(Sanitized) PAPERS ON THE ABM STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01138A000100070010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2002
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: May 22, 1969
• Content Type: MF

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TOP SECRET
22 May 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR : ABM Committee Members
SUBJECT Col. Wood's Papers on the ABM Study
1. Enclosed is the paper that Col. Wood proposed and prepared on
the important questions on the Soviet A.BM. It includes Tab A of his earlier
paper.
2. The present paper indicates, on the basis of the limited impact
of ABM intelligence on the capability of US strategic forces to inflict
fatalities on the USSR and to limit fatalities in the US, that there is little
need for information on the Soviet ABM system. The reason given is
that the US already has built or programmed a capability to overwhelm a
far greater ABM threat than the intelligence community now believes will
materialize. Col. Wood qualifies this conclusion to the extent of saying
that there is a need for intelligence on certain courses open to the Soviets
which could have significant effect on the US position: if the Soviets were
to provide the TALLINN SAM system with an A.BM capability, were to
develop a refire capability, or were to develop a Sprint-like terminal
interceptor.
3. The paper is more reasonable in tone and position than its prede-
cessor. Nevertheless, and despite the fact that its main thrust is the over-
valuation of ABM intelligence in toto, it is more than likely that Col. Wood
still has the same reservations about the relative values of elements of
ABM intelligence and (since it is just a logical extension of his position in
this paper) about the need for some 650 observables in the Network.
Although Col. Wood probably would not agree, we believe that the few
intelligence needs he cites would, when developed to the detail required
by analysts to respond to such needs, lead to a network comparable in
size and scope to the one developed by the Working Group and now in use.
OSD HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSICATION AND
RELEASE.
TS-198149-69
OSD review(s) completed. TOP SECRET
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4. We would appreciate your views on the paper, either formally
or informally, as soon as is convenient.
25X1A
Chairman
ABM Study
Distribution:
Original - C
1 - Mr.
NIPE
Bross - NIPE
25X1A
1 - Col.
1 - Mr.
25X1A
NIPE
DIA
L. Allen - SAFSS
25X1A
Frank Perez - State Department
1 - Col. A. Wood - OSD(SA)
TOP SECRET
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aC .A 1138A01,QfflftoPAPERS
DISCUSSION OF U. S. INTELLIGENCE NEEDS ON SOVIET
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE BMD
INTRODUCTION
The.size and quality of deployed Soviet BMD have a primary
influence on the size and nature of U. S. strategic offensive
forces and on the way we plan for use of these forces if deterrence
fails. For these reasons, some level. of intelligence activity must
always be directed at Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) develop-
ment and deployment programs..
Soviet B. The question addressed in this paper is what are these
needs, if any,-to support R&D, force planning and war planning decisions.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper reviews the strategic rationale for intelligence on
Soviet BMD; it uses this rationale, projected Soviet BMD and programmed
U. S. Strategic Offensive Forces data to justify a statement of intelli-
gence needs. The paper reaches the following conclusions:
1',, Programmed U. S. forces were designed for a much larger Soviet
: ND than that now projected.
2. The deployments of some U. S. programmed forces have been slowed
recently in response to sharp downward revisions in the estimates of
Soviet BND forces made over the period 1966-1969. These forces were pro-
grammed in response to an earlier, much larger projection of Soviet BNID
for the 1970-1975 period.
3. Current projections of Soviet BMD are that it will be, practically,
all area defense.
4. Discovery that the projected Soviet BMD has serious vulnerabilities
is unlikely to result in reduced U. S. expenditures for strategic offensive
forces.
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5. Confirmation of the vulnerability of BMD to chaff might
permit saving a relatively modest number of U. S. lives (by executing
heavier attacks on Soviet land based ICBMs) in the event of nuclear
war which included city attacks. The Soviets could and probably
wou:Ld reduce this benefit, however, by relying, at least in part, on
forces for attacks on our cities not vulnerable to U. S. ballistic
missiles, e.g., alert bombers or submarine launched ballistic missiles.
6. 'Radar blackout is not likely to be a desirable penetration
mode against projected Soviet BMD because it is likely to be nearly
as expensive as interceptor exhaustion. Electronic counter measures
are not likely to be relied on because of high risk. Maneuverable
reentry vehicles are not now programmed and are unlikely to be because
of their great complexities and expense. ,
7. Because programmed U. S. forces are now very conservatively
designed, we are not very vulnerable to surprises. We should, however,
be alert for interceptor refire capability and conversion of the SA-5
to an ABM. Both these events, though very unlikely, could make relatively
rapid changes in Soviet BMD capability.
