ARTICLES IN 'GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000400080033-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: January 1, 1969
• Content Type: BIO

25X1 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000400080033-7
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000400080033-7
 Government
Approved For R05NE-2658M 1YR 9 CIA-RDP80BO1495FW0400080033-7
Li
CIA
Internal Friction
Thins are not eoina.well within the
sour-ccs.ion o -i
Frict is common at various work
ing levels at the agency, and what has
evolved since the Nixon Administration
took over is a classic battle between the
"generalists" and the "experts."
Throughout its history, CIA has tried
to play honest broker, fending off the
sometimes biased use of intelligence by
the Pentagon and State Department. All
in all, it has been pretty successful.
Irlis is manX o their substantive iew.
Young
t'~h t ire more convent
w
fin. also.
Experts Not Allowed to Speak
Governe
logic demanded that the Tet Offensive
of 1968 was a military failure; North
Vietnamese logic, on the other hand,
viewed it as a success, and our sources
indicate that analysts at CIA said so.
First-rate intelligence requires first-
rate people, people who are unafraid of
questioning the conventional wisdom
and taking a stance. These are the
people who should be making the intel-
ligence judgments and not the senior
But, Government Executive sources
soon ost icy adhere to the concept
II,PMTrT man worth his salt can do any-
this is a bit pretentious of Kissinger.
He is not an expert in all areas of the
world, they claim.
staf wt oo in~prab ems within
.^.?+?,
not take a.- rea cal o. c tort to
eterrninc w o t i( reaI ` s t n
x,p rls,,AnA-t_he,,24 Lcy-
the view of nl?-r-s of r at
taut t1,ier are unable tp do anythi
out it themselves.
ing men to different management re-
tion, with little regard for the man's
preference or substantive skill.
Our sources, some of whom have
whit in ep cnowlebge and virtually un-
assailable judgment and proven records
of performance are simply out of the
i
Youn er st offers with ~ whom :over -
.....?
views of the managemen e sources ,.,. t vn,ced similar
revea uiai
a e v- e e an r 7IC -cam,; aint u ?? ave a i ere u-
e~ rw~aled t at
t ey came to A thinking of it as
pts
.
iree with the po -u a
vrnn1C c something different ... apart from the
',;_,,,A
'
"
carsery. They claiLt the
1 tL T A it
s
-Itis not they claim, the
so-called managers who would prefer to
make generalists out of first-rate analysts.
Staffers' Solution
}ra manse -n -n Off.
1
the age-old bureaucratic mechanism of bureaucratic world. But they confess
t e con erenc e tto muzz e the ex erts. that it'sias bad as anyone could imag-
By is process everyone remotely con- ine-a gigantic bureaucracy.
cerned with a problem has to agree to Unders ands ]vGovernmetit Exccu-
the final version of a study. tive cannot reveal its sources can
The theory is to bring in the best st? icysl...-JFgss sec
ideas from everyone. The fallacy in this yo_jj~ and old- m the C hey
however, lies in the fact that not every- are not simply cranks mos are dedi-
one is equally capable or perceptive. cated professionals.
Sources state that lately -wh~tti~71~' The primary purpose of intelligence
leave started out to be a puce of in their view is to provide the President
p, i tratine LSis ,> .a?K Ws- with sufficient information about a de-
on ~ c than no to velopment in foreign affairs which will
be - ish ma be it will" and permit the formulation of a position or
be ? t?~ e - policy in time to effectively cope with -
enc~e.Some of the recent studies the situation. In this type of situation,
repo have' covered every pos- intelligence which warns and assesses
sibility 10 men can think of without the seriousness of an event before it
saying just: what it is that could really happens is highly prized. Obviously.the
happen, staffers with whom Government Execu-
One of the reasons behind this dif- tive talked feel this is not happening
ference of views stems from professional these days.
approach. First-rate analysts have built Communication Needed
up an understanding of a problem
through years of close association with The re ort that the White House
nuances and fins y rear e e
rstand the
d
e
it. They un
background to the problem and, in
effect, are capable of thinking like the
enemy thinks.
In many cases this'RF5P6gqhFrA1r>
defies conventional American logic.
Vietnam is a good example, American
G ~gs@ Assistant Qr?d
Af f airs, flow ,.Only wa
e ~u gments. The CIA people reel r
who the naers
STAT
L
 Approved For Ruse I!8 : RDP80B01495FJW4.0008003
VIE POINT
Defense 'Intelligence: Calling Nixon .s Bluff
t ' faced with the 'same problem trying to assess the military
significance of the Tet offensive.
