RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD, JANUARY 20, 1962
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01083A000100130035-3
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 10, 2005
Sequence Number:
35
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 9, 1962
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MF
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9
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)
1962
SUBJECT: Recommendations of the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, January 20, 1962
1. Certain of the recommendations applying to the DD/I area
which the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board submitted
to him on January 20, 1962, were transmitted to you for comment by
my memorandum of 13 February 1962. Your comments which were sub-
sequently transmitted to me, together with those of other interested
departments and agencies, provided the basis for a report to
Mr. McGeorge Bundy by the Director, along with his own comments
in each case.
2. The Director has now received from Mr. Bundy a report of
the actions taken by the President with respect to each of the subject
recommendations, with a request that the Director submit a report by
July 2, 1962 on the status of implementation of these actions.
3. For your information, there is attached hereto for each of
the subject recommendations previously sent you the following:
a. The recommendation by the President's Board.
b. A summary of the comments by the interested departments
and agencies, along with those of the Director.
c. The action taken by the President.
d. Implementing action which is required to carry out the
President's decisions.
4. It is requested that you take appropriate action within the
DD/I area to implement the President's decisions as indicated in
attachments hereto with respect to the following recommendations:
General Recommendation
1.e.
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5. It is further requested that I be provided by June 15, 1962
with a report on the status of implementation of the President's
decisions regarding the above listed recommendation, for incorporation
in a report to Mr. Bundy and to the President's Board.
Attachments
- 2 -
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director
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General Recommendation $o. 1.e.; "Wien circumstances permit,
U. S. Arabassadore be proviAed an opportunity to comment upon the drafts
of proposed national and special intelligence estimates involving
countries to which they are accredited or 'which are geographically
or politically related to their areas of assignment."
Comments: The Department of State concurs in this recommendation.
The Department of Defense feels that it is a responsibility of the
Department of State to ensure that due consideration is given to the
views of the Ambassador during the development of the draft, rather than
after the draft has been prepared. The Department of Defense points
out (a) that occasions will be rare in which time will permit the sub-
oission of draft SlEs and SMIXs to the Ambassador for comment prior to
consideration and approval by the US15; (b) that it is unnecessary to
obtain comments of the Ambassador on draft estimates, since such draft
estimates should, of course, incorporate the views of the Ambassador
on developments in the areas, as well as reports from other sources.
CIA notes that the State Department frequently requests the views of
an Embassy on estimative problems and often sends its contributions to
estimates to the field for comment. Time permitting, it also informs
appropriate Ambassadors of forthcoming estimates and seeks Embassy
guidance on key questions contained in their teros of reference.
Moreover, completed estimates are normally sent to the field for
Embassy comments and such comments are widely distributed in the
intelligence community.
/ note that tbe President's 'Board has reopinited that the time
factor is an important element in this recommendation. I as confident
that the State Department, in its concurrence, is likewise appreciative
of this limitation. The time factor is a very real problem, and while
I endorse the principle of taking into account the Ambassador's views,
I would be reluctant to establish a system which could lead towards a
mandatory reqpirement for Ambassadorial comment on draft estimates in
all cases. I believe the State Department practice achieves the general
objectives of this recommendation insofar as is feasible.
Action taken by the President: Approved, noting the eoncurrence
of the Director of Central intelligence and his view that insofar as
feasible the general objectives of this recommendation are being achieved.
Implementi, action required: Continue current practice by the
Department of State.
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Oemsral Recommendation Eo. 1.b.: "The Political Sections of our
Habeas/es, and the Ambassadors in appropriate instances, be given an
opportunity to comment upon all political intelligence at the time it
is being furnished to Headquarters, except under circumstances in whicb
such action would impose undue delay on the reporting process."
Comments: The Department of State concurs in this recommendation.
The Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency have pointed
out that present instructions to field representatives and stations
provide for giving Embassies the opportunity to comment on all political
information reports In some instances, and when time permits, before
transmittal of the report to their respective Headqparters, and in other
instances simultaneoualy therewith. CIA's Clandestine Services note
that the obtaining of comments almost always entails some delay in
transmittal, and that in a very large number of cases any delay is
undue delay. The fastest possible dissemination of information to
Washington as well as within an Embassy in an overriding responsibility
of the intelligence community, and therefore, so far es cable-worthy
information ill concerned, a delay in transmittal for the purpose of
obtaining comments should be the exception rather than the rule. Since,
normally, tranemittal to Washington and dissemination to the lebessy are
virtuarly simultaneous, a comment made promptly on a disseminated report
can be forwarded so as to -Poch Washington very shortly after the report
itself.
In my view, the present instructions and practice employed in the
field are in conformity with the specific provisions of ESCID 2 and
DCID 2/1 and with the spirit of this recommendation.
Action taken by the President: Approved, noting the concurrence
by the Department of State and the view of the Director of Central
Intelligence that the spirit of the recommendation is being met.
Implementing action required: Continue current inatrutiona and
practices by the Departments of State and Defense and the Central
Intelligence Agency.
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Action taken by the President: Approved.
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General Reoommendation llo. 1.d.: *Mort& be continued, where
faimig177-ErIGEWIL h. intelligence personnel having special language
training to 41111.11 where maximum use may be made of their language
capabilities."
Comments: The Departments of State and Defense, and the Central
Intelligence Agency agree that this is S. continuing problem and Concur
in the need to stress language capabilities in meking field assignments.
The Department of Defense points out that the problem is oomplicated
by rotating line personnel into and out of the intelligence field and
by the length of tour limitations in foreign areas. C/A notes the
problem is acute in the areas where rare languages are spoken and in
the assignment of officers to the more complex operations, and to
supervisory poeitions overseas, where operational experience and
political sophistication are necessary qualifications.
It is evident that this is a problem whose solution must be tempered
by a full consideration of all the essential qualifications sought in
individuals selected for overseas intelligence assignment.
Action taken by the President: Approved.
leRlementing action required: Continued efforts by the Departments
of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to implement
this recommendation, tempered by full consideration of all essential
qualifications required for overseas intelligence assignment.
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General Recommendation NO. 1.e.: "When significant intelligence
is reported whiCh subsequently proves to be erroneous, procedures be
established for appropriate notification to the recipients of the
erroneous information."
Comments: The Department of State concurs in this recommendation.
The Department of Defense also concurs, and states that as a matter of
practice, each military service accomplishes this notification. The
Department of Defense also states bast to insure coviiance within
DOD, its importance has recently been reemphasized. The Central
Intelligence Agency states that procedures have long been in effect to
accomplish this purpose, to the extent that it is practicable.
I am advised that this recommendation is currently being LAple-
merited by eaca agency to tae maximum practicable extent.
Action taken by the President: Approved.
Implementing action required: Continuee efforts by tae Departments
.f State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to implement
this recommendation to the maximum practicable extent.
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Pistion token by the President: Noted that this reccessendation
has been overtaken 'by events transpiring subsequent to its submission.
bagementing, action resiuired: None.
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