8. Our forces are designed to tolerate a sizable Soviet Sprint
like terminal interceptor deployment; however, because evidence of such
a missile in the Soviet Union would signal a major advance in Soviet
BMD technology, early discovery of such a development would be of great
interest.
THE ABk4 INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM
U. S.. Strategic Objectives
The U. S. has four objectives related totally or in part to IM
of Soviet cities .V These are:
1. To dissuade the Soviets from deploying a larger BMD.
2. To deter nuclear war whether or not a Soviet BMD is deployed.
3: If deterrence fails, to discourage attack on U. S. cities. by
threatening Soviet cities with destruction while exercising control
and restraint in the use of committed U. S. strategic offensive forces.
J Though the Soviets could elect to deploy ABM defenses solely for the
purpose of defending their land based strategic offensive forces, such
defenses would affect our strategic decisions in only secondary ways
unless these defenses could also defend Soviet cities. In the latter
event our current planning practices would require our viewing such defenses
as a city BMD. This paper deals only with ABMs defending cities since no
Soviet defenses of strategic forces are projected in existing intelligence
documents.
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3
4+. If deterrence fails and if city attacks are initiated by the
Soviets, to be able to'destroy a substantial part of the Soviet urban
industrial base.
In addition, we wish, of course, to achieve these strategic
objectives at minimum cost.
Whether we can achieve the first three of these objectives depends
upon how the Soviets estimate our capabilities and their own; therefore,
when we talk about the capabilities of Soviet BMD, we should in fact be
talking about Soviet estimates of the capability of their BMD, since
it is these Soviet estimates which in part affect Soviet attitudes
toward nuclear war. Whether we can achieve the fourth objective depends
not on Soviet estimates but on the true capabilities of Soviet BMD.
Ideally, then, we need to know not only the true capabilities of Soviet
BMD, but what the Soviets think these capabilities are. The importance
of 'this distinction will be evident in the ensuing discussion.
Objective 1 - Dissuasion of'Soviet ABM Deployment. We do not
know how the Soviet bureaucracy makes major strategic forces decisions.
We therefore do not know with confidence what actions we should take
to dissuade the Soviets from an ABM deployment. Our options range from
arms control agreements to advance deployment of weapons to counter
expected Soviet BMD. One important option is to confront the Soviets
with a range of developmental penetration devices, the countering of
which will make an effective ABM system extremely expensive even at low
defense deployment levels and will reduce the Soviets' confidence that
their BMD will work. It is desirable, of course, that the deployment
of such devices be substantially cheaper, than the deployment of enough
ABMs: to counter them. Examples of such devices are chaff, atmospheric
decoys, electronic countermeasures, precursor nuclear bursts, boost glide
reentry vehicles and maneuvering reentry, vehicles. Our Advanced Ballistic
Reentry System (ABRES) development program is at least partly intended,
along with other efforts, to provide just such dissuasion.
Such an approach imposes few intelligence requirements since our
ABRES effort is driven largely by our own ABM technology, which is now
and is likely to remain several years ahead of corresponding Soviet
technology.
Objective 2 - Deterrence of Nuclear War. We deter the Soviets primarily
by maintaining forces sufficient to retaliate after a first strike and
destroy the Soviet Union, even under very conservative assumptions about
the effectiveness of Soviet forces and how those forces would be used.
Because procurement of forces takes a long time, the MM estimates
which are useful to force planners must be estimates of future BMD
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capabilities. Our estimates of Soviet ABM performance strongly influence
the size and hence the costs of our strategic forces and the use to which
such estimates are put 'influences the nature of the estimates required.
Consider,the highly simplified payoff table below:
Soviet Estimate of Soviet ABM Performance
Works
ABM Perform- Does Not U. S. Forces Under U. S. Forces
ante Work Designed; Deterrence Properly Designed
Compromised
In this table'the term "Works" implies that the Soviet BMD functions in
accordance with some specified mode of operation. One mode might be,
e.g.,, that area defense is nationwide random, that radars can see through
chaff, that city terminal defenses are subtractive, that radars can dis-
criminate decoys, and that both interceptor types must be exhausted.
The term "Does Not Work" implies that a major vulnerability exists in
the system which if exploited would permit penetration by substantially
smaller attacking forces than if the system "works." The payoff table
suggests that the U. S. will not design its forces on a "Does Not Work"
estimate unless we are virtually certain the Soviets also estimate that
the ABM "Does Not Work." Otherwise, regardless of the true capabilities
of the ABM, deterrence might fail, and enormous political and military
consequences could flow from such a failure.
mate of Soviet Works Properly Designed Over Designed
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V 4
U. S. Esti-. U. S. Forces I U. S. Forces
The payoff table above could be expanded by arraying along its
edges a complete spectrum of performance possibilities (or conversely
but equivalently, penetration modes) for the Soviet W. Assume for the
,moment that there are five such penetration modes, Q(l) through Q(5) where
the cost to the U. S. to exploit Q(i) is higher than Q(2), cost to exploit
Q(2) is higher than Q(3) etc. The table then might look as below:
Soviet Estimate of Soviet BMD Performance
Q(l) Q(2)
Q(1).
