INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY OF THE CAREER TRAINING PROGRAM APRIL 1967

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01826R001100080007-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 102
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 1, 1967
• Content Type: STUDY

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INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
OF THE
CAREER TRAINING PROGRAM
APRIL 1967
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I
Introduction 1
II
Summary 3
III
History and Scope of the Program 6
IV
Discussion 8
A.
Regulations
B.
Costs
C.
CT Staff 11
D.
Requirements and Recruiting 17
E.
Screening and Selection
F.
Cover and Security
G.
Entering on Duty and Interim Assignments 49
H.
T raining
(Table of Contents appears on Page 52 i)
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a truism that the success of this Agency in meeting
its responsibilities to the U.S. Government depends on the
caliber and dedication of the Agency's employees. The im-
portance of the role of the Career Training (CT) Program in
supplying these employees cannot be overstressed. The CT
Program, since it was founded in 1950, has entered on duty
1648 CTs, of whom 1144 were on duty at the end of December
1966. The purpose of the Inspector General's Survey of the
Career Training Program in the Office of Training (OTR) is
to evaluate in depth.the effectiveness of the program in meeting
the Agency's needs for selecting, training and placing junior
professional officers.
This in-depth study of the CT Program is the first
undertaken since a survey made in 1956 when the program was
then only five years old. The 1956 survey stated that the
Director of Training had done an excellent job of establishing
the program and that the trainees had .proven to be outstanding
employees. Previous IG surveys which have touched on the
CT Program are:
a. CIA Career Service, 1959
b. CIA Training Program, 1960
c. Office of Personnel, 1964
This survey is limited to the CT Program, but since a
major portion of OTR's training effort is spent on training
CTs, we interviewed employees in most of the offices and
staffs of OTR both in Headquarters and
ME This included interviews with all members of the
CT Staf R ,heads of schools and faculties, many instructors,
and with personnel concerned with processing and screening.
of applicants for the program in the Office of Medical Services,
Office of Personnel and the Office of Security. We also visited
recruiters in the field and talked with former recruiters.
During the training phase of our survey we reviewed
course objectives, schedules and syllabuses, sat through
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class lectures and seminar discussions in Headquarters and
. We also read critiques of
courses prepare by instructors and CTs and reviewed various
proposals to revise the content of some of the courses.
We interviewed about 100 CTs and former CTs to get
their reaction to training, placement and career develop-
ment. This included interviews with CTs in the current
training cycle, CTs attached to operating components for
on-the-job training, and former CTs who have had significant
experiences in the Directorates of Intelligence, Support and
Plans.
To get management's reaction to the training of CTs
and to the caliber of CTs provided by the CT Program, we
interviewed senior officers in all of the directorates.
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The Directorate of Intelligence
as area, stall and ivision chiefs. In the Office of National
Estimates four are GS-15 estimates officers. In the Direc-
torate of Science and Technology one is an office director.
Within the next five to ten years the movement of CTs into
senior positions should proceed rapidly.
Senior operating officials in the Agency's components
interviewed by the CT team, were almost unanimous in
stating that they were pleased with the caliber and perform-
ance of CTs assigned to them. During our own interviews
with CTs we, too, were impressed with their generally high
caliber and motivation.
Of the four major elements of the CT Program--
recruitment, selection, training and placement--the one
most critical to the success of the program is selection.
Selection is carried out in a highly commendable manner in
the Office of Training by the CT Staff which selects CTs
through file reviews and interviews with applicants in Head-
quarters. The CT Staff also performs well in placing CTs
in operating components after they have finished their training.
The CT Program since its beginning in 1950 has
recruited, selected, trained and placed junior professional
officers of high quality in all directorates and independent
offices. As of January 1967 there were 824 CTs assigned
to Agency components and an additional 320 in the training
program. Many CTs have moved into senior A enc osi-
tions. _ The Clandestine Services has several
Of the major CT Program elements, the one currently
most in need of improvement is training. The training pro-
gram is repetitive and much longer than necessary to meet
the requirements of operating components. CTs being trained
for the Directorates of Intelligence and Support are in training
for five to six months. CTs being trained for the Clandestine
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Although a good job is being done in the initial place-
ment of CTs in the operating components, monitoring career
development of CTs, particularly during their early work
years in the Directorate of Intelligence and in the Clandestine
Services, can be improved.
The original philosophy of the CT Program was to pro-
duce a small number of highly qualified young intelligence
officers. That concept still prevails; however, the program
has reached a stage in its development such that the original
philosophy may no longer be appropriate. Enrollment in the
program has expanded far beyond that of the early years, and
there is a developing body of opinion that the CT Program
should be the major source of young professionals to meet
the future needs of the Agency.
As a result of the CT Staff's effective operation and its
excellent working relationship with the Office of Personnel,
whose recruiters do a good job of identifying candidates for
the program, we believe that the CT Program should remain
the responsibility of the Office of Training rather than be
moved to the Office of Personnel, as has been considered in
the past.
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III. HISTORY AND SCOPE OF THE CT PROGRAM
The Career Training (CT) Program, first known as
the Junior Officer Training (JOT) Program, was established
in the Office of Training in November 1950 to select, train
and place in Agency components suitable young men and
women for careers with CIA. Recruitment was made the
responsibility of the Office of Personnel, which still retains
this function. In 1965 the name of the program was changed
to the Career Training Program.
General Walter Bedell Smith, DCI when the program
was established, strongly influenced its original concept,
which was to recruit and train junior career officers who
would compose an "Elite Corps" for the eventual filling of
top-level executive positions in the Agency. The "Elite
Corps" concept created serious problems in personnel
management. Many CTs thought of themselves as superior
to other Agency professionals with resulting resentment on
the part of other professionals and supervisors. In recent
years the "Elite Corps" concept has been dropped. It is
now recognized that many CTs will not get beyond mid-
management positions. This has led to a healthier outlook
by CTs and to a more ready acceptance of them throughout
the Agency.
Until 1958 the CTs took some courses in common,
but in general the training was by assignment of the individual
CT to a specific course considered necessary to his career.
In 1958 there was established a standard basic curriculum
which would be required for all CTs.
The careful screening and selection process, basic
to the original program, is still in effect. It results in
mature trainees with diversified backgrounds. The average
CT is in his mid to late 20s, has completed military ser-
vice, and has a bachelor's or master's degree. About half
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Training today as in the early 1950s consists of formal
training courses and on'-'the-job training. The total training
period has increased appreciably over the training of the
early 1950s. Today CTs headed for the Directorate of Intel-
ligence and the Support Services are in training for five to
six months; CTs for the Clandestine Services are trained for
Throughout the history of the program, the
Clandestine Services have taken the largest number of CTs.
As of August 1955, there were 85 CTs in the Clandestine
Services; 43 in the Directorate of Intelligence; and I1 in the
Support Services. At. the end of 1966 there were 593 CTs in
the Clandestine Services; 140 in the Directorate of Intelligence;
and 66 in the Support Services.
Today the CT Program is one of the major avenues of
entering professional employees into the Agency. In 1966,
201 CTs began formal training. The CT Program now has
a ceiling of 225 CTs per year plus an additional 50 per year
for two years for assignment to This is 25X1A
in contrast to the early years of Re program w Zen only
small numbers of CTs were recruited. For the first five
years the average was about 45 per year and by the end of
1955 only 231 CTs had joined the Agency. The success of the
program led to an increased ceiling, and by 1959 a total of
556 CTs had been recruited. By the end of 1966 there were
1144 CTs and former CTs in the Agency.
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A. Regulations
The basic authority for the operation of the Career
Training Program is -. This regulation, last
revised in November 1963, is currently undergoing revision.
In general this regulation provides adequate authority to
OTR and the participating directorates for the operation
of the program.
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Based on cost figures provided by the Office of Train-
ing (OTR) and the Office of Planning, Programming and
Budgeting, we believe that a reasonably accurate estimate
of the cost of operating the CT Program in FY 1967 is
$6.3 million. OTR's total budget is In our
cost estimate of $6.3 million we have included CT salaries,
CT interview and EOD travel, and salaries of the CT Staff,
which total about $2.8 million. Costs of recruiting, security
and medical processing are about $330 thousand.
rated CT share of the $4.4 million operating cost
ing effort is
cost of training is $21,000.
total cost of the program by
The pro-
of the
and the
This is based on
of the -rain-
As a result, CT man-year
This is derived by dividing the
-estimated man years of
CT training in FY 1967. Costs will remain
FY 1968.
comparable for
We have not attempted to include in these estimates
prorated costs of OTR management and other Headquarters
costs, such as salaries of instructors in the Intelligence
School, School of International Communism, and the Opera-
tions School and the travel and salaries of guest lecturers
and instructors provided by operating components. Neither
The training cycle of CTs Preparing for the Clandestine
Services has been extended
- This raises the cost of training a CT for the Clandes-
tine Services from $31, 500 to a range of $38, 000 to $40, 000.
This extension of training was at the direction of the DDP.
It adds certain extra courses and language instruction to the
existing training cycle. The Bureau of the Budget in infor-
mal discussions with the Office of Planning, Programming
and Budgeting suggested that the Agency should absorb the
additional cost incurred for language training under the pro-
posed two-year cycle. We understand that OTR will continue
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as in the past to assign CTs to rolls of the Clandestine Ser-
vices at the and the Clandestine Services
will absorb the cost of additional language training.
Our concern during this survey has not been with the
cost of the program but with the end product, namely the CT,
and the effectiveness of the training. Our findings have
shown that CTs by the end of their training, particularly
those headed for the Clandestine Services, are suffering
from training fatigue, and we have recommended in our
section on Training that the program be shortened appreciably.
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C. CT Staff
The Career Training Staff is the administrative core
of the Career Training (CT) Program. It consists of the
chief, eight Program Officers, and five clerical employees.
A Personnel Unit, attached to the staff, consists of two
personnel officers, a personnel assistant and two clerical
employees. In exercising its principal function, the selec-
tion of CTs for the program, the staff is doing extremely
well. This is a reflection of the dedication and conscien-
tiousness of the staff and its chief. The CT Program
Officers spend about half of their time on the selection pro-
cess as described in detail under the section on Selection.
Each Program Officer is also responsible for from
40 to 60 CTs who are in various stages of the training
cycle. In carrying out this responsibility, Program Officers
must perform the following functions:
Brief new CTs on the training program and
their career in the Agency.
Arrange interim assignments for CTs who
E OD before a class begins.
Arrange the 14 weeks of desk training for CTs
being trained for the Clandestine Services.
Prepare biographic profiles of CTs to assist
in placement.
Prepare over-all training evaluations of CTs.
Arrange trial attachments to operating
components after formal training is completed.
Monitor progress of CTs during training and
during their trial attachments prior to per-
manent assignment to a component.
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Maintain satisfactory working relationships
with other elements of the Agency in pro-
cessing and placing CTs.
Counsel CTs on careers.
Recommend CTs for promotions.
Handle problem cases which include cover
problems, automobile accidents and poor
performance in training.
Process internal applicants. One Program
Officer spends most of his time in processing
on-duty junior officers (internal) who apply
for the program from within the Agency.
We determined the duties of the Program Officers
from fitness reports and from personal interviews with all
of the Program Officers. We also reviewed the Position
Description U-885 for Program Officers. This statement,
originally prepared in 1962 and updated in 1966, needs a
complete revision. It contains material that is no longer
accurate. It states, for example, that "Training is pro-
vided through utilization of CIA and other government
schools, civilian colleges and universities and situational
work assignments both within the U.S. and overseas."
Assignments to non-CIA educational facilities and to over-
seas posts while in training are rare. The Position Des-
cription also refers to a function that no longer exists,
the tailoring of separate training programs to meet the needs
of individual CTs.
It is recommended that: No. 1
The Deputy Director for Support instruct
the Director of Personnel to prepare an up-to-
date Position Description to reflect accurately
the current duties of the Program Officers.
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We believe that the Program Officers are perform-
ing most of their assigned functions in the same competent
manner that they select CTs for the program. The one
exception is counseling. Many CTs complained to us that
there was too little counseling and the counseling they
received was of poor caliber. Our research showed that
CTs are not alone in their need for counseling or career
guidance. Today, industry finds that guidance counseling
is desired, needed and expected by its trainees not only
in the training phase but also during the early years of
work careers.
In reviewing the counseling program we found that
one of the main reasons for inadequate counseling is the
many administrative duties which the Program Officers
must perform simply to keep the program operating.
Individual Program Officers regard counseling as still
theoretically a function of the CT Program, but in day to
day operations they treat it as a luxury.that they can spend
little time on.
We see no easy solutions to improving the counseling
or career guidance function, but we have several sugges-
tions which may be helpful. These suggestions are directed
at lightening the administrative load of the staff, in broaden-
ing the general Agency background of the staff, and in re-
emphasizing the need for counseling.
To lighten the administrative workload, we suggest
that the CT Staff consider streamlining its present pro-
cedure for placing CTs in the Directorate of., Intelligence.
Program Officers now deal directly with desk officers and
administrative officers in OCI and other components of the
Intelligence Directorate. This is extremely time consuming.
The placement function would be more effective if Program
Officers dealt only with the Administrative Staff of the DDI,
which could then assume the responsibility of placing CTs
in its components as well as ONE.
In our section on Training we recommend that the
four-week Operations Familiarization Course be reduced
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and combined with an all-purpose familiarization course
to be held in Headquarters. This would eliminate the obli-
gation of the Program Officers
to counsel CTs during the running of
the OFC. Becaui3e of transportation problems, these trips
take at least two days,. wasting one day in travel.
Program Officers are also expected to remain in
contact with CTs being trained for.the Clandestine Services
in the Operations Course and 25X1A
- We believe that the workload of the Program Officers
could be greatly lightened if the instructors at_were 25X1A
given more responsibility for counseling CTs. This would
not come as a complete innovation, because each instructor
is already responsible for counseling two CTs during their
training - The counseling, however, is limited to
subjects related to the CTs' courses. This limitation on the
instructors' counseling is a throwback to the early 1950s
when CT training at )egan and when the small number
of CTs in the program permitted close contact between CTs
and Program Officers even during the CTs' training at_ 25X1A
With the increased numbers of CTs, this close contact is
no longer possible and we believe the instructors at_ 25X1A
can help fill the gap between CT and Program Officer by
playing a greater role in counseling. The instructors,
however, will have to be briefed thoroughly by the CT
Staff on the administrative details of the program so that
they do not in their counseling inadvertently mislead CTs
on placement and other important procedures.
