PLANNING FY 1971-FY 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01439R000500170021-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2000
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: December 16, 1968
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Releasew2001/03/04 : SE P OB01439 Pl00500170021-8
16 December 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI Planning Officer
SUBJECT Planning FY 1971-FY 1975
1. This planning statement is in effect the
first to reflect the Directorate's experience in
having an Office of Strategic Research. Too little
time had elapsed between the creation of the Office
on 1 July 1967 and the preparation of the FY 1970-
FY 1974 Program Call a year ago to enable it to be
more than an extension, in new garb, of the plans
associated with the ORR and OCI components that
made up the new Office. We now have had almost a
year and a half to develop our capabilities as an
Office and to measure our resources against the
demands (present and prospective) upon them.
2. As I see it, the resources of the Office
of Strategic Research today are deficient in almost
every area of its responsibilities. That this is
so is not surprising. The 3fflee`4had to begin with
only those resources available within the Directorate
at the outset of FY 1968. The increases received
for FY 1969 and programmed for FY 1970 help but fall
considerably short of what, in my judgment, are the
levels required realistically to meet the needs of
si-
the Deputy Director . __.... _ for _ _._ Intelligence in his respof
bility for military intelligence p:oduction.
3. As Mr. Smith expected, the elevation of
the Directorate's activities in the military analyti-
25X1C cal field to Office level has enhanced our ability
to work effectively throughout the US Government
It has at the
same time increased the number and kinds of demands
in this field levied upon ho Directorate.
TCS 3703/68
Copy
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :.CIA-RDP80BO1439R00050011OT
 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80BO1439R000500170021-8
25X1 B
3._L11Ll
4. Coincident with the establishment of the
Office has been the opening up of fields in military
intelligence analysis that a few years ago were
thought to be closed to new initiatives. This is
the result largely of two things:
The iiiipacas felt f it in the work on the grow .._
forces of the USSR. We are far from finished with
that sub.1 ect . Meantime, '
eantime ,? we are face with the need
to__appl,Xthis analyticalpoach to other subject
I
areas--Soviet naval _.? ..~ ._.,
and air forces, Chinese general
purpose forces,-the North Korean
ground
force--s-,--the
b. ound forces of Eastern Europe.
is
c axa.cter-L
istic of this kind of intelligence analysis that it
requires substantial personnel resources--both in
OSR and in IAS--and results come slowly.
5. Resources for the production of intelli-
bence, ?in the mi alitary field continue toM be 6adi
_ y
out of balance with the very large resources devoted
to collection and processing. At present, an
additional dollar or person) applied at the margin
brings a far greater return in the areas of pro-
duction than in the areas of collection or processing.
In military and military-economic intelligence pro-
duction, despite impressive gains over the last
several years, we continue to work against a large
backlog of problems for which information exists
but on which production his been limited by the re-
sources available. I am particularly concerned about
this imbalance as I look ahead to the impressively
large collection programs which are on stream for
the early 1970's.
6. As a foreword to the OSR Program Plan, let
me in brief set out the planning considerations that
I have had in mind as we reviewed the development
of OSR through the next five years or so.
7. Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Countries.
Intelligence production, Both research and current,
in this area will continue to be the major claimant
_I_ 3703)
25X1 D
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80BO1439R000500170021-8
 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80BO1439R000500170021-8
low Q
on OSR resources. The work OSR. does in this area
has a demonstrably direct effect on planning with
respect to the size and shape of the budget of the
Department of Def;:nse. For example, OSR has been
the major Agency point of contact for the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) for
intelligence judgments on Soviet forces. Irre-,
spective of what changes may be made in the organ-
izational structure of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense and its staff elements, it is clear that e ,yt
OSR will continue to play a major role in generat-
ing the intelligence data used in quantitative and
qualitative analysis at the OSD level.
S. Since July 1968, a new element has entered
the intelligence picture. With a Soviet agreement
to enter actively into discussions on the "limitation
and subsequent reduction of means of delivering
strategic weapons," new demands are being placed
on OSR. A new stringency attaches to our analysis
on Soviet strategic arms--their present numbers,
our ability to forecast and detect change, our
judgments of what will be important to the Soviets
if negotiations become a reality. This is work
that cuts across the entire Office.
