IKLE PROPOSAL TO THE DCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000100030015-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2005
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: June 4, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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SECRET
4 June 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Strategic Research
SUBJECT Ikle Proposal to the DCI
1. Dr. Proctor asked SEC to review and comment
on the proposal from Fred Ikie, Director of ACDA, and
specifically to suggest what response the DCI could make.
Following are my opinions on the subject.
2. The Ikle proposal is similar to many other
memoranda that have been directed to the DCI, DDI et
al. and contain suggestions about things we ought to
be doing to obtain better insights into Soviet strategic
policies and perceptions. His suggestions are rather
loosely formulated and not precise, but apparently
he believes we might better inform our understanding
of the Soviet weapons acquistion process by doing
case studies of particular decisions and otherwise
looking at rather narrowly focused questions and issues.
3. He includes an attachment which is a set of
broadly framed questions about the relative influence
of military and political considerations in Soviet force
planning and SALT policy; the low readiness of Soviet
strategic forces; the relationship between SALT
policy and detente objectives; etc. Alternative
answers are provided which illustrate that logically
consistent but quite different responses are
possible for the same question. Ikle also appends
some 20 additional questions which pretty well cover
the waterfront -- e.g., Is the Soviet SALT position
conditioned by the external political environment?
Why have the Soviets conducted so many fewer under-
ground nuclear tests than has the US?
4. Ikle's proposal is not unreasonable. The problem
is how to get the Ikles, Marshalls, Lodals, etc. to appre-
ciate the limitations of our resources. Their ability to
generate new questions (or the same questions over again)
seems unbounded. Last month, for example, A. W. Marshall
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suggested a wide ranging investigation of 25X1
practices, and this week he has asked for attention
to a large number of analytical and data gaps related to
conventional forces.
5. Perhaps what is most frustrating for the
analyst at the working level is the fact that he is
repeatedly ordered to provide a comprehensive treatment
of broad issues within a short deadline, while at the
same time he is asked to accomplish fundamental studies
of particular cases. A perfect example is the study
requested by the NSC through Howard Stoertz and due by
20 June. The concerns of Mr. Stoertz and the NSC are
essentially the same as those of Fred Ikle. The time
frame and research and analytical approach are dra-
matically different. Theoretically we should strike
a rational balance between the two kinds of activity.
In practice the ad hoc demands for fast responses
drive out the planned research effort.
6. At present SEC has all it can handle in the
strategic arena. The Stoertz memo will require an all
out crash effort over the next two weeks, and it is un-
likely that NSSM-191 support will end at that point.
We are also trying to complete the special study on
Soviet and Chinese reactions to US nuclear policy as
tasked by NSDM-242. The two analysts who have been
working off and on over the past 14 months on Andy
Marshall's Soviet perceptions project are trying to
complete this task to his satisfaction. One of these
men returns to active duty with the Airforce in July.
NIE 11-3/8 is now upon us. Finally we will be continually
tasked with short run SALT support. I see little
prospect that in the near term we could make a senior
analyst available for a sustained effort along the lines
suggested by Ikle, unless our responsibilities for par-
ticipation in SALT support, the NSSM process and NIE
production were substantially reduced.
Acting un-iel
SEC/OSR
Correspondence from Fred C. Ikle
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Hank raises a good point. The problem
we face here is in large measure the
problem we faced in how to get deep
political research out of the system.
The solution is probably the same --
insulate the military researchers. This
is not being done and as long as SEC is
in the midst of the policy-support business
it won't be.
Paul
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MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI 6by-
Ed:
This memo, I think, is a fair
description of the situation confronting
the Strategic Evaluation Center. I
simply must take steps to protect it
from being overwhelmed by diverse re-
quirements before it is adequately
staffed and organized.
I suggest that we respond by thank-
ing them for their questions and
suggestions which we shall use as con-
sumer guidance and background in doing
our work.
E. H. KNOCHE
0 ~ 4 June 1974
n ~.z.
I
BE 10-101
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