CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE TO CURTAIL OF MODIFY CIA'S STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO PERFORM FUNCYTIONS DIRECTED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000500030022-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: August 28, 1973
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
2 8 AUG 19/3
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Xis singer
PROBLEM: Congressional Pressure to Curtail or Modify CIA's
Statutory Authority to Perform Functions Directed
by the National Security Council
1. BACKGROUND
A. Congressional Hearings. A strong effort to amend the Agency's
statutory charter is anticipated when Congress returns in September.
The Senate and House Armed Services Committees are both committed to
hearings--Stennis' announcement came in a letter to Senator Muskie opposing
the Eagleton amendment which would have included CIA covert action under
the War Powers bill. Nedzi announced hearings by his Special Subcommittee
on Intelligence in connection with the rejection 'of the Reuss amendment to the
Procurement Authorization bill which would have prohibited CIA obligation
or expenditure of funds authorized under that bill for other than collection,
evaluation, correlation and dissemination of information. Admittedly these
public announcements were reactive, but Symington, Nedzi and others have
independently expressed their interest in either confining the Agency to an
intelligence mission or in curtailing or modifying the Agency's authority to
conduct covert action.
B. Congressional History. In previous Congresses, proposals
seeking to clip the Agency's wings were defeated largely because of the
intercession of members of our oversight committees. New congressional
assertiveness, coupled with a sincere belief that the institution of central
intelligence may be seriously undermined by continued involvement in covert
action, has created an entirely new congressional climate even among our
supporters. For example, the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee
is drafting amendments to the CIA Act for Stennis as backfire to irresponsible
proposals and as a reflection of genuine feeling that the Agency has wandered--
or been led or driven by higher authority--too far off its statutory reservation.
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C. Legislative Proposals. Attached is a listing which catalogues
various legislative proposals concerning CIA which have been introduced
in the 93rd Congress. The principal concerns motivating these proposals
are:
1. Improper Involvement in Domestic Activities. Since
the inception of this Agency, a minority in the Congress has
been concerned with this bugaboo. Now it has achieved political
adherents among a broader spectrum of members as a result of
Watergate and allegations concerning CIA involvement in police
training.
2. Circumvention of the Will of Congress. This concern has
been growing over the past several years, and is reflected in legis-
lative restrictions relating to Southeast Asia which have been inserted
in both military procurement authorization and foreign assistance
authorization legislation. The apprehension, political or real, is that
CIA's secret budgetary and appropriation process has been, or may
be, used to carry out activities which Congress in its wisdom either
has prohibited or has not specifically authorized; e. g. , "CIA's secret
war in Laos" and support for the SGU's as "local forces. "
3. Instrumentality of Presidential Power. An increasing number
of members contend that one means of preventing Presidential "usurp-
tion" of the constitutional powers of the Congress is to restrict the
use of CIA as an instrumentality for unilateral executive action.
4. Open Budget. There is increasing congressional pressure to
disclose intelligence budget figures. One proposal would disclose the
total figure for the National Intelligence Program. Another would
disclose total figures of various departments and agencies, including
CIA, NSA, and the armed services. I am concerned that this trend
will lead to pressures for further public explanations of the programs
for which the monies were appropriated and that the resulting scrutiny
would be damaging to intelligence sources and methods. I have expressed
this concern and my views regarding this matter in a letter to Chairman
McClellan (attached).
II. COURSE OF ACTION
A. General. In examining options in' connection with this upcoming
legislative problem, uppermost in our minds is the desirability of quick,
decisive and hopefully relatively painless action. Our concern is that the
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mere opening up to amendments of our statutory charter is an invitation
to a host of irresponsible proposals. The situation could get out of hand,
the resulting fanfare could adversely affect our relations with other foreign
services and sources, and there will be pressure to expose past Agency
operations to add to the "horror stories of dirty tricks. "
1. Options. The options available to us include doing nothing,
hoping for the cooling of congressional' ardor and a possible adjourn-
ment of Congress early in October. There is also the unlikely
possibility that the oversight committees could be persuaded in
hearings that no change at all is needed in the law. Also, we could
hope to rely upon a Presidential veto if irresponsible legislation
results. However, in view of the situation on the Hill, the most
prudent course may involve providing our friends on the Hill with
amendments with which we could live and to urge quick, decisive
and painless action.
2. Proposal.
a. Domestic Activities. A simple amendment would
go a long way to eliminating any undue concern over the
Agency's possible improper involvement in domestic activity.
b. Covert Action. We can get substantially at the
heart of the expressed concern that CIA has been used to
circumvent the will of Congress either by writing a reporting
requirement into the 1947 Act or by establishing in legislative
history that our committees are given a full and complete
account of our activities.
B. Discussion (Domestic Activities).
While the statutory duties
of CIA specified "under the direction of the National Security Council"
relate solely to foreign intelligence activities, the word fo rei-n does not
appear in the law. Our proposal is simply to insert the word foreign as
a modifier of the intelligence activities it shall be the duty of the'Agency
to perform under the direction of the National Security Council. It is
believed that this simple amendment will assuage unfounded but stated
apprehensions.
