MR.
But if you take the cash and invest it yourself you
can get a better rate than that.
25X1A9A MR.
So that election has become completely ineffective. The
unhealthful post provision dates from 1900. At that time the Foreign Service did
not have the opportunity of a post differential. The minute the Foreign Service
was given the opportunity of electing it [P.L. 22, 84th Congress, 19557, they
all swung away from the unhealthful post provision and they took the post differ-
ential except for one or two people because of a particular tax angle. This in-
formation comes from the retirement people in the State Department.
25X1A9A MR.
ltd like to raise one point and that is
with respect
to the five-year minimum requirement for overseas people for eligibility under
this program. Was that figure arrived at as a result of a particular study or
more or less arbitrarily chosen as being a proper and equitable figure in relation
to DD/P statistics?
MR. PAUL: Its a lesser figure than the Bureau people suggested last
25X1A9A
They offered us nine or ten years. It's somewhat of a
"blue sky" figure. In other words, since the Clandestine Services are only nine
and a half years old, you can't tell how many years a person is going to serve,
but estimations of the frequency and succession of tours up to this point lead us
to believe that five years is a good threshhold to start with, and it also is
sufficiently long to say with some justification that we have identified an over-
seas man because he has had at least two tours overseas.
MR. AMORY: And then you go back--if he serves five years and one month
overseas he counts the whole works.
25X1A9A MR.
Four years and 9 months and he gets nothing; at five years
and one month he picks it all up.
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Nowe
the meeting, which was one and a half--
25X1A9A MR.
G. Column D in the vertical chart here is the original proposal which we presented
yesterday to the DD/S staff meeting. As a result of the discussion there we com-
puted columns E, F and G. For example, E is 111 years' credit for each of all
years overseas but it's creditable only after you have served five. Now in a
dollar comparison you will see that that is pretty excessively generous. For
example, compare the very bottom figure of column E with the very bottom figure
of column A and you will see that the CIA man would get $2,275 more than the
Foreign Service Officer. In other words, it's about 20% more than the Foreign
Service gets. That is what I consider the Civil Service and the Bureau of the
Budget to be calling "excessively generous" - and I don't believe there is a ghost
of a chance of that kind of formula being approved. I think we have to be on tar-
get as far as the Foreign Service is concerned to have even equitable consideration
of the formula.
MR. PAUL: But taking E as against D, doesn't D have certain advantages--
MR. HOUSTON: The point was D only credits overseas service after five
years and therefore does better for the fellow who stays over a long time.
2 5X1A9A MR. 1I: That is right. There are greater swings. For example,
MR. PAUL: Have you discussed this other alternative that we tried before
That is shown in the comparison between column and column
the percentage relationship between A, Foreign Service, and D - I- after 5 ranges
from 98% to 107% - the swing is greater depending on the number of years' service.
At 10 years service, the bottom figure, you see that D and G are the same. This
puts a higher premium on longer overseas service.
MR. PAUL: Over 10 years D would start overtaking--
25X1A9A
That is right.
MR. STEWART: You have to figure you are going to have cases up to 15
and 20 years, too, in the long run.
MR. HOUSTON: So we thought consideration ought to,be given to that
aspect of D and encouraging the long service overseas and not letting someone
just fill out their five years to get in the group and not want to serve overseas
anymore.
COLONEL WHITE: It may be worth thinking about in view of the Bureau of
the Budget's suggestion last year that we take 10 years or 9 years, or something
20
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like that. I like this proposal myself for a minimum of 5 years and 20 years'
service, including that 5 years, but they may look at it the other way around--
25X1A9A MR. PAUL: They may look at it just the opposite, though, Red. Isn't
this your theory, that when you get up to the 20-year limit
you are really way above the Foreign Service at that point.
25X1A9A MRS
Yes, you would be too high at that point. They will say
this is excessively generous for these people.
MR. PAUL: I think it would be. I don't know.
25X1A9A MR.
Column G, which is the one and one-quarter for all over-
seas is the most equitable, in my opinion, and that is. the one which comes closest
to the Foreign Service in every situation that we have so far calculated. It
ranges from 98% under to 1020 over in only two cases. I mean, in one case there
is only $35.00 difference between ours and the Foreign Service, according to the
formula. That is Roman II, bottom figure - it's $7560 in Foreign Service and
$7525 in CIA's plan G.
COLONEL WHITE: Rud, may I ask you one question, in this way: Does this
mean that a man with 20 years' service, five of which was served overseas, at age
50 could retire with the same annuity that another individual, age 60, who had
less than five years' overseas service would get? Is that not right?
