RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD, JANUARY 20, 1962

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01083A000100130035-3
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
11
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 10, 2005
Sequence Number: 
35
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 9, 1962
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01083A000100130035-3.pdf470.67 KB
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Approved For Rele 5102102?: CIA-RDP80604.083A000100130035-3 9 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence) 1962 SUBJECT: Recommendations of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, January 20, 1962 1. Certain of the recommendations applying to the DD/I area which the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board submitted to him on January 20, 1962, were transmitted to you for comment by my memorandum of 13 February 1962. Your comments which were sub- sequently transmitted to me, together with those of other interested departments and agencies, provided the basis for a report to Mr. McGeorge Bundy by the Director, along with his own comments in each case. 2. The Director has now received from Mr. Bundy a report of the actions taken by the President with respect to each of the subject recommendations, with a request that the Director submit a report by July 2, 1962 on the status of implementation of these actions. 3. For your information, there is attached hereto for each of the subject recommendations previously sent you the following: a. The recommendation by the President's Board. b. A summary of the comments by the interested departments and agencies, along with those of the Director. c. The action taken by the President. d. Implementing action which is required to carry out the President's decisions. 4. It is requested that you take appropriate action within the DD/I area to implement the President's decisions as indicated in attachments hereto with respect to the following recommendations: General Recommendation 1.e. Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80601083A000100130035-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80B0T083A000100130035-3 5. It is further requested that I be provided by June 15, 1962 with a report on the status of implementation of the President's decisions regarding the above listed recommendation, for incorporation in a report to Mr. Bundy and to the President's Board. Attachments - 2 - Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Executive Director Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP8OBO' 083A000100130035-3 25X1 25X1 )35-3 Approved For Release 20 02/02 : CIA-RDP801301083A000100130035-3 General Recommendation $o. 1.e.; "Wien circumstances permit, U. S. Arabassadore be proviAed an opportunity to comment upon the drafts of proposed national and special intelligence estimates involving countries to which they are accredited or 'which are geographically or politically related to their areas of assignment." Comments: The Department of State concurs in this recommendation. The Department of Defense feels that it is a responsibility of the Department of State to ensure that due consideration is given to the views of the Ambassador during the development of the draft, rather than after the draft has been prepared. The Department of Defense points out (a) that occasions will be rare in which time will permit the sub- oission of draft SlEs and SMIXs to the Ambassador for comment prior to consideration and approval by the US15; (b) that it is unnecessary to obtain comments of the Ambassador on draft estimates, since such draft estimates should, of course, incorporate the views of the Ambassador on developments in the areas, as well as reports from other sources. CIA notes that the State Department frequently requests the views of an Embassy on estimative problems and often sends its contributions to estimates to the field for comment. Time permitting, it also informs appropriate Ambassadors of forthcoming estimates and seeks Embassy guidance on key questions contained in their teros of reference. Moreover, completed estimates are normally sent to the field for Embassy comments and such comments are widely distributed in the intelligence community. / note that tbe President's 'Board has reopinited that the time factor is an important element in this recommendation. I as confident that the State Department, in its concurrence, is likewise appreciative of this limitation. The time factor is a very real problem, and while I endorse the principle of taking into account the Ambassador's views, I would be reluctant to establish a system which could lead towards a mandatory reqpirement for Ambassadorial comment on draft estimates in all cases. I believe the State Department practice achieves the general objectives of this recommendation insofar as is feasible. Action taken by the President: Approved, noting the eoncurrence of the Director of Central intelligence and his view that insofar as feasible the general objectives of this recommendation are being achieved. Implementi, action required: Continue current practice by the Department of State. Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : Cl -RDP80601083A000100130 Approved For Release oO5IoVo2 : CFA-RDP80601083A000100130035-3 Oemsral Recommendation Eo. 1.b.: "The Political Sections of our Habeas/es, and the Ambassadors in appropriate instances, be given an opportunity to comment upon all political intelligence at the time it is being furnished to Headquarters, except under circumstances in whicb such action would impose undue delay on the reporting process." Comments: The Department of State concurs in this recommendation. The Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency have pointed out that present instructions to field representatives and stations provide for giving Embassies the opportunity to comment on all political information reports In some instances, and when time permits, before transmittal of the report to their respective Headqparters, and in other instances simultaneoualy therewith. CIA's Clandestine