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April 9, 2002
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July 8, 1966
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Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 July8 Dr. William T. Knox Office of Science and Technology Exeeutive Office of the President Washington, D. C. Dear Bill: We take great pleasure in transmitting to you the enclosed draft of the report of the subpanel on biographies of the Guidance and Evaluation Panel. This report cannot claim to be final. Indeed, as we see it, it is only a bare beginning. We wish to take this opportunity to thank those members of your staff, and of the staffs of various community agencies whose help was invaluable, not only in terms of excellent techni- cal presentations but also in guiding our way through the lab- yrinthine aftinistrative obstacle course the community presents to the innocent outsider. ely yours, Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 25X1A Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 DRAFT T OFORN CONTROLLEDDISSEM SECRET Presideflt'a Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Guidance and Evaluation Panel William T. Knox, Chairman DRAFT REPORT OF THE SUBPANEL ON BIOGRAPHICS Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 25X1A Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP8SME CO DRAFT SEC CONTROLLED DISSEM BIOGRAPHICS St3BPANEL REPORT Table of Contents Introduction Summary and Conclusions A. Background B. Major Findings C. Major Recommendations II. The Biographies Problem A. Information Sources for This Report B. Subpanel Qualifications C. Definition of Biographies D. Significance of Biographies E. Technical Simplicity of Biographies F. Biographies as a Laboratory for Tec III. Observations A. Relative Characteristics of Positive Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security Files B. File Overlap and the Single File Problem C. Evidence of Current Automation Efforts D. Need for Research and Development E. The Nature of the Biographies R & D Problems F. The Invisible Colleges G. Compartmentation and Security Ot014-3 Page i and Management Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A000500 500 t-34 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RI:130E1C DRAFT RET/NOFORN/CONT OLLED DISSEM Table of Contents (continued) 107001-3 Page ii H. Conceptual and Managerial Problems I. Manpower J. Communications K. An Approach to Security Problems L. File Conversion IV. Bibliography V% Appendices 1. The Nature of the Biographies Problem 2. Request for Information and CODIB Staff Response 3. National Driver Register Service 4. Classification of Biographic Intelligence Activities 5 Biographic Intelligence Systems Improvement a. Evolution of a National Agency Check System b. Search Strategies in Large Biographic Systems c. File Conversion Problems in the Intelligence Interagency Security Name Check Activity _P !la Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDOr IdA 0500051.001-3 DRAFT 3C RET OFORN CONTROLLED DISSEM Page 1 INTRODUCTION The subpanel on biographies, like the whole Guidance and Evaluation Panel, faced the question of how to provide increased technical support for the information processing activities of the intelligence community. The technical problems presented themselves as inextricably woven into the pattern of information use and therefore into the structure o management and management policy. The rapidly increasing growth rate of information in the national data base obviously generates, a need for addi- ott?.-.,X- tional resources to aid in processing/this information. However* since the potential information pool is practically infinite, the rate of improvement in information processing is directly dependent not only on the rate at which new technical approaches are implemented, but also on the growth of management recogni. tion of the fact that information processing policy must be one of its basic concerns and that this policy must take into account the need for selectivity created by the evident hope- lessness of ever marshalling "all" relevant information. The intelligence community is fortunate in having extensive resources of modern science and technology available for use now. The rate of advance in information handling technology is itself increasing. Moreover, the community already has a strong capability in applying automatic data- processing techniques to cryptanalytic and communication Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A0005090q00010 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDPSOIr"3 C"RT71-3 DRAFT 0 RN/CO OLLED DISI Page 2 problems. The community is therefore in a unique position to apply these resources before the magnitude of the data base outstrips human capability to process it effectively. One area that seems amenable to the application of modern data-processing technology and methodology is that of biographies. This subpanel has studied the suitability of automatic data processing for solving some of the problems found in the biographies area. In the process, we have examined biographic files both in and out of the intelligence community. We conclude that given strong management policy tAseystt guidance, support and evaluation, graphics could benefit greatly. Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 ? CIA-RDNOB0,1139AQQ05E0T001-3 DRAirr stuR SECRET/NOPTIN/CONTROLL Page 3ED DISSEM A. ound document is the report of the subpanel on biographies of a Guidance and Evaluation Panel created under the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, in response to a memorandum to the President by the Chairman of the PFIAB (CLIFFORD)*. The Clifford memorandum charged the panel with responsibility for: A. "Providing guidance to the intelligence community in the forwarding of methods and facilities for information handling and access; B. Evaluating in technical terms the true meaning of the enormous and somewhat heterogeneous growth of the intelligence community's information pool." The memorandum then goes on to say "It is emphasized that the proposed panel of technical experts would not be tasked with the too-obvious assignment of simply applying modern machine methods to the existing* specialized, and rigidly-maintained activities of processing and distributing information within the intelligence community. The panel would have the overall task of guiding the necessarily large, and Capitalized expressions refer to the corresponding entry in the bibliography. Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A000500050001-c Approved For Release 2002/05/09_._. CIA-RDP804?Q014.39A_Q00500050001-3 DRAFT NEGRETPage 4 /X0FORN/CONTROLLED DISSEM presently ignored, planning for the realisticand long term development of mechanized facilities for the processing of information in the manifold forms in which it is encountered within the intelligence community." Adhering to this spirit, the subpanel has not hesitated to seek information outside the confines of the intelligence community narrowly interpreted as participants in the United States Intelligence Board* The panel was given an extensive series of briefings and site visits in the major intelligence installations in the Washington area and elsewhere and access to some documents produced by earlier studies. (LISTING TO BE nicL)DED1 It quickly became clear to this subpanel that the whole subject area, and biographies especially, has an excellent history written not only by innocent outsiders but mainly by very able, knowledgeable, conscientious and thorough members of the community itself. Since the Kirkpatrick Report (KIRKPATRICK, 1960), more time has been spent, more detailed data has been gathered, more debate and interpretation has taken place than any part-time "expert however well Intentioned, could possibly equal. Without apology, this report therefore makes very little claim to originality. In the words of Tom Lehrer, "Everything, I stole from somewhere else," including of course information gathered from briefings and some more informal on-site spot checks of critical items. Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A00050005000-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDF.1r DRAFT PrOFORN/CONTROLLEDDISSEM I II II a 5tplooi-3 Page 5 B. Major Findings The major finding of this subpanel is that the main thing preventing an immediate intelligent communitywide attack on information problems in the biographies area is a combina- tion of inability and unwilliAgneep or the intelligence Go Nre ,400410% community4to pay more than lip service to the idea of concerted effort. It is the so-called "realities" of organizational politics, not any basic technical obstacles,that spawn apparent impossibilities at every step of the way. No serious technical obstacle is visible on the way toward automation in the biographies area. We do not doubt that technical problems will appear further on, but the way is clear enough to set out on the journey at once. C. Major Recommendations Our major recommendation is that a clear-cut locus of management responsibility and authority for effective decision and concerted action be created to: 1. dispel the fog that sweet talk of unity casts over a fundamental parochialism that precludes intelligent collective action. 2. focus attention on basic problems of research and development, technical feasibility, systems analysis and design and management policy and control instead of frittering it away on arguments over such profundities as the matter of how many columns of a punched card should be allocated to a name. Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A000500050-0014 r Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDPigt3t00a0t571-3 DRAFT ECRET/NOFORN/CONTROLLED D Page 6 3. establi8h technically competentlines of management to be supplied with rational system performance and cost data ? now almost totally lacking4 n order to guide e selection, ?1? the collection, storage and retrieval of information in an environment where the ideas of sampling and statistical confi- dence must overtly displace the vain ideal of completeness already abandoned in apparently random practice. l4. insure that the sound, valuable but fragm ntary ideas generated -- but not always presented -- in earlier internal community studies be given a genuine hearing leading to the vigorous exercise of management decision-making responsibility In place of the current committee practice of making recom- mendations reduced to the lowest common denominator. 5. that the results of isolated experiments be broadcast withinAKC community, evaluated critically and impartially and, LA when found valuable, applied in response to vigorous management direction. 6. ensure that the needs of users are taken into account SA-L. ??L2.6.ib) by drawing users actively into the earliest ages o systems analysis and design. The remainder of this report aims to make more to detail and amplify, end to document these basic ci nions. -7, -cc, clitAit \)-:o ?,.:5,4-1L.Q_ ? ?),z- vv4kk k? et,.$ a- sawsLc L- tev,429. tatt-*J-441- 5 4, A'ppr ved 20VJA.109-. CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 L- Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601 gAgoboopoot3 SECRET 0 CO 0 DIS Page 7 THE BIOORAPIICS PROBLEM A. Information Sources for This Report Throughout this report we shall have occasion to refer to the report of COMB Task Team 5 in a draft form dated January 17, 1966 (COMB Although than draft report does not have the blessing of COMB as of the tme of this writing, it nevertheless reflects the concentrated effort of a group of twelve members of all components of the intelligence community in gathering and evaluating data concerning the scope of biographic files, the problems associated with creating, main- taining and using them, and, in the words of the statement of objectives of the team "to identify means for improving the storage, retrieval and exchange* of information from the major name files and related data files in the intelligence community." As of 31 December 1965, members of Task Team 5 "have reported a total of 3,993 hours devoted to this effort." (COMB 1966) The subpanel is most grateful for the opportunity to use the fruits of such extensive labor as well as other related docu- ments detailed in the bibliographyllo-41 There is a major gap in the work of the Corfu Task Team 5 which, unfortunately, this subpanel has lacked the time and resources to fill. Although one of the strengths claimed for the COMB approach" is that "participation by officials derlino. Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B0g3rcart. DRAFT SEC AOFORN/CONTROLLED DISE= Page 8 with operating responsibilities gives greater assurance of utility and aceeptance of results" (BORZL 1966, p. 6), the report or Task Team 5 is restricted to technical analyses that give no evidence of participation by any official with responsibility for seeing to it that the needs of file users are indeed met. The notion of "operating responsibility thus seems to have been narrowly construed to mean responsibility for operating the files. Since it is now generally accepted that sound systems analysis requires paying attention to the users (and users paying attention to systems analysis), we see this limitation as a major shortcoming of the CODIB approach. The impression that this limitation is not mere accidental oversight is reinforced by the following quotation: "The SCIPS study group and the panel of consultants recommended the establishment of a permanent inter agency body of sufficient size to cover the problem areas. COD IB however has rejected this approach in favor of a number of ad hoc panels to be supported by a small permanent executive secretariat (group of documentalists). CODIB not only found excessive* the time necessary to build up a sizable competent permanent group (unless this were done at the expense of promising intra-departmental programs), but considers counterproductive any Plan which calls for solutions developed by specialists not themselves involved in departmental information operations" BRIGGS 1964). Since the directive creating this panel requires it to "supplement the longer range Task Force project;being pursued by the USIB (CLIFFORD page 2, paragraph 5) the availability of a Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 OFORN CONTROLL SECRET Page 9 report of the relevant Task,For e even in draft form is a major asset. It is exceedi ly rare for a panel of "outside A experts" to have access to such timely data on its subject of concern, produced by those most intimately acquainted with the problem. The findings of the subpanel are based in addition on visits to the major files [ADD LIST HERB' and on discussions with those concerned with their maintenance and their use, as well as with the COMB C: well We have also specially requested presentations of certain specific technical facts and opinions (Appendix 2) and these are attached as Appendices 3, 4, and 5. We are sensitive to the qualms of the community about the intrusion of outsiders. One CODIB Task Team urges the acceptance of its recommendations on the quaint ground that otherwise, the intelligence community "w 11 continue to be vulnerable to external Investigative and evaluative groups without having any recognized negotiating position" (COBIB VI p. 11), further warning that such groups, however well- intentioned, will tend to gather data that are fragmentary, without interrelation ani.Xl therefore tend to make recom mendations that are even an a related to real problems. The warning concludes that n the process, the outsiders will remove a thorn and, by so doing implant a tumor" (CODIB VI p. 11). We do not feel immune to such =;- but, by relying extensively on the community's own docu- ments, we hope to present it with a mirror in which it will see itselley3rmoteditor Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050091-3 E Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 DRAFT SECRET SEcRQ!O/CO!!Z DISSEM Page 10 B. ubpanel Qualifications Although the members of this subpanel are clearly outsiders to the intelligence community, their qualifications have nonetheless been acknowledged by the community. The Fifth Annual CODIB Report (CODIB 1963) quotes from a reporte an ad hoc study panel of PSAC on non-numerical information processing comiiiiia?in mid lgg) Se SCIPS report includes the owing recommendation (CODIB 19640 pi 31 Recommendation 3): technical review panel such as the PSAC ad hoc study panel on non-numerical information processing be assembled to review the detailed findings of the study and provide comments thereon." This subpanel consists of two-thirds of the afore- mentioned PSAC ad hoc study panel on non-numerical information processing. One of us was in the technical review panel for the SCIPS report and the submission of this report further implements at least this one The March, 1964, "Progress Report on Foreign Intelligence Objective No. 3' in mentioning the establishment by the National Academy of Sciences of an Advisory Committee on Automatic Language Processing comments that "This disinterested group is to advise the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Science Foundation on Research and Development in the general field of mechanical handling of languages ..." One member of recommendation. Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001- 25X1A Approved For Release 2002/046?MIA-RDP8SOE GO SECRET/NOFORN/CONThOIiLED Dissgm E0C11-3 Page 11 this subpanel was an active participant in the National Academy Advisory Committee. Since, as will be made clear in the remainder of this report, we have found that inaction andindeed, deliberate inhibition of action, is a major factor blocking progress in information handling activities of the intelligence community, these expressions of confidence in the subpanel'n previous activities are gratefully acknowledged. Moreover, the portions of the report by the PSAC ad hoc panel on non-numerical information processing quoted In COMB 1963 ascribe to that panel a certain conservatism: "The two fundamental difficulties faced in present applications are that even though large-scale commitments to the development of operational hardware systems have been made, there is (a) a lack of precise definition and specification both of the objectives to be reached and of the relevant non- numerical techniques and (b) a shortage of first-rate research workers in the fie1d.4 "Symptomatic of these ditttculties are th present and growing external pressures towards large-scale hardware procure- ment in cases where the operational purpose to be served is vague and where, in any event, the present state of the art in hardware and software is inadequate to support the grandiose 'intellectual processing' that is so ardently desired." The initial requir ments of biographies are much more Se_ modest. Our major finding B) that is is the so-called Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A000500050001-3 4 ) t Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 ?ALT SECRET Page 12 a 0 CONTROLLEDD SSEM ies" of organizational politici not any basic technical obstacles, that spawn impossibilities in the biographies area &Aka-Ivo-- should not, therefore, be ascribed to any starry-eyed belief by this subpanel in the miracles of automation. We think rather, that no degree of automation can compensate for bad management. C. Definition of Biographies Various intelligence community and related agencies of the government maintain extensive biographical files to serve the needs of Positive Intelligence, Security and,Counter- intelligence an the case may be. Our definition of these three major areas is taken from CODIB V, Annex 1: "C const tu e security. of foreign officials activities GENCE flIOGRAPHI t activity n on personal ties who a known or pos5ible threat of national normally include members and agents intelligence services, Communist Party and others engaged in organized subversive GENCE BIOGRAPHIC AREA: That activity noa onon persOilities, usually o are of general interest to the intelligence y. These include leaders in the scientific, 1, governmental, economic military, and other p ssional/governmental fields. "SECURITY BIOGRAPHIC AREA: That activity which deals With Information held tirthose organizations which have the normal function of investigating and granting clearances on individuals or counterintelligence interest in respect to the internal operations of the holding organization." 1.? Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP801811EAel5R0E0T3 DRAFT SIICRE_____Z__FORN CONTROLLED DISSEM Page 13 Biographic files include the CIA's Special Re National Security Agency's ft n the Intelligence Community and Biographic Register, the in the Office of Central Reference,and files in the Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department. Major biographic files are kept' also by the FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Civil Service Commission, the National Security Agency's Office of Security, the Air Force Office of Special Investigation, the Navy, the Army, and the CIA's Office of Security and RID. Some consolidation of the indexes, at least, to certain of the Armed Services files is evident at Fort Holabird. Additional details on the nature and use of biographic files are given in Appendices 1 and 3. Still greater detail is available in CODIB V and SCIPS 1963. D. Significance of Biographies The importance of biographic tiles in Counter- intelligence and Security is obvious since these activities are concerned primarily with people. In the Positive Intelligence areas, the biographic files are said to play a critical role in support of the evaluation and production of foreign intelligence but we have no erified this nor, apparently, has the CODIB Task Team 5 (see Section II, A). In either Impo, the collection, storage and dissemination of biographic material is presumably not an end in itself. Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 ? CIA-RDP806043?0t0R0E1-17 Dian AECRETAWORN/CONTROLLED DIS34 Page 14 At present, the differentlocatorm and the real or imagined differences in the uses of biographic flies in various branches of the community lend existing files a considerable measure of apparent variety. A case can be made, however, that similarities on the whole outweigh differences (Appendix 5). The members of Task Team 5, hobbled by their terms of reference and apparently hypnotized by the rigidities of the 80-column punched card officially see incompatibilities and impossibilities wherever two members disagree over the number of card columns that should be allocated to such data as names or birthdates the opinion of this subpanel the technical problems of biographies are sufficiently simple in contemporary terms to suggest biographic files as a primary candidate for competent and honest experiments designed to explore the relative advantages and disadvantages of various positions on the spectrum from complete isolation to total integration of tiles (Appendix 5a p. 1). The criteria for evaluating these experi ments should be based on the satisfaction of explicitly formulated needs of the community of users s to both substance and security, not on catering to the crotchets of keepers of the files. Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP8(30C344180R30E0T-3 N .1MOT OFORN/COMOLL Page 15 B. Technical Simplicity of Biographies The biographies area lends itself particularly well to a study that cuts across the whole of the intelligence community, in relatively simple yet non-trivial terms. While the problems of creating maintaining and using biographic files are by no means negligible, In comparison with mo &t cii- other files used by the intelligence community pri?reat deal cleaner, simpler and better understood (Appendices3 5). The biographic files are a very good example of files that are widespread throughout the community, used throughout the community* serviced by the whole community and which, while relatively simple in structure, present all of the problems of file maintenance in a non-trivial wayllySimpler files such as order of battle or installation files exist in various areas but1 in general, these are based on a narrower input spectrum than biographic files and serve a narrower area of the community. Because they can usually be rigidly formatted and organized and accessed through clear-cut keys such as geographic coordinates, their mechanization is well within the state of the art and therefore accomplished. We do not wish to understate the ultimate complexity of biographic files. We emphasize, however* that major advances over the present state of affairs can be made without fear of technical barrier Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80g1t9AC0 DRAFT RIT/NOFORN/CONTROLLED DISSEM 0050001-3 E Page 16 The report of the Biographies Task Team states that "no major name index In the intelligence community has yet been fully automated. Therefore proof of success has not yet been conclusively demonstrated" (CODIBV, p. 2). The parallelism between the restrictive phrase "in the inte igen?. community" occurring in the preceding quotation and in the Task Team's statement of purpose (CODIB V, p. 1) may account for the absence of reference (see also Section III E) to such files as that operated by the National Driver Register in the Bureau of Public Roads of the Department of Commerce, which this aubpanel visited (Appendix 3). This file, now accounting for 860,000 driver's licenses revoked in each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone the Virgin Islands and Guam for offenses involving drunkenne s or fatalities got no OV consideration by the Task Team under the headings "major," "fully automated" and "proof of success," or any other heading. We regard it as mos significant that such a central service can deal effective].' sovereign states a* 01-1"-A other jurisdictions. The degree of trust in the operation and of understanding of its non-deterministic aspects (see the " may be 's" in the Matched Driver Record Reports of Appendix 3) is apparently such that the practice of returning no response whatever to the state if a name is not found is generally accepted, with consequent savings in transmission and paper- shuffling costs. Registrars of Motor Vehicles apparently Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80131012EA0A5 DRAM _ssallATApipmcp.__LE OILED DISSIN understand and bel eve 5rt Page 17 there is a probablmatch in the Register they will hear about it within 24 hours. Admittedly, the National Driver Register Piles must deal only with Intentional camouflage by driver* in danger of license revocation while the community's agencies must some- times deal not only with that, but with illegible, fragmentary data, aliases, names overheard on noisy channels, etc. In the panel's view, these problems are real and serious, but in no way preclude immediate automation of a substantial portion of the community's biographic files. In commenting on the problem of variations "categories of identifying data reco repo i the Task Team states tha the impossible to develop rigid rules on what constitutes the minimum identifying data required" and that "each agency, in recognizing these problems and the nature of its own index, forms its own rules regarding minimum identifying data for recording and the depth of search according to the nature of the request (corn v, p. 8). Our site visits and conversations with members of the Task Team suggest that the following exegesis of these comments merits consideration: "Impossible" means politically, not technically impossible, the "realities" get In the way. "Impossible" perhaps means impossible with punched cards. There is no technical known to this subpanel reason/why only "rigid rules" must be considered when flexible rules might do and modern storage and logic technology permit their use (Appendix 5). In short, "impossibility" is a CODTB thingApproved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A000500050044 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 ? CIA-RDIS DRAFT _S EC1_21TZNPFORN/C ?KROLL= DISSEM leOR5 I as 5T01-3 Page 18 The foregoing should not be taken to imply that this subpanel thinks that all the problems of the intelligence community have been solved by the Bureau of Public Roads or that "not impossible" is synonymous with "easy." It is, however, clearly implied that there is a need for candid and unfettered reporting of facts and for scientific experimentation. F. Biographies as a Laboratory for Technology and Management The Clifford memorandum of June 15, 1965, (CLIFFORD) characterizes the problems of the Intelligence Community in the following terms: "The problems of the intelligence community in connection with information access and retrieval include, but are not restricted to, those common to all who must maintain very large bodies of informa- tion in accessible form. This is even true in the handling of information from unclassified sources. The importance of negative information, and of patterns of information, requires that access to intelligence information produce a completeness of response beyond that which is expected from many large files of stored information. Like statistics, intelligence cannot be satisfied with the highly anecdotal, but requires that all available items of information are allowed to con- tribute their part of the final summary or other intelligence product. (p. 3, No. 7) "As a consequence of intelligence community requirements for high recall, the mechanized and automated means of access to many sorts of intelligence files cannot be required to meet simultaneously rigid requirements as to relevance. Accordingly for some time to come the mode of gaining access to intelligence information will be through combined machine-human systems that will seek the machine retrieval of stored intelligence information in order that its relevance may be established by human examination. It is this combined machine-human factor which generates systems problems of great difficulty and dimensions. p. 3, No. 8) Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A0005000500 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80Q011_39A900500050001-3 SECRET DRAFT SECRETOFORN CONTROLLED DISSEM Page 19 "In the area of experimental approaches to the adaptation of machine processing to the storage and retrieval of intelligence information, an encourag- ing beginning has been made within the National Security Agency where the Technical Information Processing System (TIPS) study is presently under way. This experiment, although on a limited scale and confined to a selected number of organizational units and information files within the National Security Agency, is producing important lessons for the achievement of a realistic system for the interrogation of a computer by remote users requiring access to a common information base." (p. 4, No. 11) In addition, Recommendation No. 2 concerning the Technical Information System (T/PS) project (CLIFFORD, Page 5) specifically calls attention to the fact that "the capability for extensive handling of the Russian biography problem should be available in the community-wide system by the summer of 1966." The successful operation of some quasimeohanized biographic systems in CIA, NSA and the Bureau of Public Roads demonstrates that many technical and security problems arising with biographic files can be solved at least to some degree. Our observations in Section III suggest that no insuperable technical problems blook coordinated action by the community in the biographies area once management problems are resolved. In particular, biographic files are free of most of the serious linguistic problems which bedevil attempts to handle the finding and retrieval of the extensive textual materials that form the bulk of the intelligence community's files. The CODIB biographies task force implies in one of its Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 SECRET/WOMEN/CONTROLLED DISSEM Page 20 Appnitied ror Alease 2002/05/0g : CIA-RDP801301139A000500050001-3 recommendations (CODIB V, Page 5, Rem) ndation 3) that a successful biographic system could form a good basis for approaching these more difficult general retrieval problems through "a coordinated program (which) should be developed using EDP methods to provide machine indexes of the biblio- graphic data processed by any organization in this field, so that the personality information is accessible to a recipient in machine form, with quick followup to the translated source." The converse would be equally valid, that biographic indexes could lead back to bibliographic material containing informa. tion about installations organizations, etc., related to the personalities. This subpanel agrees that coordinated biographic files together, perhaps, with installation and organization files, may well form one excellent basis for indexing other holdings of the intelligence community since curiosity about an individual, an organization or an installation is so frequently a source of curiosity concerning the more detailed and extensive material that might be in the files. The subpanel takes exception only to the mode of implementation proposed by the COMB task team, namely that another task team or its successor be tasked to fdaow up on this recommendation. The record shows that COMB, as presently constituted, has been singularly ineffectual in getting action on difficult problems. Task teams have operated within severely constrained terms of reference conducive to a bizarre Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA- CROFOT0001-3 DRAr 'J Page 21 SECRET OFORN CONThOLLED DISSEM frame of mind in which members felt constrained to go at their task as CODIB, deliberately avoiding the use of information G-AE available to them as individuals" (Statement to fulyanel at Briefing of 4/19/66). Serious problems are recognized even within these limitations, statements that strong efforts are required appear, but the process seems inevitably to conclude with bland ineffectual statements about cooperation and consensus devoid of concrete suggestions for action and enforce- ment of agreements. The history of CODIB Task Team 5 - Biographies yields an illuminating example of that subtle magic. While CODIB itself boldly recommended in February 1964 to "Develop a Biographic Intelligence Processing Plan," (CODIB 1964, p, 21, Recommendation 4f), the Task Team's terms of reference as of January 1965 (CODIB V, Annex 6) and the January 1966 Draft Report contain only a limp eviscerated shadow of this goal in the statement that "the objective of this Team was to 'identify means for improving the storage, retrieval and exchange of information from the major name files and related data files in the intelligence community'. (See also Section III, DO It is equally curious that while it was recognized in 1963 that "the most significant problem in the present period is that of organization," that "collective efforts within the community will become increasingly important" (BOREL, 1963; Attachment p. 2) and that "steps can be taken within the Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A0005000500 1-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP8S0 DRAFT UREPIAMBELco TRO DISSEM 900 11.11 Page 22 present state of the art to ease some of the current problems" CODIB, 1963, p. 10), such pieties are transmogrified by 1965 into the idea that "attention (and management support)" be given "to improving the individual systems in each USIB agency, with projected compatibility monitored by CODIB and the PFIAB/OST Joint Guidance and Evaluation Panel through bri fings demonstrations and discussions." The findings of the Task TeamVI on Research and Development that "security barriers are used quite effectively to barricade against attempts by other agency personnel to acquaint themselves with ongoing R & D efforts" (CODIB VI, p. 13) and that "very few