MEMORANDUM FOR: MESSRS. PROCTOR/WALSH(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000300060057-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 57
• Publication Date: February 11, 1974
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000300060057-4
MEMORANDUM FOR: Messrs.
Attached is Ambassador Durbrow's optimistic
view of the South Vietnamese situation and his
debunking of the "political prisoners" charge.
I will send copies to OCI, OER, and OPR.
25X1
FORM I AUGN 54 l01 WHICH REPLACES
MAY BE MUS10-101
ED.
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HIGHLIGHTS OF VISIT TO VIETNAM
1. The most striking impression one had was the firm cautious
optimism expressed by all Vietnamese we talked with that despite
the severe handicaps imposed on South Vietnam by the Jan. 27,
1973 Paris Cease-fire Agreements, they were determined to carry
on the struggle against a communist take over.
2. This firm determination was predicated on the assumption
that U.S. military and economic aid will continue at approxi-
mately the 1974 fiscal year level. Without that aid level
most Vietnamese felt they could not carry on the fight against
the increasingly strong North Vietnamese forces that continue
to move south over the new road system Hanoi's forces have
built. The enemy forces must be kept off balance with con-
tinued harrassing operations.
3. The military showed realistic appraisals of the job ahead,
a determination to be prepared for all contingencies by train-
ing, continued patrolling and planning. The officers we saw
expressed the opinion that now that the ARVN forces are on
their own, they are better troops than when U.S. forces were
fighting with them. The GVN does not expect a general offen-
sive, but strong local disrupting probes.
4. The general opinion of those dealing with the economy was
that with continued economic aid at F.Y. '74 levels, South
Vi~+~ ~~T2O051O8 11 ~5P> 4~5RIIIIb ~600i 4 about five
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years provided they had relative peace and no all-out disruptive
offensive to again throw things off balance. This optimistic
hope was also predicated on the assumption that sufficient
supplies of fertilizer would be available for the cultivation
of more "miracle" rice and on the assumption that the coming
off-shore oil explorations would be successful in finding oil
in fair quantities.
5. Corruption of course exists, all admitted it, but the
government is trying to curb it as much as possible through
fiscal reforms and tighter controls.
6. The general impression of the throngs in the city streets
and in the countryside is one of basic content. The land
reform system is much sounder than that put in effect by
President Diem, because the land is given outright to those
who have tilled the land and the government pays off the
former owner over a period of years using basically P.L. 480
aid funds for this purpose.
7. It is most noteworthy that despite cries of the "Thieu
dictatorship" he had distributed over 550,000 arms to the
Peoples Self-Defense Forces, the village militia at the grass
roots level, has distributed over 300,000 weapons, M-16's and
grenade launchers to the Regi,.ilal forces (a sort of Province
National Guard who are expected to defend their local province)
v 242.QQQ similar weapons to the Popular Forces
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(local forces assigned the duty to defend their local region).
Thus all told to forces, other than the regular national
military forces of well over one million men, Thieu has dis-
tributed over one million, arms to his "home town boys" to
defend themselves against the Hanoi invaders.
8. We found no firm evidence of excessive repressive politi-
cal actions. Of course there are some persons under arrest
who could be classified as "political prisoners" b ut.this is
quite normal in a country that has been infiltrated for years
by well-trained communist political agitators and other cadre.
Against this type of operation for a country still at war it
is essential that all suspects be at least picked up and ques-
tioned if not held longer if they can't give a good account of
themselves. Under the circumstances it is good preventive
medicine to develop, train, and use a central national police
force. South Vietnam is a very small country smaller than
most American states, all of whom have some kind of a state
police force, so it's logical and useful to have the same
thing in Vietnam. With the ease of infiltration of trained
communist operators who are identical in looks, dress, and
basic language with the whole population, it is essential for
survival to have a computerized central identification system,
wi,ich American liberals are attacking as proof. of Thieu's
"police state."
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9. The group visit to Con San Prison Island facility showed
fliu stories of dungeon solitary confinement holes in the
ground to be completely false.
10. A very thorough study conducted by the American Embassy
in Saigon using all the facilities at its command including
records of U.S. Police Advisors to the G.V.N. shows that it
would be physically impossible to have over 200,000 "political
prisoners" in South Vietnam. The Embassy estimates that even
with severe overcrowding the lock-up jails and prisons could
not Douse more than 40,000 civilian inmates of all kinds from
murderers to bandits, robbers to misdemeanor type offenses.
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Routing Slip V
ACTION
INFO.
ACTION
INFO.
1
DCI
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11
IG
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2
DDCI
12
D/PPB
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DDS&T
13
SAVA
DDI
14
ASST/DCI
5
DD
15
AO/ DCI
-
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6
DDiv~&S
16
EX/SEC
7
D/DCI/IC
17
8
D / N, ,-
18
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9
GC
19
10
LC
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DCI/[1
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