LETTER TO HONORABLE JOHN C. STENNIS, CHAIRMAN FROM JAMES R. SCHLESINGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000500020018-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: May 2, 1973
• Content Type: LETTER

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DRAFT:LLM/2 May 73
Honorable John C. Stennis, Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your request of April 16, 1973, for;-our
recommendations'.on S. 1547, a bill "To establish a Joint Committee on
National Security. "
S. 1547 establishes a Joint Committee on National Security comprised
of 25 members to study: (a) whether foreign, domestic and military policies
of the United States are being appropriately integrated; (b) the recommen-
dations and activities of the National Security Council; and (c) Government
classification and declassification practices and to recommend new
procedures for the classification and declassification of material.
While this Agency is not specifically mentioned in S. 1547, the
activities of the National Security Council are within the purview of the
bill and include the direction of this Agency. Moreover, in the introductory
statement on the bill, it was pointed out that a continuing review of the
operations of the Central Intelligence Agency would be one of the functions
of the Joint Committee on National Security (119 Cong. Rec. , daily ed.
11 April 1973, 7082).
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-OW
A review of the operations of this Agency by the Joint Committee
would appear to overlap the oversight now being performed by several
committees in both Houses, including your Committee's Subcommittee on
Central Intelligence. We have every reason to believe that the Congress,
in effecting any such change in oversight, would be conscious of the need
to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Since S. 1547 deals principally with the activities of the National
Security Council, which is chaired by the President and whose statutory
membership includes the Secretaries of State and Defense, vs?d defer to
the views of the National Security Council for any further comments.
The Office of Management and Budget advises that there is no
01-
objection to the submission of this.rep rt from the standpoint of the
Administration's programs.
Sincerely,
James R. Schlesinger
Director
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 S 7082
(Mr. Ciluxcii) prohibiting the reengage-
ment of U.S. forces in land, sea or air
combat anywhere "in or over or from off
the shores" of the entire Indochina area.
Mr. President, we no longer can permit
the President's warmaking powers to go
unchecked and unchallenged. The legal
legerdemain that the administration of-
fers is an open challenge to the Congress
to assert our constitutional responsibility.
Accordingly, Mr. President, I send the
bill to the desk for appropriate reference,
and ask unanimous consent that the text
of the bill be printed in the RECORD at this
point.
There being no objection, the bill was
ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as
follows:
S. 1544
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That in order
to avoid further involvement of the United
States in armed hostilities in Cambodia, no
funds heretofor or hereafter appropriated
may be expended to finance the involvement
of any member of the armed forces of the
United States in armed hostilities in or over
Cambodia unless such expenditure has been
specifically authorized by legislation enacted
after the date of enactment of this Act.
By Mr. TOWER:
S. 1545. A bill to amend title 37, United
States Code, so as to extend From 1 to 3
years the period that a member of the
uniformed services has following retire-
ment to select his home for purposes of
travel and transportation allowances
under such title, and for other purposes.
Referred to the Committee on Armed
Services.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, in the last
Congress, I introduced a measure to cor-
rect what I felt to be an unfortunate
problem colmected with the armed serv-
ices. That bill, S. 1321, very simply would
have extended the time a member of the
uniformed services has following his re-
tirement to select his home for purposes
of travel and transportation allowances.
As you know, a serviceman is currently
allowed 1 year after the date of his re-
tirement in which to select his permanent
home site for purposes of PCS travel and
transportation allowances. But this un-
necessarily short time places a burden
on those parents with children in high
school. Many times the child must forgo
graduation from the school in which he
has spent his secondary years so that the
final move may be made, as is the serv-
iceman's right at Government expense.
There are, of course, other exceptional
instances which prevent full utilization
of this privilege, for example a serious
illness which precludes movement of the
patient.
No matter what the reason, however,
the 1-year limit is an arbitrarily short
one. Extension of the limit to 3-years will
solve most problems that could occur and
yet will not create additional costs to the
Government. I ask my colleagues to join
me in effecting rapid consideration and
passage of this legislation, which I intro-
duce today.
