INTERIM REPORT TASK TEAM VII - ANALYST COMMUNICATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01139A000300060021-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2002
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: October 26, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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26 October 1965
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
(.-;O?MM!"TTEE ON DOCUMENTATION
I -. a zo o '?tt
'(weri m i eppre ?x'ask TO
~.hi:te attachhed task team tntorrim report is distributed for discussffon
and general approval of the initial Braes of s can suggested to pars. 3,
page 5.,
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d[s r-~A, and
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T/V I I /R-1.
1 `ti October 196S
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE 80 ARD
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Committee on Documentation
SUBJECT: Transmittal of Task Team VII Report
L. Task Team VII submits the attached interim report for
information and for CODIB's general approval of the initial lines
of action suggested in paragraph 3,
2:, As we have indicated, this first report should be considered
strictly tentative. It is based on a partial Investigation of one
area only and represents only a portion of the sample that we expect
to cover in that area. Nonetheless, we have collectively arrived at
certain judgments which we feel can usefully be reported at this
time, at least as a preview of a few basic considerations in the
problem of analyst-to-analyst communication. If, as we proceed, we
discover that our initial judgments are in error, we will so report
to CODIB at once
We believe that our efforts to date9 while so far productive
of relatively small result., will enable us to move in the future at25X1A
a much accelerated pace.
Chairman, ODIB Task Team VII
t; coup 1
Cxrluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification,
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T/VII/R-1
15 October 1965
INTERIM REPORT
1. As a result of its own deliberations and informal discussions
with analysts of varying levels in State, CIA (DD/I) and DIA, the Task
Team has reached certain interim conclusions concerning the problem of
communication between analysts. These are based primarily on our
partial investigation of the Latin American area, but we suspect that
they are applicable in large part to other areas of the world as well.
a. There are, in fact, a surprisingly large number of
mechanisms by which analysts from differing agencies collaborate and
communicate. Among these mechanisms are: the USIB committees and
subcommittees; the NIE mechanism; the coordination of the Central
Intelligence Bulletin (CIB); various task teams set up from time to
time; informal analyst discussion groups, e.g., Guatemala; and the oper-
ation of normal, established liaison arrangements. Through these
various mechanisms, analysts identify their opposite numbers in other
agencies, exchange information and opinions, and achieve working level
cooperation. Nonetheless, there is variation in the application of
these arrangements with respect to both geographic and functional
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coverage. For crisis coverage, analyst communication normally is good;
in quiet areas, exchanges are minimal.
b. The time factor has a very real bearing on the question of
analyst communication. This factor also is closely related to the pro-
blem of secure communication that is discussed in paragraph e. Thus,
we find that consultation on current intelligence is very spotty--
timeliness takes precedence over coordination. On the other hand, with
some exceptions, more extensive consultation takes place on longer-range
intelligence.
c. The problem of identifying the appropriate analysts in
another agency is directly related to the organization structure of
that agency or office. State, which has a straightforward geographic
organization, presents little problem in comparison with CIA and DIA,
which are organized on a mixed geographic and functional basis. The
exchange of current organization charts would be helpful to each agency
as a means of identifying the intelligence capabilities of other members
of the community. Charts, however, should not be considered a tool for
identifying analysts. (See paragraph (d) below) In order to avoid
misuse and to overcome problems of security, organization charts of
other agencies should be held only in the top offices of an agency and
in established liaison circles.
d. The problem of identification has two facets. One is
the identification of the responsible analyst at the appropriate level
in the chain of command; the other is identification of the most
knowledgeable or expert person on a particular subject, wherever he may
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be within an organization. The first kind of identification can usually
be done, if necessary, through established liaison channels, albeit
these channels are sometimes slow and cumbersome. The second kind of
identification, however, is extremely difficult and depends on the
variables of individual knowledge or acquaintance. Even within agencies
themselves, no organized method for this kind of identification exists,
except within DIA which has now established a roster of its personnel
showing the area or subject specialties and background of each indivi-
dual. Rosters, however, should be considered to be intra-agency tools,
useful, for example, for the purpose of adjusting personnel assignments
to meet crisis situations. For interagency purposes, however, require-
ments of command channels must be maintained. Thus,. it is the responsible
analyst who is the key in this type of communication cycle and not the
analyst who might be identified as more knowledgeable. For these reasons
the idea of a complete interiasency directory of analysts' !skills and
expertise seems of dubious value--even if the many obstacles to its
preparation and maintenance could be overcome. Our present thinking on
this problem of identification tends in the direction of improved
liaison arrangements and the development and maintenance of additional
and more clearly established points of approved contact. By so doing,
the needs of command channels and security compartmentation can be met.
e. The problem of secure communication between agencies
deserves increased attention. We propose to examine the distribution
and use of the "gray" line with a view to determining if, and how, it can
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be made a more useful tool for analyst-to-analyst communication. Arrange-
ments now under way for secure facsimile transmission between the NMCC
and Operations Centers in State and CIA may alleviate this problem to
some extent. In this general field particularly we feel we shall, as
we proceed, need the assistance and expertise of a representative from
the NSA.
f. Variations in individual security clearances as a hindrance
to analyst-to-analyst communication does not appear to present a problem
in Latin America. This may, however, not be true elsewhere where more
exotic types of collection efforts are employed,
g. A factor inhibiting analyst-to-analyst communication is
that of normal departmental and agency internal constraints with respect
to departmentally-oriented intelligence. The cumulative affect of these
constraints is sometimes to erect an invisible but very real barrier to
communication and coordination among analysts in different agencies..
Nevertheless, we believe that these constraints are a normal and a
necessary adjunct to command and policy responsibility, and that no
action to eliminate this inhibitory factor is warranted.
2. It has often been assumed that existing arrangements for
analyst-to-analyst communication and collaboration were seriously defi-
cient, For the purpose of. confirming this assumption, and pin-pointing
more precisely the specific areas of deficiency,.. the Task Team has
developed a questionnaire which it is discussing with selected analysts
in State, DIA and CIA concerned with Latin America. DIA has completed
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these discussions and State and CIA expect to do so shortly. The Task
Team will then be in a position to direct its attention to specific
areas for improvement, if such should emerge.
3. Based upon its limited survey to date of the problem, the Task
Team believes the following recommendations are pertinent to the Latin
American area and intends to develop them further in connection with its
future study.
a. Each agency should develop a directory of its available
intelligence skills and expertise for its own internal use, especially
for strengthening staffs in crisis situations.
b. Interagency liaison arrangements and additional points
of contact should be reviewed and strengthened. These arrangements
should include a comprehensive exchange of organization charts of the
production components of the agencies.
c. Present facilities by which analysts in one agency
communicate with their opposites either orally or by facsimile or
similar methods, are susceptible to considerable improvement.
d. The establishment of analyst-to-analyst relationships
should be included as part of the ongoing crisis contingency planning
between State, Defense and CIA.
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