CIA MEMORANDUM 'SOVIET MILITARY RESISTANCE TO STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS INCREASES'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01439R000500170011-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 28, 2000
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 16, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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May 16, 1969
CIA Memorandum "Soviet Military Resistance to Strategic
Arms Talks Increases"
We have reviewed this study and much of the material on which
it is based, and we have major problems with it as a piece of
analysis. Because of the importance of the subject, and the fact
that US tactics on the SALT issue are presently in the formative
stage, I am circulating this RSE Memorandum, which takes issue with
the judgments and methodology of the CIA paper.
The hypothesis that the military have opposed Soviot disarm-
ament policy has often been suggested -- sometimes by Soviet
sources -- in the past. Moreover, we would be inclined to believe
that by and large the Soviet military (and perhaps many civilian
officials too) would tend to be suspicious about disarmament talks
(although, contrariwise, one can adduce a desire for more funds to
improve general purpose forces as a possible motive for some non-
missile generals to want limitation of strategic armaments). But
what is at issue here is the question of whether the degree of
military opposition at any given point in time -- and above all;
just now -- can be documented precisely enough to provide a sound
basis for US decision makers to adjust policy and tactics on SALT
questions.
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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In contradistinction to the CIA view, we believe that there is
no persuasive evidence to support the CIA hypothesis that an anti-
SALT campaign by the top Soviet military leadership has reached a
new peek of intensity. About two-thirds (almost 8 of 12 pages) of the
Memorandum endeavors to prove the military's opposition to strategic
arms control by arguing that military spokesmen have revived the dis-
carded (by Khrushchev in 1956) Leninist-Stalinist thesis that war
with the West is inevitable. That this is the military contention
is stated categorically several times, without any reservation, in
both tho sunmary and text of the remorandum.
However, this is sinply not the case. The Memorandum itself
does not prove this point, and the texts of the cited materials
available to us indicate the contrary. Indeed, the military seem
very much to be following the same general line on these matters
that the civilian chiefs have followed for years, and, as our coLments
note, there has recently been a very strong and authoritative reitera-
tion of the primacy of the Party over the military. The Memorandum's
shortcomings on doctrinal issues stem, in our opinion, from misin-
terpretation of the source materials and from confusion as to what
the Party line has been on the issues in question.
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The Partztilne. First of all, the Party line on non-inevitability
of war as embodied in the statesents of Soviet leaders and, rost
importantly, in official Party documents has remained fairly constant
since Khrushchev first enunciated it and obtained its acceptance 5n
Party documents at the 20th Party Congress in 1956. Khrushchev told
the Congress that as is known, there is a Varxist-Leninist proposi-
tion that while imperialism exists wars are inevitable." However,
ho noted that world conditions had changed, especially the increased
strength of the communist world, and concluded that; "In these con-
ditions, of course, the Leninist proposition remains in force that
since imperialism exists the economic basis for the outbreak of wars
is also maintained. That is why we must observe the greatest vigi-
lance. thile capitalism remains on the earth the reactionary forces
representing the interests of capitalist monopolies, will continuo in
the future to attempt rdlitary adventures and aggression and may try
to unleash mar. But there is no fatal inevitability of war. Now
there are powerful public and political forces, which possess serious
roans to prevent the unleashing of war by the imperialists, and if
they try to start wax to give a shattering rebuff to the aggressors,
to foil their adventurous plans."
The major themes subsequently developed have been: (1) world
war is not inevitable and can be prevented, but (2) it can happen,
and (3) no matter how ruinous the consequences, (4) the communist
side will win and capitalism will go. Thus, the resolution of the
21st Party Congress in 1959 asserted that: "The conclusion drawn
by the 20th Party Congress to the effect that there is no fatal
inevitability of war has proved to be perfectly justified....An
aggression of imperialist states against the socialist camp can have
just one outcome -- the fall of capitalism....However? at present the
possibility that the imperialists night start a war exists, and the
threat of war must not be underestimated." The Communist Party
"Program" adopted by that congress, and still accepted today including
by the military (sec below), asserted that the worldts peace-loving
forces "can pzemat a world war" (italics in the original), adding
the traditional caveat that "if the imperialist aggressors all the
same dare to unleash a new world war, the people will no longer
tolerate the system which hurls them into destructive mars. They
will sweep imperialism away and bury it." The post-Khrushchev 23rd
Party Congress, hold in March-April 1966, repeated almost verbatim
in its resolution Party leader Dreshnevts remarks to the effect that
"our Party is convinced of the correctness of the conclusion of the
international communist movement about the possibility of bridling
the aggressor, of preventing a new -world war."
