DD/I COMMENTS ON GENERAL KRULAK'S MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (CI), 'INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01083A000100120018-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: April 11, 1962
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100120018-3
L I T
U April 1962
M` U)NA 'a`U i VOR IMP, DLTaC1' t
?5t:' = J T, 1/I -.owiw is or. C+e a]. Krolak' a . da* for the Special
Group (CI), AI elligen" Ram s for Connter:=nW.
1. General Krulak' a nemax-andum probabl: serves a useful pvwpose
in htghli atin the problem of providing intelligence support to counter-
Umurge ey pla ng. However, tie have very serious tai s ri.vi ws about
his concept of at is reed and his proposal that his ..,;I be for-
,arded to the U3IB as a formal requirement.
a. As presently constituted, the FBI represents a baerket
retest for a broad range of mate reel, of unspecified 4egreo of detail
to be provided an a continuing basis, These reams is
be greatly refined to provide realistic guiftn" to intelligence col
leotion and production.
b, Despite 3 ral l rz lc's improssical, uus b of the %Mt l
rested is already available in finished intelli fors - in i '' a
an countries tyre insurgency or instability is a problea U research
re sorts, and current intelligence erticl , in basic intOl1igesdace pub-
lications like the !!II series and the Army-sponsored ht Relations
A.rsa File Caasntry %andbooks. lth the oomAwiritol-li to
Approved For Relea 4? 9/03: CIA-RDP80BO1083A000100120018-3
 Approved For Release Fri CIA-RDP80BO1083A000100120018-3
intelligence production
we not greatly
reeuire ente of various others in the general field of cold war rali cam.
The cottnteriasur planner's p tion wou
be loss o+ arable to that of the p l y
the DC/P covert action officer or of plannwe or administrators in
cold war aetivity _w in the State Department, AID,
USIA, etc. T 1%e chief probl appeare to it. not in the *unir nature'
of counterinsurgency intelligence ro rex nts but rather in the Uwk
of dsvelo ad capabilities in the co terii urgeancy field for exploitia
and bringing together the wide variety of avail b1e finished ntel -
gence, for identifying and obtaining help in dealing with intelligence
gaps and special req ire eats, for Maintaining c onti> ng e#fl*ne
of inci,*ing reports and evaluations on the situation, and for c? iming
the reliabilli of the intelllgam > is used in draft plans,
2. We recogwds a that the o mterinst gea f p
be -given a bibliography of ubliehed intelligence -.- that t?
uirs a good deal of smart from the Intelligence ty. fee feels
however, that the establishment of a close support i lii nce: capa-
bility, in or closely associated with the co terizts ? Sluing
element, will probably prove essential. This arrangement would greatly
si li the effective utilization of e- Asti intelligence material,
and the near ilaticn of a repo
cowamitV's special support opera'
rri this basis the
able to that pro+-
vided others involved in detailed cold war planning operati