Hopefully, this amendment will head off a move to strike from the
National Security Act a proviso in section 102(d)(3) "That the Director of
Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure. " This proviso was cited before
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various committees of Congress as a basis for legitimate CIA concern 25x1
over unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methodology
leading to cooperation with E. Howard Hunt's efforts to locate the source
of leaks andi --I
Also, Ambassador Helms recently exhorted Congress in his testimony on
Watergate to take a close look at the dilemma imposed by a statutory
charge which the Director has no authority to enforce. I believe we should
resist any change in this proviso as it has produced good case law. Instead,
I propose clarifying the responsibility under the proviso.
C. Discussion (Covert Action). Section 102(d)(5) of the National
Security Act specifies that the Agency shall perform "such other functions
and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the
National Security Council may from time to time direct. "
1. Statutory Language. Reasonable men could disagree on
whether this provision constitutes a legal basis for covert action
programs by CIA. The organizational predecessor of the Agency,
the Central Intelligence Group, which operated as an establishment
of the President under similar language,
in such activities. Accepting a limited definition of the phrasengage
"related to intelligence" forms a basis for arguing that the provision
contemplates only information activities. somewhat rebutted by the Encyclopedia BritaThis norml definition is
nnica which recognizes
that "At one time, intelligence referred largely to information on
foreign powers which was used in the formulation of military plans
and policies and the conduct of military operations. Both the meaning
and scope of intelligence, however, have been greatly extended by
national and international revolutionary resort of nations to political, economic and psychological ymthe increased
easures,
in addition to the employment of armed forces, in the pursuance of
foreign policy objectives. 11
2. . Constitutional Basis. In the attached 1962 memorandum by
the Department of Justice on the constitutional and legal basis for
covert activities by the Agency, it was recognized that many, all, covert activities assigned to CIA are at least "related" if not
intelligence within the scope of the law in the sense that their per-
formance may require intimate dovetailing with collection operations,
use the same or similar sources and methods and yield important
intelligence results. Even so, the Justice, memorandum justifying
f~ R"" rte. r, e,
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such activities leans more heavily on the exercise of constitutional
power of the President not needing an ex
zation, which is subsequently ratified bygthesCongress in appro-
priations for CIA (1'ratified" as a result of specific knowledge on
the part of responsible committee members and the im g
general knowledge to the Congress as a Potation of
whole),
3. on gres sional Role
covert actions raises a Any Participation of Congress in
constitutional
y when
conducted under the inherent power ofthesPrresidenticularl
the President in carrying out such initiatives should not be crly
n-
cerned with or distracted by possible congressional reaction to t
action contemplated, particularl
y he
dispatch, efficiency, and
secrecy are indispensable to success.
4. Practical Considerations.
oversight committees As a practical matter, our
presently review our budget in detail,
including funds programmed for covert action. Moreover, those
actions directed under the authority of the National Securit
and not programmed in the Agency's budget are gener y Council
ally e
of the Agency's reserve, Expenditures from the reserve, funder aut
a out
long-standing procedure, must be reported to our Appropriations
within 24 hours. To our knowledge there has never
been
breach of security resulting from our committees' knowledge of
our covert action programs. We are unaware of whether the Chair-
men of our committees have ever used this information as a basis
for contacting any Administration on the issues involved.
Most of the proposals designed to clip the Agency's covert action
wings consist of a flat-out prohibition,
reporting requirements to our committees on the basis thato therwise
no one in Congress is aware of
what is oin on. ise
Chairmen of our co g g Statements by the
e sometimes been co red b s that they do know what is going on have
instances seem to have little effect on considerations and in other
faction, stemming the tide of dissatis_
5. Proposal. In view of the way the system
experience to date, it is believed that a sta utor works and our
requiring that all activities not related to intelligen eeand directed
by the National Security Council be a
Congress would not be an undue burdenropriately reported to the
would provide a statutory basis for covert Such
second ent first,
would substantially the concern that Congress does not know what is
going on; third, would formalize in statute the procedures presently
followed,
5
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III. RECOMMENDATION
Attached are suggested amendments to the National Security Act of
1947 incorporating the thoughts expressed above. If the amendments meet
with approval, it is recommended that:
A. The Senate and House Armed Services Committees be
provided the amendments informally by the Agency as suggestions
with which we could live.
Approved: Disapproved:
B. The amendments be submitted formally to the Congress
as an Agency proposal subject to Office of Management and Budget
clearance prior to transmittal to the Congress.
Approved: Disapproved:
C. Other action you may suggest:
1s/ ie
W. E. Colby
6
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UNCLASSIFIED 44 aNLY [:1 CO...iDENTIAL El SECRET
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
EXTENSION
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Deputy Le is
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DATE
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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDI
Attached is a copy of
2
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Mr. Colby's memorandum of
28 August 1973 to Dr. Kissinger
3.
concerning our statutory authori-
ties. A copy of Dr. Kissinger,s
response is being forwarded to
4.
you the Director's office, STAT
5.
6.
Deputy Legislative Counsel
7
Att
cc: DDCI, DDO, DDM&S
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,
DDS&T, IC, IG, Mr. Thuerm
9.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
.Andy Marshall expressed interest in various
possible Congressional moves affecting CIA's
statutory authority. We had him out and dis-
cussed these in some depth. The attached is an
overall rundown of the situation and suggests a
way of reacting to it. I hope it will meet with
your approval. n
~l
E. Colby
28 August 1973
(DATE)
CvM n0. REPLACES FORM 10.101
A46 54 +Of WHICH MAY BE USfO.
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