25X1A9A MR. Well, you can compare column B - column B is the Civil
Service retirement, and until you have five years' service everybody would retire
according to column B. Now let me see if we can answer your question from this
table - age 60, 30 years' service, 8 years overseas - the overseas doesn't count
in column. B, so the man in column B with 30 years' service gets $7875. We don't
have it here for 30 years' service.
MR. HOUSTON: Including 20 years' service at 50, with 6 overseas, he
gets.$5L95.
25X1A9A MR. II He has ten more years' service so he gets a higher annuity.
He hasn't put in any time overseas.
COLONEL WHITE: That answers my question.
MR. AMORY: One point you ought to make in all arguments with. these guys
is that this table doesn't go close to the salaries at which many successful State
Department heads will retire. Many of them will get $27,500, and we can assume
our chiefs of station will go out at the top of Civil Service or a hair above that.
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Rome
So in talking about incentive to make a career in CIA or in the State Department--
one of my friends figured out if he could get an Embassy he could retire at 51
for $17,000 a year.
MR. PAUL: A career ambassador's top salary is $27,500. I thought his
retirement was computed on the basis of his service with the Civil Service.
MR. KIRKPATRICK: I think a five star General's maximum retirement is
$19,000. I don't think there is a higher retirement.
25X1A9A MR. 0 The Foreign Service is limited to 70% of their maximum
salary. It can't be more than 70%. But that means he has to have 35 years of
service to give him 70%, which is the maximum that he can retire on.
MR. HOUSTON: That is another reason for not incorporating the Foreign
Service retirement.
MR. AMORY: But 60%, which he gets up to fairly easy - for 30 years of
service. A guy comes in at 22 and retires at 52, having been an ambassador - like
Bohlen - at a first class post, gets 60% of $25,000 or $15,000 a year, which is a
base pay, which isn't bad.
MR. PAUL: For the highest five consecutive years of service--
MR. KIRKPATRICK: That is true of the Civil Service, too.
MR.
25X1A9A
That is the high five.
There's another important angle, I believe, which our formula
accommodates, and that is the suggestion, or the invitation, let's say, of the
Bureau of the Budget and the Civil Service Commission to consider the investi-
gative retirement formula. Now there is attached under tab 3, Note B - CIVIL
SERVICE RETIREMENT, paragraph 6 (readingJ:
"A special provision, very similar to the basic
formula for the Foreign Service, is available
for law-enforcement employees . ?
Now it is important, I believe, to realize what we mean when we are talking about
this. "Investigative employees" is a term which is used rather loosely. The law
enforcement provision of the Civil Service Act--and if we were granted this pro-
vision our provisions in the Civil Service Act would have the same kind of status
as the special provision for law enforcement employees, as I see it--age 50 or
over, 20 years of service, but actual service in a position as described for at
least one year preceding retirement. That is a very rough and very unsatisfactory
kind of provision, becaube that means that law enforcement employees scratch for
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fiL
getting assigned to an actual law enforcement job in their last year of service,
because unless they do that they are not eligible for this retirement. But the
legislative history back of this, although I don't want to apply it to law en-
forcement I think it is important in what we are talking about--I would like to
read this to you, and it's quite brief freadingJ:
"The legislative history of this provision shows that
its purpose is to allow the earlier retirement of
certain employees whose duties are primarily the in-
vestigation, apprehension, or detention of persons
suspected or convicted of offenses against the
criminal laws of the United States who, because of
the physical requirements of their positions and the
hazardous activities involved, are no longer capable
of carrying on efficiently."
Now that is not what we are after but the important point is that the legislative
history shows it is to permit the early retirement.
It then goes on JreadingJ:
"Their replacement by younger men would improve the
service."
That is what we are talking about, that replacement by younger men would improve
the service. And then it goes on, and this is important rreadingJ:
"A more generous method of computing the amount of
annuity is provided, not as a special reward for the
type of service involved, but rather because a more
liberal formula is usually necessary to make the
earlier retirement (with resultant shorter service)
economically possible."