intelligence staffs permit realistic evaluation of their practices or products and results of any evaluation are usually tightly held" (COD'S VI, p. 31) coupled with the absence of observable experiments that would support the change of attitude between 1963 and 1965 suggest that this change is not as down-to-earth and commonsensical as might appear at first glance. As of this writing, the report of Task Team VI has yet to be approved by CODIB! The biographies task team observed that, in the positive intelligence area, "every organization has its own standards for selection (from collected material) based on the mission it is supporting and budgetary limitations" and that "the same source document is frequently processed by different PI organizations." They further remark that "there is an Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-ROPTE30CROE51-61-3 DRAFT CONTROLLED D SUM Page 23 overlap of information in PI files because the different file systems support the same requirements, or because the personality mentioned in the source meets the selection criteria for two different requirements. (CODIB V, pp. 13-14). Given, on the one hand, that repeated handling of the Same document is prima facie wasteful while, on the other hand, interpretation of the same material from different and possibly conflicting points of view is likely to be helpful and perhaps vital to reliable intelligence production, it is sad but not surprising that the task team felt unmoved or unable to recom- mend any approach to this vital problem of management control, especially since the same problems had already been recognized earlier by the SCIPS Study (SCIPS, 1963). Indeed, a disturbing proportion of the technical people this subpanel came into contact with seemed conscious only of details of card formats, while the extent of some management personnel's appreciation of information technology seems typified by such a curious anachronistic statement as "our problems have largely to do with the processing of language, while automatic equipment is essentially designed to handle numbers" (BORK:, 1963; Attachment 1, p. 2). There is a vacuum of competent consideration of system design problems combining the understanding of needs and of possibilities. This problem is not altogether unrecognized, as shown by the following expression of the outlook for CODIB: Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A0005000 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80 5140t001r3 RET/NOPORN/CONTROLLED D18 SEN Page 24 Ne wifl need to guard against the ADP tail wagging the information processing policy dog. But we do need to give more emphasis to technical problems than we have in the past." (BOREL, 1966, p. 6). The problem is, perhaps, that the tail and the dog have not yet met each other. As for wagging, while we have repeatedly emphasized the need for keeping the user in mind, we also believe that in a community where information is the most important product, the processing of this information should be far more than a managerial afterthought. ADP, as we conceive it, has more to do with the head t/han he tail but i if pressed, we would insist at least on thinking kangaroo rather than dog. Where information is concerned, process and substance assume nearly equal weights and management cannot safely assume that it it pays attention exclusively to substance the technicalities of processing will take care of themselves. The top and middle managements of most organizations, not only in the intelligence community, were trained in days when informa- tion processing was for accountants or scholars, but not for them. The fact that modern information technology affects the very fabric of organizations has achieved some notoriety in The New Yorker cartoons, but has yet to be translated into realistic organization charts. (See also Section III, E). It is the opinion of this subpanel that the biographies , area provides a unique raboratory in which to explore the technical and management control problems raised by the Cl Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : DRAFT CIA-RD?OE)1o9N011010001-3 aiN0 RN/CONTROLLED DISSEN Page 25 memorandum and to find out which of CODIB's several minds reflects reality. The technical problem of biographies, while by no means trivial, are not so primary organizational and management COINS effort may be a beginning. Any experiment, however we3. worthless if set up in the CODIB pat are evident from the following expres severe as to becloud the control problems. The intentioned, will be n. The reasons why on of the COMB credo: Ne recognize and accept certain constraints upon what can be accomplished by joint action because of: the primary responsibility of USIB members to their command channels for carrying out basic departmental and service misSions; and, the impact of the NSC allocation of intelli- gence collection and production responsibilities among agencies upon supporting information processing programs." (BOREL, 1966, p. 3) The deadening effect of the imposition of such administrative constraints in made explicit in the recognition of the following weakness of CODIB and its approach: "Common denominator of agreement may be so large as to negate utility of the solution." (BOREL, 1966, P. 5). That these constraints bring out the worst or ubiquitous bureaucratic tendencies is made plain by the less elegant advice one of our informants assured us applies under the circumstances: "Cover your ass." We can't help thinking that this motto is as inappropriate a slogan for a healthy Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05aMA-RDFSBE1 OrOWCONTROWED DWEM Ii . E5101-3 Page 26 intelligence community as "Expose your rear would be for a crack military unit. We have, in addition, fair evidence that "the system" not the people is inherently responsible for this sad state. Individuals whose wits seem hopelessly dim in an official light visibly brighten in the sunshine of informality. This phenomenon is common to all organizations, but seems pathologi- cally pronounced in the Community. While, once again, we recognize the need for users and operators to exert the strongest influence on systems design, we recommend that members of any group constituted for this purpose be instructed to act according to their individual wisdom and conscience and that they be protected by appropriate administrative devices against any wrath they may draw from ho as a consequence. Someone, presented with conflicting opin one instead of bland, lowest common denominator consensus may then have to make wre painful decisions, but we submit that the Communit A management able and willing to act in this way. We do not think his recommendation is naive and inapplicable. We found it refreshing to learn, at Fort Holabird, that the very same people who saw only impossi- bilities, parochial interests and lowest common denominators when acting in a COD1B group, stopped dragging their feet and leaped into action when a directive issued by the Secretary of Defense on May 27, 1965, ordered them to provide a centralized ; Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A00050005000 -3 E Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 DRAFT SECRET 0 ?age 27 ( Sea_ aQ4c ScAlis,5) index to the Armed Services investigative files by May 27, 196 Indeed, the job apparently got done. Critics do point out that excessive haste has, in their opinion, produced a product lack- ing elegance, generality, or power. Nevertheless, the illustra- tion shows that management has a real choice. Under the constraints described in its credo, eau had none. Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/guice-RDP8OB 3Or0R50E1t Page 28 SE RET/NOPORN/CONTROLLE D DISSEM OBSERVATIONS A. Relative Characteristics of Positive Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security Files The Positive Intelligence files are in a sense the least seneitive of all. Since they deal largely with foreign personalities and a substantial proportion of their source material is from the open literature, the problems of indexing these files are subject only to the normal technical constraints common in the Intelligence Community, without touching more delicate areas such as might be raised in the evaluation of uninterpreted data on U. S. citizens - where the very mention of a name in the file can create a problem. On the other hand, the files are among the more problematic in terms of acquisition, indexing and completeness. In the Security and Counterintelligence files a goodly portion of the inputs is on controlled forms often supplied by the individual himself and positive identification In tags, such as Social Security number, etc., are readily possible. The PI files, on the other hand, are constituted from a much greater variety of sources they tend to be far more fragmentary and their use is more difficult. It therefore seems reasonable to infer that general volutions of Positive Intelligence biographic file problems could be readily specialized and adapted to the needs of Security and Counterintelligence file but that the reverse ; Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A00050005000 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RE1060E1C9PROrT001-3 DRA7T 0 S RET/NOPPN/CONTROLLED DISSRM very likely would be far more difficult. These stat Page 29 are supported by evidence to the effect that PI requests tend to include 20% name finding, and 80% name searchini while in the Counterintelligence and Security files the proportions are, respectively, 5% and 95%. The study of PI files thus presents the greater challenge to research and development as well as a hope of finding general solutions. Such study should be encouraged. In the near future, however, useful practical results are much more likely to be obtained by concentrating on the auto- mation of CI and Security files. B. File Overlap and the Single File Problem CODIB V points out (page 28 paragraph 6) that "there are several thousand people involved in biographic activity in the Intelligence Community, Approximately 1000 of these, at an annual salary-only cost of $5,000,000 are directly involvedert,.. work at the index level, in the preparation, maintenance and searching of the major biographic indexes. The report then goes on to point out (page 13 2.b) that The terms "name finding" and "name rehing defined in the co= Task Team V Report as follows: "NAME FINDING: The searching for name information about one or a group of individuals by looking for data elements other than the name, such as date of birth, position, location, organizational affiliation, occupation, military rank, nationality, including a combination of such factors." "NAME SEARCHING: Search of indexes or files organized by the names of persons to determine if information exists on the Individual, or to validate basic information." CODIB V, Annex 1, p. 1, Glossary. Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A00050000009 Approved For Release 2002/01RAJA-RDPESBOF3r0ORT0131-3 SECRET/NOFORWONTROLLED DISSEM Page 30 "The basic criterion of any agency for selecting an item for a PI file is whether or not the item supports the foreign intelligence effort on a particular country or area. Every organization has its own standards for selection based on the mission it is supporting and budgetary limitations. The same source document is frequently processed by different PI organizations ... There is an overlap of information in PI files because the different file syatems support the same require- ments, or because the personality mentioned in the source meets the selection criteria for two different requirements: e.g., CIA and State have an interest in military personalities who are prominent in other fields such as politico, science, space, etc., whereas DIA and NSA are interested in the same person because he is in the military field. There is no assurance, however, that because a personality is mentioned in a source document that he will eventually be processed into a PI file." Further on, the same report points out (p. 152 4.c) that "Some files are restricted by security classification as to what can be processed. Research in such a limited source file often gives incomplete or out- dated information." The CODIB report further states that "It is doubtful that any single file, whether it be computerized or manual, can ever be considered a complete or sole source for biographic information." This subpanel takes strong exception to this last statement largely on the ground that it has not been able to uncover the existence of any data, produced as a Q..s5v,c9--c-LA2,chr hensive systems stud:yAmIkthe advantages si le community-wide biographic fil result of a compre and d sadvantages of SC( G7-:? ) It should also be noted that the Clifford memorandum (CLIFFORD, Recommendation #2) specifically suggests the Russian biogrphia problem as an experimental vehicle for the expanded TIPS system (COINS). Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/DRAM-RDP8S0E9e0 SECRET/NOFORN/CONTROLLED pissEm Page 31 tto1 ?ET-3 The evidence available to us suggests that consolida- tion or at least common indexing and easy mutual accessibility of CI and Security files is technically feasible. The issue of whether or not this should be done was left in limbo by CODIB's departure from its resolution to develop a biographic intelligence processing plan" (see Section II, F). In the PI area the technical issues are more confused and therefore all the more in need of candid intelligent Investigation. For example he prevalent practice of scanning PI input materials for names, and resolving name variants and name variations before entering the material in files has led not only to a substantial backlog of unentered and therefore unavailable materill but also to the repeated resolution of the same problem by every recipient of the same material. The alternative of entering materiels only once for the whole community, using as a key whatever name variant or variation appears in the raw material, and applying name- grouping techniques to draw together scattered relevant material at the time an actual request is made for informa- tion has received only scant attention. Such a task is t;.?re, clearly with manual or older punched-card techniques, but not at all ruled out with modern equipment. The feasi- bility, potential dollar lavings and increased information availability that such techniques might provide must be investigated in spite of the specter of centralization (Appendix 5). - Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05%:p9A-RDP80136 ACO5 SECRET/NOPORNJONTROLZED DISSEM 5E0113 Page 32 The SCIPS report points out that, although "DCID 1/9 allocates responsibility for production of biographic intel- ligence and the collection and maintenance of biographic data on foreign personalities," (SCIPS 1963, p, 57), various agencies (NSA is singled out), maintain substantial biographic 1.141 files without specific ?cation in DCID.41604(lso, as 4111PW 0-side neidenae of many files that are no longer input ) tel." The report then comments that "a set of huge files with their implied amount of processing effort is being main- tained in a manner not identifiable in terms of DCID func- tional responsibilities. This is not to say that NSA does not have a need for this information, for it manifestly does. Therefore the inference is that those responsible under DCID are not performing satisfactorily to NSA needs or that subject category is not a good way to allocate this responsibility or both" (SCIPS 1963, p. 68) Had CODIB undertaken "to develop a biographic intelligence processing plan" some light might now shins on this obscurity. They did not and therefore it does not. C.. Evidence of Current Automation Efforts There is encouraging evidence of widespread begin- nings of modest automation efforts throughout the Intelligence Community. Within the CIA the Special Register, the Biographic Register and the Walnut system oeiated indexes are Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDFSBE1COR5CE09001-3 DRAFT /No Hie? Page 33 OLLED DISSEM mechanized to varying degrees and with a variety of different technical and file structure approaches However, in some of these cases, punched cards were introduCed 10 years ago and nothing new has happened since. Wholly or partially mechanized biographic files exist also in the NSA, DIA, and at Ft. Holabird. However, as discussed above (Section II, F) community effortsto mechanize biographic files are fragmented and generally uncoordinated between agencies. In view of the recognized overlap of biographic files (CODIB V, p. 14, pare 20), it is difficult to understand why a community-wide effort to evaluate the possible support of ADP has not been sponsored, except on the hypothesio that management has been unwilling to sponsor it. Why CODIB oes not recommend such action is clear from its charter charter and the pressure toward the lowest common denominator. The irony of this situation is made plain by Recommendation 8 of CODIB V which states (CODIB V, p.) "The Task Team III (or its successor) be tasked to study those various programs exploiting open source scientific and technical information which generate personality information of positive intelligence value as a by-product. A coordinated program should be developed using EDP methods to provide machine indexes of the bibliographic data processed by any organization in this field, so that the personality information is accessible to a recipient in machine form, with quick follow-up to the translated source." (See also Section II, F.) Apparently, community-wide mechanization is good in this bibliographic area but not good in the derived biographic area. This subpanel has not perceived any substantive Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A000500060 Approved For Release 2002/0WKIA-RDAE &0650 01-3 SECFM/NOPORN/CONTROLLED DIMES Page 34 reason for this distinction, and our recommendations reflect this fact. D. Need for Research and Development There is some encouraging evidence of recognition of the need for research and development activities in the biographic* area. Notably, the COMB V Report stresses the critical technical problem of dealing with name variants and name variations in name searching through biographic files especially those with a preponderanceof foreign names or even of U. S. citizens in cases where is not possible (see also Section III Problems created by the high proportion of common names in various files (CODIB V, p. 8 item 8) are also recognized, as is the _more difficult technical matter of providing usefully formatted identifying data on named or unnamed persons to permit searches of the name-finding type or identification in the absence of names. Nevertheless, the Panel is encouraged by the finding of the CODIB Task Group (CODIB V1 p. 11, item 5) that "in observing some of these typical and widely used forms, the Team found that certain basic data, such as name, place and date of birth, Service Serial number, Social Security number, sex, etc., were included on each form." While this finding applies primarily to the Cl/Security files, perusal of the Chart in Annex 4 of the CODIB report indicates that an effort source format control Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A000500050a01-4-? Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDPAQW,1132,A000500050001-3 DRAFT st,GRET SECRET/NOFORNAONTROLLED DISSEM Page 35 is being made to provide similar fields, even in the Positive Intelligence filet although the probability of no information appearing in these fields is obviously greater. The fact that certain standard elements, blanks in the formsyls it were EJL may occasionally be left empty inCalsmishoubmwmforms does not negate the clear possibility of defining standard elements even in PI files. The specter of empty fields haunts those accustomed only to punched cards, but is readily exorcised by more modern techniques. As pointed out in the Introduction to this report, the principal technical issue faced by the intelligence community is that of making maximum use of the technology and methodology available in the nation, In some problem areas, there will be a need for directing resources toward the development of technical solutions designed especially for biographic information processing problems. In order to guide such efforts the community will need a coordinated R & D program and strong in-house capabilities in specific areas which are not covered in other government or noagovernment agencies. (The original CODIB Terms of Reference (DCII) 1/4) charge CODIB with the responsibility and authority to develop a long range plan for R & D in information processing. HOLD FOR CHECK OF 4/23/65 TERMS AGAINST 6/6/9J) CODIB has never A(4K_.0? ru 4-ttA /):4 r HA Y Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP806011641a04 00 12V Approved For Release 2002/05/444A-RDP80B011SAEO5COrre E.' T ECRET/NOFORIVCONTRObLED DISSEM Page 36 concerted action in developing such a plan; the torte of Task Team VI represent an admirable start but its tartly critical report has been referred for further drafting by 41110 usual CODIB technique. The effect of CODIB action in the R & D area has been to prevent other groups from initiating a community-wide program by keeping the R & D responsibility preventing itself C 10810WOMmap in its charter and, by inaction, from initiati such a progrem.+ The biographies area is merely one of many that are hampered by this policy. It is therefore understandable that CODIB V did not recommend any R & D activity as an aid in solving biographies problems; the Task Team objective appears carefully emasculated in order to preclude any consideration of fundamental methods for solving biographic problems. The Task Team was barely able even to state the roblem under its modified objective. Finding #1 (CODIB V, 1) states that: "1. Improvements in the speed and quality of biographic information processing involving interagency exchange on U. S. citizens and foreign nationals are necessary to further improve security, and to afford policy makers and analysts better response from biographic intelligence files on foreign nationals of interest from a variety of angles - military, subversive, political and scientifte. The Team finds that use of computer techniques and inter. agency telecommunications links may provide significant improvements." nding #2 then remarks: "2. There are, however, profound, complex problems and significant costs in making major changes in the large biographic holdings of community concern, particularly if the changes involve conversion to computer systems." 14 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A00050009-100111,44" Approved For Release 2002/0%1 ? 