PERSONNEL OFFICE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01826R001100010024-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2000
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: July 27, 1953
• Content Type: MEMO

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 Approved For Rele a 2001/09/04 1826R00100
itcurl y ONFIDE,
27 July 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK,
INSPECTOR GENERAL, CIA
SUBJECT : Personnel Office
REFERENCE : Your "Eyes Only" Memorandum, subject
as above, dated 1 July 1953
1. My comments are based upon the following standards of personnel
administration:
a. A commander or employer must have a constant interest in
his personnel and they must feel that their interests are being pro-
tected. Each echelon of command (or responsibility) must have,
therefore, a "father" of personnel.
b. Simple and uniform procedures, administered with a view to
helping the individual, are necessary to maintain high morale, attract
and hold good people, and thus increase the efficiency of the Agency.
Organizational Relationships
2. I am impressed by the virtual absence of close relationship between
the members of the Clandestine Services and those of the Personnel Office
upon whom they depend for support. This situation, of course, is aggra-
vated by the security barrier. The "operators" are reluctant to give suffi-
cient detail, and this tends to undermine any sympathetic attitude in the
Personnel Office. The principal contacts between the two are conducted on
a low level.
3. This is not the fault of either side, but results from the organiza-
tional position and location of the all inclusive Personnel Office. Whereas
the entire Clandestine Services organization from DD/P on down is really
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a field operating organization and could be located outside of the Washington
area, the Personnel Office and other segments of CIA are largely depart-
mental elements. As DD/P has the responsibilities of a field commander,
he should have his own thoroughly integrated administrative set-up for all
personnel under his control. During CIA's early days, there were two per-
sonnel offices. The rationalization for the present arrangement is that,
since the Clandestine Services headquarters is in Washington and since the
Agency must have a departmental Personnel Office in Washington, it saves
bodies to combine the two in one. However, it divorces authority over
personnel matters from responsibility for accomplishing the mission.
4. You will recall that, prior to the merger of the Clandestine Serv-
ices, OSO and OPC had personnel staffs to exercise supervision over per-
sonnel which were necessary attributes of ADSO's and ADPC's responsibili-
ties. I have the impression that when General Smith made his decision on
merger he envisaged a comparable staff element in the Office of the new
Chief of Administration under DD/P (although I am aware that the record
supports neither this thesis nor the antithesis). Such a staff would have
bridged the gap between the personnel offices and the operators. This would
not have been a duplication but a very necessary staff service. However,
this staff was never organized and the then existing personnel staff of OPC
was transferred to the Central Personnel Office. This resulted in the com-
mander (DD/P) losing control of his operating personnel to an administrative
element under another commander (DD/A).
5. If the present organizational arrangement is to obtain, an effort
must be made to integrate the Personnel Office with the operators much
more fully than at present. The Chief of Personnel Division, Covert, should
be recognized as a de facto member of the DD/P staff and should regularly
meet with DD/P, CAO, and with the several career service boards within
the DD/P complex. A similar relationship should be effected with the Senior
Staff Chiefs, Area Division and Branch Chiefs. People are our most impor-
tant asset. They must have a feeling of participation and a sense of well-
being based upon the realization that their immediate chief is safeguarding
their interests.
Career Service Program
6. While I am not qualified to comment in detail on the Career Service
Program or the varying requirements ' h have resulted in the system
described I am impressed by the impersonal
nature of this system. Here is a group of interlocking boards each with
their own criteria and standards with partially rotating membership upon
which employees
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which employees must depend for many of the personnel services on which
morale and efficiency are dependent. It therefore seems to me that in this
program the personnel administration responsibilities of the various levels
of command in the organization are being abdicated to a machinery which
cannot give the morale of employees the necessary support. It is suggested
that the Clandestine Services have only one board appointed by and respons-
ible to DD/P, and he should have final authority in each case subject only to
DCI authority.
7. In general, CIA follows the policy issued by the Civil Service Com-
mission regulating the maintenance and contents of personnel files. By
reason of the sensitivity of its work, CIA is permitted considerable latitude
in handling these records. Recently, however, the Department of State has
been criticized for the inefficiency and insecurity of its personnel filing
system, and a responsible officer was directed by Congress to take immedi-
ate remedial action. CIA might find itself vulnerable to similar criticism
if too many custodians and systems are established and if the sensitive per-
sonnel material is susceptible to removal or is open to wide examination.
This Agency should therefore favor the maintenance of one set of files along
Civil Service requirement lines. These files should be open to the examina-
tion by supervisors or others requiring them for examination in connection
with efficiency ratings, transfers, promotions, or routine matters consistent
with Civil Service policy.
8. CIA maintains a second set of files, however, in the Office of Inspec-
tion and Security. By law these files cannot be exposed to wide examination
by reason of their classifications (CIA) and the restrictions placed upon them
by the FBI. The control on these files is excellent, and it seems logical to
allow the Personnel Office to open a subsidiary ("Administrative") section in
connection with each security file. This section would contain any derogatory
information which would affect the subject's appointment, transfer, or pro-
motion. Since a personnel action is required for each change of status, the
"Administrative" section of the security files would be referred to in connec-
tion with each action.
Pipeline Mechanism
9. The attached chart was part of a study prepared two years ago by
members of the Administration and Logistics Staff in OPC. This study
pointed out the fact that the personnel pipeline was too small to permit
bringing the staff up to its T/O level; that under then existing procedures,
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three months were required for prospect-search and discussion, another
three months were required for clearing and recruiting processing time,
and that an additional one to four months were required for post-employment
training and/or adjustment to the job; that the existing T/O slots had been
spread all the way back through these pipeline processes, including six
months during which the employees were not even on board; that this situa-
tion was aggravated by a high degree of attrition, including attrition while
people were in the pipeline; and that under these conditions the organization
could never reach T/O strength. The recommended solution was either a
pipeline T/O to cover people in process but not yet effectively at work, or
the authorization of a given percentage over-strength. As far as I know, no
further action was taken on this problem and we have recently seen Con-
gressional action to freeze our strength at the number on board as of a
given date, even though that number was approximately - people short
of our T/O. I believe it is the responsibility of the Personnel Office to re-
study this whole matter and to establish appropriate pipeline machinery to
prevent future recurrences of this situation.
10. Also lacking is provision for establishment of the reserves in
terms of personnel which CIA would be committed to supply in the event of
hot war. The Unconventional Annex to the Joint Outline Emergency War
Plan and the Command Relationship provisions therein make it clear that
this would be a commitment far beyond the capabilities of CIA's present
personnel machinery. I am submitting specific recommendations on this
point, however, through appropriate channels.
Individuals Engaged in Personnel Matters
11. In the PPC Staff, Administrative Officer,
GS-9, is the only member of the PPC Staff who spends a considerable por-
tion of her time on personnel matter
ief, Planning & Program
Coordination Staff
Attachment:
Chart
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