It is not inaccurate to say that each of the services Force or Army officer to accept such a response ty.
emphasized those aspects of intelligence which best suited Consider also that a tour at DIA for a military officer is
its interests and budgetary needs. We had a missile gap; we three, maybe four years. In a 20- to 30-year military career
t a
k hi
In a igence Agenc DIA if elected t this Perhaps the major source of the difficulties that plague
was an overstatement at best. nderlying his statement, DIA is the fact that it is totally a military organization.
however, was an apparent realization on either his part, or Consider what the prospects of going to DIA appear like to
one of his staff, of the actual conditions at the Pentagon's a career Army or Air Force officer. He knows that he will
intelligence component. be thrust into a position when, on occasion, his professional
Former Secretary of Defense McNamara, soon after judgment will vary markedly from his parent service. He
taking office in 1961, realized that he was faced with a will be expected to defend a position that could enrage the
problem of vested interests in intelligence reports crossing Chief of Staff of his parent service-and the men who do
his desk. At that time, DOD intelligence matters were such things get known pretty quickly in the service.
handled separately by the three services. Frankly, it seems too great a task to force a loyal Air
take a broader view and set aside the interests of the
had no missile gap.
To remedy the situation, McNamara created DIA, a joint
service national intelligence agency that conceivably would
What resulted was the imposition of another b their tour, not making waves and playing every situation by
Id in the fnrm of DIA which constantiv finhts the service ear. The result:_intelligenee to the least. common dei~Qn~ina
m to accep
. that is a very short period. Is it fair to as
responsibility that conceivably could damage his career?
These are the kinds of questions with which the career
military officers grapple during their tours at DIA. Well over
individual services. It didn't work, however, because each 90 percent of these men are human, with normal aspirations
service retained an intelligence staff which has slowly grown and career goals, and silently, individually and even
larger and larger. subconsciously they resign themselves to "sweating out"
ins te7gence staffs who tailor their intelligence to justify
their operations.
McNamara was on the right track and superficial changes
Some improvements were noted, but with interservice
tor.
" here is a way to solve the problem and Melvin Laird has
exhibited an interest in doing just that. He has asked his
occurred. The tune and flavor of the one daily report did Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration, Robert
change. He no longer got three versions of the same story. L. Frochlke, to take a hard look at DOD intelligence.
b'f
l
l
d
disagreement rampant on most crucial intelligence ques-
tions, the DIA never mustered sufficient courage to meet
these problems head-on. Instead_ a slow subtle deteriora
tion set in at DIA and the art of compromise reigned
su reme.
'ilie result over the years has been a product renowned
in intelligence circles as intelligence "to the least common
denominator."
Crucial questions are tackled in studies, but the studies,
long on detail, always manage to finesse past taking a
position. Judgments are softened or avoided altogether.
Ambiguity characterizes most reports filtering up to the -
Vietnam more than any other experience prove the
Secretary of Defense and his staff.
Air Force career officers on the DIA staff in
particular, at times, became almost paranoic when forced
to comment on the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the
U.S. bombing against North Vietnam. Army officers were
Mara a i or -finally or
e re mgs
or s
i
Unless this man falls prey to the co
he'll be given at DIA, he might recognize the definite
conflict of interest that torments the military officers there.
In case he does miss the subtle conflict, we suggest
Laird seriously consiger creating an Assistant ecretary of
Defense for Intelligence, staff the command levels of DIA
with career civilians who have far less vested interest in a
particular branch of service, create a separate J-2 organiza-
tion to staff the JCS intelligence needs and do away with or
restrict,the size of the service intelligence staffs.
Last month Frochlke was told by Laird to make changes
in the management of intelligence functions within Defense.
It seems to us that the responsibilities given to Froehlke
amount to little more than another Defense Department
study when an organizational shake-up is really needed.
These changes, which probably would be welcomed with
relief by individual military offers, could result in a Defense
intelligence organization that finally accepts its national
responsibilites and provides the Secretary of Defense with
meaningful, timely and realistic reports on which to base
policy.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000400080033-7
65
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000400080033-7
MEMORANDUM FOR:
This case has been turned over to
the IG by the Director.
17 October 1969
(DATE)
FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10.101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000400080033-7