The counseling function would be greatly improved by
the earlier identification of CTs for the directorate to
which they will ultimately be assigned. We believe the CT
Staff can accomplish this through information on the CTs
already available to them. This information includes the
CTs academic background, military and work experience,
findings of the Assessment and Evaluation Staff, test scores,
recruiter's interview, Program Officers' interviewing,
personal contact since the CT joined the Agency, and the
CT's personal inclination. Much of the CTs' dissatisfaction
with counseling is a result of unanswered questions on their
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future assignments during the initial three months of training.
It is not until this period is over, the end of the OFC, that
the CT Staff and offices of operating components select the
directorate for which the CT will be trained.
As mentioned earlier, the Program Officers, who
range in age from 35 to 59 and in grade from GS-13 to GS-15,
do extremely well in selecting candidates for the CT Program.
But their capability to counsel on career guidance is limited
by their Agency backgrounds which, on the whole, are not
broad enough to permit discussions with CTs in depth on
Agency operations. The Program Officers are weak in repre-
sentation from intelligence production offices and from opera-
ting components of the Clandestine Services. Of the three
Clandestine Services representatives, two have served only
in Headquarters staff and service functions and the third
has had no field experience since World War II. Of the
three officers with backgrounds in the Directorate of Intel-
ligence, only one has had experience in a production office.
We believe the staff needs an infusion of Program Officers
with recent intelligence production experience and field case
officer experience. Such additions to the staff would be
even more effective if an ex-CT with meaningful experience
in the Directorate of Intelligence or the Clandestine Services
could be included. There is a former CT serving on the
CT Staff now, but his career in the Agency has been spent
entirely in OTR.
The Chief of Operational Services in the Clandestine
Services has recommended to the DDP the establishment
on his staff of counselors for CTs and other professional
officers. This would ease the counseling load of the Pro-
gram Officers. To avoid conflict with the CT Staff, the
counseling would have to be carefully coordinated with the
CT's assigned Program Officer until the CT is permanently
assigned to an operating component.
There is also evidence that one or two of the Program
Officers are disinterested in counseling CTs. In addition
to CTs who commented on this, one of the CT Program
Officers told us that he felt CTs looked on the CT Staff
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as an administrative group not interested in career dis-
cussions with CTs. This attitude can be improved by
increased emphasis placed on counseling.
It is recommended that: No. 2
The Deputy Director for Support instruct
the Director of Training to improve CT counsel-
ing to include:
a. Placement of CTs for the
Directorate of Intelligence through the
Administrative Staff of that directorate.
b. Enlarging responsibilit for
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c. Earlier identification of CTs
to the directorate where they will ulti-
mately be assigned.
d. Addition to CT Staff of former
CTs with recent experience in operating
components.
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D. Requirements and Recruiting
states that "to be eligible for the Junior
Officer Training Program a candidate must have a college
education or, in the case of on-duty personnel, its equiva-
lent in experience.... The candidate must also be qualified
to undertake assignments of any degree of sensitivity and
be medically qualified for full duty/general." Beyond
this there are no specific written qualifications for a CT.
In the search for high caliber junior officer personnel,
certain general guidelines are followed, both at the Head-
quarters selection level and at the recruiter level where
recommendations are made for candidates for the CT
Program. The applicant must be of above average intel-
lectual capacity with a good academic record in college,
have a strong motivation for public service, and be flexible
enough to adapt to the varying requirements of Agency
service. It is preferred that the applicant has completed
his military obligation, although in a limited number of
cases military service may be sponsored by the Agency.
There alre no fixed age limits. Although the program is
generally seeking candidates between 24 and 30 years of
age, candidates at ages of 21 and 35 have entered the
program.
Recruiters told us that they find these general guide-
lines to be adequate for recruiting CTs. Based on our
personal observation of CTs during our interviews and on
management's favorable reaction to CTs, we see no need
for additional written requirements.
In quantity the CT Program is meeting the current
Agency requirements for CTs. The quotas for FY 1965
and 1966 were as follows:
Clandestine Services
90
Support Ser.vicefi
55
Directorate of Intelligence
55
Directorate of Science and Technology
10
Office of the Director
10
Contingencies and Attrition
5
Total
225
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Assignments to directorates fluctuate somewhat from class
to class, but in any given year directorates usually receive
their quotas. In FY 1965, 218 CTs entered on duty; and in
FY 1966, 210 entered on duty. The FY 1967 and FY 1968 quotas
have been established at 275 for these two years with 50 CTs
earmarked each year for the Program.
The Chief of the CT Staff expects to mee the Y 1967 quotas,
but because of the decreased numbers of applicant files
received from July to December 1966, he is worried about
FY 1968.
It should be emphasized that the quota of 225 CTs per
year is only adequate to meet current requirements. The
225 quota was increased from 150 in 1964 as a result of the
identification by the Office of Personnel of the "valley after
the lump" which will occur in the 1970s when many officers
now in their 50s will retire under existing Agency policy.
But as CTs have been recruited and trained under the new
quota, operating components have used them as replace-
ments to fill vacancies created by the departure of profes-
sional employees. Thus the increased 4uota is having little
impact on the personnel shortage anticipated for the 1970s.
Even with a greatly increased quota. for CTs, the CT
Program will not enter on duty the majority of professional
employees in any given year. Other channels for specialists
and junior professionals will have to be used. In Calendar
Year 1966, for example, professionals
who entered on duty were CTs. Of the many
were professionals in categories normally not, considered for
the CT Program. Some were technicians and scientists for
NPIC and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Others
were junior analysts for OCR and Records Integration Division.
CTs enter the Agency via the following three prime
channels:
a. Field recruiters
b. Internal Agency applicants
c.. Write-ins, Agency referrals, walk-ins
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In the October 1966 class of 75 CTs, there were 16 internal
candidates, 49 CTs from recruiters, and ten write-ins or
Agency referrals.
As with the class of October 1966, recruiters usually
account for 50% to 60% of the CTs in any given class. It is
our view that the 17 recruiters, who range in grade from
GS-12 to GS-15, are doing an excellent job of recruiting for
the CT Program. It should be noted that recruiters spend
only 20% of their time in recruiting CTs. They also recruit
clerical help, communications employees, scientists,
economists, and professionals for other Agency components.
We heard criticisms in Headquarters that many field
recruiters lack Agency experience other than recruiting.
As a result, they are unable to discuss with authority the
workings of the Agency with applicants. Also, this line of
criticism continues, recruiters become frustrated because
they do not understand .the time involved in processing appli-
cant files in Headquarters.
It is true that most recruiters have limited Agency
experience. Several of them entered on duty in 1951 and
have been assigned only to recruiting since then. But we
are not convinced that this seriously detracts from their
effectiveness as recruiters. It might be useful for the
recruiters to have a broader knowledge of the Agency, but
we do not consider it essential to the success of their efforts.
The usual campus interview is limited to one-half hour, just
time to allow the recruiter to give a minimal statement
about the Agency, to explain the filling in of forms, and to
chat briefly with the applicant. Non-campus interviews
follow a similar pattern. Thus, broader knowledge of intel-
ligence would not necessarily improve recruiting techniques,
but it could contribute to higher morale for the recruiters.
Since high morale is important to their recruitment
approach, we discuss below some ideas for broadening the
recruiters' scope and for keeping them current with Head-
quarters developments. We also find there is a need to
keep recruiters up to date on personnel procedures and the
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mechanics of paper handling, so that they will be aware of
the time element and other factors affecting applicant
processing.
Through the years the recruiter's only regular contact
with Headquarters has been at the annual recruiters' con-
ference which is devoted mainly to repetitious discussions
of personnel requirements. There have been occasional
training courses attended by recruiters, and in 1963 there
was an effort to expose recruiters to Headquarters training.
Seven recruiters who are still in the field took Intelligence
Orientation, a course designed to introduce new employees
to the Agency and hardly appropriate for employees who
at that time had been on duty for over ten years. A more
appropriate course today would be Intelligence Review.
Other courses taken by recruiters have tended to be localized
in the support area in courses such as personnel management.
We believe that the best approach to familiarizing field
recruiters with Agency intelligence activity is to give them
periodic Headquarters training. Several weeks of work
experience, similar to the program initiated by the Office
of Personnel in the summer of 1966 when three field
recruiters were brought to Headquarters to observe per-
sonnel operations, will provide the necessary up-dating on
administrative procedures.
We also believe that selected recruiters would benefit
from participation in the Mid-Career Executive Development
Program.
It is recommended that:
The Deputy Director for Support instruct
the Director of Personnel to:
a. Periollically bring field recruiters
to Headquarters to expose them to meaningful
training and work experience.
b. Consider recruiters for selection to
the Mid-Career Executive Development Program.
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The IG Survey of the Office of Personnel in 1964
pointed out that there was a wide difference in what
recruiters tell applicants about CIA. The survey recom-
mended that the Director of Personnel develop a current,
factual and interesting statement to be used by recruiters
in describing CIA to applicants. The DDS concurred in
October 1964. As nearly as we could determine, such a
statement does not exist today. Based on our interviews
of CTs in the last two classes and with recruiters, we
believe there is still a need for a statement not only to
describe the Agency but also the CT Program.
The Deputy Director for Support instruct
the Director of Personnel and the Director of
Training to prepare and maintain an up-to-date
description of the Agency and the CT Program
for use by recruiters.
Since the beginning of the CT Program in 1951, the
Office of Training and the Office of Personnel have used
imaginative techniques for recruiting CTs. In 1966
advertisements were run in about 50 daily newspapers.
This program has not been fully evaluated, but 200
replies were received from the ads that appeared in the
New York Times. During our survey we interviewed
several CTs whose first contact with the Agency was
through answering these ads.
In 1963 the Office of Personnel initiated a "100
Universities" program which sponsored high level Agency
speakers to address selected members of university
faculties. In its first year 105 universities were visited.
Since then the number has declined and present thinking
is that a saturation point may have been reached and
further campus visits may not be necessary for a few years.
Another program which is still operating is that of
the University Associates, which began in 1951 and now
has 28 university administrators and faculty members.
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The program is not a strong arm of recruitment but some-
times helps in supporting Agency programs at university
campuses. The only compensation of the associates is $50
a day while in Headquarters three days each November
when they attend the University Associates Conference.
Some typical comments of Headquarters personnel,
recruiters and former recruiters are: "Spotty .... some
no good at all .... concept was sound but through the years
the quality has deteriorated.... needs culling out.... role
needs redefining. "
No. 5
,The Deputy Director for Support instruct
the Director of Personnel and the Director of
Training to:
a. Review the role of the university
consultants to determine if the program
is worth maintaining.
b. Clarify objectives, cull out
marginal consultants and appoint new con-
sultants after adequate indoctrination if
the program is to be continued.
The relationship between the recruiters and the CT
Staff members a few years ago was distant. Today, as a
result of joint Office of Personneland OTR attention, the
relationship is excellent. At the annual recruiters con-
ference in September 1966, for example, recruiters and
CT Program Officers spent time together
discussing mutual problems. itionally,
M
recruiters par icipated in CT Program Officers' inter-
views with applicants.
We noted a lack of information in Recruitment Division
on the makeup of CT classes. This kind of information
would be helpful to the management of Recruitment Division,
as well as to the recruiters, who told us it would assist
them in their recruitment efforts. This information
already exists in the CT Staff in the form of profile data
on each CT.
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It is recommended that: No. 6
The Deputy Director for Support instruct
the Director of Personnel to obtain from the
Director of Training the CT class profile data
and to make this information available to the
field recruiters.
Recruiters, in their efforts to recruit CTs from a
wide variety of universities, visit some 400 different
campuses a year. The result of their diligence is shown
in the October 1966 CT class, which had CTs from 28
home states and 80 colleges and universities. There is a
possibility, however, that in their efforts to get wide geo-
graphic representation among applicants, they are becom-
ing too thinly spread.
Recruiters from private enterprise have a similar
problem, and the director of placement at a major U. S.
university stated that recruiters would do better by con-
centrating on fewer campuses. We feel that, with limita-
tions on.field recruitment personnel, concentration of
effort on campuses with large CT applicant potential is
more efficient than trying to cover many campuses. This
would permit the recruiter to become better acquainted
with a smaller number of universities, so that in addi-
tion to knowing placement officers he could develop con-
tacts with department heads and senior professors. We
recognize, however, that recruiters spend only 20% of
their time, interviewing for CTs and have requirements
for other employees which require their visiting smaller
campuses. We are, therefore, not recommending that
recruiters concentrate only on large campuses, but we
do feel that these campuses are probably the best source
for CTs, and the Director of Personnel, when planning
recruiters' schedules, might consider this factor.
We also heard objections to recruiters spending
too much time on undergraduate campuses. This has the
drawback of attracting young men who lack military
training and are, therefore, not desirable for the CT
Program. We believe that concentration of effort would
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be more productive at the graduate school level, at
Veterans Administration offices and,. where it can be
arranged, military discharge centers.
Recruiters are encouraged to look for qualified
Negroes.. Major Negro colleges such as Howard and
Tuskeegee are visited, but experience shows that these
universities are not apt to produce CT material. The
large non-segregated state universities are more pro-
ductive. To date the CT Program has had a total of 16
Negroes. Recruiters also are on the lookout for Orientals.
One of the problems here is that Orientals are a small
minority group and there are simply not enough of them
to meet the demand. The July 1966 class had one
Japanese-American, who had a`'master's degree in
Asian` Studies from the University of Southern California.
In 1961 the DDCI approved a memorandum from
the Director of Personnel recommending that as a guide
for advancing CTs, the Agency should adopt a standard
but not automatic rate of promotion so that CTs would
be promoted. from GS-7 to GS-11 in about 3-1/2 years.
During the year after the memorandum was disseminated,
at least in the Clandestine Services, promotion of CTs
to GS-I1 in three to 3-1/2 years was considered to be
virtually automatic. But during the next few years as
budgetary restrictions were felt, it became impossible
to follow this policy.
