INTERAGENCY REASSESSMENT OF THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000300020036-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2007
• Sequence Number: 36
• Content Type: MF

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE. AGENCY
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NSA review completed
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT OF
THE NAVY
THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE,
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
SUBJECT: Interagency Reassessment of the Personnel Strength
of Soviet Armed Forces
Reference: DIA letter S-3227/DI-3A, dated 29 October 1974,
subject: Interagency Steering Group - Soviet
Military Personnel Strength (U)
1. Enclosed is an Executive Summary of the interagency reassess-
ment of the personnel strength of the Soviet armed forces. A
detailed assessment is scheduled for dissemination about mid-
May 1975. The Steering Group concurs in the Summary.
2. it is recommended that the Steering Group be redesignated as
an interagency Soviet Military Manpower Review Board. under DIA
chairmanship. The Standing Group is needed to continue research
and analysis in those areas of the reassessment reflecting un-
acceptable uncertainty.
3. Concurrence in this proposal or other pertinent comment is
requested by 25 April 1975. 25X1
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:xecutlve summary
(S) 1 Cy (CHAIRM1N) DIA
NSA
DIA Review
Completed.
UPON REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURE Air Force
Navy c
Army
THIS 1JUC:UMENT BECOMES 1/
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
SOVIET ARMED FORCES -1ANPOWER STRENGTH
REASSESSMENT (U)
1. BACKGROUND
a. Historically, assessments of Soviet military manpower
have been derived by a combination of methods. To estimate
the strength of combat forces, manning. factors were developed
for the various types of ground units, aircraft, ships, SSM and
SAM sites. These factors were then multipled by the numbers of
units or weapons systems in the order of battle. Similarly,
the strength of combat service support forces has been calcu-
lated largely on the basis of estimated manning factors and
order of battle. Personnel engaged in national level command
and general support activities, however, were not specified by
type of organizational unit for counting purposes. This portion
of the count was estimated by using a combination of the avail-
able intelligence on manning levels and, in some cases, per-
centage factors derived from the US experience in staffing
similar functions, such as command and control, research and
.development, and military medical care.
b. DIA, in 1974, initiated a reassessment of the national,
command and general support elements of Soviet armed forces.
The DIA assessment followed the format of previous Defense
Intelligence Projections for Planning (DIPP) in that it pro-
vided personnel. strengths for the following functional
categories: Ministry of Defense and Force Headquarters;
Research and Development; Training; Intelligence; Military
Assistance and Service Support. Since the Soviet Ministry
of Defense is not organized according to these categories,
this approach risked possible omissions and double counting.
However, the DIA study served as a catalyst, stimulating
interest in obtaining a more accurate manpower assessment both
inside and outside the Intelligence Community. The reassess-
ment presented here is a direct result of DIA Appraisal of
24 August 1974.
c. An interagency study of Soviet personnel strength was
initiated in October. 1974 under the chairmanship of the Defense
Intelligence Agency. Its goal was to count all personnel,
military and civilian, falling under the purview of the
Ministry of Defense (MOD). Soviet security forces are not
subordinate operationally to the MOD in peacetime, but were
included because service in these components satisfies the
obligations of the Soviet Conscription Law of 1967, and be-
cause some units would probably come under MOD control in
wartime.
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d. Active participants in the interagency study included
DIA, CIA, NSA and the three military departments. Because DIA
and CIA maintain the most comprehensive data bases; the main
burden of the reassessment was assumed by these agencies. NSA,
however, contributed significant and indispensable data on
signal and SIGINT personnel. An NSA study also provided the
basic description of the organizations and staffs at the higher
levels of the Soviet MOD. Department of the Air Force developed
an assessment of Civil Defense personnel. The United States
Army Medical Intelligence and Information Agency (MIIA) made
what was perhaps the first serious attempt at a comprehensive
count of Soviet military medical personnel. Within the Steering
Group, all agencies participated in refinement of the final
products.
2. ANALYTICAL APPROACH
a. From the outset, all agencies recognized that the evi-
dential base for the reassessment was poor. In addition to
SIGINT, defectors and recent emigres from the USSR have provided
some data on manning levels, but the general fund of hard infor-
mation is still inadequate. Consequently, reliance on order of
battle manning factors as a primary analytical base, whatever its
shortcomings, continued to constitute the best starting point.
It was believed, however, that existing uncertainties in the
manpower estimates could be reduced by exploitation of new data
.and.the application of improved methodologies where possible.
b. The basic approach required development of a detailed
breakdown of the known organizational entities comprising Soviet
armed forces as a means of minimizing omissions and double
counting. The comprehensive organizational unit breakdown not
only provided a framework for order of battle holdings but also
an improved yardstick for measuring the reasonableness of the
strength assessment of staff and service elements. This approach,
of course, has its own limitations. Our knowledge of higher
level staffs is very general both as to function and as to
strength. Nevertheless, we believe that by using the Soviet
organizational scheme a more complete assessment of Soviet MOD
strength has been achieved.
c. The index of organizations for inclusion in the count-
comprises.
(1) Ministry of Defense joint agencies, e.g., the
General Staff, the Main Cadres Directorate, thhMain Finance
Directorate, etc..