Services note that the obtaining of comments almost always entails some delay in transmittal, and that in a very large number of cases any delay is undue delay. The fastest possible dissemination of information to Washington as well as within an Embassy in an overriding responsibility of the intelligence community, and therefore, so far es cable-worthy information ill concerned, a delay in transmittal for the purpose of obtaining comments should be the exception rather than the rule. Since, normally, tranemittal to Washington and dissemination to the lebessy are virtuarly simultaneous, a comment made promptly on a disseminated report can be forwarded so as to -Poch Washington very shortly after the report itself. In my view, the present instructions and practice employed in the field are in conformity with the specific provisions of ESCID 2 and DCID 2/1 and with the spirit of this recommendation. Action taken by the President: Approved, noting the concurrence by the Department of State and the view of the Director of Central Intelligence that the spirit of the recommendation is being met. Implementing action required: Continue current inatrutiona and practices by the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80601083A000100130035-3 Approved For Release 005/02102 : CIA-RDP80601083A000100130035-3 Action taken by the President: Approved. Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80601083A000100130035-3 Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80601083A000100130035-3 General Reoommendation llo. 1.d.: *Mort& be continued, where faimig177-ErIGEWIL h. intelligence personnel having special language training to 41111.11 where maximum use may be made of their language capabilities." Comments: The Departments of State and Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency agree that this is S. continuing problem and Concur in the need to stress language capabilities in meking field assignments. The Department of Defense points out that the problem is oomplicated by rotating line personnel into and out of the intelligence field and by the length of tour limitations in foreign areas. C/A notes the problem is acute in the areas where rare languages are spoken and in the assignment of officers to the more complex operations, and to supervisory poeitions overseas, where operational experience and political sophistication are necessary qualifications. It is evident that this is a problem whose solution must be tempered by a full consideration of all the essential qualifications sought in individuals selected for overseas intelligence assignment. Action taken by the President: Approved. leRlementing action required: Continued efforts by the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to implement this recommendation, tempered by full consideration of all essential qualifications required for overseas intelligence assignment. Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80601083A000100130035-3 fr Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80601083A000100130035-3 General Recommendation NO. 1.e.: "When significant intelligence is reported whiCh subsequently proves to be erroneous, procedures be established for appropriate notification to the recipients of the erroneous information." Comments: The Department of State concurs in this recommendation. The Department of Defense also concurs, and states that as a matter of practice, each military service accomplishes this notification. The Department of Defense also states bast to insure coviiance within DOD, its importance has recently been reemphasized. The Central Intelligence Agency states that procedures have long been in effect to accomplish this purpose, to the extent that it is practicable. I am advised that this recommendation is currently being LAple- merited by eaca agency to tae maximum practicable extent. Action taken by the President: Approved. Implementing action required: Continuee efforts by tae Departments .f State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to implement this recommendation to the maximum practicable extent. Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80601083A000100130035-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80601083A000100130035-3 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80601083A000100130035-3 ? fink Aft Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80601083A000100130035-3 Pistion token by the President: Noted that this reccessendation has been overtaken 'by events transpiring subsequent to its submission. bagementing, action resiuired: None. Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP801301083A000100130035-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80601083A000100130035-3 Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80601083A000100130035-3 lik rIk its ApprovedF.Q1,- Rele 14.21105 P80601013A00010013008t6/ ?DT THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL WARNING ; This docuroent contains classified information affecting tho national Securty of the United States within the meaning of the espionage ; laws, ITS Code, Title 18, Sc, tions 793, 794, a r d 793. The !aw prohibits ; its b.:ins/a-fission or the retcelation of its con Lents in an it manner to t an unauthorized pet son, a, well as its use any mannt. r prejudicial to th4 safety or interest of he United State; or for the b triefit of any fore4 7i overnment to the di. triment of tho Un ted Sbt; tes. ;THIS DOCUMENT MUSTBE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS Al ALL TIME :7; ' It is to be seen only by US personnel especially i doctrinated t and authorzed to receiv; COMMUNICATlONS INT7;LLIGENCE information; its security must be maintained in t.ecerdance with COMNIUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REG',JLItTIONS No action to be taken on any COMMUNICATION ti INTELLI- ; GEN( !E wh:cli may be contained herein, regardless of t`r;t alw.,ntages to be gained, unless such action is first apptoyed by the Director ; of Ceritral 3.1telligence. TOP SECRET lir 04,7? #?1F," 174 ii/d1 M1/1{/ /Z./*/)X, ? 77, .A0 . Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80601083A000100130035-3