An examination of the Personnel Status Report for
CTs confirms that all CTs are not promoted to GS-11 in
three to 3-1/2 years. In some cases they have advanced
to GS-11 in less than that time; but in the Clandestine
Services, for example, about 30% of GS-10s on duty as
of 31 December 1966 had been with the Agency 3-1/2 years
or longer.. However, if the time on duty is extended to
four years, there is an immediate drop in the percentage
figure, for only about 5% of those on duty four. years are
still at the GS-10 level.
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As a result of the policy expressed in the 1961 memo,
former CTs in the Clandestine Services are complaining
about not being promoted according to the 1961 policy,
and some have resigned because of this. Another problem
is that some recruiters and Headquarters personnel are
still referring to.the GS-7 to -11 in 3 to 3-1/2 years. The
CT Staff in its pre-employment interviews disabuses the
applicant of this notion, but even a brief exposure to this
can be harmful. CTs are now told they will receive their
first promotion about seven months after beginning their
training if their performance is satisfactory but that later
promotions will depend on their performance as related
to other professional employees in the component where
they are permanently assigned.
The Deputy Director for Support instruct
the Director of Personnel to caution recruiters
against discussing promotion policies for CTs
except for the first promotion, which comes
seven months after the beginning of formal
training.
We are not opposed to promotion to GS-11 in the 3-1/2
year period, but we are opposed to having commitments
made to applicants that are not kept. The CTs we have
interviewed feel that the GS-11 provides an adequate sub-
sistence wage for the married man with children. We
agree with this attitude and think that every effort should
be made to protect our investment in the CTs by arriving
at GS-11 in a reasonable time period.
Competition for capable young men and women is
increasing. We could find no agreement in the Office of
Personnel and the Office of Training on how competitive
the Agency is with other government agencies and private
industry for recruiting trainees. There appears, however,
to be a recruiting problem developing rapidly, based on
our entering salaries, and we believe there is justification
for increasing these salaries.
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The CT applicant is not interested in a business
career. He shares the views of most of his contemporaries,
only 31% of whom, according to an October 1966 article in
Newsweek, were considering a career in business. He
volunteers for CIA seeking challenge, responsibility and
an opportunity for public service. He is not after a large
salary, but he must meet certain minimum financial
requirements to support himself and his family. This
presents a problem because the Agency's beginning salaries
are somewhat below industry and government. In 1967,
for example, average salaries for graduates with a BA
degree in liberal arts entering management training in
industry will average about $6700 per year, roughly the
equivalent of the second step of a GS-7. Eleven of the CTs
in the class of October 1966 were GS-7s. Management
trainees with master's degrees will receive about $8400.
This is the equivalent of a Step 4 of a GS-9.
In comparing our starting salaries with industry's,
it should be remembered that CTs are not recent college
graduates. Most of them have completed military service
and many have had significant work experience. CTs,
therefore, should not be equated with recent college graduates
for salary consideration.
For applicants with PaA's, the Agency is roughly com-
petitive with other government a e,ncies which starts BA's
who finish in the upper quarter o their class as GS-7s.
The CT Staff takes into consideration the maturity of
Agency applicants and starts most of them as GS-8s.
In another important category, however, the Agency
is not always competitive with the rest of the government.
Although some other government agencies hire applicants
with master's degrees as GS-9s if they are in the upper
quarter of their class, the Agency usually starts them as
GS-8s. The Agency does start a few applicants with
master's degrees as GS-9s, but this leads to morale pro-
blems. One CT, hired as a GS-8, who had served several
years as a military officer and had a master's degree in
political science and all his course work completed for a PhD,
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said that some of his classmates who started as GS-9s
had backgrounds similar to his.
The Foreign Service hires its Junior Foreign Service
Officers at the equivalent of a GS-7, and promotions in the
lower grades occur at a slower rate than CTs.
The Agency hires applicants with law degrees at
about the same salary levels as it hires applicants with
master's degrees. In the October 1966 class, of three
CTs with LL.B. 's, one was a GS-8 and two were GS-9s.
The FBI, on the other hand, starts its new agents, most
of whom have law degrees or degrees in accounting, as
GS-10s.
The fact that CTs are promoted within about seven
months after formal training begins does not alter the
weakness in the Agency's hiring pattern. This is because
CTs may enter on duty up to four months before training
begins and their time in grade for promotion counts only
after they begin formal training. Hence, a CT could be
in grade up to 11 months before receiving his first pro-
motion. He is then promoted under Agency policy on the
GS-8, GS-9, GS-10 schedule. Most other federal agencies
do not use these intermediate grades in the promotion of
professional personnel.
During our survey various proposals were being
considered to increase starting salaries for all CTs. One
of these proposals, which appears to have merit, is to
start CTs with BAs in Step 4 of a GS-7 and CTs with MAs
in Step 4 of a GS-9. We realize that raising CT salaries
would have an impact on the budget of the CT Program.
Another obstacle to carrying out such a proposal is the
reluctance of the Clandestine Services to accept CTs at
higher grade levels than they now receive them. OTR,
therefore, finds itself in a squeeze between competition
and Clandestine Services policy.
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It is recommended that: No. 8
The Deputy Director for Support instruct
the Director of Personnel to review the present
standards for determining starting salaries for
CTs and to consider recommending raising
these salaries to meet competition from other
government agencies and industry.
We believe that another deterrent to recruiting is
the length of the training program, which ranges from
five to six months for CTs entering the Directorate of
Intelligence and the Support Services,
for CTs entering the Clandestine Services, a increasing
rate of declines and increasing numbers of applicants
who do not return forms to the recruiters may well be a
result of their reluctance to enter a long training program.
The CT Program is not only in competition with
industry and other government agencies for capable young
trainees; it is also in competition with other Agency com-
ponents. ORR, for example, is seeking young economists,
for direct hire. The Clandestine Services have a lateral
entry program; a records integration program; and various
programs for contract employees. Partly because of this
competition, applicant files forwarded to the CT Staff
dropped from a monthly average of 94.6 in FY 1966 to an
average of 67.5 in FY 1967. At this rate, the October
1967 and later classes would not be filled. In early 1967,
as a result of meetings among representatives of the
Support Services concerned with recruitment, additional
files were channeled to the CT Staff.
The Office of Personnel, however, is not at all
certain that it can continue to provide the CT Staff with
the numbers of files it needs to fill the quota for the
October 1967 class. (The July 1967 class, based on appli-
cants in process, will probably reach its quota of about
90 CTs. )
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The recruitn :;? of internals has not been aggres-
sively pushed by the management of the various components
of the Agency. Since 1963 about 90% of the applicants have
been self-referrals rather than persons recruited through
supervisory recommendations based on a high level of on-
the-job performance.
Under Selection we discuss the favorable aspects of
the selection of CTs from among on-duty personnel, but
there are certain distinctly unfavorable aspects. The system
of self-referrals results frequently in an unhappy situation
where the applicant is acceptable to the CT Program but
is not made available by the employing component in a
reasonable time. In other cases when component chiefs
have recommended candidates to the CT Program, they
have done so to solve personnel problems. Examples of
such misuse are: solving placement problems of the returnee
with no assignment; rewarding a good work-horse type; cir-
cumventing the problem of being over T / O strength; and
training secretaries who want to become professionals who
might not otherwise be promoted.
Internal CTs have been recruited from every major
Agency component. The greatest single source is Records
Integration Division (RID), where many "direct hires" have
been assigned because the candidate needed greater maturity.
RID is now being utilized as a proving ground for future CTs.
The next biggest single source has been OCR. A fair num-
ber have been recruited fro
contract personnel who have demonstrated acceptability
through performance in Vietnam, Laos or elsewhere.
The consensus of senior officers and of supervisors
of internal CTs is that they are not of the same high caliber
as externals. In general, they are evaluated as lacking the
qualities of spark, imagination, poise, ingenuity, or mental
capacity. They perform well but are not considered to have
the potential of external CTs. We believe that the lower
quality of internal CTs may well result from the fact that
the large majority of candidates apply on their own initia-
tive seeking escape or betterment rather than being top
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employees selected and recommended by supervisors.
We think that the caliber of internals would be improved
if the supervisors were more active in recommending
qualified personnel for consideration as participants in
the CT Program.
Over the years the percentage of internals in the
program has averaged about 22%. We believe that 15% to
20% is a reasonable mix that will provide a given class
with some but not too many CTs experienced with varied
facets of Agency procedure.
It is recommended that: No. 9
a. The Deputy Director for Support amend
to include a statement in the following
vein: Supervisors are urged to recommend as
applicants to the CT Program employees who
meet the qualifying requirements and who have
demonstrated by their on-duty performance that
they are the types of persons suited for the CT
Program.
b. The Deputy Director for Support issue
annually a notice directing the attention of super-
visors to the above provision of
From its inception the CT Program has sponsored
military duty for candidates who have not fulfilled this
obligation and whose services would probably be lost to
the Agency unless a legitimate mechanism were in existence
to provide appropriate military training for outstanding
men subject to loss to the draft. Thus there have been
developed four service programs sponsored by the Agency
in cooperation with the parent service. These programs
are the Air Force Officer Training School, the Army OCS,
the Marine Officer Candidate Course, and the Army ROTC.
The quotas are 28 per fiscal year for the Air Force, 15
for the Army OCS, and "as-can-be-arranged" for the
Marines and Army ROTC. As of February 1967, there
were 41 CTs in the various programs. A noteworthy
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feature of the programs is the arrangement with the Services
to detail the CT candidate back to the Agency for the last
12 to 24 months of his active duty status.
The military programs have been subject to criticism
because of the high attrition rate among CTs after completion
of their military obligation. Current or even recent figures
are not available from either the Office of Personnel or the
Office of Training; but of the 158 CTs whose military ser-
vice was sponsored in the first ten years of the program,
only 60 were on duty as of 31 December 1966, an attrition
of 68 per cent. In view of previous criticisms of the value
of the military program and because it is administratively
time-consuming and cumbersome, we are disturbed by the
unavailability of data to evaluate the worth of this program
over the last five years.
Despite this high attrition factor, we believe that
Agency sponsorship of military duty for highly qualified CT
candidates is a valuable method of obtaining competent
men who would otherwise be lost to the Agency. For in
spite of the increased number of academically qualified men
who have completed military service, it is currently neces-
sary to utilize the military program quotas to meet the
personnel requirements of the CT Program.
It is recommended that: No. 10
The Deputy Director for Support instruct
the Director of Training with the Director of
Personnel to maintain up-to-date statistics on
CTs whose military service has been sponsored
by the Agency so that military programs can be
properly evaluated.
One of our major problems in recruiting is the lag
between the time the recruiter first sees an applicant and
when the applicant is notified of the Agency?s interest.
Prompt follow-up is needed to retain the interest of the appli-
cant, who has probably had several interviews in the same
period. The Director of Placement at M.I.T. considers
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a satisfactory period between on-campus interview and
notice of company reaction to be 7 to 10 days. DiPont,
using teletype and other mechanized procedures, guarantees
reaction within 48 hours.
CIA's performance in this area is poor. The Agency's
normal time from interview to forwarding a letter indicating
interest is at least 30 calendar days. It is difficult to weigh
precisely the impact of this waiting period on an applicant,
but CT Program records show that in FY 1966, 42 appli-
cants declined during this period. Probably of greater
importance is the added time that this initial processing
Adds'to the total processing of an applicant which now takes
six months and over. During FY 1966, 268 applicants
declined. The CT Staff has ample evidence accumulated
through the years that the slowness of Agency processing
is one of the major factors contributing to applicants who
accept other positions rather than wait.
Following is the processing record of a typical
applicant file:
Applicant interview in the field 14 May 66
Recruiter forwarded papers 28 Jun 66
Recruitment Division Hqs. processing 1-8,Jul 66
Correspondence Section, Place-
ment Division acknowledged receipt
of application to applicant
CT Staff received file 14 Jul 66
Application placed in process
(Security and Medical) 21 Jul 66
Correspondence Section forwarded
letter to applicant expressing interest 26 Jul 66
Note:
1. The recruiter does not forward his file to
Headquarters until receiving completed forms
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and academic records from the applicant.
In this case the applicant delayed sending
his forms from 14 May to 28 June.
2. The Correspondence Section does not
forward the letter to the applicant expressing
Agency interest until the CT Staff has
screened the application file and decided
the applicant is CT material.
We noted other cases that took up to three months
before the applicant was informed of Agency interest.
Some of this was due to the Placement Branch's forward-
ing files originally recommended by the recruiter for the
CT Program to other components. In some cases the com-
ponents held onto the file for over a morth only to return
the file to Placement Branch with an expression of no
inte re s t.
The Skills Bank put into effect in the fall of 1966 by
the Placement Branch should reduce the delays in proces-
sing previously experienced when files were shopped to
Agency components. Under the Skills Bank system files
for the CT Program are supposed to be forwarded directly
to the CT Staff. Files placed in the Skills Bank remain
there for two weeks for examination by personnel repre-
sentatives from other operating components. But even
with the Skills Bank operating successfully, the CIA system
for processing files needs revision. This can only be
accomplished through tighter control, constant monitoring
and by a vigorous and imaginative approach to devising
means of short-cutting existing methods. Some of these
short cuts might involve:
a. Placing more reliance on the recruiter's
interview by the CT Staff rather than waiting until
the complete file of A&E tests, etc., are available.
b. Having the recruiter's material go directly
to the CT Staff rather than following the existing
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pattern, which is:
(1) Recruiter's file to Recruitment
Division in Ames Building
(2) Recruitment Division to Place-
ment Division at Langley
(3) Placement Division to Records
Control Division
(4) Then to CT Staff at 1000 Glebe
c. Reducing processing time in Placement
Division, Records and Control Division, and CT
Staff. Files often rest in Placement Division and
Records and Control Division several days. The
average time for reaching a decision on whether
or not an applicant is desirable in the CT Staff was
21 calendar days in 1966. The CT Staff is taking
steps to reduce this time.
It is recommended that:
The Deputy Director for Support instruct
the Directors of Personnel, Training, Medical
Services and Security jointly to review the pro-
cessing of CT applicants and to submit their
recommendations to him for reducing processing
time.
Assigning a correspondence clerk to the personnel
section of the CT Staff to send letters to applicants inform-
ing them of receipt of application and of Agency interest
would help eliminate delays in processing.
It is recommended that: No. 12
The Deputy Director for Support instruct
the Director of Personnel to consider assigning
a correspondence clerk from the Records Control
Division to the Personnel Section which is attached
to the CT Staff to facilitate correspondence with CTs.