By Mr. HUMPHREY:
S. 1 A bill to establish a Joint
CM ii a on National Security. Re-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE April 11, 1973
ferred to the Committee on Armed position of its membership. It would have
Services, representation from those individual and
JOINT COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY committee jurisdictions that have pri-
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I am
introducing a bill today which would es-
tablish a permanent Joint Congressional
Committee on National Security.
I believe this committee will enable
Congress to address itself in a more com-
prehensive way than ever before to a
thorough and ongoing analysis and eval-
uation of our national security policies
and goals.
If the 93d Congress has one important
objective, it should be redressing the im-
balance between the executive and leg-
islative branches relating to both do-
mestic and foreign policy.
I propose that the committee have
these main functions:
First, to study and make recommenda-
lons-on_ all issues concerning national
security. This wor d include review of the
ris eslUeeht's report on the state of the
world, the defense budget and foreign as-
sistance programs as they relate to na-
tional security goals, and U.S. disarma-
ment policies as a part of our deense
considerations.
Second, to study and make recom-
mendations on Government practices of
classification and declassification of
documents.
Third, to conduct a continuing review
of the operations-of the Ce ralIntelli-
gence Agency, the Departments of
Defense and State,.aril other agencies
intimately involved with our foreign
policy.
For too many years, the Congress has
had inadequate information on matters
concerning national security. We in the
Congress have had to accept partial in-
formation, often in limited context, and
as a result have been unable to weigh
the total picture.
The consequence of this situation has
been a continuing dimunition in the for-
eign policy role of the Congress.
It is often difficult for Congress to
obtain adequate disclosure of Govern-
ment documents. On several important
occasions heads of the Defense and State
Departments and members of the Na-
tional Security Council, have claimed
executive privilege and have refused to
answer congressional inquiries on mat-
ters concerning our national security.
While the President and key Govern-
ment officials meet occasionally with the
leaders of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on an informal basis,
there is no forum for a regular and frank
exchange between the Congress and the
executive branches on the vital issues
affecting our national security. I am par-
ticularly sensitive to this missing link,
having had the special experience of
serving as a U.S. Senator for 17 years
and as Vice President for 4 years.
The Joint Committee on National Se-
curity would provide that link.
It would function in the national se-
curity field in a manner comparable to
the Joint Economic Committee, which
conducts a systematic review and anal-
ysis of the President's annual economic
report.
Its unique feature would be the com-
mary responsibility in military, foreign
relations, and congressional leadership.
It would include the President pro
tempore of the Senate; the Speaker of
the House; the majority and minority
leaders of both Houses, and the chair-
men and ranking minority members of
the Committees on Appropriations, For-
eign Relations, and Armed Services, and
the Joint-Committee on Atomic Energy-.
--It would not usurp the legislative or
investigative functions of any present
committees, but supplement and coordi-
nate their efforts in a more comprehen-
sive framework.
- -1 want to emphasize this last point.
The proposed Joint Committee on Na-
tional Security is not being created as a
competing force with the Armed Services
Committee or the Foreign Relations
Committee of which I am proud to once
again be a member. It will be a way to
coordinate the information which the
Congress so desperately needs to carry
out its oversight responsibilities of the
executive branch in the field of national
security.
Nor is it designed to usurp the Presi-
dent's historic role as Commander in
Chief, or to put the Congress in an ad-
versary relationship with the executive
branch.
It is, rather, a new body, to be com-
posed of members of both parties and
both Houses of Congress, that will make
possible closer consultation and coopera-
tion between the President and the Con-
gress.
In recent years, we have seen a gradual
isolation and insulation of power within
the executive branch. The Constitution,
I suggest, intended something quite dif-
ferent when it called for a separation of
powers.
We have not had the mechanism in
our national security apparatus for ade-
quate consultation between the two
branches in the formulation of national
security policy.
As one observer of the foreign policy
process observed:
National security Is too important to be
left to the national security apparatus.
I concur with this view. The President
and his national security advisers have a
duty and constitutional obligation to re-
linquish some part of the initiative which
they now command in the conduct of
American foreign policy.
There are reasons for the concentra-
tion of power which has developed with-
in the executive branch which are quite
understandable considering our experi-
ence in World War II and afterward. But,
times change, and so must our institu-
tions and responses.
