CHINA AND THE ABM QUESTIONS FOR THE MEETING OF JANUARY 29-31, 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000100020021-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: January 15, 1970
• Content Type: LIST

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GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
China and the ABM
January is, 1970
ues t:ions for the bfeetingr of. January 29.1 1970
1. The agreed, intelligence community judgment in
SNIE 1.3-69 is that the possession of nuclear weapons and
the means for their delivery is likely to' have a sobering
effect upon Chinese policy; and that China will probably be
.subjected to the same constraints and complications of policy
as the other nuclear powers.
A. Do you agree? If you do not agree,. could you
explain why you disagree?
B. Can China be deterred from attacking the U. S.
or its allies by the nuclear weapons which the U. S. now
possesses or which it will need in the future to deter a
Soviet attack?
G. How likely would be a Chinese fa rstr .strike
against the U. S. in the absence of an ABM defense?
2. SNIE 13-69 states that "for some time" China is
likely to value its nuclear -capability primarily as a great
power status symbol and for its political ;effects.
.As This estimate implies that China is not building
nuclear weapons systems with the intention 'of using them in a
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first strike, Do you.ggree?
B. Will China try to build a secure deterrent
capability?.
0. What are the "political effects" that SNIE 13-69
concludes China expects? Do they include' blackmail of Asian
neighbors, the U. S. or the USSR?
3. What strategic capabilities will China have by 1975?
By 1980?
4. How would you.expect Chinese strategic plans to.be
affected by a SALT agreement under which the U. S. and the USSR
deploy anti-China AEM systerns?
A. Would China assume that either the U.S. or the
USSR was keeping a first strike capability that increased the
danger to China's security?
B. How would you expect general Chinese policy toward
the U
S
t
'
.
,
o Q. affcc
Chinese ABM systems?
5. What level :of U.S.?casualties could be expected from
a Chinese first or second strike by 1975 (1980) assuming a
full U. S. Safeguard deployment and the Chinese nuclear capability
now projected by the' intelligence community?
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A. How soon would Safeguard need to be expanded to
keep U.S. fatalities from a Chinese first or second strike
at this level?
B. What effect upon the U.S. and Soviet assured
destruction capability vi,s~a-vis each other would such an
increase in ABM defense against China have?
C. Should, the U.S. seek to maintain a first strike
capability against-the Chinese? If s.o, for how long?
6. What..options would the Chinese have for circumventing
:Safeguard (e..g. unorthodox means of delivery, CBW, attacks on
Alaska, Hawaii, Tokyo) ? Would these be attractive to. them?
7. Does Soviet security from Chinese attack require an
anti-China ABM system now or in'the 1980's?
S. Would the ABM deployed by the USSR. in the event of a
SALT agreement permitting an'anti-China ABM be such as to
require the U.S. to deploy MIRV in order to' maintain an assured
destruction capability against the USSR?.
9. Now will Mao's death affect Chinese nuclear arms policy?
What are the chances for a revival of the Chinese-Soviet alliance?
10. How would our Far Eastern: allies, especially Japan,
react to deployment of an anti China ABM system by the U.S.
and the USSR?
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13 January 1970
QUESTIONS CONCERNING CHINA AND THE ABM
1. The agreed NIE judgment (March 1969) is that
the actual possession of nuclear weapons is likely to have a
sobering effect on Chinese policy, and that China will
probably be subjected to the same constraints and compli-
cations of policy as the other nuclear powers. Comment.
2. That.same NIE states that "for some time" China
is likely to value its nuclear capability primarily as a great-
power status symbol and for its political effects. Comment.
How long is "for some time?"
3. In what manner do US, Soviet, considerations
dictate Chinese strategic weapons planning?
4. Over the next decade, what mix of regional and
continental strategic weapons capabilities is Peking likely to
develop?
5. How important a factor will US ABM progress
be in China's policy consideration, over the next decade, as
compared with developments re US strategic weapons? The
same re ABM agreements reached by the US and the USSR?
6. How likely is Chinese nuclear blackmail --
vis-a-vis Asia, the US, the USSR -- and what forms,
specifically, are any such efforts likely to take?
7. What kind of strategic weapons capability are
the Chinese Communists likely to have by 1975? 1980?
8. What specific Chinese progress is likely in
penetration. aids by 1975? 1980?
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9. How important a US-Soviet problem will
result if the US expands its ABM system to meet growing
Chinese capabilities?
0. What steps are the Soviets taking re re-orienting
their ABM's against the Chinese? Their strategic missiles?
How firm are our data on these questions?
11. What will be the prospects for China's nuclear
behavior in a post-Mao situation?
12. Prospects for the Sino-Soviet relationship in a
post-Mao situation, and especially the possible effects upon
US defenses against strategic attack?,
13. How would Chinese conduct be affected in the
event that the Japanese should begin to develop a nuclear
capability?
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Remarks :
ACDA/GAC Questions on China and the ABM --
for GAC Meetings 29-31 January 1970.
Herewith a preview look at China-ABM
questions which Mr. Dean Rusk, McCloy's China
panelist, is asking DCI to give his views on.
Rusk's letter to DCI should arrive today. Note
that these China-ABM questions include a number
of items on which CIA may not wish to comment.
Note also that the attached list of questions con-
siderably re-words the (13 January) China-ABM
questions I suggested to ACDA/GAC (attached),
in response to its request
CC: C% .e , - l Ate*
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
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19Jan70
A
FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67 237
25X1