U. S. Estimate Q(2).
of Soviet BM Q(3)
U. S. Forces
Performance Q(l+)
Under, Designed
Q(5)
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Q(3)
Does Not Work
Q(t+)
Q(5)
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The intelligence task then is to find, for each of a list of exploitable
penetration modes (Q(1), Q(2) ... Q(5)), the probability that the Soviets
will estimate that they will be able to defeat it. This implies that
U. S. decision-makers will examine our intelligence data on both the
BMD and on what the Soviets think of the BMD to see if Q(5) is available
to us. If they can say virtually positively that q(5) is not available
then they will examine Q(4), then Q(3), etc., until. they find a penetra-
tion mode which can be exploited and which the Soviets will also believe
is exploitable.
For force structure design, all of our estimates must be for a
future A34 system. If Q(l) through Q(5) are visualized as penetration
modes such as radar blackout, exhaustion, rate saturation, etc., the
intelligence task boils down to making high-confidence estimates, of
which, if any, of these penetration modes will be available. The intelli-
gence data required is that data needed for this specific decision.
Objective 3 - Deterrence of City Attacks.During a Nuclear War.
If deterrence fails and a nuclear war starts, we hope to avoid attacks
on our cities by holding Soviet cities hostage to withheld U. S. forces
sufficient to destroy Soviet cities if they initiate city attacks.
Just as for objective 2, the size and types of forces we withhold must
be persuasive to the Soviets. Hence, their estimate of their RMD per-
formance is again one of the crucial parameters. The main difference
between the two objectives is that of time--future BMD capabilities are
pertinent to analyses of our deterrent of nuclear war, present and near
future capabilities are pertinent to war planning which in turn determines
the forces we withhold for city attacks.
Objective 4 - Destruction of Soviet Cities. This objective requires
that we know the truth about available Soviet BMD penetration modes.
Again, however, we must have very high confidence in our estimates, since
an underestimate of Soviet BMD capabilities could result in a failure
to destroy their cities if that became necessary. Such failure would in
some sense imply losing the war.
This discussion of the implications of U. S. strategic objectives
relative to Soviet BMD is summarized in the following table.
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U. S. ,U. S. Decisions Time of the
Objective Involved Estimate Needed Estimate
Soviet Estimate Mid Range
of available Future
Penetration
Modes
War Planning Soviet Estimate Present and
of available Near Term
Penetration Future
Modes
4 War Planning Penetration Present and Very High
Modes truly Near Term
available Future
In sum, we should be trying to estimate penetration modes with very
high confidence for both the mid-range period and the near future. Our
collection needs should be.tailored to these estimate requirements. If
we cannot make detailed performance estimates. of the required quality,
we should not expend large sums on such estimates..
CURRENT KNOWLEDGE AND PROJECTIONS OF SOVIET 13MD
overestipiated Soviet BMD for those years now past.
Table I shows,our current projection of Soviet BMD order of battle.
These data show that significant terminal defenses are not expected before
about 1976. Figure 1 shows how our estimate of total order of battle
has changed as a function of the date on which the estimate was made.
This figure shows that we have made large downward revisions of Soviet
order of battle since late 1965. The figure also shows that we.greatly
Estimated Soviet ABM: Source NIPP-69
72 74 76 78
RA}Ei FERS
Confidence
Required
Moderate to
Low
Very High
Very High
Launchers 24-24.' 56-64 64-64 64-344 214-884 464-1064
Terminal Intercep-
tor Launchers. 0-0 0-0 0-0 0-0
Total 24-24 56-64 64-64 64-344
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R&D
Most difficult
Penetration
Modes to
counter
2 Force Structure
0-120 0-600
214-1004 464-1664
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Figure ]V=/
History of U. S. Estimates of Total Soviet ABM Order of Battle
(Data are High National Intelligence Projections
for Planning (NIPP) Estimates)
I
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1 Sit
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111
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V --These data do not include the Tallinn system. High NIPP data are shown
since the High NIPP drives force structures in the out years and low
-and high are usually equal in near future years.
