COMMENTS ON JCS PAPER: 'JOINT COUNTERINSURGENCY CONCEPT AND DOCTRINAL GUIDANCE,' 5 APRIL 1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01083A000100120015-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: May 2, 1962
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100120015-6
2 May 1962
Comments on JCS Paper: "Joint Counter-Insurgency
Concept and Doctrinal Guidance," 5 April 1962
O/DDI
1. Since the referenced document was prepared by the military with
the stated purpose of providing "doctrinal and conceptual guidance" for the
US Armed Forces, it is understandable that the paper as a whole lays heavy
stress on the role of the military in counterinsurgency operations and treats
the roles of non-military governmental agencies in rather cursory fashion.
The portion of the paper dealing with the specific responsibilities of prin-
cipal participants in the counterinsurgency effort is far from exhaustive;
the very brief treatment of CIA's responsibilities, for example, makes no
mention of the agency's role in trying to identify potential or incipient
insurgency situations although this is mentioned elsewhere in the paper
almost in passing. Moreover, in describing "military counter-insurgency
programs," the document enumerates certain "military civic action" projects
such as health and welfare programs, and psychological warfare operations,
which, unless thoroughly coordinated with the activities of other responsible
US agencies, could be counter-productive. Presumably, as the counterinsur-
gency problem is more thoroughly studied by all governmental agencies con-
cerned, a balanced national concept will be produced.
2. The section of the JCS paper headeeL "mar- d" is too brief and
not truly "background." The two specific casts of Insurgency described
(Laos and South Vietnam) are cast in terms of post-mortem, lauding the roles
of the US military in these operations and criticizing the lack of proper
coordination of unidentified "various components" of the government. On
"f"uture Incur c ," the broad statement is made that "similar Loo Laos and
South Vietnsa insurgencies are incipient elsewhere in Southeast , in
Latin America, in Africa, and in the Middle East," and that these will be
Supported by the USSR. While it is likely that potential insurgency exists
in the areas cited, it is quite unlikely that insurgency in Colombia, for
example, would bear much resemblance to that in Laos or South Vietnam or
that Soviet support for a Colombian outbruk would take the form of an air-
lift. Yet the paper seem to assume that all insurgency situations will
follow the same pattern and therefore can be countered in the same way.
3. This raises a fundamental question of definition which the document
itself does not clarify. In referring to insurgency in the first few pages,
the document does not specify the instigator or sponsor of insurgency.
Under title of "The Threat," however, on y Ccmunism is treated as the in-
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 Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100120015-6
stigator or supporter of insurgency. But in the glossary, insurgency
is defined as "subversive political activity, civil rebellion, revolt,
or insurrection designed to weaken and/or overthrow a duly constituted
gevertmeeent or occupying power." No instigator or sponsor is mentioned.
The definition of counterinsurgency similarly does not mention Cmmmism
as the force to be countered. It is entirely possible that insurgency (as
defined in the document's glossary) could arise without Cammmist instiga-
tion and that the objectives of the insurgents might be quite different from
Ceamist.objectives in the country concerned. The JCS doctrine appears to
apply exclusively to Communist-inspired and -supported insurgencies and does
not take into account other possibilities which would fall under the glos-
sax^f's definition of insurgency.
4+. The JC8 paper in toto convoys the impression that CIA and other
civilian agencies deserve only minor roles in counterinsurgency operational
planning and although the paper acknowledges certain non-military aspects
of counterinsurgency, it leaves the reader with the feeling that counter-
insurgency is essentially and in all cases a military affair. Some of the
more subtle forms of insurgency (by Ccatimuniste) are enumerated in the section,
"The Threat," followed by the statement"...active guerrilla warfare is only
one aspect of insurgency, albeit a most important one which demands particu-
lar attention by the military." This is followed by a detailed account of
"time-tested?' guerrilla tactics. In several places scattered throughout the
paper the point is made, however, that success in counterinsurgency opera-
tions cannot be accomplished by the military alone but is dependent on the
integrated efforts of all government agencies concerned.
5. Two sentences in the paper--several pages apart--seem to be worth
highlighting. One says, "The essential element of political stability is
a government which responds to the needs of the people." The other, "the
creation of a condition of political stability and the creation of a govern-
ment which can gain and retain the support of the people is a prime objective
of US counterinsurgency efforts.'" The organization of the JCS paper could
perhaps be improved if the Idea embodied in those sentences were presented
at the beginning, follnwed by a description of a national concept for attain-
ing the stated objective. Finally the mill, ter1 role in attaining the objec-
tive as a member of the US team could present specific doctrinal and tactical
guidance for the military in carrying out its mission toward achieving the
prim Objectivee.
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