RELATIONS WITH DIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01439R000500110027-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: June 4, 1969
• Content Type: MF

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4 June 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence
25X1 A9a ATTENTION
SUBJECT Relations with DIA
1. This memorandum is in response to the recent request of
the DDI for delineation of those major problems with DIA which
would be appropriate for discussion by the DDCI and, hopefully,
resolvable at his level with DIA.
2. For the past four years components of OER engaged in work
on the Vietnam War have worked very closely with their DIA counter-
parts. The wide variety of relations between the two agencies have
included exchanges between working level analysts, informal and
formal coordination of intelligence reports, participation in joint
working groups and the publication of joint intelligence reports.
The working relationship between the two agencies is better than
it was a few years ago and there has been marked progress in
developing more consensus and agreement on critical intelligence
problems. Nevertheless, the relationship has been an exceedingly
trying experience which has frequently impeded the intelligence
process, particularly on matters of national intelligence concern.
3. Our difficulties with DIA reflect both institutional
arrangements and management practices within DIA, and the basic
DIA philosophy about its relationship to the national intelligence
community on the one hand and to the field commanders and their
intelligence units on the other hand.
Institutional-Management Factors
4. Several facets of DIA organizational arrangements and
management practices have a disruptive effect on harmonious and
effective CIA-DIA relationships. Some of the more important of
these follow:
a. DIA has chosen to diffuse and to decentralize a
number of the intelligence functions associated with the
Vietnam War. At the same time, however, they have not
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set up procedures or machinery to coordinate or resolve
differences of view between the separate DIA units that
may be concerned with a particular aspect of the war.
Thus CIA may find that it cannot reach agreement with DIA
because two or more relatively autonomous DIA units are
in disagreement. Apparently such a disagreement can only
be resolved at the highest levels of DIA, levels to which
lesser ranking units are unable or reluctant to bring their
cases. As a result, the DIA position frequently becomes
such a watered-down compromise that it is not meaningful,
or the reaching of CIA-DIA agreement is impossible or must
be deferred for unacceptably long periods,of time.
b. Another obstacle to effective inter-agency relation-
ships results from a DIA unwillingness to authorize its
officers -- at almost every level -- to enter into official
inter-agency agreements on intelligence questions. It is
not uncommon after days of hammering out an "agreed"
position to find that the position accepted by the DIA
representative is completely unofficial and informal.
Moreover, the subsequent amendments to the DIA representa-
tive's position are so numerous and from so many different
levels of the organization that any supposed agreement is
rapidly undone.
The Philosophy Problem
5? This heading is a rubric for a basic DIA approach to the
intelligence function that is a constant irritant to effective
inter-agency relations and, more significantly, has a harmful
impact on the whole national intelligence function.
6. The problem arises from the conflicting pressure within
DIA on the one hand, to present the best possible input into
national intelligence and on the other hand to conform with and
to support the intelligence judgments of the military services and
field commanders. This dilemma has several untoward results. DIA
frequently feels compelled, for example, to espouse viewpoints of
field commanders with which it does not agree. Or, in seeking to
accommodate divergent views, DIA produces intelligence that
inadequately presents the views of either side. This situation
in one famous instance -- the enemy strength debate -- delayed for
over 15 months the production of highly significant national
intelligence.
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7. This entire philosophical dilemma is pertinent to the
very basic issue of determining the fundamental purpose and
function of a national defense intelligence agency -- should it
be an independent and objective intelligence voice for the Depart-
ment of Defense or should it be a conveyance for the intelligence
views of field commanders?
25X1A
PAUL V. WALSH
Deputy Director
Economic Research
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