In an article in Foreign Affairs, July
1959, I expressed my concern over this
development. I noted that the Congress
"with its power of the purse, and through
the right to investigate, to criticize, and
to advocate-does exert a significant in-
fluence on the quality and direction of
U.S. foreign policy."
I found that the Congress must have
its own vehicle for educating itself and
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 7083
expressing ideas on this question and
the more general issue of national secu-
rity.
I wrote:
Such independent expertise is absolutely
necessary if the house and Senate are to
fulfill their Constitutional responsibility of.
surveillance and initiative. Without com-
petent independent sources of fact and wis-
dom they cannot make discriminating judg-
ments between alternative programs and
proposals.
I, therefore, suggested:
The Congress prompt the executive to put
its house in order by itself creating a Joint
Committee on National Strategy, to include
the chairmen and ranking minority mem-
bers of the major committees of the House
and the Senate.
Such a coinitteem's purpose would be
to look at our total national strategy-
military, political, economic and ideo-
logical. This committee would not usurp
the functions of any of the present com-
mittees, but supplement them by en-
dowing their work with a ' larger frame
of reference. As I said in 1959:
The Chairmen of the Committees rep-.
resented would come away from the meeting
of the new Joint Committee with a greater
appreciation, for instance, of the relation-
ship between fiscal policy and national pro-
ductivity and how both factors relate to
our defense posture and our negotiating
position. Responsible statesmanship consists
precisely In the capacity to see complex
relationships in a perspective as broad as
the national purpose itself.
Mr. President, I made that proposal in
1959. Had it been adopted, perhaps the
history of the past 12 years might have
been different. I cannot help but believe
that if we had shared more fully in mo-
mentous decisions, like those in Viet-
nam, we would be less divided as a nation
by the bitterness and hatreds that con-
front us today.
But I submit, Mr. President, that now
is not the time for regrets. It is a time for
careful and responsible decision; it is a
time to adapt our institutions to change;
above all, it is a time to act.
It is not enough for the Congress to
insist upon its prerogatives if it is not
prepared to cope with its responsibilities,
The executive branch, recognizing the
deep interrelationships between issues of
foreign affairs, military policy, and some
crucial domestic issues prepared itself
to fulfill its responsibilities to the Con-
stitution by forming a National Security
Council.
It is fitting, therefore, that the Con-
gress adopt a similar, parallel and coun-
terpart mechanism: a Joint Congres-
sional Committee on National Security,
which could draw on the experience and
expertise of legislative leaders in vari-
ous national security areas.
Our existing congressional committees
lack coordination. The joint committee
would not, under my proposal, usurp any
of the functions of these committees of
the two Houses, but would address itself
to the broad-gaged issues that overlap
their jurisdictions and thereby assist the
congressional and executive decision-
making process.
Issues of defense, arms control, foreign
development and security assistance, na-
tional priorities, foreign policies, the de-
velopment of a global concept for our
national interests, and a simultaneous
evaluation of our security interests, clas-
sification and declassification proce-
dures-all these and many more issues
require coordination and a broad focus.
The joint committee I am proposing
would concentrate on these and other
topics. Let me summarize why I believe
such a committee is desirable:
First, it would provide for a total anal-
ysis and evaluation of national security
jointly by both Houses of Congress.
Second, it would permit closer consul-
tation and cooperation in national secu-
rity planning with the executive branch
than is now possible. This, I believe,
would help restore the intended balance
of power between the two branches and
strengthen the decisionmaking process.
Third, the committee will have the
power to review and simplify classifica-
tion procedures and to declassify docu-
ments whose contents should not be with-
held from the public. Thus, we can
achieve greater understanding, support,
and public participation in the establish-
ment of our objectives and policies.
The composition of the joint committee
can be summarized as the following:
The Joint Committee-
First. There will be 25 members with
fully bipartisan representation. The ma-
jority party will have three members
more than the minority party.
Second. The experienced authority of
the Congress would be fully represented
on the joint committee.
Third. Each House also would have the
opportunity to be represented by out-
standing members who are not chairmen
or elected leaders through the provision
for membership of two majority and one
minority member from each House.