The lines drawn on this figure do not imply continuous estimate changes;
estimates were published late in the year in the NIPPs, e.g., NIPP-69
was published in late '68, etc. The lines are mostly for clarity in
showing related points and trends. Intelligence Assumptions for Planning
(IAP) data were used for "late 63" data points.
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Qualitative Characteristics
National estimates have not included estimates of the performance
of Soviet BMD. For example, the estimates have not dealt with those
factors which might cause the Soviet'ABM to be vulnerable to chaff.
The estimates, also, have not provided data from which a determination
can be made of the firing doctrine or operational mode of the Soviet
area ABM. For example, the intelligence estimates have not specified
whether the area defense would be subtractive, random, pre-committed
or preferential. In the absence of such estimates, the following
has been generally assumed for force structure design purposes:
1. The area ABM will work and will perform in a random
mode. Area interceptors must be exhausted for any
penetration to occur.-
2. The area ABM will be vulnerable to chaff (the
opposite assumption has also been used to examine
less likely U. S. offensive force performance).
Any area interceptor can defend any part of the
Soviet Union.
There has been general acceptance that the projected Soviet area
AIM will not perform.better than set forth in 1 through 3 above. The
acceptance has been informal in the sense that the Draft Presidential
Memoranda, the Department of Defense Strategic Force and Effectiveness
Tables and other similar documents have been based on this performance
description, without objection from either the intelligence community
or others.
PENETRATION MODES OF PROJECTED SOVIET ABM
reentry vehicles might be available.
Practically, the projected Soviet ABM is an area defense in the
1970-1976 period. Assuming the Soviets will defend their radars from
direct attack, penetration modes other than exhaustion with armed
1. Use of area penetration aids (e.g., chaff) as well
as reentry vehicles to exhaust the ABM.
2. Use of radar blackout to either destroy the defense
or to penetrate it.
3. Use of maneuverable reentry vehicles to absorb several
Soviet interceptors per U. S.'reentry vehicle..
Use of electronic counter measures (ECM).
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PROGRAMMED U. S. FORCE CHARACTERISTICS
In the 1976 period, we will have deployed MINUTEMAN IIs,
MINUTEMAN IIIs, POLARIS A-3 and POSEIDONS. Table.II below shows
the number of area interceptors per missile each can absorb if
programmed area penetration aids work as they have been designed to
work.
Area Interceptors U. S. Missiles can Absorb
With and Without Area Penetration Aids
With
Penet
out Area
ration Aids
With Area
Penetration Aids
MINUTEMAN II
1
9
MINUTEMAN III
3
15
POLARRIS A-3
1
1
POSEIDON
10
10
Table II suggests some payoff if we know that area penetration aids
work; however, the existence of the large POSEIDON force, which has a
larger number of warheads and no penetration aids, will reduce the value
of such information considerably.
Radar blackout. is likely to be a high risk penetration mode even
,with good intelligence since the tactics required are complex. In
addition, if the ABM order of battle is small, as projected for the mid-
70s by NIPP-69, blackout might not be much more efficient than penetration
by exhaustion. It is unlikely that we would rely on radar blackout (even
though we might use it to supplement other tactics) for either force
structure design or war.pla.nning. In this regard, only our MK 12 reentry
vehicles will,have a precursor burst capability, a prerequisite to the
use of radar blackout. We do not have large warheads programmed capable
of providing such bursts.
Maneuverable reentry vehicles are not now programmed for our strategic.
offensive forces, nor is it likely that they will be even if a larger
Soviet BMD is projected. This results from such factors as the likely
expense of such systems and the large payload capability already available
in U. S. forces.
ECM.is most likely to be used as an?adjunct to other more reliable
penetration modes. Because its success is highly dependent on Soviet
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electronic system capabilities, some of which we might be unable to
learn about short'of fighting a war, we are unlikely to rely on
EC4,heavily.
CAPABILITIES OF PROGRAMMED U. S. OFFENSIVE FORCES
For Assured Destruction
Table III shows a number of U. S. programmed force capabilities
against, the High NIPP-69 strategic offensive and defensive threat in
an Assured Destruction test. Our retaliatory requirements are the
main determinants of U. S. forces. In this test U. S. forces are attacked
by the full weight of alerted Soviet offensive forces. U. S. forces
receive tactical warning only (permitting launch of alert bombers) and
attack the Soviet Union's urban industrial target system through alerted
Soviet defenses. This is the worst that could happen to U. S. forces,
given the High NIPP threat.
Table III
U. S. Strategic Offensive Force Performance Against Soviet
High NIPP- 9 Threat Assured Destruction Test
MO
72
y
Surviving Reliable Missile Warheads
at Area Defenses.
