COMMENTS ON SELECTED ASPECTS OF(Sanitized) TRIP REPORT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01439R000500090035-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 17, 2002
Sequence Number:
35
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 11, 1969
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 102.81 KB |
Body:
Approved For Relase 2002/01130 ?'C1X- 00090035-2
11 February 1969
25X1A9A
25X1A9A FROM
25X1A
SUBJECT : Comments on Selected Aspects o
Trip Report
25X1A9A
1. Section 4. I'm not sure that the difficulties encountered by con-
tractors in detaining data on the war should present us with any particular
concern. Firstly, operations researchers always complain about not
having enough data. Secondly, it would appear to me that this is the
responsibility of the agency issuing the contracts and not a national
intelligence problem. Thirdly, I am deeply suspect of people under forty
who make broad comparisons between their current working conditions
and those available to their profession during World War II. Fourthly,
while there is a substantial element of truth in the accusation that the
US lacks an integrated strategy in Vietnam, it is unlikely that any major
change in this situation can be brought about from the bottom up. If
our strategy is fragmented, it is because the problem is complex, not
because of an abler ce of agonizing .eappraisal.
2. Section 5. No comment other than that I am not surprised.
3. Section 9. The problem stated here -- that of a reduction in the
quality and quantity of pacification information since early 1968 -- is
one in which I partially concur. The absence of reasonably independp:nt
observations by State Department and other representatives in South
Vietnam, however, has hit harder at OCI's operation than mine. Our
main beef has been with the appalling tardiness of HES data and with the
unexplained absence of any quantitative data on the APC.
Our evaluations of the situation in Vietnam have periodically been
plagued with military reporting that was wishful rather than accurate.
For this reason I share -apprehension over MACCORDS tightening
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80B01 00500090035-2
I
Approved For Release 2002/p1./3Q a 000500090035-2
NOW
its grip on the information process. Nonetheless, I feel that to challenge
this situation would require a thorough analysis of exactly what we want
that we are not getting now. This was, as you recall, one of the featured
objectives of the now-defunct Data Task Force. Frankly, I feel that
unless we are willing to reassemble that type of political horsepower,
our disappointments with the reporting procedures will fall upon deaf
ears. 25X1A9A
Approved For Release _ a 1439R000500090035-2
SERVDER WILL CHECK CLASSIF' TION TOP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED COivr'IDENTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
[DATE
INITIALS
1
Director/OCI
z
2
- W O (~l
lnnJ
3
4
JL
5
C2 Z- 7?~
-
-
6
r
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
_
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
Drex--
I have read comments on
paragrap on 't think this
answers my question. I want your response
to the following:
1. Is the necessary information
available anywhere ? IR
2. Is the information really important
FRO NNAME. AD R
11 j=
ADDI 7E44 26 Feb
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
NO. 237 Use previous editions
FO1-NM67 J I
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1439R000500090035-2
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1439R000500090035-2
25X1A
ILLEGIB
25X1A