For a more complete description of the
functions and composition of this com-
mittee, I ask, Mr. President, unanimous
consent that the bill to establish a Joint'
Committee on National Security be
printed at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the bill was
ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as
follows :
S. 154
Be it. enacted y e Senate and IIo,4se
of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the
Congress declares that- .
(1) it has been vested with responsibility
under the Constitution to assist In the for-
mulation of the foreign, domestic, and mili-
tary policies of the United States;
(2) such policies are directly related to the
security of the United States;
(3) the integration of such policies pro-
motes our national security; and
(4) the National Security Council was es-
tablished by the National Security Act of
1947 as a means of integrating such policies
and furthering the national security.
SEC. 2. (a) In order to enable the Congress
to more effectively carry out its constitu-
tional responsibility in the formulation of
foreign, domestic, and military policies of the
United States and In order to provide the
Congress with an improved means for formu-
lating legislation and providing for the inte-
gration of such policies which will further
promote the security of the United States, ,
there is established a joint committee of the
Congress which shall be known as the joint
Committee on National Security, hereafter
referred to as the "Joint committee". The
joint committee shall be composed of
twenty-five Members of Congress as follows:
(1) the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives;
(2) the majority and minority leaders of
the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives;
(3) the chairmen and ranking minority
members of the Senate Committee on Appro-
priations, the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, and the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy.
(4) the chairman and ranking minority
members of the House Appropriations Com-
mittee, the House Armed Services Commit-
tee, and the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee;
(5) three Members of the Senate appointed
by the President of the Senate, two of
whom shall be members of the majority party
and one of whom shall be a member of the-
minority party;
(6) three Members of the House of Rep-
resentatives appointed by the Speaker, two of
whom shall be members of the majority party
and one of whom shall be a member of the
minority party.
(b) The joint conunittee shall select a
chairman and a vice chairman from among
Its members.
(c) Vacancies in the membership of the
joint committee shall not affect the power
of the remaining members to execute the
functions of the joint committee and shall
be filled in the same manner as in the case
of the original appointment.
SEC. 3. (a) The joint committee shall have
the following functions:
(1) to make a continuing study of the
foreign, domestic, and military policies of
the United States with a view to determin-
ing whether and the extent to which such
policies are being appropriately integrated
in furtherance of the national security;
(2) to make a continuing study of the
recommendations and activities of the Na-
tional Security Council relating to such
policies, with particular emphasis upon re-
viewing the goals, strategies, and alternatives
of such foreign policy. considered by the
Council; and
(3) to make a continuing study of Gov-
ernment practices and recommendations
with respect to the classification and de-
classification of documents, and to recom-
mend certain procedures to be implemented
for the classification and declassification of
such material.
(b) The joint committee shall make re-
ports from time to time (but not less than
once each year) to the Senate and House of
Representatives with respect to its studies.
The reports shall contain such findings,
statements, and recommendations as the
joint committee considers appropriate.
SEC. 4. (a) The joint committee, or any
subcommittee thereof, is authorized, in its
discretion (1) to make expenditures, (2) to
employ personnel, (3) to adopt rules respect-
ing its organization and procedures, (4) to
hold hearings, (5) to sit and act at any time
or place, (6) to subpena witnesses and docu-
ments, (7) with the prior consent of the
agency concerned, to use on a reimbursable
basis the services of personnel, information,
and facilities of any such agency, (8) to pro-
cure printing and binding, (9) to procure
the temporary services (not in excess of one
year) or Intermittent services of individual
consultants, or organizations thereof, and to
provide assistance for the training of its
professional staff, in the same manner and
under the same conditions as a standing
committee of the Senate may procure such
services and provide such assistance under
subsections (i) and (j), respectively, of sec-
tion 202 of the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1948, and (10) to take depositions and
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S 7084 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
other testimony. No rule shall be adopted by
the joint committee under clause (3) pro-
viding that a finding, statement, recom-
mendation, or report may be made by other
than a majority of the members of the joint
committee then holding office.