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E. Screening and Selection
In the past, arguments- have been advanced to move
the CT Program to the Office of Personnel. This is based
on the assumption that selecting, training and placing CTs
are personnel functions similar to recruiting for the CT
Program, which is carried out by the Office of Personnel.
Our interviews with officials of operating components, who
expressed satisfaction with the caliber of CTs they receive,
and our reviews of CT performance after leaving OTR
show that the selection process in OTR has worked out
extremely well. We see little advantage to moving the
program to the Office of Personnel where it would pro-
bably be diluted with other personnel programs. We
believe, therefore, that the CT Program best meets the
needs of the Agency in its present position in the Office of
Training where it has been located since the establishment
of the program in 1950.
At times criticism has centered on the method of
selecting CTs. In 1960, for example, the IG Survey of
Agency training suggested that the CT Staff might be
assuming "excessive responsibilities" in selecting CTs
and recommended that the Director of Training establish
a selection panel composed of line officers from the three
directorates with representatives from the Office of Per-
sonnel, OTR, and Chief, CT Staff. The DDS agreed with
this recommendation. In practice, however, it was too
unwieldy to have a formal panel, as such, operate with
any degree of efficiency without disrupting the mechanics
of pre-employment interviews, now running over 500 per
year. The Director of Training, in an effort to comply
with the spirit of the recommendation, succeeded in acquir-
ing representatives from the Directorate of Intelligence and
the Clandestine Services to serve on the CT Staff. This
has been the practice to date.
Even with representatives from the Clandestine
Services on the CT Staff participating in the selection
process, the DDP has not always been satisfied with the
method of selecting CTs, and from time to time the
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Clandestine Services has inserted itself in the selection
process. In the spring of 1966, for example, the Director
of Training, responding to a request frbm the DDP's Train-
ing Officer, agreed to alert the Training Officer when CT
applicants were scheduled to visit Headquarters. The
Training Officer then arranged to have senior officials
from the Clandestine Services participate in interviewing
applicants with CT Program Officers. This procedure
proved to be unwieldy and was generally unsatisfactory to
both the Clandestine Services and the Office of Training.
It was abandoned after a brief trial period.
Another screening procedure, developed by the
Clandestine Services in April 1966, is a panel that inter-
views CTs after they have completed the first portion of
their training. The purpose of the screening is to deter-
mine CT suitability for the Clandestine Services. We
discuss this panel in more detail in our section on Placement.
Another common criticism of the CT Program of a
few years ago was that there were too many CTs from
Eastern universities. It is true that during the first
several years of the CT Program Ivy League universities
contributed many CTs. From 1951 to 1958 the percentage
was 20%. There were several reasons for this. Tradi-
tionally, students from Eastern universities had more
interest in foreign affairs and government service than
students in other sections of the country. Also, the
faculty and administration of these universities were more
receptive to Agency recruiters and other representatives
than universities in other sections.
Criticism of this aspect of the CT Program was for-
malized in 1956 when the IG survey of the program empha-
sized the need to recruit candidates from sections of the
United States other than the East. Since then the percentage
of Ivy League graduates has steadily declined. This is the
result of several factors including the increased interest
in foreign affairs and in government service outside the
East and the increased nationwide coverage by Agency
recruiters. Of the 370 CTs who entered the Agency from
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the March 1965 class through the October 1966 class,
only 7% were from Ivy League universities. Eighty dif-
ferent educational institutions were represented including
well-known colleges and universities such as the University
of Wisconsin and Stanford University, and lesser known ones
such as Iona College and Central Missouri State College.
It is not unusual to have graduates of the Military Academy
and the Naval Academy.
The educational backgrounds of the Agency's CTs
are much more varied than that of the young Foreign Ser-
vice Officer. From 1957 to 1962, one-third of the 926
officers appointed to the Foreign Service came from ten
universities. Four of them were Ivy League schools. The
others were California, Stanford, Georgetown, Colorado,
Michigan and Minnesota.
The first step in the Headquarters process of select-
ing CTs is the review of applicant files by the CT Program
Officers. The Program Officers are assisted by the CT
Program Personnel Branch in this file review. The Per-
sonnel Branch has two professional personnel officers who
technically belong to the Placement Division of the Office
of Personnel, but they are physically attached to the CT
Program. The personnel officers and the CT Program
Officers work together in a highly effective manner.
To fill the Agency's requirements for CTs, the CT
Staff must spend a large amount of its time in screening
files and interviewing CTs to meet the quotas for CT classes.
In FY 1966 the staff reviewed 1106 files, including files
from recruiters and internal Agency candidates, and held
543 interviews to get 140 CTs entered on duty. (During
the initial file review, 42 applicants declined and 211 were
rejected. During the remaining phases of screening, 550
personnel actions were canceled as a result of applicants
declining and because of medical and security rejects. )
As mentioned in the section onRecruitment, the
applicant is not informed of Agency interest until the CT
Staff has decided, after reviewing the applicant's file,
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that he appears to have appropriate qualifications for the
CT Program. The first step in the file review is made
by the personnel officers assigned to the staff from the
Office of Personnel. This review eliminates about 10%
of the files because of routine disqualifying factors,
previously unnoticed, such as close foreign relatives
and recent Peace Corps experience.
The file is then forwarded to one of the Program
Officers on the CT Staff who usually has the following
background material to assist him in his review:
a. Recruiter's interview report
b. Applicant's PHS form
c. Transcript of academic records
d. Test results
e. Comment from CT personnel officer
f. Medical history
In reaching his decision the CT Program Officer has
no written requirements to assist him beyond -, 25X1A
which specifies only that an applicant must have a college
education and be medically qualified. What he does have
is a body of experience from which to draw, accumulated
during the 15 years that the CT Program has been in
existence. Although there are no minimum language or
military requirements, applicants with military service
and language skills are preferred. In practice, most
CTs have performed military service before joining the
Agency. In the absence of specific requirements, the
Program Officer looks for such things as capacity for
hard work, significant military service, and the applicant's
ability to project his personality.
After completing his file review, the Program
Officer decides to begin the processing of the applicant
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or to reject him. If the decision is to begin processing,
clearance for pre-employment interview is requested
from the Office of Security, and the letter informing the
applicant of Agency interest is forwarded.
The test results show that CTs normally place in the
top 10% of the population of the United States in mental
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aptitude and well above the average of other Agency pro-
fessional employees. In the last few years the A&E Staff
has noticed a slight drop in test scores of applicants
accepted by the Agency, but the psychologists do not inter-
pret this as an indicator of an over-all drop in CT quality.
The A&E Staff does not know how accurate the test
results and A&E's interpretation of them are in predicting
job performance. The staff expressed a concern that the
CT Staff might be placing undue reliance on the A&E
interpretation of the test results. We do not believe that
A&E needs to be concerned because Program Officers
look on the test results as only one of several tools in
reaching a decision on an applicant's suitability for the
CT Program. There are indications, however, that the
Clandestine Services panel that interviews CTs after they
are in training for suitability for the Clandestine Services
may be overemphasizing test results.
Until mid-1963, all CTs were psychologically
assessed by the A&E Staff after the CTs entered on duty.
This assessment, based on personal interviews, lasted
for two days and was aimed aelping with assignments.
As a result of the increased size of CT classes, this type
of assessment was discontinued as a general practice
except for internal candidates who are seen for a day.
All CTs are seen by. Agency or contract psychia-
trists. The psychiatric interview is based on a personnel
index form, filled out by the CT. The interview itself
takes about one hour. (In Calendar Year 1966, 546 appli-
cants were interviewed. ) The objective of the interview
is to determine emotional suitability for Agency employ-
ment. If an applicant is rejected because of psychiatric
reasons, the Chief of the CT Staff may request a waiver
from the DDS.
Relations between the CT Staff and OMS are excellent c,
When doctors in OMS have reservations about an applicant,
they frequently discuss the problem with the Chief of the
CT Staff before making their formal recommendation.
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Selection of a CT from on-duty personnel is based
on a more thorough screening evaluation than for an
external. First, discussion with the applicant is not
inhibited by security restrictions. Second, the record
of the applicant's performance is available. Third,
queries about the applicant can be made of his supervisor
and co-workers to determine their evaluation of suitability.
Fourth, more time is devoted to assessment, including
a full hour with the A&E psychologist. Finally, there is
better opportunity for personal interview by the CT Pro-
gram Officers. In the case of CTs applying from the
Clandestine Services, there is the additional pre-selection
procedure established by the Clandestine Services Selec-
tion Board for CTs. The ratio of selection of CTs from
internal applicants is higher (one out of every three appli-
cants) than for externals (about one out of eight). This
higher ratio is due in part to preliminary screening which
eliminates some candidates before they become formal
applicants.
The majority of CTs major in political science,
history, internal relations, area studies and languages,
but each class usually has English, psychology, law or
journalism majors. With the broadening of the program
to meet requirements of the four directorates, CTs with
majors in business administration, engineering and mathe-
matics are increasing. Of the 75 CTs in the October 1966
class, 22 had graduate degrees, mostly master's.
In 1966 the average CT was 26 years old and almost
half were married. The average grade of the October 1966
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class was GS-8. About 90% of the male CTs had completed
military service ranging from a few months to several years
of active duty, including service in South Vietnam. Military
service can be enlisted or commissioned. About 8% of an
average class is female.
In addition to military and academic experience, about
half of the CTs in any class will have had significant work
experience. In the class of October 1966, 20 different fields
of endeavor were represented including: accounting, insur-
ance, sales, engineering, teaching, advertising, radio/TV,
manufacturing and missionary work.
The A&E Staff made a study in 1964 of personality
characteristics of 214 male CTs who entered on duty in
1961, 1962 and 1963. CT characteristics were compared
with non-Agency groups who had taken similar tests. The
study, later updated through July 1965, showed that the
average CT is an activist. He scores highest on dominance.
His lowest score is on femininity, the same as military
officers. He is aggressive, confident, self-reliant and
has strong initiative. He has greater leadership potential
than business executives. The group from which the CT
differs most is the beatnik.
A senior officer in the Clandestine Services who has
closely observed a cross section of CTs during the past
year describes them as representing a high average input.
In their p=olitical thinking he considers them in the middle
of the road.
The team took a random sample of ex-CTs who are
now on duty at the GS-12 level and reviewed their files to
see if there were a correlation between background and
on-job performance. We considered age at EOD, college
or colleges attended, major academic fields, class stand-
ing, honors received, scholarships, own contribution to
college expenses, environment and geographic area lived
in, training record, A&E record, promotion progress,
interim and permanent assignment, military experience,
and language qualification. Analysis of these factors
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did not develop a pattern which would permit us to state
that firm prediction could be made about the potential
success, failure, or mediocrity of any given individual
of certain qualifications as opposed to another with different
qualifications. The file review did establish that the quality
of the personnel entering the Agency as CTs is high and
that the CT recruitment and selection process is an effec-
tive mechanism for providing the Agency with high caliber
personnel.
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It is recommended that: No. 14
a. The Deputy Director for Support
instruct the Director of Training and the
Director of Personnel:
(1) To tighten existing briefing
procedures of applicants for the CT
Program to ensure that applicants are
adequately briefed by recruiters and
Headquarters personnel to minimize
security and cover problems.
(2) To review existing processing
methods to identify and correct procedures
which unduly reveal Agency interest in
applicants.
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G. Entrance on Duty and Interim Assignments
When a CT enters on duty he initially receives the
normal Agency EOD processing given to all professional
employees. This processing, spaced over a period of two
weeks, includes briefings by the Office of Security, the
Office of Personnel and the Office of Training. Early in
this period a member of Cover Staff assigns the CT his
cover and the CT personnel officer and a Program Officer
on the CT staff brief the CT on the training curriculum
and discuss the Agency's promotion policy. They also
answer any questions the CT may have on the Agency or
the CT Program. Wives of CTs receive a group briefing
on the CT Program during the first week of formal training
To decrease the numbers of applicants who might
decline employment during the long pre-employment
waiting period, the CT Staff often enters an applicant on
duty as soon as he is cleared, whether or not a CT class
is about to begin formal instructions. If a class if not
scheduled to begin for three weeks or longer, the CT is
given an interim or temporary work assignment in an
operating component. Under the three-class-per-year
cycle beginning in 1967, the interim assignment may
extend to four months.
The numbers of CTs on interim assignment will
vary, depending on the timing of the next class. As of
I December 1966, for example, 23 CTs were on duty
awaiting the beginning of the February 1967 class. In
addition to CTs on interim assignments while awaiting
the beginning of their formal training, there are usually
a few CTs on interim assignments waiting for military
duty in Agency-sponsored programs and CTs between
classes.
The Program Officers on the CT Staff take the first
steps in assigning a CT to an interim assignment. In
planning the assignment, the Program Officer has at his
disposal language qualifications and educational and
other background information on the CT. He is also
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impi
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familiar with the CT's personal preference and with the
needs of the Agency. When dealing with the Directorate
of Intelligence, he contacts the office concerned, some-
times at the desk or branch level, but assignments to the
Clandestine Services and the Support Services are made
through a central personnel officer.
Our survey showed that in most cases the interim
assignments are satisfactory and make a useful contri-
bution to the CT's development by providing him an
opportunity to work and to see the Agency at work. One
CT told an inspector that after he had entered on duty he
had reservations about a long-term career in the Agency,
but his interim assignment of three months on a WH desk
was so rewarding it convinced him he should remain +#.jth
the Agency.
We also uncovered, however, evidence that the
interim assignments do not always receive enough atten-
tion and are considered a stopgap measure. Two CTs
who resigned in 1966 and one who resigned in 1967 said
that dissatisfaction with their interim assignments in the
Clandestine Services was a major factor in their resigna-
tions. One claimed he was underemployed and had to look
for work; another found the work boring and lacking in
challenge. Other CTs also commented to us that interim
assignments need more attention than they have been
getting.
The CT Program and 'ersonnel Officers caution
the CTs that their interim assignment may or may not be
challenging but, at least, it gives them a chance to get
settled in Washington, to become acquainted with opera-
tions of the Agency and to make friends. It can be argued
that CTs having received this admonition should be suf-
ficiently mature to accept gracefully an interim assign-
ment that does not necessarily tax their abilities. The
fact remains, however, that when CTs join the Agency
they are eager to go to work, and even though they are
cautioned about interim assignments they may become
disenchanted if they find themselves with little to do.
