COMMENTS ON ABM: AN EVALUATION OF THE DECISION TO DEPLOY AN ANTIBALLISTIC MISSLE SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01439R000500170009-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2000
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: June 4, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT Comments on ABM: An Evaluation of the
Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic
Missile System
1. The Messrs. Chayes and Wiesner and their
publishers have done an impressive job of assembling
and producing this compilation of articles opposing
the proposed Safeguard ABM deployment in the relatively
short time available. A number of the chapters are
off-the-shelf items which had previously formed the
basis for magazine articles or Congressional hearing
testimony. However, the editors have come up with
a number of new pieces. Some of these, such as Adam
Yarmolinsky's chapter on "The Problem of Momentum"
in military procurement are more editorial than
analytical in content. On the whole, however, the
professional quality of the material appears quite
high.
2. The principal reference to intelligence and
"the threat" come in the opening chapter, "An Overview"
and in Carl Kaysen's following chapter, "Defense of
the Deterrent." Kaysen points out that Secretary Laird
has simply projected the current estimate of Soviet
SS-9 deployment at a high rate, with the implicit
assumption that they will carry highly accurate MIRVs,
in order to reach his conclusion that the Soviets
will have a first strike capability in the mid-1970s.
He correctly states that no new or greatly revised
intelligence estimates were involved. He also dis-
counts Secretary Laird's reference to a possible
increase in Soviet ASW capability against the Polaris
submarine in the 1970s on the sufficient grounds of
Laird's lack of evidence and argumentation."
3. Statements about Soviet offensive and de-
fensive forces appear to be consistent with national
estimates, although only open sources, if any, are
cited. For example, the force levels given for Soviet
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strategic offensive systems on page 33 appear roughly
correct for that time (presumably early spring 1969),
and the statements about the SA-5 (Tallinn) system
and the Moscow ABM deployment on pages 37, 38, 51,
and 56 are in line with current estimates.
4. The chapter "Can the Communists Deceive Us"
by Jeremy J. Stone offers an interesting and on the
whole correct analysis of US unilateral capability
to monitor Soviet weapons, stressing its potential
use in verifying arms control agreements. The entire
chapter is based on open sources which the author 25X1D
cites in footnotes. Although some of his sources
are inaccurate and most are prone to exaggeration to
improve their newsworthiness
The article is
also of interest as an indication of what the Soviets
should be concluding about US capabilities on the
basis of their scrutiny of "Aviation Week", "US News
and World Report", and other standard sources.
5. The major problem areas in development and
deployment of ABM defenses defined by the authors
correspond to those which have been brought to our
attention by US ABM contractors. In particular, the
difficulty of designing and programing the computer
programs or software for an ABM system is properly
emphasized on pages 15, 16, 58, 125, 128, and 129.
The related problem of achieving high reliability in
large, complex systems also receives deserved attention,
as on pages 114, 118, and 119.
6. Costs of Safeguard components given on page
9 are near those we have received from the Safeguard
System Office. They appear to be correctly used in
the analysis of system costs.
7. The cumulative costs of ABM research and
development in the US since 1957 were stated to be
about $4 billion by Senator Kennedy on page XX. We
have been given this figure in the past by the De-
partment of Defense and believe it to be the best
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available. On page 3 the authors estimate $10 billion
for total US expenditures on ABM research and develop-
ment since 1954. No documentation for this figure
is offered. Differing criteria for allocation of costs
to ABM R&D may account for the higher figure, but we
think it is much too high to represent costs properly
attributable to the US ABM R&D program.
8. We have not attempted to check out the war
gaming calculations, which probably vary in some of
their assumptions and conclusions from those used by
the DoD in its assessment of the potential threat to
Minuteman.
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