9. The success of OSR, working with IAS, in
its attack on the Soviet ground forces intelligence
problem has spawned a keen interest in DoD, particu-
larly in entities such as Systems Analysis, for the
same kind of careful, quantified assessment of other
Soviet forces and Chinese and North Korean forces
as well. This has in turn been re ecte in a
variety of studies relating to NATO policy and
other questions of US political--military policy.
The Central Intelligence Agency is looked to for
work on these subjects because of its freedom from
departmental policy pressures, as well as its
innovative approach in the application of new' V
intelligence techniques to old problems. As I
look ahead to FY 1975, 1 see little likelihood
of any decline in the role the Agency--and OSR--
is expected to play.
TCS 3703/68
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80BO1439R000500170021-8
 Approved For Release4O01/03/0 ,._Q 4tR P80B014391J0500170021-8
Q LL UA'
10. A vital part of OSR's overall intelli-
gence approach to the analysis of military forces
is its military-economics work. This work--which,
by agreement between the DCI and the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, is concentrated in CIA and performed
as a service of common concern--has of necessity
been almost entirely limited to Soviet forces.
Beginning in Fir 1969, we have started to apply
some resources to military-economics analysis of
Chinese and Eastern European forces. Over the
next five years or so, we must create a capability
in this area that is roughly equal to the capability
we now have on the USSR. This will require some
increase in personnel although we believe some
diversion of resources now on the Soviet problem
may be possible. l
11. China, North Korea, and North Vietnam.
As noted last year, our plans cal for creating in
FY 1971 a China Division out of the China Branch
in the Theater Forces Division. Good management,
as well as the nature of the intelligence problem,
will require this. The Branch already is so large
that we are considering dividing it into two branches
in FY 1970. The situation that has developed in
Korea over the last year means that we must step
up the work we are doing on North Korean forces.
We have begun to do this and, looking ahead, I
expect the China Division will require a NK-NVN
branch, probably from the time of its establishment.
12. As noted above, the military-economics
effort on China is a major new area in our planning.
I expect initially to have that work largely ac-
complished within the existing Programs Analysis
Division with close working relations with the
China Division.
13. So far as Chinese forces are concerned,
the major intelligence analytical problem in terms
of r sp rce t e conventional fo
policy planning for the Far East must beu based on
a far better understanding of Chinese capabilities
for employment of its ground, naval, and sir forces
than the lntellig ..,..c community can
TCS 3703/68
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 CIA-RDP80B01439R000500170021-8
 Approved For Relea 2001/03/04 : ~- ~60B0143 000500170021-8
today. At the same time, intelligence analysis
on whatever strategic nuclear forces the Chinese
finally deploy will be a priority obligation of
OSR. Our planning has foreseen this expansion
of of-fort on China and the Far East. I suggest,
however, that all the factors at work--policy
interests and pressures, availability of sources
and information, and analytical capabilities--
mean we should be advancing timetables of the
past and building up our.resources on China faster
than previously planned.
14. OSR is including no projection for
intelligence analytical resources, current or
research, on the armed forces of North Vietnam.
This area was deliberately excluded from OSR when
.the Office was established, in order not to inter-
rupt arrangements then being applied to a current
critical problem. I expect, however, that in the
time covered by this planning period the responsi-
bility for those forces would move to OSR. 1 have
discussed this with the Director of Current Intelli-
gence and he agrees with this view.
15. Third World countries. OSR now devotes
a little more than five percent of its current
and research manpower to analysis of non-Communist
countries with advanced weapons capabilities or
potential. Given the other priorities, I foresee
little change in this level, at least in the early
years of this planning period. The pressures for
significant increase, if they come, probably will
occur toward the mid-1970's when more countries
have assimilated the technology associated with
advanced weapons and delivery systems.
16. Automation, the intelligence process,
and OSR. This planning paper deals more fully
than the last With the application of automated
techniques to OSR's responsibilities. I am con-
vinced that the future capability of the Intelli-
gence Directorate in the area for which OSR is
responsible is intimately bound up with what we--
and the Agency--are able to do in EDP.
