THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE VIEW OF NEGOTIATIONS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B00023A001000010005-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 12, 2006
Sequence Number: 
5
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 27, 1967
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B00023A001000010005-9.pdf970.5 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2006/0 The South Vietnamese view of N.~iations F Ie `respects This me orande em mines the attit South Vietna se f-over t toward r tiatioi both general and specific termn. discusses the basic ingredients. of th and certain politicl factors which ome into play. in the second section we t to estimate C 7 reactions to three sets of alretv- stancos in w! is talk with anti ri t be held. The attitude of South Vietna 's litaxy gov ern nt toward a negotiated. sett .e nt is do ted by three co iderati ss participation ir.. any talks in which its ftture is at stake; rejection of N T claia to authority over any portion of iti terrfi - tory or people y and quairantees against C tni; , t sub version followinq a withdrawal. In addition to these for a settle nt, the def a o! cooperation in the event of pre tween the O and Hanoi would depen the bombing campaign in the North of reciprocal action by Tumoi, and on which the talks were hold. Approved For Release 200q/02/10 : CIA-RDP8000023AO01000010005-9 first section Vietnaa ose Vi;,? nt i Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80B00023AO01000010005-9 TCV -.. titter of South V to ' V .Uta q t ad a wmotiatwl seethe sat of the wax inated by three ideti ss r too ai . ata 4 aW1 party to any talks in a futmze is at stasFk it should wle the authority of the Nat r4tieft o South Vietnam (m I for a pea e niAtter June 106 S, bt ii,t their ear p' a . te, they their i ss anywhere ec d t tie rith it+ l es istwwo n. and leaders ammivton t & n coti atet - =tr , but since 'tialltti s voul+ : past ? ar profpss4id * entati s of Hanoi they Na d ,- ast any ti f i, t r has ultod f .lo m pressures whiob have -fir ce Ise to take note of p;>,i.. , as ira ti in s amridemm thaw A%-*-' gain ea . and -li.?tis climate has inpro"d. It does nott how. rs, Appoar to mark w~y A ntal i r e o aatt ttid+ . an to terror s t, i. of all tom.. . Viets 2) South Viet t- 'etn#1 cf.fai 3) a graft*. ! v o at, a f greater IL i4.:asv Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80B00023AO01000010005-9 Tim MRST Approved For Release 2006 - 00023A001000010005-9 1+ad, the 1.u- a z:,. as 1 * jrc , may Prove 0 I *Un& u 7. oat has pomed no a tto VALtraj eo t 1U! =0 f a StOP towazd talks, tromly a i to the nogetAstims t i it ti .. is a 1 ted AL *t1 ?s In tho peace 41ity of ota a t4v? A . * party. i.. *t 1i ct i o m rt " role in aer "em's +a1 : aft .f' that ha" 00atribt t4be troo Approved For Release 2 9 an in s has r"pmdea t j Lat'' U 14 stowing into o P rae cat rat of Viet-.. al ra ssmw point 606MMI-0 of ,# ou's *ream of Low or it Octvb*r this year. #.a~ ,, I 0023A001000010005-9 *h v. TOP SUMS` Approved For Release 2006 02/10: CIA-RDP OB00023AO01000010005-9 25X1 8. Another fact which should be noted is that South Vietnam's new constitution gives the National Assembly the per "to determine declarations of war and the holding of peace talks." Apart from the militant Catholics, the predominantly civilian assembly is not likely to be more recalcitrant to- ward negotiations than the executive. South Viet- nam's leaders might try to exploit this constitutional provision, however, should they feel that negotiations might jeopardize their own interests. 9. In the final analysis, the degree of South Vietnamese cooperation in any approach to a settle- ment will be governed by the considerations mentioned earlier, i.e.,, by the extent to which Saigon believes its essential interests are protected. These require- ments would of course became decisive in the event that US-DRV talks moved from preliminary to substan- tive questions. But they probably would strongly in- fluence the ms's willingness to cooperate even in the first stage of any talks. 10. South Vietnam's basic requirements for a settlement may be modified, of course, if the strategic balance alters significantly over the next year or so. In this event, N cooperation would depend on the extent to which its assessment of the prevailing situa- tion accords with our own. Another factor which could assume more importance under changing conditions is the degree of confidence Saigon has in US motivation. This has not been a significant problem so far,, largely because the military leadership has assumed that US policy in to pursue the war until it can be brought to a conclusion on favorable terms. Should the GM inter- pret any future diplomatic moves on our part as signifying a retreat from this policy, its attitude toward negotiations would become increasingly in- transigent. Approved For Release 2006 P10 : 5 80B00023A001000010005-9 TOE` 1?" Approved For Release 2006/ - 00023AO01000010005-9 Uoul*v we ., 1# with the r * .. .. ' inw ix- Oates of i s 1 Ankol the toll jug o X - 1 - . s mr -i ;, i e thola Oi r p 2 uj* first tt"O #a ti- toward a sattlowat L.**. that tE. k tint n subs o it to the 41 LAS (a L 1st - NMI* an e i of tho three imc' r ;l Alaimix* po Uti fallout in A*s 10; the W-VU choose t tse not to *Lou% t the Wks * b C-f t U em. S , nt wed tho - i ii acurso of tA* disc , 4014 i opt a S. , t4* - mj4bt thA talker. A S try"q dtoerw4it the frt wcml4 0 t nee ik 1 P far .. t ttdAft ML-R- **m as rat s . * t 1 for di f ou tU* ` ..rst P LAO*, t: *q as b iri Ut thaa a;..-- 'fit t440 u tic as If 4 it i - - a "r - tf t, 25X1 Approved For Release 20Ub1UJ"U .> , OB00023AO01000010005-9 Approved For Release 2006 YM have path C &9 tit t* 84 oarAitUmm, the we, OS f^OW fare d i- y ,iUt to talk the LT :r the WO&4jtiM&,, the OW r itrobably would Pr*Z r to do as a *..: 1 to V-- . v disaw . rather than t tl of .- L4 4 not to s* of aotion would ?d. th t outright. ..is actAca mit a *4 a Lett a ice:, 81]~Villty Would b* to o taus rim th* of S* i9 then. A9* n, VhIch alt r s' Chan* would be influor4ad y the v Approved For Release 20610=0 - 0023AO01000010005-9 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80B00023AO01000010005-9 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80B00023AO01000010005-9