MEMORANDUM FOR DD/I FROM W.A. TIDWELL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01083A000100200008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 11, 1961
• Content Type: MF

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/22 :CIA-RDP80B01083A000100200008-5
11 August 1861
MEM4RANDiM FOR : DA f l
1. Z~-iere is one defect in the current organization of
CIA that has worried me for a number of years sad which my recent
experience on the Cuban problem has emphasized. This defect is
the lack of a systematic intelligence support structure in the
operating elements of CZA.
2. If we were to think of DD~P, its divisions and stations,
as being the G-3 section and the troop units of a field army,
it would seem at first glance that the DD~I area, would represent
the G-2 section of this field army. The facts of the case, however,
are quite different. The DD~I area is oriented primarily to serve
as the G?2 section of the highest level of the tT. S. Goverment,
and while obviously its products have score utility to DDfP, this
utility is strictly a by-product of our main function. This
deficiency in the organization is not widely recogrz#.zed in.DD/P.
The average DD/P officer with whean I have cane in contact is not
aware of the intelligence support to operations that could be
provici,ed through the use of the skills, techniques, and institutions
already developed f.n the intelligence ccunity.
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3. Various parts of the intelligence support gap in DD~P
h~td. been filled in different ways.
The reports officers throughout DDfP also dQ s
certain amount of intelligence Rapport as a by-product of the
background Which they have to build up in order to do their basic
lob of producing GS reports. some divisions also have a few staff
officers who perform parts of this function Without it being clearly
recognized that this iR What they are doing.
~. DPD is probably the 'best served DD~P division in this sense,
in that they do have an intelligence staff whose fob it is to provide
intelligence Rapport for operations. This intelligence staff is not
only capable of producing a good. deal. of the intelligence support
itself, but is sufficiently fermiliar with the intelligence community
to knout where to go to get help on those matters it cannot handle
itRelS.
5. Zn the case of the Texget Analysis Bretnch of the War Plans
staffs there has been something of a running fight with the
Geographic Area of C~tR because of the tendency of the Target Analysis
Branch to re-do Mork produced by f]~ when it could probably have
been done better by ORR in the first place if there had. been proper
levying of requirements and adequate briefing of ORR concerning the
operations to be supported,
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6. The problem was particularly acute in the case of the
Cuban task force. The task farce as such had no intelligence
eectitm a;ad as far ass I knox the only people in the task force
specifically working on intelligence were a small group in the
FM Section in Headquarters who were working on terrain studies in
preparations for the invasion. Furthermore, this small group
attempted to work in such a ecmpartmented manner that they did
not take full advantage of the assistance they could have received
from PIC, 4RR, and others. In the FZ, political action, and
propaganda fields there was no independent intelligence support.
The heads of the respective section in the last analysis acted as
their own inteLtigenee officers. In the case of the base in Miami,
there was no intelligence support organisation at a11, which meant
that the intelligence sent to the base from Headquarters was not
properly used and information collected by the base was not adequately
integrated into the planning and operations of the base. To the
bent of my knowledge, n~ of the bases in the Project had an
intelligence officer.
7. Although the Central Intelligence Agency is one of the mayor
action arms of the U. S. C}overxnaent, and although it is an intelligence
agency, it probably makes leas use of inteLl.igence in its operations
than any other action Agency of similar stature. If, as a result
of changes in the structure of the intelligence community that may
cane about in the next few months, there is an opportunity for the
situation to be corrected, Z strongly recosmnend something along the
following lines:
_3_
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a. A Chief of Qperational Intelligence reporting
directly to DD~P and supported by an Intelligence Staff
which would be responsible for seeing that the DD/F received
adequate intelligence support for any decisions that he is
required to make concerag the operations of DD~P. This
~~
staff might control the FY reports apparatus and certainly should
control the intelligence support funetians of Division D.
It should also have a small number of highly ecanpetent
analysts who could do original. work when necessary) but rho
could also draw upon intelligence already available to the
intelligence community in order to apply it to specific
operational problems.
b. Each Division should have an Intelligence Officer
reporting directly to the Division Chief and supported by a
smala, staff in order that the Division Chief migkit make his
operations.]. decisions in light of full intelligence support.
c. Each major base and station overseas should also
have an intelligence officer performing the same function for
the Chief of the Base or Station. In the case of the larger
installations
the intelligence officer should probably also be supported by
a staff. The intelligence officers at the division and lower
levels should be under the cc~mnand of the Chief of the Unit
to which they are assigned but there should be a right of
secure ceanmunications on intelligence matters through
STAT
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the intelligence structure and outside of the DD~P
coagnassd structure.
~. Z cars see several advantages to this system in addition
to the primary advantage of making it possible for CIA operations
to be conducted on a sounder basis.
e. The new system should make it possible to bring into
the inteLtigenee community a great deal of information and
area knowledge that now rem?~ins untapped in the car~partmented
areas of DD~P.
b. The new system could act as a meeting place for the
two sides of the Agency that now have very little in common.
Many well qualified DD/I personnel could move into the
operational intelligence fi`ld and from there into operations
while many operational personnel with goad area knowledge and
experience could reverse the processes and eventually
become useful members of the DDIZ area.
c. It should have additional intangible benefits by
helping to break down the isolation of the two major
portions of the Agency and tend to make people feel they
belong to CIA. rather than to DD~P or DDfZ,
d. The existence of a half-way house between DD~P and.
DD~I might make it easier to establish a more meaningful
career management program throughout the Agency.
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