YOUR MEMO RE COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01083A000100090066-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 66
• Publication Date: February 6, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

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OffiCe 1 YlmorandUM ? UNITED STATES GO V R
ty
W. P. Bundy
DATE: 6 FebruL ry
t
T subscribe -- as do our senior stsff people ---ergo attached. 25X1
Vie feel ?Tou Greatly exagv-erate the importance of time ix',.ness, except for the area
of intelligence related to v~rning, which I believe is under dFta1 ed study by
JJ and Co. As aA practical matter, si eak.ng of such major chant-es on an across-the-
board basis, gP,s'.i biy I Iwould be most likely 25X1
to foul things up and delay the really necessary c antes. in other words, then.
may be areas where intelligence shrr ld, and does not now, have the ki;;d of ideal
system you envisage. ?But let's talk about those rather than about the whole of
things.
Moreover, one needs to know w1 tlher your propo-;al involves a factor of 5
or 50 in multiplying current facilities and cost. '_y hunch would b& nearer 50,
but our rain comment would a; . ly even if it w rr: only 5.
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4 February 1958
MEMORANDUM FOR: DAD/NE
SUBJECT: Comments on Intelligence Communications and Related
Procedures 0 Memo dated 13 January 1958)
1. In general the subject memo is a noble and novel effort to shake
the intelligence community loose from some horse and buggy practices
and procedures. I would agree with the desirability - as firmly as
I an against sin - for the development of a communications continuum
based entirely on electrical means - witti sufficient capacity to handle
nearly all intelligence information. I believe, however, that the memo
would be more effective if in paragraphs 9 and 10 it gave a fairer
representation of the existing situation and did not confuse the
problem of acquiring information with that of transmission. While it
is true, as stated in para. 9, that the great bulk of intelligence moves
majestically by hand around Washington, finally to be embodied in a
formal publication and tossed upon the waters, significant information
dealing with imminent threats to US security are handled in a much
more rapid manner. The criticisms of the present situation in para.
10 are only partially justified. Despatches do come in 6 weeks late
with interesting info but the highlights have almost always been sent
by cable. Our lack of knowledge with respect to the situation in the
USSR at this very instant, yesterday, or last week has little to do
with communication channels. Although we do need faster reporting
and higher volume facilities, our problems with respect to the USSR -
and many other areas - are primarily those of acquiring information
and analysis of the info once it is received.
2. The memo raises another point in its proposal for what amounts
to a direct channel for raw intelligence from the field to the desk
of the policy maker. One gets the vision of the busy policy maker being
frequently b with
latest word
This may not be the intention, but such would be tinevitable result.
The US government has gone toofar already in being conditioned to react
to snippets of "'hot" intelligence direct from the wire and pays too
little attention to considered analyses (not necessarily a process
requiring 3 months, but a process which fits a current report into a
broader perspective). Of course, there needs to be a system for alerting
the highest levels with the utmost speed to really ominous reports, but
the function of the intelligence community in Washington is to evaluate
25X1
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Paw intelligence and to provide the consuner of intelligence with the
best judgements available as to what the raw intelligence means. If
you scatter a number of intelligence staffs at the end of teletype
machines in the offices of various high-level consumers around town,
some central control would be necessary to prevent widely varying
interpretations of the same report being passed to the different consumers.
3. Despite my comments in the paragraph above there certainly
are merits in a system permitting rapid, simultaneous transmission
by secure electrical means of intelligence info to the consuming officials.
However, the discussion in paras. 25-28 appears to reflect a lack of
understanding of the importance of due deliberation in the process of
evaluating intelligence. For the most part, and except in highly
unstable and fast moving situations or in the case of enemy preparations
for attack, policy should not be made on the basis of response to the
last bit of intelligence. Although this may, in fact, often be the
case in many governments because it is easier to react than it is to
think and plan ahead, there is no reason why the intelligence community
should abet such a process. Whether our "studies" should be bound in
heavy vellum or transmitted by ticker immediately upon approval is
beside the point. The point is that mere "timeliness" is not the only
or necessarily the overriding factor in much of our work. Analysis
and judgement are crucial to the process and they must not be slighted.
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