9o.
1904
2840
2883
Surviving Reliable Area Objects at
Area Defenses '
2587
5631
6734
6449
? Surviving Reliable Terminal Objects
.at Terminal Defenses
.1364
2083
2891
3333
Surviving Reliable Missile Warheads
at Terminal Defenses
?906
1904
2752
2608
.Detonating Missile Warheads
902
.1876.
2723
2570
Percent Soviet Fatalities,. Missiles
Only
43
1414
44
43
Percent Soviet Fatalities, All U. S.
Forces
43
45
45
44
.Percent Soviet Fatalities, All U. S.
Forces, No Penetration Aids
43
44
44 .
41
Percent Soviet Fatalities, Bombers Only
29
26
12
17
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This table shows that U. S. forces are designed very conservatively
given.the projected Soviet ABM threat. For example in 1976:
1. Almost 2900 reliable U. S. missile warheads can be expected
to be delivered to Soviet area defenses. Maximum projected Soviet area
ABM reliable order of battle is about 650 interceptors.
2. If U. S. area penetration aids work, about 6+00 targets (war-
heads and chaff) can be delivered to the Soviet area defenses.
3. If U. S. area penetration aids work, about 2600 missile
reentry vehicles can be delivered to Soviet terminal defenses. Projected
Soviet reliable terminal interceptor order of battle is 90 such inter-
ceptors.
wl u result in procurement of smaller U. S. forces.
For Wear Fighting
The paper at Tab A discusses the sensitivities of the performance
of U. S. forces in, war fighting scenarios to ABM information. The con-
clusion of the paper at Tab A is that U. S. force performance is quite
insensitive at ABM levels in the neighborhood of those projected by
NIPP-69. It should be noted that the smallest ABM estimate used in the
paper at Tab A is about twice as large as the High NIPP-69 projection
for mid-1976 and almost two and one half times the tiid-range estimate
for mid-1976 in NIPP-69. This suggests that the value of information
on Soviet ABM vulnerabilities is likely to be very low given NIPP-69
projections, likely employment of Soviet forces and U. S. programmed
4. If U. S. area penetration aids don't work, about 2250 warheads
can be delivered to these terminal defenses.
5. If the Soviet ABM will not work at all, and if we know before
the war that it will not work, Soviet fatalities would not be significantly
increased (about 1f) because. the marginal benefits of delivering warheads
is very low at fatality levels in the 40% to 50% range.
6. Even though projections of Soviet ABM, made over the 1966-1969
period, have decreased by very large amounts, our programmed forces have
changed only slightly.'
In sum, our forces are extremely Capable against the High.NIPP-69
ABM threat. Additional knowledge of vulnerabilities in this threat will
not meaningfully improve the estimated performance of our programmed
forces. It seems unlikely that knowledge of vulnernhi1i+iaa in +hia ADM
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HEDGING SOVIET ABM DEPLOYMgNTS GREATER THAN NIPP-69 PROJECTIONS
U. 8. Strategic Offensive Forces have substantial capacity to
tolerate increases in projected Soviet ABM. Events that would be of
some significance that ought to be watched for are:
l.. Refire capabilities that would permit more than one
ABM interceptor to be launched from a single launcher.
2. Conversion of an. air defense system, i.e., the SA-5,,
to an ABM.
3. Development of a Sprint like terminal interceptor.
The first and second of these could imply a sudden change in
projected Soviet ABM'order of battle. Depending on the number of
refi:res and the rate of conversion of the SA-5, these developments could
be serious ones.
Our programmed forces have a substantial capability to accept a
Soviet terminal defense once our multiple independent targeted reentry
vehicles are deployed on POSEIDON and'MI:NUTEMAN III. The development
of a Sprint like terminal interceptor would, however, imply significantly
i mnrroveA Q-4-4. A
i _ "1--- -' - ----
BM
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THE VALUE OF INFORMATION ON THE PERFORMANCE OF
ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES IN WAR PLANNING
Introduction
Estimates of present-or prospective performance of enemy anti-
ballistic missiles (Am) enter into at least three classes of DoD
activities:
1. Formulation of R&D programs.
2. Formulation of future force. structures.
3. War planning for strategic nuclear warfare.
The first two require estimates of future enemy ABM capabilities
because these two activities affect future U.S. capabilities. Relevant
estimates are generally of ene'my' capabilities three or more years in the
future because at least this much time is required to make significant
changes in programmed forces.
War planners for strategic nuclear warfare can use estimates of
present or very near future ABM capability because war plans can be
developed or changed on short notice. The effect of such war plan changes
is to utilize existing strategic forces in different ways. If a war
planner knows that a Soviet ABM is ineffective so that it can be pene-
trated by techniques that do not require ABM interceptor exhaustion, he
can reallocate weapons to save U.S. lives.
