RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD, 20 JANUARY 1962 (GENERAL RECOMMENDATION 1(A), RESPECTING NIES AND SNIES, PP. 2-3)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01083A000100130036-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: February 21, 1962
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP801301083 000100130036-2 25X1
21 Feb rua ry 1962
MR IORA1f1?tBi FOR MR. KIRKPATRICK
SUBJECT: Recommendations of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,
20 January 1962 (general Recommenda-
tion I(&), respecting NIEs and SNI$e,
pp. 2-3)
1. We would of course welcome any innovation
which promised to facilitate timely receipt of judg-
wents from the field on estimative problems. 22IR has
frequently requested the views of the Slabassy for these
purposes, and, we understand, often sends its contri-
butions to estimates to the field and solicits comments.
Perhaps this should be done more often or more systemati-
cally. IHR also sends to the field copies of completed
estimates for comment; the Resbassy's c nts on these
are given wide distribution in the intelligence community.
2. We would, however, note certain practical
(1 'TieultieS and f mdeme tal hazards in the way of a full
and literal implementation of this recommendation :
Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100130036-2
 Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100130036-2
a. Most obvious is the time factor. Few
national estimates are now prepared at a leisurely
pace, and in many, perhaps most eases, there simply
is not time to get successive drafts to the field
(they would probably have to be pouched) and receive
comments without unacceptable delay. xcept on crash
esstimatess, this difficulty need not apply to the
matter of sending terms of reference or key questions
to the Smbasssy for count nt, by cable, if necessary.
b. More fundamental is the question of
separating intelligence and policy functions. As the
senior US representative on the spot, with all the
infor ation-gathering and analytical resources of the
country team at his immediate di-sposalj, the ambassador
is of course a principal source of intelligence as
well as of policy judgments regarding his country of
assignment. No estimate should be written which does
not take full account of the ambassador's assessment
of the situation, and in practice there is a general
tendency to take the word of the men in the field on
many matters of judgment. However, one of the main
purposes of the intelligence estimate is to provide
US decision-makers with an independent assessment which
does not necessarily coincide with that of the
2
Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100130036-2
 Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100130036-2
ambassador, who normally plays an active and direct
role in the policy deliberations the estimate
designed to support. Should estimates, which are
regularly given informal review by the State policy
desks in draft, be normally subject to review by the
ambassador as well, there would in our view be serious
danger that the estimates would become unduly subject
to policy pressures. A similar danger would arise
if, by analogy, senior military field eaere --
e.g., Admiral Felt, General Power, or General Norstad
were formally brought into the estimative review
process on papers in their area of interest.
3. Thus while we set high value on the ambassador's
contribution to and criticism of estimates, we would
hope to avoid any system which gives the ambassador
a real or implied veto over the contents and language
of estimates, or which, even implicitly, gives an
Embassy the right to urge material for Inclusion based
on views not shared by the intelligence community.
4. In sum, we consider that the most use
aspects of this rec laudation could be accomplished
chiefly by greater attention to informing ambassadors
of forthcoming estimates concerning the
Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100130036-2
 Approved For Release 2005/02/02 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100130036-2
and sending terms of reference to the field for oom-
ments on key questions. We see no objection to sending
drafts of estimates to the field, subject to the
caveats expressed above, but time and other factors
raise serious questions about how feasible in practice
this would be in many cases.
SHERMAi KSNT
Assistant (Director
National Estimates
Approved For Release 2005t0102: CIA-RDP80BO1083A000100130036-2