US INTELLIGENCE 1965-1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01083A000100110015-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 18, 1960
• Content Type: MF

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/14 :CIA-RDP80B01083A000100110015-7
18 April 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the DD/I (Planning)
SUBJECT: US Intelligence 1965-1970
REFERENCE: Your TS #172618, Same Subject
1. The discussion of US intelligence in the period
1965-1970 is of course an extremely difficult problem to
deal with. In general, I have no quarrel with anything
in the subject document. However, I have the feeling that
the presentation is somewhat thin and that the President's
committee may wish to come to grips with some more
fundamental aspects of the problem. Perhaps when the
material on Comint and the Clandestine Action Programs
are included, the discuss ion will have the requisite amount
of meat.
2. I think a key to the problem is the one you alude
to in your Section II: Conclusion: it is difficult to assess
the effectiveness of intelligence in the abstract. The period
1965-1970, especially in connection with the underdeveloped
areas (China and Africa being the most important) will create
very substantial problems for the US intelligence community.
Whether we will in fact be in as good a position to deal with
these problems as the general thrust of your report indicates,
is something I am not very sanguine about. Perhaps some
discussion of this problem and the attempts we are making
to deal with them would be appropriate.
3. On page 2, paragraph C, , you make an assumption
that there will be a change in the Administration's policy
which will result in an increase in the personnel strength of
the intelligence community. Perhaps this assumption is
justified on the basis of information of which I am innocent,
but in any case, I don't think we should imply that an increase
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/14 :CIA-RDP80B01083A000100110015-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/14 :CIA-RDP80B01083A000100110015-7
in personnel strength will increase the effectiveness of our
intelligence (I don't think it will). The emphasis should be
on quality (along the lines that you make throughout the
paper) rather than an increase in personnel strength ep r se.
4. One development which I think should be empha-
sized is the increasing reliance on overt, analytical-type
intelligence and a decrease in the effectiveness and productivi-
ty of Clandestine (Spook-type) intelligence. This trend has
been evident over the past several years and I think it might
be worth noting - if we can get away with it.
5. Your Section VIII makes several good points with
respect to the relationship of intelligence to policy at the
Washington level.
Deputy Assistant D'rector
National Estimates
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/14 :CIA-RDP80B01083A000100110015-7