1A-RDP80,001_1_39A000500050001-3 SECRET AmFoRIVONTRoLLED pissm Page 37 The inclusion of policy makers in Finding #1 implicitly argues for the importance of the files and the associated problems. The recognition of the profound nature of the problems in Finding #2 implicitly argues for the need for very strong and powerful recommendations for action in the R & D area as well as other areas. The actual recommendations made by the Task Team are pathetically inadequate when held up against the problem as stated in Findings #1 and #2 However, when the recommenda tions are compared with the Task Team objective, the fit is exceedingly precise. This subpanel can only conclude that the original objective was modified (see Section II, F) in order to place strict control on the recommendations of the Task Team. TcflubPanel suggests that in the future control be placed on the findings rather than on the recommendations; this would seem to be a more effective technique for the apparent purpose. Given the context s eubpanel understands why the Task Team could not make recommendations in the R& D area; therefore this report includes R & D recommendations the Task Team should have made (Sections I C; III 8). Faced with Findings #1 and #2, this subpanel would be remiss to do less, E. The Nature of the Biographies R & D Problem There are many biographies problems that can be solved with available technology. However, there is a wide Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A0005000S30i3 ta 0 -T Approved For Release 2002/05/09 ? CIA-RDP80 1 9FACD5 0 3 DitAn SECRET/NOPORN/bONTROLLED DISSEM Page 38 gap between available technology and the community's capa- bility to apply it, It is apparent to the subpanel that a new qualification, namely computer systems analysis, must be added to the community's wide range of expertise. This qualification must be distributed broadly and at every level including the highest. Once a major fraction of community personnel have some training and experience in this discipline, it will become much easier for the community to avail itself immediately and rationally of the benefits of off the-shelf technology and methodology. Ancillary benefits will also come in the R & D area. Specific and important benefits should accrue directly in biographic problem areas. The most immediate and important benefit would be an appreciation by senior management personnel responsible for biographic file installations and their use of the need for and the nature of R & D work. With appreciation and understanding would come stronger leadership and better control. Of the entire listed membership of Task Teem V, no single person has the experience or qualifications of a pro fessional EDP systems or applications analyst. A few have medium heavy experience, but the rest have very little1 if =cc] any, experience in applying EDP equipment oblems. This casts no aspersions on the personnel involved, because there tvA3 not been a need in the past for such experience. Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/04D?TCIA-RDP801301139A000500050001-3 C E 'Page 39 SECRET/NOPORN/CONTROLLEP DIESER Most biographic files were started as manual systems; the need for mechanization is relatively recent. Thus the lack of highly qualified personnel in biographic file systems may be seen as the root of the lack of appreciation for R & D work. But even granted the existence of a cadre of highly qualified EDP systems analysts in biographies work, there remain the "profound, complex problems" of Finding #2, and these have to be solved,/these problemsx combining the technical and the administrative therefore problems for which methodologies or technologies cannot merely be picked off the shelf. In order to shed further light on these problems it is instructive to examine the Task Team Findings (Section III, D) and their atatement of the problems from the viewpoint of a professional EDP systems analyst. Finding 01 begins with the clause "Improvements in the peed and qu-ility of biographic information processing are necessary ..." This statement i very good because it emphasizes speed and 9uality, two of the three basic parameters by which any information processing installation can be measured (the third parameter is cost). The Team further found "that use of computer techniques and interagency telecommunica- tions links par provide significant improvements." At this 'Our emphasiS. Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/01934&-RDP80B21 AMORVOONTROLLED DISSEM or Page 40 point, the Team reveals its level t expertise; thei is no real doubt that computers and telecommunications links can improve biographic information processing because of the high capacities (bandwidths) of both modern computers and tele- communications equipment! Evidence if needed, is f und in the fact that some members of the community have already installed both types of equipment (e.g., CIA-Walnut and LDX) precisely on the ground that both quality and speed are thereby improved. The best evidence for the feasibility of improvement via EDP is there fere found within the community itself. A professional systems analyst would also be able to deduce this trivial conclusion from an examination of the files themselves. For the moot part they are formatted, and even the unformatted files (such as in CIA-BR) offer no technical impossibilities (Appendix 5)G6st is the most important determinant, barring politics, of course. Finding 0 ie somewhat ore instructive. Here the emphasis is on "making major changes particularly if the changes involve conversion to computer systems. This state? ment distorts the realities of conversion (Appendix 5c). Usually, the cost of the job is the only hindrance and it is hard to believe that any other parameter could be seriously considered. The "profound, complex problems" have been solved in several community installations visited by the Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A0005600500M-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 LcIA-RD,E8Off1 trirry001-3 DRAFT 0 C., ET/M0FORWOONTROILED DIPBEM Page 41 subpanel; usual y the profound complex problem turned out to be changing the attitude of management. This change, however can hardly be charged as a technical component of the systems problem. More to the point it should be noticed that Finding #2 sees the problema as consequences of making *hen ea in the file installation. In other words, the new file will be a modified version of the old file, and the greater the changes, the greater will be the problems introduced. The inevitable conclusion is that the best way to solve the problems is to make no c nges at all. This gratuitous finding thus gives the couip-de-grace to Finding #1 which weakly states that changes k'ir;TrievA may improve the speed and quality of biographic information processing. The professional systems analyst would not be intimidated by Finding #2, thus leaving the subpsnel with the conclusion that this Finding was intended for readers who are not systems analysts. The remaining Findings offer b.tantil data for the systems analyst. Findings #3 through #10 presentn numerical data that is very useful in dertV ng a picture of the biographic file problems. Indeed, the problems are great, but by no means beyond the limits of technical possibility. Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/ PORN CONOLLED DIS C' r. RDP80B011SA600510e040r3 Page 42 Finding #8 is worth a modicum of attention. Despite the Implied threat of Finding 0 Finding #8 says that for name searching, EDP may provide Improvements, but this state ment was apparently considered rash and puerile, for it was immediately slugged in the following sentences with the pompous and nuous y true pronouncement that no major name index .. has yet been fully automated, (see also Section I, E) thus invoking the threat of Finding #2 In Finding #101 the body of FInding #1 is still twitching. We are told here that name finding may possibly be improved, but only by exchanging information about "EDP techniques for improving speed and flexibility of response." Notice how the golden "quality" of Finding #1 has been trans- muted to leaden "flexibilit Finding #11 then concludes with a wideeyed view of the wonderful world of professional interchange. The whole net of Findings reminds one of Franck 's Symphony in D where the good theme jousts with the bad theme. In CODIB V, the bad theme wins, and Finding #11 depicts the rainbow after the storm. The foregoing considerations while necessary to achieve catharsis, do not take the most constructive viewpoint of the problems. The standard approach of systems analysis Is to create something new out of something old: change is not something to fear, but something to use to advantage. Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/0401g1A-RDP8OBS1EA0e5ft5eilf sEcREr1opoRNICONTROLLED DISSEM Page 43 PreoccuP*t ion with format standards can prevent one from seeing a better solution to the overall problem. Annex 4 (CODIB 17) illustrates the reality of the problem in different agencies. There seems to be little doubt that each agency will need more or less data in its records than another agency. There is no technical reason why each agency cannot have information entered, stored, and retrieved in any format of its choice. Annex 4 merely tabulates the differences which the system must accommodate. From a systems design viewpoint t would be a mistake to try to force standard formats on every agency when there are more significant and difficult problems to be solved. As discussed earlier in this report (Section II ), bio- op.?41 v4.) graphics offers unique rtwttie3 as a vehicle for R & D. Sample suggestions are as follows: ????? 1. What would a single communitywide biographic file installation be like? Specify its size in storage capacity, response speed, request rate, etc. What administrative problems would it create? How serious are these? 2. Develop methods for recognizing proper names in unformatted text and for extracting text which includes references to or data about people. Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/0Mi+IA-RDPEEVE3001940?541-3 AOFORN/CONTROLLED DISSEM 3Develop a specif a Page 44 on for a very low costtech- nology for entering data into tiles, to be installed 1972-75. Compare with cost projections of optical character recognition technology. Will the latter be the final answer? If not, a different approach must be developed and work should be started now. cifications for nology that technology1970's. What type h perform t? F. The Invisible Colleges There is a strong need for positive interagency cooperation, information exchange and joint enterprise in the biographies realm. This need is clearly demonstrated by our observation of efforts in several agencies without evidence of mutual knowledge. This impression, which might otherwise be attributed to the superficial character of an inquiryyby outsiders, is corroborated by Finding 011 of the CODIB Task Force, which states; "The Teem agreed that the professional interchange derived from the Task Force effort was highly valuable to each member in providing new insights in manual and machine techniques, interagency channels, sources of information and policies of bther agencies." A similar reaction was observed by the Panel in the o of a meeting on March 29th 1966 which confronted representatives of the Electronic Data Processing arms of NSA, DIA and CIA, Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/911A94-RDP8OBOS3 ECRET/NOMINMONTROLUD DISSEM torri Page 45 with representative. of the counterintelligence offices in a discussion of security and compartmentation problems. Om l'nvisible colleges i.eI.* responsible for the work that does get dor 9ot adequate .12 cikkAZNI1 11 -re Q-C,-,r; ???-??