17. Throughout the planning process, I have
assumed ha t ti + will pursue a vigorous 'o ram to
Approved For Release 2001 /03/04 c P80B01439RMO~C~'I 1-8
 Approved For Release?2001/03/04 : JArt_PP.?0B01439 100500170021-8
incur porai e at: iomatod e S into the total
analytical process. We must do this and we must
do it successfully if 0Sit is to have advanced
significantly in the military analytical field
by FY 1975. There are not enough personnel re-
sources available to the Intelligence Directorate
for OSRI to enable us to meet our objectives solely
through an increase in people.
V 18, Collection management. Although not
as visible as OSR's intelligence production, our
investment in time and people to guide the collection
of intelligence information is a major claimant
on OSR's resources. This will increase as new
systems become operational, for it is character-
istic of virtually all new technical collection
systems that their major output will be in those
subject areas directly a part of OSR's responsibility.
This means that over the planning period OSR will,
in addition to finding ways to automate its work
in collection management, require some increase in
the number of people assigned to this work.
/Production 19. Production assistance. OSR has one
Assistant who works with O CI CI as a part
of this Office's responsibility for current re-
porting in the military and military-related
scientific and technical fields. After a year
and a half, I am coming to the view that expansion
of the Production Assistant concept to the other
producing divisions of OSR is desirable, and for
many of the same reasons that led OCI to develop
this approach several years ago. The division
chiefs and their deputies are so involved in the
day-to-day matters of management, policy, and repre-
sentation, as well as substance, that their time
available for prompt and uninterrupted review of
material prepared for publication is greatly cir-
cumscribed. I plan to test this concept in FY 1970
and, if successful, propose its Office-wide appli-
cation in FY 1971.
20. OSR and IAS. I understand that OSR is
now responsi 1e for a out half of the departmental
.irect su ort re uirements against which l.. pro-
;;rams its work. We are a ready faced with a
Approved For Release 2001/03/0 ~qA-R,QP80BO1439R000500170021-8
 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA
situation where the expansion of OSR's work in
the application of the Soviet ground forces-
methodology to other Soviet forces and to other
countries is limited in part by the capabilities
of IAS. Mr. Stoortz and I have been examining
short-term solutions. It seems to me inevitable
that the advent of new photographic systems and
the pressures noted above to expand OSR's work
of this nature will, to be effective, require
increased capabilities in IAS.
21. in brief, OSR is the Directorate's
point of responsibility for a major area of ac-
tivity within the intelligence community and
within the US Government. This is an area of
:Increasing supply (in the form of future collec-
tion systems) and growing demand (for more data,
more advanced analysis, on a broader range of
subjects). OSR will best be prepared to meet its
responsibilities in this area over the next five
years with resource increases at the levels in-
dicated in the Anne
BRUCE C. CEA.RKE,
Director
Strategic Research
Attachment:
Annex
`.CS 3703/63
. 25X1A9a
SE
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80BO1439R000500170021-8
 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80BO1439 00500170021-8
The FY 1971 personnel requirements over those now
programmed for OSR in FY 1970 are for the following
purposes:
-Five professionals and one clerical to
effect the establishment of a 'China (cw Fir
East) Forces Division and to increase current
epsand res rcch"analysis on Chinese
and North Korean (and possibly North Vietnamese)
forces.
L
-Four professionals to increase OSR work on
military-economic analysis of Eastern European
and tMes-e'"'mi-fitar"Y forces.
-Four professionals to increase research
analysis on the air, naval, and ground_forces
of USSR and Eastern European countries.
-Three professionals to serve as prod ction
assistants in the review and preparation of
material in the research analysis divisions.
-One professional to help the OSR Planning
Staff in its growing responsibilities for the
development of OSR computer-assigned rogjZpLMs
and for guidance t"o ec pica and other collection
sources.
-One professional to help the Publicalian
Sta ,_.cope with increased intelligence production.
-Two clericals or intelligence assistants
to provide necessary clerical support and to
release analysts from detailed work of a clerical
nature.
..ems U-11-V T 25X1A
-.4
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RD 0500170021-8