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the number of U.S. lives
that might be saved if a war planner knew that a deployed Soviet ABM
could. be penetrated without exhausting its interceptors.
1. If the U.S. knows that a Soviet AIM is totally. ineffective, under
likely conditions of,,~~jntelligence uncertainty, targeting, Soviet ABM
order-of-battle (OB)J , performance of U.S. forces and in likely scenarios,
about 1 to 3.5 million U.S. lives might be saved.
2. Under much less likely conditions, this reduction in U.S. fatal-
ities might rise to between 1.5 and 9.5 million.
1 All OB in this study is based on the number of launchers projected
in NIPP-68. These launchers are assumed not to becreloaded during
the battle.
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3. The only way these estimates could be significantly increased
are: (a) to project a much larger Soviet OB than used in this study;
(b) assume, if the Soviet AIM works, that U.S. penetration aids, es-
pecially'chaff, do not work; or (c) assume, if Soviet AIM works, that
the area defense performs'in a precommitted or a preferential mode.
This latter assumption is roughly equivalent to a gross increase in
projected Soviet area Acv! OB.
The General Nature of U.S. Strate i c Nuclear War Plans
Our strategic nuclear war plan, the Single Integrated Operating
Plan (Slop), contains three tasks: (1) destruction of Soviet strategic
nuclear offensive capabilities (Task A ; (2) destruction of Soviet con-
ventional warfare forces (Task B); and (3) destruction of a large part
of the Soviet urban industrial system (Task C). These three tasks are
arranged in "attack options", the selection of which determines which
tasks will be performed. In addition, the STOP contains numerous. special
features not relevant to the problem of this paper.
Tasks A and C are especially interesting in this analysis. The ex-
tent to which Task A is performed, in certain.scenarios, influences the
number of fatalities the Soviets can inflict on the U.S. Task C, if it
must be performed, determines in some-final sense who "wins" the war.
More importantly, the assured ability to perform Task C is not only the
pre--war deterrent but is also the intra-war deterrent to inhibit growth
of a counterforce strategic nuclear war to a very destructive counter urban
war. Because of the importance of Task C, it has first call on strategic
military forces. After forces are assigned to Task C to insure its per-
formance, forces are then assigned to Tasks A and B.
Because Task AA targets (strategic offensive forces) generally have
short reaction times, they are considered time sensitive and have high
priority for attack by ballistic missiles. Task B targets are much less
time sensitive and may consequently be attacked effectively with bombers..=
Task: C, though not time sensitive, should, however, have weapons assigned
to it which can be withheld for a long time without their being destroyed
by enemy action--they should have enduring survivability. With present
and foreseeable technology and economics, only ballistic missiles (sea
based and land based) will have this property. Tasks A-;and C, therefore,
compete for the same limited resources--ballistic missiles. If bombers
can be given enduring survivability, they could also be assigned to Task
C; as discussed later, such assignment would reduce the value of knowing
an ABM is ineffective. The assumption that bombers are not used in Task
C. therefore, tends to increase the values of AIM intelligence estimated
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If, to perform Task C. AHvIs must be penetrated) missile delivered
weapons must be set aside in Task C forces for this purpose. The number
set aside is determined by ABM OB and by the estimated performance -
capa
bilities of this OB. If high confidence estimates of reduced performance
can be made, fewer weapons need to be assigned to,Task C; this frees wea-
pons for Task A. The addition of weapons to Task A should enhance our
ability to strike at Soviet forces assigned to their Task C thereby re-
ducing U.S. fatalities.
The study reported in this paper is of the fatality reductions that
can be obtained under certain interesting cases of war outbreak, Soviet
war planning, and intelligence on the performance of Soviet ABM.
Confidence Requirements in Estimates of Enemy APM Performance
Properly functioning strategic nuclear defenses must virtually ex-
clude penetration of nuclear weapons; otherwise, the defenses themselves
can be brought under attack and destroyed. This characteristic of
strategic defenses causes them to exact an "entry price". which must be
paid in offensive weapons. Performance estimates of the defenses are in
effect estimates of the entry price. If the entry price to a defended
target is underestimated by the attacker, the defended target is likely
to escape without damage. If the entry price is overestimated, an inef-
ficient offensive weapon allocation results and the defended target will
be "over killed".
Since an underestimate results in large negative payoffs to the
attacker and an overestimate in offsetting relatively small positive and
negative payoffs, only very high confidence estimates of reduced per-
formance are lik
l
t
e
y
o be acted upon by war planners.