Z -Federal Personnel Manual
R-5-36
Approved October 29, 19567
In other words, it's a purely pragmatic thing, that they are not rewarding a
law enforcement employee for his service but they are giving him more because if
they don't give him more money he can't afford to retire. That is what we are
talking about, too. If we want early retirement we have to give more, otherwise
they are not going to volunteer to retire, and the retirement has to be voluntary,
as I understand it. That perhaps might bring us to this statement which we
discussed yesterday at your indicating Colonel WhiteJ staff meeting: What is
the objective you are after? And I have a wording here which may be on target
and maybe it is way off: "The objective of the retirement system for CIA is to
improve the service by providing persons who serve extensively overseas with CIA
special retirement benefits in terms of an economically feasible annuity upon
retirement at an age earlier than normal for most Government employees." We are
asking for retirement at an age earlier than normal for most Government employees
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ILA
for those who serve overseas, and in order to do that we are providing an econ-
omically feasible annuity. I think that is our objective - I'm not sure, but as
I understand it that is the objective, and. those are the three essential elements:
(a) earlier retirement than normal for most by reason of overseas service, (b)
having been identified as a part of an overseas group, and (c) in order to make
it possible on a purely pragmatic basis rather than as a. reward for overseas
service - an economically feasible annuity, which comes about through a more gen-
erous formula. That is exactly what was done by Congress for law enforcement
employees, and therefore those principles apply to what we want, which is early
retirement in order to improve the service.
MR. PAUL.: Isn't it also in our case, in part, at least, a reward?
25X1A9A
It may be but that is not our objective.
COLONEL WHITE: My feeling is that this is a more saleable objective,
even though we may be looking for some intangibles that Gordon talked about.
I think if we approach it as a. pragmatic thing rather than
a desire to reward, it is more saleable.
COLONEL WHITE: Because right away they would say, "Well, they think
they are different from everybody else."
25X1A9A
We are doing it to improve the service, solely, and in
order to improve the service we are giving a more generous annuity because by
giving a more generous annuity we persuade more people to volunteer to retire at
an early age.
MR. HOUSTON: That was the rationale used in that bill and it might be
for ours. As a matter of fact, though, the agencies that have this use it as a
recruiting incentive and as a statement of reward for tough service.
25X1A9A MR.
We certainly could once we had it, but I don't believe we
should say that is why we wanted it.
MR. HOUSTON: But you will be a little two-faced about it. That is what
MR. STEWART: The Army uses 20 years' service as a recruitment incentive
and their purpose of the 20 years is obviously to keep it a young service. I see
no conflict there.
MR. HOUSTON: No. It's consistent.
MR. STEWARTt I would like to possibly take up the various issues raised
24
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now in the retirement provisions and see if we can arrive at some decisions. First,
as to the number of years to be served in order to earn an accelerated retirement
rate. Is 5 years accepted, as a starting point?
MR. AMORY: I'm just turning over in my mind - yes, but in view of what
the Bureau of the Budget said last year we might hold this in reserve - five years
or one-third of total service, whichever is greater. In other words, I am a
little worried about their looking at a guy who has only had five years, who came
in in his 20's and has basically been a bureaucrat in Washington for 25 years, and
he comes up to retire on his 60th birthday. Does he deserve any premium? We want
a guy who is typified--you put it very well a half hour ago - this is the kind of
guy who is basically an overseas servant--if a guy joins us at 48 and does five
years and retires at 59 or 60, and if his career with us has been substantially
overseas. I am not asking you to change this on the record but I would suggest it
to whoever may be negotiating further on this.
MR..KIRKPATRICK: I think that is all right.
25X1A9A MR. May I make this suggestion--this is a negotiable point -
we can withdraw on a year by year basis - 6, 7 or 8--all it means is that a man
has to serve seven years before he gets any of this acceleration but it doesntt
change the formula.
MR. HOUSTON: Five years or a percentage of service--
25X1A9A MR.
If we do it on a percentage of service it makes the
computations more qualified.
MR. AMORY: Once he met the standard then your computation--
25X1A9A MR. But it would be six and two-thirds anyway, because 20 is
minimum. Isn't that what you mean? If it's five years then you have automatically
moved up to six and two-thirds.
MR. AMORY: Then I would suggest our conceding--pointing to 7 years
and from there on 7 years or 25%, rather than adding absolute figures.
25X1A9A
I wonder if I could point out a flaw? If you take a
percentage of total time - for instance, one-third, you may have a man in his 50's
who has just the minimum percentage of years to allow him to retire under the
special benefit, but if he stays another year he would lose it, and you may want
him to stay for another year.
MR. STEWART: A very good point.
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25X1A9A
25X1A9A
Of course, underlying all of this - if the Director says,
"I need you and I'm not going to let you retire" - that will be the end of it.
This is not a right to retire.
MR. AMORY: But if the Director didn't let him retire then this man would
suffer a severe financial penalty.
25X1A9A MR,
Using five years as a point of departure and then
falling back to six, seven, eight, if possible. To hold it in line somewhere,
if possible, I think is practical.
25X1A9A
fi
ve and L ine, which is the bargain-
ing year.
