GENERAL DYNAMICS MACHINE LANGUAGE TYPEWRITER - REPORT AND FINDINGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01139A000200110010-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: December 14, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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REFERENCE MATERIAL
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14 December 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, USIB Committee on Documentation
SUBJECT: GENERAL DYNAMICS MACHINE LANGUAGE
TYPEWRITER - Report and Findings
I. Background
1. In December 1960, CODIB set up the Working Group
on Remote Systems Input. Its immediate purpose was to com-
pare the requirements and specifications of?USIB agencies
for remote systems input devices in order to combine them
into a single set covering all essential features. The
Group duly formulated a statement of requirements for an
Input/Output Typewriter for typing classified information
at jointly used installations abroad. The statement included
functional specifications common to all participating agencies,
as well as those of major significance to one or more agencies.
NAG-.lA/TSEC (later, FS-222) was subsequently designated as
the security standard for the equipment.
2. BuShips, Department of the Navy, was selected as
executive agent by DOD to contract with industry for the
development and production of the secure machine language
typewriter. The R&D Contract was awarded to General Dynamics/
Electronics. GD/E in turn chose the MITE Corporation as sub-
contractor for mechanical assemblies. Work on the project
commenced in early 1964, and the initial briefing of the
Working Group by the BuShips Project Officer in May of that
year indicated a satisfactory beginning.
II. The Problem
1. By October 1964, when the Group was again briefed
on the progress of the development, some problem areas were
becoming evident. It was reported, for example, that the
size and weight, as well as certain of the security require-
ments, would be difficult to attain.
2. As additional problems were identified and correc-
tive measures applied - and as additional requirements were
levied - the equipment began to take on a character substantially
a,, CI1
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different from the original USIB functional specifications.
The complexity and projected unit cost have, at this point,
reached alarming proportions. This, together with some pro-
blems (operational and security) which have not yet been
resolved, leads the Working Group to conclude that there is
little hope for obtaining an equipment from this effort which
will. meet USIB requirements and gain user acceptance. The
problem, then, is whether to continue to support the effort
as programmed, attempt to redirect it, or recommend cancel-
lation of the contract now. Facts bearing on the problem
and on the Working Group's recommendation are presented
below.
1. During the early stages of development, it
became apparent that (a) the machine would be larger and
heavier than anticipated and (b) it would have to be com-
pletely enclosed - in fact, virtually sealed - in a "quiet"
cover to meet the acoustic requirement of Federal Standard
222? A decision was made to go into microelectronics and
provide a recessing keyboard to reduce the size and weight.
Even so, it now appears that the machine will exceed the
100 pound weight limitation by 30-50% and also be two or
more inches wider than the design goal. The effect of the
"quiet" cover concept is that of making access to the paper
and tape, for correction purposes, difficult. This factor
may well affect typist's acceptance of the device.
2. In order to develop a machine with the broadest
possible customer appeal, the scope of the contract was
modified to provide for on-line communications capability
and direct code conversion. By including a variety of
optional features to increase the demand, it was felt that
the unit cost would be held down. However, despite the ori-
ginal quotation of $3,400 per unit in lots of 1000 machines,
General Dynamics is now talking of a unit cost appraoching
$10,000. Some members of the Working Group feel the on-line
feature has complicated the design and will lead to increased
maintenance problems. The contractor has affirmed, however,
that the existing problems are not related to the on-line or
code conversion capabilities.
3. Inspection of the Engineering Model at the con-
tractor's facility by members of the Group along with engi-
neering and security advisors, pinpointed some of the pro-
blems and objectionable features. These range from poor
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design, to the use of questionable materials, to probable
operating and foreseen maintenace difficulties, to doubts
about the ability of the equipment to meet the requirements
of Federal Standard 222. It was determined that, if the
effort is to continue, some redesign involving additional
R&D funds is imperative.
4. The contractor was called to Washington
9 November 1965 to review the problems and discuss redesign
recommendations. A summary of the results of this meeting
is outlined below.