Description of Calculations Performed
The Scenario
The scenario assumed was that both sides received warning and
were able to alert opposin strategic forces. The Soviet Union (Red)
struck first at U.S.-(Blue) strategic offensive forces. Blue then struck
back at Red strategic forces. After this, both sides attacked each others'
cities.
The Force
Red offensive forces were in the mid-range for 1976 as projected
by NIPP 68. Blue forces were as programmed for mid-76. Both sides were
assumed to use bombers only against Task ?B targets. This assumption'in
effect removed all bombers (but not bomber bases) from the problem. This.
assumption is Ai......?
a
_
sed l
te
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Red ABM 0B was varied and is specified where the results of
the calculations are shown.
Both area and terminal penetration aids are assumed to work
for both Red and Blue.
Target Systems
Both Red and Blue counterforce target systems were determined
from NIPP-68 and the FYDP respectively. The urban industrial target sys-
tems were the largest 150 Soviet cities and the largest 250 U.S. cities.
Soviet population in the city targets was 82.4 million; U.S. population,
119.6 million. The urban target systems approximate those used in the
SIOP and the RISOP (U.S. version of the Soviet SIOP).
Performance of Soviet ABM
Two performance levels were examined for Soviet APM. First, it
was assumed to be very effective. In this case, interceptor exhaustion
.had to occur before penetration occurred. The area defense was assumed to
be random, the terminal defense, subtractive. The effect of these assump-
tions is to bring all reliable area and terminal interceptors into battle.
Next, the AEI was assumed to be wholly ineffective. In this
case the ABM OB was zero; none of the interceptors got into battle.
These two cases are the extreme possibilities for the perform-
ance of a random area, subtractive terminal defense. Other .cases, e.g.,
if rate saturation is possible, would fall between these two extremes.
If the performance level assumed results in a low effective OB, the re-
suits of the "wholly ineffective" case would approximate the low effective
OB assumption.
Soviet Withhold Variations
If the Soviets withhold untargetable forces (e.g., SLBMs or
Alert Bombers) to strike U.S. cities, our reallocating weapons from Task
C to Task A will not'-reduce U.S. fatalities at all. If the Soviets with-
hold. only land-based missiles, we have maximum opportunity to reduce U.S.
fatalities by Blue weapon reallocation from Task C to,Task A. Both these
cases are examined.
Soviet Fatality Levels
Blue forces can be divided between Tasks C and A to achieve any
given level of Red fatalities from zero to nearly the number of people in
the cities being attacked. Data are presented.for three levels of Soviet
fatalities, 50 million, 60 million and 70 million. These levels were
treated as parameters in the study.
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Results of Calculations
The tables below show the U.S. fatalities for Soviet A.H4, both
effective and wholly ineffective, for various other conditions. The
tables also show U.S. lives that might be saved if a Soviet AHM is in-
effective and we know it is so that our war plans can be-adjusted to
take advantage of this knowledge.
Table lA
U.S. Fatalities in Millions
Soviets Withhold SLBMs for Red Task C
Soviet Fatalities - 70 Million
Performance of AIM Lives Saved by Knowing
Soviet AH4 OB Effective Ineffective AEM is Ineffective
1000 Area
470 Terminal 80.0 79.0 1.0
2000 Area
940, Terminal 81.1 79.0 2.1
Table lB
U.S. Fatalities in Millions.
Soviets Withhold SLBMs for Red Task C
Soviet Fatalities 0 Million
Performance of ABM
Soviet AEI OB Effective , Ineffective
1000 Area
470 Terminal
2000 Area
940 Terminal
.79.6 79.0
80.2 . 79.0.
Lives Saved by Knowing
ARv! is Ineffective
Table 1C
U.S. Fatalities in Millions
Soviets Withhold SLBMs for Red Task C
Soviet Fatalities - 50 Million
Performance of AH4 Lives Saved by Knowing
Soviet ABM OB Effective Ineffective AEvi' is Ineffective
1000 Area
470 Terminal 79.4 78.6 .8
2000 Area
940 Terminal .80.2 78.6 1.6
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These tables show that knowledge of Soviet ABM ineffectiveness might
permit saving about .5 to 2.0 million lives for the conditions shown and
that lives-saved are not very sensitive to Soviet fatality levels. This
result was to be expected with SLBMs withheld. The only reason some lives
were saved is that the model used assumed that some land-based missiles
not alert for'the Red Task A strike could be made alert for Red Task C.
Additional attrition of these, when ABM is ineffective, saves some lives.
Tables IIA through IIC show the same data if Red withholds land-
based ICBMs for Red Task C.