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While the gloomy side of a nuclear war's consequences has been
played down by the post-Khrushchev regime (and we emphasize the Ingitul?
not just the military), the theme has not disappeared from view.
Speaking at the Party's 50th anniversary ceremoniee in November 19670
Party leader Brezhnev called for heightened vigilance toward imperial3st
provocations "since under modern conditions, a world war employing
nuclear missile weaponry could lead to the destruction of hundreds of
millions of people, to the destruction of entire countries, to the con-
tamination of the earth's surface and atmosphere."
We are unaware of the reiteration by any Soviet regime spokesman,
high or low, civilian or military, of the Leninist-Stalinist inevita-
bility-of-war thesis. Nor, with one exception, do we know of any
rejection of the thesis that should a world nuclear war break out the
communists would survive and win it, although this hard-line theme
for obvious reasons is not repeated on all occasions. The significant
exception was Premier Malenkov's statement on March 12, 1954, that in
modern conditions a world war "would mean the destruction of world
civilization." However, this statement and its implications were
almost immediately rebutted by both Khrushchev and by Ealenkov himself,
both of whom in speeches in April of that year reverted to the standard
line that a new uar would bring the "collapse of the whole capitaliet
system." After halenkovls disgrace and ouster in February 1955 Molotov
specifically attacked the Malenkov thesis (but not its author), asserting
that "not world civilization" but "imperialism" would be destroyed in a
new war.
The Memorandum's Interpretation. As is clear from even the fore-
going brief exegesis, communist doctrine on the war issue contains
both "hard" and "eoft" elements, which can be and are given different
emphasis according to the intention of the spokesman and the political
climate of the time, However, we find that the CIA Memorandum not
only errs in what it chooses to call the "Party line," but also playe
rather freely with quotations, choosing a "hard" one but ignoring a
"soft" one when present. A few examples:
One whole page (4-5) is devoted to a Bochkarev article, which is
alleged to introduce a new Party line and for this reason is cited as
"the first concrete evidence of military dissatisfaction with the
government proposal to enter strategic arms limitations talks with the
US." (p. 6) Bochkarov's new Party line is stated to be (p. 5) his
assertion that "if imperialism plunges mankind into nuclear war, it
iimperialisY will perish, but not 'both sides," The Memorandum's
deduction from this statement is: "Bochkarev's interpretation is
sharply divergent from the Party line, as set f9rth in fermi CPSU
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documents, that nuclear war would be mutually destructive." But
Bochkarev was actually quoting from the 21st Party Congress' Program
(sec above) on the outcome of a nuclear wars And neither it nor
other "formal CPSU documents" say that war would be "mutuelly
destructive."
Some Party statements still do refer to the awful consequences
of a nuclear war (see Brezhnev above), but not in such a way as to
deny the possibility of communist victory. And se did Mr. Bochkarevl
In the same sentence noted above (which was quoted only in part by
the CIA lere,morandum)" Bochkarev concluded the sentence following on
from "both sides" with the statement that "although even the socialist
countries would be confronted with tremendous suffering and sustain
huge losses." Finally, a word on the nature of the Bochkarev article:
it was polemicizing with a philosophical article which did violate the
Party line in both letter and spirit by asserting that a nuclear war
would mean "suicide for both sides." Bochkarev is thus firmly in step
with the political leadership, which has made concerted efforts to
eradicate the doctrinal meanderings of the Malenkov/Khrushchev era
that were considered debflitating to morale and a communist world
outlooks especially in the armed forces. But he can hardly be said
to provide the "first concrete evidence" of the Soviet rilitaryte
opposition to strategic arms control talks with the US.