-?.s cha C G. Compartmentation and Security There is convincing evidence that eompartmtatjon exists not only for security reasons but as the R & D report points out (COD VI, p. 13) also for administrative reasons masquerading as "security barriers that are used quite effectiv ly to barricade against attempts by other agencies' personnel to acquaint themselves with ongoing R & D effort." The problem of file security fails to be adequately distinguished from administrative and in-fighting problems. We acknowledge the genuine needs for security and compartmentation but we believe that these have been grossly exaggerated wlith adverse effects on Community cooperation. The Community clearly recognizes the possible damaging effects of compartmentation witness the statement "Research in sueh a limited source file often gives Incomplete or out-dated information." (CODIB V, p. 6) Anecdotal evidence of the effects of delayed or Impossible collation of relevatit facts abounds, but we notice a total absence of either a mechanism for studying this problem or even a genuine concern for it. The OODIB Biographies Task Force report nimbly skirts around the problem by making such Innocuous recommendations (CODIB V, p. 4, item 5) as that Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A0005ak OP00- Approved For Release 2002/05/W4A-RDP806011SA0E5C05RO1 /NOFORVOONTROLLED DISSEM Page 46 "the CODIB Support Staff be directed to prepare and maintain current publications to inform users of biographic information ..." with the hedge that this effort be limited "within the limits of security classification and need- to-know prescribed by each attenCY**" This recommendation firmly endorses motherhood with zero real effect; in fact, it flatly contradicts the one previously quoted from page 16 of CODIB V. H. Conceptual and Managerial Problems The R & D report rightfully points out that "Conceptual and managerial problems are more crucial than purely technical." (CODIB VI, P. 3). The R & D report further points out (CODIB VI p. 5) that 4There is neither an organized set of R & D objectives, a policy for establishing R & D objectives, nor a mechanism for accomplishing either." It is clear to the Panel that the product of one agency or compartment is the input of another; that there are many loops, cycles, interconnections, etc., but that the prevalent concern for local optimization of resources and performance is mailighat by any visible concern for total systems design. There is an almost total absence of planning data or statistics in a form that would enable management to determine appropriate courses of action. This Panel would Our emp Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05gARA-RDP8013 U ,0)10A941351211011QQ0,I4? -.)r.11t. SECRETATOFORN/CONTR9LLED DISSEM Page 47 welcome a refutation of this statement in the form of appro- priate data. For instance although the question of security of shared files is agreed on by everyone to be of primary importance, no one can supply useful data or criteria concerning such elementary matters as the relationahip between the level of security precautions and expense and the safety acquired at such a level. It is striking in fact, that the Chairman of the USIBSecux'ity Committee regarded this question as a nove one when it was asked during the Security Briefing of the Panel on March 20, 1966. The data may exist somewhere, but the fact that this Panel was unable to uncover it is itself symptomatic. Elementary facts concerning management techniques should be made available if a decent system is to be developed. , We have dealt briefly elsewhere in thia report with our concern that process become less of a stepchild (or tail) of Substance, with the need for users to participate in systems design, with the problems of enforced consemus and lowest common denominator, with the need for a probabilisticview of collection and retrieval, and with the need for introducing competence and understanding of systems design problems at the highest level of management. At the root of much o over the introduction of automatic information processing technique there is a fear, not only about the matter of security, but also about agency or management authority. After allfolk wisdom tells us that knowledge is power. Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A0005 DRAFT 8ECRZT OPORN CONTROLLED DISSEM IRET Page 48 This is a valid concern, but we suggest that it can be exaggerated, and that the fear is a large extent fear of the unknown. While there are legitimate reasons to guard information, at least part of this concern arises from a mistaken confusion of information gathering with the exercise of authority. Clearly, the opening of information lines up, down and acre.ss would legitimize a leaping over organizational boundaries that, while essential for real accomplishment, is done nowadays only at official risk and peril. Organization lines reflect lines of authority, but while knowledge is power, the gathering of information is not the exercise of authority. It seams, therefore, perfectly proper for a manager to leap several levels down in search of answers, for a subordinate to leap across organization lines and occasionally over his boss's head, so long as decisions and orders travel by normal channels and care is taken to protect legitimate privacy. This vital question must be dealt with if real progress is to be made in Community-wide information processing. Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 ? CIA-RDP80B0j1,39App05 DRAPT ; 050001-3 SECRET/HOPORN/CONTPOWD DISSEM Page 49 I. Manpower The Subpan l believes that there is a serious shortage of skilled manpower applicable to biographic prob- lems. The skills in short supply include both computer sys- tems specialists and biographic specialists. There appears to be a wide variation in competence and experience of these people in the installations visited, and the absence of poal- tive communication channels precludes a sufficient interchange of experience which could help upgrade weaker personnel. The Subpanel is impressed with the quality of ex- pertise found among senior biographic personnel. However, these specialists appear to be made, not born, and their skill Is the result of extensive on-the-Job experience. At the same time, this pool of talent is fragmented along the same lines 83 are the files. This strikes the Subpanel as an unwarranted division of a critical capability. To have experienced indexers review identical source materials in several agencies and yet have analysts be unable to have view of the total picture of an ,t17 -- individual strikes the Subpanel as a serious deficiency. We applaud th intent of Recommendation #8 of the Biographies Task Team Report which recommends in part, "A coordinated program should be developed using SDP methods to provide machine indexes of the bibliographic data processed by any organization in this field, so that the personality information is accessible to a recipient in machine form, with quick followup to the translated source." '4()__15D'i S Ik f ; - er-% Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDR8q13011 A 00500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80 W3A9Q O;00050001-3 DRAFT SECRET/NOFORN/C ONTROLLED DISSEM - ..111116.0. Page 50 tiailliarrairo----- Considering the strategic necessity of a pre- eminent capability in biographies, the Subpanel feels that more than good intentions are required. Therefore, it is r commended that a plan for develop- :a Ing a community-wid captbI?Ity with the highest professional standards of performance be submitted by 2 Jan 1967. This plan AAA-kJ:L.-A-3 must includesmiNWPAMOMmtfor upgrading the skills of individuals to a much higher average level and It must also include plans for Wit adding EDP expertise to the, important ap bility. Appendix 5 of this Report presents some specific suggestions which should have been included in the Biographic Task Teem Report. J. Communications Recommendation 4'2 of the Biographies Task Team Report says that each Agency should Study the feasibility of telecommunication links within the national agency check complex to facili- tate the exchange of requests and replies." In this connection, it should be noted that the extent of this problem and its security implications may have been exaggerated. The figures compiled by the Biographies Task Team reveal that an extraordinarily high percentage of requests addressed to bio- graphic files are returned with an indication that no record ), 4.) could be four 4. This fraction varies ffom ;0% for Civil Service Commission tiles to a low of 2% for DIA files. For positive f.,LE3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP8 1.11.19A00 500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 ? CIA-RDP8OB DRAFT SECRET/NOFORN/CONTROLLED DISSEM 0050001-3 Page 51 intelligence requests, three of the five agencies cited stated that 50%-of the responses were no hits. Since this response can be communicated by one bit (or none) of information, it strikes this that neither traffic density nor security plays a ci-Ltt A C major role role and that current time delays are o ndi There oug?ckirv,z is no evidence-eit ~ear 4 diversification and multiplicity of the files. This Subpanel believes that telecommunication links are obviously feasible and here is no need to study anything except the costs and configuration desired. This is routine engineering work and should be implemented within 6 months. K. An Approach to Security Problems We note with pleasure a tradition and an experiment which suggest that the security problem for biographic files may be tractable. The Biographic Task Team Report points out that "Information about individuals comes from a great diversity of sources, through a large number of channels, and has been stored in a variety of retrieval systems in diverse formats." wage 6, item 1) 4151)3-i3 V f the no-hit responses are due to the The Report then goes on to point out that "These have traditionally taken the form of index references, either self-contained or leading to dossier files or individual documents." Here, the tradition of the Community seems in complete accord with the needs of a readily accessible, mechanized or unmechanized, biographic file system. The CIA experience with Walnut and its associated systems reinforces this impression. The Walnut File contains at least two major types of biographic documents; one Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : 00500050001-3 f, sav,-cS Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B011-39A000500050001-3 DRAFT ) SECRET/NOFORN/CONTROLLED DISSEM Page 52 of the counterintelligence type, the other of the Russian biographic type - to which access is controlled by different compartments. There isfebilialOWejea unified index to these collections but security compartmentation is still maintained within the in- dex as a safeguard. The separation of index and dossier leads naturally into it strirtified retrieval technique which could S4-0n6, valffile fras2A7pof security' lesiose- he pace of mechaniza- tion. Index file volumes are considerably less than dossier file volumes and the one can be mechanized while the other is not. Together with the use of such techniques as LDX trans- mission, this may lead to reasonable solutions. The separation of index and dossier leads naturally to the concept of free search on the index with a filter at the out- put. This is, in fact, the way in which the Walnut File operates Anyone who is authorized to use this file has access to the index, but when a hit is made in the file, is authorized to see are returned to a control point and the requester is permission of the controller to have di only items which the requester ed to ha ye I in such a sensitive technique him - the others are sent to notified that he must seek access to the data if he is he fact that this kind of system can work area is most encouraging. The fact that this seems to be unique illustrates how slowly ideas travel, even on innocuous matters of technique. COINS is presently trying to grapple with some of the problems 1-k k %eas2T05A P of adding biographic files to s,-54 VWS101002000 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP8017 1411500050001-3 DRAFT Page 53 SECRET OPORN CO TROLLED DI SEM the system. It should be iraructiVe to study their selection. of files for the system and files that will not become part of the system. Except for large dossier-type files, there should be no particular bias except that of utility. Security should not present any serious barriers. The 4,mplication of the Walnut approach is quite serious. It suggests that in principle,the notion of free index search can be adopted throughout the community. The material in dossiers. may then be kept at any level of classification, subject to ap- propriate output filtering. The requester can be notified that material is immediately available; that there are more hits, but that he should consult the controller for permission to see these. The importance of this techniquat)without thific7 tooksOorso access to otherwise denied files is at best a passive matter. An analyst may send out a request for Information and may hit a very sensitive file. Those who control the file may, if they feel so inclined, take his request seriously, sanitize the material, and make it available to him. This is in principle the role that resident controllers in groups that keep sensitive files play in substantive production areas. Given the general SA.A_S climate in the community, however that the tendency to give no response in the face of great trouble mimed be very gre1a . A detailed analysis of how such reqlr ja handled is not available, but the Subpanel would be L1IkT to have this point refuted. Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B011 pt50 050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 DRAFT SECRET/NOFORN/CONTROLLED DISSEM Page 54 The value of positive information about hits is that INLA,4e" without a need for creating a central authority 4ith the dis- QA-0-k, advantages inherent in ), one could insure much greater pressure for a request to be filled. An analyst who knows that someone else holds material hat may be interesting / to him, and that he has the right to request access to such material unless positively denied by security rules, is likely iv.. to be far more alert and diligent digging out this information and exercising pressure via his superiors than if he is at t e, 141 1 IA', mercy of passive responses to a broadcast req est.& Sak,"34 -kx-7-41". -11-A kA---e-414a.Cru Ce....-.4,03,-r.AA..s -4--- citmz, kal.-0.4- (.1,,?:,t,---iy,....t. ,,,,,4a...,k 1_4) The Walnut File approach thus offer?otential ad- o.t.A.reuzeoi,442-- vantages both those who must maintain security of the file and to the user who needs access to all information which he is justified in having. L. File Conversion The enormous size of present iographic files create a major problm in aut*matioLvrsjofrom menial, partially manual, files to machine systems is hindered by the ktaa-,3 Vo-f. effort required serve that the has, Is interesting, in this connection, to ob pie of conversion of minimal usable files j-iAU 4? vAR--- Cer.e.re?- either consciously or unconsciously, been followed in some of the experimental situations we have seen. The example here is the Walnut/Russian biographies scheme where a name search system has been developed experimentally for application to the totality of a relatively small Russian biographies scheme. One of the Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RD 91 UW9'00500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 DRAFT SECRET/NOFORNiCONTROLLFD DISSEM Page 55 problems that must be considered in doing conversion is that of maintaining usable files at all times during the conversion process. Th,Oubpanel noticed that some installers have managed to convert their files or are in the prima while others are wringing their hands and pointing to the differences which osteneibly prevent them from starting a conversion e f t. by While it is/no means true that the totality of all files should be converted, it is nevertheless true that no fundamental technical problems prevent conversion. The Subpanel was also L?dirig that stiff directives from high 04- .--rt--tEek ? Silf4 SQ authority haetreat effect in ' upovercoming obs acles of all types%,-aDEQD3AeigaraF&Cpcars205ftle- 10REDMIllibp The implication Ona, 18 that the Community Is not tibN ) c.1-k Z 4 8 For instance, on re 13 of the CODIB Report on the 1 SC IPS Study, the following statement is quoted from the SCIPS 7 Report: nearly as helpless maa- "The most pressing problems of systems Integration or interface appear to be between components within agencies rather than between agencies." The CODIB comment concurs, but with a hedged statement: "This statement is probably true and deserves careful consideration. This is not to say that Information processing does not warrant community consideration to a considerably greater degree than it has had to date -- it does; but this find- ing reflects a logical first-things-first philosophy." Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP 0 500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/paiCIA-RDP80B01139A000500050001-3 SECRET/d0FORN/cONTROLLED DISSEM Page 56 LA-Q. Q.":70- Ste_ 4? clearly killing with kindness.44he biographies area A ic ak,44- 1 is by no more can be done within an agency than means clear-cut that across agency lines. ThOSSubpanel recommends tlasilise- this question However, IAA p9 ODIE ability to 4; reort,(4 71 i1Wiiel adown findings, and pull the teeth out of recommendations must be Sk.a, overcome during the course of Weft experiment. tIASubpanel recommends that file conversion to any interagency biographic file automation cost and effort required for file conversion will it will increase; the resulting strain on manpower resources willigtigher. Viims a major effort should be initiated experiments Qv? v42-t-,---LiAtx 402 studies be int experiment. The not decrease 1SORIND to convert manual biographic files on the community. The experience an helpful in other file conversion IP I a large scale in ata obtained will be very efforts outside of biographies. Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80W1-139A000500050001-3 1) ? 25X1A 25X1A Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A000500050001-3 DRAFT SECRET SECRETINOFORN/CONTROLLED DISSEM BIBLIOGRAPHY "Processing of Printed Intelligence Inform:titian" This paper was prepared for the ODDR&E during June 1961, by Mr. while he was serving a two-week tour of mili- tary duty with the Defense Department. (S&T Cont.No. 0553-b4) BOREL 1963: United States Intelligence Board, Committee on Documentation "Foreign Intelligence Objectives" CODIB-D-107/4, 16 September 1963, Paul Borel,Chairman (CODIB). Attachment: Excerpt from DCI Report on Intelligence Objectives (Sc 08732-63/1) (S&T Cont.No. 0229) BOREL ;965: Memorandum for Mr. William T. Knox on "Problem Areas of Possible Interest to Panel", 22 December 1965, and Attachment "Selected Problem Areas in the Intelligence Community", 22 December 1965, by Paul Borel, Ass't Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA. (S&T Cont.No. 1861) BOREL ;966: Memorandum for Mr. William T. Knox on CODIB Presenta- 25X1A tion to PFIAB/OST Joint Guidance and Evaluation Panel, 25 April 1966. (SW Cont.No. 0691) United States Intelligence Board, Committee on Docu- mentation -rrogress Report on Foreign Intelligence Objective No.)", CODIB-D-107/8, 9 March 1964,1 Secretary (CODIB) 25X1A Attachment: Memorandum for Deputy to DCl/National Intelligence Pro- grams Evaluation (6 March 1964) by Paul Borel, Chairman (CODIB) with attachment: (Proposed Text for) "Progress Report on United States Foreign Intelligence Objective No. 3: Automatic Data Processing" (S&T Cont.No. 0229) CLIFFORD: President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Clark M. Clifford, Chairman, Memoran um for t e Pres dent on U.S. Intelligence Community Capabi I les or the Handling of Intelligence Information, June 15, 1965 CODIB V: Report, T/V/R-10 dated 17 January 1966 of Task Team V (Biographies) of the Committee on Documentation of the United States Intelligence Board (CODIB) (S&T Cont.No. 0142)(Stamped "DRAFT") [Revise to latest version sent by Landau/Borel 6/66] ODIB : Report T/VI/A-1, dated 28 September 1965 of Task Team VI(Intelligence Data Handling Research and Development) of the Committee on Documentation of the United States Intelligence Board (CODIB) (S&T Cont. No. 1586) CGDIB 1961: CODIB Third Annual Report 30 June 1961 Serial No. CODIB-AR-3 CODTB-1962t_t CODIB Fourth Annual Report, 31 July 1962, Serial No. CODIB-AR-4 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A040Q5 000:. :1-3 ; Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80B01139A000500_050001-31 DRAFT SECRET/NOFORN/CONTROLLED DISSEM CODIB 1962b: Information Processing Programs in USIB Member Agencies (Appendix C of CODIB 1962a) CODIB 1963: CODIB Fifth Annual Report, 5 September 1963, Serial No. CODIB-AR-5 COD/B 1964: United States Intelligence Board Committee on Documentation "Stage 1 Report of the Staff for the Community Information Processing Study (SCIPS)" USIB-D-39.7/5 COBID-D-82/28, 26 February 1964 CODIB 1965a: CODIB Draft Task Team Quarterly Report for the period 1 July to 30 September 1965, Serial No. COD'S-D-112/5, 1 November 1965, Limited Distribution CODIB 1965b: CODIB Seventh Annual Report, 3 December 1965, Serial No. CODIB-AR-7 COD/B 1966: CODIB Draft Task Team Quarterly Report for the period 1 October to 31 December 1965. Serial No. COD'S-D-112/6, 18 January 1966, Limited Distribution KIWATRICK 1960: The Joint Study Group Report on Foreign Intel- ligence Activities of the United States Government, 15 December 1960, (TS Control No. 172800) (SW TS Cont.No. 598) =IPS 1,963: Staff for the Community Information Processing Study (SCIPS) Stage 1 Report Vol. II, Oct. 1963 (Sc No. 12481/b3, 15 January 1964) pp. 57-70 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP8OBOV14.900t39,. 50001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80ff01139 000500050001-3 DRAFT SECRUARZIVIMEIgLIMAt Appendix 1 Nature of the Biographies Prob1em Approved For Release 2002105/09 C DP80B01139A000500050001-3 - 3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80601139A000500050001-3 DRAFT S t- 3ECROJLCONThQLLED DISSEM Appendix 2 Request for Informs, on and CODIB Support Staff ReBporz3e Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP800011 bo 500050001-3 Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDIVRASIe4000500050001-3 SECRET/SOFORN/CONTROLLED DISSEM 0.tbint NATURE OF THE BIOORAPHICS PROBLEM' "The Intelligence Community has for many years collected an ever-increasing amount of information about individuals from e great diversity of sources through a large number of channels, and has stored the data in a variety of retrieval systems in diverse formats. These have traditionally taken the form of index references, either self-contained or leading to dossier files or individual documents. The Team decided, as a point of departure, that the relative pay-off in system improvement would be higher in respect to the larger biographic files in which there is a high degree of activity and interagency communication. Thus, many of the smaller files studied by SCIPS (the Staff for the Community Information Processing Study) were not included. "There are three types of major biographic indexes and files now In operation. They are the Positive Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security holdings. There is relatively little exchange of re- quests between the PI biographic files and the Security files, moder- ate exchange between the CI and PI communities and frequent exchange between Security and CI. The Counterintelligence (CI) biographic system centers around the foreign counterintelligence repository of CIA and the domestic counterintelligence holdings of the FBI. The Security and PI holdings of the agencies referred to in this report also lead to CI data in some degree. The interagency exchange of Security data centers around the name search type operations per- formed by CIA, State, Army, Navy, Air Force, FBI, Secret Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and Civil Service Com- mission (CSC). The major PI biographic records are contained in the files of the CIA Biographic and Special Registers, DIA, NSA/Office of Central Reference, Department of State and Air Force/Foreign Technology Division (FTD). "There are important and fundamental differences between, and some similarities in, the basic operating procedures and kinds of searches that are made in the PI systems versus the Cl/Security systems. The PI biographic :systems are deeply intertwined with, and in many cases actually part of, larger intelligence collection and storage systems which are mission, subject or area oriented. In contrast, the Cl/Security systems are clearly oriented to the heavy use of name searching among alphabetically ordered biographic Indexes which, in most cases, lead to dossier files. The Team determined that there is name searching and name finding going on in both the Positive as well as the Cl/Security activity. However, the bulk of the requests in both areas involve name searching (above 95% in the Cl/Security area and about 80 in the PI area)." *(CODIB1V, p.6, Par. 1,2,3) Approved For Release 2003/9,5nhellf-RDP801301139A000500050001-3