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This attitude is not typical of Agency trainees only. Per-
sonnel managers in industry have found that challenge
and responsibility are among the most important factors
that the young man of today looks for in his job,
When the CT Program was smaller, Program
Officers had time to check carefully the suitability of
interim assignments. But in view of the large number of
CTs in the program today, this is no longer possible. A
tightening of existing procedures is needed to improve the
effectiveness of the assignments. Presently, after the
component is notified of the assignment of a CT, there is
seldom any further contact with the component until the
CT completes his assignment. At that time he is required
to submit a report of his work. The component providing
the assignment is not obligated to report on the CT's per-
formance, although it sometimes does so voluntarily.
We believe that components need to be informed of the
importance of the interim assignment.
The Deputy Director for Support instruct
the Director of Training to prepare a memorandum
of instruction for the Directorate of Intelligence,
the Clandestine Services, and the Support Services,
emphasizing the importance of the interim assign-
ment and requesting that the component provide
an evaluation of the CT's performance.
Another important aspect of interim assignments is
that in the past they have often led to permanent assign-
ment of the CT to the component sponsoring the interim
assignment after the end of formal training. This occurs
when the CT becomes interested in the component and
when the component's management is impressed with his
performance and qualifications.
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H. Training Page
1. Introduction 52
2. Formal Courses 56
a. Familiarization Training
Introduction to Intelligence
Intelligence Techniques Course
Operations Familiarization Course
Support Services Familiarization
b. Challenge of Worldwide Communism 62
c. Managerial Grid Course 63
d. Intelligence Production Course 64
e. Support Services Course 66
f. Operations 66
Operations Familiarization Course
Operations Course
Soviet Bloc Operations
China Operations Course
3. On-the-Job Training
a. Headquarters Desk Training
b. Desk Experience
4. Language Training
5. Training Coordinator
6. DDI Representation in OTR
7. Need for Instructor Training
8. Training of Women C T s
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H. Training
Beginning in February 1967, formal training classes
for the 275 CTs the Agency hopes to recruit each year will
be held three times a year. Excluding language training,
CTs whose careers are in the Directorates of Intelligence
or Support will be in a formal training status for about six
months. CTs for the Clandestine Services will be in formal
training for 18 to 22 months. If the one-to-four-month interim
assignment which may precede formal training is included,
for the Directorates of Intelligence and Support could spend
up to ten months.
broadly defines the objective of the formal
training program as that of developing the professional
potential of qualified personnel to fill positions of increas-
ingly greater responsibility within the Agency. We believe
that through the years this requirement has been met.
Senior Agency personnel in the operating components con-
firmed this. The CT training, however, is too long, and
we found substantial evidence of training fatigue among CTs
who were completing the program. Furthermore, the
training is not always directly responsive to the needs of
the Agency. This applies particularly to the training for
CTs preparing for the Clandestine Services. There is a
need for over-all coordination of the training program,
and training can be carried out more effectively and
economically than it is now being done.
As will be discussed in detail later in this section, the
training cycle should be shortened appreciably. This can
be done by combining the various familiarization courses
into one course, by postponing language training, by combining
pertinent elements of=training with the Operations Course,
and by deleting the Managerial Grid and the 13 weeks of desk
experience. Many subjects can be condensed without losing
their instructional value,
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Our recommendations, if accepted, would reduce the
total time spent in a training status for the Clandestine
Services from and training
for the Directorates o Intelligence an Support from six
to four months.
This will improve the quality of training and CTs will
not be suffering from training fatigue when they report to
operating components. Shortening the over-all training
program has other advantages. It would help with recruiting
desirable young men and women, some of whom the Office of
Personnel believes now fail to apply after talking with the
recruiter, or decline after applying because of reluctance to
enter a long training program.
CTs object to the lengthy CT training program, partic-
ularly the training required for the Clandestine Services.
Some CTs resign from the Agency because of this. Several
senior operating officials in the Clandestine Services told
us that CTs joining their divisions were stale from the pro-
longed training.
This attitude confirms what private enterprise, with
whom we are in competition for trainees, has found. All
management trainees, whether in CIA or in industry, need
to experience at an early date a sense of accomplishment.
They chafe at long formal training programs.
The Agency's CTs do not differ markedly from industry's
trainees except they may be more mature. Most CTs are in
their mid to late 20s and have had military and other non-
academic experience after acquiring basic BA degrees. Some
have left graduate school because they are tired of being
professional students. They join the Agency in search of
challenge and an opportunity to go to work only to find them-
selves in another prolonged quasi-academic environment.
Most U. S. companies are meeting this problem by
drastically cutting back on their formal training programs.
Even on-the-job training, which takes 13 weeks of training
for the Clandestine 1erv yes, is being abandoned by many
private firms.
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Other U. S. Government agencies which attract high
quality trainees are also minimizing formal training. Agencies
participating in the Civil Service Commission's Management
Intern Program, which. enters on duty interns who pass
competitive examinations as GS-7s and -9s, have one-year
training programs emphasizing on-the-job training. In the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, which had 14 trainees
in 1966, only four weeks were spent on initial orientation.
The rest of the year's training emphasized work assign-
ments sprinkled with short curses.
Formal course training for junior foreign service
officers consists of an eight-week program known as the
Basic Foreign Service Officers Course, which provides an
understanding of the Foreign, Service role in foreign policy.
CIA, on the other hand, is moving in the opposite
direction and is constantly adding to. its training program.
We do recognize, however, that a career in intelligence
is unique and not being closely related to academic training
requires more specialized training than. does private
industry or other government activities.
We find some evidence that the length of training
courses and, in some instances, the type of training given
to those CTs going into the Clandestine Services is con-
trolled not by a determination as to how much or what type
of training is needed but by a pre-determined period of
time over which a CT should be trained. We find little
evidence that training requirements for the over-all program
have been arrived at through consultation with consumer
divisions and staffs. It has not been a question of whether
the training is meeting the requirements of the components
within the Clandestine Services but whether the training is
being extended over what is considered an appropriate
period of time to qualify a CT for an assignment in the
Clandestine Services.
During this predetermined period of training,
considered to be for the Clandestine Services,
some operating officials and training instructors look on
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the CTs as being in training confinement. We often heard
this attitude expressed as, "Let's give them all the training
we can while they're still captives." Such thinking has led
to a somewhat haphazard adding to the program of courses,
the value of which is questionable. The one-week. Managerial
Grid Course, for example, was added in 1966 to CT training.
While this course is appropriate for mid-careerists and
senior officers, we question its suitability for CTs. A two
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In the remainder of this section on training we discuss
each course taken by CTs. In some instances we recommend
condensing, combining, or eliminating existing subject
material. Our over -all recommendation on the CT training
cycle appears on page 87 . A summary of current course
and proposed IG revisions is on pages 87 and 88.
2. Formal Courses
a. Familiarization Training
All CTs take the same courses for their first 13 weeks
of formal training as follows:
Introduction to Intelligence 2 weeks
Intelligence Techniques 3 weeks
Challenge of Worldwide Communism 4 weeks
Operations Familiarization 4 weeks
We believe that the objectives of these courses, with the
exception of Challenge of Worldwide Communism, should
be to familiarize CTs with the functions of the Agency.
But only Introduction to Intelligence, which develops an
understanding of the concepts of intelligence, approaches
being a familiarization course. Intelligence Techniques
gives instructions in techniques of the Directorate of
Intelligence, and Operation Familiarization instructs in
Clandestine Services tradecraft.
We see no vaifd reason for the teaching of intelligence
techniques during these opening weeks of training, partic-
ularly since, after Operations Familiarization, the CTs
attend courses especially designed to train them in skills
needed by the directorates where they are to be assigned.
Neither do we find justification for three separate famil-
iarization courses. Individually, these courses have many
excellent points, but taken together they contain needless
duplication.
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We believe that the course content can be made more
responsive to the needs of the Agency for familiarizing CTs
with. Agency operations by combining the three courses into
one all-purpose familiarization course under a single course
director. With the elimination of duplication and the deletion
of instructions in techniques, the nine weeks now spent on
these three courses could readily be reduced to six weeks.
In the remainder of this section on familiarization
training we will discuss separately Introduction to Intelli-
gence, Intelligence Techniques, and Operations Familiarization.
We also discuss the need for Support Services familiarization,
which we believe should be included in CT familiarization.
(1) Introduction to Intelligence
The objectives of this two-week lecture course are
to develop an understanding of the fundamental concepts
of intelligence, the role of U. S. intelligence agencies and
the functions of CIA. Lectures are given by members of
the Briefing Faculty of OTR, and by guest speakers from
other Agency components. The course is well run and
the over-all quality of speakers is usually excellent with
the exception of some guest speakers from the Clandestine
Services. We noted that some of the course content is
duplicated in later courses, particularly the lectures
delivered by speakers from the Clandestine Services.
This includes the one-hour lectures on PM activities,
Clandestine Services Reporting and Counterintelligence,
all of which are later covered in Operations Familiarization.
Movies used in the course for describing activities of the
Directorate of Intelligence are out of date and do not
accurately reflect these operations. In view of the course
objectives aimed at familiarization, a final exam does not
appear to be necessary.
During this introductory phase of training, we blieve
there is a need for a presentation on the Role of the Ti. S.
in the World Today, preferably by a non-Agency speaker.
This should be related to a lecture on American Policies
and Practices, perhaps similar to that given. in the Intro-
duction to Intelligence for non-CTs and similar to the
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Peace Corps' American Democracy and Institutions. In
the Challenge of Worldwide Communism Course half of
one day is spent on reading and group discussion on values
of American society. Some of this might well be included
at this point in the CTs' training. Another desirable
introductory lecture might be similar to the talk given by
the Chief of to the graduating
class on what is expected of
a CT in CIA and on "facts of life" in a large organization
such as ours.
We believe that these additional lectures can be
added and at the same time this section of training reduced
to about one week by eliminating many of the formal pres-
entations on Agency organization and functions.
Several of the lectures such as the ones on
and intelligence research facilities can be included later
in our proposed familiarization course.
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(2) Intelligence Techniques Course
The objective of this three-week course, which follows
the Introduction to Intelligence, is to provide instruction
and practice in the techniques used by the Directorate of
Intelligence in the production of intelligence. OTR also
vlOws this course as giving CTs the opportunity to look
at that Directorate's functions, to help them make known
their inclinations toward an Agency career in that Direc-
torate, and also as giving OTR a chance to evaluate the
capability of the CT for that type of work. This course,
available only to CTs, is the responsibility of the Intelli-
gence Production Faculty of OTR. It is presented with
imagination and the CTs, who are kept busily engaged
in preparing written exercises and briefings based on
intelligence publications, have high praise for it.
We share the CT view of the operation of the course
but have reservations about the basic objective of the
course. We do not believe that "instruction" and "practice"
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in the production of intelligence are needed during the early
weeks of CT training. The objective of this course should
be to familiarize CTs with the Directorate of Intelligence.
With familiarization as an objective, blocks of instruction
and the
reporting could
be eliminated. Two weeks should. be sufficient to provide
necessary familiarization on the Directorate of Intelligence,
since CTs heading for that Directorate later receive
detailed instruction in intelligence operations in the
Intelligence Production Course.
(3) Operations Familiarization. Course
The four-week Operations Familiarization Course
25X1A (OFC) is for CTs
and non-CTs. Non-CTs are usually in the minority, but
of the 339 students in the four OFC courses held in CY
1966 the percentage of non-CTs varied from 14% to 60%
of the total class. The name of the course is in conflict
with the course objective, which is to give a comprehensive
understanding of the operational methods of the Clandestine
Services, its FI, CI and CA programs and operational and
intelligence reporting. In attempting to give the student
a "comprehensive understanding," the course goes far
A senior instructor at -pointed out that the OFC
is not really a familiarization course because students
are rated on their proficiency. The evaluation of the
student's performance, which is placed in his personnel
file, discusses his indivi `al performance in Clandestine
Services skills including simulated agent meetings and
operational and intelligence reporting.
We see little justification for the OFC teaching
tradecraft and other details of clandestine operations.
CTs headed for the Clandestine Services (96 from the
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four CT classes of 1966) will get this kind of training later
in the OC, and CTs going to the Directorates of Intelligence
or Support (104 from the 1966 classes) will, we feel, receive
adequate operational familiarization in the proposed shortened
course. By regarding the objective of the OFC as truly
familiarization, we believe that the course content can be
shortened to two weeks and incorporated into a six-week
all, purpose familiarization course at Headquarters.
Instructors from OTR's Headquarters Operations School
with the help of guest speakers should be able to provide
instruction for this portion of the course.
25X1A Although the faculty at _s not united in its views
on the desirability of holding the OFC in Headquarters,
some senior instructors feel strongly that the training at
25X1A =should be restricted to CTs headed for the Clandestine
Services. This group feels that holding the OFC
interferes with the running of the OC and dilutes e quality
of instruction in the OC. We share this view.
The CT Staff views the OFC as a means of exposing
the CT to the Clandestine Services, and assisting the CT
in making known his wishes regarding a career in the
Clandestine Services. We believe that the two weeks of
Clandestine Services familiarization in the all purpose
familiarization course should be sufficient for this need.
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The CT Staff also views the OFC as a means for the
Agency to evaluate the suitability of a CT for a career in
the Clandestine Services. The Chief of the OFC, however,
told us that because of the large number of students taking
the OFC, his instructors are able to make only a cursory
evaluation of their performance and suitability for the
Clandestine Services. This emphasizes the need for
earlier identification of CTs for assignment to a direc-
torate and the need to use existing information on CTs to
assist in this selection rather than relying on the OFC
evaluation of CTs.
Non-CTs who attend the OFC-- the_ November/
December 1966 course had 11 non-CTs-- can be trained
by existing operations courses presented in Headquarters
by OTR. Non-CTs could also be trained by running a
separate two-week familiarization course, which would
probably be more suitable for training staff employees
and contract employees than the existing OFC. There is
already a precedent for this. The Introduction to Intelli-
gence and the first two weeks of Challenge of Worldwide
Communism, which all CTs take, are also held separately
for other Agency professional employees.