(b) Subpenas may be issued over the sig-
nature of the chairman of the joint commit-
tee or by any member designated by him or
the joint committee, and may be served by
such person as may be designated by such
chairman or member. The chairman of the
joint committee or any member thereof may
administer oaths to witnesses. The provi-
sions of sections 102-104 of the Revised
Statutes (2 U.S.C. 192-194) shall apply in
the case of any failure of any witness to com-
ply with a subpena or to testify when sum-
moned under authority of this section.
(c) With the consent of any standing,
select, or special committee of the Senate or
House, or any subcommittee, the joint com-
mittee may utilize.the services of any staff
member of such House or Senate committee
or subcommittee whenever the chairman of
the joint committee determines that such
services are necessary and appropriate.
(d) The expenses of the joint committee,
shall be paid from the contingent fund of
the Senate from funds appropriated for the
joint committee, upon vouchers signed by
the chairman of the joint committee or by
any member of the joint committee au-
thorized by the chairman.
(e) Members of the joint committee, and
its personnel, experts, and consultants, while
traveling on official business for the joint
committee within or outside the United
States, may receive either the per diem al-
lowance authorized to be paid to Members
of the Congress or its employees, or their
actual and necessary expenses if an itemized
statement of such expenses is attached to
the voucher.
By Mr. PELL (for himself, Mr.
PASTORE, Mr. KENNEDY, and Mr.
BROOKE):
S. 1548, A bill to establish a Commis-
sion to review the proposed closing of
any military installation. Referred to the
Committee on Armed Services.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I am intro-
ducing today legislation to establish a
Commission to review and evaluate pro-
posals by the Department of Defense for
closing of military installations within
the United States.
Joining me in presenting this legisla-
tion are my distinguished senior col-
league from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORE),
and my distinguished colleagues from
Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY and Mr.
BROOKE).
I am presenting this legislation be-
cause of my deep concern over reports
of impending announcements of the
closing of military installations in Rhode
Island, the procedures that are followed
in making decisions on base closings,
and the immense impact that closing of
military installations can have on the
economic life of a region.
The legislation I have proposed would
establish a 17-member Commission, in-
cluding executive branch officials, Mem-
bers of Congress, and public representa-
tives, to review and evaluate proposals
by the Defense Department for the clos-
ing of military installations. The legis-
lation would require 180 days advance
notice of any proposed base closings to
the Commission. The Commission would,
within 90 days of receiving notice of a
proposed base closing, submit to the De-
fense Department and the Congress a
report including its findings and recom-
mendations.
The Commission's recommendations
would be based on a determination of
whether the base closings would be in
the best interest of national defense, the
Nation's economy, and military effi-
ciency.
Mr. President, this legislation is timely
and badly needed.
The Defense Department has con-
firmed that a major package of military
base closings will be announced before
the end of this month.
Because of reports that these impend-
ing base closings would affect installa-
tions in the State of Rhode Island, the
Rhode Island congressional delegation
has met twice with Secretary of Defense
Elliot Richardson. The second of these
meetings was held just yesterday in con-
junction with the congressional delega-
tion from Massachusetts in the office of
the majority leader of the House of Re-
presentatives THOMAS P. O'NEILL.
At that meeting, it was made clear
that the New England area would be
hard hit by the forthcoming base clos-
ings.
April 11, 1973
retary Richardson, the Members of the
Senate and the House presented cogent
and, I believe, persuasive arguments for
the continued operation of the military
installations in our States.
At the meeting yesterday, I presented
factual information, based on strategic
and cost-saving considerations, that I
believe argue very strongly for the con-
tinued operation of the Newport Naval
Base.
I ask unanimous consent that there be
printed' at this point in the RECORD two
charts, prepared at my request by the
General Accounting Office, which demon-
state very clearly the economic and
strategic advantage of maintaining New-
port as the home port of the Atlantic
Cruiser-Destroyer Force.
I think these are factors that should
be considered when vitally important
decisions are made about deployment of
forces and the closing of military in-
stallations.
Mr. President, these decisions are
much too important to be left entirely to
middle Ievel, faceless bureaucrats, op-
erating in the executive branch without
any opportunity for objective public
review.
