INFORMAL VIEW ON THE CURRENT SOVIET POSITION ON DISARMAMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080076-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 76
• Publication Date: February 26, 1957
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/31 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080076-4
Mr. Robert E. Matteson
W. A. Tidwell
Informal View on the Current Soviet Position on Disarmament
February 26, 1957
There is attached a Staff Memorandum prepared by a meMber of the Office
of National Eetimates of CIA giving his views of the current Soviet position
on disarmament. This is not a coordinated paper and represents nothing more than
the views of one well-informed intelligence analyst* I feel, however, that it
is worth considering as a background paper on the subject.
Attachment:
Staff Memorandum No. 10-57
as stated.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/31 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080076-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/31 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080076-4
It. Robert L. Matteson February 26, 1957
W. A. Tidwell
Comments on "Reconciliation of Positions"
I have two general comments that pertain to a nuMber of points set
out on the sheets.
One, in those proposals related to the budget questions, I think that
we should ask for a clarification of the role that prices in various countries
will have since the countries involved have radically different price structures
and economic controls. For example' a country might double its armament
purchases over time by following a deflationary palsy while another country
mL;ht halve its amaments acquisitions by following an inflationary policy.
With regard to the points corxcernin force levels, I think we would be
well advised to agree on what constitutes armed forces since the Soviet Union
has at least two organizations of uncertain status. These are the troops of
the HVD who are uniformed, arned and organized in a military fashion and the
D3S1AF which perforns a great many support functions in training personnel for
military and civil defense purposes.
EXSEC (Not for Log)
WATidwell:cpc
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/31 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080076-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/31 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080076-4
Ar, Robert E. eattesen
W. A. Tidwell
esbruary 26, 1957
Intellieence concerning poesible eoviet attitude in forthcoming
disceesions
Thu will recell that last week Ar. Donkin brought to the Governor's
attention a National intellieence Estimate reviewine the world situation (!IE 100-3-57).
This UIE indicated that there was considerable fluidity in the current world
situation are that there were factors which mijlt lead one to believe that the
eoviet Union mieht take sone concrete steps of a more realistic nature than they
have soectimes undertaken in the past. I personally agree with Mee Dobkin that
this is a most thoueht provokine estimete and that the factors discussed may have
considerable influence on the Soviet position in London.
I am eorwardine with this memorandum, however, a copy of draft of
eIb 12-ee entitled Hetebility of the Soviet Satellite Structure". The final
approved estimate is probably out be now but this draft is the latest version
that I could eet re* hands on. I would like to call your attention particularly
to paragraph 13 of the Conclusions and paragraphs 5, 21 and 22 of the Discussion.
This estimate envieaees no possibility of a general political or military withe
erawal oe the Soviet Union from europe even in return for a. withdrawal of U.S.
forces, The ettimate envisages a rt id o'. act attitude rather dieferent from that
Liplied in the earlier estimete mentioned above. I was struck by this seeming
inconsistency.
I think that it would probably be advisable for lovernor etassen
to be acquainted with the satelAte eetieate and the diverse tmplications in theee-
e-e"
two estimates.
It SWIM to es that there are three eeneral interpretations of the
Soviet attitude that we mieht expect. Unfortunately at this juncture there is no
way of knowing for sure which is likely to be the correct one. They might be
stated as follows:
1) ell Soviet 3roposals are desiened for propaganda effeet
completely cynical.
2) Domestic problens in the 3oviet Union are so severe and Soviet
foreien-poliey has received such setbacks recently that the Russians are genuinely
interested in reducing their comaitmenta proveded they drive a sufficiently hard
bargain to leave the feeline relatively secure.
3) There exist in the Soviet Government two or more schools of
thoueht embodying the above positions aed teat the proponents of each school of
thoueht rise or decrease in influence in accordance with external events and/or
the Aseree to which the respective policies advocated achieve concrete results.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/31 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080076-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/31 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080076-4
2 -
If one were to accept this categorisation of pot:sib's interpretations
for the sake of ar-ument, one could almost say that the satellite estimate
subscribes to the first view and the estieate of the world situation to the
second. I think, however, that we should not overlook the third possibility.
for exenple, I have been struck by a seall matter which could actually refloat
such a situation. You probably recall that when Preateent eisenhower proposed
the open skies policy at eeneva, his Russian counterparts were horrified because
such a scheme would "put both our countries in the hands the intellieence
eeople". Upon looking into the Etussian organization ':or the conduct of aerial
photoTaphy, I fine that there are two major or ;anizations involved. One of
teese is the 'ilitary Topoeraphical Departueat of the einistery of Defense which
Ls a relatively soar' organization. It almost appears that the eissian eilitary
has traditionally used aerial photo raphy eer front line tactical situations and
not :or lene-rano strateeic intelligence. On the ether hand, the second organi-
zation, tee Chief Directorete ef Carto-yaphe and leotioey of the einistery of
Interior (M71)) has a leree aerial photo raphic capability which has been used
extenaLvely for mappine ane 'or the plamein; of natural resource Oevelopmeet.
The lir force intelli7ence tecenicians say that the equipment ane techniques
used by the 'WP in ecrial photoeraphy are quite ewe.
It is ieeerostia to note that the eebruary 1 TASS statement on
dlsareeeents ween it referred to the proposal for using aerial photoeraphy in
europe, used the words ewithin the area disposition in Europe of the principal
areed eorces of the eorth etiantic Bloc and the earsaw Treaty Powers". -1%12 is
the kind of lane-Jae that one ei At expect if there were a cation of jurisdiction
between the elle) and the eoveet hinistery of Defense. In other words, the eilitary
ei,et retain jurisdiction for aerial photoraphy in an area that could be fined
as a purely military area but the fee, ii ;ht be involved if the area included the
tnterior of the eoviet Onion or .involved eziw; aerial pnetoeraphy in areas and
aeeint the targets requirine aealytical toeltniques developed by the 1eile. Could it
be )ossible that e have in the eovember 17 proposals a set of proposals acceptable
to one 7,roup in the Soviet elvernmeet and deliberately constructed to avoid
involving another roup in the :evict emernmeet openeed to such a course of action?
1 this were-tee case, It would create complications for the American scheme of
pro:mu:sive application of inzpection and controls since eassian cooperation in
rye area of jurisdiction ei;et lac radically different t'rOM euesian cooperation
In aeother. On the other hand, successful impleeentation of controls agreeable
to oee ;roue ei-ht stronethen the position of that eroup ieside the eoviet enion
so as to lake possible :lore comprehensive agreements in the future.
Attachment:
As stated.
cc: EXSEC (Not leir Log)
WATidwellscpc
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/31 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080076-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/31 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080076-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/31 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080076-4
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