(4) Support Services Familiarization
During most of the history of the CT Program, few
CTs chose the Support Services as a career. In recent
years, however, as the result of the DDS' emphasizing
the need for encouraging CTs to enter the Support
Services, increased numbers of CTs have elected to
serve in his Directorate. In CY 1966, 66 CTs were
headed for the Support Services area out of a total of
201 CTs who entered formal training. The one-hour
lecture given by the Deputy Director for Support in the
Introduction to Intelligence is a major factor in this
change. Other contributing factors are the result of
comments on the effectiveness of the program from CTs
already in the directorate and from CT Staff counseling.
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While this speaks well for the improved reputation
of the Support Services as a career, we do not believe that
CTs under current training procedures receive enough
lectures on the Support Services. CTs are exposed to
the Directorate of Intelligence in the Intelligence Techniques
Course and to the Clandestine Services in the OFC, but
the only instruction CTs receive on the Support Services
area is five hours during the Introduction to Intelligence.
This limited exposure does not give the CT enough infor-
mation to make a decision regarding a career in the
Support Services or to appreciate that directorate's
varied role.
We believe, therefore, that the DDS should be
allocated a block of instruction in the all-purpose Famil-
iarization Course sufficient to familiarize the CT with
the operations of the various components of the Support
Services. The material presented in the Familiarization
Course could be used as a foundation for the seven-week
Support Services Course required for CTs entering
components of the Support Services.
It is recommended that: No. 17
The Deputy Director for Support instruct the
Director of Training, with representatives from
the Directorate of Intelligence, the Clandestine
Services and the Directorate of Science and
Technology, as appropriate, to design a six-week
course to be held at Headquarters to familiarize
CTs with the functions of the Agency, to replace
the nine weeks of training now consumed by
Introduction to Intelligence, Intelligence Techniques,
and Operations Familiarization.
b. Challenge of Worldwide Communism
The objectives of this four-week course are to
develop a familiarization with the doctrine, organization
and tactics of International Communism and to develop
an understanding of the challenges facing the United
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States from Communism. The course, required for all
CTs, follows the Intelligence Techniques Course and is
the responsibility of the OTR's School of International
Communism. The content of the course is built on two
existing courses available to non-CT professional
employees: Introduction to Communism and Communist
Party Organization and Operations. The course consists
of lectures by a highly competent faculty, seminars,
problems involving CT participation, and required
reading on communist theory and history of Communism.
The course is extremely well done and meets its objectives.
CTs had high praise for the tempo of instruction, the
currency and depth of substance and the caliber of the
instructors.
c. Managerial Grid Course
The Managerial Grid Course, now required for all
CTs, uses the grid concept of classifying leadership to
permit an understanding of managerial styles of others
as a means of diagnosing problems, opening communi-
cations and developing team action skills. The Support
School of OTR is responsible for this course.
In our interviews, CTs and OTR training officers
raised questions on the value of giving this training to
junior officers. In theory the training progresses from
senior supervisors down the echelon. In this instance
the progression is reversed and the grid is given to
junior officers who most likely well be assigned to
supervisors completely unfamiliar with the purposes of
the grid system. Thus the CT has undergone an additional
week of training of little immediate advantage'to himself
or the Agency.
Most of the Agency's experience with this course,
prior to the requirement for CTs taking it in 1966, was
with senior officers. Of the over 400 Agency personnel
who took the course up to the time of the requirement
for CTs, the most sizeable block was in the grade of
GS-15 and above. Another sizeable group was that made
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up of mid-career GS-13s and -l4s. It is OTR's experience
that the group that had benefited the most is the mid-career
group.
This course is given by OTR separately for other
Agency professional personnel and CTs could take it later
in their Agency careers when they have advanced to
supervisory responsibilities. At that future time the grid
would be appropriate to the individual and advantageous
to the Agency because the CT would be in or approaching
the level of mid-career development. In view of this and
in consideration of the already overextended program of
training for CTs, we do not believe that the contribution
to the CTs' training of the Managerial Grid Course is
sufficient to warrant continuing it.
It is recommended that:
The Deputy Director for Support instruct the
Director of Training to delete the Managerial Grid
Course from the CT Training Program.
d. Intelligence Production Course
The objective of the nine-week Intelligence Production
Course is to prepare C 9'for assignment to the Directorate
of Intelligence, but a few CTs who are to be assigned to
the Directorate of Science and Technoy may also take the
course. CTs acquire a detailed knowledge of the offices of
the Directorate of Intelligence and receive training in skills
required to produce intelligence. Instructional techniques
include lectures, written and oral exercises, tours of the
intelligence production offices, and brief work assignments
there.
The course, which currently averages 15 CTs per
class, helps the CT determine the component most appropiate
to his interests and training and provides the CT Staff with
information to aid in determining his assignment. From
the inception of this course the Intelligence Production
Faculty of OTR has had responsibility for the management
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of the course and primary responsibility for its ckorltent.
This course has been considered for some years as the
presentation to the CTs of the "DDI image," but has had
no formal review by the Office of the DDI. Currently
such review is being performed by a senior officer
representing the DDI.
We believe that the course provides the CT with a
good introduction to the Directorate of Intelligence through
personal contact with supervisors and analysts in OCI,
ORR and other components as well as with ONE and does
help in determining final placement. These offices have
been extremely cooperative in providing senior officers
to lecture, to conduct seminars and to meet with the CTs
for informal discussion. In ONE arrangements are made
for the class to sit in on a regular meeting of the Board
of National Estimates and to talk with the area officers.
We believe, however, that the course is too long and
run at a too leisurely pace. Elements 6f,-,the course which
we believe could be reduced are the three weeks allowed
for the major research project, the extensive time spent
in map reading and the day spent looking at computers.
Some supervisors in the Directorate of Intelligence stated
that the time spent in the Intelligence Production Course
would be more useful to the CT and the receiving component
if equivalent time were spent training on the desk. We do
not share this view. We agree with the comments of CTs
on the job whom we interviewed who stated that they had
found the course to be helpful to them not only in giving
them a working knowledge of Agency components but also
of elements in the Intelligence Community outside of the
Agency.
With the completion of this course, which follows
the OFC, the CT finishes formal training in the CT Program
and enters on trial assignment with a component of the
Directorate of Intelligence.
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It is recommended that: No. 19
The Deputy Director for Support instruct the
Director of Training to meet with representatives
of the Deputy Director for Intelligence and the
Deputy Director for Science and Technology as
appropriate, to review the objectives and doctrine
of the Intelligence Production Course and develop
a curriculum of about six weeks.
e. Support Services Course
The objective of the eight-week Support Services
Course is to prepare CTs for assignments in the Support
components of the Agency. CTs receive familiarization
on Support Services components, but the emphasis is
on small field station operations. Travel, logistics,
finance and other pertinent subjects are studied. The
course, available only to CTs, is managed by the Support
School of OTR, which worked closely with the Training
Officer of the Support Services in planning the
curriculum. This training, which follows the OFC, is
the last formal course taken by CTs before assignment.
We believe that the course is meeting its objective
in a highly satisfactory manner, but we noted one slight
problem. Through 1966, most of the 98 CTs who took
the course since it began in 1965 were assigned overseas.
But in the third course only five out of 23 CTs received
overseas assignments. The CTs from this class who
were assigned to Headquarters duty complained to us over
the emphasis in their training on overseas duties. This
might be remedied by requirements for CTs earlier so
that assignments could be decided on before the course
began. This would permit modifications in the curriculum
to include more emphasis on Headquarters operations when
most CTs in a given class are to begin service in Headquarters.
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is a prerequisite for the course. After finishing the OFC,
the CTs take two weeks of formal Headquarters desk train-
ing, the Managerial Grid and 14 weeks of actual desk exper-
ience before beginning the OC. In 1966,85 CTs and four
non-CTs took the two runnings of the course.
Instruction emphasizes live problems and is broken
down as follows:
50% on live problems
35% on seminars
10% on lectures
The main topics covered in the course are: t'radecraft
which emphasizes agent handling and recruitment, intelli-
gence and operational information reporting, counter-
intelligence, covert action, Clandestine Services operating
programs, photography,
and
In its present format the OC is almost entirely oriented
toward city operations and the toward rural areas. In
an effort to offset the emphasis on city operations, a full day
on counterinsurgency has been added to the OC. One result
of this is to duplicate material later covered in the_ A
better solution would be to combine the urban problems of the
OC with the rural problems of the=into one opera: . dons
course.
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
We were very favorably impressed with them
25X1A
management of the course and the high caliber of them
instructors on the Operations Staff responsible for the running
25X9
of the course. The caliber of instructors has greatly improved
in the last few years as the result of joint OTR/Clandestine
Services effort. The DDP, realizing the need for providing
OTR with experienced operations officers, considers a tour
in OTR to be comparable to an overseas tour for career
purposes.
The ratio of DDP careerists to OTR careerists is
favorable. During the November 1966 - January 1967 running
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It is recommended that: No. 21
The Deputy Director for Support instruct the
Director of Training to have CTs and CT applicants
informed of the desirability of having a basic
typing skill and to assist CTs to acquire this basic
skill.
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the CTs training for the Clandestine Services not receiving
a trial attachment is that under the new program they take
13 weeks of desk experience part way through their training.
a. Headquarters Desk Training
The objective of the two-week formal Headquarters
Desk Training is to familiarize CTs with desk operations
in the Clandestine Services prior to their 13 weeks work
experience on the desk. The training follows the one-week
Managerial Grid and the Operations Familiarization Course.
It does not duplicate later training taken in the Operations
Course because the Operations Course is aimed at training
CTs for field operations rather than the functions of Head-
quarters. The course had a trial running in October 1966
for five female CTs. The first full running was in January
1967 for 38 CTs.
The training, which is the responsibility of OTR's
Operations School, is divided into the following separate
units:
Unit 1 Clandestine Services Records I 2 days
Unit 2 Clandestine Services Records II 4 days
Unit 3 Role of Headquarters Desk Officer 3 days
Units 1 and 2 are standard OTR courses available to
all Clandestine Services personnel. Clandestine Services
Records I covers the Clandestine Services records system:
input, maintenance and retrieval methods. Clandestine
Services Records II concentrates on Agency resources for
running a name trace and preparing biographic information
studies. Unit 3, a newly developed block of instruction,
is concerned with the organization and functions of a
Headquarters branch, policy guidance to the field, and
operational supervision and guidance exercised by a
branch.
In view of our later recommendation that the 13 weeks
desk experience be eliminated, this block of instruction
would better serve the training needs of the CT Program
if it were given after the CT returns to Headquarters
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followin completion of the Operations Course at the
and prior to his attachment to
an operating component.
b. Desk Experience
The 13 weeks of desk experience for CTs being
trained for the Clandestine Services follows the Operations
Familiarization Course, the Managerial Grid and the
two-week formal Headquarters desk training. After
completing this training the CTs go to the
to take the 14-week Operations Course.
The purpose of the desk experience is to acquaint CTs
with Clandestine Services operating procedures and to
provide a break in their formal training. We see little
justification for this training. Under our proposed
shortened training cycle, desk experience can equally
well be acquired after. the completion of formal training
when the CT can be attached on trial to an operating
component.
Recent moves to lengthen the training of CTs for
the Clandestine Services up to two years with the addition
of the Course, several Headquarters
courses, and proposed language training have temporarily
disrupted the six months attachment concept. OTR for
budgetary reasons cannot keep CTs on its rolls this
additional time. Our recommendation to s'ten the
over-all training of CTs for the Clandestirib Services
from two years to nine months would again permit the
six-month trial attachment to be used as a period of
desk instruction.
Viewing the desk experience as a break in formal
training does not appear to be sufficient justification for
this training. If the total training is shortened as we have
recommended, a break consisting to week or two of
annual leave could be inserted part way through oi.r
proposed Combined Operations- Course
at the
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Another objection to the 13 weeks of desk experience
is that about one-third of the CTs required to participate
in the desk experience, according to CT Staff estimates,
have already been exposed to desk work. The CTs with
this work experience fall into two groups: internal CTs
who may already have served on a desk and external CTs
who have had interim assignments while awaiting the
beginning of the formal training program. The CT Staff
is aware of this problem and can exclude CTs with equiv-
alent experience from the desk work, but the CT Staff
must then find an adequate training substitute. This
places additional administrative strains on the CT Staff,
which is already overburdened with administrative details.
The Deputy Director for Support recommend
to the Deputy Director for Plans the elimination
of the 13-week desk experience from the CT Training
Program.
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In late 1966 the Bureau of the Budget told the Agency
it would have to absorb the estimated $600, 000 in additional
costs as a result of the two-year training proposal but
approved the existing program of bringing on 275 CTs per
year. This means that OTR can hold CTs on its rolls for
only abort 18 months and stay within its budget. CTs in
language training beyond 18 months will be permanently
assigned to the Clandestine Services, which will then be
responsible for their continued language training.
We have strong reservations on the desirability of
language training for CTs at the end of their formal
classroom training. At this point in their Agency careers,
all of which has been in training, they are anxious to
start work and gain a feeling of accomplishment rather
than continuing in an academic environment for another
four to six months. Division operations officers responsi-
ble for the Soviet Bloc and China Operations Courses,
taken by CTs just before language training, commented
on the apathy of CTs. This apathy, the result of lengthy
training, made it difficult to reach the CTs with the
course content.
Most of the senior operating division officials whom
we interviewed in the Clandestine Services object to the
current approach to language training. They would prefer
to start the CT on a desk assignment immediately after
he finishes his operations training, have him remain on
the desk for 6 to 18 months and then study a language
just prior to his first assignment overseas. They point
out that one of the disadvantages in the CTs studying a
language before the desk assignment is that the average
CT will forget much of his language during his desk
assignment and will need a refresher course before an
overseas assignment or may have to take an additional
language directed at the country of assignment.
As we have pointed out elsewhere, the Agency does
not know at this stage of a CT's development if he will
make the Agency a career, nor do we know whether the
language studied will be the most pertinent to h1s overseas
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assignment. He may resign during training or before going
overseas; or he may have attained required proficiency in
a language of marginal value in his country of assignment.
Since six months of language training costs the Agency
about $7, 500 per CT, from a cost point of view the advis-
ability of giving language training at this time in a CT's
career is questionable.
It is recommended that:
No. 26
We have discussed each of the courses taken. by CTs
and have made recommendations concerning many of them.
