INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01083A000100100017-6
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 23, 2004
Sequence Number: 
17
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 15, 1962
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01083A000100100017-6.pdf108.23 KB
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Approved-?or Releas 0 CIA-RDP80B64083A000100100017-6 15 August 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD SUBJECT Intelligence Required for Counterinsurgency REFERENCES . a. USIB-D-63.6/ 1, 30 April 1962 b. USIB-D-63.6/3, 11 July 1962 1. Pursuant to receipt by the Secretariat of USIB vote sheet and telephonic concurrences in the draft memorandum response to the Military Representative of the President, the Intelligence Board on 10 August approved that memorandum, circulated with reference b. , subject to an amendment proposed by DIA. 2. Attached for information and record purposes is a copy of the memorandum as approved, in the form in which it was transmitted by the Chairman, USIB. 25X1 Executive ecreta GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved For Releas CIA-RDP 0100017-6 Approved-For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP80B01.083A000100100017-6 SECRET Attachment USIB-D-63. 6/4 15 August 1962 UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD 10 August 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Intelligence Required for Counterinsurgency 1. The intelligence community has reviewed the attachment to your letter of 30 April 1962 concerning intelligence required for counter- insurgency. We believe that the following measures are those most likely to orient our efforts to provide the needed intelligence: a. I have directed that the appropriate authorities in the intelligence community responsible for drafting National Intelligence Estimates and for producing current intelligence take cognizance of the Essential Elements of Information required for counterinsurgency and see that as many of these elements are answered as may be feasible in the course of production of National Intelligence Estimates and current intelligence. b. Most of the basic non-estimative questions posed in the EEIs are addressed in various sections of the National Intelligence Survey, notably Section 57, which deals with subversion. I have directed the Office of Basic Intelligence, CIA, to review the outline, content, and schedule for Section 57 and other pertinent sections to see that the NIS will be as responsive as possible to the EEIs and that appropriate priority may be given to sections pertaining to the countries listed by c. I have also asked the intelligence authorities of the Department of State and Department of Defense to bring the Essential Elements of Information to the attention of U. S. Approved For Release R1 TCIA-RDP80B01083A000100100017-6 Approved-For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP80B0*083A000100100017-6 SECRET Attachment USIB-D-63. 6/4 15 August 1962 diplomatic and consular posts and military commands overseas so that they may appreciate the overall pattern of our interest in developing counterinsurgency intelligence and may add to their existing requirements those not already listed among them. d. CIA will also take action where appropriate to collect such additional information as may be required in support of the EEIs. 2. Although the measures outlined above should provide the answers to nearly all of the EEIs, I am sure that as time goes by additional EEIs will be developed, and the intelligence community will develop new assets and procedures for providing the required answers. In such a situation it is important that there be a close day-to-day working relationship between the intelligence community and action officials concerned with counterinsurgency. The intelligence community will be prepared to do what is proper and feasible in the establishment of such a working relationship. 3. We also feel that intelligence designed specifically for counterinsurgency situations would be more meaningful if viewed in the broader context of problems covered by standard current intelli- gency publications and National Intelligence Estimates. /s/ JOHN A. McCONE Chairman Approved For Releas Q6i4-I CIA-RDP80B01083A000100100017-6