(2) Force component agencies under the Ministry of
Defense, e.g., ground force headquarters, air force headquarters,
etc..
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(3?) Field elements subordinate to Ministry of Defense
joint agencies, e.g., Military Commissariats, field agencies of
the Main Intelligence Directorate, etc..
(4) Major field organizations of the individual force com-
ponents, e.g., military districts, air defense districts, fleets,
groups of forces, and their subordinate elements.
3. METHODOLOGY
a. No single universal procedure could be employed for all
of. the organizational entities. The methods employed for two
major force components and one major staff element (that of the
Main Intelligence Directorate) are outlined in succeeding para-
graphs for illustrative purposes. The methodologies for. all
subelements in the assessment will be provided when the full
assessment is published.
b. Assessments of ground divisions are largely developed
on the basis of estimated tables of organizations and equipment
(TOE) and a categorization system which fits all existing
divisions into one of three levels of manning, the levels con-
stituting a fixed percentage of authorized (TOE) personnel.
Aggregates are produced by multiplying numbers of divisions
within each category. This counting procedure has an underlying
logic and is the best option in the absence of direct evidence.
The potential for inaccuracy, however, is clear. TOEs are
estimates. More than one TOE for each type division may exist.
Divisions may not necessarily fall within three categories
only. Many components of existing divisions remain unidentified
and unlocated.
c. The naval count is also, in large measure, keyed to a
necessary but imprecise methodology. Standard manning factors
are assigned to ship classes. The manning factors are based
on direct but incomplete and sometimes contradictory evidence.
Moreover, all ships within a class a.-e assumed to be manned at
the same level. Again, however, there is no substitute for
the method in the absence of definitv.ve data.
d. Because existing evidence was totally inadequate,
assessment of personnel performing in a military intelligence
role (GRU) was based, to a considerable degree, on comparison
with the United States military intelligence population.
4. CONFIDENCE FACTOR
Each methodology used is designed to overcome data
gaps but, as indicated above, none does so perfectly. In
addition, there is the possibility that some organizations
have been omitted and others included that no longer exist.
The resultant estimate, therefore, must be considered a gross
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estimate of Soviet manpower.. To gauge the degree of uncertainty
in each element of the estimate, each joint agency task group
charged with. assessing the manpower of a given Soviet MOD element
was charged also with providing a statement of their confidence
in that estimate. These judgments will be furnished when the
details of the estimate are published. For the total assessment,
the Joint Steering Group believes there is a 90 percent probability
the true total lies within "+15 or -15 percent of the estimated
number.
5. MANPOWER TOTALS
The results of the reassessment of military and civilian
manpower strengths of the Soviet. armed forces are summarized
in the table on the page following. Total manpower strength.of
the Soviet armed forces including security forces on
1 February 1975 is estimated at 5,475,000, comprising 727,000
civilian and 4,748,000 military personnel. These totals compare
with previous DIA-CIA figures for mid-1974 as follows: total
.manpower -- 5.2 million; civilian personnel -- 1.2 million;
military personnel -- 4.0 million.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that the Steering Group be redesignated
as an interagency Soviet Military Manpower Review Board under
DIA chairmanship in order to direct continuing research and
analysis in those areas of the reassessment reflecting un-
acceptable uncertainty. It is probable that additional analysis
and data collection can improve the soft portions of the re-
assessment and thereby increase overall certainty.. A continuing
effort is warranted by the strength issue and can be best
.accomplished while the reassessment machinery is intact.
4,
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7.
INTERAGENCY ASSESSMENT
CIVILIAN
MILITARY
-- MOD/GS/MPD, et al
- Components 3/
261,000
785,000
--- Ground Forces
162,000
1,809,599
-- Air Forces
113,000
499,000
--- National Air Defense Forces
30,000
554,000
-- Strategic Rocket Forces
39,000
397
000
--- Naval Forces
106,000
,
369,000
(
450, 000)
(3,628,000)
- Security Forces
711,000
4,413,000
--- MVD Internal Troops
9,000
166,000
---- KGB (Border Guards,
4,000
152,000
Signal)
3,000
.16,000
16,000
334,000
TOTALS
-
727,000
4,747,000
1/ DOI is 28 February 1975.
2/ May vary considerably from actual strength because of omissions,
manning data deficiencies and the use of analogous manning data
for counterparts to US forces. .
3/ Figures do not include component contribution to MOD staffs
and directorates.
4/ The percentage of civilians appears low in comparison with
other components; this aspect will be subject to continuing
analysis.
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UNCLASSIFIED
U-1
EXECUTIVE SEC1tETARIAT
Routing Slip
TO:
ACTION
INFO
DATE.
. INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
3
S/MC
4
DDS&T
51
DDI
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DDA
7
DDO
8
D/DCI/IC
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9
D/DCI/NI
10
GC
11
LC
12
IG
13
? Compt
14
D/Pers
15
D/S
16
11, DTR
17
Asst/ DCI
18
AO/ DCI
19
20
21
22
SUSPENSE
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CONFI1 aTIAL I I SEcRET~
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