Other MilitarComraes. Other misinterpretations of Soviet
military commentaries in the CIA Memorandum are not so flagrant, but
they are still, in our opinion, serious. For example, the Memorandum
works up to "Stage Three" of ellegod military opposition, asserted
to have taken place after renewal of the Soviet proposal for strategic
arms control talks to the Nixon administration. Here (pp. 7-8) the
Nemorandien asserts Defense Minister Grechko (and Bochkarev in another
article not available to us) revived the Leninist inevitability-of-war
thesis in his Koemunist article because he quoted Lenin to the effect
that socialiam's initial victories "must provoke" clashes between
imperialists and socialist states, and a communist war in defense of
sociensm would be a just war. Grechko was using this Leninist quote,
along with other historical material, to argue the need for a strong
defense posture on the occasion of Soviet Armed Forces Day. However,
in his discussion of contemporary conditions he implied that Soviet
military readiness and weaponry were in a satisfactory state. Furthsr-
more, at the end of the article he reiterated the non-inevitability-
of-war doctrine, asserting that the Warsaw Pactts present military/
economic might "is a powerful factor for restraining aggression, for
preventing a new world war."
Armed Forces political commissar- General Yepishev is also said
(14 8) to have "revived the 'inevitability" thesis" in an April 1969
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Kommunist article. Actually, Yepishev had nothing to say about the
subject beyond reiterating the communists' right to resist if the
imperialists "succeed" in unleash-ng a war. He even stopped short of
claiming an inevitable communist victory. The key message of his article
was on political indoctrination and Party control methods taken in the
armed forces to raise morale and discipline -- which is probably the
major objective of most of the military themes the CIA Memorandum
interprets as opposition to arms diplomacy.
We have the same sort of problems with the quotations, and interpre-
tations given theml in the other military commentaries cited.
Disarmament Issues in the Military...T=2. The effort in the Memo-
randum (i) to find evidence of resistance to the regime's policy on
disarmament in the military press is mostly materiel which OSE had pub-
lished earlier, and which we and others in the intelligence community
found unpersuasive. In general, Red Star does not devote as much space
to general political issues as, for example, Pravda or Isvestim, and
by and large absence of specific endorsements forstanding Soviet policy
lines on disarmament -- in the absence of the start of strategic arms
talks, there has not been much news to report -- does not really afford
evidence of military opposition to the talks, Rod Starts omissions from
a Cromyko speech were attributed to TASS, and as such were not necessarily
a military opinion. The alteration of the Mazurov speech was done in ell
of the Soviet press and, agnin, is not to be taken as an expression of a
military viewpoint. (The fact that the deleted passage was somewhat
acerbic in its suggestion that the Americans wore delaying matters seems
to indicate that the change was intended to have the opposite political
effect from the one suggested in the paper,)
Military Infiqhtiag. We have taken issue earlier with CIA/GSR on the
dispute they profess to sea in this section (pp. 9-11) between advocates
of strategic and conventional forces. We find the article by Bondarenko
cited in the paper (pp. 9-10) somewhat less polemical than the CIA paper
suggests. It does not advocate strategic weapons at the expense of con-
ventional forces, but rather points to the necessity of having the where-
withal for both types of warfare.
Differing interpretations aside, the representatives of various armed
forces branches -- such as former strategic rocket forces Marshal Moskelenko,
cited on p. 10 -- almost invariably speak up for their service interests,
The question is whether this natural pride of service reaches the stage of
a polemic. We feel that the material cited by the Memorandum does not offer
convincing proof of a polemic of any consequence in the armed forces on the
question of a balanced force structure -- an issue that has appeared pretty
well settled since Khrushchev's day, although it could come unstuck and
particularly at the present time.
Evan less does the material and analysis Offered by the Memorandum
support its major conclusion (p. 11) that the Soviet military is now arguing
"against a comprehensive strategic arms limitation agreement with the US,"
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