COMMENTS ON SELECTED ASPECTS OF(Sanitized) TRIP REPORT

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01439R000500090035-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 17, 2002
Sequence Number: 
35
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 11, 1969
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01439R000500090035-2.pdf102.81 KB
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Approved For Relase 2002/01130 ?'C1X- 00090035-2 11 February 1969 25X1A9A 25X1A9A FROM 25X1A SUBJECT : Comments on Selected Aspects o Trip Report 25X1A9A 1. Section 4. I'm not sure that the difficulties encountered by con- tractors in detaining data on the war should present us with any particular concern. Firstly, operations researchers always complain about not having enough data. Secondly, it would appear to me that this is the responsibility of the agency issuing the contracts and not a national intelligence problem. Thirdly, I am deeply suspect of people under forty who make broad comparisons between their current working conditions and those available to their profession during World War II. Fourthly, while there is a substantial element of truth in the accusation that the US lacks an integrated strategy in Vietnam, it is unlikely that any major change in this situation can be brought about from the bottom up. If our strategy is fragmented, it is because the problem is complex, not because of an abler ce of agonizing .eappraisal. 2. Section 5. No comment other than that I am not surprised. 3. Section 9. The problem stated here -- that of a reduction in the quality and quantity of pacification information since early 1968 -- is one in which I partially concur. The absence of reasonably independp:nt observations by State Department and other representatives in South Vietnam, however, has hit harder at OCI's operation than mine. Our main beef has been with the appalling tardiness of HES data and with the unexplained absence of any quantitative data on the APC. Our evaluations of the situation in Vietnam have periodically been plagued with military reporting that was wishful rather than accurate. For this reason I share -apprehension over MACCORDS tightening Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80B01 00500090035-2 I Approved For Release 2002/p1./3Q a 000500090035-2 NOW its grip on the information process. Nonetheless, I feel that to challenge this situation would require a thorough analysis of exactly what we want that we are not getting now. This was, as you recall, one of the featured objectives of the now-defunct Data Task Force. Frankly, I feel that unless we are willing to reassemble that type of political horsepower, our disappointments with the reporting procedures will fall upon deaf ears. 25X1A9A Approved For Release _ a 1439R000500090035-2 SERVDER WILL CHECK CLASSIF' TION TOP AND BOTTOM UNCLASSIFIED COivr'IDENTIAL SECRET OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP TO NAME AND ADDRESS [DATE INITIALS 1 Director/OCI z 2 - W O (~l lnnJ 3 4 JL 5 C2 Z- 7?~ - - 6 r ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION COMMENT FILE RETURN CONCURRENCE _ INFORMATION SIGNATURE Remarks : Drex-- I have read comments on paragrap on 't think this answers my question. I want your response to the following: 1. Is the necessary information available anywhere ? IR 2. Is the information really important FRO NNAME. AD R 11 j= ADDI 7E44 26 Feb UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET NO. 237 Use previous editions FO1-NM67 J I Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1439R000500090035-2 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1439R000500090035-2 25X1A ILLEGIB 25X1A