In arriving at our over-all recommendation on the CT
training cycle, we monitored a cross-section of classes
inmost of the courses. We reviewed critiques of courses
prepared by both CTs and instructors. We interviewed
CTs taking these courses, CTs on interim assignments,
and former CTs who have served for several years in the
various directorates. We talked with instructors and
senior Agency officials. We have summarized the current
training cycle and IG proposals for training on pages 87 and 88.
Our opinion, which is supported by the consensus of those
interviewed, is that the CT training cycle for all directorates
can be appreciably condensed without loss of instructional
value. We have arrived at an estimated four months of
formal training for CTs entering the Directorates of
Intelligence and Support and an approximate nine months
for those entering the Clandestine Services. We do not
consider these periods to be necessarily the fina:' length
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of the training cycle. However, we do consider them to
be reasonable guidelines for reviewing the CT training
program and focusing the objectives on current conditions.
It is recommended that: No. 27
The D`axty Director for Support, in consultation
with the Deputy Director for Plans and the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, review the CT training
cycle with the objective of reducing the training
period of CTs oin into the Clandestine Services
from and for CTs going
into the Directorate of Intelligence and Support Ser-
vices from six months to four months.
CURRENT AND IG-PROPOSED PROGRAMS
Weeks
Courses Taken by All C.Ts Current Proposed
Introduction to Intelligence 2
Intelligence Techniques 3 ) 6 (one course)
Operations Familiarization 4 )
Challenge of Worldwide Communism 4 4
Additional Training of DDP CTs
Formal Hqs Desk Training
Managerial Grid
Desk Experience
Operations Course
Language Testing
Soviet Operations
China Operations
Additional Training for DDI CTs
Managerial Grid 1 Eliminate
Intelligence Production 9 6
Totals 10 6
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Weeks
Additional Training for DDS CTs
Current Proposed
Managerial Grid
1
Eliminate
Support Services
7
7
Total Formal Directorate of
Intelligence Training
Total Formal Support Services
Training
Including normal vacations of two to three weeks,
CTs undergoing Clandesti ing are in a
formal training status for ? If three to
six months are added for training in a language to attain
the intermediate proficiency level desired by the DDP,
the total formal training period would be
and since CTs enter on duty from a few days to four
months before formal training begins it is ossible that
a CT could be in training status for
5. Training Coordinator
During our inspection we were repeatedly told by
OTR personnel that the various courses taken by CTs need
more coordination than now exists. Our. survey confirms
this need. While most of the individual courses are
extremely well done, the program as a whole contains
needless duplication. The content, for example, of
several lectures given by Clandestine Services officers
in Introduction to Intelligence in Headquarters is duplicated
during the Operations Familiarization Course. The China
Operations and Soviet Operations Courses duplicated
material given in other courses and a proposed TSD
course would have duplicated instruction already given in
the Operations Course.
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We believe that the appointment of a training coordinator
responsible to the Director of Training, whose duties would
include reviewing the content of all the courses in the program,
would correct this duplication. While reviewing course content
the coordinator should also determine if subject matter; in
individual courses is related to the over-all objectives of
the program. Teaching techniques, including adequacy of
graphic aids, motion pictures, and instructor presentation
are other areas that need over-all reviewing. A training
coordinator could have detected the pedagogical weakness
in the two-week China Operations Course.
The training coordinator could also be a point of
contact with the Assessment and Evaluation (A&E ) Staff of
the Office of Medical Services. The A&E psychologists
can be of assistance in sampling student reaction to instruction,
changes in student motivation and interests as they progress
in the course, and in offering suggestions for improving
instruction techniques. Another important area that A&E
can help is in interpreting the psychological makeup of the
CTs, their anxieties and goals to the CT Staff and instructors.
25X1A An instructor at the pointed out
that some 20 to 30 years separate the average instructor
from the CTs. He suggested that it would help the instructors
to communicate with the CTs if they knew more about the
drives and objectives of the CTs.
Several senior OTR officers urged that there be more
contact on training between the chiefs of the five schools
25X1A in OTR and the each of
whom is responsible for some part of CT training. A
training coordinator could assist the Director of Training
by chairin meetin s with the chiefs of the schools and
of the to discuss details of
training. These meetings would also give the chiefs of
schools the opportunity, not now available, of exchanging
ideas for improvements of training. The Chief of the CT
Staff, who despite his intimate association with the CT
Program has little to say about the training of CTs,
should also attend these meetings. Heads of faculties
should also be invited to participate.
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The training coordinator should keep abreast of
latest training developments in government and industry,
a function of the Director of Training under 25X1A
He could act as a focal point for the application in OTR
of the research on industry's and government's experi-
ence with programmed learning being done by the former
Director of Training. Another responsibility would be
to maintain contact on CT training matters with training
officers and operating officials in the directorates.
In considering desirable qualifications for a training
coordinator, a teaching background would be helpful but
not necessary. Of more importance would be a thorough
knowledge of the needs of the Agency.
There is a precedent in OTR for the position of
training coordinator. Several years ago a senior member
of the CT Staff, a GS-15 Career Training Officer with
Clandestine Services operational experience, had among
his other duties that of coordinating training courses for
CTs. But because his other duties had higher priority,
he was unable to make significant progress as a coordinator.
When this officer left the CT Staff, the coordinating function
was not renewed.
The Deputy Director for Support assign a
senior officer to the Office of Training to report
directly to the Director of Training as a Special
Assistant for coordinating training. His duties
as related to the CT Program should include:
a.. Reviewing Career Training Program
course content to ensure that individual courses
are related to the over-all objectives of the
program and that needless duplication is not
included.
b. Ensuring that sound instructional
techniques are employed.
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c. Chairing meetings with chiefs of
schools and staffs to exchange ideas for
improving CT training.
d. Keeping abreast of latest training
developments in government and industry.
e. Maintaining liaison with the
Assessment and Evaluation Staff of the
Office of Medical Services to take advantage
of the services A&E can offer to CT training.
f. Maintaining contact with training
officers and operating officials in the three
primary directorates that use CTs.
6. DDI Representation in OTR
Traditionally the DDI has given only slight attention
to the training of CTs. But in the fall of 1966, concerned
over the Directorate image presented to the CTs, he assigned
a senior official to review training of CTs and to review
course content pertaining to his Directorate. This repre-
sentative has recommended that there be a permanent
representative of the DDI in OTR. We believe that this
recommendation is sound.
The duties of the Directorate representative could
include reviewing course content and making certain the
curriculum meets the needs of the Directorate for CTs
and coordinating any substantive changes with OTR. He
could coordinate requirements for CT assignees and
work with the CT Program Officers in planning both
interim and long-term assignments leading to permanent
placement. He could be available to discuss with individual
CTs careers in the Directorate, thus easing pressure on
the counseling function of the CT Program Officers. He
could act as coordinator for the intelligence briefings
which OCI now presents to the CTs during their entire
training program as a result of the recommendation by
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the Directorate representative in December 1966. He
could also serve as the focal point for general support to
OTR. An ideal length of tour would be about two years.
The Deputy Director for Support negotiate
with the Deputy Director for Intelligence for the
assignment of an experienced officer, preferably
from OCI, to the Office of Training as a special
assistant to the Director of Training to repre-
sent the Deputy Director for Intelligence in OTR.
7. Need for Instructor Training
Instructors in Operations 25X1A
25X1A ave a wealth of operating experience but
only a few have had any teaching experience. With the
increased numbers of Clandestine Services careerists
25X1A being assigned as opposed to OTR careerists, this
lack of teaching experience has become more noticeable.
Several instructors both Agency careerists and 25X1A
contract employees, feel a need for assistance in preparing
segments of instruction and in basic instructional techniques.
Requiring all officers, newly assigned to OTR as
instructors, to take the one-week Instructor Training
Course would give them a useful exposure to pedagogical
methods, which when combined with their operational
experience would greatly improve their over-all effective-
ness as instructors. The Instructor Training Course has
not been given regularly since the death of the course's
chief instructor in mid-1965 and was not listed in recent
issues of the OTR Bulletin. OTR, however, retains the
capability of presenting the course and gives it when there
is a need. Operations instructors in Headquarters took
the course in July 1966. But OTR?s records show that the
course has not been given to the instructors since
February 1965. Since there is a 30% to 40% turnover in
instructors each year, this course should probably be made
available to instructors -several times a year.
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We believe it would also help to have an officer
experienced in teaching techniques assigned to the staff
25X1A of the Chief- This officer would be available
to help instructors improve their teaching methods,
help them plan new blocks of instruction, and to revise
old material.
A few years ago the Agency consultant in effective
speaking and conference techniques fro
25X1A
sect to visit~nd offer suggestions .or
25X1A
improving techniques of presentation. Instructors found
this to be helpful.
The Deputy Director for Support instruct
the Director of Training to:
a. Require that all career officers
and contract employees assigned to OTR
as instructors take the Instructors Train-
ing Course.
b. Assign an officer experienced in
teaching techniques to the staff of the
to
assist instructors in Improving instruc-
tional techniques and in preparing blocks
of instruction.
8. Training of Women C T s
arl 1967 the DDP established a program lasting
from eeks for the training of women CTs who are
destined for the Clandestine Services. After initially
taking the basic 13 weeks of instruction common to all
CTs including the Operations Familiarization Course,
they take one of four special courses: CE, Reports, CA
and Operations. These courses include 12 weeks of on-
the-desk training. Included in the schedule are courses
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whose value we have questioned for all CTs. Although
this program is in its initial running, it appears to have
certain undesirable factors common to the training for
male CTs such as extended length of time, duplication,
and the inclusion of the Managerial Grid. We have pre-
viously recommended that the CT training cycle be
shortened. In a similar manner we believe this training
for women CTs can be appreciably condensed without
loss of instructional value.
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I. Placement
Placement of CTs is well handled. The first step
in the process begins with the recruiter, who may indicate
on his interview report where he thinks the CT could best
serve the Agency. The Program Officers on the CT Staff
during the Headquarters interviews of applicants usually
comment on the applicant's potential, and the A&E Staff
also contributes its views. These are now only preliminary
steps, however, and the formal identification of the CT for
a particular directorate is not made until the CT has com-
pleted 13 weeks of training including the Operations Fami.
liarization Course (OFC). This identification, which is
one of the major functions of the CT Staff, is based on
everything that the Agency knows about the CT plus the
needs of the Agency and the preference of the CT.
After the OFC, CTs selected for the Directorate of
Intelligence take the nine-week Intelligence Production
Course; CTs for the Support Services take the Support
Services Course; CTs for the Clandestine Services take
two weeks of classroom work in the operation of a Head-
quarters desk and then begin a 13-week period of desk
experience in a division.
In our section on Training we recommend that the
four-week OFC be reduced to two weeks and combined
with the Introduction to Intelligence and Intelligence
Techniques Course into one familiarization course. This
shortening of the OFC, which the CT Staff uses as an
indicator in deciding whether or not a CT is suitable for
the Clandestine Services, should not adversely affect
the identification for a directorate. The instructors in
the OFC told us that since they can give only a cursory
evaluation of CTs because of the large classes, they
.doubt the validity of using the OFC as a fair indication of
CT potential. Additionally, using a familiarization course
as a major tool for determining a CT's career does not
appear to be sound. The CT Staff has sufficient material
on hand concerning the CT's backgrounds and interests to
arrive at an early identification of directorate.
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Once a CT is identified for the Clandestine Services,
the next step is the selection of the division where he will
spend his 13 weeks of desk experience. Representatives
of Operational Services and the Office of the DDP review
the requests of the divisions and staffs for CTs and decide
on allocations. With these allocations they review files of
the CTs identified for the Clandestine Services and, after
discussions with the CT Staff, assign the CT to a parti-
cular division.
Under our section on Training we recommend that
the 13 weeks of desk experience be eliminated. This
should not alter early identification by division. Earlier
identification can be extremely helpful to the morale of
the CTs who, until the recently devised selection for desk
experience, did not learn of their division assignment
until the very end of their training. Now they can read,
study and discuss with instructors a geographic area on
their own during training.
During their desk experience, CTs are exposed to
another screening process. A panel, since April 1966,
has interviewed CTs to determine their suitability for
the Clandestine Services before they continue with their
formal training. The panel is chaired by Chief,-
and has four other senior members. The panel reviews
files and interviews CTs to determine suitability and
motivation. As of 1 February 1967 the panel had turned
down only two CTs out of a total of 81 CTs interviewed.
The panel had reservations on four others, three of
whom performed satisfactorily in the remainder of their
training.
We question the need for this recently adopted
screening process. The Clandestine Services is repre-
sented in the original selection of CTs and their placement
after training by careerists from the Clandestine Services
assigned to the CT Staff. As we have pointed out earlier,
the selection of CTs is carried out in a highly commend-
able manner. Furthermore, the panel has rejected only
a small percentage of CTs.
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It is recommended that: No. 31
The Deputy Director for Plans review
the present procedure for determining suit-
ability of CTs for the Clandestine Services
to determine whether this additional screen-
ing process is necessary in view of the effective-
ness of the initial screening of CT applicants
by the CT Staff and the success of the Staff in
placing CTs after training is completed.
Until the training for CTs going into the Clandestine
Services was recently extended all
CTs on the completion of their formal training were
attached to operating components for trial periods of
three to six months. Now, only CTs entering the
Directorate of Intelligence and the Support Services have
a trial period which gives the CT a chance to prove him-
self on a real job. Each supervisor must submit a progress
report to the CT Staff after three months, and the CTs
must provide the CT Staff periodic progress reports. CTs
remain on the rolls of OTR during this trial period. If
their performance is satisfactory they are permanently
assigned to the operating component.
Most attachments lead to permanent assignments,
but occasionally a CT is unable to perform at the level
expected of him. In OCI, for example, he might not deve-
lop the ability of rapid writing to meet publication deadlines.
An unsatisfactory attachment may also result from poor
supervision, lack of work, or because the CT finds the
work unsuited to his career objectives. When an attach-
ment is not satisfactory, the CT Staff will try to place
him elsewhere in the Agency. On rare occasions the CT
may be tried on two or three jobs before being successfully
placed. After exhausting all possibilities, the CT Staff
may encourage the CT to resign.