MR. STEWART: I think one of the things we have to face is the compo-
sition of the population of the Agency that we have now and the population which
we will have at some future time. Using nine years it would be perfectly satis-
factory if we were getting legislation ten years from now when you have established
a lot of people who are overseas types and had their nine years or ten years, or
whatever it is, and you're doing them a. favor. What we want to do now is to set
up a basis for retirement at 50 for a gopd number of people who are now in the
Agency and a fair number of whom probably would not get nine or ten years over-
seas between now and age 50. What we want is permissive retirement. They may
not want so much money but they may want to retire, get a decent annuity, and go
on to doing something else.
25X1A9A
25X1A9A
This will be the bulk of my people who would be
The five years counts from September, 192+7, and does
not take into account the time spent prior to 1921-7.
MR. STEWART: I would try for five years now, and I don't know whether
you would write in the piece of legislation that the Director at his option may
increase that rate at some future time. It may be desirable at some future time--
25X1A9A
No less than five years, at the discretion of the
MR. AMORY: I think that would gum up your selling possibility. A lot
of people would say, "Just when I have this all set then the groundrules are
changed." I think that would be quite unequitable.
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MR. STEWART: I think it would be, yes.
25X1A9A MR,
I keep losing sight of and keep needling myself to come
back to the important thing, which I think is true, that we have a present age
and grade and service work force but ten years from now that picture is going to
be quite different because we grew by a large amount of lateral entry, and now
we grow by bringing people in at the bottom - so ten years from now our average
age and grade and total overseas service is going to be very different from the
way it is now in the Clandestine Services. It won't be any different in the DD/I
and DDS as far as overseas' service is concerned, to any great extent whatsoever.
This is primarily a problem of Commo and the Clandestine Services.
25X1A9A
One of the problems, I will have people who will
figure on doing two tours probably overseas while they are young and they don't
mind going overseas, but when they get older they don't want to. I need an in-
centive that will keep them going overseas, and this will do it. A man wants to
get five years and he will go again and get six, and by that time I've got him.
If you can get them to do three tours, they're in then and will want to stay then.
25X1A9A MR-
This will give you better competition with the
electronics people on the outside, too, because you are going to be a lot closer
to what they're offering on the outside.
25X1A9A
six years.
rule.
The thing that appeals to me is five years or
I don't think it should be more than that. We ought to stick to that
MR. STEWART: Well, five years actually amounts to two long military
tours, two State Department tours, or three short military tours. I think it's
a fair enough figure.
MR. PAUL: Then let's try for that and stick to it pretty hard, and
leave it up to the Director if he wants to do anymore.
MR. STEWART: The second point is, then, do we pay the first five years?
Do we make this retroactive under the system - E, F and G?
MR. AMORY: I will move G as the preferred form.
COLONEL WHITE: Second.
. . . This motion was then passed . . .
MR. STEWART: I think that does it.
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'"Ok
MR. HOUSTON: I have some further question. Supposing we get up, under
one of our proposals or another, before the committee or in preliminary discussions
and Vinson or Russell, or whoever we're talking to, says that they will give us a
letter of intent to go ahead under section 10 and they will give some indication
to the Comptroller General but "don't bring up any retirement." How important
is retirement? Would we be willing--
MR. KIRKPATRICK: Yes, sir: For a bad Congress - to go up if they say
not to come up--because theytre aching to get a big crack at us.
MR. PAUL: I think the Director would react instantaneously on that.
25X1A9A
0
We have very. little to lose by postponing the retirement,
really, because if it's retroactive to 19+7 the only persons who are going to lose
are those who retire between. now and the enactment of the bill.
MR. KIRKPATRICK: If it was last year, I would say push it, but this
year I would say if our friends up there - Vinson and Russell - want us to stay
off that subject, that we will pull out immediately, because there are a couple of
laddies up there waiting for a. good peg to hang us on.
MR. AMORY: Just to show them we really want this could we say we are
perfectly willing to let this sit in committee for the first session?
MR. KIRKPATRICK: No sir,. Bob, I wouldn't even let it get printed, be-
cause all you're going to need is to get it up and some parliamentarian--we don't
have enough friends to keep it bottled up.
MR. HOUSTON: We can convince them of that since retirement could be
retroactive.
MR. KIRKPATRICK: Last year I wouldn't have hesitated a minute to get it
out on the floor because I thought. we were safe from any threat of investigation.
This year it isn't so.
MR. PAUL: We kept in our bill, at General Cabell's behest, the raising
of the ceiling on military officers from 15 to 35. Actually we have cleared through
everybody, including, in principle, the Director--and I hope I'm not misquoting--
to leave it out. As I recall at the last meeting here it was decided there was
no need to go for it, particularly if this was liable to set the committee against
has indicated he isn't particularly interested in pushing for this.