The decisions are much too important
to economic operation of the Defense
Department, too important to the maxi-
mum strategic use of our military forces,
and much too important to thousands of
workers who have devoted years of their
lives to loyal and efficient service at
these installations, to permit arbitrary
decisions without review.
For example, the civilian workers at
the Naval Air Rework Facility at Quon-
set Point in Rhode Island have through
the years proven their efficiency by meet-
ing production quotas and consistently
achieved their work objectives with
fewer work hours than the targets estab-
lished by the Defense Department. I ask
unanimous consent that there be printed
at this point in the RECORD a table com-
paring the productivity of these workers
with other similar Government facilities,
prepared by my staff with the assistance
of the GAO.
There being no objection, the table was
ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as
follows:
ATTACHMENT 1
SUMMARY OF EXCESS COST PER ROUND TRIP OF STEAMING FROM SELECTED HOME PORTS TO SECLETED MISSION AREAS OVER NEWPORT (AT 16 KNOTS)
6th Fleet (Gibraltar) mission area - Norwegian Sea (Bergen, Norway) mission area
Type of ship
Per hour
Norfolk
(+26 hours)
Charleston
(+50 hours)
Mayport
(+76 hours)
Norfolk
(+32 hours)
Charleston
(+58 hours)
Mayport
(-1-82 hours)
CVS--1i(aircraftcafrier,ASW)....................... _______J
$2,070
$53,820
$120,060
$157,?320
$66, 240
$120, 060
$169, 740
CVA 42 (attack aircraft carrier)___________________________________
3,026
78,676
175,508
,
229,976
96,832
175,508
248,132
CV- 60 (attack aircraft carrier) r--------- __________________
3,243
84,318
188
094
246,468
103,776
188,094
265,926
CA (heavy cruisers) ---------------------------------------
159
4,134
9,222
12, 084
5, 088
9,222
13, 038
CG (guided missile cruiser)___________________________153 3,978
8,874
11,628
4:896
8, 874
12, 546
DLG (guided missile frigate) ------ _------------ __________------ 113 2,938 .
6,554
8,588 -
3,616
6,554
9,266
DDG (guided missile destroyer) ---------------------------- .::_._. 85 2,210
4,930
6,460
2 720
4,930
6,970
DD (FRAM I) destroyer___________________________________ _____ 61 1,586
3,538
4,636
1, 952
3, 538
5,002
DE (1052 class) escort ship .............................::j ::.a 53 1,378 ' -
3,074
4,028
1,696
3,074
4,346
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^ UNCLASSIFIED u E` aF ^ CONFIDENTIAL El SECRET
ROUTING ND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT; (Optional)
PROM: John M. Maury
NO. STAT
~
Legislative Counsel
GLC ~~ 9
6
---___--
7D43
DATE
3 May 1973
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
~' ' ' DDI
Attached is a proposed recom-
mendation to the Director on a bill
2.
by Senator Humphrey for a joint
congressional committee on.
national security. Also attached
3?
is an explanation of the bill.
You may be interested that
H
h
4.
ump
reys 1959 article in Foreign
Affairs, cited in support of the bill,
contains statements which some-
5. a
what undermine his proposition:
"... we in the U. S. might well give
more attention to the central virtue
6.
of the old diplomacy--the ability to
conduct confidential negotiations
7
confidentially. "; and "The role of
the Senate in dealing directly with
international problems is severely
B?
and properly limited by the Consti-
tution, which vests in the Execu-
ti
B
h
l
ve
ranc
exc
usive power to
9.
conduct foreign relations."
In effect, we are deferring to
10.
the policymakers on the two more
obvious defects of the bill: (1) it
would make Congress
riv
to the
p
y
most sensitive activities of the NSC
and the President's chief policy
12
advisers in direct conflict with the
prerogatives of the President; and
(2) it defeats the original purpose
13.
of the NSC if it forces the Presi-
dent to avoid use of the mechanism
i
d
~l'? T
t
i
n or
er
o ma
ntain the confid
14,
tiality of his initiatives and options
15.
C,V" i t n Liskgge or .e -.
 Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP80B01495R000500020018-9
Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP80BO1495R000500020018-9