Table IIA
U.S. Fatalities in Millions
Soviets Withhold SS-lls for Red Task C
Soviet Fatalities - 70 Million
Performance of ABM Lives Saved by Knowing
S
i
ov
et ABM OB Effective Ineffective .. ABM is Ineffective
1000 Area
47CI Terminal- 84.5 81.2 3.3
2000 Area
940 Terminal 90.7 81.2 9.5.
Table IIB
U.S. Fatalities in Millions
Soviets Withhold SS-lis for Red Task C
Soviet Fatalities - 60 Million
Soviet ABM OB
1000.Area
470 Terminal
2000 Area
940 Terminal
Performance of AIM
Effective' Ineffective ABM is Ineffective
Lives Saved by Knowing
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Table IIC
U.S. Fatalities in Millions
Soviets Withhold SS-lls 'for -Red Task C
Soviet Fatalities - 50 Million
Performance of ABI. Lives Saved by Knowing
Soviet ABM OB Effective Ineffective AIM is Ineffective
1000 Area
470 Terminal 82.2
2000 Area
940 Terminal 84-5
79.2
79.2
3.0
5.7
These last three tables show that if land-based ICBMs only are
assigned to Red Task C. and if ABM OB is large, U.S. lives saved, by
knowledge of vulnerabilities in Soviet ABM, would reach as high as 9 -
10 million. In more likely situations, i.e., Soviet AHI turns out to be
about like our mid-range projections, U.S. lives saved would be about 3
million.
Additional Aspects of this Problem
Several assumptions used in this analysis can now be analyzed for
their implications.
Assumption 1 - Bombers are used only in Task B by both Red and Blue.
Alternative Assumptions
U. Red assigns bombers to Red Task C. The effect of this
would be to reduce the value to-Blue of knowledge that Red's ABM is in-
effective since alert bombers are not targetable.
b.' Red assns bombers to Red Task A. This would give
Blue an incentive to withhold SLBMs for Blue Task C, and would increase
the total Blue withhold required if Blue insisted on riding out the bomber?
attack before executing Blue Task C. Such use of Red bombers should not,
however, have any pronounced effect on the value of knowing Red AH4 is
ineffective. I
c.. Blue assigns bombers to Blue Task C. Since bomber
effectiveness is not sensitive to knowledge of Red's ineffective ABM) such
use of Blue bombers would reduce the value of knowing about Red's inef-
fective ABM.
d. Blue assigns bombers to Blue Task A. If Red does not
wait until after Blue bombers attack to execute Red Task C, such use of
Blue 'bombers would have no effect. If red did wait, the effect of Blue
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bombers would be to reduce the marginal damage of the ballistic missiles
reassigned to Task A on the basis of knowledge of Red's ineffective AIM.-.
The net result of such use of Blue bombers would be to reduce the value
of knowledge of Red's ineffective ABM.
Assumption 2 - Blue's penetration aid work.
Alternative Assumption
The grossest alternative assumption is that Blue's penetra-
tion aids, especially chaff, do not work. The effect of this alternative
would be to substantially increase the value of knowledge that Red ABM
is ineffective. This is caused by the fact that any reduction in Blue
penetration efficiency (ABM interceptors absorbed per offensive booster)
forces Blue to set aside more forces if Red AIM is effective.
Assumption 3 - Red's Task C withhold is all in either land-based
or'sea-based forces.
Alternative Assumption
Red might use a mixed force of bombers, SLBMs and ICBMs
for Red Task C to guard against gross failure of any one of these classes
of systems. The effect of this is to make the value of knowledge of
Red's ineffective AH'fall between the extremes shown in Tables lA-C and
IIA-C. If Red uses many bombers, the value of ABM knowledge could fall.
below the tabled estimates.
Assumption 4 - City target systems are limited in size about as
used in this analysis.
Alternative Assumption
Use larger city target systems. The larger the city target
systems, the smaller will be the value of.knowledge of Red's ineffective
ABM. This is caused by the fact Red's weapons, destroyed by Blue's re-
allocation on-the basis of Blue's knowledge about Red's ABM, are achieving
lower average returns against a large city target system than a small one.
Assumption 5 - The scenario used. 1
Alternative Assumptions
a. Red executes Task C before Blue can strike Red's Task
C forces. The estimates derived here will be reduced in any scenario in
which Red executes Red Task C before Blue can strike Refits Task C forces.
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b. Blue-strikes first. The estimates will be reduced if
Blue strikes first inflicting higher overall attrition on Red forces.
This results from the lower marginal damage done by the missiles Blue
reallocates from Task C to-Task A in this case..
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