A. Prototypes
(1) Additional R&D Costs Related to Recommended
Redesign
a. Solenoid Power to Assist for
Keyboard $ 24,500
b. Reduce Speed to 120 WPM to
Minimize RFI Problem 58,600
c. Redesign Case for easier access
to tape 19,100
d. Provide Gear Reduction System
for Motor Drive 11,800
Total 11 ,000
(2) Extension of R&D Contract
Estimated at Six Months - to August 1966
B. Production Models
(1) Tooling and Start-up Costs
a. Preproduction Engineering $ 303,000
b. Mechanical Subsystem Processing 115,000
c. Tooling
1,030,500
Total $1,448,500
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(2) Unit Cost for First Lot of 1000 Machines
a. Typewriter Only
b. Teletypewriter
c. Teletypewriter with Code
Converter
Start-up Costs Amortized Over
1000 Units - Additional $1,448
per unit.
$ 8,500
9,000
9,300
(3) Delivery of First Production Machines
a. 27 Months After Approval of
Prototypes - About Nov-Dec
1968
b. Accelerated Program - 17 mos.
after Approval of Prototypes,
achieved by Starting Prepro-
duction Engineering during
Prototype Evaluation - About Jan 1968
C. Other Factors
(1) Estimated Production Rate
(Beginning in 1968)
(2) Delivery of First Thousand
Units (20 Months @ 50 Units
per Month)
- 50 Units per Mo.
- Late 1969 or
Mid 1970
D. Some Unanswered Questions
(1) Required Length of Maintenance Training?
Electronic/Mech. Engineer?
(2) Security Standards in 1969 - 1970?
(3) Operator Acceptance?
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IV. Findings
1. The Working Group has agreed unanimously that
production of the General Dynamics typewriter under con-
tract by any USIB Agency is highly unlikely in view of the
projected unit cost, production schedule, and other pro-
blems cited above. The Group has considered alternatives
to recommend to CODIB in the framework of the Group's in-
terest as potential users of the equipment. Thus the
questions of operator acceptance, maintainability overseas,
and cost of the end product were primary considerations;
security specifications (Federal Standard 222) were formally
ruled beyond the competence of the Working Group in dis-
cussing alternatives, though the security aspect could not
be discounted as a practical matter as each member decided
upon his position.
2. The Group felt that there were one of two
alternatives it could recommend to CODIB:
a. outright cancellation of the project, or
at least withdrawal of CODIB's endorsement of continuance,
on the grounds that further expenditures in redesign and
prototype delivery and testing are not justified. Each
agency would then re-examine its own resources, and develop-
ments in industry, in hopes of finding a substitute which
would meet the original specifications. Any breakthroughs
would, of course, be shared with the community.
b. continue the contract, with redesign esti-
mated at $114,000 and 6 months delay to meet the most basic
criticisms of all parties concerned, in order to provide
prototypes for testing. Given the investment to date, the
experience to be gained from prototype testing would be
worth the additional cost. Should this alternative be
adopted by CODIB, BuShips should be responsible for sche-
duling testing of the prototypes by those agencies concerned,
and prepare a final report on test results for CODIB.
3. The Working Group is deadlocked in recommending
either alternative. Each of the 7 members has registered a
formal vote in light of his own convictions and the techni-
cal advice available through his own agency. The Air, Army,
and Navy members vote for continuing the project through
prototype delivery and testing. The CIA, DIA, and NSA mem-
bers vote for cancellation of the contract forthwith. The
State member abstains.
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4. It is recommended that CODIB consider this
problem at the earliest opportunity, since the contractor
is effectively stalled until further direction from the
government is received. It is also recommended that CODIB
solicit the opinions of the technical security experts
most familiar with this development in weighing the pro-
blems discussed herein.
5. The undersigned and other Team members will
be available should CODIB wish further oral elaboration
of this report in the course of its deliberations.
25X1
Chairman, CODIB
Working Group on
Remote Systems Input
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