Our interviews with CTs on trial attachments showed
that the CTs are gainfully occupied and that their talents
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are being utilized. A CT in the Office of Security was
working on automation of management information. Those
in the Clandestine Services who were under the old training
cycle had been given responsible desk assignments. In
OCI CTs were assigned primary responsibility for current
intelligence reporting on a particular country or on a pro-
blem relating to a country.
After CTs have satisfactorily completed trial periods
of attachment, they leave the rolls of OTR and are per-
manently assigned to the directorate where they have been
attached. If the component is an office in the Directorate
of Intelligence, the CT will normally remain there for the
rest of his career, although he may transfer to another
component. While still a junior officer he might also
transfer to the Clandestine Services, but this happens infre-
quently. Agency experience with regular input of CTs
into the Support Services is too recent to permit generalizing.
It is likely, though, that the CTs will remain in the Support
Services, probably rotating to two or three offices or
serving overseas before assuming the career designation
of a particular office. If the component is a division of
the Clandestine Services, the CT will probably remain in
that division for his first several years in the Agency.
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Traditionally, most CTs have pursued their Agency
careers in the Clandestine Services. When the 1960 IG
su*(ey of Agency training was made, 79% of all CTs were
in `the Clandestine Services, 18% in the Directorate of
Intelligence, and 3% in the Support Services. This pattern
has not changed appreciably although in recent years the
percentage of CTs entering the Clandestine Services has
declined slightly. At the end of Calendar Year 1966, of
the 824 CTs assigned to Agency components, 72% were in
the Clandestine Services, 17% in the Directorate of Intel-
ligence, and 8% in the Support Services. The CTs in the
remaining 3% were divided between the Directorate of
Science and Technology and the Office of the Director.
It is unlikely for the foreseeable future that the Directorate
of Science and Technology will use more than a few CTs
per year. That directorate is hiring scientists and tech-
nologists to fill critical needs. This does not normally
permit time for several months of training ~n the CT Program.
R
Now that the CT Program is 15 years old, former
CTs are beginning to move into middle and senior Agency
positions. In OCI, for example, an area chief and a division
chief are former CTs. ONE has four GS-15 estimates
officers. A former Directorate of Intelligence officer from
the first CT class is an office director in the Directorate
of Science and Technology. The Clandestine Services has
two GS-15 officials in Headquarters and
MEMME ranging in grade from GS-12 to
GS-14. In the Support Services, one former CT is the
chief of support in an area division. Within the next five
to ten years the movement of CTs into senior positions
should proceed rapidly.
Attrition
One of management's key concerns about any career
training program is the attrition of the program's graduates.
The over-all attrition of the Agency's CTs from the begin-
ning of the program through December 1966 is 31%. Attri-
tion from early classes is as high as 65%. Many of the
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factors which make for separation of CTs, such as the
impact of security and cover on the CT and his family,
are peculiar to CIA. But attrition is higher than in com-
parable programs outside the Agency, and we believe it
is possible to reduce it.
In investigating CT attrition, we found that our first
problem was to come up with a meaningful expression of
attrition. During our interviews we received conflicting
statements concerning attrition. After studying machine
runs of CT separations and other pertinent material pro-
vided by the Office of Personnel and the Office of Training,
we concluded that trying to express CT attrition in a
single percentage is misleading, and that the most effec-
tive method of describing attrition is to consider attrition
by blocks of classes since 1951.
We heard criticism of the accuracy of the machine
listing used for our. analysis. The criticism is that the
listing, which shows CTs who have joined the Agency and
left from 1951 through December 1966, records as separa-
tions CTs who have resigned to enter Agency-sponsored
military programs and CTs who resign for cover reasons.
We believe, however, that for our purposes of showing
trends rather than analyzing every class the listing is
adequate.
The machine listing shows that a total of 1648 CTs
have joined the Agency since the first class. in December
1951. Of these 1648 CTs, 504 or 31% have left the Agency,
leaving 1144 or 69% still on duty. These percentages can
be misleading, because they are based on every CT who
has entered on duty, including CTs from the most recent
classes and CTs who entered on duty in 1966 for the
February 1967 class.
We believe that the most meaningful. evaluation of
attrition is had by excluding CTs in the most recent classes
and by examining earlier groups. Early CT classes have
greater attrition than recent classes. Of the 156 CTs, for
example, who joined the Agency in the first five CT classes
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between December 1951 and December 1953, the attrition
is 65%. There is a progressive decline in attrition in the
later years, so that of the 374 CTs who were in the five
classes from July 1962 to July 1964, the attrition is only
24%. Most attrition occurs while the CT is still a trainee.
In examining attrition of CTs, three sub-categories
should be considered: externals, internals and female CTs.
Of the 1379 externals who have entered on duty, 465 or 33. 6%
have left. Of the 269 internals, 39 or 14. 5% have left.
This is to be expected because internals enter the CT Pro-
gram usually with at least two years of Agency experience
and have decided on an Agency career before applying for
the CT Program. As we indicated earlier, the lower
attrition of internals is one of the advantages of having
internals in the CT Program. At the same time, however,
it does not mean that the Agency should place less emphasis
on recruiting externals who in general have a higher potential
than internals.
Analysis by sex of CTs shows that of the 1649 male
CTs who entered on duty, 415 or 28% have left. Of the 179
females, 89 or 50% have left. Because of marriage and
related factors, this attrition is not startling. Also,
female CTs who separate are not always a net?ss. Some
of them marry Agency personnel and contribut Ito their
husbands' careers.
In reviewing the attrition of CTs who have been in the
Agency five years, we find that the Agency does not do
quite as well as other organizations that operat training
programs for high quality trainees such as the t T. The
Agency had two classes in 1961 totaling 89 CTs As of
December 1966, 36 of these CTs had resi n,ed, a 40%
attrition. While this is lower than prIte? enterprise's
over-all 50% attrition, it is greater than specific employers
with good management trainee programs, such as Chase
Manhattan Bank, which has a five year attrition of 34%.
The Agency's CT attrition is also greater than that of the
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federal government's Management Intern Program, which
lost 32% of its 1961 group, and more than that of the Depart-
ment of State's Junior Foreign Service Officers.
There are no panaceas for lowering attrition. CTs
leave CIA for many of the same reasons that cause personnel
turnover in industry, academic and professional fields.
Other pastures appear greener; the salary and fringe bene-
fits look better; the job offers more challenge and greater
advancement potential. Reducing the rate of CT attrition
depends on developing sounder personnel management
throughout the career of the CT, both during and after his
formal training. The following recommendations, made
earlier in this report, are directed at correcting conditions
that contribute to CT resignation:
Not mentioning promotion to GS-11 in 3 to 3-1/2 years.
Recommendation No. 7, page 25.
Consideration of higher starting salaries.
Recommendation No. 8, page 28.
Increased emphasis on counseling.
Recommendation No. 2, page 16.
More attention on interim assignment.
Recommendation No. 16, page 51.
Shortening of training program.
Recommendation No. 27, page 87.
Career Monitoring
A common criticism of the CT Program is that it trains
CTs for an office such as OCI or a directorate rather than
training CTs for an Agency-wide career. We do not see,
however, how the CT Program can do othe:Qwise since the
Agency is compartmented into numerous individual career
services.
The development of the CT's career through selected
assignment, rotation and promotion varies considerably by
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component. The Support Services is the only directorate
that has a specific career program for CTs. When the CT
is attached to that directorate, the Support Development
Panel assigns him to an office or prepares him for an
overseas tour. His career i$ then monitored for four to
six years. This system started in early 1965 when the
first Support Services Course was held.
The purpose of this program is to prepare CTs for
management positions. To achieve this the DDS plans to
rotate CTs in various offices on two-year work assignments.
The assignments are flexible and if the CT performs well
in his first assignment and if he wishes to remain there,
that office might be his career.
As of February 1967, 98 CTs had completed the
ort Services Course prior to assignment. The DDS
The Support Development Panel reviews the CT's
performance ten months after his last promotion in OTR.
If his work has been satisfactory, he is promoted. His
performance is reviewed annually thereafter and if he
performs satisfactorily he is promoted to GS-11 when he
then goes in competition with general support officers in
the same grade.
The Foreign Service has a similar monitoring system.
The Foreign Service takes on 150 to 200 junior officers
yearly, and monitors the careers of these officers for
their first three tours. The normal pattern is two tours
overseas of two years each followed by a tour in Washington.
If the officer's first assignment is to a large post, an
effort is made to assign him to a small post for his next
assignment. The Foreign Service also attempts to have
his second assignment be to a different geog:aaphic area
than the first.
We believe that the other directorates should care-
fully examine the pattern developed by the Foreign Service
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and the Support Services. We do not advocate hand holding,
but monitoring the careers of CTs helps prevent the CT
from getting lost in an office or division of a directorate
and ensures that his assignments are comparable for pro-
motion purposes with his classmates.
CTs who enter the Directorate of Intelligence are
assigned to an office, usually OCI, DCS or ORR. That
office then becomes responsible for the development of
the CT, who acquires the career designation of the office
after leaving the rolls of OTR. The administrative office
of the DDI assumes no further active responsibility for the
CT. The disadvantage to this approach is that the CT who
may not be doing well in a particular. office, or who has
advanced as far as he can in that office, must depend on
his own initiative or that of his supervisor to try to place
him in another office.
In the Clandestine Services there is only a minimum
of monitoring of CT careers above the division level.
His desk work, additional training, overseas assignments,
and Headquarters assignments are primarily a division
responsibility. Operational Services appears to exercise
only a minor role in these personnel functions.
We believe that the first several years of a CT's
career are too critical to be left almost entirely to any
one division or staff. If the DDP does not consider a
central monitoring of CTs to be feasible, we believe that
In our interviews with senior operating officials in
the Clandestine Services, we found a considerable variety
of opinions concerning early assignments of CTs. On only
one point was there agreement. This was the desirability
of assigning CTs overseas after twelve to eighteen months
of desk work. But on the number of overseas tours and
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Promotions
In reviewing promotions of CTs, we have identified
three major problem areas. The first two, the grades at
which CTs enter on duty and slowness in promotion to
GS-11, we have discussed under our section on Recruiting.
We recommended that the DDS consider giving higher
grades to CTs when they join the Agency and pointed out
the desirability of CTs reaching GS-11, which has an ade-
quate subsistence'wage for a CT and his family, in a
reasonable time period.
The third problem area is that of the CT's mid-
career, when he is a GS-12 or -13. About one-third of
the 824 CTs assigned to Agency components are GS-12s
and -13s. When they become GS-13s they join the Agency's
600 other GS-13s who have only a slight opportunity of
advancing to GS-14 because of lack of headroom. The
situation of the GS-13 CTs will soon become known to CTs
in the GS-9 and -10 grades who have just been assigned to
operating components. This can have only an adverse effect
on morale of the younger CTs and, in some cases, will
lead to resignations. During our survey several CTs,
recently assigned to components, expressed doubts to us_
about their future, not just based on promotions, but in
terms of acquiring responsibility. One of the CT resignees
we interviewed left because of these reasons.
CTs do not join CIA to make a lot of money. They
apply for the Agency because they think they will like intel-
ligence and are service-oriented. Also, they are seeking
a challenge and a chance to use their innate and acquired
skills. At the same time, however, they have families
to support and must give practical consideration to the
development of their careers.
The capable CT probably would have a more success-
ful career as far as promotion and early assumption of
responsibilities are concerned if he entered government
through the Federal Government Management Intern Pro-
gram, which in 1966 hired 417 Management Interns.
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Applicants who pass the required Intern exam become
GS-7s or -9s as do our CTs. However, their promotion
rates are rapid and their average grades are higher
than CTs in operating components. One CT resigned to
participate in the Management Intern Program.
The FBI starts its new agents, mostly lawyers and
accountants, as GS-10s. First promotions of agents
come faster than do CTs. If their performance is satis-
factory, they may be promoted to GS-11 in I -1 / 2 years
and to GS-12 three years later. The maturity and educa-
tional. backgrounds of many of our CTs are comparable
to FBI agents.
All professional trainees in the federal government
do not, of course, move as rapidly as Management Interns
and FBI agents. In the Foreign Service, for example,
promotions in the lower grades are slower. It takes
about three years to move from the equivalent of GS-7
to GS-9, but promotions come with regularity in mid-
career and a capable FSO can look forward to being an FSO-2,
which is between a GS-15 and a GS-16, in about 21 years.
Studies now being prepared by the Office of Personnel
on the scope of Agency losses among management and
professional personnel during the next decade may lead
to personnel action to relieve the GS-13 bulge. Thus,
future attrition and retirement appear to be the principal
solution to the problem of lack of headroom that exists
today.
Perspective
Today the CT Program approaches a point in its
development that requires scrutiny of the basic philosophy
on which the program was established. The original con-
cept of obtaining for the Agency a small number of highly
qualified young intelligence officers still governs the CT
Program. But with its expansion there is a developing
opinion that now considers the CT Program the major
source for procuring young gene-al intelligence officers to
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meet the expanding requirements of the Agency. The
Program Memorandum on Program-Wide CT training
prepared by the Office of Planning, Programming and
Budgeting based on projections made by the Support Ser-
vices shows 275 CT positions for FY 1967. This number
is increased yearly until by FY 1972 the figure is 325.
The Office of Personnel is studying the impact that
retirement of senior personnel, over the next. five to ten
years will have on future personnel needs. One current
estimate is that as many as 400 CTs would have to enter
on duty each year to replace officers who will be retiring.
If such a quota were established and filled, the CT Pro-
gram could not continue as it was originally conceived.
It would become instead a system for recruiting, selecting,
and training young phi.eralist intelligence officers to meet
the Agency's needs for professional personnel..
25X1A A long lead time is needed to recruit and train CTs.
For the Clandestine Services this lead time could easily
is
maintained. We believe, therefore, that the Office of
Personnel and the Office of Training should prepare as
soon as possible long-range quotas for the CT Program
based on the latest available studies on the impact of
retirement.
In view of the demonstrated effectiveness of the CT
Program in meeting already-expanded requirements, we
conclude that the Agency's interests would be best served
by using the CT Program as the basic mechanism for
fulfilling the Agency's growing need for young professionals.
The Deputy Director for Support, upon
the completion of the studies on the impact of
retirement on the Agency, Consider requ'-sting
a temporary increase in the table of organization
of the Career Training Program to meet retire-
ment losses anticipated in the next five to ten
years to avoid last-minute crash recruiting programs.
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Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01826RO01100080007-9
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