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BRIEF FOR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01495R000100020003-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 1, 2005
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 8, 1970
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01495R000100020003-9.pdf117.82 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2005/12/24: CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100020003-9 TAB Approved For Release 2005/12/24: CIA-RDP80BO1495R000100020003-9 CIA-RDP80B01495R 00020003-9 Approved For Re ea. a 200~fj,2424 H th MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence SUBJECT Brief for Arms Control Negotiations with Communist China 1. On 22 July Philip Farley, Acting Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, passed to us a paper prepared in response to a Depart- ment of State request to examine arms control subjects the U.S. might discuss with the Chinese Communists at Warsaw, asking for Agency comments on the draft. The paper was discussed by representatives of the State Department, the Pentagon, the NSC, and the Agency on 9 September, and as a result of this discussion the paper is being redrafted in NSSM format with no change in substance. This redraft should satisfy certain presentational problems outlined in paragraph 2 below. USACDA desires formal comments from the Agency by 15 October. Our recommendations are set forth in para- graph 5 below. 2. We had no trouble with the paper. In general, we find it thoughtful, well reasoned and long overdue. There are, however, certain improvements which can be made in terms of presentation. USACDA has set forth a number of approaches to the arms control problem as it relates to the Chinese Communists in pell mell order; these various proposals are not really a "package" and need not. be dealt with as a seamless fabric. Moreover, the timing factor is likely to be an important one, and this problem is not dealt with in the paper as it now stands. _,3' Of course we cannot be certain how exactly the Chinese will react to any or all of these proposals. Much will depend on context--on how the talks develop, on what v a;: ,Y ny V 'Approved For Release 2005/12/2e~: t bpgwo 105 .01 } 0003-9 .k F Approved For Release 2005/1 2/24%% LiI RDP80B01495R 0(100020003-9 other subjects come under discussion and whether or not progress is made in dealing with them, and on how precisely the arms control issue is raised in the talks. These are at this point all imponderables, and it is therefore impossible to tell at this point if the Chi- nese will bite. It seems fairly certain, however, that they will be interested in most if not all of the pro- posals canvassed in this paper. TnTegree with Mr. Farley, acting director of USACDA, that the idea of mutual renun- ciation of force declaration is the most promising of the several proposals--with the proviso that it is presented in a bilateral, rather than a multilateral context. The idea of a Peking-Washington "hot line" might also be a one-shot, rather dramatic sweetener as an opening gambit. 4. We would tend to doubt that the idea of drawing Chinese scientists into a series of "private" arms con- trol discussions similar to the Pugwash meetings of the mid-1950's is likely to go far. We do not believe that ideas discussed in such a forum would "perculate up" in China today. In addition, it is unlikely that Chinese scientists would be allowed to discuss disarmament mat- ters with U.S. scientists unless a very high-level decision were made in Peking--and this in turn would depend on progress-in the official talks. This seems to us the forum in which US ideas on arms control should be raised. 5. Apart from these minor caveats, we find the paper useful and concur in its thrust and in its conclu- sions insofar as they relate to the Chinese view of the problem, to Peking's likely reactions, and to the past history of the subject in the Sino-US context. .4rL.--lar-ger -policy--matters"' of course, the- Agency can take--no-position. We recommend the Agency concur in 'the paper. Chief, China External Branch,'FE/OCI Recommendation contained.in paragraph 5 is APPROVED: Deputy Director for Intelligence Date 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/ /`~ A-RDP80B01495R000100020003-9