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MR. PAUL: Is the Council's position still as it was before?
MR. AMORY: I'd like to keep it in or at least have another crack at
the Director about it. I have five different cases of guys from my side of the
house who served on military detail with us--Hutch, for example--who has now
gone back to the Air Force and is doing intelligence work in the Far Eastern
command, and he's going to retire at his earliest opportunity - and he would be
a terrific asset. We are going to get a lot of guys who are essentially, morally
CIA converts but can't afford, wisely and financially, not to run out their
string in the military service. Secondly, we get reports all the time from war
college people, both from down here and up in the service ones, that CIA is so
much better than the old one was that a hell of a lot of guys would like to work
with us. We are going to pick up occasionally guys that are intelligence trained.
These are not misfits or want in because they were buddy-buddy with some guy in
the office.
MR. KIRKPATRICK: Then leave it in and if the committee starts to ob-
ject, yield on it.
MR. AMORY: I'd hate to see it thrown out in the front office here be-
cause at the moment somebody doesn't see a pressing need for it.
COLONEL WHITE: General Cabell's feeling was just that this ought to
be put in, and if at any time we saw it was jeopardizing anything, that we could
then withdraw. And the other thing I would say is that I think on the results of
this meeting we ought to brief the Director and General Cabell as quickly as we
can, before we go back to the Bureau of the Budget, to make sure we have their
support, and at that time all of this will be presented to the Director.
MR. STEWART: Do we have to have 35?
MR.,KIRKPATRICK: Take any number you want.
MR. HOUSTON: This is an interesting thought: NSA is proposing in
their legislation the authority to hire retired officers who have served with NSA.
COLONEL WHITE: Didn't the 35 come from the Hoover Commission's recom-
mendations?
MR. KIRKPATRICK: They weren't specific.
25X1A9A MR.
Does the Director get any comfort from the fact that
if he is hit by an old crony he can sit back and say, "Gentlemen, Itd love to do
it but I'm full up to the limit right now. The law says 15 and I've got 15 and
that is it."
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MR. STEWART. I think 25 is a much better number than 35, speaking for
MR. KIRKPATRICK: I think Larry's comment on the NSA proposal might be
studied a little more.
MR. HOUSTON: Something along that line. We might think of some wording.
COLONEL WHITE: How about your IAC people? Would that exclude your
IAC people unless they had actually served with the Agency?
MR. AMORY: It probably is so easy to get around that. If you want a
guy just arrange for him to be recalled to active duty, and just post him to us
for a year.
25X1A9A MR. Couldn't you get around this if you had to by having a man
assigned to us for one day? He had served with us.
MR. STEWART: I think if we want them I'd like to have the thing say
we want them without limitation, and have our own groundrules as to how to pick
them up. I would prefer to hold the number down to 25 rather than 35 simply be-
cause if you get 35 and that gets around there will be a lot of fellows lining up.
MR. KIRKPATRICK: They already are.
COLONEL WHITE: I'd like to say just one other word on that, that des-
pite Bob's plea here, generally speaking I think this is something we are putting
in more or less because we felt we had to put it in but we werentt going to bleed
and die over it. So I see no sense in watering it down or restricting it to
enhance the chance of getting it through.
MR. KIRKPATRICK: But Gordon, the Director of Personnel, is going to
have to live with this thing.
25X1A9A
COLONEL WHITE: Yes, sir.
MR. AMORY: But isn't it true, actually, that we have fudged in a sense?
I think our No. 3 guy in
shop is retained on active duty and assigned
to us far beyond his time. We can clean up some of these phoney jobs now where
he is ordered to duty from retirement from the Army, and work with us. If you're
worried about being able to fill those up, we can convert several people like so
f indicated by snapping finger s_7 - so you can say I've only a handful.
MR. STEWART: I think we could say 25, but I can't honestly see that we
have 35 positions.
COLONEL WHITE: We can never say at any time during the history of the
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Agency that we haven't had an adequate number of positions to take care of our
MR.. AMORY: No, that is not true. I lost two excellent guys in the
NIS program. I had to work it out with General Partridge and it took a week
once, because you wouldn't take the guy aboard on a PL 15.
MR, PAUL: I'd like to add to Colonel White's suggestion that we ought
to talk this over with General Cabell and the Director before we talk to the
Bureau.
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MR. STEWART: If there is no further business, the meeting is adjourned.
. . . The meeting adjourned at 4:40 p.m. . . .
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